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Such an agreement on ABM testing would not be of interest only to the USSR. The Administration is quite right in pointing out that the Soviet BMD programme is a formidable one; it follows that a well-devised, verifiable set of constraints on testing would not impact the US alone. Indeed, from the point of view of carrying out a technically rigorous US SDI research programme, there would be considerable domestic and Alliance virtue in having some test activities clearly permitted, so proposals to conduct such tests could be considered on their merits and not a surrogate for debate on the whole future of the ABM Treaty.

The necessary premise of any such approach is that, in the near term, the Western objective with respect to the ABM Treaty should be to maintain its limits in verifiable ways, not to loosen it either deliberately or by legalisms. It is not clear that the Soviet Union would be interested in a genuinely mutual enhancement of the Treaty's limits. Soviet behaviour already gives sufficient reason for concern about their willingness to remain at the very low level of permitted ballistic missile defences established in 1972. However, unless one believes – in advance of the fruits of scheduled research – that it is clearly in the West's interest to see the 1972 regime abolished, it should be our objective to establish stronger restraints on testing and development, not to match Soviet avoidance.

Such a policy would have a further virtue in terms of maintaining public support for US negotiating and modernization efforts. For it would involve meeting Soviet demands that negotiations on all subjects be conditioned on severe new restrictions on ballistic missile defence work (at least by the US), not with trying to persuade the Soviet leaders of the virtues of SDI, but with asking them to agree to a concrete set of specific verifiable measures defining permissible and non-permissible development work. Such an agreement would – if only for reasons of verifiability – leave plenty of scope for a genuine research programme, and it would deny the Soviet Union the high ground on the issue in the talks.

(3) ASAT

A third element in an interim arms-control programme should be an effort to determine whether a useful ASAT agreement is possible. Both sides appear to stand at the edge of the vastly enhanced anti-satellite capability, from spin-offs of BMD work as well as from dedicated ASAT efforts – which

will themselves be spurred on by the prospect of space-based defences. The window to decide whether we wish to enter that world will not remain open forever. There are severe problems about verification of any ASAT agreement and about defining what space-related activities among the immense range with some ASAT potential are to be covered. Clearly no meaningful ASAT agreement is possible if the US establishes as a condition that no such agreement can be permitted to inhibit research on ballistic missile defence.

Nonetheless, US (and Western) dependence on space for critical military missions is sufficiently greater than that of the Soviet Union to make ASAT limits likely to be in our interest if they are effective, particularly if there is an effective ban on space-based defences (against which ASAT are an important counter-measure). In a crisis, vulnerable satellites would present attractive (but highly escalatory) targets for high-confidence ASAT systems, and the capability for attacks on missile early-warning satellites could prove highly destabilizing. It is therefore worth considering a brief moratorium on further ASAT testing on both sides (preferably linked with agreed limitations on certain forms of ABM testing) to see whether a meaningful longer-term agreement on ASAT capability is possible.

(4) C³

A new and creative element in the debate on arms control (and, indeed, on nuclear strategy more generally) is the attention to the utility of improving communications in a crisis. The range of proposals is broad – and many do suffer from assuming that better means of getting messages across will, *ipso facto*, produce better understanding and greater restraint in crises. Even the best channels of communication will not help much without a willingness to listen, reconsider, and compromise in the tension of a crisis. It is, however, equally true that without such channels in place, the impulse to moderation may not find a means of expression. Discussion of such concepts as jointly established crisis control centres and procedures could do little harm – especially if developed in consultation with allies who could otherwise be sensitive to 'condominium' fears – and could be very helpful.

This arms-control agenda admittedly leaves a good deal unaddressed. Nuclear winter remains as

Strategic
Crime
Balance

great a danger as ever. Deterrence by threat and not immunity from attack will have to remain the fundamental ultimate instrument of strategy, though the capacity for flexibility can offer at least a theoretical possibility of avoiding ultimate escalation without conceding defeat. Neither strategy nor diplomacy should be premised on the expectation of producing fundamental changes in East-West relations, or indeed in the relative roles of the United States and the European allies in their own collective security. Both the US-Soviet conflict and the concept of collective security between the United States and her European allies rest on natural and continuing national interests and objectives and are unlikely to be changed.

Nor is such a short-term agenda comprehensive. Notably absent is INF, on the regrettable, but clear, ground that the two sides are – even after the back-door Soviet concession in Gorbachev's freeze proposal that some new US INF deployments are legitimate – so far apart on basics that no quick agreement is possible. But such an agenda would offer an opportunity to reach militarily meaningful

and strategically sound agreements fairly quickly. And some early achievement may well be essential to public patience, not just with arms control, but with necessary nuclear modernization and conventional defence programmes as well. Interim agreements along these lines would protect achievements already accomplished – and it would leave the door open to new directions, whether in deployment of defences or in more radical agreed limitations.

Such an agenda, coupled with a programme for research on strategic defences that genuinely seeks to determine what is wise, as well as technologically possible, could form a basis for consensus during the next few years both in the US between the Administration and Congress and in the Alliance generally. It would also provide a way of working with the USSR towards keeping the arms-control process moving forward during what will be a difficult period. The alternative to some such interim programme may well be the collapse not only of arms control, but of US and Alliance unity on defence issues.

Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative for the ABM Treaty

GEORGE R. SCHNEITER

Introduction

The Reagan Administration has made a marked departure from recent American administrations in its emphasis on strategic defence. The key element of this emphasis is the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), an effort aimed at developing an effective defence, largely spaced-based, against ballistic missiles. The degree to which the American public and Congress will support SDI remains to be seen. Considerable support exists for the concept of a defence against nuclear weapons, as opposed to just threatening to use

them in retaliation. However, there is also great scepticism that a defence such as envisioned by the President is achievable. The debate may in the end focus on the net worth of a capable but imperfect strategic defence.

In any event, SDI is a current emphasis of the US strategic programme, joining a considerable build-up in US strategic offensive forces. The US defence budget has now begun to reflect increases in research on technologies applicable to a space-based defence. And the United States has enlisted the endorsement of her NATO allies for at least the research portion of SDI.

This article will examine the effect of this new direction in US defence policy on strategic arms control. It will focus particularly on questions raised for the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in the eyes of many the principal lasting achievement of the era of detente. This Treaty,

George R. Schneiter is a member of the research staff at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. From 1978-81, he was Deputy Director of the DoD SALT Task Force. The views expressed in this Paper do not necessarily represent those of the DoD its Military Departments, any other US Government Department or Agency of the Center for naval Analyses.

which bans a territorial defence against strategic ballistic missiles and severely constrains other ABM activities, is the only one of the SALT agreements still legally in force.

