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America: 1986

**Our Strength Restored,
the Peace Sustained**

**Five Years of Achievement:
A Fact Book of the Reagan Administration's Foreign and Defense Policies**
A publication of The Republican National Committee



America: 1986

Our Strength Restored, the Peace Sustained

Five Years of Achievement: A Fact Book of the Reagan Administration's Defense and Foreign Policies

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January 1986

After a decade of steady decline, the Reagan Administration pledged to restore our nation's "margin of safety," restore respect for the United States abroad, strengthen our alliances, promote democratic values and human rights, and assist the economic development of lesser-developed nations. This the President's leadership has accomplished. The Reagan Administration halted the decline of America's defenses and restored its credibility as a reliable ally.

President Reagan and the American people believe that the peace can only be secured through the strength necessary to keep it. Peace cannot be achieved by wishful thinking about our adversaries or unilaterally weakening our defenses and alliances. The challenges to world peace must be met by strength, for history has shown us that weakness and vacillation invite aggression.


The Reagan Administration has set into motion a comprehensive, affordable and realistic defense modernization program of our conventional and nuclear forces.

Progress has been made in restoring America's deterrent capability during the first five years of the Reagan Administration. The MX Peacekeeper missile has continued its successful flight test program, the first B-1B strategic bombers rolled off the assembly line and began flight testing, substantial progress has been made toward the goal of a 600-ship Navy, military re-enlistments are up, and the readiness capability of our forces has increased. This Administration proudly promotes the values of democracy both at home and abroad. These values have served to cement our alliances and secure our friendship with democratic nations. Who can forget the pride Americans felt for the liberation of the island of Grenada, and which American does not walk just a little taller because of how our naval aviators captured the terrorists of the Achille Lauro?

Indeed, world peace is more assured because this Administration has restored America's credibility as a world power.

Dialogue and a willingness to resolve fundamental differences with our adversaries through peaceful means is the cornerstone of the Administration's defense and foreign policies. To this end, the President has not only sought real arms reductions, but has also proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative to lower the threshold of the nuclear threat.

A safer world, one in which democratic values, human rights, and economic development can flourish, will not be achieved without effort. The challenges and threats to our democratic way of life are real. They cannot be simply wished away. Under Ronald Reagan's leadership, America has not, and will never, abdicate its responsibility as the leader of the free world.



Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman
Republican National Committee



DEFENSE POLICY

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(Note: Terms explained in glossary are noted with an asterisk [*] in text.)

Rebuilding American Defenses, Regaining Worldwide Respect: *Achievements of the Reagan Defense Program*

Today America walks tall and proud; her honor and prestige restored throughout the world because President Reagan revitalized our nation's ability to deter aggression against ourselves, our friends, and our allies. The quest for world peace and regional stability can be accomplished only through the pursuit of peace through strength. This was President Reagan's mandate, first given to him in the landslide of 1980, and reaffirmed by an even greater landslide in 1984.

The following points highlight the achievements of the President's defense modernization program:

- **THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE***: To protect the American people from nuclear attack, President Reagan authorized research for a new anti-ballistic missile defense system.
- **MX* PEACEKEEPER DEPLOYMENT**: The first 42 Peacekeeper missiles are in production. The MX continued its successful test program, and the first missiles will be deployed beginning in late 1986—the first new U.S. ICBMs in 15 years.
- **MIDGETMAN* DEVELOPMENT**: The development of a small ICBM, the Midgetman, has begun for a possible deployment in the early 1990s.
- **B-1B* DEPLOYMENT**: The first B-1B bombers rolled off the assembly line and began flight testing. The first squadron will be operational in 1986. Research on the Stealth* or advanced technology bomber is on or ahead of schedule.
- **THE TRIDENT* SUBMARINE AND THE D-5* MISSILE**: The U.S. has begun to deploy the new Trident ballistic missile-carrying submarine at the rate of about one each year. Beginning in 1989, these submarines will carry the D-5 (Trident II) missile—a larger, more accurate missile, able to attack all types of Soviet targets, including hardened or fortified military targets.
- **CRUISE MISSILES***: The deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles began on a variety of attack submarines and ships.
- **PROTECTING U.S. SATELLITES**: To protect satellites which are vital to our nation's security, President Reagan ordered the testing of anti-satellite weapons*, resulting in the first successful U.S. test against a target in space.
- **PERSONNEL UPGRADED**: The quality of our manpower forces increased. In fiscal 1984, more than 93 percent of our recruits were high school graduates, compared with less than 70 percent in fiscal 1980.
- **REENLISTMENTS UP**: With a rising rate of reenlistment, our armed forces are retaining more experienced people. The overall reenlistment rate has increased from 55 percent in fiscal 1980 to 68 percent in fiscal 1984.
- **SPARE PARTS AND TRAINING**: Improvements in the quantity and the acquisition of spare parts have led to better-trained forces.
- **FLEET MODERNIZATION**: Substantial progress has been made toward the goal of a 600-ship fleet—a goal that will be achieved by fiscal 1989. The fleet will have grown to 555 ships by the end of fiscal 1986, up from 479 at the end of fiscal 1980.
- **A FIFTH NUCLEAR CARRIER**: The fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was launched.
- **IMPROVED READINESS***: The number of Navy ships rated "fully" or "substantially" ready has grown by more than 25 percent since January 1981.

- **AIR FLEET MODERNIZATION:** The Air Force is continuing to modernize its F-15 and F-16 aircraft. Since 1980, the Air Force has more than doubled its inventory of F-15s and F-16s to nearly 1,400 aircraft.
- **A LEANER DEFENSE BUDGET:** Efforts to weed out waste, fraud, and abuse in defense spending have been pursued vigorously.
- **MANAGEMENT REFORMS:** A new 10-point parts acquisition policy was issued, which reforms the spare parts procurement process.

The safety and security of our people and the pursuit of global stability and world peace require that President Reagan's defense program, as outlined in 1981, be fully implemented.

America's Security Threatened

When President Reagan took office five years ago, the United States' defense capability had serious problems.

- **STRATEGIC FORCES:** Our strategic deterrent capability, which is based on the credibility of our nuclear forces to prevent attack, had been allowed to deteriorate.
 - A decade of underfunding of U.S. military forces had resulted in the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the survivability of our ICBM forces was seriously threatened.
- **CONVENTIONAL FORCES:** Five years ago, many American planes could not fly and some American ships could not sail because they lacked spare parts, trained personnel, and sufficient ammunition for essential training.
 - The morale of U.S. servicemen was exceedingly low; the All-Volunteer Army had declined to the point of failure.

GROWING SOVIET THREAT: While U.S. military forces had been allowed to deteriorate, the Soviet Union undertook a massive military buildup. The Reagan Administration was quick to realize that if the disparity between the Soviet and U.S. military capabilities continued to widen, the threat against our nation, our friends and allies would grow and the risk of war would increase. Weakness would invite aggression.

Rebuilding Our Defenses

The Reagan Administration embarked on a twofold program embodied in the principle of peace through strength—rebuilding U.S. defenses and an arms control agenda that seeks to obtain significant, verifiable, and mutual arms reductions to equal force levels.

- Keeping the American people safe and at peace is, as President Reagan has stated, his "most sacred trust."


Comparing U.S. and Soviet Arsenals

During the 1970s the Soviets moved from strategic parity to a position where they were well ahead of the United States in most measures of military capability. *

U.S.S.R. Outpends U.S. On Strategic Forces

- Since 1965, the Soviets have spent \$260 billion more on strategic forces than the U.S. Since SALT I* was signed in 1972, they have spent about \$167 billion more than the U.S. Since SALT II* was signed in 1979, they have spent about \$53 billion more. Soviet spending on strategic forces will continue to outstrip U.S. spending.

U.S. and Soviet Spending on Procurement of Strategic Forces (1965-1988)



The Soviets spend more on strategic forces and are projected to continue to do so.

- Since 1965, they have spent \$260 billion more.
- Since SALT I, they have spent \$167 billion more.
- Since SALT II, they have spent about \$53 billion more.

Soviet spending estimated in equivalent dollars. Procurement includes strategic offensive forces, strategic defense, surveillance and command, control and communications systems.

Growing Soviet Forces

- The Soviets now have 2,832 strategic missiles and bombers; the U.S. has 1,893.
- The U.S. had deployed no new type of land-based strategic missile (ICBM)* since 1970, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force.
- The Soviets, by contrast, deployed at least three new types of systems involving over 800 missiles and are testing two more new types, one of which has just been deployed.

Soviets Lead in Production and Modernization


- The Soviets have more modern strategic forces than the U.S. The aging U.S. arsenal makes modifications mandatory if we are to continue to field an adequate deterrent.
- **OVERALL STRATEGIC COMPARISON:** About three-quarters of U.S. weapons are on launch systems at least 15 years old or older. By contrast, over one-half of total Soviet weapons are on launch systems less than five years old (only 4 percent are on systems over 15 years old).

- **LAND-BASED MISSILES:** About 20 percent of U.S. weapons are on ICBMs. Of these, 20 percent are on systems 15 years or older. By contrast, about 65 percent of Soviet weapons are on ICBMs, of which about 50 percent are on systems with an average age of less than five years, and over 90 percent are less than 10 years old.
- **SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES:** About half of the U.S. strategic arsenal is on submarines. Eighty-five percent are on submarines that are over 15 years old. By contrast, the Soviet Union has placed only about 25 percent on its submarines, 85 percent of which are 10 years old or less.
- **BOMBERS:** About 30 percent of the U.S. strategic arsenal is on bombers, all of which are over 20 years old. By contrast, the Soviet Union has placed about 10 percent of its strategic arsenal on bombers. Of these, over half are on Backfire* bombers, which on average are less than five years old.


Soviet Forces—Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)

The Soviet Union has a monopoly on the largest and most powerful missiles—the so-called heavy missiles*.

**US-USSR
Inventory Warheads By Age of Launch Systems, 1984**



- Of the 1,398 Soviet ICBMs, 308 are SS-18* heavy missiles, each of which have twice the payload or destructive potential as the projected U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile.
 - Each Soviet SS-18 missile, which can carry 10 warheads, has more explosive power than all the bombs dropped in World War II.
 - These 308 SS-18s *alone* can deliver more destructive power than *all U.S. strategic missiles combined*.
- **U.S. LAND-BASED STRATEGIC FORCES IN JEOPARDY:** Because of the massive buildup of the Soviet ICBM forces, the Soviet Union is capable of destroying virtually all of our land-based ICBMs. The U.S. has *no* comparable capability, because our missiles lack comparable destructive power and accuracy.
- This has resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union has modernized its missiles over the last decade while the U.S. has not.
 - **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS:** To meet the threat to our land-based ICBM force, the Reagan Administration has ordered the deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a smaller, mobile, single-warhead missile, the so-called Midgetman.



