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Arms Control

The Test Ban Shibboleth

Mikhail Gorbachev sings a seductive tune in demanding a complete halt to further testing of nuclear weapons. The campaign is going so well that he has twice extended a self-imposed moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing, piously declared last July to mark the 40th anniversary of the American bombing of Hiroshima.

In the battle for public opinion, Mr. Gorbachev seems to be advancing easily. Last week 63 members of the House and Senate wrote the White House urging Mr. Reagan to call off an American nuclear test. Other members want to withhold money for American tests so long as the Soviet moratorium continues. With its peremptory refusal even to consider a complete test ban, the Administration plays into Mr. Gorbachev's hands.

The President's two principal arguments are that nuclear explosions are necessary to maintain the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and that a ban would be unenforceable because Soviet cheating could not be detected. He is widely disputed by scientists outside the Government.

Proponents of a test ban argue cogently that it is one way to cool the nuclear arms race and to encourage nonnuclear powers to remain so. They contend that a test ban would lock in the present American advantage in the design of nuclear warheads. The demand for a test ban has thus become the touchstone of sincere peace seekers.

But Mr. Gorbachev's persistence and Mr. Reagan's resistance probably have little to do with sincerity about arms control. A test ban now, without other agreements, would appear to do a great deal more for the Soviet Union than it has yet admitted: it would kill development of the nuclear-powered X-ray laser, a device that some see as the most promising technical component of

President Reagan's antimissile defense initiative.

However misconceived that "Star Wars" program, the Administration is not obliged to kill it for free. It should be bargained away in orderly fashion, for sizable reductions in nuclear stockpiles.

"Star Wars" aside, why should a test ban be a prepayment for a major arms control agreement? The Administration is pursuing arms talks with the Soviet Union across a wide front; to hang toughest on the items the Russians want most is not a bad tactic provided the negotiations are sincerely pursued. And if the Administration were not sincere, there is no way to make it so except at the ballot box.

Instead of urging the Administration to throw in its hand on the test-ban issue, Congress would do better to elucidate the underlying facts. Would a test ban really halt the arms race? It would freeze technical change in warhead design, but not all changes have been bad. A freeze 20 years ago would have prevented development of lower yield warheads and of permissive action links, the safety devices that prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. What can one predict for a freeze now?

The Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories that design nuclear weapons have a vigorous interest in opposing a test ban; it would put them largely out of business. Congress should rigorously examine their contentions that stockpile testing is necessary and that seismic monitoring could not detect Soviet cheating.

Securing the answers to such questions would help lay the ground for a test-ban negotiation. Shouting at the White House, especially during the din of Mr. Gorbachev's public relations campaign, will not.

Significant transfers of arms and related equipment to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific in the past quarter.

Middle East

Acquiring Country/Group	System	Item	From	Quantity	Cost	Status
Afghanistan (Mujahidin)	Missiles	CIA-supplied Stinger SAMs	US	NA	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Iraq	Missiles	Su-25 Frogfoot and SA-13 SAM	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
Jordan	Aircraft	CA-101 Aviojet trainers (CASA)	Spain	16	\$90m	Signed (March 1988)
Oman	Switches	Advanced circuit switches (Plessey)	UK	NA	\$700,000	Reported (March 1988)
Saudi Arabia	Aircraft	BAe Tornado fighters, Hawk trainers, Pilatus PC-9 trainers, training, technical programs, spares	UK	72/30/30	\$7b	Signed (February 1988)
Saudi Arabia	Support	Personnel for operation, maintenance and training of F-5 aircraft weapon system (Lear Siegler)	US	559	\$37m	Reported (March 1988)
Saudi Arabia	Missiles	AIM-9L Sidewinders; AIM-9P4 Sidewinders; Stinger launch units; Stinger reloads; Harpoon ASMs	US	995/871/200/	\$354m	Before Congress (April 1988)
Saudi Arabia	Training	Simulators and training equipment as part of Tornado/Hawk and PC-9 order	UK	NA	NA	Contract Reported (April 1988)
Sudan	Miscellaneous	20 Walid APCs, weapons, ammunition and equipment	Egypt	NA	\$6m	Delivery Reported (April 1988)
Syria	Vessels	Romeo-class submarines	USSR	2	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Syria	Missiles	Sepal (SSC-1-B) surface-to-surface cruise missiles	USSR	NA	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Syria	Vessels	Nanuchka-class missile corvettes with new model Styx missile	USSR	4	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Syria	Miscellaneous	SA-5 SAMs, patrol boats, Styx and Sepal anti-ship missiles	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
Yemen (YAR)	Armor	T-72 tanks, attack submarines and MIG-29 Fulcrum delivery expected 1987	USSR	16	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)

Africa

Angola (UNITA)	Missiles	CIA-supplied Stinger SAMs	US	NA	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Angola	Miscellaneous	Mi-24 Hind and Mi-17 Hip H helicopters, MIG-23s, SA-13s	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
Chad	Vehicles	V150S Commando Armored cars (Cadillac Gage)	US	8	\$3.7m	Reported (February 1988)
Chad	Missiles	Emergency resupply of Redeye missiles (General Dynamics)	UK	NA	NA	Reported Delivering (March 1988)
Ethiopia	Miscellaneous	APCs, T-55 tanks and MIG-23s	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
Mozambique	Miscellaneous	Mi-24 Hinds, several PT-76 light tanks, BTR-60 APCs artillery pieces, BM-24 rocket launchers, SA-3 SAM launchers, Yevgenya-class minesweepers, SO-1 patrol boats	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
Niger	Aircraft	M-11VBL light armored vehicles (Panhard)	France	3	NA	Reported (March 1988)

Asia and the Pacific

Australia	Simulator	Acoustic and visual simulation for SCTT-3 Submarine Command Team Trainer (Ferranti)	UK	1	NA	Contract Announced (April 1988)
China (PRC)	Aircraft	Challenger aircraft (Canadair)	Canada	3	NA	Reported (March 1988)
China (PRC)	Avionics	Integrated avionics system kits for F-8, support equipment, training and system installation	US	55	\$50m	Before Congress (April 1988)
India	Simulators	Simfire Mk II Extended Range Improved tactical and gunnery simulators and spares	UK	120	\$4.2m	Reported Ordered (March 1988)
India	Vessel	HMS Hermes aircraft carrier	UK	1	\$84m	Negotiations Revived (March 1988)
India	Miscellaneous	I-76 transports, MIG-29 deliveries continued, Receiving MIG-27 and first Kilo-class attack submarine	USSR	3	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
India	Aircraft	Additional Mirage 2000 fighters (AMD)	France	8	NA	Reported Ordered (1988)
India	Aircraft	Dauphin helicopters for Air Force (Aerospetale)	France	6	NA	Order Signed (April 1988)
India	Artillery	Bofors-77 155mm howitzers	Sweden	400	\$1.1b	Contract Reported (April 1988)
Indonesia	Aircraft	Eight F-16A/B aircraft with an option for four more	US	12	\$200m	Letter of Offer (March 1988)
Indonesia	Vessels	General Dynamics Van Speijk-class frigates with option for 2 more with spares, tooling, ammunition and training	Netherlands	4	\$1.3b	Reported sold (February 1988)
Indonesia	Vessel	Attack-class large patrol craft	Australia	8th	NA	Reported Handed Over (March 1988)
Indonesia	Simulator	Simgun tactical small arms simulator (Weston Simfire/Linlib)	UK/Indonesia	NA	NA	Reported Ordered (March 1988)
Japan	Aircraft	Additional Lockheed/Kawasaki P-3C anti-sub. aircraft	US	30	NA	Reported Before Congress (Nov. 1985)
Korea (DPRK)	Missiles	SA-3 Goa missiles	USSR	NA	NA	Reported (March 1988)
Korea (ROK)	Aircraft	F-16D multi-mission fighters (General Dynamics)	US	1 of 38	NA	Rollout Delivery (March 1988)
Laos	Vessels	Patrol boats	USSR	48	NA	Reported Proposed (February 1988)
Laos	Aircraft	MIG-21 fighters	USSR	27	NA	Reported Delivered (February 1988)
Malaysia	Vehicles	Last of 116 Stonefield vehicles (Stonefield Holdings)	UK	NA	NA	Delivering (March 1988)
Malaysia	Vessels	Lerici-class mine countermeasure vessels	Italy	4	NA	Delivering (March 1988)
Malaysia	Grenades	Colored hand-held smoke grenades (Peira-Wessex Schermuly)	UK	NA	NA	Announced (March 1988)
Pakistan	Missiles	Improved TOW missiles	US	2,030	\$20m	Before Congress (April 1988)
Philippines	Vehicles	M-35A1 heavy cargo trucks (AM General)	US	97	NA	Reported Delivered (February 1988)
Singapore	Aircraft	Additional B.211 trainers to 10 already ordered (Siai Marchetti)	Italy	20	\$5m	Ordered Confirmed (February 1988)
Sri Lanka	Aircraft	SF.260 trainers/ground attack aircraft (Siai-Marchetti)	Italy	2	NA	Reported Present (February 1988)
Thailand	Communications	C* network (Electronics Tech. Projects)	US	NA	\$4m	Reported (March 1988)
Thailand	Air Defense	Centralized air defense system (System Development Corporation)	US	NA	\$71m	Reported (March 1988)
Thailand	Avionics	Head-up display weapons aiming computer systems for F-5E/F aircraft (GEC Avionics)	US	39	\$9.3m	Reported ordered (April 1988)

Latin America

Colombia	Aircraft	500MG Scout Defender helicopters (Hughes)	US	8/2	NA	Delivered (February 1988)
Cuba	Miscellaneous	SA-13 SAMs, shoulder-fired SA-14s, Stenka-class fast patrol craft	USSR	NA	NA	1985 Delivery Reported (March 1988)
El Salvador	Aircraft	UH-1H, UH-1N helicopters (Bell), A-37 (Cessna)	US	6/12/1	NA	Delivery Confirmed (March 1988)

Democrats, the country's "most prominent figures" have been actively engaged in drug trafficking . . . Nicaraguan State Security has claimed to have uncovered a CIA plot to infiltrate the Salvadoran guerillas launched from Meanguera Island in the Gulf of Fonseca . . . Rumors in Honduras say that ousted (1984) chief of the armed forces, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, has made many trips back to Palmerola Air Base — center of the US military presence in Honduras — from his exile base in Miami, Florida, to advise the *contras*; the Honduran Armed Forces Public Relations Office would not deny the rumor . . . A barge loaded with 18,600 kilos of explosives was discovered in the Brazilian Amazon port of Manaus; it was rumored to be destined for Colombia's M-19 guerillas . . . In Colombia, the latest rumors say that the so-called America Battalion, which had been fighting with the M-19, has left the country . . . Salvadoran rebel radio claims that "several hundred North Americans" are currently working with the Army's General Staff . . . Liberia's Samuel K. Doe has set up a committee to look into charges by Liberia Unification Party Chairman William Gabriel Kpoteh — who also heads the new opposition coalition — that the Government plans to stage a "fake coup" in order to charge the opposition with participation . . . Mauritian Foreign Minister Madun Dulloo has denied that Mauritius is about to establish diplomatic relations with Israel . . . The "Army of Southern Lebanon" has denied that its commander, Maj. Gen. Antoine Lahd, was wounded in an ambush in South Lebanon . . . ■

Leadership Profile: al-Sayyid Sadiq 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi *Leader, Umma Party, Sudan*

The man whose party was expected to win the largest single number of seats in the new Assembly in Sudan's first elections since the 1969 military takeover is Sadiq al-Mahdi, whose *Umma* Party represents the major religious force known as the *Ansar*, inheritors of the movement led by Sadiq al-Mahdi's great-grandfather, the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, who proclaimed himself the expected Mahdi of Islam in 1884 and is best remembered in the West for the death of Gen. Charles Gordon at Khartoum and the later campaign by Kitchener to recover the Sudan. Although the *Ansar* movement has split into at least four factions, Sadiq al-Mahdi's is considered the most influential politically.

Sadiq al-Mahdi was born in 1936, the son of Siddiq al-Mahdi. When Siddiq al-Mahdi died in September 1961, the post of religious leader (Imam) of the *Ansar* was inherited by Siddiq's brother, Hadi al-Mahdi. But the political leadership of the *Umma* party was taken over by Siddiq's son Sadiq.

Sadiq was educated at Comboni College in Khartoum and then at St. John's College, Oxford. From 1961, as mentioned, he became leader of the *Umma* Party. Beginning in 1965 — after the "civilian coup" of 1964 restored civilian rule, the *Umma* held the Prime Ministership, in the person of Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub. Sadiq, not yet 30 at the time of the 1965 elections, was too young to be elected to Parliament and thus, while head of the Party, was not Prime Minister. Sadiq won a by-election and eventually sought to replace Mahgoub but this was opposed by his uncle, the Imam Hadi. Finally, after Mahgoub lost a censure vote in July 1966, Sadiq was elected premier. He held the post only until May of 1967, but during his tenure he sought to downplay sectarian rivalries and support agrarian and social reforms. This deepened the split with his more conservative uncle. When the Government fell in 1967, the split in the *Umma* led to its loss of power; Sadiq and his faction joined the opposition.

Ja'far Numeiri overthrew the Government in May of 1969. Discussions with Sadiq al-Mahdi broke down, and he was arrested on June 6, charged with high treason. Relations with the other faction of the *Ansar* also worsened, and when Numeiri tried to tour the brotherhood's traditional stronghold, Abba Island, and was opposed, he ordered an attack on Abba. In the attack, the Imam al-Hadi was killed.

Also in 1970 Sadiq was exiled from the country. He returned in February 1972, and had his family's property, which the Government had confiscated, returned to him. But he was arrested again. In April 1974 he was released and sent again into exile. He spent the years 1974-77 abroad, mostly residing in Libya or London. In 1976, he was charged by Numeiri with masterminding a coup attempt in the Sudan; Sadiq was in London at the time. Sadiq later admitted involvement. With the National Unionist Party figure Sharif al-Hindi, Sadiq formed a National Front in exile. Both men were sentenced to death *in absentia*.

When, in 1977, Numeiri tried to reconcile with the opposition forces opposed to him, Sadiq returned to the Sudan, meeting with Numeiri at Port Sudan. He was named a member of the Committee of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), Numeiri's sole ruling party. But his relations with Numeiri were never better than cool.

Sadiq al-Mahdi tried, in 1980, to mediate the Iranian hostage crisis, without success. In 1983 he spent time as a Visiting Fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford. Later that year, Sadiq denounced Numeiri's strict enforcement of Islamic *shari'a* law; he was arrested once again, returning to prison in September of that year. In December of 1984 he was released, though he remained under close surveillance until the fall of Numeiri.

Sadiq al-Mahdi is considered a moderate to conservative in most areas; he opposed the strict version of Islamic law favored by Numeiri and the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the rival pro-Egyptian Unionist tendency, the *Umma* Party has always been a nationalist force. Although Sadiq al-Mahdi ideologically has little in common with Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, Qadhafi provided him with a home and a forum during his years of exile, and he may be open to closer ties with Tripoli.

As for the continuing rebellion in the South, Sadiq's opposition to the *shari'a* punishments and the fact that his tenure as Prime Minister was regarded as one of relatively improved North-South relations might work in his favor, although at this point few expect the southerners to compromise again with the Muslim north. ■

TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS DELIVERED

BY

RICHARD PERLE

AT THE

GROUPE DE BELLERIVE CONFERENCE

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

29 JUN 1985

*Grand
Council*

⊕
speech

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am pleased and honored to have been invited to address this distinguished gathering of men and women whose dedication to peace is so admirably reflected in the public lives and careers of those assembled, from all over the world, in this place so long associated with the search for peace. There is no higher calling than the search for peace and freedom; and there is no path to their attainment more important than free and open discourse conducted with clarity and candor. I shall endeavor in these remarks to be both clear and candid. I should prefer to be diplomatic as well -- in this city of diplomacy; but in the twenty minutes allotted to me there is no time to treat, in the gingerly manner customary in international diplomacy, those ideas and arguments, some of which we have heard yesterday and again this morning, that are misleading, or malicious, or just simply false. Yesterday morning, Professor

Gromyko contributed arguments of all three types, and Dr. Arbatov has done so again this morning.

In a single breath, Professor Gromyko managed to celebrate "the great victory over Japanese militarism in World War II" while condemning as "an indefensible, immoral action" President Truman's use of atomic weapons to bring that war to a close. The use by the United States of the atomic bomb against Japan came at a moment when the Soviet army was busy consolidating its hold over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that it continues to occupy to this day. And it was motivated, not as Professor Gromyko suggests, to impress upon the Soviet Union that the United States had succeeded in developing the atomic bomb, (a charge repeated by Dr. Arbatov this morning) but to save the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Americans and Japanese who would doubtless have perished in the prolongation of a bitter war. Professor Gromyko referred in his speech to President Truman's desire to exhibit the American monopoly of nuclear weapons in order to acquire, for itself, "a special role of world leadership." But nowhere did he acknowledge that, in a manner unprecedented in human history, the United States never used its unique possession of atomic weapons to attack, or threaten, or intimidate any other nation. It is fair to ask whether Joseph Stalin or his successors would have done the same, or whether Germany or Japan would have been spared with atomic weapons in Soviet hands in 1945.

Professor Gromyko would have us believe that the Soviet build-up of strategic nuclear weapons has been forced upon them by American efforts to achieve what he calls "unilateral advantage." But it is the Soviet Union, alone, that today possesses a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a combination of yield and accuracy sufficient to attack and destroy hardened military facilities that are essential elements of the American nuclear deterrent. The United States has no comparable hard target offensive capability. It is the Soviet Union alone that has deployed a system of anti-ballistic missile defense. It is the Soviet Union alone that has a fully tested and deployed anti-satellite system. It is the Soviet Union alone that has mobile missiles with multiple warheads of intercontinental range. And until the North Atlantic Alliance began a modest offsetting deployment of intermediate ballistic missiles in Europe a year ago, it was the Soviet Union alone that possessed such weapons, which it continues to deploy in numbers that vastly exceed the American equivalents. We know, from Dr. Andrei Sakharov -- a man whose immense personal courage and internationally recognized scientific and moral stature stands in sharp contrast to the deplorable cruelty and isolation he has experienced at the hands of his own Government -- we know from Andrei Sakharov that he was drafted to begin work

on the Soviet hydrogen bomb a full year before President Harry Truman made the decision to proceed with the development of an American hydrogen weapon.

While I am on the subject of U.S. and Soviet weapons developments let me cite a few examples of the different U.S. and Soviet trends in weapons development over the past two decades. The last of our B-52 bombers rolled off the production line in 1962, twenty-three years ago; and some of our active fleet of strategic bombers were built as far back as 1956. We began deploying our newest land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles fifteen years ago. And during the same year we began deploying the Poseidon submarine launched ballistic missiles. We did not field another new strategic system until 1978, when we began deploying the Trident I submarine launched missiles. Since then we have begun to deploy air and sea-launched cruise missiles and to build the Trident I ballistic missile carrying submarine at the rate of about one a year. By contrast the Soviet Union has, since 1971, deployed at least three, and probably four new types of ICBMs, eight improved versions of existing ICBMs and SLBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and we are about to see a new intercontinental bomber. And the Soviet Union is continuing to develop new strategic weapons of all types. Professor Gromyko told us

yesterday that the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe "constitutes a real threat to African countries" and the Middle East. And yet the ~~cruise missiles~~ to which he refers are, as I trust he knows full well, targeted on the Soviet Union. Indeed, their guidance system is such that they can only be directed against targets that have been surveyed and stored in their guidance computers. And there will be, at most, four hundred and sixty-four of them if an agreement is not reached in Geneva, as we hope one will be, to limit the deployment of medium-range systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

But can the same be said of the Soviet SS-20? There are now well over 1200 warheads on Soviet SS-20s (probably closer to 2400 if one counts re-fire missiles) and the range of them is twice that of the American cruise missiles. They can reach well into Africa and the Middle East; and unlike the American cruise missiles, there is no technical limit on their targeting. And while the United States would gladly abandon its entire force of medium-range missiles, as President Reagan has proposed, the Soviet Union has rejected the proposal to eliminate this entire class of weapons on both sides. The effort to frighten countries in Africa and the Middle East by raising the false spectre that American missiles, reluctantly deployed in Europe, and in the interest of European security, might be used against them, is

propaganda pure and simple, as is Professor Gromyko's suggestion that the forces of the United States Central Command might be equipped with neutron weapons.