The article first reviews the strategic forces and programmes of the United States and Soviet Union, with emphasis on defensive forces. It then addresses the background and current status of the ABM Treaty. Finally, it identifies and discusses the critical issues with regard to the future of the ABM Treaty.

Strategic Forces, Programmes, and Directions *Offensive Forces*

The American strategic offensive forces are well-balanced, with roughly equal emphasis on inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bombers equipped with bombs, short-range attack missiles (SRAM), and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). The United States has underway modernization programmes for all three legs of this strategic triad. The recent thrust has been to increase prompt hard-target kill capability and to improve the ability to penetrate air defences. A future emphasis is expected to be on improving the survivability of the ICBM force. The deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) has further diversified US nuclear forces, and the current deployment of the *Pershing II* ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe adds new capability to US Europe-based nuclear forces.

In her strategic offensive forces, the Soviet Union has in the past given primary roles to ICBM and SLBM, although the appearance of the *Blackjack* bomber and recent cruise missile developments indicate an increased role for airborne systems. The USSR also has active ICBM and SLBM modernization programmes. A recent emphasis has been on improving ICBM survivability by increased mobility. SLBM programmes will provide improved accuracy and additional warheads.

Defensive Forces

The United States deployed extensive air defences – interceptor aircraft and the *Nike* series of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) – in the 1950s in response to the Soviet bomber threat. Developments in SAM technology provided the base for US efforts to develop a defence against Soviet strategic ballistic

missiles. The United States eventually decided her ABM technology could not provide a sure enough defence for protection of cities, so the objective shifted to defence of the *Minuteman* ICBM force. In the 1970s, the United States began deploying an ABM system to defend *Minuteman* silos but subsequently deactivated the system after concluding that advances in penetration aids, which the Soviet Union could eventually duplicate, would enable ballistic missiles to defeat such a system. Logic then dictated that, if the US could not defend against the powerful and growing Soviet ballistic missile force, it made no sense to maintain a costly air defence against the relatively weak Soviet bomber force. Consequently, in the early 1970s the US strategic defence mission was reduced to one of principally warning and airspace control, with only research and development on defence against ballistic missiles.

Based on the US ABM research and development efforts in the 1970s, a non-nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) system appeared practical, and a programme was undertaken to develop such a capability.

This general approach to strategic defences continued until the Reagan Administration. Secretary Weinberger's Fiscal Year 1983 *Annual Report to the Congress* stated: 'We have virtually ignored our strategic defensive systems for more than a decade. . . . Our program ends these years of neglect'.¹

The current status of US strategic defence programmes is as follows.

Air defences. Planned and continuing improvements include:

- Deployment of high-frequency over-the-horizon radars on the east and west coasts of the US for overwater surveillance.
- Modernization of the fence of ground-based microwave radars across northern Alaska and Canada by the installation of 52 new radars.
- Modernization of interceptor-aircraft forces with F-15s and F-16s.

ASAT

- Development of the miniature-vehicle ASAT, which would be launched by specially-equipped F-15 aircraft to destroy or disable low-altitude satellites.
- Deployment of a network of ground-based electro-optical sensors for space surveillance.

ABM

- Upgrading of ballistic missile early warning capability through modernization of launch-detection satellites and ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars in, Greenland and England.
- Plans to build two *Pave Paws* radars, in Texas and in Georgia, for detecting and tracking SLBM. These radars will add to the coverage already provided by the *Pave Paws* radars in Massachusetts and California and the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System (PARCS) radar in North Dakota.

But the most far-reaching and controversial aspect of the US strategic defence efforts is the part that has, since President Reagan's 1983 speech, been consolidated under the SDI programme. This programme 'is chartered to explore key technologies permitted by the ABM Treaty so that a future President and Congress will have technical options to decide whether to embark on development and deployment of strategic defences against ballistic missiles'.² The United States makes clear that the programme is now in only the 'research' phase, an important distinction given the ABM Treaty's limitations on 'development', the stage following research.

The Department of Defense describes four phases in the SDI program:³

- *Research phase*, from now to the early 1990s, when a decision could be made on proceeding into systems development.
- *Systems development phase*, during which prototypes of defence system components are designed, built and tested.
- *Transition phase*, during which there is incremental, sequential deployment of defensive systems by both sides, accompanied or preceded by significant reductions in nuclear ballistic missiles.
- *Final phase*, when deployments of highly effective, layered defences are completed and ballistic missile force levels reach a minimum, defences are incorporated against other means of nuclear attack, if similar technical progress in such defences has been attained by that time.

This progression represents the most extensive ABM deployment the US might undertake. Presumably the Soviet Union would undertake simi-

lar deployments. The foregoing description of the SDI programme suggests that effective defences against other means of nuclear attack, e.g., ALCM, would *not* be a necessary condition for a US decision to proceed with such extensive ABM deployments. However, it is unlikely that such an expensive programme would get Congressional support without assurance that other delivery means, especially airborne systems, could also be thwarted.

The principal functions and elements in the SDI programme are the following:

- Warning, surveillance, tracking, battle management: through satellite-borne sensors, principally passive detectors of infrared radiation.
- Discrimination of re-entry vehicles (RV) from penetration aids: through optical sensors, imaging radars.
- Destruction of missiles during boost and RV-deployment phase and (less efficient) destruction of RV during midcourse phase through:
 - Satellite-based chemical lasers, electromagnetic rail guns, X-ray lasers, particle-beam generators, rocket-powered interceptors.
 - Submarine-launched X-ray laser generators.
 - Ground-based lasers reflected from satellite-based mirrors.
- Destruction of RV during terminal phase: through interceptor missiles, using non-nuclear kill mechanisms.

The SDI programme emphasizes space-based components because of the desirability of countering ballistic missiles early in their trajectories. The missiles may be more vulnerable during this phase because their boost and guidance systems are still operating. Also they offer fewer, more lucrative targets then, because the post-boost deployment systems have not yet dispersed the warheads on their individual trajectories. For midcourse or terminal-phase destruction of the RV, techniques that would allow each defence element to defend a larger area are preferred because they minimize the number of such elements required to protect against attacks that might be concentrated against a few particular targets. As will be discussed later, both space basing and wide-area coverage run counter to the objectives and the limitations of the ABM Treaty.

US policy regarding ABM could, of course, in time shift to other directions; such shifts have

occurred in the past. Several alternative directions might be pursued.