Soviet Forces—Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)

- **THE SOVIET THREAT:** The Soviet Union has built up a very large force of ballistic missile submarines that exceeds that of the United States in every characteristic except number of warheads.*
 - Between 1967 and 1982 the United States did not build a single ballistic missile submarine. The Soviets deployed six new classes involving 62 new strategic submarines during the same period.
 - The U.S. deployed only one new strategic submarine missile (SLBM) during the past 12 years, while the Soviets deployed five new types during the same period.
 - The Soviet Union now has more than twice the number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (68 vs. 37) carrying almost twice (982 vs. 616) the number of missiles as we do.
 - The Soviets have introduced the Typhoon, a new missile submarine, which is about 50 percent larger than our new Trident submarine, with larger and more powerful missiles.
 - The Typhoon missile may be the first submarine-launched missile capable of destroying protected or fortified military targets, a capability that we do not presently have.
 - The missile carried by the Typhoon is roughly comparable to the U.S. Trident II missile, which will not become operational until 1989.
 - The Soviets are also preparing to deploy a second new SLBM, the SS-NX-23, on improved Delta-IV submarines.
- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS:** To meet the expanding Soviet threat, the Reagan Administration has ordered the production of the submarine-launched cruise missile. Initial emplacement of submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)* began in June 1984. The deployment of these weapons makes it more difficult for the Soviets to launch a surprise attack, because they would have to target every potential Naval vessel that could carry these weapons.
 - While the survivability of the U.S. sea-based force is presently not threatened by the Soviet Union, current trends show that such a threat could soon develop unless we keep upgrading our forces.

Soviet Forces—Strategic Bombers

- **THE SOVIET THREAT:** The Soviets now have 480 heavy bombers compared to 263 for the United States. Since the number of Soviet bombers is increasing steadily, the threat to the United States can be expected to increase significantly over the next decade.
 - The Soviet Union has deployed more than 250 modern intercontinental Backfire bombers and is soon expected to deploy the Blackjack* bomber as well.
 - The Backfire was introduced in the mid-1970s and is being produced at a rate of at least 30 per year. The Blackjack will be introduced in 1986. The Soviets are now building Bear H bombers which carry long-range cruise missiles.
- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS:** To meet the Soviet bomber threat, the Reagan Administration has ordered the development and deployment of 100 B-1B bombers and the development of the Stealth aircraft, an advanced technology bomber.
 - The current U.S. bomber force consists of 263 B-52s, which were designed in the late 1940s to meet the threat of the 1950s. While some of the equipment on the B-52s has been upgraded, it basically remains a 1950s vintage aircraft. Today, our entire heavy bomber force consists of these aging and increasingly vulnerable B-52s, the last of which was deployed in 1962.

- The B-1B is an advanced, multipurpose heavy bomber capable of delivering a wide variety of nuclear and conventional munitions and long-range cruise missiles. The first B-1B squadron will be operational in 1986, with all 100 operational by 1988.
- The Stealth aircraft is an advanced bomber designed primarily for nuclear strike missions against very advanced enemy air defenses. Stealth aircraft will be operational in the early 1990s.

Strengthening the NATO Alliance


A secure Western Europe is of vital importance to the United States. The security of Western Europe rests on the ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend themselves if attacked. The Soviet threat to Western security and political independence is real and serious.

- NATO is a defensive alliance which seeks to prevent war, and will use its weapons only in response to attack. The Warsaw Pact, by comparison, maintains military strength on a scale well in excess of that reasonably justifiable for defense.

The Threat From The Warsaw Pact


- **PERSONNEL:** The Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of some 6 million personnel of which some 4 million face NATO in Europe. The standing forces of NATO total 4.5 million personnel, of which nearly 2.6 million are stationed in Europe.

■ NATO-Warsaw Pact ■ Force Comparison



- Warsaw Pact forces consist of about 192 active and mobilisable divisions, of which some 115 divisions are positioned "well forward" or considered ready to fight on very short notice.
 - NATO has 115 divisions, of which 88 are considered active or rapidly deployable.
- **TANKS AND ARMORED WARFARE:** Soviet-Warsaw Pact nations have more than an almost 13-to-1 advantage in battle tanks, an almost 2-to-1 advantage in anti-tank guided weapon launchers, an almost 3-to-1 advantage in artillery and mortars, and a 2.5-to-1 advantage in armed personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, even if U.S. and Canadian forces are included.
- **TACTICAL INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT:** The Warsaw Pact has a more than 5-to-1 advantage in tactical interceptor aircraft (4,195 interceptor aircraft vs. 795 for NATO).
- **THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES:** "Theater nuclear forces" include short-and intermediate-range nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft used in support of ground forces.
- **Missiles:** The Warsaw Pact maintains about 2,000 delivery systems as opposed to 300 for NATO, an almost 7-to-1 advantage. The Warsaw Pact retains a very substantial advantage in the longer-range intermediate-range missiles even following initial deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles* and Pershing IIs* in Europe.

Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles




- **Aircraft:** NATO has about 700 intermediate-range nuclear-armed aircraft. It is estimated that overall the Warsaw Pact could employ about 3,000 of its operational INF aircraft in a nuclear role, a more than 4-to-1 advantage in their favor.
- **In sum,** the Warsaw Pact shows a continuing buildup of its nuclear forces across the entire spectrum. In Europe, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage over NATO in all major categories of nuclear forces.
- **THE SOVIET SS-20* THREAT:** In 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile. This weapon was far more capable in every characteristic than other existing Soviet missiles. The destructive capability of the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force increased dramatically with the deployment of the SS-20. These missiles represented an enormous new threat to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
 - The Soviet Union has more than 565 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, 441 of which are three-warhead SS-20s.
 - The Soviet Union is adding one SS-20 missile launcher every week.
 - Evidence of the existence of "reload missiles"* for the SS-20 substantially raises their overall number of warheads, according to NATO officials.
- **NATO'S RESPONSE:** To meet the threat posed by the massive Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO requested in 1979 that the United States deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. Deployment began in late 1983. As of December 1985, NATO had deployed 140 Pershing IIs and GLCMs. When fully deployed, the Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles will allow NATO to respond in kind to an attack by Soviet intermediate-range missiles—a capability NATO does not now possess.

Chemical Weapons—Soviets Prepare for Chemical Warfare

- **SOVIETS EXPAND AND MODERNIZE THEIR STOCKPILES:** The Soviet Union has continued to expand and modernize its enormous chemical weapons arsenal. It has invested large sums in chemical warfare equipment and personnel with which it regularly conducts large-scale military exercises. The Soviet modernization of its chemical weapons capability has created an imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in their favor. As of January 1984, the Soviets had a 12-to-1 advantage in personnel, a 25-to-1 advantage in decontamination equipment, a 5-to-1 advantage in ground-based delivery systems, and an 11-to-1 advantage in training facilities.
- **SOVIET CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION:** The Soviet Union has 14 operating chemical agent production facilities; the U.S. has none. There is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets have used chemical agents on defenseless men, women and children in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.
- **U.S.-NATO POLICY:** The U.S. has a policy of no first use of chemical weapons and aims to ban chemical weapons from the world's arsenals.
 - In April 1984, Vice President Bush presented a bold initiative for a comprehensive worldwide ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. The Soviets have wrongfully rejected the Administration's plan as a propaganda trick.

- **U.S. Restraint:** The U.S. has refrained from producing chemical weapons since 1969, unilaterally freezing production. This approach has not worked. The current U.S. stockpile is old; the average age is 26 years. Some of these munitions are obsolete. Some are well past their shelf life and are leaking. Most of our stockpiled chemical munitions can no longer be delivered effectively on the battlefield.

Nato-Warsaw Pact Chemical Warfare Comparison



THE REAGAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

To redress the imbalance created by the unprecedented Soviet buildup of the 1970s and to correct the deficiencies of our aging forces, on October 31, 1981, the Reagan Administration announced a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program. The program calls for:

1. ICBM modernization;
2. SLBM* modernization;
3. Modernization of strategic bombers;
4. Improvement in command and control communications systems*;
5. Improvement in strategic defenses.

ICBM Modernization: The MX "Peacekeeper" and Midgetman Missiles

- **THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION:** U.S. ICBMs are currently obsolete and vulnerable to nuclear attack because they lack the necessary accuracy and power to attack the most important Soviet military targets, which have been hardened to withstand nuclear attack.
- **THE SOVIET THREAT:** The Soviet ICBM force grew enormously in numbers and destructive power during the past two decades. By contrast, the United States has not deployed a new land-based strategic missile in 15 years. During that time, the Soviets deployed three new missiles and are currently testing two additional systems, one of which has just been deployed.
- **U.S. SECURITY AT RISK:** In January 1983, President Reagan established the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces (also known as the Scowcroft Commission) to review how best to proceed with strategic modernization. The Commission, which issued its final report in March 1984, noted:

The Soviets . . . now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all . . . U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot inflict similar damage, even using the entire force. (Emphasis added).

- **RESTORING RETALIATORY EFFECTIVENESS:** To solve the problem of retaliatory effectiveness, the Reagan Administration called for a limited deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman III silos.
 - The MX missile will reestablish our hard-target capability; i. e. , the MX will restore our ability to destroy hardened or strengthened Soviet military targets.
 - The deployment of the MX will decrease the Soviet Union's confidence that an attack against our strategic systems would succeed.
- **SURVIVABILITY OF OUR LAND-BASED MISSILES:**
 - In the short term, survivability of the MX Peacekeeper will depend on its interaction with the other components of the Triad—the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the strategic bombers.
 - In the longer run, ICBM modernization will be achieved through the development and deployment (in the early 1990s) of a new small ICBM called the Midgetman, as well as through research and development on new techniques to harden silos and shelters or underground basing.

- **MX IS VITAL FOR ARMS CONTROL:** A U.S. failure to deploy its programmed force of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles will be viewed by the Soviet Union as a unilateral concession ceding another decade of superiority in land-based missiles—those weapons the Soviets have always valued most and regarded as the ultimate yardstick of relative military power.
- **MIDGETMAN:** The deployment of a new small missile will add to flexibility and overall capability of the ICBM force.
 - The Midgetman can be placed in super-hardened underground facilities and can also be made mobile.
 - The greater survivability of the Midgetman will enhance strategic stability by discouraging the Soviet Union from attacking its silos, thereby increasing the risk of effective American retaliation.

SLBM Modernization

- **THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION:** The current fleet of U.S. missile submarines is old. Except for the five Trident missile submarines that have just recently become operational and two others on sea trials, all other U.S. ballistic missile submarines were built before 1967 and will have to be retired in the 1990s.
- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE:**
 - Trident missile construction will continue, and a larger, more accurate sea-launched ballistic missile—known as Trident II or D-5—will be developed and deployed on Trident submarines in 1989.
 - The Trident II and the submarine-launched cruise missile will improve our ability to destroy hardened Soviet military targets—something that our existing submarine-launched missiles are unable to achieve.
 - **DETERRENCE:** As a result of SLBM modernization, the U.S. will have a survivable force that can attack the things the Soviets value most: their strategic nuclear missiles, their fortified military facilities, and their civilian and military leadership. This capability will serve as a major deterrent to a Soviet nuclear attack on the U. S.

Modernization of Strategic Bombers

- **THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION:** All U.S. heavy strategic bombers are already more than 20 years old. They face a vast and sophisticated array of Soviet defenses that are continually being improved. If not replaced soon, our B-52 bombers will not be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses and attack their targets. Additionally, the B-52 bomber is vulnerable to Soviet attack on its air bases.
- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE:** A new version of the B-1, the B-1B, will be developed and 100 aircraft will be operational by 1988. Research and development will continue on the advanced technology bomber (ATB) or “Stealth” bomber aircraft.
 - Both aircraft will have a dramatically improved capability to penetrate Soviet air defenses and to survive a Soviet attack on their air bases.

Improvement in Command, Control and Communications Systems


- **THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION:** An absolutely vital element of our deterrent is the ability to communicate with our forces. We take extensive measures that make it impossible to launch an attack without authorization from the President. Today, our command, control and communications network has many deficiencies. There are real doubts that some elements of it can perform under enemy attack.

- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE:** The U.S. will deploy improved radar and satellite systems to enhance early warning capabilities and to assess more accurately and reliably the size and scope of a Soviet missile attack. To ensure that presidential orders can be passed from command centers to commanders in the field, development of new satellite communications systems will also take place.

Improvement in Strategic Defenses

- **THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION:** Strategic defenses are defenses against bomber or missile attack. These consist of anti-missile defenses of various types, *of which the U.S. has none*; surface-to-air missiles, of which the U.S. has none, and only 300 interceptor aircraft. By comparison, the Soviets have 100 anti-ballistic missile launchers, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and 1,200 interceptor aircraft of which 600 are modern aircraft capable of intercepting low-altitude bombers. The Soviet Union is also upgrading and expanding its Moscow ABM* system.

US-USSR
Comparison of Forces Dedicated to Strategic Defense



- **THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE:** The Administration's program involves the construction of radars to detect bomber attack, the procurement of airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS), and five squadrons of F-15 fighter interceptors. The Administration has also authorized a very substantial increase in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) research and development.

Conventional Forces

- To improve the readiness and sustainability* of our conventional forces, the Reagan Administration's defense program proposed to:
 - provide our ground forces with additional quantities of both weapons systems and support equipment;
 - modernize Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps tactical aircraft;
 - increase the Naval construction program;
 - replenish stocks of supplies and ammunition; and
 - meet recruitment standards and retain qualified personnel in our armed forces.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

Assuring Our Survival: An Overview

President Reagan has said many times that a "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Even while nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. has kept world peace for over 35 years, the President believes that our nation must find a better way to assure a credible deterrence than holding one another's populations hostage.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a broad-based research program which promotes the development of technologies which would shield the United States and its allies from a Soviet ballistic missile attack. Included are such non-nuclear technologies as lasers, particle-beam weapons, and guided interceptor missiles, as well as certain nuclear-based technologies.

In a historic speech to the American people on March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed his Strategic Defense Initiative, which would enable America's best minds to research reliable defenses for the U.S. and its allies against ballistic missiles—that is, to develop a "Peace Shield." The ultimate decision regarding the feasibility of this project and its deployment will be made in the future, by some other president.

The Strategic Defense Initiative reflects the high value Americans place on human life. Simply stated, the moral and ethical foundation of the Strategic Defense Initiative is this: It is better to destroy incoming missiles than to annihilate populations.

The Strategic Defense Initiative: Key Elements

The SDI research program will provide a future President and Congress with the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems.

- **ASSURING SURVIVAL:** The SDI would move the United States from a doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)* to a posture of Mutual Assured Survival (MAS)*. This would be accomplished by the development of defensive systems, including space-based systems, that would allow the U.S. to defend itself from nuclear attack by ballistic missiles and bombers. With such defenses, enemy missiles would be destroyed in space before they could reach American soil.
- **RATIONAL AND MORAL:** The Strategic Defense Initiative is a rational and moral approach to enhancing our security and that of our allies as well as of strengthening international stability and peace. Should our efforts to prevent a nuclear war fail, it is far more rational and moral to have a policy that will enable us to destroy missiles in space than to kill people on earth.
- The proposal will not *initiate* the militarization of space. Space has been militarized for *offensive purposes for more than a generation*.
- **THE SDI IS NOT DESTABILIZING:** A successful program will deter the possibility of war, as well as reduce the offensive value of ballistic missiles.
- **THE PROGRAM IS COST-EFFECTIVE:** The Strategic Defense Initiative research program will cost about \$26 billion over five years (FY 1985-FY 1990) or only about \$20 a year for each American citizen.
- **THE PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ABM* TREATY:** The Strategic Defense Initiative research program ordered by President Reagan does not violate our country's arms control treaty obligations under the ABM Treaty.
 - The 1972 ABM Treaty *explicitly* permits the kind of research envisaged by the Strategic Defense Initiative.
 - The current U.S. research program *does not* constitute a decision to fully develop and deploy defensive systems.
 - *While the U.S. is living up to its ABM Treaty commitments, the Soviet Union is not.*

The Soviet Militarization of Space

The Soviet Union is actively engaged in its own massive program to develop and deploy defenses against missiles and bombers. Most were undertaken before the president's decision in 1983 to engage in research in defensive technologies. There is no reason to believe the Soviets would stop now if the U.S. decided to cease its research activities.

- The Soviets have upgraded the capability of the only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system in the world today—the Moscow ABM system; and
- The Soviets have built a large phased-array radar in Siberia, which *violates* the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. As the President noted in a February 1, 1985 report to Congress, the Soviet Union “may be preparing” a missile defense of its homeland in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- In 1985, some 80 percent of Soviet space launches were purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. The Pentagon report, *Soviet Military Power, 1985*, notes:

This is an increase from 70 percent in previous years. The Soviet military space program dominates the U.S.S.R.'s overall space effort.
- Testing and deployment of the Soviet Union's ground-based laser system could begin by the early-to-mid 1990s.

- The Soviets could have a prototype of space-based anti-ballistic missile system ready for testing in the late 1990s.
- The Soviets have begun to develop at least three types of high-energy laser weapons for air defense.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATS)

For more than 25 years the security of U.S. satellites has been vital to the defense of this nation. They bolster our national security by gathering electronic intelligence data, which allows the U.S. to monitor compliance with arms control agreements, and serve as an early-warning system to detect hostile ballistic missiles.

- The Soviet Union began testing anti-satellite weapons over 15 years ago.
- The diversity of Soviet anti-satellite weapons and their efforts to conceal their capabilities have precluded the United States and the Soviet Union from negotiating a verifiable anti-satellite weapons agreement.
- President Reagan directed the Defense Department to test anti-satellite weapons, and in September 1985, the U.S. Air Force destroyed an old satellite 290 miles above the Pacific Ocean, the first test of an anti-satellite weapon against a target in space.

Soviet ASAT Capability

The Soviet Union, which has been testing anti-satellite weapons for 15 years, has developed the capability to destroy U.S. satellites in near-earth orbit, and has developed the *only* operational anti-satellite weapons system in the world. Moreover, the Soviets may have at this time *three* systems capable of destroying U.S. satellites.

- Despite much rhetoric about the "primitiveness" of the Soviet ASAT system, there is no question that the Soviets have the capability today to destroy all or nearly all U.S. low-altitude satellites. The U.S. has *no* comparable capability.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE BUDGET

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH: To correct the deficiencies in the U.S.'s defense capability caused by years of declining funding for our military forces, the Reagan Administration developed an affordable, multi-year defense program.

- **DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS:** In 1960, defense comprised 45 percent of federal budget expenditures; by fiscal year 1978 it had declined to 22.5 percent of the budget.
- The Administration has asked Congress for \$277.5 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1986, representing only about 30 percent of total federal expenditures, and 6.6 percent of GNP.
- Even with the continuing buildup, defense spending will account for less than 33 percent of the federal budget in fiscal 1990 and will average only slightly more than 7 percent of GNP over the next five years (FY 1986-1990). It has been estimated that Soviet defense expenditures, by contrast, could reach 20 percent of its GNP in the not-too-distant future.
- Despite all the criticism of a massive defense buildup, U.S. defense spending then will represent roughly the same share of federal spending as it did in 1972.

FEDERAL BUDGET TRENDS

Fiscal Year	DoD Outlays as a % of Federal Outlays	DoD Outlays as a % of GNP
1950	27.4	4.4
1955	51.3	9.2
1960	45.0	8.3
1965	38.7	7.0
1970	39.4	8.0
1971	35.4	7.2
1972	32.6	6.7
1973	29.8	5.8
1974	28.8	5.6
1975	25.5	5.7
1976	23.6	5.4
1977	23.4	5.1
1978	22.5	4.9
1979	22.8	4.9
1980	22.5	5.2
1981	23.0	5.4
1982	24.5	6.0
1983	25.4	6.4
1984	25.9	6.2
1985	25.7	6.4

■ How the defense budget is spent:

- The largest share of the FY 1986 defense budget goes for manpower costs; it does not go for procurement of new weapons systems. Only 11.9 percent of defense spending in the FY 1986 budget will be available for new programs compared to an estimated 43 percent for manpower costs. (By contrast, the Soviet Union spends between 10-15 percent of its defense budget on manpower).

- Despite the great attention they receive, strategic nuclear forces—our intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers—do not consume most of the budget. Spending on strategic forces now represents less than 1 percent of our GNP, under 6 percent of our total federal budget, and less than 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget.

■ **SPENDING ON HUMAN NEEDS:** This Administration spends more than ever on human needs. Direct payments to individuals alone represent 41 percent of total budget outlays. During the decade of the 1970s, a Democrat-controlled Congress and the Carter Administration worked hand-in-hand to increase social service spending at the expense of national security. Defense spending was effectively cut, as its budget was ravaged by inflation.


- For those who measure “fairness” in terms of expenditures on human services, the budget of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which spends more than two-thirds of 1 billion dollars every day, is the third largest of any governmental body in the world; only the budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union are larger.


■ **U. S.-SOVIET BUDGET TRENDS:** Soviet military expenditures grew during the 1960s and 1970s while U.S. expenditures declined after accounting for inflation.

- Today, the Soviet Union spends 15 percent of its GNP on defense. In fiscal 1985 U.S. defense expenditures comprised 6.4 percent of GNP.

The Federal Budget, National Defense, and Strategic Forces 1950-1984

(As of November 1983)





A Leaner Defense Budget

WEEDING OUT WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE: The Reagan Administration came into office pledging to weed out waste, fraud, and abuse in government programs, including in the defense area. While the President pledged to restore the nation's military strength, he also sought to obtain more defense from each defense dollar. To achieve this goal, the Administration undertook a comprehensive program of management reform.

- **THE CARTER-MONDALE LEGACY:** When the Administration took office, it inherited billions of dollars worth of contracts—many of which were poorly written and so provided opportunity for waste, fraud, and abuse. Likewise, the Administration inherited many programs which were already over budget and behind schedule. However, the Administration's commitment to reform the acquisition process and to identify and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse remained undaunted despite the scope of the challenge it faced.
- Critics who accuse the Administration of wasting the American taxpayer's defense dollar overlook the fact that it is the Administration's efforts to root out waste, fraud, and abuse which have brought horror stories of \$400 hammers or \$9,000 wrenches to light. These same critics also overlook the corrective steps that have been taken to deal with these problems.
 - Secretary Weinberger has stated:

Yes, the horror stories will probably continue, as long as we continue to do our job of searching out the skeletons in our own closet and finding and reporting these stories . . . We are committed to giving the American taxpayer a stronger defense that makes use of every dollar.

■ **MANAGEMENT REFORMS:** The Reagan Administration has implemented a wide range of management reform programs. Among these are:

- A sweeping review of the defense acquisition process, which was ordered by the Secretary of Defense in March 1981.
- A new Review and Oversight Office, established in April 1981, to ensure better coordination of the Pentagon's audits and investigations. Since then, over 68,000 internal audits have been completed with a potential savings of over \$7.9 billion.
- A 10-point program for ending spare parts abuses, issued by the Secretary of Defense in July 1983, which included incentives for employees who discover cost savings; stern disciplinary action against those who allow abuses to continue; debarring of contractors who refuse to meet contracting standards; and a strong commitment to greater competition for spare parts acquisition.
- An independent, bipartisan Commission on Defense Management, appointed by President Reagan in June 1985, to provide recommendations for continued management and procurement reforms.