Dr. Arbatov this morning, even while invoking the name of George Orwell, has rewritten post-war history in a manner that reminds one of Orwell's description of the Soviet Union as "a place where yesterday's weather can be changed by decree." I doubt that Orwell's writings are widely available in the Soviet Union, but Dr. Arbatov is privileged to read what he likes; I wonder whose political system he thinks serves as the model for Animal Farm or the awesome totalitarian State depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we in this room, and most of the world, accept an image of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that is characterized by a spiralling arms race. And yet the facts are significantly different. The United States has today, deployed around the world, some eight thousand fewer nuclear weapons than we had deployed in 1967. And as Senator Stevens indicated earlier, the megatonnage of this diminished American force is barely one-quarter of what it was in the late 1960s. Moreover, the Western Alliance agreed, at a meeting in Canada a little over a year ago, to reduce further, by fourteen hundred weapons, the number of our nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. By contrast, we have seen in recent years consistent additions to Soviet

nuclear forces: eight thousand new strategic warheads alone since 1969, when the SALT I negotiations got under way, four thousand of which have been added since 1979 when the SALT II Treaty was signed.

Not only have the treaties of the past failed to achieve the limitations that we in America, and I trust most of you, had hoped for, but even those agreements that have been reached are now being violated. The SALT II Treaty, for example, permits the deployment of one new type of ICBM. The Soviets are presently deploying two new types of ICBM's and there are strong indications that we will see further new types as time goes on. The SALT regime has required (and it has been understood well on both sides) restraint in the concealment of information so that we might verify performance under the agreements. And yet the Soviet Union has consistently been obscuring the information upon which clear judgements necessary for verification must be based.

Senator Stevens has already referred to the Radar Krasnoyarsk, a radar that practically completes the comprehensive radar coverage of the Soviet Union in a manner that would permit a rapid deployment of short-lead time, and highly mobile elements of a comprehensive territorial defense.

Now Dr. Arbatov has said this morning that the radar Krasnoyarsk is for space tracking purposes. Radars for space

tracking purposes, ladies and gentlemen, are oriented towards space, where the objects to be tracked are to be found. The Radar Krasnoyarsk is not oriented towards space; it is oriented towards the horizon which is precisely how one would orient a radar that was intended, in due course, to support the infrastructure for a nation-wide system of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The radar at Krasnoyarsk is identical to a radar already completed at Pechora, a radar that the Soviets have acknowledged is for the purpose of long-range detection of ballistic missiles. And the Krasnoyarsk radar happens to be situated in violation of the treaty, in the precise location that one would have anticipated if one were looking for comprehensive radar coverage of Soviet territory. With respect to space tracking, there are many other radars in the Soviet Union that can perform the space track function far more efficiently and effectively than the radar at Krasnoyarsk. Space track radars, ladies and gentlemen, unlike radars that may become part of a system of anti-ballistic missile defenses are not surrounded by thousands of tons of concrete and hardened to resist the blast over-pressures of a nuclear war.

I was not surprised that Dr. Arbatov reserved most of his remarks for the American program on strategic defense. And I must say to you that Soviet comment on the American strategic defense research program has yet again, in his remarks, reached

an extravagant hypocrisy. In the spring of 1983, a few days after President Reagan's speech announcing the initiation of the American program, there appeared in Pravda, reprinted elsewhere in other papers around the world, an open letter from a group of Soviet scientists deploring the American SDI, deploring the use of science for military purposes, and in passing, suggesting that it would not be possible to achieve an effective result. There was a large number of signers of the letter; let me recall some of them to you: one was Mr. P.D. Grushin, who was the Head of the Design Bureau responsible for anti-aircraft and ABM systems in the Soviet Union. Another was V.S. Semenkhin, a leading figure in the development of command, control and communications systems for anti-aircraft and ABM use. Another was B.V. Bunkin, an important figure in the development of radars and other key components of weapon systems for strategic defense. I can go on, the list is long. For among the signers of that letter, ladies and gentlemen, were the principal architects of the Soviet SDI program, a program that has been underway since the mid-1960s, at increasing levels of investment and research following the ABM Treaty of 1972.

The Soviet Union has long been working on directed energy weapons, on particle beam weapons, on lasers both ground and space-based. And this Soviet effort, far from tapering off when

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the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to abandon anti-ballistic missile defense in 1972, has increased significantly ever since. In January, in this city, Secretary of State Shultz met with Foreign Minister Gromyko. It was agreed by the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is a Soviet research program on SDI and that it will continue just as the Soviets expect the American research program will continue. And the Soviet Foreign Minister acknowledged that it is impossible to verify research.

In my judgment, Soviet insistence in the various disarmament negotiations now under way that the United States abandon its SDI research program, as a precondition for progress in other areas -- something they know we will not do -- is simply a device for justifying the Soviet's unrelenting build-up of offensive weapons and Moscow's refusal to move towards satisfactory agreements limiting those offensive weapons. Dr. Arbatov has said this morning that it is impossible to overcome the laws of physics. I assure you, Dr. Arbatov, that we will bear your advice in mind and instruct our scientists accordingly that they should conduct their research with the laws of physics firmly in mind.

I should like to conclude with a few words about arms control. Throughout the first Reagan Administration, there were questions from a number of quarters, including at home, about the

Administration's commitment to arms control. I might say in passing that the program of today's event, which describes the morning presentations as "a view from the South," "a view from the East," and "a view from the West," must contain a typographical error. There is the view from the East, and you have heard it from the Soviet delegation, but there are many views from the West. And some of the criticism of the new Administration's approach to arms control came from within the West, and questions were raised about the seriousness and the sincerity of the United States in its approach to arms control. By now, I think the record of our proposals speaks for itself. Because on one issue after another, on a wide variety of issues of disarmament and arms control, the United States has put forward proposals that we believe could and should lead in the normal course of negotiation to agreements that are militarily significant, verifiable, fair and equitable. We believe that such agreements would achieve greater stability than we would expect to achieve in the absence of a collaborative effort. We have, as many of you know, proposed deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces in the START talks. Dr. Arbatov now says that it will not be possible to reach an agreement along those lines because the United States is continuing its program on strategic defense. But we saw no progress in achieving significant reductions in those offensive forces before we announced

our program of strategic defense research in 1983. And I am sorry to say the Soviet Union seems determined to cling to its large and growing force of destabilizing inter-continental ballistic missiles and has thus been unwilling to respond positively to the American proposal to reduce to the still awesome level of 5,000 the number of such warheads on the ballistic missiles on both sides. In the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces, as you know, we have proposed to eliminate them entirely. And when the Soviets rejected that proposal, we offered to reduce them to any equal level that the Soviet Union would accept.

With respect to chemical weapons, again in Geneva, the United States has proposed to ban them completely and the only thing that stands in the way of concluding a treaty banning chemical weapons is the difficult issue of verification. And in this regard we have made an unprecedented proposal: that inspectors organized internationally should be permitted to go anywhere, at any time, in order to verify suspicion that one side or the other is violating that ban. The Soviets reject this proposal for international inspection.

I think I should say at this point that, much as we might desire far-reaching arms control, the obsessive secrecy of the Soviet Union puts real and practical limits on the extent to

which it is reasonable to expect the West to accept the risks of uncertainty associated with broad and comprehensive approaches to arms control, especially where issues of research or qualitative limitation are concerned. And if we didn't think that before the last year or two, we surely do now, following the determination, after careful study by all agencies of the United States Government, that the Soviet Union is violating major provisions of most of the treaties that exist between us.

With respect to nuclear testing, which was mentioned a number of times this morning and yesterday, the United States believes that there is a good likelihood that Soviet tests have exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold limit that now exists between us. For this reason, we have made a simple proposal: that we permit the scientists of each other's country to go to the areas where these tests are conducted and take the appropriate measurements of yield so that we could be confident that ratification of that treaty would be justified. Those of you who are familiar with the testing establishments of the two countries will recognize that in those remote locations there is no conceivable military intelligence that could be obtained by technicians with measuring devices competent to establish test yields. Thus far the Soviets have not responded favorably. I regret, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, that I have found it necessary, considering what was said earlier by Professor Gromyko and Dr. Arbatov, to say some things in direct response

that some will regard as too explicit for diplomatic dialogue; but I believe we will not get very far in our deliberations here if we obscure the fundamental differences of fact on which we and the Soviet Union disagree. I hope that we will find mechanisms for resolving those differences in fact, and still other mechanisms, however difficult it may be, for composing the relationship between us, based on a common understanding of what forces are possessed on both sides leading to a radical reduction of those forces. The world has far too many nuclear weapons. The reductions that are possible on both sides could be dramatic; and there is now no obstacle except the artificial Soviet linkage between reductions in offensive forces and a demand that the U.S. terminate its SDI research, that stands in the way of those deep reductions.

Postscript:

Upon reading the transcript of these remarks I am struck at the apparent absence of hope, or optimism, in my exchange with the Soviet speakers. I suspect that this derives, at least in part, from the ease with which Professor Gromyko and Dr. Arbatov yielded, in their presentations (which preceded mine), to the temptation to propagandize their audience. I

like to believe that in the privacy of the negotiations between us, in Geneva and elsewhere, a more constructive dialogue may be found and agreements reached.

Snake Oil From Moscow

The U.S. can no more extract an attractive "stand-alone" theater-nuclear pact than it can negotiate an on-site inspection plan worth the paper it was printed on.

By COLIN S. GRAY

Why are some political leaders so reluctant to tell the truth about the Soviet Union and its disarmament proposals? Far from being "very grateful for the offer" to eliminate all nuclear weapons in a three-stage process advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev on Jan. 15, President Reagan could have said that the offer was utterly trivial, indeed, it was even insulting to the intelligence of reasonable people in the West, and that it was the kind of initiative that gives the Geneva process a bad name.

The case for the mendacious triviality of the new Gorbachev offer may be stated succinctly as follows: In the Soviet Union we have a country of known, indeed, incontestable, bad character that would have the motive, the opportunity and the means to cheat. The U.S. and other NATO governments know this, the Soviet leadership knows that they know this, so why must Mr. Reagan play at "let's pretend" to treat the new Soviet offer with respect?

Improbabilities

Two answers suggest themselves. First, there are—inevitably—a few seemingly attractive "nuggets" in the comprehensive Soviet proposal. Absurd though the grand design of the Soviet offer may be, our professional diplomats and amateur Soviet watchers harbor dreams of being able to construct a negotiable deal with only those elements of the Soviet proposal that serve U.S. goals. We know that the opponent offers to begin to eliminate all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe in stage one (1986 to 1991-94) and to permit on-site inspection. But the U.S. can no more extract an attractive "stand-alone" theater-nuclear agreement from Moscow than it could negotiate, or even less possible, implement, an on-site inspection scheme worth the paper it was written on.

Second, Western leaders believe that their domestic political constituencies would not tolerate being told the truth about Soviet arms-control behavior. Some senior American officials observed that they would have been inclined to take the new Soviet disarmament offer more seriously had it been presented in private first. What those officials should have said is that the proposal is so ridiculous that there would have been no point in the Soviets presenting it in private.

For any proposal on nuclear disarmament to be considered serious, it must recognize that the West cannot disarm if it

cannot defend. The U.S. arms-control position in Geneva recognizes the necessary relationship between disarmament and strategic defense; the Soviet position reverses strategic common sense and mandates that there shall be no disarmament if the U.S. deploys new strategic defenses. Yet the official public response from Washington is producing a serious self-inflicted political wound. Mr. Reagan will be placed under pressure to respond in some positive way, show an "enlightened flexibility"—not, as some American media pundits allege, because Mr. Gorbachev has taken the initiative, but rather because the White House did not move swiftly, surely and persuasively to call snake oil snake oil.

The Soviet Union is offering, or pretending to offer (since both sides know that this is strictly political theater), attractive items within the steel band of a rigorous prohibition on SDI development, testing and deployment. Many people in the U.S. and in Western Europe likely either are convinced or are convincible that the SDI stands in the way of complete nuclear disarmament—which is, of course, Mr. Gorbachev's objective.

To some people it will seem that Mr. Gorbachev has offered a seemingly detailed (phases with dates), superior (all nuclear weapons) and practical scheme for nuclear disarmament, as contrasted with Mr. Reagan's dream of effective defenses one day. Moreover, the Gorbachev scheme, given its hints at collateral designs for other elements of military power, would save money at a great rate, whereas Mr. Reagan's SDI certainly must cost at least several hundred billion dollars and even then its effectiveness likely will be questionable.

The key to effectively explaining the utterly unacceptable character of the Soviet proposal lies in Mr. Reagan's speech writers assembling, and interrelating, three themes that already have appeared many times in presidential rhetoric: commitment to (nuclear) disarmament; the Soviet propensity to lie and cheat; and SDI. The truth wouldn't hurt us. Tersely stated, the major points the administration should register publicly, promptly, in its considered reply to the new Soviet offer are:

1) The U.S.S.R. cheats on arms-control agreements. The U.S. has verified an expanding, and strategically an increasingly serious, pattern of Soviet noncompliance

with existing treaties and agreements.

2) Cheating on arms-control agreements is always a serious matter. However, the ambiguity over compliance that, in strict security terms, we can tolerate when nuclear arsenals house thousands of weapons is altogether different from a situation where we know we have zero nuclear weapons and the Soviets claim that they are at zero also.

3) The issue is not the desirability of complete nuclear disarmament; rather, it is the impossibility of verifying compliance, or continuing compliance, with such a scheme. The Soviet Union is the largest country on earth, and a police state.

4) On-site inspection can be helpful, as the U.S. has long maintained. But there is no way that a combination of satellite surveillance and reconnaissance and teams of foreign inspectors could verify that the Soviet Union had no nuclear weapons secreted in bunkers in its forests, in mine shafts or in innocent-seeming buildings.

5) The Soviet Union has been constructing nuclear weapons since the late 1940s in conditions of the utmost secrecy. The U.S., as an open society, does not give the Soviets anything remotely resembling the verification problem that they pose. The U.S. knows with considerable, though not absolute, assurance how many nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has deployed on its operational delivery vehicles. But we do not know exactly how many nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has produced over the years, nor how many delivery vehicles the Soviet Union has built in secret and "warehoused." The U.S. government has long been concerned about the large difference between the estimated production runs of some strategic weapons and the numbers that it sees deployed or expended in tests.

6) The Soviets cheat today on agreements over items that, in some cases, are of only slight or modest strategic value to them. How could they resist cheating in a situation where cheating would be ludicrously easy, while the reward could be domination of the world?

7) Complete or even very substantial nuclear disarmament will be tolerable for Western security only if we deploy very effective strategic defenses. The logic is absolutely inexorable. We know that the Soviet Union is not to be trusted; indeed, all

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*aim
control*

STAND...Continued

In accordance with the Soviet disarmament program, both nuclear charges and the means for their delivery must be subject to destruction. Some types of delivery vehicles are obviously capable of being converted; for the purposes of geophysical and space research, for example. So, recourse may be had to on-site inspections and to international verification [kontrol] measures as regards the observance of complex procedures in the destruction of nuclear combat ammunition and the dismantling, liquidation, or conversion of delivery vehicles.

After completion of the third stage, when there are no more nuclear weapons on earth, all countries will draw up a universal accord -- verifiable by means of joint efforts, of course -- in order to prevent these weapons from ever being brought back again. "And so we propose," the statement emphasizes, "to enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons on the basis of mutually acceptable and strictly verifiable accords."

In order to achieve this aim, we must, above all, block all channels of improving nuclear weapons. This is a priority task. The reduction of strategic arsenals without banning nuclear tests is no solution to the dilemma of the threat of thermonuclear war because the remaining weapons could be modernized and the likelihood of the creation [sozdaniye] of increasingly lethal and sophisticated weapons (neutron or X-ray laser type weapons) would remain. In other words, ending tests is an essential practical step toward the elimination of nuclear arms. The introduction of a comprehensive moratorium would also provide a reliable machinery for verifying [kontrol] nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union favors the intensification of talks on concluding an effective and verifiable international convention on banning chemical weapons and destroying existing stockpiles of these weapons.

At the Vienna talks on armed force and limitation and reduction in Central Europe, NATO representatives are citing the same old problem of verification [kontrol] as the main obstacle preventing achievement of an agreement. However, the Warsaw Pact countries are no less interested in proper verification [proverka]. The Soviet leader's statement points out that a possible accord would, naturally, require sensible verification [kontrol]. This implies, in addition to national technical means, exchanges of the musters of military units subject to reduction and reciprocal notification of the beginning and completion of the process of reduction. It is also envisaged that each side would establish three or four observation posts for the duration of the withdrawal. Permanently manned verification [kontrol] posts would monitor the entry and exit of all military contingents to and from the reduction zone.

The Soviet program for disarmament and verification [kontrol] is not to the detriment of any side. The stance taken by the United States and its NATO allies was quite different, at least until quite recently. The United States also allegedly favors verification [kontrol]. It has proposed, for instance, inviting Soviet representatives to attend nuclear tests. But for what purpose? In order to condone the process of improving nuclear arsenals by their presence, perhaps? It is also talking about the desirability of providing "free access" to laboratories engaged in space technology research. Yes, we favor such inspections [proverka].

However, as M.S. Gorbachev has noted, if "laboratories are to be opened up, then it must be solely for purposes of verifying [kontrol] the ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons and by no means in order to legalize them."

Strict and reliable verification [kontrol] of the process of disarmament rather than of the arms race, this is the essence of the Soviet Union's stance. This approach opens up broad prospects for strengthening security and establishing firm trust between states.

SNAKE OIL...Continued

shades of opinion on arms control in the U.S. agree that no arms-control agreement of major security significance can rest on trust alone. Only deployed defenses in the West would serve adequately both to deter the Soviet Union from cheating on a comprehensive nuclear-disarmament agreement—that is to say they would need to cheat on a gigantic scale in order to achieve a militarily useful illegal nuclear arsenal—and to enable us to live with the inevitable uncertainties over Soviet compliance.

A nuclear-disarmament regime that, thanks to strategic defenses, was robust against unpleasant nuclear surprises also would need to be proofed against conventional aggression. Strategic defense could protect all NATO countries as they mobi-

lize to resist attack.

Strategic Defenses Needed

Americans and Western Europeans approve of arms-control activity because they seem to believe that in some mysterious way arms control promotes political confidence and peace. However, those same people, time after time when polled, have no difficulty crediting Moscow with a willingness to cheat on treaties. The time is long overdue for the administration to assemble its national security policy story in one package. The public should be told that Mr. Gorbachev has trivialized the Geneva process by introducing a grand design that he knows is fundamentally unacceptable. The goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can be pursued, and would be practical to implement safely, only if the

West can develop, test and deploy strategic defenses.

In saying that he is "grateful" for the new Soviet plan, and that "it's just about the first time that anyone has ever proposed actually eliminating nuclear weapons," the president contributes to confusion at home, fuels pressure for an unwise "flexibility" over essentials in his own currently sound policy, and generally gives credit that Mr. Gorbachev in no way deserves.

Mr. Gray is president of the National Institute for Public Policy, a Fairfax, Va., group studying military-strategy issues under foundation and government contract. He is a member of President Reagan's outside advisory panel on arms control.

WASHINGTON TIMES

29 January 1986

Pg. 3-D

BARRY SCHNEIDER/ MICHAEL ENNIS

Confusing times for strategic planners

This is a confusing time for strategic planners — those whose job it is to design U.S. missile and bomber forces to carry out their roles and missions and to deter the Soviet Union from war and coercion.

Not only must strategic planners come to grips with new "deep-cut" arms reduction proposals, they must also consider the extension of the SALT II Treaty.

The Geneva arms negotiations have resumed, and the United States and Soviet Union each have introduced a new deep-cut proposal. Both the United States and U.S.S.R. have offered to cut strategic force numbers in half. This has sent strategists back to the drawing board to reconsider what kinds of forces the United States should deploy under such limits.

Preliminary analysis of the deep-cut proposals indicates that they may have lacked an overall strategic vision, since they would tend to freeze ICBMs into their current fixed silos; may drastically reduce the ballistic-missile submarine force, which provides our only relatively invulnerable retaliatory capability; and would curtail the U.S. ability to carry out its own counter-

vailing strategy for deterrence by severely limiting its MX and Trident 2 missile deployments.

At the November summit, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to the principle of a 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons and to work for early progress in freezing and reducing theater nuclear missiles facing one another in Europe. The Soviet leader linked progress in offensive arms cuts to further restrictions on research on strategic defenses. Ronald Reagan refused to abandon the SDI program, which is already restrained by the ABM Treaty. Unless this impasse is worked out, there is likely to be no reduction in strategic arms.

Now that the United States has decided to extend the SALT II Treaty that formally lapsed at the end of 1985, the United States may find itself in a more dangerous situation if some approximation of its proposal were accepted.