One possibility would be to try to extend the ABM Treaty, perhaps with increased restrictions on ABM deployments, developments, or possibly even research. Soviet statements regarding their arms-control objectives appear to indicate that they would favour this course, with a comprehensive ban on 'scientific research', development, testing and deployment of 'space strike arms', defined by Moscow as arms designed to strike targets in space from earth or to strike targets on earth from space.⁴

Another possibility would be to go ahead with a limited deployment of ABM systems to defend strategic offensive forces such as ICBM. Prior to the advent of SDI, defence of ICBM provided the principal incentive for US ABM development. The ABM Treaty explicitly permits limited deployments for that purpose, and as noted earlier the US operated such a system briefly in the early 1970s. In the late 1970s the United States considered deploying another ABM system, the Low-Altitude Defence System (LOADS), for protecting the MX ICBM. Both the MX and the LOADS launchers were to be moved occasionally to make it harder for the Soviet Union to target them confidently. Some changes to the ABM Treaty would have been required to accommodate LOADS as envisioned then. However, it clearly was not an area-defence system, it would have been consistent with the original objectives of the Treaty, and the Treaty changes required (to permit land-mobile components and more radars, launchers and missiles) would have been reasonable. With MX now planned to be based only in fixed silos, LOADS has less appeal. However, a mobile small ICBM might benefit from such a defence.

A third possibility is that some elements of an SDI-type defence could be deployed to defend offensive-force or C³ assets, perhaps without requiring much change to the Treaty. However, these elements would probably provide some wide-area-defence capability, contrary to the Treaty's objectives.

In contrast to the United States, the USSR has, since World War II, given strong and continued emphasis to strategic defences. She has spent vast sums on defences against US long-range bombers, in addition to the more immediate threat of the shorter-range bombers of surrounding countries. The recent upgrading of Soviet air defences – including deployment of the low-altitude-capable SA-10 SAM, the SA-X-12 SAM/anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM), and interceptor aircraft capable of engaging low-flying targets – makes penetration by US bombers and cruise missiles more difficult. Nevertheless, the US apparently believes Soviet air defences will still be penetrable – in the near term with the ALCM and the B-1B bomber, and in the longer term with the 'stealth' Advanced Technology Bomber.

In the ABM field, the USSR has maintained an operational ABM system around Moscow since before the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty and has recently begun to upgrade it, within the confines of the Treaty's obligations. The Soviet Union is adding a new high-acceleration interceptor; increasing the number of ABM missiles to the permitted ceiling of 100; upgrading her battle-management system with a large, four-sided, phases-array radar near Pushkino; and completing early warning coverage with a new, large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, the last in violation of the Treaty.

Soviet Programmes on Strategic Defences

	ASAT	Air Defence	ABM
Ground-based laser	ioc* end of 1980s	ioc late 1980s (point defence)	Component test early 1990s ioc 2000s
Airborne laser	ioc early 1990s	ioc early 1990s	—
Spaced-based laser	Prototype late 1980s	—	ioc 2000s
Space-based particle beam weapon	Test early 1990s	—	Prototype late 1990s

* Initial Operating Capability.

The USSR continues programmes in advanced technologies applicable to strategic defence – high-energy lasers and particle beams, for example – as well as in the manned and unmanned use of space for military purposes. She has an operational low-altitude ASAT system based principally on ballistic-missile technology, and ground-based lasers that could interfere with US satellites.

According to the DoD, 'Soviet programs for the development and application of directed-energy technologies to strategic defense have been very vigorous in the past and will continue to be so in the future, irrespective of what the US does about new strategic defense initiatives'. The DoD cites these potential developments and deployments⁵ (see table on p. 216).

Finally, the USSR has put considerable resources into passive defence, aimed primarily at protecting leadership, armed forces and industrial capacity. The extent to which these measures would be effective in a nuclear exchange is controversial.

The scope of all this activity has prompted many to believe the Soviet Union plans to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and deploy an extensive ABM system. Alternatively, she may only be maximizing her defence under the Treaty and hedging against US developments.

Strategic Arms Control

The initial efforts to control nuclear arms were aimed at reducing the hazards of nuclear testing. These efforts produced the 1963 multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; and the 1967 multilateral Outer Space Treaty, which bans placing nuclear weapons in earth orbit.

More public attention has focused on later negotiations aimed at limiting the delivery means of nuclear weapons, particularly strategic delivery means, and methods of countering those delivery means. The SALT I agreements – the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty and the five-year Interim Agreement freezing levels of ICBM and SLBM launchers – were signed and entered into force in 1972. The ABM Treaty remains in force by its terms; the interim Agreement has expired but is still observed by both sides. Similarly, both sides are adhering to many aspects of the unratified 1979 SALT II Treaty, which places broader limits on strategic offensive delivery means.

The following sections discuss the ABM Treaty and the ASAT negotiations.

ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty bans the deployment of ABM systems for defence of the territory of a country, and further bans the providing of a 'base' for such a defence.⁶ It explicitly limits regional ABM deployments; it also restricts the kinds of ABM systems and components permitted to be developed and tested. The following listing gives the Treaty's principal limitations.

SALT I: ABM Treaty (signed 26 May 1972; in force from 3 October 1972; modified by Protocol signed 3 July 1974, and in force from 24 May 1976; unlimited duration, review every five years);

Bans deployment of ABM systems and their components, with the following exceptions:

Each side may deploy an ABM system at one deployment area, subject to certain limitations:

If National Capital Area:

No more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 interceptors at launch sites

ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes

Components must be within 150 km of side's national capital

If ICBM Silo Launcher Area:

No more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 interceptors at launch sites

No more than two large phased-array radars comparable to US PAR and MSR

No more than 18 ABM radars, with less power-aperture than MSR

Components deployed within 150-km-radius circle containing ICBM launchers

Center of deployment area no less than 1,300 km from side's national capital.

Bans

Development, testing and deployment of:

Systems and components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based

An ABM launcher that can launch more than one ABM interceptor at a time

Systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers

Deployment of ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars (this is

implicit in the deployment limitations already listed, but an 'Agreed Statement' dealing with this was added presumably to clarify the handling of 'exotic' systems and components).

- Giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radars ABM capabilities, or testing them in an ABM mode
- Ballistic missile early warning radars that are not located along the periphery of the side's national territory and oriented outward
- Transfer of ABM systems or components to other states
- Deployment of ABM systems or components outside a side's national territory.