ARMS CONTROL

Previous Arms Control Efforts: A Legacy of Failure

- Past efforts to achieve strategic arms control agreements failed to prevent the Soviet Union from engaging in the largest military buildup in history. This buildup occurred because of loopholes and ambiguities in previous arms control agreements, including SALT I and SALT II.
- **SALT I:** This treaty failed to put any effective restraint on Soviet military capabilities.
 - In 1969, when the SALT I negotiations began, the Soviets had over 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads; in 1972 when SALT I was signed, they had 2,300.
 - By 1980, the Soviets were threatening U.S. ICBM survivability with more than 5,000 warheads.
- **SALT II:** This treaty is seriously flawed because it allows for dangerous and destabilizing asymmetries which favor the Soviet Union. The SALT II treaty:
 - Allows the Soviet Union to retain a monopoly on modern heavy missiles—SS-18 ICBMs.
 - Excludes the Backfire bomber, which is capable of striking the U.S. homeland, from effective limitation.
 - Contains many ambiguities, particularly those related to provisions for verification.
 - Would allow a doubling in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads or bombs targeted against the U. S.
 - In 1979, when SALT II was signed, the Soviets had 5,500 warheads. The present Soviet total of 8,900 strategic nuclear warheads could grow to more than 15,000 within the guidelines of the SALT II treaty.
- The Reagan Administration has endorsed the Senate Armed Services Committee's 1979 conclusion that the unratified SALT II treaty is "*not in the national security interest of the United States of America.*"

Reagan Arms Control Agenda Enhances U.S. Security

Having set into motion a program to reverse the decline in our nation's defenses, the Reagan Administration set forth a wide range of arms control proposals that have sought to obtain significant, verifiable, and mutual arms reductions to equal force levels.

- **REAL ARMS REDUCTION:** The Reagan Administration has revolutionized the conduct of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. For the first time since the beginning of the strategic arms negotiations in 1969, the negotiations agenda has been dominated by the concept of actual reductions. The Reagan Administration has rejected "cosmetic" arms control agreements that allow large increases in nuclear weapons.
- **NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH:** The Soviet Union is negotiating for the first time with a serious partner who does not make unilateral concessions or deludes itself about the Soviet willingness to exploit loopholes to expand its military capabilities or even violates agreements.
- **REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS:** The Reagan Administration has been the first Administration to face up to the reality of Soviet arms control violations and has developed a policy to deal with these violations.
- **STRENGTHENING OUR ALLIANCES:** Despite repeated attempts to destabilize the NATO alliance, the United States continued its initial deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. Moreover, NATO pledged to make basic improvements in its conventional forces. Today, NATO unity and support for the President's approach to European security remains strong.


Proposals

The Administration began arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on a wide range of issues in late 1981 and early 1982. These included both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems, conventional and chemical weapons. The Soviet Union walked out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations in 1983 and refused to set a date for the resumption of the START talks. On January 7-8, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz met with then-Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. At this meeting, agreement was reached to resume arms talks on strategic, intermediate-range and space weapons. The following are the major arms control proposals made by the Reagan Administration:

- **START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks).** In 1982, the United States proposed to reduce the number of and the destructive power of strategic missile warheads—from the then-Soviet number of 8,000 to 5,000. No more than half of these would be land-based.
- **ADMINISTRATION SHOWS FLEXIBILITY:** In order to facilitate an agreement, the Reagan Administration made substantial adjustments to its initial position. In October 1983, the Administration, with congressional backing, incorporated the mutual build-down concept into our START negotiation position. A mutual build-down would require the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce their respective arsenals by 5 percent each year, and to destroy two old weapons for each new one deployed.
- The Administration also proposed a concurrent build-down of bombers, as well as negotiation of additional limits on air-launched cruise missiles.
- In 1985, the Reagan Administration offered to trade-off areas of U.S. advantage against areas of Soviet advantage provided that the resulting agreement brought about substantial force reductions to equal and verifiable levels.

■ US ■ USSR ■

Strategic Ballistic Missile Warheads



■ **INF** (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces). In 1981, the United States proposed the complete abolition of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and the establishment of certain limits on shorter-range forces that could substitute for them. Specifically, the United States proposed, with procedures for verification, the dismantling of the SS-4, SS-5*, and SS-20 ballistic missiles in exchange for U.S. cancellation of its plans to deploy Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe to counter these Soviet missiles. This proposal is designed to eliminate first-strike weapons.

Soviet Failure to Respond to U.S. Arms Control Proposals

- From 1981-83 at the INF talks, the Soviets proposed agreements that were blatantly one-sided: they would have prohibited any NATO deployment of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, while allowing the Soviets to retain their very substantial monopoly in long-range intermediate nuclear forces. The Soviets have proposed:
- counting British and French missiles as belonging to the United States. These missiles not only do not belong to us, but they are of a different type from the ones under discussion at the negotiations;
 - excluding the Asian part of the Soviet Union from the limitations, even though intermediate-range Soviet missiles launched from Asia can easily reach Western Europe; and

- counting U.S. but not Soviet fighter bombers.
- In 1982-83 at the START negotiations, the Soviets proposed a series of limitations that would terminate critical U.S. programs such as the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile while allowing most Soviet programs to continue without effective limitations.

New Soviet Proposal Presented

- **SOVIETS RESPOND TO U.S. FIRMNESS:** In September 1985, the Soviet Union revealed an arms control proposal before the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. The Administration stated that the Soviet proposal could be the start of a "successful process" in the effort to reduce nuclear weaponry on both sides. The Administration noted that the Soviet proposal shows that the President's "strategy has worked, that firmness and allied solidarity, which has been demonstrated over the past five years, have paid off."
- **PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSAL:** Preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposal indicated that it contained some major flaws.
 - It is unequal in the Soviet favor, allowing the Soviets to retain major advantages in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and ballistic missile throw-weight.
 - Prevents modernization of U.S. weapons.
 - Seeks to remove the U.S. nuclear deterrent from our friends and allies in Europe and Asia.
 - Key elements are not verifiable.
 - Has preconditions attached to it since it calls for the elimination by the U.S. of research into strategic missile defense.

U.S. Compliance with Existing Agreements

Despite evidence of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the Reagan Administration is meeting all of its arms control treaty obligations.

- In June 1985, President Reagan announced that he would "go the extra mile" to establish a framework of mutual restraint, i. e. , a framework by which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. limit their forces pending an arms control agreement.
- To comply with SALT II Treaty obligations, the Reagan Administration decided to dismantle a missile submarine, despite Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty.
- The President also ordered that the Department of Defense provide him with a report no later than November 15, 1985 on "appropriate and proportionate" responses to Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty.

The Reagan Administration is concerned about Soviet arms control treaty violations. In his June 1985 report to the Congress dealing with arms control compliance, President Reagan stated:

The U.S. will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns about Soviet non-compliance. In this effort, we cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance, and, in effect, unilateral disarmament." Soviet violations, the President said, are "very crucial issues . . . The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security and raises uncertainty about the forces the U.S. will require in the future.

The Soviet Response: A Record of Non-Compliance

- **OVERALL TREATY VIOLATIONS:** In a report to Congress issued in December 1985, the Administration stated that it has determined that the Soviet Union has violated the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons*, the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, the Helsinki Final Act*, the SALT I Agreement, the SALT II Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty*. The Administration also stated that the Soviet Union has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty*.
- **SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS:** Specifically, the Administration has determined that the Soviet Union:
 - has used chemical and biological agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in violation of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention.
 - has violated the Helsinki Final Act which prohibits large troop movements without advance notification, when it conducted the Zapad-81 exercise in September 1981.
 - has encrypted (encoded) missile telemetry (radio signals which transmit technical information during missile flight test) in violation of SALT II.
 - has tested and deployed a new ICBM, the SS-25*, which violates the SALT II Treaty. (The SS-25 is either an impermissible modification of an existing type of Soviet ICBM or it is a prohibited new type of missile.) Moreover, the Soviets have concealed SS-25 missiles.
 - has violated the SALT II Treaty limit by deploying more bombers and missiles than is permitted.
 - has deployed SS-25 missiles in former SS-7 missile sites in violation of the SALT I Agreement.
 - has likely violated the 150-kiloton underground testing yield limit by conducting tests with yields of up to twice the limit allowed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
 - has probably deployed the SS-16* ICBM which is forbidden by the SALT II Treaty.
 - has violated the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty by discharging radioactive debris from underground nuclear tests beyond its borders into the atmosphere.
 - has violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by constructing a large and powerful phased-array radar* near the city of Krasnoyarsk in southern Siberia. This phased-array radar is deployed deep within Soviet territory. The ABM Treaty requires that such radars either be limited to the Moscow area or be located on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and be oriented (aimed) outward.
 - has probably tested surface-to-air missile radars in a manner prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

The Nuclear Freeze


The Reagan Administration strongly opposes the nuclear freeze because it would preserve the dangerous imbalance between U.S. and Soviet military forces, and would codify its further erosion over time. If a freeze went into effect now, the advantages the Soviets enjoy (as illustrated in the following graph) would be sealed.

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Land-based missiles	1,030	1,398
Sea-based missiles	600	954
Nuclear missile submarines	37	62
Heavy missiles	0	308
Missile warheads	7,500	8,900
ABM missile launchers	0	100
Surface-to-air missiles	0	10,000
Strategic bombers	263	480
Strategic missile throw-weight*	4.4 m. lbs	11.9 m. lbs

- Under a nuclear freeze, the U.S. would be prevented from modernizing its strategic forces.
- The nuclear freeze would entail a breach of promise between the United States and its NATO allies, by preventing us from deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the threat posed by the ever-growing SS-20 missile force, as we have promised our NATO allies.
- Key elements of the nuclear freeze proposal are simply not verifiable. The key defect of the nuclear freeze is that it seeks to limit a very wide range of systems without serious consideration as to whether these limitations can be effectively verified. For example, U.S. satellites cannot verify that which is being produced inside Soviet factories or hidden in warehouses. This is particularly important in view of the Soviet record of violating key provisions of many arms control agreements.
- Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the Democrat Party in 1984 called for a mutual and verifiable freeze to serve as an integral part of U.S. policy.

Comparison of US and Soviet Long-Range INF Weapons

How Today's LRINF Imbalance Developed
and Soviet Public Descriptions of US-USSR Force Posture



*US decision called for LRINF deployments at end of 1983 unless an arms control agreement was reached which made them unnecessary.

GLOSSARY

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system—system composed of radars, guided interceptor missiles designed to intercept and destroy incoming warheads.

ABM Treaty—The 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (as modified in 1974) bans deployment of ABM systems except that it allows the U.S. and the Soviet Union to deploy one ABM system around the nation's capital or at a single ICBM deployment area.

anti-satellite systems (ASATs)—systems designed to destroy or incapacitate satellites in orbit. Soviet anti-satellite systems can destroy low-altitude military and civilian satellites.

Backfire bomber—a modern supersonic bomber similar in design to the U.S. B-1A, which was cancelled by President Carter. The Backfire bomber is capable of striking targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.

binary chemical weapons—chemical weapons composed of two non-lethal agents which when combined form a lethal agent. This increases safety because the probability of both tanks leaking is low.

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention—the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and the transfer of biological agents or toxins.

Blackjack bomber—a large supersonic Soviet heavy bomber designed to penetrate advanced air defense.

cold launch—ejecting a missile from its launcher by compressed air prior to igniting a missile's rocket motor. This allows for easier reload of launchers. Reload and launching of additional missiles from silos is a means of circumventing or evading arms control limits.

command, control and communications systems—an intricate web of satellites, sensors, communications gear, computers, etc., that enables our strategic forces to carry out their assigned missions in peacetime or in case of war.

cruise missile—a small, jet-propelled pilotless vehicle with an advanced guidance system that gives it high accuracy. Cruise missiles can be launched from ships, submarines, aircraft, or ground vehicles.