For example, if the U.S. plan were accepted, the United States might find itself with no viable basing mode for its own ICBMs except the current immobile silos. Adherence to SALT II could block the adoption of the "Carry Hard" ICBM basing mode for MX and also prevent pre-

ferred designs of new superhard silos from being employed. SALT II Treaty numerical limits on total missiles and bombers also would argue against deploying the Small ICBM now on the drawing boards. The new deep-cut proposal by the United States also would ban all mobile missiles, eliminating either the Small ICBM or MX deployed in a mobile mode — all currently under active consideration.

The U.S. deep-cut proposal would cut projected air-launched cruise missile strength by 50 percent, from 3,000 to just 1,500, and would reduce the number of warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles by 50 to 75 percent. U.S. bomber strength would remain undisturbed, although more than 200 older spare B-52s no longer in operational use would need to be dismantled.

Beyond the numbers is the question as to whether the U.S. proposal was informed by a coherent strategic view that meshed U.S. deterrence policy, targeting policy, strategic force structure, and the capability to carry out assigned roles and missions.

The new deep-cut proposal raises fundamental questions. Does it make sense to block new ICBM basing modes that could increase the survivability of U.S. land-based missiles? Does it make sense to leave U.S. ICBMs in silos while drastically reducing the numbers of sea-based and air-based weapons?

Arguments that the administration spokesmen made two years ago against the nuclear-freeze proposal

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PLANNERS...Continued

may come back to haunt them when they try to explain the implications of the new U.S. deep-cut proposal.

Two years ago administration officials argued that a nuclear freeze would freeze Soviet superiorities in place while blocking U.S. responses such as the MX, Trident 2 sea-launched ballistic missiles, the Small ICBM, and air-launched cruise missiles. During the freeze debate much was made of the fact that the freeze would keep U.S. bomber numbers constant and prevent modernization — the same for strategic submarine forces — without placing any limits on Soviet air defenses and anti-submarine forces.

The only difference today is that the administration would not freeze U.S. force levels, it would *cut them in half* while permitting Soviet countermeasures to grow unchecked.

Under the U.S. proposal, each side would be limited to 4,500 warheads on its land-based and sea-based missile forces. No more than two-thirds of these could be on ICBMs. If that were the decision, the United States would deploy only seven or eight strategic submarines rather than the 36 that are deployed today. This would allow only five on station at sea at any one time. More than likely the United States would choose to have something on the order of 13 submarines, still a reduction of 23 from the present numbers.

Such drastic reductions in sea-based forces would make the Soviet anti-submarine task an order of magnitude easier. A proposal that blocks means of rescuing the ICBM from its present vulnerable basing mode and which ultimately places the sea-launched ballistic missile force in jeopardy does not seem a sensible approach to U.S. security.

Finally, the new U.S. arms reduction plan would likely handicap the U.S. ability to implement its own countervailing strategy of deterrence. Jimmy Carter introduced this strategy in Presidential Directive 59 in 1980, and Ronald Reagan reportedly endorsed it in National Security Decision Directive 13 in 1981.

The logic behind the countervailing strategy is the assumption that if the United States is capable of retaliating against the things Soviet leaders hold most dear, this will maximize U.S. war-deterrence leverage with them. Such a strategy requires that U.S. forces are able to put at prompt and sure risk such things as Soviet leadership bunkers, their

LOS ANGELES TIMES

3 February 1986

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Bomb Design Bars Test Ban, Pentagon Says

By ROBERT SCHEER,
Times Staff Writer

The Reagan Administration is opposed to the comprehensive test ban proposed by the Soviets because the National Weapons Laboratories have designed nuclear bombs of such fragile sophistication that they must be constantly tested, according to a Defense Department official.

Although President Reagan's five predecessors in the White House sought a complete ban on nuclear testing, the Defense Department now maintains that the design of America's strategic weapons precludes such an agreement.

According to Frank Gaffney, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear forces and arms control policy, the designers of the United States' current nuclear arsenal "did not emphasize aspects of warhead design which would enhance weapon endurance in a no-test environment."

Gaffney's explanation of the Administration's lack of enthusiasm for the Soviets' proposal appeared in a letter he recently sent to Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), who made the document available to *The Times*.

"I find it incredible," Markey said, "that they have never taken account of the possibility of a test ban when they're designing warheads."

Markey, a proponent of such an agreement, charged that, "after reviewing this letter, I can only conclude that the Pentagon and the weapons labs are now trying to torpedo prospects for negotiation of a test ban by trying to convince people that there are insurmountable technical obstacles to a comprehensive test ban agreement."

The Gaffney letter fuels a long-simmering dispute over the feasibility of such a moratorium, which has been opposed by the federal weapons laboratories at Los Alamos, N.M., and Livermore, Calif. The debate has flared recently as the result of the Soviets' unilateral moratorium on testing, which was announced before the Geneva summit conference and then extended until April 1.

Both superpowers have agreed to observe a ban on atmospheric testing and a restriction holding underground tests below a 150-kiloton threshold. When they signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, both sides pledged to pursue a ban on all nuclear testing.

When the Jimmy Carter Administration came close to concluding such an agreement with the Soviets, however, the directors of Livermore and Los Alamos met with the President to argue for the necessity of continued testing. The

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

chain-of-command, and instruments of coercion (i.e., ICBMs).

It would be difficult to implement the countervailing strategy with just a few MX missiles and a handful of Trident submarines. What is not clear from the current U.S. arms reduction proposal is whether a conscious decision was made by President Reagan to abandon the countervailing strategy or whether deterrence policy requirements were overlooked in deciding upon the pre-summit initiative.

Clearly, the countervailing strategy needs the kind of forces that the arms reduction plan would deny.

In the months ahead, as the U.S. and Soviet negotiators bargain to find common ground between their rival proposals, U.S. decision-makers hopefully will come to understand the contradictions inherent in the current proposals better and will reformulate a deep-cut proposal that will permit preserving the sea-based deterrent force, ICBM modernization that reduces ICBM vulnerability to attack, and which permits the United States the capability to back its own official doctrine of deterrence.

The present plan is deficient on all counts.

DOBRYNIN...from Pg. 5

promotion, announced at the close of the 27th Communist Party Congress in Moscow, also gives Gorbachev easier access to Dobrynin's advice on U.S.-Soviet relations. The Kremlin leader also named Alexandra P. Biryukova, a trade union official, to the secretariat, the first time a woman has been elevated to the top leadership in 25 years.

STEALTH...from Pg. 1

material, says Sherman Mullin, ATF project manager for Lockheed.

The Air Force will award contracts to three or four of the companies later this year to continue to develop and test their designs over the next three years, Col. Piccirillo said.


In 1989, the service will pick one contractor to build the aircraft, which is designed to take the place of the F-15 fighter.

In addition to the seven prime contractors, scores of defense subcontractors also will be positioning themselves, trying to get bits of their technology into the final design.

The project is particularly important to defense contractors because it is one of only two fighter programs scheduled for the rest of the century. The other is the Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft program, which will use similar technology to produce new carrier-based air-to-surface fighter-bombers.

"The ATF's the only game in town, and the big contractors better get in on it or they will be out in the cold," said Paul Nisbet, a defense stock analyst with Prudential Bache Securities Inc., a New York investment house.

"I can't imagine how any project could have a greater priority with the Air Force," said Sherman Mullin, project manager for Lockheed.

A FIGHTER FOR THE FUTURE: THE PILOT'S VIEW

Hostile air target



Friendly aircraft



Flight path guide



Ground and air threats

**What the stealth fighter would do**

Knock out enemy fighters and Airborne Warning And Control Systems planes to protect U.S. aircraft and ground forces.

Operate at a cruising speed of 1.5 times the speed of sound.

Take off and land in less than 2,000 feet.

Deploy advanced heat-seeking, air-to-air missiles.

Remain invisible to radar through the use of non-metal composite construction.

Operate through use of computerized helmets that help pilots track, hit targets.

Conceal weapons within body for speed and stealth.

Pinpoint own maintenance problems by computer, cutting size of ground crew.

Source: U.S. Air Force

The Washington Times

corporate margins," Mr. Nisbet said.

The company's out-of-pocket costs go well beyond technological development. Mustering political pressure often is the most expensive part of getting a major contract, analysts said.

"There already is a tremendous amount of lobbying going on," Col. Piccirillo said. "Under our system, Congress obviously has a lot of influence over..."

tween the members of the team for major components of the aircraft, he said.

This dual-source concept has been used successfully by the Air Force in purchase of aircraft engines and Cruise missiles.

It also may help to progress that th...

Squeezing the military budget

Lawmakers tell the Pentagon, 'You can't have it all'

By Peter Grier

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The exchange was a brief but telling glimpse into the future of the United States defense budget.

Melvyn Paisley, Navy assistant secretary for research, went before a congressional subcommittee recently to plead the case for his programs. His statement was barely out of his mouth when the panel began clamoring for cuts.

"What are you willing to trade?" pressed one representative. "You can't have it all."

That phrase exemplifies Congress's attitude toward the Pentagon this year — it can't have it all. The question is: What is it that it can't have?

The Reagan administration's \$312 billion proposed budget for the Defense Department will likely take small reductions in lots of line items. Will there be big cuts or elimination of flashy weapon systems, as well?

Panel members facing Mr. Paisley were quick to point out several large research projects they considered vulnerable, such as the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey. The Osprey, a sort of combination helicopter-airplane being developed for the Marine Corps, has drawn criticism from Congress for its increasing costs.

The Army's Bradley armored personnel carrier is mentioned as an item where savings might be found. Congressional aides say it's unlikely the Bradley will be canceled, though, because it is already well into production (more than 2,000 have been built).

But the future of

congressional sources, include the Aquila remotely piloted surveillance plane, the E-6 communication aircraft, and the M9 armored combat earthmover.

One package approach to defense cuts Congress may use is to delay research and initial production on the next generation of weapons.

These systems, which include the SSN-21 sub, the Osprey, the LHX light helicopter, and the "stealth" bomber, could power the defense budget upward well into the 1990s, if they are all fully funded. Buying all the

SSN-21s that the Navy wants would cost an estimated \$100 billion over several years. The LHX program could cost some \$30 billion. According to an unpublished Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study, delaying 10 of these new systems could save \$2.1 billion in 1987, and \$48.6 billion by 1991.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D) of Georgia, who requested the CBO study, favors taking some of these savings and spending it on increased production of the current generation of weapons, such as F-15 fighters and M-1 tanks. By buying in bulk, the Defense Department could reduce the

unit cost of these weapons, argues Senator Nunn, saving taxpayers money in the long run.

Shorthand for this budget switch is EPR (efficient production rates), and it is gaining in popularity on Capitol Hill, particularly among Democrats who worry that their party has acquired an anti-defense label by opposing many weapon systems.

"There's more and more interest in it," says one top congressional defense aide.

Hanging over the whole defense budget year, of course, is the Gramm

According to a Congressional Budget Office study, delaying 10 new weapons systems could save \$2.1 billion in 1987 and \$48.6 billion by 1991.

Controlling Transfer of Strategic Technology

April 1986

Background: The purpose of controlling the export of strategic militarily relevant technology is to deny Warsaw Pact and certain other countries access to technology that would increase the effectiveness of their military establishments. Because development of sophisticated weapons today depends on many advanced supporting technologies that have dual use (civilian as well as military), it is increasingly necessary to identify and control those commercial technology transfers that could threaten US national security. US regulations require a license to be issued before any technology can be transferred to a potential adversary country. This requirement permits a review of the potential military utility of the technology, to ensure that transfers of militarily relevant technologies do not occur under the guise of civil-use projects. The need to maintain more effective controls on the transfer of Western technology to the East is highlighted by conclusive documentation of the USSR's past and continuing reliance on Western high-technology know-how in furthering its military buildup and in strengthening those elements of the Warsaw Pact industrial base that directly support Soviet war-making capability.

The Soviet Union is determined to obtain controlled Western equipment and technology by any means it can--including circumvention of export controls. The US, acting alone, could not prevent such diversions of controlled items, because in many cases we are no longer their sole producer. The cooperation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) is therefore of greater importance than ever. As evidence of Soviet diversion efforts mounts, the COCOM nations' determination to improve enforcement capabilities has grown, and additional resources are being applied to this task.

Organization and major functions of COCOM: COCOM, established in 1949, now includes the US, Canada, Japan, and 13 European countries. Spain was the latest member to join, in late 1985. COCOM has no formal relationship to NATO. Although COCOM is not based on any treaty or executive agreement, there have been few instances when a member country has deviated from commitments made in COCOM.

A permanent COCOM secretariat is located in Paris, staffed by dedicated and highly experienced professionals. All 16 member countries have permanent delegations to COCOM, also based in Paris. The US delegate and his deputy are Department of State officers. Their permanent staff is joined by teams of US-based government technical experts and interagency policy-level personnel during negotiations on new or revised export control definitions and other substantive meetings.

COCOM is principally a coordinating and decision-making mechanism. Agreements are put into effect jointly by its member countries. As enacted, each member's publication of the agreed control definitions carries the force of law or of export control regulation, so that the definitions may be administered and enforced effectively. The

controlled products may be grouped into three categories--direct military use, dual use, or atomic energy use. COCOM also reviews potential shipments of specific embargoed items to proscribed countries. All comments by other COCOM delegations are considered by the exporting member, which permits the export only when the risk of the diversion to military use of the product or technology is deemed acceptably small. Equipment capabilities may have to be altered in order to gain acceptance for shipment. Finally, the COCOM member countries act to harmonize their licensing practices on export controls and to coordinate their export control enforcement activities.

Improving COCOM's effectiveness: COCOM faces continued Soviet and Warsaw Pact efforts to obtain militarily sensitive equipment and technologies. At the July 1981 Ottawa summit, President Reagan raised the problem of transferring Western technology to the Soviet Union. These discussions led to a high-level COCOM meeting in Paris in January 1982, the first such Under Secretary-level COCOM meeting since the late 1950s. Subsequent high-level meetings took place in April 1983 and February 1985. Lower-level consultations are held regularly, as the US is cooperating actively with other COCOM members for improvement in each of the three above mentioned functional areas. About \$2 million is now being spent to upgrade the computer equipment, software, and other facilities for the COCOM secretariat.

Relations with non-COCOM countries: One problem facing COCOM is how to protect against the export or re-export of embargoed commodities from non-COCOM countries to the countries of concern. The US deals with this problem in part by requiring licenses for re-exports of US-origin embargoed products. COCOM members also maintain continuing dialogues with a growing number of other countries regarding cooperation on export controls and avoidance of diversions. Some countries could choose to adopt full COCOM membership. Others that produce or trade in embargoed high-technology products have established methods for cooperating in the protection of militarily relevant items.

For further information: See also Department of State GISTs on "U.S. Export Controls" and "U.S. Export Controls and China."

On Pentagon Reform

By HERBERT STEIN

I have always been skeptical of complaints about management of the defense program. Often they seemed to be rationalizations for cuts in defense expenditures that were really wanted on other grounds. Also, I had seen lots of high-powered secretaries of defense, and many expert commissions on defense management, come and go. I thought what mortals could do they had done and what waste remained we would have to live with.

I have now had an unusual educational experience. I have been serving as a member of the President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard. I have had discussions with many secretaries of defense, past and present, other high-ranking civilians in the DoD, numerous four-star officers, defense contractors, defense reformers, whistle blowers, students of defense and members of Congress. I have had the opportunity to chew the subject over with other members of the commission, which includes four former high civilian defense officials, four former high military officers, two former cabinet members, three businessmen, a senator and a congressman.

This has not made me a defense expert. But it has led me to some conclusions and, most unusual at my age, it has caused me to change my mind on some points.

Basically, I have concluded that some important things are wrong and should be fixed. It isn't useful to repeat Bert Lance's Law: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The defense program isn't broke but it is defective, and it can and should be fixed.

Nothing I have learned indicates that the defense budget should be cut. Steps can be taken that would get more military strength per dollar of expenditure. But these steps still have to be taken. Even after they have been taken, their full effect on costs will not be seen for several years. Most important, applying these savings, when realized, to cutting the budget will be justified only if the amount of military strength we are now getting is adequate. It may be that the savings should be applied to achieving a higher level of strength, not a lower level of expenditure. That issue our commission did not study.

As I see it, there are five major defects in defense management:

1. Decisions about the size of the defense program and its main elements are not realistically adapted to national-security goals and plans, on the one hand, and to the capacity of the economy on the other hand. The most conspicuous evidence of this is the major shifts from a low level of defense spending in the late 1970s to the rapid buildup initiated in 1981 to the abrupt slowdown of the program now under way—while the national-security threat and our capacity were basically unchanged.

The low budgets of the late 1970s resulted from wishful thinking about the threat. The Reagan buildup reflected a more accurate estimation of the threat, but it did not prepare the country to pay for the buildup, either by taxes or by borrowing. The cuts already made in the Reagan program, and the further cuts threatened, are caused by arbitrary limitations on acceptable amounts of taxing or borrowing.

Responsibility for these serious deficiencies begins at the White House. The president, with the assistance of the National Security Council, does not formulate a national-security policy precise enough for defense options to be deduced from it. He does not get military options presented to him in terms that permit him to judge how well they meet his national-security objectives. He does not get budget options presented in terms that permit him to

judge how much more or less security is provided by more or less expenditure. Too often, military requirements or budget limits are accepted as absolutes, dominating all other considerations, rather than as factors to be weighed against each other.

The difficulties are compounded when the decisions move to Congress. Decision making about defense is now divided among dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees, so that hardly anyone feels a primary responsibility for the defense program as the safeguard of our national security. Too many are able to look upon the defense budget as a big pot of money from which they can serve their special interests.

2. The defense program is highly unstable. The big swings from the Carter program to the first-term Reagan program to what looks like the second-term Reagan program have already been noted. Since the program is not firmly rooted in national-security requirements and economic capabilities, it is also subject to frequent and unpredictable swings between years and even within the year. These swings originate both in the administration and in

Board of Contributors

Getting the job done efficiently is subordinated to a passion for participation by representatives of secondary DoD interests, such as small business, equal opportunity or environmental advocacy.

Congress, as defense becomes just another counter in the game of budget management and budget politics. Defense officials and contractors are also encouraged to play this game. Since future budget limits are uncertain, they have an incentive to get projects initiated even though funds to complete them are not in sight, hoping thereby to establish commitments that will force the money to be provided later. If this hope is disappointed, there are costly stretchouts or cancellations.

Unnecessary instability of all kinds is the greatest source of excess cost in the defense program. A reasonably stable and predictable path of expenditures in the past 10 years would have yielded the level of forces actually achieved at a cost tens and possibly hundreds of billions of dollars below what we have actually spent.

3. Present organization, forces and plans are not well adapted to the limited-violence crises that are experienced today. The Marine intervention in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada are examples. Our military establishment is designed to prepare in peace for a war in which all forces are engaged and the nation is on a war footing. They have not been well prepared for the other circumstances in which the armed forces may be needed. These are likely to be circumstances in which speed, secrecy and flexibility are essential, in which the forces engaged are small but include elements from more than one service and more than one theater, in which there may be unusual limitations on the way force is used and in which continuous integration of political and military decisions is imperative. A major obstacle to effective operation in such circumstances is an excessively long chain of command between the political-military decision makers in Washington and the forces involved in the field. For example, when the

Marine garrison was in Lebanon, command over them ran from Washington to Brussels to Stuttgart to London to Naples to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to the Marine component of that fleet and then to the Marines ashore. Such a chain offers too many opportunities for information and instructions to be delayed, lost or misunderstood.

4. Probably the most serious deficiency in the defense acquisition process is the failure to assign clear responsibility and authority once a decision has been made to enter production. Nominally at this point a program manager takes charge. But in fact his authority is severely limited. He must contend with a large number of people who are in a position to make distracting demands upon him. These include representatives of the services who want to change the system in one way or another and representatives of various ancillary functions, such as aid to small businesses, environmental concerns, competitiveness concerns, etc. The program manager must also report on his progress through many layers of higher authority and seek approval from all of those layers for decisions he wants to make.

This is the opposite of the best private practices and the few outstanding Department of Defense programs. There the basic principle is to give someone the authority to do his assigned task and to hold him accountable to a high-level official who is the only person entitled to change his assignment. In Department of Defense common practice, the primary objective of getting the job done quickly and efficiently is subordinated to a passion for participation by representatives of secondary interests within the Pentagon, such as small business, equal opportunity or environmental advocacy.