The United States and the Soviet Union clearly had different objectives in agreeing so to limit ABM. For their part, the Soviet leaders wanted to prevent the US from deploying an ABM system better than theirs, and they were willing to accept the offensive weapon 'freeze' of the Interim Agreement in exchange for the ABM limits. The United States, on the other hand, had primary interest in the offensive limits but also wanted ABM limits to stop the offence-defence build-up cycle and to ensure the penetration capability of her ballistic missile deterrent forces. During the negotiations the United States maintained that failure to replace the Interim Agreement with more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms could constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

The United States has sought more specificity in the terms and language of the SALT agreements than has the USSR. In some cases the Soviet Union agreed to clarifying statements. In other cases ambiguities or lack of agreement remained. To some extent these differences are inevitable in any negotiations because of differences in the systems the two sides have developed, and in terminology (exacerbated in this case by differences in language). Moreover, one side may want to protect programmes or concepts that are unknown to the other side. And, it is particularly difficult to deal with systems and concepts that are only in the research or concept-development stage, where the engineering details of a system, or even the nature of and inter-relationships among its components, have not yet been determined.

The drafters of the ABM Treaty knew that new kinds of systems, such as some of those being considered under the US SDI programme might

eventually reach a stage or development that could be viewed as inconsistent with the Treaty. Such future systems were dealt with in a number of ways.

As one example, the ban dealing with mobility (including a ban on space-based systems) was not limited to those kinds of components specifically mentioned in the Treaty - ABM radars, ABM launchers, and ABM interceptor missiles. Rather, it banned the development, testing and deployment of all mobile ABM systems and components'. These more general terms also apply to potential future systems 'to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory'. Such future systems conceivably could include other kinds of components, but the Treaty drafters did not try to define what those future kinds of components might be. An initialled Agreed Statement did state that limitations on systems and components based on 'other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars' would be subject to discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission (scc) (the body set up to deal with questions of interpretation, implementation and compliance with the SALT I agreements) and agreement via amendment of the Treaty. Presumably such discussions would address the question of what constitutes a component - an important question in the SDI context.

The Treaty drafters also stopped short of trying to define precisely what constitutes an ABM capability - another important issue. This issue hinges on what constitutes the ability 'to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory'. Among the kinds of defensive systems that must be distinguished from ABM systems are: anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM), systems to counter non-strategic ballistic missiles; air defence surface-to-air missiles (SAM), systems; and anti-satellite systems. Particular attention was paid to one of these - air defence SAM - during the negotiation of the Treaty, because of US concern that the Soviet SA-5 SAM system might have ABM capability. Because of the large numbers of SA-5s deployed, such a capability would give the USSR a significant base for a nationwide ABM system.

It is worth considering how the SA-5 question was dealt with both in the SALT I negotiations and subsequently in the scc. In the negotiations, the sides agreed not to give ABM capabilities to non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars

nor to 'test them in an ABM mode'. The United States further stated unilaterally her understanding of the kinds of 'events' that would constitute testing in an ABM mode. Later, after the Treaty came into force, the United States became concerned that certain testing of the SA-5 radar might be aimed at giving it an ABM capability. The United States raised this issue in the SCC, and the testing in question ceased. The sides then agreed in the SCC on more detailed criteria for permitted activities at ABM test ranges.

Thus, in the SA-5 case, the sides were unable or unwilling to agree in advance on criteria more explicit than 'tested in an ABM mode'. However, when a specific question arose, they were able to agree on more explicit criteria. Similarly, detailed dismantling and destruction procedures have been negotiated in the SCC for existing systems, but no attempt has been made to negotiate such procedures for future systems.

The Interim Agreement negotiations provide a different type of example of a definitional issue that was left unresolved – the definition of a heavy ICBM. The United States sought to define a heavy ICBM as an ICBM with volume significantly larger than that of the Soviet SS-11 ICBM. The Soviet Union would not agree to that definition, for a reason that later became clear: Soviet leaders intended to deploy as a light ICBM the SS-19, which has a volume much larger than that of the SS-11. In this case, failure to achieve precision in a definition was, at least in part, due to conflict with a side's planned programmes.

A final example of a definitional issue deals again with a question of capability. The USSR claims that the large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk is for space tracking; the United States claims it could be used as a ballistic missile early warning radar regardless of what other uses might be made of it. Such an issue could also arise regarding, say a system the testing side claimed had only ASAT capability, but which the other side viewed as having potential ABM capability.


ASAT Negotiations

In 1978 the Carter Administration, as part of a comprehensive series of arms-control negotiations and discussions with the USSR, initiated bilateral negotiations on the control of ASAT. These talks were suspended in 1979 with little progress having been made, apparently in part because of Soviet insistence on banning the US space shuttle.

The focus of discussions on space arms control subsequently shifted to the UN, where the USSR has submitted draft treaties calling for a ban on the development and deployment of ASAT weapons. The Reagan Administration has argued that the Soviet initiatives pose profound verification problems.⁷ It has been unwilling to enter into Soviet-proposed negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Rather, the US and her Allies have proposed discussions there on a broad range of space arms-control issues. The US also has been unwilling to join in the USSR's announced moratorium on the launching of any type of ASAT weapon, arguing that to do so would leave the Soviet Union with a destabilizing advantage. This argument is made on the grounds that the United States must herself develop and deploy an ASAT for two reasons: to deter the Soviet Union from using ASAT, and to be in a position to disable Soviet low-altitude satellites that would be of tactical value during conventional hostilities.

But there is a third, more important reason that is not mentioned in the Administration's public position on ASAT arms control: a ban on ASAT would prevent many experiments essential to the SDI research and development effort. ABM systems capable of intercepts outside the atmosphere inherently have ASAT capability, as satellite orbits are easier to predict than are ballistic missile trajectories and satellites are far more fragile targets than re-entry vehicles. Also, many of the concepts for space-based components of ASAT and ABM systems are common to each other, with the principal differences being in the energy levels involved and in the target-handling (multi-shot) capacities required. On both counts, ABM system requirements are far more stressing. Therefore, although the Reagan Administration states that the door is not closed to effective ASAT arms-control measures, there is little likelihood that it will make any concrete moves in that direction while it continues its current approach to ABM research and development.

Conversely, many of the tests one might do in developing an ASAT system would be relevant to ABM development, and many of them would be helpful for the monitoring side to distinguish from actual ABM development. Therefore, continuing to permit ASAT testing, which is allowed under the current arms-control regime, will pose serious verification problems which, in the view of many threaten to undermine the ABM Treaty.



Critical Issues and Specific Questions

What are the critical issues raised by the ABM Treaty and what specific decisions will political leaders confront in the near future?

Issues

The above diagram depicts various decisions open to political leaders regarding the ABM Treaty. They range from abandoning the Treaty to strengthening it by adding constraints on systems that could undercut it – ATBM, SAM and large, phased-array radars (LPAR) – and constraints on other areas of strategic defence-air defence, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and ASAT.