D-5 or Trident II missile—a larger, more accurate missile able to attack all types of Soviet targets, including hardened or fortified military targets.

encryption—encoding of radio signals or telemetry of missiles so that information is denied as a source of verifying arms control agreements. Encryption that impedes verification is prohibited by the SALT II treaty.

Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons—the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and prohibits the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

ground-launched cruise missile—a small, jet-propelled pilotless vehicle launched from a mobile truck launcher that carries a 200 kiloton warhead. The ground-launched cruise missile has a range of 1,550 miles. Although it would require at least four to five hours to reach its target, it has a unique advantage—its guidance system allows it to follow the contour of the land. It can thus evade enemy radar by flying below the "radar floor" at minimum altitude of only 50 feet.

heavy missile—the largest, most destructive missile that now exists. Each Soviet SS-18 heavy missile has twice the payload or destructive potential as the projected U.S. MX ICBM. Each SS-18 can deliver 10 warheads each with the destructive potential of one million tons of TNT, i. e. , 1,000 kilotons of TNT.

Helsinki Final Act—The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in 1975. All signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.

hot launch—igniting a missile's rocket motor inside the silo launcher. Hot launch makes it more difficult to rapidly reload missile silos.

Limited Test Ban Treaty—ratified by Congress in 1963, the treaty prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space as well as the discharge of radioactive materials from underground nuclear tests beyond national boundaries.

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—a missile capable of reaching the U.S. or Soviet homeland or distances greater than 3,000 miles.

measure of military capability—by this we mean yield, payload, throw-weight, number of weapons, etc.

Minuteman ICBMs—a three-stage solid fuel ICBM. Two versions are currently deployed—the Minuteman II and the Minuteman III. The Minuteman II was introduced in 1966 and the Minuteman III was introduced in 1970. There are 450 Minuteman IIs in the U.S. ICBM force and 550 Minuteman IIIs. The Minuteman II is a small, solid fuel ICBM which carries a single warhead. The Minuteman III is slightly larger than the Minuteman II and carries three warheads. The Minuteman III has approximately one-eighth the size and destructive potential as the Soviet SS-18.

Midgetman—small, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile that carries one 300 kiloton warhead.

multiple independently launched targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—warheads dispensed from a single missile that can be aimed at a number of widely separated targets.

mutual assured destruction (MAD)—theory that deterrence is based solely on a nation's ability to attack and destroy urban populations in a retaliatory attack. Under this theory, mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack is desirable and efforts to limit damage stimulate the arms race.

mutual assured survival (MAS)—the antithesis of mutual assured destruction. This theory holds that the essence of defense and arms control policy should be to reduce the vulnerability of both sides to nuclear attack. This can be accomplished by increased emphasis on the development of defensive systems against nuclear attack.

MX Peacekeeper missile—a large intercontinental ballistic missile which can deliver ten 300 kiloton warheads. It will be the first new U.S. ICBM since 1970.

payload—the weight a missile can deliver to a given distance.

Pershing II missile—an intermediate-range nuclear missile. It has a range of 1,000 miles; it carries a single 100 kiloton warhead and its speed enables it to reach Soviet targets within 15 minutes from launch time.

phased-array radar—a sophisticated electronically-steered radar that can track a vast number of targets simultaneously.

readiness—the ability of forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed. Readiness depends on having the required quantities of equipment in the hands of the units on a day-to-day basis, and on having the required number of adequately trained personnel assigned to ensure that people and machines can work together.

reload missiles—extra missiles to be reloaded and fired from existing missile launchers.

SS-5—a first generation Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of about 2,000 miles. Has recently been phased out by the Soviet Union.

SS-16—a Minuteman III-sized solid fuel ICBM first tested by the Soviet Union in 1972 and probably covertly deployed in the late 1970s. Its deployment is prohibited by the SALT II Treaty.

SS-18—the largest, most destructive missile in the world. Each missile has twice the destructive potential of any missile that was allowed the U.S. under the SALT II agreement (see *heavy missile*).

SS-20—a very powerful intermediate-range nuclear missile capable of delivering three nuclear warheads up to a 5,000 kilometer range with great accuracy. The SS-20 has a reload capability. In other words, the Soviets have two missiles for each of the 441 SS-20 missile launchers.

SS-25—a second new type of Soviet solid fuel ICBM which has been tested and deployed in violation of the SALT II Treaty.

Stealth bomber—an advanced bomber designed to incorporate advanced technology (even more advanced technology than that incorporated into the B-1B) that will be able to penetrate the most advanced air defense systems. The Stealth aircraft will be operational in the early 1990s. The Stealth bomber is an advanced technology bomber (ATB).

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. SALT I—an arms control treaty ratified by Congress in 1972. SALT I froze submarine- and land-based ballistic missiles at then-existing and unequal levels in the Soviet favor. Also included in the SALT I negotiations was the ABM Treaty, also ratified by Congress in 1972. **SALT II**—an arms control treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union and signed (though not ratified by Congress) in 1979. SALT II carried over most of the unequal features of SALT I.

strategic defenses—defenses against ballistic missiles and other potential types of intercontinental nuclear strike forces. President Reagan has termed research into this area the Strategic Defense Initiative.

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—a ballistic missile launched from a submarine. This missile is capable of performing the same missions as an ICBM even with missiles of much shorter range because of a submarine's mobility.

sustainability—groups together items needed by forces to sustain combat in the event of war. It includes replacement equipment, spare parts and ammunition, and other essential consumables. Sustainability also includes the manpower required to maintain combat strength—to rotate, replace and reinforce as the course of battle demands.

telemetry—radio signals which transmit technical information during missile flight tests.

theater nuclear forces—short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. These range from battlefield nuclear weapons to weapons of almost ICBM range.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty—signed in 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapons test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by Congress.

throw-weight—the total weight of nuclear explosives a missile can deliver to either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Trident missile submarine—a large, long-range missile-carrying submarine designed to replace missile submarines built in the 1960s. It carries 24 nuclear missiles.

warhead—the nuclear explosive device carried by a missile.


yield—roughly speaking, the amount of energy or destructive potential of a nuclear weapon. It would be roughly proportional to the payload or throw-weight. In other words, the heavier the weapon, the more powerful it tends to be.



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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INHERITS WEAK AND VACILLATING FOREIGN POLICY

Four years of the Carter-Mondale Administration saw American power and prestige dwindle abroad. Soviet adventurism was encouraged by policy failures which made this country appear as if it were a paper tiger—unwilling and unable to fulfill its commitments to its allies.

- Vacillation and weakness in the face of aggression and a malaise in leadership caused our allies to question our commitment to honor our treaty obligations. The Democrat administration's failure to respond to blatant anti-Americanism helped to promote the perception that they were reluctant to protect American interests and citizens.
- Iran was lost to the militant anti-American followers of the fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini.
- Not only was the U.S. embassy seized in Iran, but 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days. This national humiliation and the aborted Desert-1 rescue attempt served as a graphic and tragic reminder of the degree to which U.S. military readiness had declined.
- The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; the Democrat response was an ill-conceived grain embargo which only hurt American farmers, who have yet to recover from its devastating impact.
- The Soviet Union increased its presence in Cuba, thereby increasing the threat to the United States and its Caribbean Basin and Central American allies.
- The government in Nicaragua was overthrown and supplanted by a Marxist totalitarian dictatorship, which is supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba—despite the Carter-Mondale Administration's provision of enormous amounts of aid to the Sandinistas.
- Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said it best:

... At home and abroad, our country slid into real deep trouble. North and South, East and West, our relations deteriorated. The Carter Administration's motives were good, but their policies were inadequate, uninformed and mistaken. They made things worse, not better. Those who had least, suffered most. Poor countries grew poorer. Rich countries grew poorer, too. The United States grew weaker. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union grew stronger. . .

(Address to the Republican National Convention, 1984)

AMERICA IS BACK UNDER REAGAN LEADERSHIP

Ronald Reagan's election reaffirmed America's commitment to its historic ideals of peace and freedom. As our economy was restored, so too was confidence in traditional American values and institutions. At home and abroad, people no longer lament about the inevitable decline of America's greatness, but proclaim that democratic institutions and values can succeed and that our adversaries' challenges can be answered. Today, under Ronald Reagan's leadership, the world applauds America's freedom, marvels at her achievements, and respects its new-found strengths.

The Reagan Administration has based its foreign policy on the principle of peace through strength. The administration has worked during the past five years to promote economic development and democratic values, to strengthen relations with friends and allies. After five years of Reagan at the helm, America has regained its moorings. Under this President's leadership, the U.S. has regained its role in international affairs. Today, America is respected abroad and peace is more secure.

The Reagan Administration can point proudly to its foreign policy accomplishments.

- **HALTING SOVIET EXPANSION:** Under Reagan's leadership, Soviet expansion has been checked, and even rolled back on a small Caribbean island, Grenada.
- **STRENGTHENING THE NATO ALLIANCE:** The Reagan Administration has improved relations with the NATO alliance. Despite massive propaganda campaigns by the Soviet Union and the European left, Alliance solidarity remained strong. NATO's commitment to deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles is firm and proceeding on schedule.
- **NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL FROM STRENGTH:** The Soviet Union returned to the arms control bargaining table after a year-long walkout. The Administration reaffirmed its commitment to equal and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.
- **DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP:** President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev met in Geneva where the President laid the groundwork for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
- **SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IMPROVE:** Ties between the People's Republic of China and the U.S. have been strengthened as trade, technology transfers, and scientific, cultural and educational exchanges have grown. Relations with Taiwan continue to be warm.
- **PROMOTING STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:** In the Middle East, the Administration worked with Israeli and Arab leaders to promote peace and regional stability.
 - The U.S.-Israeli relationship was strengthened in a variety of ways. Economic, political and military ties were enhanced, prompting Israeli leaders to laud this new level of harmony and understanding between our two nations.
 - The U.S. has supported efforts to prevent a widening of the Iran-Iraq war. The Administration has also remained committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet their legitimate self-defense needs.
- **PROMOTING HEMISPHERIC STABILITY:** The Reagan Administration continued its efforts to resolve the crisis in Central America, working on bilateral and multilateral bases to stabilize the region.
 - Based on the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission, the Administration submitted legislation in support of an \$8 billion economic aid program for Central America.
 - The Administration worked with the Contadora nations to find a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan crisis. It gained congressional support for non-lethal aid for the democratic resistance forces.
 - The Caribbean Basin Initiative showed signs of success as American business explored investment opportunities there and trade from the Basin to the U.S. increased.
- **PROMOTING DEMOCRACY:** The Administration supports the growth of democratic institutions throughout the world. It is particularly heartened by the progress made by nations in Central and South America. It has fostered this growth through the "Democracy Project."
 - Project Democracy emphasizes leadership training in the theory and practice of democracy and the skills necessary to build basic institutions of democracy as well as to counter the actions of anti-democratic forces. The program seeks to educate leaders and strengthen democracies through the exchange of ideas and information and the development of long-term ties between American institutions and their foreign counterparts.