The Department of Defense commonly insists that its weapons systems be produced with parts made to order to military specifications rather than permitting production to commercial specifications or purchase of parts available in the commercial market. In a great many cases the commercial specifications or parts of equivalent performance are much cheaper than the military specifications. In some cases the commercial specifications are of superior quality because market-competition forces private producers to incorporate the latest technological advances, whereas military specifications change only slowly. The insistence on military specifications is an example of bureaucratic aversion to taking the risks involved in a decision to depart from an established routine.

Other defects, although possibly less clearly established than these, are also important. These include inadequate balance among the views and responsibilities of the service chiefs, the chiefs of the Unified Commands for the various global regions and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, weakness of the military transportation system, premature decisions on adoption of weapons, "gold-plating" of requirements, inability to attract and hold highly qualified people in defense acquisition, and ineffective and excessively bureaucratic methods of dealing with problems of fraud and abuse.

This is an impressive list of things wrong with the management of our national defenses. But it is also a list of things that can be corrected, if not perfectly at least substantially. It is an agenda for the future, not an indictment of the past.

Mr. Stein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under Presidents Nixon and Ford, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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Weighing the Soviet Plan

Some Say Offer Is an Innovative Package; Others Call It Old Ideas in New Booby Trap

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 — With the latest nuclear arms proposal by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Moscow has seemingly reversed itself and opened the door to permitting research on space-based defenses and to eliminating its SS-20 medium-range missiles and all other nuclear weapons in Europe.

News
Analysis

According to some Administration officials, these are the two principal and possibly promising features of the Gorbachev plan announced Wednesday. But the plan continues to call for cuts in all offensive nuclear forces while banning defenses, which means it remains at fundamental odds with the Reagan approach, which is built around the introduction of defenses as most offensive forces are destroyed.

But fundamental issues aside, Administration officials maintain that the new Gorbachev proposal is an innovative package of tantalizing and often ambiguous proposals for complete nuclear disarmament by the end of the century. As such, they say, it serves notice on President Reagan that more pressure and hard bargaining are to come.

The proposal also caught Administration officials by surprise, as they themselves admit, and threw them on the defensive.

Soviet diplomats here are aiming to keep it that way by giving an upbeat interpretation of prospects in the arms talks that are again under way in Geneva, with one saying, "It's definitely a very interesting game now."

But "game" is precisely the construction put on the proposal by most Administration officials, who find themselves either thoroughly confused or, as in the case of Pentagon officials, convinced that Moscow has simply repackaged old ideas into a new booby trap.

One booby trap is clear. Mr. Gorbachev is seeking to destroy not only all Soviet and American medium-range missiles, as Mr. Reagan proposed in 1981, but all shorter-range and battlefield nuclear weapons and all French and British nuclear weapons as well.

That brings the United States and its European allies face to face for the first time with a choice they have sought to avoid for decades: Do they want a world without nuclear weapons in which they would be confronted with Russian conventional military superi-

ority? Or do they wish to abandon this pretense and continue to base deterrence on the threat of nuclear reprisal?

The starting point in the offer Wednesday by Moscow is a reduction by 50 percent of all Soviet and American missiles and bombers capable of striking the other side's territory. That is identical to Moscow's previous proposal, which was rejected by Washington on the grounds that it included American missiles in Europe capable of hitting Russia but excluded Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

But the new offer seems to deal with this problem. It states that in the first stage the two sides will reach and begin putting into effect "a decision on the complete liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone."

French and British Arms

It also suggests at least a partial solution to the equally fundamental problem of French and British medium-range nuclear forces, which Moscow previously wanted to include and Washington to exclude in the initial cuts. In the first stage of the new Soviet offer, Moscow seeks to sidestep this issue by freezing British and French forces at existing levels.

That still leaves untouched Soviet SS-20's targeted on Asia. But Moscow commits itself to dismantling these in a subsequent stage, presumably if China destroys its nuclear weapons.

All of this, however, is made dependent on renunciation by both sides of the "development, testing and deployment" of space-strike weapons, the way the Russians refer to President Reagan's missile defense program, formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative and popularly called "Star Wars." But here, too, there is an apparent concession. There is no mention of research.

Some Administration officials say this is just a trick. They note that elsewhere in the proposal, Mr. Gorbachev spoke of banning the "creation" of these space weapons. In the past, Soviet officials have defined the word creation to include research.

These officials also point out that the Soviet leader omitted the word research in his interview with Time magazine last summer, only to insist on a research ban at the summit meeting with Mr. Reagan in November.

To these Administration officials, the omission is a ploy to make the American and European publics believe a concession has been made, though the concession has not been made.

But other Administration officials argue that something is going on. Soviet officials in Moscow have been informally telling visitors recently that they are prepared to be "realistic"

about research. The news report held that Moscow was prepared to allow research for five to eight years.

Some officials say Moscow is seeking to take a less than absolutist stand and will try to draw a line in negotiations between research on the one hand and development on the other.

A Face-Saving Solution

The same officials say this would also make a face-saving solution possible for Mr. Reagan. To date, he has insisted that his program is solely a research one, to determine the feasibility of space-based defenses. In accepting Moscow's offer, he could say he had fully protected his vision and used it to gain deep cuts in offensive forces.

Queried today about what Mr. Gorbachev had in mind about research, a Soviet diplomat stated, "It's a legitimate question, so ask it in Geneva."

The banning of space-based weapons is apparently not the only condition for nuclear disarmament in the new plan. Mr. Gorbachev also seemed to insist that the two sides agree in the first phase of his three-phase plan to stop all nuclear tests. He even extended Moscow's one-sided moratorium on such tests, which had been scheduled to end Dec. 31, for an additional three months.

Administration officials said they were not sure whether acceptance of the test ban was a precondition for the whole package. In any event, they said, the idea continued to be unacceptable.

Including Other Powers

In the plan's stage two, which would begin no later than 1990 and take no more than seven years, other nuclear powers — presumably meaning China — would join in, first with a freeze on their nuclear forces. In addition, Britain and France would have to begin reducing their medium-range forces at this point.

The proposal does not explain how negotiations would be arranged with China, France, Britain and others. It is clear that they must take part; it is equally clear that those three countries have refused to do so thus far and have plans to expand their nuclear forces.

The third stage would begin no later than 1995 and be completed no later than 1999, by which time all nuclear weapons would have been destroyed.

The problem with stages two and three, from the Administration and allied standpoint, is with the elimination of all tactical and battlefield weapons with a range shorter than medium-range missiles. Mr. Reagan's formal proposals have called for a freeze on these weapons, perhaps some reductions, but never their elimination.

For more than a decade, the military doctrine of the Atlantic alliance has rested on the notion of deterrence through the threat of using nuclear weapons first against a Russian attack with conventional forces. There has been no move to abandon that, with the consequence of a very costly buildup in conventional forces.

"This just symbolizes the double-edged-sword nature of the whole new Gorbachev proposal," one key Administration official said. "It forces us to make hard choices that we haven't been willing to make so far."

traditional artillerymen who consider the light divisions too vulnerable.

The public appears to find low-intensity wars distasteful.

Noel C. Koch, the senior Pentagon civilian in charge of special operation forces, said the apparent public sentiment for a quick, neat military response to terrorism was one thing, but "I think we'd be kidding ourselves" to believe that that translates into support for a protracted war against insurgents.

Charles Wolf Jr., dean of the Rand Corporation Graduate Institute, said at the conference that America's allies had not been much help either. The Soviet Union, he said, held "a significant advantage" in low-intensity warfare because of its client states.

He Suggests a New Force

He proposed that the United States set out to build its own third world mobile fighting force, drawing soldiers from Egypt, Morocco, Taiwan, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina to intervene on behalf of anti-Communist causes.

The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency also came in for abuse. The specialists in little wars complained that civilian intelligence agencies hoarded and swapped their information for geopolitical leverage, rather than circulating it to the military for immediate use. The complaint about the State Department and foreign relations committees in Congress was that they took military aid money and lavished it on Israel and Egypt, Greece and Turkey, keeping one ally "from cutting the throat of another," as General Gorman put it, while neglecting Latin America and other hot spots.

Another encumbrance, the conferees said, is the military-industrial complex.

"To put it bluntly," said General Gorman, "the U.S. can no longer be of much material help to a third world country wrestling with insurgency because we do not have the sort of inexpensive, simple, rugged military equipment they require." The system churns out complex and expensive fighter planes, but balks at producing the cheap machine guns, boot soles and field rations that could transform many guerrilla wars, he said.

Private Army Training

Perhaps the most radical proposal offered to meet these shortcomings came from William J. Taylor Jr., a former Army colonel now at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. He suggested hiring private contractors to take over the business of training, arming and supporting friendly forces in the third world.

"I don't believe that you can fix the problems within the military establishment," he said.

The military men present generally scoffed at the idea of sending contractors into crossfires. Instead, they proposed nothing terribly unconventional.

Micromanaging defense

JIM COURTER

In its precipitous rush to pass an omnibus funding bill and adjourn for 1985, Congress presented the American people a Christmas gift that will last throughout this year. I am thinking specifically of the Defense Appropriations portion of the Continuing Resolution Conference Report, which is what passes for a defense appropriations bill in this day and age.

This hodge-podge of pork-barrel amendments, annoying reporting requirements, and dizzying funding restrictions cannot fairly be called responsible legislation. It is, however, emblematic of the congressional tendency to "micromanage" the Defense Department to such an extent that the Pentagon comes to resemble the hapless Gulliver, firmly moored to the ground by countless strings.

The congressional appetite for "over-oversight" has been growing since the beginning of the last decade and shows no sign of abating.

For instance, as the *Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report on Defense Organization* noted, there has been a veritable explosion of congressional reporting requirements and program changes in the defense funding bills. Thirty-six reports were requested from the Pentagon in 1970; by 1984, the number had jumped 1,172 percent, to 458 reports. Six hundred and fifty programs were changed in appropriation in 1970; almost 1,900 programs were altered last year.

This micromanagement activity takes place in both the funding committees and on the House and Senate floors during debate. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees changed 440 procurement programs and 317 research and development programs last year, and this activity was followed by more than 200 additional amendments during the 18 days of debate on the House and Senate floor. It is a small wonder that last year's authorization bill was 169 pages long, with 354 pages of report language; just 10 years ago, the bill was only 15 pages long, with 75 pages of report language.

There is nothing inherently unhelpful about more congressional involvement in the defense of

America; in fact, many important reforms have resulted from this completely warranted concern. What is disturbing are the truly trivial, parochial, and intrusive activities which masquerade as legitimate oversight functions. No one can credibly contend that all these actions will result in a better defense for America, although they may result in a better economy for certain key congressional districts. It is not enough to dismiss these actions as "pork barreling," because the situation has reached epidemic proportions, and more exposure clearly is needed.

Even a cursory glance at the recent defense appropriations bill will yield numerous examples of this abuse. In fact, I found 27 questionable provisions in the bill, and this, I am certain, is only the tip of the iceberg. It is as if the defense funding bills have become convenient vehicles for attaching all manner of amendments, under the safe assumption that the bills are not likely to be vetoed.

This practice has gone on so long now that it is possible to arrange the various amendments and reporting requirements in categories, based on their underlying causes and their intended effects. For example, because protectionism is the rage in the Congress, many of the amendments seek to protect certain domestic industries, with little regard for the effect on the Defense Department, the federal budget, or the nation as a whole.

The recent defense appropriations bill contains several provisions designed to benefit the domestic coal industry, by mandating increases in Defense Department use of American coal, preventing purchases of foreign coal, and blocking conversion of coal-fired heating plants to oil use. Little or no consideration is given to the effect of these provisions on American defense capabilities, which should be the guiding principle in all such matters. It is possible, indeed probable, that the provisions may benefit America's defense, but that consideration appears only to have been an afterthought.

There are many other examples of protectionist requirements in this bill alone. American textiles, silverware, and hand measuring tools are given a leg up against their foreign competition in defense procurement. Domestic aircraft ejection seats are ensured of an equal shot

al: more military control of intelligence and foreign aid, more money, more public education, and more conferences.

Editorial

Nuclear Freeze: The Hidden Costs

Although the recent off-year Congressional elections were indecisive indicators of general trends in national politics, leaving the basic power equations in Washington essentially unchanged, the nuclear freeze proposal did clearly establish itself as an issue with considerable public support.

The freeze proposal calls for a verifiable mutual halt in the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union, to become effective as soon as the agreement can be worked out with the Russians. It is opposed by the Reagan administration on the grounds that it would make permanent a current, perceived Russian military advantage, and by others on the grounds of a general mistrust of the Soviets. Despite this, the nuclear freeze concept has won broad public support primarily because of its simplicity of concept, and the implication that it would significantly reduce current and future U.S. military budgets, thus freeing money to restore cut social programs and/or reduce the tax burden, while, at the same time, reducing the likelihood of nuclear war.

The larger organizations of the American Jewish community have been relatively slow to take a stand on the issue, although some small Jewish groups have actively promoted the concept since its inception three years ago. Recently, however, national Jewish interest in the nuclear freeze has increased. Reform and Conservative rabbinic groups have gone on record with strong pro-freeze positions, as has the National Council of Jewish Women and several local Jewish communal relations councils. Other Jewish groups have refrained from comment either out of a concern about possibly damaging or alienating the American defense establishment, which is important to Israel, or out of lack of an informed opinion on the question.

Without judging the overall merits of the nuclear freeze, we wish to explore one facet of the proposal: its impact upon the national defense budget. Proponents of the freeze deny accusations that it is, in fact, a unilateral disarmament proposal. They contend that current nuclear weapons in place on both sides are adequate to meet all national military requirements. Many nuclear freeze proponents also go one step further, urging the U.S. to match a Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in any future conflict.

The combined effect of these twin proposals would be to limit any future military conflicts to conventional weapons only. In this area, all military experts agree that the Soviet Union holds a vast numerical advantage, in planes, in tanks, in men under arms, in naval ships. Furthermore, the technological superiority of Western weapons over their Soviet counterparts has been seriously eroded. The military implications of these facts are that the Soviet Union has a much greater reserve capacity to fight an extended conventional war than the NATO allies.

For 30 years, the NATO answer to this conventional warfare inferiority has been a strategic plan to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield to neutralize the Russian advantage. The nuclear freeze and non-first use policies, if adopted, would force the abandonment of this strategic plan, making a major conventional arms buildup by the US and its allies the only alternative to permanent military inferiority to the Russians. Thus defense budgets would have to increase rather than shrink if the nuclear freeze and non-first use proposals were adopted. To build the thousands of tanks, ships and planes required to bring us even, and to first rebuild the long-neglected defense plants necessary for that rate of production, would require hundreds of billions of dollars more in defense spending than currently planned, to say nothing of the costs to recruit and train the additional personnel needed to man these weapons.

While we do not question the sincerity of those who support the nuclear freeze and non-first use proposals, we wonder whether they are prepared to pay the heavy additional economic price that would then be required to protect the security of the Free World against the vast superiority of Russian conventional arms.

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Nuclear Freeze Debate Heats Up in Jewish Co

Comments

A Jewish Federation Council debate on the California nuclear freeze proposal has been underway for nearly three months, and, in the latest round of that debate, concerned citizens had the opportunity to hear from one of the measure's milder opponents, James Digby.

Though he is a senior staff executive at Rand Corporation, Digby is also executive director of the California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy and appeared wearing that hat before a small audience of what turned out to be primarily proponents of the initiative.

Framing his comments by saying he is "not violently opposed to the nuclear freeze initiative in California," the thirty-year veteran analyst of major American policy issues offered stimulating reasons why a nuclear freeze would not reduce the possibility of a super-power nuclear war.

First, a freeze would leave in position a number of so-called "battlefield" nuclear weapons which, from the point of view of military strategy, attract attack, according to Digby, thereby increasing the possibility of warfare. Digby refers specifically to an estimated 7,000 American nuclear warheads in place in Europe. A freeze, he claims, leaving this portion of the U.S. arsenal in place, adds pressure to the possibility of the wrong kind of confrontation.


Digby also maintains that a freeze would prohibit making some of America's weapons less vulnerable. Here the line of reasoning is as follows: if weapons are not well enough protected to withstand attack, the Soviet Union might be encouraged to knock out such weapons, whereas, if weapons were better protected, less "vulnerable," or more sophisticated, there would be less reason to attempt to do battle with them. Simply stated, Why would anyone attack something knowing it could not be beat?

Digby also feels the freeze movement, which has gained popularity in a number of states across the country and has been endorsed in 15 state legislatures, distracts from other, more important concerns which, if taken seriously, would lessen the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Here he is concerned in particular with nuclear proliferation and how the initiative fails to

address the current Administration's lax stance on international commerce involving the kind of plutonium needed for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Digby feels strongly, too, that if the

that it calls attention to the disastrous consequences of any nuclear confrontation, that it stimulates learning and informed discussion among voters, and that it has jarred American government officials



"NOT VIOLENTLY OPPOSED" is how guest speaker James Digby (right), Executive Director, California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, framed his comments regarding the Bi-Lateral Nuclear Freeze initiative at a recent JFC-sponsored community discussion. With Digby is Richard Gunther who organized separate meetings featuring opponents and advocates of the measure which comes before California voters on the November ballot.

United States wants to avoid nuclear war it must act with a "posture and strength which keeps the lid on non-nuclear constraints in volatile sections of the world like the Middle East and Europe." By minimizing conflicts in these areas, he suggests, the U.S. will lessen chances for a nuclear conflict.

What Digby sees as positive about nuclear freeze measures like the one coming before California voters in the fall is

into action on an issue of critical importance to just about everyone.

Earlier this year JFC sponsored another freeze discussion, that one featuring proponents of the initiative, among them Rabbi Leonard I. Beerman of Leo Baeck Temple.

Rabbi Beerman and others who strongly favor the measure have called upon the local Jewish community to support it as a

means of containing a nuclear arms race which they see as having "doomed us to nuclear insanity."

Citing the lesson of history which teaches that "every civilization has perished sooner or later," Beerman suggests that this civilization may be in the process of making the same mistakes which led to the destruction of cultures preceding it.

Pointing to high investments both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have made in their nuclear arsenals, Beerman suggests there is a tremendous irony in developing such weaponry, stating, "For the sake of protecting their nations, the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been brazenly prepared to sacrifice more than 100 million of their citizens on the first day of an all-out nuclear war." What kind of defense is there really in nuclear weapons, the Rabbi asks, if it leaves half a nation dead and the future of the survivors largely in jeopardy?

He also points up the moral choices the arms race has led to, suggesting that the billions of dollars spent on weaponry could have been better allocated for food, education, and shelter for more than 700 million people in desperate need around the world. "How can we pursue human goals, how can we reckon with the decay of our cities, how can we care for the poor and the hungry and the abandoned . . . when our ultimate commitment is not to what is humane, not to God, but to this super Moloch in whose nuclear temple we have been prepared to sacrifice our children?" he asks.

Finally, Rabbi Beerman sees the issue of a nuclear freeze as one in which Jews in particular should play an influential and positive role, if only because they know so well what kind of brutality mankind is capable of. Quoting from a Holocaust survivor, he states, "We have a duty to reaffirm, in this place and at this time, the primordial importance of the great values of Judaism in the continued quest for survival and peace . . . From where, if not from us, will come the warning that a new combination of technology and brutality can transform the planet into a crematorium? From where, if not from the bloodiest killing ground of all time, will come the hope that co-existence between . . . enemies is possible?"

Comment

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
Digby also maintains that a freeze would prohibit making some of America's weapons less vulnerable. Here the line of reasoning is as follows: if weapons are not well enough protected to withstand attack, the Soviet Union might be encouraged to knock out such weapons, whereas, if weapons were better protected, less "vulnerable," or more sophisticated, there would be less reason to attempt to do battle with them. Simply stated, Why would anyone attack something knowing it could not be beat?

Digby also feels the freeze movement, which has gained popularity in a number of states across the country and has been endorsed in 15 state legislatures, distracts from other, more important concerns which, if taken seriously, would lessen the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Here he is concerned in particular with nuclear proliferation and how the initiative fails to

address the current Administration's lax stance on international commerce involving the kind of plutonium needed for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Digby feels strongly, too, that if the

that it calls attention to the disastrous consequences of any nuclear confrontation, that it stimulates learning and informed discussion among voters, and that it has jarred American government officials



"NOT VIOLENTLY OPPOSED" is how guest speaker James Digby (right), Executive Director, California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, framed his comments regarding the Bi-Lateral Nuclear Freeze initiative at a recent JFC-sponsored community discussion. With Digby is Richard Gunther who organized separate meetings featuring opponents and advocates of the measure which comes before California voters on the November ballot.