A variety of approaches are possible. For example, one might for the present retain the Treaty, but later modify it to permit SDI development and deployment. This would seem to be the approach preferred by the Reagan Administration, assuming that research would prove a comprehensive strategic defence programme to be lethal, survivable, cost effective and affordable.

Of the elements and concepts being considered in the SDI programme, radars and interceptor missiles are the only ones explicitly dealt with by the ABM Treaty.

Under the Treaty, ABM interceptor missiles may be developed, tested and deployed, provided their launchers are fixed and land-based and cannot be reloaded rapidly or launch more than one missile at a time. If deployed, the launchers must be within a permitted deployment area, and there must not be more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles and 100 ABM launchers in that particular area.

ABM radars likewise must be fixed and land-based. They are subject to additional constraints, depending on whether they are part of a national capital area defence (in which case they must be located within no more than six ABM radar complexes, each complex having a diameter of no more than 3 km) or an ICBM silo launcher area defence (in which case they must be located within

an area having a radius of 150 km and containing ICBM silo launchers). In the latter case, there may be no more than 20 ABM radars, two of them permitted to be large, phased-array radars and 18 of them required to have a power-aperture product less than 3 million watt-metres squared. Any other large, phased-array radars (other than those located at test ranges) must fall into one of the following categories:

- Radars for ballistic missile early warning, which must be located along the periphery of the side's national territory and oriented outward (so they will be relatively vulnerable to attack, have less accuracy for trajectory prediction, and therefore be less likely to assume the ABM role of battle management).
- Radars deployed for tracking objects in outer space.
- Radars deployed for use as national technical means of verification.

The reason for these restrictions on radars was the belief that large, phased-array radars would be an important element of a territorial defence. A limit on their deployment would therefore limit the potential for a side rapidly to break out from the treaty constraints, given the long time it takes to construct such radars.

Were the United States to decide to pursue a more conventional ABM defence of her ICBM, such development would be permitted – again, so long as the components (launchers, interceptor missiles, radars) were fixed and land-based. When the United States was planning to develop the LOADS system as an MX defence, the strategy was to postpone for as long as practical the testing of the components on mobile platforms, to delay the requirement to modify the Treaty. Radars and missile launchers could have been designed to be compatible with mobile platforms, the mobile platforms could have been designed and constructed, and the radars and missiles could have been field-tested on and flight-tested from fixed platforms. The United States appears to be planning a similar approach in the SDI programme.

The SDI programme also includes satellite-borne sensors for warning, surveillance, tracking and battle management. Both sides deploy launch-detection satellites as permitted implicitly by the Treaty, which makes no mention of satellites used for early warning. However, the Treaty does not permit the use of satellites to substitute for 'ABM

radars'. This means, for example, that they could not perform the task of discriminating warheads from decoys, doing fine tracking of warheads and interceptors and guiding interceptors. An infrared detection system that did this job in place of an ABM radar could be developed, but only in a fixed land-based configuration (an impractical concept for a strategic system, since clouds could severely limit its utility at times of crisis).

The other items listed above – lasers, rail guns and particle-beam generators – which would substitute for the interceptor missiles in a 'classic' ABM system, also are permitted to be developed only in a fixed, land-based configuration. Thus, some proof-of-principle testing of such systems could probably be carried out, but field testing them on satellites is prohibited. If the devices had less than ABM capability, the Treaty technically would allow them to be tested on satellites, but serious verification problems could result. Finally, such devices with ABM capabilities could conceivably be tested in space if they were launched from fixed, land-based launchers into a non-orbital ballistic trajectory, since it could be argued that these were fixed, land-based devices (even though their ultimate application might be on a satellite or a sea-based platform).

In deciding on the approach to take for tests that the other side might find difficult to verify or view as circumventions, a key consideration would be the precedent one would be setting for the actions of the other side. The Reagan Administration appears more intent on conducting the tests it deems necessary for the SDI programme than on ensuring verifiability. Its approach to SDI argues that tests are permitted so long as an ABM capability is not present or the devices being tested are 'subcomponents' rather than 'components' of ABM systems. The criteria used for these determinations have not been stated publicly. Others, such as *Longstreth*, *Pike* and *Rhineland*, would have the US seek Soviet agreement on explicit definitions of 'develop and test' and 'components'. Further, they recommend banning ASAT systems and severely limiting certain kinds of directed-energy testing in order to avoid undercutting the Treaty.⁸

Finally, one potential element being addressed under SDI – the nuclear-driven X-ray laser – would violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty if it were tested other than underground, and the Outer Space Treaty if it were ever deployed in orbit.

Questions

(1) *Should the ABM Treaty be retained?* Few are calling for immediate abandonment of the ABM Treaty. Although the Reagan Administration urges a programme that could lead to the eventual deployment of extensive strategic defences, it wants to retain the Treaty in the near term. Arguments have been made for abandoning the ABM Treaty on the grounds that the USSR is clearly violating certain limitations (for example, with the placement of early warning radars) and has deployed or is about to deploy non-limited systems having some ABM capability (SA-10, SA-X-12), whereas the US has carefully complied with all the Treaty's limitations, and the existence of the Treaty inhibits support for US ABM R&D.

A counter argument is that, given the numbers and capabilities of the offensive forces on both sides, there is little choice for the present but to rely on the doctrine of deterrence by threat of retaliation. The Treaty's limitations support that doctrine under the current circumstances. Moreover, the USSR has an operational ABM system, with open production lines, and appears much better prepared than the US to deploy a widespread defence rapidly if so permitted. Also, the Treaty's constraints are important to the viability of the British and French nuclear deterrents. Neither of these countries favour the Treaty's abandonment.

(2) *Should the ABM Treaty be relaxed to permit SDI development beyond the research stage?* The answer appears to be 'No' at least for the near term. The Department of Defense has said that the research necessary to determine whether to proceed into systems development will be completed in the early 1990s. The United States would not want to give the USSR the opportunity to conduct such development ahead of the United States.

Before the United States could proceed with full-scale or prototype development of any of the space-based concepts, she would have to change or withdraw from the Treaty. However, some aspects of ABM components might be examined during testing for applications requiring less-than-ABM capability. For example, the United States might investigate pointing and tracking techniques as part of the development of a space-based laser for ASAT purposes. Although such tests might not prove that a type of device would work

in an ABM role (which would require higher power, faster response, etc.), they could show that a type of device would *not* be practical for ABM purposes. Of course, a side product of such testing would be concern on the part of the other country that the testing side was already violating the ABM Treaty, as it may be difficult to verify the capability of the hardware being tested.