- The program recognizes that the proponents of democracy need an international network which will provide them with moral support, intellectual stimulation, practical and technical assistance, and protection against their adversaries.
- **COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:** The Administration has worked to combat international terrorism, submitting legislation that addresses the problem at home and abroad.
 - Intense diplomatic negotiations and President Reagan's strong and effective leadership led to the successful freeing of 39 American hostages held during the hijacking of a TWA airliner in June 1985.
 - At the President's direction, U.S. military forces intercepted an aircraft over international airspace that was transporting the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. The President's bold and decisive action was cheered by the American people and met with strong bipartisan congressional support.
- **HUMANITARIAN AID:** Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. continued to be the largest food-aid donor to Africa, providing nearly as much food as all other donors combined.
 - The Administration remained committed to helping Africa cope with long-term development, working on programs in more than 20 African countries.
- **SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:** President Reagan spoke out forcefully against human rights abuses, condemning South Africa's policy of apartheid. The Administration made it known privately and publicly that it remains unalterably opposed to apartheid. To reinforce its views, the Administration imposed a variety of measures designed to convey to the South African government the need to redress the inequities of the apartheid system.
- **STANDING FIRM AT THE U.N.:** The Administration defended U.S. interests in the United Nations and other international organizations. The U.S. withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) whose policies frequently served anti-U.S. political ends.

SOVIET UNION

The Reagan Administration does not accept the inevitability of an endless, dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. The avoidance of nuclear war lies at the core of America's relationship with the Soviet Union. President Reagan's leadership has committed America towards rebuilding its defenses, restoring its economic greatness, and recapturing its moral leadership so that it may engage the Soviets in constructive dialogue from a position of strength and not weakness and vacillation.

President Reagan has stated that:

The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding. The United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where our heroes rest. What is called the West is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to share them. . .

We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order the lives of its people, that any nation has a historic right to use force to export its ideology. This belief—regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government—is at the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural conflict—and competition—with one another. . .

U.S.-Soviet Policy Based on Three Principles

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is based on three principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. The U.S. does not overstate the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge, but neither can it overlook the existing dangers.

The Reagan Administration believes the U.S. must have the necessary strength—military, economic, or social—to counter Soviet objectives.

The United States does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union. In dealing with the Soviet Union, the overriding challenge is to preserve peace while protecting freedom. To do this, the U.S. must strengthen deterrence by maintaining a strong defense.

Soviet Challenges

The Soviet Union and the United States have sharply divergent political goals and moral philosophies, which will not soon disappear. The nuclear age impels us, however, to work toward a dialogue through which political solutions to outstanding issues can be solved. Nevertheless, numerous Soviet actions have given the U.S. cause for concern. These include:

- a continuing quest for military superiority;
- a continued involvement in efforts to destabilize certain regions of the world and to support international terrorism;
- the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet “model” on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies;
- violation of both the letter and spirit of certain treaties and agreements; and
- a consistently poor human rights record.

Hopes for the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

The United States desires a more stable and satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union. U.S. goals include:

- equal and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms;
- the cessation of Soviet interference in the affairs of sovereign states;
- respect for human rights.

Direct Dialogue: President Reagan Meets Gorbachev

In November 1985, President Reagan met with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Dialogue focused on four areas:

- Arms control;
- Human rights;
- Regional conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Angola; and
- Economic and trade issues.

Meeting With Gorbachev Ends on Positive Note

Addressing Congress and the American people on his return from Geneva, President Reagan said that he had accomplished his goal of initiating a dialogue with the Soviet Union, saying he had called for a "fresh start—and we made that start."

- President Reagan termed the meeting "constructive," although he noted that serious differences separate our two nations. "I can't claim that we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose—but we know each other better and that's a key to peace."

President Reagan and Gorbachev to Meet Again

President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev agreed to meet again. Gorbachev will visit the U.S. sometime in 1986; President Reagan will go to the Soviet Union sometime in 1987. Among the other areas of agreement resulting from the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting:

- **SECURITY:** The two leaders agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; that neither nation will seek to achieve military superiority; and that they would seek to accelerate the work at the arms control talks;
- **NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:** Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- **CHEMICAL WEAPONS:** President Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban;
- **RISK REDUCTION CENTERS:** The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to study the creation of a joint crisis center and other procedures to reduce the risk of nuclear war;
- **PROCESS OF DIALOGUE:** The President and the Soviet leader agreed to regular meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials in different fields, such as agriculture, housing, and the environment;
- **NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY:** Agreement was reached to set into place measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific;
- **CIVIL AVIATION:** A tentative agreement was reached to resume direct commercial airline service between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.;
- **CONSULATES:** The two nations agreed to simultaneously open consulates in New York and Kiev;
- **EXCHANGE INITIATIVES:** The U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an academic and cultural agreement.
 - The President and Gorbachev also agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the two leaders at their next meeting.

CHINA

Sino-U.S. Relations

President Reagan supports strengthened Sino-U.S. ties, viewing such a relationship as vital to our long-term national security interests and as contributing to stability in East Asia. This fundamental approach is predicated on the belief that a stable and prospering China can be an increasing force for peace, both in Asia and the world. A revitalized China, open to the outside world, offers enormous promise and challenge. While there are differences in policy between our two nations, the Administration believes that a core of common strategic interests combined with the growing benefits of economic cooperation facilitated by China's economic reforms, provide Americans with ample grounds for a strengthened U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Sino-U.S. Relations Continue to Grow

- **TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER UP:** Technology transfer has become the touchstone of Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-technology products such as computers and laboratory instruments to China.
 - Trade in high-tech products has substantially increased. Export licenses in 1984 were up 100 percent from 1982; 35 percent from 1983.
- **EXCHANGES INCREASE:** Scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges have also increased.
 - More than 10,000 Chinese students now study in U.S. universities.
 - Every month, 150 Chinese scientific or commercial delegations come to the U.S.
- **ENERGY COOPERATION:** Thirteen American companies are collaborating with the Chinese in the search for oil. Americans have invested almost \$700 million, as of early 1985 in joint ventures and offshore oil exploration in China. This makes the U.S. China's largest foreign investor.
- **PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT CONCLUDED:** An agreement to sell nuclear materiel and equipment for peaceful nuclear energy uses was initiated by President Reagan in 1984. The Administration conducted negotiations for two years to ensure that China would not use material and equipment purchases from the U.S. for any nuclear explosive or military purpose.
- **TRADE INCREASES:** China has become the U.S.' fourth largest supplier of textiles.
- **TAX TREATY CONCLUDED:** A tax treaty between the U.S. and China concluded during President Reagan's trip to China in 1984 reduced China's tax rates on U.S. business profits, investment income, capital gains, and pensions.

Taiwan

The U.S. has sought to enhance relations with China in cultural, economic, and trade areas, without compromising our moral and legal commitments to the people of Taiwan. President Reagan has reiterated his deep concern for the well-being of Taiwan.

- **ARMS SALES CONSISTENT WITH TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT:** U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will be consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act which calls for the maintenance of a self-defense capability sufficient to meet Taiwan's military needs, but with the understanding that China will maintain a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question which will permit gradual reductions in arms sales.

- **SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TAIWAN ISSUE:** The Administration believes that the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people in Taiwan and the PRC to resolve. The U.S. will not exert pressure on Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing. The Administration supports a peaceful resolution of this issue.

CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

The Economic and Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Sea Lanes

The Caribbean Basin forms our "third border." Many major U.S. cities are closer to Central America than they are to each other.

- Cuba is a mere 90 miles away; El Salvador is closer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts. Washington, D.C., for example, is closer to Costa Rica than to San Francisco.
- The very proximity of these nations ensures that their interests and ours are intertwined.
 - Nearly half of U.S. trade and more than one-half of U.S. imported petroleum as well as many strategic minerals pass through the Caribbean sea lanes.
 - In times of war, almost two-thirds of the resupply and reinforcements needed by NATO would have to go through this area.
 - The crucial strategic and logistic link provided by the Panama Canal, which can be used by virtually all U.S. naval vessels except the large attack carriers, is vulnerable. It could be bottled up by hostile air and naval power in or near the sea lanes. Nicaraguan airfields, for example, are only 400 miles away. Some of these airfields are being upgraded to accommodate sophisticated jet fighters, such as Soviet MIGs.

Potential Immigration Problems

- The Caribbean region has become the main source of immigration to the U. S. By 1984, one out of every eight persons born in the Caribbean lived in the U.S.
 - Concerns about the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Communist oppression by seeking entry into our country are well-founded. In May 1984, President Reagan stated that Communist guerrilla warfare had caused 800,000 people to flee their homes.
 - Politically-motivated influxes of people to the U.S., such as the Mariel exodus from Cuba and Central America, impose excessive strains on our law enforcement systems and on our local economies.
- The U.S. shares an 1,800-mile border with Mexico, a country that is potentially threatened by the instability and violence in Central America.

The Reagan Administration recognizes that vital U.S. interests are at stake in Central America and the Caribbean. In addition to basic humanitarian concerns for the people of the region, the Administration believes that it is in our national self-interest to prevent the economic collapse or penetration of Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regimes into the Caribbean Basin countries.

- As President Reagan stated in April 1985:

If we provide too little help, our choice will be a Communist Central America with Communist subversion spreading southward and northward. We face the risk that 100 million people from Panama to our open southern border could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes and threaten the United States with violence, economic chaos, and a human tidal wave of refugees.

The Soviet Presence: The Cuban Threat

The Soviet Union, through its Cuban surrogate, has established a permanent presence in the Western Hemisphere, thereby constituting the greatest threat to U.S. security in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. Armed and economically supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba is providing training and materiel assistance to radical revolutionaries in this hemisphere and the world over. Each year the Soviets provide more than \$4 billion in economic aid to Cuba. Military aid in the last four years alone has totaled almost \$3 billion.

- **THE MILITARY PRESENCE:** The Soviets have 7,000 civilian advisers and a 2,800-man combat brigade in Cuba. To spy on the U.S., the Soviet Union established its most sophisticated electronic intelligence facility outside of its borders at Lourdes, which is staffed by 2,100 technicians.
- **DESTABILIZING THE REGION:** Cuba has the largest armed force in the Caribbean Basin and the second largest in Latin America. In 1982, the Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as many military advisers in Latin America as the U.S. had sent.
- **THE STRATEGIC THREAT:** Soviet long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft are also deployed in Cuba.

Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean

Castro has provided indispensable logistical and financial assistance to guerrilla movements in Latin America.

- **DESTABILIZING EL SALVADOR:** For more than five years, El Salvador has been a target of Cuban and Nicaraguan violence. Leftist guerrillas, with the active support of the Sandinista regime, the Soviet Union, and its Cuban surrogate, have been subverting the reforms of President Jose Napoleon Duarte and his democratically-elected government.
- **GRENADA:** The Soviets used the Cubans to funnel military, economic and technical assistance to Grenada in an attempt to turn the island into a springboard for spreading insurgency and revolution.
- **NICARAGUA:** Cuba is actively engaged in converting Nicaragua into a communist, totalitarian regime such as itself.

The Administration's Central America Policy

President Reagan has repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in Central America. Toward this end, the Administration has sought to:

- **FOSTER DEMOCRACY:** Bolster democratic systems where they already exist and help countries in the process to reach democratic goals quickly. Elections must be fair, safe, and open to all. The Administration has worked vigorously to correct human rights problems;
- **SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:** Seventy-eight cents out of every dollar of U.S. aid to Central America in the past four years has been economic. Programs such as those facilitated by the Caribbean Basin Initiative foster regional trade, investment, and economic development. U.S. technological assistance has focused on the modernization of the agricultural and industrial sectors, as well as improving health care;
- **PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE:** Security assistance is a shield for democratization, economic development, and diplomacy. No amount of political or economic reforms will bring peace so long as Cuban-backed leftist insurgents believe they will win by force. In the past four years, twenty-two percent of U.S. aid to the region has been in the form of security assistance; and

- **FOSTER DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS:** The U.S. government supports dialogue and negotiations among the countries of the region and the factions within each country, forging political solutions within the context of the democratic process.