United States wants to avoid nuclear war it must act with a "posture and strength which keeps the lid on non-nuclear constraints in volatile sections of the world like the Middle East and Europe." By minimizing conflicts in these areas, he suggests, the U.S. will lessen chances for a nuclear conflict.

What Digby sees as positive about nuclear freeze measures like the one coming before California voters in the fall is

into action on an issue of critical importance to just about everyone.

Earlier this year JFC sponsored another freeze discussion, that one featuring proponents of the initiative, among them Rabbi Leonard I. Beerman of Leo Baeck Temple.

Rabbi Beerman and others who strongly favor the measure have called upon the local Jewish community to support it as a

means of containing a nuclear arms race which they see as having "doomed us to nuclear insanity."

Citing the lesson of history which teaches that "every civilization has perished sooner or later," Beerman suggests that this civilization may be in the process of making the same mistakes which led to the destruction of cultures preceding it.

Pointing to high investments both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have made in their nuclear arsenals, Beerman suggests there is a tremendous irony in developing such weaponry, stating, "For the sake of protecting their nations, the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been brazenly prepared to sacrifice more than 100 million of their citizens on the first day of an all-out nuclear war." What kind of defense is there really in nuclear weapons, the Rabbi asks, if it leaves half a nation dead and the future of the survivors largely in jeopardy?

He also points up the moral choices the arms race has led to, suggesting that the billions of dollars spent on weaponry could have been better allocated for food, education, and shelter for more than 700 million people in desperate need around the world. "How can we pursue human goals, how can we reckon with the decay of our cities, how can we care for the poor and the hungry and the abandoned . . . when our ultimate commitment is not to what is humane, not to God, but to this super Moloch in whose nuclear temple we have been prepared to sacrifice our children?" he asks.

Finally, Rabbi Beerman sees the issue of a nuclear freeze as one in which Jews in particular should play an influential and positive role, if only because they know so well what kind of brutality mankind is capable of. Quoting from a Holocaust survivor, he states, "We have a duty to reaffirm, in this place and at this time, the primordial importance of the great values of Judaism in the continued quest for survival and peace . . . From where, if not from us, will come the warning that a new combination of technology and brutality can transform the planet into a crematorium? From where, if not from the bloodiest killing ground of all time, will come the hope that co-existence between . . . enemies is possible?"

NEWSLETTER

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File

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NEWSBRIEFS

LAVIE TO BE READY BY 1986: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens announced that the prototype of the Lavie fighter jet will be produced by 1986. Israel has already invested \$100 million in preliminary research and up to \$2 billion more will be spent to develop the prototype. Arens noted that the Lavie should be the most advanced plane of its kind when it is finished since the US is not presently developing any new warplanes.

MORE ON RA'S BANAS: Negotiations are continuing between the United States and Egypt regarding American use of the Egyptian air base in Ra's Banas on the Red Sea. Egypt has emphasized that it will not jeopardize Egyptian sovereignty over the territory and has refused the American request to allow the US Army Corps of Engineers to assume the construction section in the base. Due to these legal difficulties, it has been agreed that Egypt will develop the base, and will grant temporary facilities to the United States in the event that the security of any Arab state is endangered.

MUFTI GRANTS DISPENSATION: The top Moslem leader in Jerusalem, the Mufti Sheikh Saad el-Din el-Alami, has issued a religious dispensation for any Moslem who succeeds in killing Syrian President Hafez Assad. The Mufti called for Assad's death on the grounds that he has permitted the killing of other Moslems and is therefore no longer considered a member of Islam himself. He cited the Syrian Government's killing of thousands of Moslem Brotherhood members in Hama and the murder of Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camp of Tel Zaatar during the Lebanese civil war.

FRENCH ARMS SALES: Because of Iraqi pressure, France has agreed to lend Iraq five Super Etendard jets equipped with Exocet missiles to use in the war against Iran. This is the combination that proved so deadly to the British forces in the Falklands War last year. The French government has also announced that it will provide Egypt with French Mirage-200 fighter jets in addition to Mirage-3 and Mirage-5 aircraft, Crotale anti-aircraft missiles and other equipment. The Mirage-200 jet is considered to be one of the most sophisticated fighter planes in the world.

DUTCH TO QUIT UNIFIL: The Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands has announced that it will withdraw its troops serving with the UN multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon in October if the situation there remains unchanged. In the meantime, the 812 Dutch troops will stay on to assist in implementing the Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal agreement.

FRANCE CLOSER TO NATO: The French National Assembly has approved France's most important military policy change since President DeGaulle's withdrawal from the integrated military command of the Atlantic Alliance in 1966. The five-year defense plan accepts the concept that the security of France is bound to that of the Alliance. This change from a position of isolation is related to French concerns over recent Soviet arms modernization and the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. An indication of how closely France is now working with NATO was the permission granted to US bombers taking part in a major exercise to refuel in French airspace for the first time since 1955.

SOVIET USING CLIENTS IN AFGHANISTAN: A major commander of the Afghan freedom fighters has reported that the Soviet Union has incorporated commandos from five client states and Palestinian guerrillas into its occupation army. Col. Ghulam Wardak said that he has seen himself troops from Cuba, South Yemen, East Germany, Bulgaria and Ethiopia taking part in assaults against Mojadeede positions.

NUCLEAR VERIFICATION MONITORS: According to Sandia Laboratories, a national defense lab in New Mexico, the US is developing a network of seismic stations that will assist in the verification of any nuclear test ban treaties that may be negotiated with the Soviets. The stations consist of small black boxes that are buried beneath the ground and which record any bomb that has been detonated and its size and location. The system differs from previous verification measures that depended on national means, that is, methods employed in each country's own territory, that of their allies, or from satellites. The seismic boxes would be placed in both the Soviet Union and the US and would preclude the need for on-site inspections.

Is The Nuclear Freeze A "Jewish Issue"?

Shoshana Bryen

Strategic goals and tactical decisions relating to national security are subject to a certain amount of public pressure in a democracy. The Jewish community, as a highly organized and politically active American subgroup, can and should bring its particular history and principles to bear on issues of American policy.

Strategy and tactics are not an unfamiliar realm for most American Jews as we participate in various ways in support of Israel and her relations with her Arab neighbors and the United States. Deterrence, appeasement and verification arise over and over in relation to Israel. Moral judgments and acceptance of ethical principles are, if not automatic, made with sympathy for the essential "rightness" of Israel's independence and territorial integrity.

American Jewry has little trouble with the "Jewishness" of the military defense and preparedness of Israel. Indeed, year after year, while praying that Israel will not have to use her military might, organized elements of the Jewish community approach Congress for military aid for Israel. "It is necessary," we repeat to our lawmakers, "that Israel not be weakened; that the Arabs not perceive a shift in US policy away from Israel, because if there is such a shift, the Arabs will take advantage of it and Israel may not survive."

This is the theory of deterrence—that Israel must be strong enough, and perceived as strong enough, to make the cost of attacking her unacceptably high for her adversaries.

The vast majority of the Jewish community opposes the creation of a Palestinian state. Nearly as many oppose unilateral Israeli recognition of the PLO, rightly claiming that giving something to an avowed enemy of Israel without demanding serious reciprocity,

will simply whet their appetite for more. There is, furthermore, a large body of opinion in the Jewish community which says that even if Yasser Arafat were to announce his recognition of Israel and declare acceptance of a state limited in size, the PLO should not be negotiated with, as the PLO is not trustworthy and the limited state would only be a first step toward a Palestinian state in all of Israel.

This is opposition to a policy of appeasement. There is no historical evidence that appeasement has ever produced a lasting peace.

America

It is incongruous that Jewish acceptance of deterrence and rejection of appeasement (mainstream opinions in relation to Israel) are so rarely applied to American strategy and tactics. Jewish leadership groups have adopted resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze. Not unilateral freeze, in most cases, but "mutual and verifiable" ones, imputing "evenhandedness" to the procedure and the relationship between the superpowers. Is evenhandedness the approach the Jewish community should take? Is lumping together the adversarial parties and their claims to defensible positions the best way to ensure the continuation of America's role as a defender of democratic values, while limiting the ability of the Soviet Union to threaten free countries and export ideological and armed terrorism?

This "ethical neutralism", the suggestion that the Soviets and the Americans have the same goals, the same ethical principles and equal moral, political and social systems, should be anathema to Jews. Is the country which imprisoned Anatoly Scharansky and exiled Ida Nudel to be considered in the same way as the United States?

When evenhandedness is applied to the Middle East by pro-Arab politicians, it arouses our fury. We understand the meaning of the term—the loss of American support for Israel; the suggestion that Israel should be considered in a political and moral vacuum; that it can be in the American national interest to forego a friendly, democratic and free nation, or ask it to risk its freedom and independence because "other interests" dictate that it do so.

The Soviet Union

Few Americans would deny that the Soviets have made themselves into our ideological, political, social and economic adversaries. Few too, would deny that they intend to mount their political and ideological challenge on the back of a military buildup of un-

precedented proportions. And Jews, of all minority groups in this country, should recognize Soviet tenacity, obduracy and certainty of purpose (many of us or our families have been subjected to life in that country, and our fellow Jews are unable to escape). Any notion that the Soviets would be flexible or fair-minded certainly was put to rest by Afghanistan and by Soviet action in crushing the free labor union in Poland.

Since WWII, the Soviets have maintained that they require a "buffer" to protect their homeland. They occupied Eastern Europe, annexed the Baltic states and other territories, and co-opted Finland. Not content with a purely defensive buffer in the form of additional territory, they have placed a ring of multiple-warhead missiles aimed at Western Europe around the buffer (deliberately unsettling the nuclear balance). Those missiles, coupled with the conventional strength of the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, are designed to ensure that "the war" will be fought in Western Europe, rather than Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union itself. It is worth noting that the NATO alliance is utterly defensive—it can only operate after one of the NATO members is attacked.

There is, in this, a judgment of the behavior of one system compared to another, similar to the one we often make for Israel. We believe, and we say, that Israel is not committed to the destruction of Arab states, but the Arab states are committed to the destruction of Israel. The United States is not committed to the destruction of the communist system, but the Soviet Union is, by doctrine and practice, committed to the defeat of capitalism.

Europe and the Freeze

A freeze in nuclear delivery systems binds us to accept the basic array of nuclear delivery systems currently deployed. This would suit Soviet purposes quite well, since they have completed, or nearly so, their deployment of multiple warhead SS20s and we have not yet begun deployment of Pershing IIs. (The Pershing program is, in any event, a response to new Soviet deployments of advanced missiles. Unlike the Russians, we would not field a single missile if they would reduce or eliminate theirs.) Over any term, 3-5 years seems to be the ballpark figure, a freeze would result in substantial harm to our security by allowing the Soviets to solidify the nature of their attack against our known, and older, systems without fear of new American systems,

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EDITORIALS

The Palestinians: Toward Political Independence?

Factions of the PLO are embroiled in a civil war that may determine the organization's political and military posture for some time to come. The war is not between "moderate and radical," but between "radical and more so," played out for all the world to see. Unelected and self-appointed, the PLO was never entitled to its grand appellation "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Although Arafat's personal popularity is still strong, some Palestinians are considering hard political alternatives, raising interesting possibilities for future diplomacy.

This is clear even in the Bekka Valley, where the PLO has physical control of the civilians. After years of serving as a shield for terrorists, and years of impotence in the face of their self-appointed representatives, the civilians have objected to the violence of their "protectors." Five hundred women, children and old people marched between warring factions of the Fatah—not demanding unity to defeat the Zionist enemy—but simply an end to the bloodshed; and a ceasefire was instituted. It happened not once, but twice, and most recently, shopkeepers in the Bekka organized a shutdown to protest the killing. At least temporarily, the people have been able to raise a united voice to protest actions of the PLO.

Disagreement with the PLO is more organized on the West Bank. Following the suspension of talks between the PLO and Jordan, a group of West Bank and Gaza residents, including members of Chambers of Commerce, intellectuals and other professionals, met to establish an opposition front which they call the Popular Alliance. Representatives of the Alliance are planning to visit Amman and other Arab capitals in the near future to gain Arab support for their approach.

West Bank leaders, including Mayor Elias Freij of Bethlehem, have publicly expressed concern that if Arafat saves his position in the Fatah by rejecting all forms of negotiation, the future of the West Bank will be out of Palestinian hands. For Freij, and others, the PLO was important for raising the "Palestinian issue" in international fora, but it is now unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to resolve their dilemma. The Popular Alliance and the Village Leagues are attempting to ensure that West Bankers have a voice in the future of the territory.

The emergence of these individuals and organizations underscores the failures of the PLO. It also implies that some Palestinians realize that the "fighting PLO heroes of Al-Biqa and Lebanon" are fighting for the preservation of their own organization, not the future of Palestinians. The limited support Arafat is receiving from the Arab world and the Soviet Union, as well as the intensity of the rebellion inside the organization and its support by Syria, may increase their understanding that fighting Israel in Lebanon will not bring West Bankers closer to achievement of any of their goals.

The PLO, which has always claimed to be democratic, feels threatened by the emergence of a new opposition front, and has announced that it will fight the Alliance in the same manner that it fights Israel.

There is no popular revolution going on among the Palestinians against the PLO. Yet, the PLO retains veto power over those who would choose negotiation as an option—they vetoed Issam Sartawi, permanently. But we in the US should be fully aware of the difficulties inherent in introducing people to democracy, and waiting for it to take root. Even as we consider the unhappy state of our present position vis a vis Lebanon, we can take a small (growing?) measure of comfort from the thought that a small seed of political independence may be germinating on the West Bank. With proper encouragement, we may yet find more reasonable Palestinians with whom a future peace for the region can be fashioned.

Adding Insult to Ineffectiveness

The government of Saudi Arabia has insulted us again. Two years ago, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was told he was just an arms merchant and the Saudis paid cash. Secretary of State George Shultz has been subjected to a public Saudi double-cross. The President's envoy Robert McFarlane was kept waiting 24 hours, and finally was summoned to meet King Fahd at midnight.

Mr. Shultz was told by the Saudis some months ago that if he could arrange a Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement, the Saudis would help to pressure Syria to withdraw. Shultz accomplished the nearly impossible: the Israel-Lebanon Accord was ratified by both governments and parliaments. What role did the Saudis play? Not only did they try to dissuade the Lebanese from entering into the agreement, they never exerted any influence with Syria.

Shultz did not negotiate the Accord at the behest of Saudi Arabia, certainly, but their assurance of help with Syria must have weighed heavily in his overall calculations. It surely must have accounted for much of his optimism after the signing, when others were pointing a gloomy finger at Syria as the possible spoiler. Finally, his confidence in the Saudis must have been passed along to President Gemeyel, who used it in his own calculation of the situation. Gemeyel has now had to admit to "surprise" at Syria's refusal to withdraw from his country. He told reporters on his visit to Washington, "Nothing in the course of these negotiations led us to believe that Syria's position would be so vehement."

The Saudi promise to our Secretary of State was a sham, and their current posture is outrageous for a country presumed in many government circles to be friendly. We would not accept such an action from Britain or France, and certainly not from Israel. Where is our indignation?

Where is our political common sense? Saudi Arabia is politically incapable of being anyone's ally, or applying pressure to anyone. Why do we have to pass every "test of friendship" in arms sales while they pass none? Why do we continue to misjudge their interests, influence and method of doing business?

Partly, because using Western standards and illusions, we assigned to them a political importance they did not have. They exacted a political as well as economic price for their oil in the West, and because they used their influence so successfully here, we assumed they could and would do so in the Middle East. However, in regional terms, they are just a conservative monarchy ripe for revolution. They operate by consensus, catering to the slowest and most radical states in the region. And they know, better than we, that they paid bills for the radicals to buy protection, not influence.

The haze of oil wealth is slowly lifting, and we should see with new clarity that Saudi Arabia is just one country among many in the region, not the key to great US influence with radical (or any other kind of) Arabs. The problems we face in Lebanon are difficult enough if we approach them directly. It is naive and insulting to pretend any longer that Saudi Arabia will help. They are unwilling and unable to be an intermediary. Let us have no illusions about them in the future.

Chad, Too

What do Ndjamena, Beirut and San Salvador have in common? In each, a Soviet surrogate (Libya, Syria and Cuba via Nicaragua) is attempting to upset the internal balance of power to topple governments friendly to the West. In each place, we find a congruence of pro-Western, anti-Soviet interests. And in each place, the resolve of the West will affect our ability to deal in the other places.

For Lebanon, the British, French and Italian governments have committed their forces alongside ours for the preservation of the Gemeyel government. For El Salvador, the OAS is considering holding the Sandinistas to the contract they made with that organization before they came to power; Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala rely on the strength of the elected government of El Salvador to set the stage for their own futures free of Soviet controlled guerrillas; and our European allies are beginning to understand the magnitude of US concerns. For Chad, France (the last colonial power there), Zaire and Egypt are supplying logistical and

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

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military support along with US logistical assistance.

These are not necessarily crises that directly involve US vital interests (other countries are affected more strongly), but as the superpower in each case, we carry great responsibility, and failure to respond to a small country's plea for help will weigh most heavily upon us.

Certainly our response in Chad will be calculated into Cuba's plans for Central America, and Syria's for the dismemberment of Lebanon. But before we get into a domestic shouting match about sending combat troops to Chad or the "next Vietnam" or "slippery slopes," we would do well to remember that combat troops are not our only option.

We have allies (in this case, allies with a greater immediate stake than we have); we have a confluence of countries in Africa which has ostracized Khaddafi, which allows us the rare luxury of a reasonable debate in the UN; and we have the means to assist the Chadian government without direct involvement of our troops (AWACS in Sudan, for example). We must choose to exercise all of these options, and with France, to exercise leadership of a loose confederation of disparate governments who all have something to lose if Libya is allowed to bully other countries in Africa.

The civil war in Chad is 18 years old. We may not end it. But to ignore it or to call it someone else's problem is to signal to Soviet proxies that Western and pro-Western countries cannot rely on the US for more than lip-service in the face of Soviet plans. In that respect, Ndjamena, Beirut and San Salvador have more in common than we might have once believed.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Stefan Leader, Shelah Leader, Sheila Tobias and Peter Goudinoff

Editor's Note: The authors are co-authors of What Kinds of Guns are They Buying for Your Butter?: A Beginner's Guide to Defense Weapons and Military Spending (Morrow, 1982). See Book Review JINSA Newsletter, Dec/Jan 1983.

Chemical and biological warfare are not new developments. In ancient times smoke was used as a weapon, and during sieges, rotted carcasses were flung over castle walls in hopes of spreading disease. But chemical and biological warfare as we know it, is a comparatively recent development related to the advent of modern chemistry and biology.

Despite the 1907 Hague Convention banning poison gas, belligerent nations used phosgene, chlorine, and mustard gas (see Box) in World War I in hopes of breaking the stalemate on the Western Front. However, gas did not produce the desired result; of the 16 million battle dead in that war, only 91,000 deaths were attributed to poison gas. The point is that although the first German gas attack at Ypres in 1915 blew a major hole in the British lines, it did not break the stalemate and, although gas was used numerous times after that, it was not a war-winning weapon. The effects of gas are just too unpredictable—varying with wind, temperature and humidity. And if both sides use it, there is no advantage.

This point was not lost on Germany. In World War II, they had nerve gas but did not use it because, according to Albert Speer (cited in Seymour Hersh's book *Chemical and Biological Warfare*) they thought the Allies also possessed such weapons and would retaliate in kind. So, perception of the ability to retaliate turned poison gas into a deterrent, rather than a usable weapon.

Indeed, since WWI, such weapons have only been used when one side possessed it. The Italians used it against the Ethiopians in 1936, and the Russians appear to have used it against the Afghans.

The delivery of chemical agents poses no particular technological problem. In combat, the delivery systems are essentially the same as for other ordnance; bombs, shells and missiles. In the case of Yellow Rain, in Laos and Kampuchea, the Vietnamese are believed to be using crop-spraying aircraft, this time spreading a toxin in an aerosol particulate form, a technique the Soviets appear to have also used in Afghanistan.

There is one new delivery system under consideration: the cruise missile. The cruise missile is a highly versatile pilotless airplane and published reports suggest that chemical warheads for cruise missiles are under development. Several different varieties of cruise missiles are planned and some have already joined US forces. Because it is a flexible and accurate delivery system, cruise missiles might enhance the effectiveness of chemical weapons, particularly at long range.

NATO's proposed response to Soviet activities is to modernize its deterrent force of chemical weapons by producing binary 155mm artillery shells and the "Bigeye"—a 500 pound bomb for use by the Air Force and the Navy. Binary weapons consist of two relatively safe chemicals: DF (methyl phosphonic

(continued on page 8)



Prototype of the new American gas mask (US Army Photo)

Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Selected List

Chemicals: (non-lethal since their specific purpose is to incapacitate, rather than kill. In heavy doses, non-lethal chemicals can kill.)