(3) *Should the ABM Treaty be relaxed to permit US deployments for protecting ICBM?* An ABM system designed to take advantage of location uncertainty (for example, by occasional deceptive moving of radars and interceptor missiles and launchers) would significantly raise the number of RV required to cause a given level of damage in an attack against an ICBM force. For example, in the case of the shell-game deployment scheme the United States considered for MX, fielding one mobile ABM radar and three mobile ABM interceptor missiles per ICBM would have the same effect as doubling the number of protective shelters. Such a deployment would require modifying the Treaty, however, to permit mobile ABM radars and launchers and to permit the numbers of radars and launchers to exceed 20 and 100, respectively. The Reagan Administration currently shows no interest in shell-game basing, but this kind of ABM defence could provide similar leverage for road-mobile basing, which is being considered for the new small ICBM.

Before developing such a system, one would want to ensure it was the most cost-effective way to enhance ICBM survivability, and be convinced that making modifications to (or withdrawing from) the ABM Treaty was in the US interest, taking account of what the Soviet Union might do.

Most would agree that such an ABM deployment would be stabilizing if the other side could be confident that the deployment did not provide wide-area defence or a rapid break-out capability for such a defence. This approach might have worked in the MX-defence context for a system such as LOADS, with its obviously limited defence capability. But it is unlikely one could convince the Soviet Union that a system derived from, or part of, the SDI programme would be so limited. For SDI, the stated objective of the types of systems being considered is a nationwide defence, and the DOD stresses the importance of a large area of coverage by the interceptor missiles planned for the terminal tier of the system.

Further, such modification of the Treaty for testing offensive assets would appear to be inconsistent with the Reagan Administration's long-term objective of defence dominance, which is diametrically opposite to the strategic concept on which the ABM Treaty is based.

(4) *Should the ABM Treaty be clarified with regard to what is meant by 'components' and 'development'?* Assuming the Treaty will remain in force at least into the next decade, it may be desirable for the US and USSR to agree more precisely on certain terms that will bear on the sides' actions over the next few years, particularly with regard to experiments they may conduct in space.

An issue of this kind arose in connection with an experiment in the Talon Gold programme.⁹ This experiment, to have been conducted on the space shuttle, was to investigate precision acquisition, tracking and pointing issues associated with space-based lasers. Some argued that the experiment would violate the ABM Treaty, in that it would constitute the development of a space-based component based on 'other physical principles' and capable of substituting for an ABM component. The DoD decided to cancel the particular programme, saying that it wanted to do the work as part of the co-ordinated SDI effort. However, some implied the delay reflected concern that the experiment would have violated the Treaty. In any event, this case provides an example of the kind of questions that will arise as experiments related to directed-energy or other weapons are conducted in space.

The Treaty speaks of 'systems' and 'components', but does not define the terms. It provides examples - ABM systems for the former, ABM radars, ABM launchers, and ABM interceptor missiles for the latter. But it does not state what might be considered a component of an ABM system of a different nature (based on 'other physical principles', for example). One could argue that, based on the examples provided in the Treaty, the word 'component' means a major element of the system, comparable to a radar, launcher, or missile in its contribution to the overall system. The sides might agree explicitly on such an interpretation. However, questions would still arise.

One way to provide more guidance would be for the sides together to postulate different overall systems, describe them, and then agree on what constitutes a component for Treaty purposes, and

perhaps what level or kind of testing might be permitted before it would be considered to conflict with the Treaty. This would be difficult now, given the formative state of the US programme and the certain Soviet unwillingness to volunteer anything about their plans or to facilitate unilateral US progress. Such issues may have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the actual programmes as they develop.

The meaning of 'develop and test' was addressed in SALT I. During ratification, US officials made clear the US interpretation that development and testing in the Treaty context refer to 'field testing' as opposed to 'laboratory' development and testing. A key aspect of the interpretation was that the activity referred to must be verifiable by national technical means. Thus, for example, components of a space-based directed-energy ABM system could be built and tested in an indoor laboratory without violating the Treaty. On the other hand, a prototype of a component that was part of a fixed, ground-based directed-energy ABM system could be field tested - for example, tested on an outdoor range (presumably, even if it were also a component of a space-based system).

The United States might seek Soviet agreement to the US interpretation of 'develop and test', in part to remove an ambiguity caused by differences in the Russian and English texts of the portion of the Treaty banning components that are not fixed and land-based. The Russian text uses 'create' where the English text uses 'develop'. Again, however, it is unlikely that, given their position on SDI and the ABM Treaty, the Soviet leaders would at this time agree to any interpretation that the Administration would accept.

A different reason for the US to seek clarification of these definitional issues would be to enhance US confidence in Soviet compliance. To date, there appears to be little if any US concern that Soviet space and directed-energy activities have violated the ABM Treaty, although, as noted earlier, the Reagan Administration considers the USSR to have significant programmes in the military applications of space and directed energy. Nevertheless, as these Soviet programmes progress into the field-testing stage and power levels increase, areas of ambiguity could arise. The issues, however, would probably concern whether devices have ABM capability rather than whether the activity constitutes development and testing.

(5) *Should the ABM Treaty be strengthened to deal better with systems such as ATBM, SAM and LPAR?* When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, two major US concerns were: preventing the upgrading to ABM capability of Soviet non-ABM systems, such as air-defence SAM; and preventing the establishment of a radar base for a Soviet nationwide ABM system. The USSR would go only so far to meet these concerns. Therefore it is not surprising that there are now questionable Soviet testing and construction programmes in these areas. The Soviet motivation for the Krasnoyarsk radar probably derives from the cost of alternatives that would provide equivalent coverage and still be within Treaty constraints, as well as the US programme to expand and modernize her ballistic missile early warning radar system (some of it outside US territory). However, the blatancy of the Krasnoyarsk radar siting and orientation is surprising to many. The US Delegation to the Geneva negotiations has apparently been charged with addressing these topics as matters of some priority. How might these issues be dealt with so as to satisfy both sides?

There seems little that can be done with regard to the SAM (or ATBM), short of restrictions on the capabilities of those systems themselves. (The USSR has adamantly resisted any limitations on air defences in past negotiations, and her position is unlikely to change.) Many SAM inevitably have *some* capability against *some* strategic ballistic missiles, depending on factors such as the re-entry vehicle's speed (a function of the missile's range), ballistic co-efficient (which affects atmospheric slowdown), and radar cross section (detectability). What distinguishes a useful ABM system is the ability to intercept intercontinental-range ballistic missiles having low-radar cross section (RCS), high-ballistic-coefficient RV and, if it is to do a satisfactory job of defending territory, to do so over an area of thousands of square miles. It is unlikely the systems in question can do this, although their potentially large numbers tend to compensate for a small coverage area.