Administration Initiatives Foster Progress

- **RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH:** Economic decline has been stemmed. After a decline of 4 percent in 1982-83, gross domestic product (GDP) for Central America as a whole grew by 1.2 percent in 1984.
- **ECONOMIC STABILIZATION:** U.S. economic assistance in the amount of \$274 million from the FY 1984 supplemental budget and \$607 million from the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution provided balance-of-payment support for vital imports and other assistance for economic stabilization.
 - A trade credit insurance program was established to provide guarantees for up to \$300 million in trade credits in fiscal 1985.
- **REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT:** The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a 12-year U.S. program of preferential duty-free treatment for 20 countries from the Caribbean Basin, went into effect on January 1, 1984.
 - Proposed by the Reagan Administration in 1982, the Caribbean Basin Initiative was designed to stimulate investment and trade in Caribbean Basin countries.
 - As of January 1985, U.S. imports from Central America had risen by \$220 million, an annual growth rate of 12 percent for the region as a whole.
- Millions of dollars have been allocated for improved health care and housing, humanitarian relief, and educational opportunities.
 - \$50 million was obligated for health services.
 - Some 1,200 Central American students were studying in the U.S. by the end of FY 1985.
- **FOREIGN AID:** For FY 1986, the Administration's economic assistance request for Central America totaled \$1 billion; the military request was \$261 million.

Building Democracy: A Record of Progress

- **EL SALVADOR:** In March and May 1984, nearly 80 percent of the Salvadoran electorate turned out in the presence of hundreds of international observers to elect their president, Jose Napoleon Duarte.
 - Nine political parties representing a broad range of opinion campaigned in the March 1985 legislative and mayoral elections, despite guerrilla attacks and harassment.
 - Political murder by "death squads" declined dramatically from the level of previous years.
- **GUATEMALA:** On July 1, 1984 Guatemala held a nationwide election to select delegates to a Constituent Assembly. More than 72 percent of eligible voters turned out. National elections were held in November, 1985. Because no candidate received 51 percent of the vote, as required by the Guatemalan Constitution, a run-off election was held in December, 1985. A new Congress was also seated in December, and the new president will be inaugurated in January, 1986.
- **HONDURAS:** Honduras continued to consolidate the democratic system begun with the 1981 Constitution. Presidential and congressional elections were held in November, 1985, marking the first transfer of power from one elected president to another since 1927.

- **COSTA RICA:** Costa Rica has remained steadfastly democratic, and President Monge's strong economic policies produced the highest economic growth rate in Central America in 1984.

While much remains to be done, the Reagan Administration's policies have produced beneficial results. The Reagan Administration will continue to strengthen democratic institutions, promote economic development, improve human rights, and help "foster the infrastructure of democracy around the world."

Grenada: President Reagan Acts to Ensure the Safety of Americans

Americans can be proud of the swift response of our country together with Grenada's democratic Caribbean neighbors, in liberating more than 110,000 people from the terror and tyranny of a Communist/totalitarian dictatorship. Today, Grenada is free and America is helping to rebuild its economy.

Background

With Soviet assistance, Cuba planned to turn this tiny island-nation into one of the largest military forces, person-for-person, of any country in the world. The island of Grenada, only twice the size of Washington, D.C. and with a population of 110,000, had more armed forces and more weapons and military supplies than all of its Eastern Caribbean neighbors combined.

- **THE THREAT:** In October 1983, 1,000 Americans in Grenada were endangered when a small group of insurgents even more radical and more pro-Cuban than the island's leader, Maurice Bishop, staged a bloody coup. There was fear, not only of regional destabilization, but also of a replay of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.
- The Point Salines airport, built primarily by "armed Cubans", was designed to accommodate military aircraft, including Soviet long-range bombers. This, in a country which did not even have an air force.
- The rescue operation uncovered five secret military agreements signed by Grenada—three with the U.S.S.R., one with Cuba, and one with North Korea.

The Rescue Mission

In response to an urgent formal request from members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the United States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, assisted in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada. The legitimacy of the OECS request and the concern for the safety of American citizens led the Reagan Administration to mount a rescue mission. This rescue mission succeeded and the American forces were greeted as liberators.

Repression and Militarization in Nicaragua

Over the past five years, the nations of Latin America have moved towards democracy. Notably, there is one exception. Nicaragua has continued to move away from the democratic principles of the revolution which overthrew the government of Anastasio Somoza in 1979. The Sandinista regime reneged on its written promise to the Organization of American States to establish a real democracy, hold free elections and respect human rights.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: Nicaragua has become a communist totalitarian regime, abusive of human rights and seeking to destabilize the emerging democracies of the region. The Sandinista regime refuses to hold free elections; has militarized the nation and supports armed insurrection in other countries in ways that serve Soviet goals of destabilization and conflict.

In October, 1985, the Sandinista regime formally suspended all civil rights, including freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.

- The right to dissent is denied, religious freedom has been curtailed and entire cultures have been denied their homes or livelihoods.
 - The Sandinistas control all media outlets through censorship.
 - Neighborhood watch committees, informant networks, rationing of basic necessities and enforced participation in Sandinista organizations are all used to control and intimidate the people.
- **REPRESSION AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL:** Since 1979, the Sandinistas have consolidated control over the government and the armed forces, and the private economy. Nearly half of Nicaragua's industry and 40 percent of its agriculture have been placed under direct state control.

Nicaraguan Armed Forces: Largest Ever in Central America

In their six years of power, the Sandinistas have followed Cuba's example in developing a massive military establishment.

- Nicaragua, a country of less than three million people, has developed the largest, most powerful armed force in the history of Central America. Since 1979 its military manpower forces have increased from 10,000 to 120,000 (as of mid-1985), a force level far beyond that required for legitimate security needs. By contrast, next-door Costa Rica has no army and in Honduras the armed forces stand at 16,000.
- **THE CUBAN PRESENCE:** As of mid-1985, Cuban forces in Nicaragua numbered 7,500 (up from 165 in 1979), some 3,000 of whom are military or security personnel attached to the armed forces, internal security and intelligence organizations.
 - In December 1985, Secretary of State Shultz said that there was "incontrovertible evidence" that large numbers of Cuban soldiers are heavily involved in combat against the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. According to Sandinista defectors, Cuban advisers wear Sandinista uniforms, pilot Soviet-built helicopters, and sometimes engage in combat.
 - An additional 30 to 40 Soviet and more than 60 East German military/security advisers also operate in Nicaragua.
- **THE REGIONAL THREAT:** The total value of tanks, helicopters, and other war materiel shipped to Nicaragua approached \$500 million by early 1985.
 - More than 40 new military bases and support facilities have been constructed since 1979, representing a Soviet investment of \$70 million.
 - The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete airfield, when completed, will be the longest military runway in Central America and will be able to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-bloc inventory. The potential threat to Nicaragua's neighbors would then increase dramatically.

Aggression and Subversion

- **REGIONAL INSTABILITY:** Since 1979, the Sandinista regime has engaged in aggression and subversion against its neighbors—El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. It has supported leftist Guatemalan insurgents, and its forces have raided Honduras and Costa Rica. The leftist Salvadoran guerrillas, which are seeking to overthrow the democratically-elected government of President Duarte, receive the bulk of their arms, ammunition, and supplies from Nicaragua.
- **A HAVEN FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:** Nicaragua has become safe haven for international terrorist groups such as the German Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Italian Red Brigade. The Sandinista connection with the PLO and radical Middle Eastern states is more than a decade-and-a-half old.
 - The Sandinista government has issued Nicaraguan passports to radicals and terrorists from the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe, thus enabling them to travel in Western countries without disclosing their true identities.

The Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters

Economic mismanagement, human rights violations, and abuse of governmental authority have driven more than 120,000 Nicaraguans into exile. By 1982 many of them had taken up arms against the Sandinista regime, and by 1985 these armed forces had grown to 15,000.

- **THEIR GOALS:** The freedom fighters support democracy, and are calling for national independence, and for the fulfillment of the original promises of the anti-Somoza revolution. They are against the subversion of these ideals by the Sandinista regime.
- **THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS DESERVE U.S. SUPPORT:** The freedom fighters deserve U.S. support, since vital U.S. strategic interests are at stake.
 - Nicaragua's freedom fighters are not asking for troops but only for technical and financial support and supplies.

Administration Efforts to Resolve the Nicaraguan Conflict

U.S. policy toward Nicaragua since the Sandinistas' ascent to power has consistently sought a peaceful resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict. The Reagan Administration has not sought to overthrow the Sandinistas.

- **DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS:** The Reagan Administration has made numerous attempts to engage the Sandinistas in serious diplomatic negotiations, both bilaterally and through the multilateral Contadora peace process. Senior U.S. diplomats have traveled to Nicaragua repeatedly to discuss U.S. concerns directly with the Sandinistas.
- **THE REAGAN PEACE PROPOSAL:** The Sandinistas rejected President Reagan's peace proposal, which called upon both the Nicaraguan government and the freedom fighters to lay down their arms and accept an offer for church-mediated talks, internationally supervised elections, and an end to the suppression of civil rights.

President Orders Trade Embargo

In response to Nicaragua's aggression in Central America, President Reagan, by Executive Order in May 1985, imposed a trade embargo. All imports and exports to Nicaragua were prohibited. All goods and services originating in Nicaragua were banned from our shores, as were that country's air carriers and merchant ships.

Reagan Policy Objectives: Democracy, Stability, and a Restoration of Human Rights

- Restoring genuine democracy;
- A definitive end to support for terrorism and insurgency;
- The removal of foreign forces, including the thousands of Soviet-bloc, Cuban, PLO, Libyan and other military and security personnel; and
- Regional stability through reductions in Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore the military balance between itself and its neighbors.

Despite Sandinista rejections, the Reagan Administration remains committed to a peaceful resolution of the Nicaraguan threat. The Sandinista government has bargained in bad faith and engaged in grandstand diplomacy, seeking only a propaganda advantage.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Objectives of U.S. Policy

The peace, security, and well-being of the nations of the Middle East are critical to a broad range of American interests. The U.S.' comprehensive and balanced approach in the Middle East and Persian Gulf is aimed at protecting these interests, which include:

- protecting U.S. national security through the preservation of a global strategic balance which will permit free and independent societies to pursue their aspirations;
- checking the spread of Soviet influence in this strategic region;
- working towards the resolution of regional conflicts which threaten international security;
- assuring the security and welfare of Israel and other important friendly nations in the region;
- preserving and fostering the U.S.' critical interest in access to the region's oil; and
- supporting other major economic interests, including access to markets for American goods and services, cooperation with the wealthier states in the region to maintain a sound international financial order, and assisting the orderly economic development of the region.

The Search for Peace—The Administration's Middle East Peace Initiative

In September, 1982, the Reagan Administration called for a "fresh start" in the Middle East peace process. In pursuit of a lasting solution to the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Reagan Administration outlined seven essential points upon which American policy towards the conflict would be based. Included are the following:

- The Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, with its concept of an exchange of territory for peace, and the Camp David Accords, which provide for Palestinian autonomy with full guarantees for Israel's security.
- The U.S. opposes any proposal that threatens the security of Israel. As President Reagan has stated, "America's commitment to Israel is ironclad."
- The U.S. will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank or Gaza. Neither will the U.S. support annexation or permanent control of these territories by Israel.