- phosgene: Used to incapacitate by causing choking. Heavily used in WWI, it caused death.
- HD—mustard gas: Used in WWI and still stockpiled in the US, it is designed to harass the enemy by causing burns and skin blisters. Used by Italy in Ethiopia in 1936, it can kill.
- DM—adamsite: Used to harass and incapacitate by causing nausea. First used in WWI, it was also used in Vietnam.
- CS—tear gas: Used to incapacitate and harass. Employed for riot control and used in Vietnam.
- CN—tear gas: Used to harass and disperse. Used in Vietnam.
- BZ: A psychochemical used to incapacitate by causing temporary paralysis, deafness, and blindness. Highly unreliable and may cause maniacal behavior.

Chemicals: (lethal, since they are specifically designed to kill)

- chlorine: The first gas used in WWI, at Ypres in 1915, killed more than 5,000 soldiers. It was replaced by phosgene and mustard gas.
- GB—Sarin: A nerve gas that kills by causing convulsions and suffocation. It is a standard US nerve gas and would be used in the new binary weapons.
- VX—A standard US nerve gas that kills by paralyzing the central nervous system.
- CD—Soman: A nerve gas that kills in minutes by attacking the central nervous system. Developed in 1944, it is thought to be standard in the Soviet arsenal.

Biological:

- anthrax: A fatal bacterial disease that attacks the lungs. A 1978 accident in Sverdlovsk, USSR, is believed to have been caused by anthrax, but the facts have not been clarified.
- plague: a lethal bacterial disease of wild rodents that occurs in two forms: bubonic and pneumonic. Bubonic plague causes hemorrhages (black spots) and is commonly called black death. Pneumonic plague is highly infectious and is transmitted by coughing.
- yellow rain: A mycotoxin of the tricothecene group that is produced naturally by wheat mold. It can be produced synthetically, so it blurs the line between biological and chemical agents. It can be artificially dispersed in an aerosol form.

Defoliants:

- agent orange: A compound consisting of 2,4-D (dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (trichlorophenoxyacetic acid). Used in Vietnamese jungles. Veterans exposed to agent orange believe that it produced lasting harmful side effects, but this is controversial.

About The Newsletter

"By 8 A.M. the early bird edition of Current News, a compendium of clippings from more than 20 newspapers, will be at the White House, the State Department, the National Security Administration and other top echelon offices of the military establishment.

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New York Times (6 July 1983)

We are gratified that Current News has found it appropriate to include material from the past 18 issues of the Newsletter in its clips. While we are pleased with the recognition we have received, and believe we produce high-quality material, we are always looking for ways to improve. WE WOULD LIKE TO SOLICIT YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS REGARDING THE CONTENT, STYLE AND FORMAT OF OUR NEWSLETTER. PLEASE TAKE THE TIME TO SEND US YOUR THOUGHTS.

The Editors

The Soviet Air Force—Toward the 21st Century

Yossef Bodansky

Since 1979, the total Soviet military establishment has been undergoing its most profound changes since the introduction of nuclear weapons to the Soviet armed forces. Marshal SU N. Ogarkov wrote, "A profound revolution in the whole sense of the word is taking place in military affairs in our time," manifesting itself in all aspects of the Soviet military establishment, from the introduction of new technology to reorganization of the troops, and most importantly, in profound changes in doctrine and operational art. Its essence is Soviet determination to win a future conflict (including those in Central Europe) during the initial period of a war in a non-nuclear battlefield.

This has imposed a demanding challenge to the Soviet art of war. The awesome ramifications of fighting a nuclear war (which the Soviets are also determined to win) have compelled the Soviets to reorient their perception of future wars. They are determined to win the strategic victory in a non-nuclear war before the West has had the opportunity to introduce nuclear weapons.

Operations

The new significance of land operations meant that these operations would be conducted at new strategic and force levels—theaters of military operations (TVD). This means that missions and goals, especially those in the enemy's deep rear, which were previously defined as strategic, have become an integral component of the combined arms offensive. M.M. Kir'yan explains:

An operation is taken to mean the sum total of engagements, battles and strikes, coordinated and inter-related by objective, place and time, conducted in a TVD or an operational (strategic) axis under a uniform concept and plan for accomplishment of strategic, operational-strategic or operational missions. Operations may be conducted by formation of one or more combat-arms of the armed forces...

The basic features of modern operations are as follows: great spatial scope; disappearance of distinctions between front and rear; decisiveness of goals; a sharp increase in losses of personnel, military equipment and other means; highly dynamic, frequent situation changes and so on. It is envisaged that actions by combat arms of the armed forces must be strictly coordinated with each other on the basis of a single strategic concept. It is believed that the strategic offensive will become the basic kind of military action.

Winning Early

The ever-present danger of nuclear escalation has put greater emphasis on winning during the initial non-nuclear period. The fate of the entire war will hinge on the outcome of the initial strategic offensive, because it should determine not only the fighting ability of the forces on the battlefield, but also the enemy's ability to mobilize its national assets and wage a protracted war. Preventing the enemy's reorganization in the rear is of greater strategic significance than the magnitude of the military victory on the battlefield. If the war-fighting capability of the enemy is destroyed, the remaining forces on the battlefield are doomed in any case. Therefore, the essence of the current Soviet strategic doctrine is carrying the combined-arms military operations to the entire depth of the enemy rear from the very outset of hostilities.

The Rapid Offensive

This required a rapidly developing offensive. General of the Army I. Ye. Shavrov emphasizes that the offensive is "the basic type of combat operation. The most important principles of the offensive remain: the decisive massing of troops and means along the axes of the main strike; the surprise in initiating combat operations; reliable suppression of the opponent's prepared defense on a wide front and at high speeds." This offensive is a very complex and demanding undertaking, comprised of two main

elements: a steady rapid advance of the main combined arms formations; and vast diversified activity of numerous forces through the entire depth of the enemy which will disrupt warfighting capability, cut main forces and grouping, create chaos, capture strategic objectives in the enemy rear, and facilitate the rapid advance of the main forces. The military operations in the rear are conducted by units ranging from armies to battalions. The main elements are tank armies and divisions, operating in close coordination with helicopter Air Assault Brigades and independent helicopter squadrons assigned to them, as Operational Maneuver Groups; Airborne Divisions and helicopter Brigades of Special Duties of the Airborne Troops (currently an integral part of the Ground Forces); and large scale aerial activity by the Air Force.

The Expanded Battlefield

Current military operations and the fire power of the participating non-nuclear weapons systems have resulted in a massive expansion of the battlefield, creating demand for the conduct of military operations of an unprecedented size. These operations are under a centralized, yet flexible, troop control system capable of maximizing all the assets at the disposal of the commander. Ogarkov explains:

Front commands have available destructive means (missiles, missile-carrying aircraft, etc.) and combat capabilities which significantly exceed the limits of frontal operations. There has been a sharp increase in the maneuverability of troops; and the accomplishment of many strategic and operational tasks by supra-units and formations of combat arms of the armed forces have changed. As a result, earlier forms of the use for formations and supra-units have to a great extent ceased to meet the new conditions. In this connection, it is evidently necessary to regard as the basic operations in a possible future war not the front,

but a larger scale form of combat actions—the strategic operation in a theater of military operations."

Under the conditions of this highly mobile warfare, the role of the Air Force becomes particularly important for its ability to provide fire support and deliver powerful strikes to the rear of the enemy.

Air Power

Looking at the use of air power, General of the Army Shavrov concluded that:


The Air Force was enlisted to fill a great range of tasks in the interest of other services of the armed forces and conducted independent operations, which sometimes took the form of special-purpose air operations. The most typical tasks of the

vevance of troops and material-technical means.

The Soviets allocate an ever increasing role to helicopter operations both as components of helicopter assault-landing operations and as the main source of close air support and anti-tank air strikes.

The organizational changes in the Soviet Air Force (VVS), as the main supporting combat arm of the Ground Forces in the deep non-nuclear offensive, point to greater centralization in the command and control of available and future assets, flexibility of their operational use, and the organization of new levels of supra-units and formations corresponding with the organizational-operational changes in the Ground Forces.

TABLE 1—COMMAND STRUCTURE




air force are: struggling for air superiority; support for ground forces and the fleet during operations; isolation of the battlefield from the inflow of reserves; airborne assault and air drop; safeguarding air-mobile operations; strikes on objectives of the deep rear for the purpose of undermining the opponent's military-economic potential and the morale of the population; conducting aerial reconnaissance; the con-

Ground Forces

The Soviet Ground Forces are the heart of the Soviet military organization, and the reorganization and structure of the Soviet land combat arm (Rocket and Artillery Forces, Troops of Air Defense, the Air Force, etc.) were tailored accordingly. In wartime, Soviet forces operate in strategic groupings known as TVDs. (In peacetime, the TVDs overlap with groups of Military Districts.) Each strategic grouping of TVD is divided into a number of Fronts usually three to five. (In peacetime, each Front corresponds with a Military District (MD).) Each Front is divided into Armies which are the main operational-level units. The Army is divided into four (sometimes three to six) Divisions. Currently, there is a relatively fixed allocation of Divisions to the various Armies. However, under conditions of developing offensives and sudden changes, the Soviets will transfer Divisions from one Army to another in accordance with battlefield requirements.

The assets, units and sub-units of the combat arms are organized to support the Ground Forces. They are assigned with their respective professional command echelons, to the various levels of the Ground Forces. The superior professional officer is under the command of the TVD commander. His assets are divided into a core unit which answer to him (and thus to the TVD commander) and into a number of sub-units which are assigned to the fronts of the TVD. The commanders of these sub-unit answer to their respective Front commanders. Their assets, again, are divided into a core unit under their (and the Front Commander's) command and in



In wartime, Soviet forces operate in strategic groupings called TVDs. In peacetime, the TVDs overlap with groups of military Districts.

Organization of the Soviet Air Force

TVD	VA MD	TVA	HQ LOCATION
Central Europe	24th		Legnica, Poland
	GSFG Germany	16th	Zossen-Wunstorf
	GSF North Poland	37th	Legnica
	GSF Central (Czech.)	10th	Milovice
North-West	—		—
	Leningrad	13th	Petrozavdonsk
West	46th		Smolensk-Orcha, Bel.
	Baltic	30th	Riga
	Belussian	1st	Minsk
	Carpathian	57th	Lvov
South-West	4th		Venitza, Odessa
	Odessa	15th	Odessa
	Kiev	17th	Kiev
	GSFSouth (Hung.)	2nd Air Div. (36th)	Budapest
Near East	—		—
	North Caucasus	—	—
	Transcaucasus	34th	Tbilisi
	Turkestan	6th	Tashkent
	GSFAfghanistan	U/I	Baghran
Far East	30th		Irkutsk, Transbaikail
	Central Asia		
	Transbaikail (inc. Mongolia)	Far East	
	Siberian	VVS	Khabarovsk (F.E.)
National Reserve	36th		Moscow
	Moscow	2nd	Moscow
	Ural	—	—
	Volga	—	—

the Regiment. Higher command levels assign their integral helicopters to the Regiment in accordance with the development of the military situation. There is a professional Army Aviation officer (usually a pilot) permanently on the Regiment staff, and the helicopter forward air controllers are at the Battalion level. The Soviets define these missions as air accompaniment.

The current TVA, like the Ground Forces Army, does not have a permanent allocation of divisions. (In peacetime, the TVA overlaps with all the aircraft in the Military District of GSF (Group of Soviet Forces)). The Air Commander of the VVS of each Front allocates Divisions from his assets as necessary.

Operational Flexibility


The emphasis on operational flexibility is prominently featured in the description of the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force, written by Chief Marshal of Aviation, P. Kutakov, Commander-in-Chief VVS:

Our Air Force has now become a powerful arm of the armed forces of the USSR. It is highly mobile and maneuverable, making it possible to quickly shift the efforts of aviation from one sector and theater of war to another, to penetrate deep into the enemy rear, to use different weapons and electronic warfare resources in all-weather conditions at any time of the day and year, and to make sudden strikes from the air against large permanent and small mobile targets. Today, the main indicator of the power of the Soviet Air Force is its high combat readiness.

Early Signs

Signs of reorganization appeared as early as mid-1980, but the reorganized VVS became operational only in the fall of 1981. The commander of the 'strike command' is General Colonel of Aviation V.V. Rechetnikov, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief VVS [until September 1981, also Commanding Officer of Long Range Aviation (DA)].

The TVA, in its previous role, has not been mentioned since 1980. Instead, the Soviets coined the terms VVS, or VVS of the Military District of Group of Soviet Forces. In some cases, aircraft and personnel were defined as belonging to the MD or GSF in question. The aircraft mentioned included types which previously belonged to the IA-PVO. The first MDs in which TVAs were reorganized and which absorbed ex-IA-PVO interceptors were the Baltic MD (August 1978) and the Carpathian MD



"Today, the main indicator of the power of the Soviet Air force is its high combat readiness."

(Winter 1978-79). The complete absorption of the ex-IA-PVO aircraft was initially observed in the Odessa MD. The aircraft of the Group of Soviet Forces in German (GSFG) were the first outside the Soviet Union to be labeled VVS-GSFG.

The Moscow area is unique in its organization. It is not a 'combat' TVD, but rather, the Moscow, Ural and Volga MDs compose the National Reserve. In it, the Moscow Air Defense District of the PVO was not disbanded, and still controls most of its 300 aircraft. The 36th Air Army (VA) based near Moscow controls the four Soviet divisions of strategic bombers (two M-4 BISON and two Tu-16 BADGER). Since there are very few tactical aircraft in the area, these assets of the VVS seem dedicated to special and specialized duty-roles.

The Far East

The new organization was first implemented in the Far East, where there was already an existing command and control infrastructure, to simplify the process. The rapid buildup of the Chinese border and the growing involvement of Soviet forces in the Third World between 1970 and 1976, created the need for a regional command structure. Initial locally-based attempts were tested between 1976 and the fall of 1978. In late December, 1978, General of the Army V.I. Petrov was nominated to a new position, and Brezhnev personally congratulated him on this new assignment. However, it was only in March, 1980, during Petrov's official visit to Mongolia, that his full title became known: Commander-in-Chief of the

Troops of the Far East. (Currently, Marshal SU Petrov is Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.) In late 1980, General of the Army V.L. Govorov was identified on supra-Military District assignment in the region, but only after the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February, 1981) was he identified as Commander-in-Chief TFE-TVD. At the same time, G.P. Skorikov, already First Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Main Staff VVS, was promoted to Marshal of Aviation on 5 November 1980, and took over the reorganization of the Far East Command. In late 1982, Marshal of Aviation Skorikov returned to permanent assignment in Moscow. Peter Kirsanov was promoted to Marshal of Aviation on 16 December 1982, and took over the VVS-TFE-TDV. The assignment of a permanent commander meant that the Far Eastern VVS had become fully operational.

Since the end of the Great Patriotic War (World War II), the aerial assets in the Far East have been reorganized under peacetime conditions in a unified command, because of the harsh climate and the lack of local infrastructure, maintenance facilities and organized transport in the rear. Therefore, there was a skeleton of a supra-MD organization. However, the transfer of local aerial assets to a functioning VVS was accompanied by an unprecedented buildup. In mid-1979, there were some 2000 aircraft in the area (all units) and some 400 additional in reserve. In late-1982, there were over 3200 front line aircraft plus 600 or more in reserve, as well as over 1000 helicopters.

to sub-units assigned to the Armies of the respective Fronts. And so on down to the Regiment which is the lowest unit-level to include professional assets.

Reorganization

The reorganization of the Soviet Air Force follows the same pattern, where emphasis is on restructuring aerial assets so they can operate in the new TVD-oriented military operations.

Until 1980, the Soviet Air Force included the following components:

1) **Long Range Aviation (DA)**—the Soviet strategic bomber command, divided into three Armies, each divided into Regiments.

2) **Frontal Aviation (FA)**—the largest command which includes all the fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters capable of operating in land operations; combat aircraft, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft; combat and assault helicopters; and some of the medium transports.

A) The FA was divided into operational units—Tactical Air Armies (TVAs) which included a fixed number of assets and were assigned to specific Fronts.

3) **Transport Aviation (VTA)**—a centralized command which includes heavy transport and national assets (i.e., Aeroflot).

4) In addition, the defensive fighters and interceptors were operated by the Interceptor Aviation, a separate command of the National Air Defense (IA-PVO).

The Frontal Aviation (FA), the Long Range Aviation (DA), and the National Air Defense (IA-PVO) were disbanded during 1980, and organized into a unified "strike command." The Air Force is now divided into seven Air Forces (VVS) corresponding to the six theaters of military operations (TVDs) and the National Reserve. Each VVS is divided into a TVD-level core unit—Air Army (VA) and a "new" FA component. The FA component is divided into Tactical Air Armies (TVAs) which are assigned to the various Fronts of the TVD. Despite the similarity in name, the cur-

rent TVA is different from its pre-1980 incarnation. Each TVA is divided into Air Divisions, which are operational formations.

The Air Army

The Air Army (VA) absorbed the assets of the DA as well as the theater strike aircraft of the FA (Su-24 FENCER) and conducts all the deep rear air-to-surface operations (both strategic bombing and deep interdictions) as well as providing autonomous reconnaissance, EW-ECM and aerial refueling capabilities. Currently, there are only five VAs. Two of the TVDs do not have VAs since there is no deployment of comparable aircraft in these TVDs.

The FA is divided into four mission-oriented sections:

1) **Air Cover**—all fighters and interceptors which perform dedicated air-to-air activities.

2) **Air Preparation**—all aircraft involved in interdiction missions.

3) **Air Support**—all aircraft involved in strikes connected with the situation in the battlefield, such as isolation of the battlefield.

Each section controls (for advisory coordination) all the assets in the TVD. Since new Soviet combat aircraft have multimission capabilities, which the Soviets emphasize, the above sections are not rigid departments. Their main responsibility is mission allocation and the supply of mission support services (intelligence, technical data, tactical coordination, forward air controllers and GCI services) when needed. The TVA commander assigns the Air Divisions to a section on the basis of available assets and battle situation.

4) **Army Aviation**—is only nominally part of the FA and includes the assault and combat helicopters of the TVD, organized in independent regiments, squadrons and elements, and assigned to all the unit levels from TVD down to the Division. Some are assigned to dedicated heliborne units. The unit-level which has authority to use helicopters is

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Reorganization of the Soviet Air Defense

Yossef Bodansky

Following World War II, the Soviets became aware of the potential capabilities of strategic airpower, which resulted in an intensified buildup of a bomber (and later, missile) fleet and the initiation of an unprecedented air defense buildup. In 1948, the air defense components of the Soviet armed forces were established as an independent arm, receiving a Commander-in-Chief of its own in 1954. The production of mobile SAMs and the increased proficiency required to operate modern air defenses resulted in the establishment of the specialized Air Defense of the Ground Forces as an independent component (designated PVO-SV). In the early 1960s, the PVO-Strany (National Air Defense) introduced new elements to ICBMs and satellite defense. By the late 1970s, the PVO-Strany was comprised of the following:

- IA-PVO - Interceptor Aviation of the Air Defense
- ZRV - Surface to Air Missile Troops
- RTV - Radio-Technical Troops (Radar and C³)
- PKO - Antispace Defense (anti-satellite, although jurisdiction is not entirely clear)
- PRO - Antirocket Defense (ABM and "gray areas" such as the SA-5/SH-4)

The importance of the Air Defense Troops is underscored by the fact that in 1979 it had virtually no non-Slavic troops. Its 1981 arsenal included 2,500-2,700 first line interceptors plus some 600 reserves, and approximately 14,000 SAMs on 9,500 launchers at more than 1,200 sites.

Until 1980, the PVO-Strany was divided into ten Air Defense Districts (ADD): two major central districts; and two belts with four ADDs each, subdivided into four sectors with two ADDs each.

The central ADDs were: 1) *Moscow* - located in and around Moscow and responsible for the defense of the capital and the crucial installations around it, including the Soviet ABM system and major radars; and 2) *Baku* - located on both sides of the Caspian Sea, protecting the southern approaches and particularly the oil fields and the various test centers (Baykonour, Tyrtam, etc.)

The belts run parallel to the Soviet land borders with the exterior running between the border and the "arch of life" (the zone of crucial economic functions and a majority of the Slavic population). The interior belt includes the "arch of life" and the northern approaches over the pole. The four subdivided sections are West, South, Center and East, but their exact boundaries are not clear.