Time will alleviate this problem to some extent as the United States phases out her shorter-range SLBM, the principal candidates for defence by these systems. Also, the development and deployment of penetration aids is an important unilateral measure the United States can take. On the other hand, SAM capability will likely continue to improve, making the problem worse. Perhaps the

most effective Treaty provision the US could seek would be measures to enhance monitoring of the testing of borderline systems, so as to increase the likelihood of detecting testing of SAM systems against targets representative of strategic ballistic missiles. There may be no choice, however, but to live with the problem, relying on unilateral measures and the 'tested-in-an-ABM-mode' criterion for establishing ABM capability.

With regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar, it is difficult to envision any Soviet actions short of dismantlement that would convince the US it is not a ballistic missile early warning radar. Even the on-site inspections mentioned by Ambassador Dobrynin early this year would be of little if any help. However, the United States could seek Soviet agreement that these radars will not be significantly defended (for example, Soviet agreement to the US unilateral statement in SALT I that the US would regard any increase in the defences of ballistic missile early warning radars by SAM as inconsistent with the Treaty). Also, the US could seek a numerical limit on such radars, freezing their numbers at the levels currently planned by the two sides.

(6) *Should the ABM Treaty be complemented by limitations on other forms of strategic defence, such as air defence and ASW?* This question would be relevant if it were decided that defence dominance is unachievable, impractical, or undesirable, and therefore the United States should continue to rely on deterrence as it exists now – that is, with offence dominance. In this case, it might be desirable to seek additional limitations aimed at ensuring the survival and penetration capability of the sides' deterrent forces. Such limitations could be consistent with the negotiation of significant reductions in the numbers of offensive weapons – some would argue much more so than would an increase in defences.

Consideration has been given to such limitations from time to time. A fundamental problem is separating strategic from other needs. The Soviet Union would be expected to resist limitations on her air defences, in light of the large investment in them and the needs to defend against air attacks from nearby countries. The USSR has, on the other hand, been more interested than the United States in limitations on ASW, presumably because of American superior submarine hiding and hunting capabilities. Whether her view might change in

light of their reported narrowing of the US lead in submarine technology remains to be seen. Another impediment to ASW limitations would be their possible effect on the US Navy's needs for ASW to protect Western shipping.

Conclusion

The Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative programme has put the ABM Treaty under considerable stress. SDI proponents and critics, arms-control advocates and sceptics, and the US, her allies and her adversaries all have their agenda for what should be done concerning the Treaty:

- The US maintains that the Treaty should be retained in the near term, while at the same time embarking on a programme of strategic defence that is diametrically opposed to the Treaty's fundamental principles.
- The Soviet Union voices support for the Treaty, condemns the US SDI programme, and argues for even tighter constraints on ABM technology, while at the same time building a huge radar that blatantly violates one of the Treaty's key provisions.
- Champions of the ABM Treaty seek to strengthen it by banning activities that could undercut its limitations, while hoping that the Soviet Union will improve her sad record of SALT compliance.

- US allies voice concern about the effect of SDI on strategic stability and the ABM Treaty, which they believe continues to play a critical role in deterrence, while at the same time attempting to appear at least minimally supportive of the US SDI effort.

Ultimately, the fate of the SDI effort and the ABM Treaty will likely be determined by a combination of US budgetary considerations (as the SDI grows and competes for scarce resources); the technical results of research and development activities in ABM and related areas such as ASAT; Soviet activities (including force deployments, R&D, and arms-control negotiations and compliance); and the results of American Presidential elections.

In the meantime, the stresses on the ABM Treaty can best be dealt with in the same way similar stresses have been in the past: in the workmanlike atmosphere of the Standing Consultative Commission, as they arise. Future problems, including those associated with SDI, can be anticipated and even predicted, and it is important that the US government carefully prepare its position with regard to them, taking account of potential Soviet activities as well as those the US plans to undertake. But trying to deal bilaterally with such future problems in the abstract is not likely to work, particularly given the current and probable near-future state of relations between the two sides.

NOTES

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- ² Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1985*, Fourth Edition (Washington DC: USGPO, 1985).
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
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- ⁵ Department of Defense, *op cit.* in note 2, pp. 43-5.
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- ⁸ Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike and John B. Rhineland, *The Impact of US and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty* (Washington DC: Report for the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985), pp. 66-7, 75-7.
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(NEWSPAPER — EXPEDITE)

The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Where We Are After the Summit



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Arms Control

Following is an address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1985.

We stand today at the edge of what we hope can be a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, ushered in by the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We are poised not just between rounds III and IV of the Geneva talks but also, in a sense, between the first summit and the beginning of preparations for the second.

It does not detract from the worthwhile nature of the November summit to reflect on the difficult issues which continue to divide the two sides at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. It is my intent to review the positions of the two sides in the talks and to dwell for a moment on those differences which appear most intractable.

The November summit and the autumn events leading up to it represent not only the possibility for a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship but mark what we hope is the beginning of a genuine process of give-and-take in the nuclear and space arms talks. The barriers to agreement are, however, substantial.

Soviet Counterproposal

The first break in the ice came at the end of September with the tabling of a Soviet counterproposal to our March 1985 offer. While the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing, it also contains, as the President expressed it, "seeds which should be nurtured."

The Soviet offer consists of various bans and freezes, as well as limits on and reductions in offensive forces.

• "Strategic delivery systems" would be reduced by 50%, to a level of 1,250 for the U.S.S.R. and 1,680 for the United States. However, the Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would also cover, on the U.S. side,

LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2,000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. Thus, were the United States to retain equality in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, it would have to cut LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft to 430, 20% of the current Soviet level. If the United States were to retain LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at current levels, it would have to cut strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to less than half the allowed Soviet number.

• "Nuclear charges" would be sharply reduced to a level of 6,000. However, they would be defined to include the gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles carried by U.S. heavy and medium-range bombers. By counting such bomber weapons as equivalent to Soviet ballistic missile RVs, despite the massive Soviet air defenses faced by bombers and the lower readiness rate of bombers compared to ballistic missiles, the United States would be significantly penalized.

• "Charges" on any one component (that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, or bombers) would be reduced to 60% of the total, leading to a maximum level of 3,600 ICBM RVs. Although this sublimit would represent a major reduction, Soviet prompt counterforce capabilities would actually grow against the reduced number of U.S. hardened facilities.

• All cruise missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers would be banned,

Acronyms

ABM—Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ALCM—air-launched cruise missile
GLCM—ground-launched cruise missile
ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile
INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces
LRINF—longer range INF
RV—reentry vehicle
SALT—strategic arms limitation talks
SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM—sea-launched cruise missile
START—strategic arms reduction talks

terminating the U.S. ALCM, SLCM, and GLCM programs.