The Administration's Middle East Peace Initiative is balanced and fair. It is an "initiative," not a "plan" to be imposed on the parties of the region. The U.S. is prepared to support these positions in the course of negotiations.

U.S. Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Search for a Lasting Peace

SUPPORT FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS: The U.S. will continue to seek a lasting peace that respects the legitimate concerns of all parties. The U.S. will always insist on Israel's right to exist in peace behind secure and recognized borders. The only way to achieve a genuine, lasting peace is through direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states.

OPPOSITION TO TERRORISTS: The U.S. opposes governments or terrorist organizations which seek to undermine Israel and Arab friends.

- U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is unchanged: the U.S. will never recognize or negotiate with any group that espouses violent solutions or refuses to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 or recognize Israel's right to exist.

ISRAEL

The United States has an historic commitment to Israel's security dating back almost four decades. U.S. assistance to Israel provides a tangible demonstration of the strength and durability of that commitment.

- **ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE:** From 1981 to 1984, the U.S. provided almost \$9.8 billion in aid to Israel—more than has been provided by any previous Administration over a comparable time.
 - In 1984, aid to Israel made up more than a quarter of our entire foreign aid program.
 - In FY 1985, Israel received \$1.5 billion in supplemental economic aid.
 - For FY 1986, the Administration requested \$1.8 billion in military assistance in forgiven loans for Israel, and \$1.2 billion in economic aid, also in forgiven loans, making Israel the largest U.S. foreign aid recipient.

The Strategic Relationship

Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship has been strengthened. President Reagan has stated that the U.S. and Israel will continue to work together: "Our friendship is closer and stronger today than ever before. And we intend to keep it that way."

MILITARY COOPERATION: President Reagan has pledged repeatedly to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge. As the President stated, Israel and the U.S. are "allies in the defense of freedom in the Middle East."

- A joint political-military group has been created to discuss expansion of U.S.-Israeli military cooperation.
- The U.S. renewed a U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement that provides for cooperation in military research and development, procurement, and logistics. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. has already purchased Israeli-manufactured radios, remote piloted vehicles, anti-tank weapons, and sophisticated aircraft components. The U.S., in turn, has made available the latest technology for the development of the Israeli-designed Lavi aircraft and a new class of missile attack boat, the SAAR 5.
- The U.S. and Israel agreed to coproduce three conventional submarines for the Israeli Navy. The U.S. also agreed to acquire a second squadron of Kfir fighter aircraft. The U.S. Navy will join Israel's Navy in building missiles and spy drones.

- Joint anti-submarine exercise took place and the U.S. Sixth Fleet made regular port calls in Haifa.
- Israel has agreed to the Reagan Administration's offer to participate in research and development for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
- The U.S. and Israel agreed to use each other's medical facilities in emergencies. This involves U.S. utilization of Israeli hospitals; the prepositioning of U.S. medical supplies in Israel; and the exchange of visits by U.S. and Israeli military physicians.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A Joint Economic Development Group was created to discuss problems of the Israeli economy and to find ways where U.S. cooperation can help Israel overcome its economic difficulties.

- The U.S. and Israel concluded a free trade agreement in April 1985 which grants Israel open access to U.S. markets.

POLITICAL SUPPORT: President Reagan called on Arab leaders to negotiate *directly* with Israel.

- The Reagan Administration reaffirmed that the U.S. would not deal with the PLO.
- U.S. support for Israel continued in the United Nations and other international arenas. In turn, Israel voted with the U.S. in the U.N. more than it did with any other country.
 - Of the 153 issues which came to a vote in the 1984 General Assembly, Israel and the U.S. agreed on 88.5 percent of them. Jerusalem concurred on nine of 10 issues regarded by the U.S. as key questions.

EGYPT

The Reagan Administration has worked with Egypt and other friends in the Middle East to build relationships which will protect and advance our mutual interests. The Reagan Administration has sought to strengthen bilateral relations with Egypt.

- **ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE:** The Administration requested \$1.3 billion in military aid, all of it in forgiven loans, and \$815 million in economic aid, also in forgiven loans for FY 1986. Egypt will also receive \$227 million under PL 480. Egypt is the U.S.'s second largest foreign aid recipient.
 - Egypt received \$500 million in supplemental economic aid in FY 1985.

A Continued Partnership in the Peace Process

U.S.-Egyptian relations are marked by continued partnership in the peace process. Our countries consult on other regional issues. The Administration will continue to work with Egypt for Middle East peace and stability.

JORDAN

Jordan is a key participant in the search for an Arab-Israeli peace. As such, its continued security is fundamentally important to U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Jordan is a bulwark of stability and moderation in the area.

- Over the past year, King Hussein of Jordan has met with President Reagan on a number of occasions, and has taken steps to advance the peace process.

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

As the anti-communist leader of the conservative Gulf states and as the largest oil producer in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to outside interferences. These include military threats arising out of the Iran/Iraq conflict, from radical states in the area, and particularly from Soviet or Soviet-inspired direct and indirect military action.

AWACS: In response to these threats, the Administration offered to provide Saudi Arabia with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and other air defense enhancement equipment. The sale was approved by Congress in late 1981. Delivery of the AWACS system is scheduled to begin in 1986.

- The sale of AWACS and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia serves the vital interest of the U.S. by enhancing Saudi Arabia's capacity to defend itself, and demonstrating our credibility as a reliable ally.
- Assurances and safeguards have been instituted to prevent these aircraft from compromising Israel's security.

U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES: The United States has four primary objectives in the Persian Gulf region. These include:

- the continuation of stable and secure access to regional oil;
- the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence;
- assuring the security of friendly states in the region; and
- the demonstration of U.S. reliability and resolve in supporting overall regional security.

TERRORISM

U.S. Policy: No Concession to Terrorists

Terrorism is a worldwide problem, whose primary targets are the U.S. and the democratic nations of the West. The U.S. government will not be intimidated by terrorist threats or demands. The U.S. refuses to concede to terrorists' demands and encourages its allies to do likewise. Acquiescence to terrorist demands only encourages more terrorism, further endangering innocent lives.

Reagan Administration Efforts to Combat Terrorism

DECISIVE ACTION CAPTURES HIJACKERS OF ACHILLE LAURO: President Reagan ordered U.S. military forces to intercept an aircraft over international airspace that was transporting the terrorist hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. As the President noted, "We will not tolerate terrorism in any form. We will continue to take every appropriate measure available to us to deal with these dastardly deeds. There can be no asylum for terrorism or terrorists."

OTHER EFFORTS: Efforts to combat terrorism have been at the forefront of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy agenda.

- The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism signed by the President authorized a total FY 1985 expenditure of \$356 million for enhanced security at high-threat diplomatic posts abroad.
- The U.S. Anti-Terrorism Program was established by the Administration to help friendly governments counter terrorism. Using U.S. facilities, foreign delegations are trained in anti-terrorist policy, crisis management, hostage and barricade negotiations, airport security measures and bomb disposal methods.

- The formation of the Overseas Security Advisory Council which brings together public and private officials to exchange information on security issues;
- Control of trade with states which are supporters of terrorism;
- Improvements in intelligence-gathering capabilities; and
- Increased security at U.S. airports and aboard U.S. aircraft.

AFRICA

Reagan Administration Policy

The Reagan Administration's policy toward Africa is based on several key principles:

- **FOREIGN AID:** Increased economic freedom, especially for agriculture, is essential to the health of most African economies. U.S. development assistance programs are cast for the long term. They are tailored to promote self-sufficiency and local initiative, and to decrease dependency on foreign assistance.
 - U.S. economic assistance has grown from \$787 million in 1981 to over \$1 billion in 1985, not counting emergency assistance.
 - The Administration requested \$1.2 billion in foreign assistance for FY 1986. Of the total FY 1986 request, only 17 percent is military-related assistance; 83 percent is economic.

Humanitarian Aid

In response to the widespread famine in Africa, the U.S., at the request of the Reagan Administration, is providing unprecedented levels of assistance. The U.S. is attempting to alleviate the immediate needs of millions of starving people as well as to promote long-term solutions to Africa's food production problems.

- The U.S. has long been the largest food aid donor to Africa, providing almost as much aid as all other donors combined.
- On January 3, 1985, President Reagan announced a comprehensive African Hunger Relief Initiative, in which he directed the U.S. government to provide more than 1.5 million metric tons of emergency food (at a cost of more than \$1 billion) during fiscal year 1985—three times the record amount from the previous year.
- Through international organizations and regional programs, the U.S. is supporting such efforts as agricultural development projects, land reclamation, and other programs to develop agricultural land and to train farmers in soil conservation techniques.

Refugee Assistance

The number of refugees and displaced persons in Africa has increased by 20 percent since mid-1984, to 2,500,000. Total U.S. government assistance to African refugees from all sources, including food and in-kind contributions, was expected to reach at least \$150 million in FY 1985 (compared to \$105 million in FY 1984).

SOUTH AFRICA

The Reagan Administration Rejects Apartheid

The Reagan Administration rejects the South African government's policy of apartheid which denies basic rights to South Africa's 23 million blacks. The Reagan Administration believes apartheid is an abhorrent, repugnant policy, totally against the ideals of the American people.

The U.S. relationship to South Africa is far from a "normal" one. Significant embargoes and restrictions are already in place on U.S. trade and cooperation, in military and nuclear areas, as well as in U.S. commercial relations. President Reagan continued to disassociate the U.S. from the apartheid machinery when he signed an executive order in September, 1985. The president ordered the following steps:

- A ban on bank loans, with the exception of those which improve economic opportunities or support educational, housing and health facilities that are open to all races.
- A formal ban on the sale of computers to South African agencies that enforce apartheid.
- A ban on U.S. sales of the Krugerrand gold coin.
- A denial of export assistance to American companies that do not adhere to the principles of non-discrimination.
- An increase in scholarships for South Africans and funding for programs to promote human rights.
- Creation of an advisory committee to monitor the situation in South Africa and recommend steps that encourage peaceful change.

Constructive Engagement

- The Reagan Administration believes that the best means to encourage the white government of South Africa to enact a policy away from apartheid and toward a system based on the consent of the governed is through a policy of "constructive engagement."
 - The Administration's policy of constructive engagement is based on the belief that positive change is more likely to occur through dialogue and negotiation than through confrontation.

The Reagan Administration Opposes Economic Sanctions

President Reagan opposes economic sanctions against South Africa. The President believes that punitive economic sanctions or trade restrictions against South Africa will injure those we profess to help—South Africa's black population.

- If new investment in South Africa were prohibited, black South Africans would lose job opportunities. The South African economy must create 250,000 new jobs for young blacks each year, and twice that many people will be entering the job market by the turn of the century. Such an economy needs more jobs, not less.

Reagan Administration Policies Helping to Promote Change


The Reagan Administration has undertaken a number of programs designed to directly aid black South Africans. Included are:

- A multimillion dollar scholarship program to bring black South African students to U.S. universities.
- Training programs in cooperation with the AFL/CIO for black South African trade unionists.
- Scholarship support for university-level study in South Africa.
- Support for small business development in black South African communities.
- The provision of \$30 million over three years to give South African blacks better training and educational opportunities.

Administration Will Continue to Urge Peaceful Change

While the process which moves the South African government away from apartheid has begun, the Reagan Administration does not endorse nor is it satisfied with the limited changes that have been made.

- The Reagan Administration is committed to using its limited influence to promote peaceful change in South Africa and will continue to voice its condemnation of apartheid's evils.





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