Changing Defenses

In the 1970s, the Soviets realized that their stationary defense was complex and cumbersome. Accumulating experience and trends from the Vietnam and Arab-Israeli wars, noted air defense expert Col. B.T. Surikov wrote in early 1973, "At present, countering low-flying targets is considered to be one of the most complex tasks in anti-aircraft defense." Low-flying targets include both aircraft and cruise missiles, late discovery of which reduces the warning time for the air defense systems. While

the PVO-Strany maintained a sophisticated capability against ultra high/very fast targets, the main threat had become the extremely low altitude penetration. This had also become the main consideration of the Frontal Aviation (FA) and the PVO-SV, so that there had been unification in their threat envelopes and requirements for missiles and aircraft.

From the defender's point of view, the solution was to push the initial line of defense as far forward into enemy territory as possible to increase the depth in which to counter those targets that penetrated the initial line, before they reach Soviet territory. This imposed strategic duties on the Ground Forces, but there was no attempt to establish coordination between the PVO-SV and the PVO-Strany to facilitate the transfer of "targets" from one arm to the other as they moved closer to Soviet territory.

"The Soviets were reluctant to commit themselves to large scale organizational upheaval. The invasion of Afghanistan brought the Soviets to reexamine their position...It was made to order disorder."

The Commitment to Change

The situation in the late 1970s called for major improvements in C³ for the entire Soviet Air Defense system. Initial signs of a reallocation of resources surfaced in the mid-1970s when some MiG 23 regiments were transferred from the IA-PVO to Frontal Aviation to enhance their long-range combat capabilities.

However, the Soviets were reluctant to commit themselves to large-scale organizational upheaval. Any change would involve both units of the PVO-Strany and the Ground Forces (PVO-SV), as well as the Air Force (VVS), particularly its Frontal Aviation component which controlled aerial activity on the battlefield. Oddly enough, the invasion of Afghanistan brought the Soviets to reexamine their position although there was no aerial challenge to their forces. The transfer of seven divisions into Afghanistan and the vast regional changes and redeployment that followed had virtually shattered the existing order in four regional Military Districts: Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, Turkestan and Central Asia. For the Soviets, it was made-to-order disorder, providing the opportunity to carry out major structural changes. Examination of the possibilities took place in April 1980, corresponding with the initial post-invasion regional buildup of ground and air forces. In July 1980, high-level concluding meetings resulted in final affirmation of the program.

Implementation

Once approved, the program was swiftly implemented in two initial stages: first, the Baku ADD (an independent entity) was absorbed into the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts; later, all the ADDs in the areas east of the Urals, within the jurisdiction of the Command of the Forces of the Far East, were dissolved and absorbed into the local Military Districts (MDs).

When the various military organizations carried out their local Party Congresses prior to the XXVI CPSU Congress (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), there was no mention of the Baku ADD. Senior officers, previously identified in the Baku ADD participated in Congresses of other military organizations. The most important transfer was that of Gen. Lt. Art. Tufik Yakubovich Agaguseynov, previously the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Baku ADD, who participated in the Congress of the Transcaucasus MD. His case is significant because he is the only Muslim Soviet general and his political position is probably more important than his military qualifications, although he is considered one of the leading experts on SAMs.

The lack of a Party Congress in the Baku ADD means that the district had ceased to exist as an independent military organization before the end of

1980, and that at least its SAM-AA responsibilities were taken over by the Transcaucasus and Turkestan MDs.

The Change

Since the beginning of 1981, after the XXVI CPSU Congress, more and more weapon systems that previously belonged only to the PVO-Strany began to appear in exercises of the Ground Forces, and were identified as sub-units of the GF. The first exercise of this kind took place in the Central Asian MD, one of the four MDs to undergo structural changes after the invasion of Afghanistan. Later, similar exercises took place in the Siberian and Far East MDs.

The most significant change in the position of the PVO took place when registration requirements for Soviet higher military schools were published

TABLE 1

		1980	1981
GF	PVO-SV	5	—
PVO	SAM-AA	6	11
	Fighter		
	Pilots	3	1
	EW	5	5
VVS	Pilots	11	13
	Navigators	2	2
	Av. Eng.	6	6
	Av.		
	Comm.	1	1
	Tech.	4	4

in late 1981. (The schools are described by the nearest Western terms.)

In September 1977, the Soviets had announced the establishment of the Military Academy of Air Defense of the Ground Forces in Kiev, saying then that the growing sophistication and importance of the air defense components of

the Ground Forces justified an independent academy. In 1981, the responsibility for that academy was transferred to the PVO, in addition to its previous Military Command Academy of Air Defense.

In 1982, various weapon systems of the PVO appeared under GF and VVS terminologies, namely, they belonged to the local Military Districts rather than ADDs. Only the Moscow ADD retained

of IA-PVO air bases by the FA (and vice versa) provide better deployment for combat activities. The greatest improvement, however, will be in the case of means allocation and the use of AWACS aircraft. The redistribution of existing fighters would enable the FA to use the long-range MiG 23s of the IA-PVO for offensive operations, leaving the short-range MiG 21s for stationary defense missions. Such a transfer will

"It is a program...that demonstrates their total commitment to the offensive as the optimal Soviet form of warfare."

its independence, probably because of its unique role in connection with the ABM issue. Exercises took place in the European MDs in addition to the already-mentioned Asian MDs, meaning that the previous ADDs were abolished. A unified organizational-geographical formulation had been created.

The PVO

From the new organization, it seems that the Soviet Air Force, and especially the Frontal Aviation, took over most of the interceptors of the IA-PVO, using them in coordination with their own fighters and interceptors. On the other hand, the elaborate equipment of the PVO-SV was transferred to the PVO. However, in its present condition, the PVO is a different force, comparable to the Tank Forces or the Combat Engineers, as a highly professional force, but operating on the battlefield under the command of the Ground Forces. The "new" PVO is in charge of all the ground-based air defense systems of the USSR, enabling far better cooperation, coordination and utility of the sophisticated systems by all components of the air defense. It also places all the echelons of the air defense under a regional basis of C³. A major step in this direction was the establishment of a new command position in the Regimental HQ—Commander of PVO of Motorized Rifle Regiment, with the rank of Lt. Col. This officer is in charge of all the anti-aircraft activities in the Regiment and their coordination. His position is similar in rank and stature to that of the Air Coordinator who is in charge of and responsible for the helicopters and their operations in the area of the Regiment.

Improved Coordination and Efficiency

Coordination between the mobile and stationary components of a Military District's air defense in the case of an offensive in which forces of the MD form a Front and advance, is along the proven and well-defined lines of communication between the MD and the Front forces. Thus, the new arrangements of the PVO unify the last component of Front-Rear communication to the standard form. This will simplify almost every aspect of the use of air defense from the transfer of data from the Central Command Centers in the rear to an organized transfer of targets rearward to centralized resupply of missiles and technical maintenance and services.

Reorganization provides the Soviets with an entirely new infrastructure and fleet of fighters which can be reallocated in order to optimize their operational use. With very few exceptions, the FA and the IA-PVO had operated from separate air bases, relying on separate stocks of spare and professional manpower, creating tremendous waste. Use

enlarge the fleet of offensive MiG 23 fighters available to the FA from approximately 13-1600 to 22-2600.

AWACS and C³

Despite the unquestionable success of the Soviet Tu-126 (AWACS) in the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the aircraft remained limited for operations with the IA-PVO. Now, with a new generation based on the Il-76T entering operational service, the FA will be able to use such aircraft for its operations in the deep rear of the enemy. Although the sophistication of the Soviet equipment falls below that of the American E-3A, the use of vacuum tubes makes it immune to jamming while (as was proven in India) it is capable of jamming other aircraft radar very effectively. Massive or elaborate use of AWACS aircraft by the Soviets in offensive operations will enhance their flexibility and effectiveness tremendously, even with the existing equipment.

As in the case of the land-based air defense, unification of air force components provides the Soviets with improved C³ capabilities. They are able to concentrate their efforts in shorter periods and on a local basis. They are able to manage the local resources more effectively, especially the human resources, whose shortage is already felt. Here too, the transfer of responsibility for a moving target from one fighter formation to another can be carried out using local forces and C³ facilities. All these factors speed up the process, making the interception more likely and more effective.

Conclusion

The restructuring of the Soviet Air Defense system was carried out with emphasis on improved performance against aircraft and missiles. The best performance of the new arrangement is during an offensive advance of the major Ground Formations with their integral air defense components, creating greater operational depth for the complex system. In other words, even the Soviet Air Defense system is optimized for offensive operations. At the same time, it provides the Soviet Union with efficient defensive capabilities that cover threats in every known envelope of performance. Based on the unified Command and Control structure and the operational flexibility, it is capable of growing into unknown envelopes.

With these changes, the Soviets simplified their system, making it more efficient, effective and capable of reacting to sudden threats. They improved operational capability and performance by risking a thorough organizational change resulting in better use of existing weapon systems. It is a program that demonstrates the professionalism of the Soviet Defense establishment and demonstrates their total commitment to the offensive as the optimal Soviet form of warfare.

July/August 1983

FREEZE

(continued from page 1)

changes or defenses. Placing Pershing IIs in Europe would require them to consider the capabilities of a more sophisticated system in planning any attack.

Another cost of a long-term freeze would be a rapid, perhaps total, erosion

"Policies subject to blackmail include: a Palestinian state; Soviet access to Persian Gulf oil; favorable trade terms with the West; and a general denigration of the role of the US and our Western allies in world politics."

of the Atlantic alliance. The alliance is already in a state of confusion over a response to the deployment of the SS20s around its land perimeter. NATO has adopted a "two track" approach to nuclear defense, planning to deploy the US Pershing IIs late this year unless negotiations now underway in Geneva change the balance by agreement. A freeze would leave the Soviets with more than 300 medium-range ballistic missiles, NATO with none; abandoning a position widely considered to be a test of NATO cohesion. The likely result is that US military support in a crisis will be written off in advance, with far-reaching results.

Soviet Plans

It is unlikely that the Soviets would decide one morning to blow up Bonn, Paris, London or the Hague. Far more plausible is the scenario of political blackmail, backed by the threat of military action. Policies subject to political blackmail include: the establishment of a Palestinian state; Soviet access to Persian Gulf oil; favorable trade terms with the West; and a general denigration of the role of the US and our Western allies in world politics.

Under such conditions, we might survive nominally as Americans (as Israelis might remain Jews in a "secular, democratic state of Palestine"). There would be no shots, no atomic bombs, no nuclear holocaust. Not "better red than dead"; rather a case of creeping Sovietization, Finlandization, or in future jargon, "Franconization" or "Britainization".

As the majority of American Jews believe the PLO would accept one step of appeasement at a time until Israel was destroyed without a war, so should we believe the Soviets will accept one step at a time. The first step would be a "freeze" under Soviet conditions: non-deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe. This freeze, whether unilateral or "mutual and verifiable" leaves the US in a position of acquiescing to the first stage of Soviet demands vis a vis the European continent, and waiting for the next stage.

The implied cost is staggering. Without any further need to make concessions to Western sensibilities, the Soviets would quickly move to trample those basic values, rights and equalities that form the backbone and substance of free nations. The social framework, itself centered in the West on the middle classes, would be replaced by shock treatments. The temptation to quash minorities, especially political and religious minorities, would be intense. Unleashing a totalitarian system on a foreign land, as happened in Eastern and Western Europe during WWII, as happened in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, might well presage a new holocaust.

Europeans have spent a generation since WWII living under the assumption

that the US nuclear umbrella would protect them from such dangers. The umbrella has holes; will the Europeans fix it with us, or will they trade for a Soviet umbrella, with all of the political dangers attached? Absent a strong, credible United States, will they have a choice?

And Israel

If this comes to pass, what happens to

Israel, a pro-Western democracy in a region largely comprised of Soviet clients or weak states ripe for the sort of revolution the Soviets foster? In many cases, the Europeans already call for Israeli concessions to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians", considering an independent state to be inevitable. How much harder would they push in the face of subtle, or not-so-subtle, Soviet pressure? How quickly would the delegitimization of Israel proceed? Diminution of American influence on behalf of Israel would produce rapid, largely complete delegitimization of that country as the Europeans move closer to Soviet policies.

Verification

According to recent polling data, both proponents and opponents of a nuclear freeze believe the Soviets cheat on international agreements. So while proponents advocate a freeze on both sides, in the absence of credible verification measures (which the Soviets have always rejected), from an American perspective, we can assume they will cheat on this agreement as well.

Furthermore, how mutual and verifiable can any political agreement between adversaries be? We are technically at peace with the Soviet Union, just as Israel is technically at peace with Egypt. In the case of the Camp David Accords, however, Israel insisted on a monitoring and verification system run by an ally on the ground to enhance their confidence. The United States has watched the Soviet Union systematically violate the Helsinki Accords, which were monitored by human rights allies on the ground. Unfortunately, the monitoring body was subject to Soviet control, and has effectively been harassed into abandonment.

How shall we verify a nuclear freeze in a manner which cannot be undermined by internal Soviet politics? Spy satellites and ground monitoring stations outside the Soviet Union are useful, but can be jammed or fed false information. Camouflage, an important part of Soviet military doctrine, can cover important sites. The best of all possible solutions would be to have American teams on the ground in the Soviet Union, with access to sites, plants and the military personnel in charge.

The Soviets have never agreed to on-site inspection of any military installation, and there is little reason to believe they would do so this time. *but if they did*, how much better to agree to a mutually verifiable *reduction*, than a *freeze*. Dismantling the SS20s should be better than freezing them. Fewer weapons should be preferable to whatever number we now have.

Arms Reduction

Freeze advocates themselves generally assert that freezing nuclear weapons is only an interim step, designed to produce serious arms control and reduction. The question arises as to whether a freeze provides the Soviet Union with

incentive to negotiate more seriously, or is simply atmospheric.

Arms control talks have proceeded for many years, and our practical experience has been that the Soviets negotiate most seriously when they have something tangible to gain. We have been able to obtain a mutual arms control agreement, such as the ABM Treaty, only when it appeared that the US would proceed with a program the Soviets wanted to halt.

It is clear that the Soviets want to halt the Pershing II program. Soviet Party Chairman Yuri Andropov spent a large part of one speech talking about "reduction" of arms, scarcely a common principle in Soviet military doctrine. The Pershing IIs counter the SS20, and the Soviets have committed themselves to developing a new generation countermeasure. It may be that for internal (economic or other) reasons, they are less than enthusiastic about pursuing the next stage of their buildup.

This is not the time to give the Soviets an easy victory at the expense of European (and free world) security. Since we know what they want, the Soviets must understand that we will exact a serious price for concessions on the Pershing IIs. Experience leads us to put the burden of proof on those who argue that a freeze can produce serious arms reduction negotiations. A freeze now would give them what they really want for nothing.

The Middle East analogy holds here as well. The Egyptians concluded that they could not regain the Sinai in battle and would have to proceed through negotiations. This was not the result of unilateral Israeli concessions, but rather deterrence. Israel had the real and perceived strength to make another war unacceptably costly for Egypt. Only in that way were the Israelis able to exact a price for withdrawal from the Sinai. From that experience, Israel and her supporters conclude that face to face negotiations, with *both* sides holding bargaining cards, will produce a more secure peace than unilateral concessions.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and President Reagan's Zero Option meet the criteria for serious negotiations. Both the US and the Soviets stand to gain political and military objectives they consider important (and the rest of the world gains, by extension). Opponents argue that the Soviets will not agree to the Zero Option, and thus we should advance positions they are more likely to accept in order to make "progress". A freeze would also assist in making progress, they say, by showing good faith (much the way freezing settlements on the West Bank would show good faith; a position the majority of American Jews appear not to ascribe to). Aside from the distasteful grovelling inherent in accepting one's opponent's terms for settlement before negotiations begin, the President's proposals represent real arms *reduction* and a step away from the brink we all fear. This is a highly principled and secure position from which to negotiate.

Conclusion

The American Jewish community accepts the principles of deterrence and verification. We understand negotiating from strength and the importance of basic principles and ethical judgments. We make cogent arguments for security, military preparedness and a technological edge. We oppose appeasement and unilateral concessions, and have little difficulty distinguishing between the aggressor and the defender of the society and property we hold dear.

These things we do well on behalf of

"Experience leads us to put the burden of proof on those who argue that a freeze can produce serious arms reduction negotiations. A freeze now would give (the Soviets) what they really want for nothing."

Israel. An equal application of these principles to the United States and the Soviet Union would lead us far from advocacy of a nuclear freeze. We would find ourselves in a position to make a

specifically Jewish contribution to American national security, based on our communal experience and the lessons we have learned from it.



Liberators' and Resistance Fighters' Conference to be Held in Jerusalem

The Government of Israel has declared 1983 the "Year of Jewish Heroism and Valor." From October 2-6, 1983, Jewish soldiers, fighters and survivors, and concentration camp liberators from all over the world will convene in Jerusalem at the World Assembly to Commemorate Jewish Resistance and Combat During World War II. Fifty years after the rise of Adolph Hitler, those who fought the Nazis will gather to share memories and celebrate their victory, to serve notice to the world that they will not forget the Holocaust nor allow it to be repeated.

The Assembly will be conducted under the patronage of Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Highlights of the program will include reunions of resistance groups and liberators; presentations by Prime Minister Begin and President Chaim Herzog; and visits to Yad VaShem, Massada, IDF camps, settlements in Judea and Samaria, and kibbutzim founded by survivors. A plenary session will be held in which the "Role of the Jews in their Struggle against Nazi Germany" will be discussed. The Israeli Government is minting a special State medallion for all Assembly participants.

ARE YOU AN AMERICAN LIBERATOR?

If so, the Israeli government would like to invite you to participate in this historic event. JINSA is an American contact point for the World Assembly to Commemorate Jewish Resistance and Combat During World War II. For more information, please complete the attached form and send it to:

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
1100—17th Street, N.W., Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 659-3800

Name: _____
Address: _____
Telephone: _____

WEAPONS

(continued from page 3)

diflouride) and QL (isopropyl alcohol amine) separated by an impermeable membrane inside the weapon's casing. The poison (VX) results only when the two chemicals are mixed, which occurs when the weapon is fired or dropped. Binaries are somewhat safer and more reliable and do not pose an environmental or health hazard, as does our present stockpile of aging and leaking chemical weapons.

American Policy

President Reagan's proposal to renew production of chemical weapons raises many of the same questions posed by the Administration's nuclear weapons policy. Essentially, he seems to be following a "two-track" policy of both attempting to negotiate with the Soviets a ban on development, production and possession of chemical weapons, while at the same time, seeking to produce a more reliable deterrent force of our own.

The Situation Today

The US stopped producing chemical weapons in 1969—a unilateral decision made by President Nixon. The US also renounced the first use of such weapons in 1975. Similarly, the production of offensive biological weapons ended in 1970 and the US is a party to the 1972 Biological Convention banning their use.

Thus, for more than a decade, the US has relied on its existing stockpile of chemicals—mostly mustard gas, and two lethal nerve gases: GB (Sarin) and VX. Most of our chemicals, totaling about 50 million pounds, are stockpiled in the US, although a small quantity is in West Germany under exclusive American control. Some chemicals are stored in bulk, some in the form of

bombs and artillery shells. Only the US (among NATO members) and France have chemical weapons. And, while there has been no new production of chemical weapons, the US Army has continued research on chemical warfare defenses. Similarly, all production of biological weapons is banned, but there is on-going research to discover antidotes to these agents and defenses against their effects.

President Reagan has now asked Congress to lift this fourteen-year moratorium on producing chemical weapons in order to replace part of the existing stockpile with "binary weapons." As a preliminary step in this direction, he requested and received in 1981, \$20 million to upgrade the arsenal in Pine Bluff, Arkansas for production of binary weapons.

Why the change in policy? In part, because US intelligence reports indicate increasing Soviet production and reliance on chemical weapons. It is believed that from 10-30% of stockpiled Soviet artillery shells contain chemical agents. Moreover, Soviet troops are trained and equipped to fight in a chemically polluted environment. In short, the Reagan Administration believes that the Soviets are better prepared to wage war with chemical weapons than is the US or NATO.

In response, the NATO alliance has increased its defensive measures, including issuing protective masks and suits to all US active and reserve forces, and all NATO troops. (The protective clothing we issue to our troops is superior to that which Soviet troops receive. The US uses an advanced charcoal-impregnated fabric while the Soviets rely on old-fashioned rubberized garments which trap heat, making it almost impossible to fight for long periods of time.) The US is also in the

process of integrating chemical warfare experts into all military units and special training programs have been revived. However, the Soviets are believed to have more troops specifically trained in chemical defense than we.

Finally, recent reports of Soviet use of chemicals in Afghanistan and by Soviet allies in Southeast Asia (the mysterious Yellow Rain) have led to formal US charges that the Soviets have violated the 1925 Geneva Agreement on chemical weapons and the Biological Warfare Convention of 1972. While not conclusively proven, there is enough circumstantial evidence that the Soviets have used chemicals to warrant real concern.

Furthermore, the existing US stockpile of chemical weapons appears to be deteriorating and may be both unsafe to handle and inadequate for use in war or as a deterrent.

All these factors led the Administration to certify to Congress in January 1982, that renewed production of chemical weapons is in the national interest.

The Weapons Themselves

The charge, made by some Administration officials, that the Soviets are ahead of us in chemical weaponry does not mean that there has been some sort of breakthrough in technology. For, unlike other fields of weapons technology, there have been few new developments in chemical weaponry since WWII. The nerve gasses, which are the mainstays of the US and Soviet arsenals, have remained basically unchanged for the past forty years.

Instead, research and development have centered more on delivery systems, protective devices and antidotes. The US concern is that the Soviets have an operational capability that our forces lack. There is also reason to suspect that

the Soviets are experimenting with offensive biological weapons, that is, the delivery of disease.

Talks aimed at limiting chemical weapons began in 1977 and the last round of discussion ended in July 1980. President Reagan has not resumed bilateral negotiations with the Soviets, however, both we and they participate in a Geneva-based chemical weapons working group under the auspices of the UN Committee on Disarmament. Efforts to achieve a complete ban on chemical weapons have been stalled over the issue of verification—a matter of real and legitimate concern, particularly in light of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, and the still unanswered questions about the 1979 Sverdlovsk incident (in which numbers of Soviet citizens died from an anthrax-like infection that may have resulted from an accident at a biological warfare research or production facility).

Congress has been more resistant to the Administration's chemical weapons proposals than it has been to President Reagan's nuclear policy. The decision to upgrade the Pine Bluff arsenal followed a fierce and closely fought battle. And, although the President met the legal requirement to certify to Congress the necessity of resuming chemical weapons production, Congress refused in 1982 to authorize production of binary weapons and denied the President's request for funds to procure the necessary material. Senator Mark Hatfield (OR), a key opponent of binary weapons production, argued that the long range cost would amount to some \$6 billion.

In July 1983, the House turned down a similar request but the Senate (with Vice President Bush casting the tie-breaking vote) approved the Administration request to resume production. A House-Senate Conference Committee confirmed the Senate ac-

tion, and, as of this writing, plans to resume production are moving forward.

Conclusion

Much of the rhetoric surrounding chemical and biological warfare echoes themes sounded by the Reagan Administration on nuclear arms: the Soviets may be ahead in fielding an operational chemical warfare capability; we need to improve our own deterrent force; we need to be ready to fight with chemical weapons; and we need a credible deterrent as a lever to prod the Soviets into negotiating a ban on chemical weapons.

There is general agreement that prudence requires the US to maintain some chemical capability as a deterrent. The question is, as with nuclear weapons, how much deterrent is enough? And if we do need to maintain some form of chemical deterrent, what is the safest way to do so without endangering the American public and the environment?



Soviet soldier in full protective gear

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING:

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN (concerning the withdrawal from Lebanon): "I am very hopeful that if this partial withdrawal takes place that it will be recognized and admitted to be by the Israelis as one phase of their agreement to withdraw. If they withdraw in a phased withdrawal it certainly will give us a better case for breaking the roadblock that has been established by Syria and persuading them to keep their original promise that when others withdrew, they would withdraw....I think there is fear if there's simply a withdrawal to another line and then a digging-in and fortifying along that line, that this would be what it looks like Syria is doing, and that is simply trying to partition Lebanon, reduce Lebanon and grab off some territory for themselves. But with the agreement that's been signed between Lebanon and Israel, I don't think Israel has that in mind." (26 July)

AMIN GEMAYEL (President of Lebanon, concerning Syria): "Nothing in the course of these negotiations led us to believe that Syria's position would be so vehement....I don't know when the Syrians will stop such kinds of neo-terrorism. I know one thing. If they will not stop such kind of action, those bombs, they will return to Damascus." (21 July)

HAFEZ ASSAD (President of Syria, concerning US mediation efforts in the Middle East): "How could the US be a fair mediator between any Arab party and Israel when she has been encourag-

ing and fully backing Israel's continuous aggression against the Arabs? Through the state of disorder deliberately created by the US in the Arab area the US has claimed itself as a mediator and arbiter not only between the Arabs and Israel but between the Arabs themselves. This mediation cannot be accepted unless we accept that the enemy can be a fair judge. This is only accepted by those who give themselves up to the United States." (1 August)

YASSER ARAFAT (Chairman of the PLO, concerning the mutiny within Fatah ranks): "Syria and Libya were given the role of Arabizing the war by preparing for a new massacre against the Palestinian revolution....I hope you will not fall into the trap—which is being planned by the United States and the other countries that conspire against the Palestinian revolution—of believing that there is internecine Palestinian fighting. This is not true because the Beirut heroes are not fighting each other. What is happening now is a Syrian attempt backed by tanks and artillery and supported by a Libyan brigade to implement the Syrian decision—agreed to by Shultz—to deal a blow to the Palestinian revolution.... Despite all this, we still say that the fighting which is taking place is internecine Palestinian fighting (sic) between the Arafat loyalists and opponents. I say to you that I am honored to be a fighter in the Palestinian revolution. However, I do not want to have loyalists because we must all be loyalists

to Palestine and the sons of Palestine." (1 August)

MOSHE ARENS (Israeli Minister of Defense, concerning the Lebanese withdrawal plans): "On the Lebanese issue we found something that Israel and the United States have actually shared for several months now: identical goals. The President spoke of these: a sovereign Lebanon, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the prevention of hostile acts against Israel from Lebanon. But if, in the past, we found our views on the situation were different, and so we also sometimes reached different conclusions about what should be done to achieve these goals...we have found that the views, the evaluations of the Lebanon situation by us and by the Americans, were very close to each other....I think that before we came, there may have been a delusion here, that the Syrians could be tempted to leave, that if some sort of formulation could be found that would permit the Syrians to leave in a dignified way, without recognizing the agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon, then they would be prepared to leave. I think that in the talks, after our explanations, our position was accepted, that the Syrians do not want to leave. There is no formula that will make them leave....And so what is needed is a joint, coordinated effort between us, the Americans and the Lebanese which, even at best, will take time, which will perhaps bring the Syrians to the conclusion that it would be better for them to leave than to stay." (29 July)

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Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Arms
Control

Following is an address by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the Foreign Service Institute Symposium on "The Future of Start," Arlington, Virginia, March 13, 1986.

After last November's summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we thought that the summit and the events leading up to it might well foreshadow the possibility for a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We were fully aware, however, of the substantial barriers to agreement which remained to be surmounted.

On March 4 our negotiators concluded the fourth round of the nuclear and space arms talks (NST) in Geneva. This was preceded by Gorbachev's January 15 announcement of a new Soviet arms control proposal. In late February, after extensive consultations with our allies, the President authorized our negotiators in Geneva to present a comprehensive response to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal.

It is appropriate to recall the main outlines of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal and those of the President's response, as well as such clarifications as our negotiators have been able to obtain from the Soviet negotiators in Geneva.

I will first address the initial steps as they have been set forth by both sides. Agreements concerning the first steps and the manner in which they are executed will largely determine what is possible in subsequent stages.

One of the features of Mr. Gorbachev's proposal was his attempt to trump the President's emphasis on the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons by offering a staged timetable to achieve that goal. But the second and third stages of his proposal can only be agreed and implemented by a multilateral group of nations including the United Kingdom, France, China, and other industrial nations as well. Furthermore, for those steps to become practicable, with no diminution of the security of the United States and its allies, a number of changes must first take place in the world scene. There must be a correction in today's imbalances in non-nuclear capabilities; an elimination of chemical warfare capabilities; an improvement in the methods of handling conditions of tension in the world, such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola; and a demonstration that the Soviet Union has reconciled itself to peaceful competition.

With regard to the first steps, there appeared to be some new elements in the position of the Soviet side. On INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], the Soviets appeared to have shifted somewhat their position on British and French nuclear forces. Because the INF proposals represent the most tangible movement resulting from Mr. Gorbachev's package, because the U.S. February initiative focuses on INF, and because these movements ultimately

affect prospects in START [strategic arms reduction talks], I will later provide some elaboration of developments in this area. Mr. Gorbachev also expressed at least rhetorical support for more extensive verification measures than the Soviets have supported in the past. Finally, a first reading of the English text of Gorbachev's proposal indicated there might be a change in their position calling for a ban on strategic defense research; this, however, like several other indications of change, later turned out to be illusory.

START

But before getting into such areas of change in the positions of the two sides, let me review the basic position of the United States in the three NST negotiating groups and the status of our discussions with the Soviets. In START, the U.S. position reflects the summit joint statement commitment toward "the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., appropriately applied..."

- Reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] would be reduced to a limit of 4,500—about 50% below current levels.

- Reentry vehicles on ICBMs would be reduced to 3,000—about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2,500 and a limit of 3,600 proposed by the Soviets.

• The highest overall strategic ballistic missile throw-weight of either side would be reduced by 50%, in this case, from the Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds. (By way of comparison, the United States has 4.4 million pounds.)

• Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throw-weight limits, the United States would accept equal limits of 1,500 on the number of long-range ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers—about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

The United States cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and bomber weapons, as proposed by the Soviets. If one counted ALCMs, short-range attack missiles, and gravity bombs as equivalent to Soviet ballistic missile RVs—despite the massive Soviet air defenses faced by U.S. bombers and the far lower readiness rate of bombers compared to ballistic missiles—the United States would be significantly penalized. But if the Soviets were to accept our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs along with our proposed limit of 1,500 ALCMs, it would result in reduction to a total of 6,000 ballistic missiles RVs and ALCMs on each side. This total constitutes the same number proposed by the Soviets for the overall limit on “nuclear charges” but would include a more appropriate definition of which systems reflect the strategic balance.

With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States has proposed a reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to a limit of 1,250–1,450, or about 40–45% below the current higher Soviet level. In this context, the United States could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400)—about 40% below the current U.S. SALT [strategic arms limitation talks]-accountable level.

For reasons similar to those applying to an RV and ALCM aggregate, the United States cannot agree to the Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached on a range of 1,250–1,450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, it would result in reduction of the total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to between 1,600 and 1,800.

“Build-down” is our suggested means of implementing the agreed reductions. We are prepared to begin working out details of a reductions

schedule as soon as agreement can be achieved on the endpoints to be reached at the completion of the first stage.

The U.S. proposal also contains a ban on the development and deployment of all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and on the modernization of existing heavy missiles due to the destabilizing character of such systems. All mobile ICBMs would also be banned because of significant verification difficulties and inherent asymmetries in deployment opportunities between the sides.

Round 4 of the NST negotiations was not productive with respect to START. Mr. Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal did not include any changes in the Soviet position regarding START, and the Soviet negotiators at Geneva neither responded adequately to the possibilities raised by the U.S. initiative at the end of the previous round nor did they introduce any new ideas of their own.

A large boulder on the path to progress in START has been the continuing Soviet insistence on defining strategic weapons as those systems capable of striking the territory of the other side. In addition to those central systems that the United States considers to be strategic, the Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would also cover, on the U.S. side, all our LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles, 340 “medium-range” dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe and Asia, and 540 attack aircraft deployed on all 14 U.S. aircraft carriers, while 2,000–3,000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, including some 300 Backfire bombers, would not be so counted. Were the United States to retain equality in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the Soviet definition, we would have to cut LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at sea and on land to 430—20% of the current Soviet global level. If the United States were to retain LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at current levels, we would have to cut strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to less than half the allowed Soviet number.

The Soviets proposed this inequitable definition of “strategic” during the early stages of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. In both cases, they eventually withdrew their definition and agreed to a “central systems” approach to defining the systems subject to limitations in the agreements—that is, to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We hope and expect that they will do so again. Until they do, prospects for progress on START will be severely encumbered.

I have mentioned the disputed issue of how bomber weapons should be handled. Another issue between the sides concerns the handling of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The Soviets contend that all cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers, including SLCMs, should be banned. Yet the Soviets do not answer our questions about how such a ban could be verified and do not acknowledge that such an outcome would leave the United States, much of whose population and industry is within range of shorter-range SLCMs, much more vulnerable to attack from residual systems than the Soviet Union.

Another issue inhibiting progress in START is the Soviet demand for agreement to a ban on “space-strike arms” as a prerequisite even to serious negotiation on measures to limit strategic offensive systems. We regard such a precondition as unacceptable on its merits; we also believe serious negotiations in all three groups should proceed concurrently. We do not dispute the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive areas. In fact, it was the United States which first drew this connection during SALT I. With these considerations in mind, I will turn briefly to the defense and space negotiating group.

Defense and Space

With respect to defense and space, the United States has made clear that we are committed to the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research program, which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. We are seeking to explore with the Soviets how a cooperative transition toward a more defense-reliant regime could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible, but the Soviet negotiators have resisted even discussing the subject with us. We are also proposing that the Soviets join us even now in an “open laboratories” arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other’s strategic defense research programs and provide reciprocal opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

As in START, there was no tangible progress during round 4 in defense and space. We initially thought it might be otherwise. The English text of Mr. Gorbachev’s proposal at the opening of the round made no reference to “research”; the word “research” did not appear in it. Later, however, we found

that the Russian text uses the word "sozdaniye" which is generally translated as "create" and which they claim includes "purposeful research." Soviet negotiators have explained that Mr. Gorbachev had intended no change whatsoever in the Soviet position on what they call "space-strike arms."

We have had great difficulty in the defense and space talks in even getting the Soviets to acknowledge indisputable facts. The Soviets refuse to admit the nature and extensive scope of their own strategic defense research and development activities; they deliberately distort the nature and scope of the U.S. SDI program. If there are grounds for encouragement in this forum, they can only be found in the grudging admissions occasionally made by Soviet officials in informal discussions that the logic and coherence of official Soviet positions are flawed and/or inconsistent with the public statements of General Secretary Gorbachev.

INF

The commitment by both sides at the summit toward early progress on an interim INF agreement, the inherent flexibility in the INF portion of the American proposal of November 1, and the apparent movement in the Soviet INF negotiating position heralded by Gorbachev in mid-January raised expectations about the possibilities for success in reaching an INF agreement. The United States studied carefully the Soviets' January proposal and probed Soviet negotiators on the details behind this proposal. We also consulted intensively with allied governments in preparing an appropriate response.

Some elements in Gorbachev's proposal on INF seemed to be constructive. The Soviets appeared to have dropped their demand that British and French SLBM nuclear warheads be counted equally and along with U.S. LRINF warheads. The Soviets expressed willingness to accept an outcome involving reductions of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe, including the SS-20s, to zero. The potentially positive impact of this proposal was negated, however, by a number of unacceptable conditions and omissions related to the offer. Among the conditions are:

- A nontransfer provision calling on the United States to assume an obligation not to transfer strategic and medium-range missiles to third countries. This, of course, is aimed directly

at longstanding programs of cooperation the United States has with its allies and would signal the end of the U.K.

Trident modernization program; and

- A demand that the United Kingdom and France not "build up" their "corresponding nuclear arms" and declare their intent to begin to eliminate those forces in stage 2. The Soviets know that a ban on strategic modernization would sooner rather than later spell the demise of British and French SLBM forces.

Among the omissions are:

- The absence of a provision for reductions in SS-20s in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R. until a subsequent stage and until after U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe have been reduced to zero; and

- The absence of a provision limiting SRINF [shorter range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles. If LRINF missiles were reduced to zero, the effect could be circumvented by SRINF deployments, which can cover most of the important targets in NATO Europe when forward deployed in Eastern Europe.

The consequence of accepting the Soviet proposal would be the elimination of U.S. LRINF missiles from Europe and the probable deterioration of U.K. and French nuclear deterrents, but without elimination of the SS-20 threat which our friends and allies in both Europe and Asia face.

Our study of the Gorbachev proposal in detail and in its overall effect caused us to conclude, based on both the manner of presentation and the substance, that it had been designed primarily for its political and propaganda impact. We do not wish, however, to leave any stone unturned in the search for progress in Geneva. We take seriously the commitment undertaken in the summit joint statement to accelerate efforts to find common ground between the positions of the two sides. It is for these reasons that the President authorized in late February the tabling of a new U.S. INF proposal.

The United States continues to believe that the best solution in INF remains the global elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. When we first proposed this idea at the opening of the INF negotiations in 1981, the Soviets accused us of wanting something for nothing, of offering to destroy paper missiles in exchange for the destruction of real

missiles. But by the end of 1985, the United States had deployed 236 LRINF missiles in Europe. Absent an INF agreement, that number will continue to grow until the full operational capability of 572 missiles is reached by the end of 1988. All five NATO basing countries are acting in accordance with the commitments made in the 1979 NATO dual-track decision. Thus, contrary to Soviet criticism, the plan offered by the United States in February 1986 to eliminate all LRINF missiles worldwide by the end of the decade is both new and significant.

The United States has proposed a detailed, phased approach for reaching its objective, which would achieve balance at the earliest possible time while maintaining stability throughout the reductions process.

By the end of 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia.

Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the numbers of LRINF missile launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50%. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.

Associated with this plan, there would be a parallel series of global LRINF missile warhead ceilings under which the United States would retain the right to global warhead equality. As Soviet SS-20 launchers were reduced, the launchers and their associated missiles and agreed support equipment would be destroyed. U.S. systems in excess of the launcher limits cited above could be withdrawn to the continental United States unless or until they were also in excess of the equal global warhead ceiling associated with the launcher reductions then being implemented, in which case they would be destroyed.

These reductions and limits would involve U.S. and Soviet systems only. There would be no agreed constraints on the forces of the United Kingdom or France.

These reductions would also be accompanied by constraints on SRINF, either establishing a ceiling at current Soviet levels or at the levels both sides had on January 1, 1982. This ceiling would enter into effect by the end of 1987.

By insisting that Soviet reductions to 140 LRINF missile launchers in Europe would have to occur before the

United States would reduce below that level, we seek to avoid near-term military and political problems and to ensure that at no point during the reduction process would the Soviets be able to achieve a lasting advantage.

I have dealt with INF issues in some detail because an agreement in this negotiating group could precede and influence an agreement in START. Likewise, Soviet willingness to make arms control progress before the next summit and to fulfill their commitment toward early progress focused on the principle of 50% reductions may be manifested first or perhaps only in INF.

Verification

The United States continues to stress the critical importance of agreeing to effective means of verification so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of any arms control agreements which are negotiated. Thus, Mr. Gorbachev's positive statements on verification in his January 15 article were welcomed throughout the West. However, past Soviet reluctance to agree on measures necessary to verify compliance provided grounds for some skepticism as well. Round 4 provided little evidence that Soviet attitudes on verification have undergone fundamental change. The Soviets neither agreed to nor proposed specific verification meas-

ures in either the START or INF groups. We expect that Soviet sincerity regarding verification will be put to a clear test when the negotiations resume in May. At that time, our INF negotiators will continue presentation of specific verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits we seek. These details are being presented in the context of a comprehensive verification regime which includes the use of national technical means of verification and cooperative measures between the two governments, such as onsite inspection and data exchanges.

Conclusion

My remarks today have reflected the lack of constructive activity by the Soviet START delegation during round 4 of the nuclear and space arms talks. I do not wish to imply by this negative report that I cannot imagine significant START progress in the months to come. The Soviets have abandoned their current definition of strategic systems before. They can do so again.

We also believe that reductions in strategic offensive systems would be mutually advantageous whether or not strategic defenses are deployed and that there are considerable opportunities for equitable offense-offense tradeoffs. Despite the significant differences in the two sides' application of the 50% reductions principle, the United States sees a potential for convergence on several is-

sues, including reductions in ICBM warheads, total ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile throw-weight, and the total number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to be permitted.

However, the Soviet side, rather than engaging in specific discussions of these issues directed toward narrowing remaining qualitative and numerical differences between us, has emphasized public rhetoric rather than taking concrete steps at the confidential negotiating table where the Soviets have elected to restrict themselves to abstractions and generalities. The Soviets have turned aside our efforts to expand areas of commonality. As long as they remain frozen in this approach, no significant progress is possible.

The primary missing element in the Soviet negotiating formula for START is a willingness to take into account Western interests and not just their own. Were that attitude to change, major progress toward a START agreement would not be far behind. ■

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