- All "new" nuclear delivery systems would be banned, probably precluding the U.S. D-5 and Midgetman missiles and advanced technology bomber, while allowing the Soviet SS-25, SS-X-24 and SS-NX-23 missiles and Blackjack heavy bomber.

- Research, development, and deployment of "space-strike arms" would be banned, halting the U.S. SDI program and allowing many Soviet ABM activities to continue.

In sum, despite significant reductions, the Soviet counterproposal would block U.S. strategic defense programs while allowing Soviet programs to proceed; it would halt the modernization of U.S. strategic offensive forces; and it would include in reductions U.S. systems which defend our allies and exclude Soviet systems which threaten them. The net effect would be a lopsided nuclear balance, a weakened U.S. deterrent, and decreased stability for both sides.

However, in spite of its numerous flaws, the detailed Soviet counterproposal did include the principle of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and, along with subsequent offers in Geneva, seemed to contemplate an interim INF outcome which would allow for U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. Building on such positive elements, President Reagan directed that a new U.S. proposal be advanced at the negotiations on November 1.

U.S. November Proposal

Strategic Offensive Arms. The new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in a constructive and equitable way.

- Reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs would be reduced to a limit of 4,500—about 50% below current levels.

- Reentry vehicles on ICBMs would be reduced to 3,000—about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2,500 and their proposed limit of 3,600.

- The highest overall strategic ballistic missile throw-weight of either side would be reduced by 50%, in this case, from the Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds. (By way of comparison, the United States has 4.4 million pounds.)

- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throw-weight limits, the United States would accept equal limits of 1,500

on the number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers—about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

- For reasons previously alluded to, the United States cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. But if the Soviets were to accept our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs along with our proposed limit of 1,500 ALCMs, it would result in reduction to a total of 6,000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States has proposed a reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to a limit of 1,250-1,450, or about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level. In this context, the United States could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400)—about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

For reasons similar to those applying to an RV and ALCM aggregate, the United States cannot agree to the Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached on a range of 1,250-1,450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, it would result in reduction of the total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to between 1,600 and 1,800.

The U.S. proposal also contains a ban on the development and deployment of all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and on the modernization of existing heavy missiles due to the destabilizing character of such systems. All mobile ICBMs would also be banned because of inherent verification difficulties and asymmetries in deployment opportunities between the sides. "Build-down" is the suggested means of implementing the agreed reductions.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. With respect to intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States continues to prefer total elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Thus, our previous proposals remain on the table. We have also made a new proposal as an interim step toward this goal.

- The United States would cap its own LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed as of December 31, 1985 (140 Pershing II and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number.

- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but the mix would be a subject for discussion. For example, we could agree on a mix giving the United States an approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe (based on 4 warheads per GLCM launcher, 1 warhead per Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads per SS-20 launcher).

- The Soviets would be required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (not within range of NATO Europe) by the same proportion as the reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe. The end result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits.

- Appropriate constraints would also be applied to shorter range INF missiles.

Defense and Space. With respect to defense and space, the United States has made clear that we are committed to the SDI research program, which is being carried out in compliance with the ABM Treaty. We seek a Soviet commitment to explore with us now how a cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible. We are also proposing that the Soviets join us, even now, in an "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs and provide reciprocal opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance. The United States continues to stress the critical importance of agreeing to effective means of verification so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. The importance of verification is more evident now than it was before, given Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The United States continues to stress the need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, for noncompliance is both politically corrosive and militarily hazardous. Restoring compliance is, thus, a critical step.

The Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance. One initial step is for Soviets to alter their current encryption of telemetry and revert to telemetry practices in use at the time of signing of

SALT II. This is militarily important in its own right and is also of considerable political significance.

The November Summit

You know the duration of the sessions at the November summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev: some 5 hours of one-on-one dialogue and more than 8 hours of discussion in plenary. The two leaders had an intensive and frank examination of the issues in all four agenda categories. The potential intangible benefits to be derived from the development of personal rapport between these two men is obvious, so I will confine my observations to the language relating to the nuclear and space talks which appeared in the joint statement published at the conclusion of the summit and to a discussion of issues it addresses.

We were able in the joint statement to achieve Soviet commitment to early progress in the negotiations, focusing particularly on "the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and USSR appropriately applied" and "the idea of an interim INF agreement." As I have already mentioned, these concepts are common elements in the fall proposals of the two sides, but it is not clear that the Soviets do not still link such language to termination of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI is, of course, not mentioned at all in the joint statement. The Soviets were content, in the end, to repeat the language of the joint agreement of January 8, 1985, which included the goal of preventing an arms race in space. We have

made abundantly clear to the Soviets that, in our view, SDI is consistent with this goal; we are calling for a cooperative approach to the deployment of defensive systems—as opposed to a "race"—were our research, or theirs, to demonstrate that such systems could help the world get rid of the threat of mutual destruction.

I would highlight another passage in the joint statement: "During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon." It will be useful for us during the negotiations to have this acknowledgment that effective verification measures must be devised concurrently with the resolution of other issues. It represents another modest step in our efforts to put verification concerns on a par with the reductions or limitations themselves.

One of the less encouraging aspects of the summit was Gorbachev's unwavering opposition to SDI. There were, indeed, no signs of movement from even the most untenable elements of the Soviet position on strategic defenses, such as the proposed ban on all research. The Soviets also refused to move from any of their fundamentally unacceptable positions on START and on INF. More encouraging are the growing indications that the Soviets may be willing seriously to discuss all three aspects of the negotiations concurrently when the nuclear and space arms talks resume in Geneva in January with-

out demanding a prior agreement on a ban on SDI research.

It is also noteworthy that the President seems to have made some progress in convincing Gorbachev that he is sincere in his stated intentions for SDI, even though the Soviet leader vigorously disputed the President's conclusions about its consequences.

During the next round of the nuclear and space arms talks, commencing on January 16, 1986, we will be able to judge the Soviet implementation of our mutual commitment to accelerate work. We plan to spend the opening weeks describing our November 1 proposal in greater detail. Max Kampelman¹, Senator Tower², and Mike Glitman³ will have authority to explore opportunities for give-and-take. We hope to elicit constructive responses from the Soviet side so that we may then be able to report that they are engaged in a genuine process of serious negotiation toward balanced and verifiable agreements which will improve stability and reduce the risk of war.

¹Max M. Kampelman, Head of U.S. Delegation on Arms Control Negotiations and U.S. Negotiator on Defense and Space Arms.

²John Tower, U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms.

³Maynard W. Glitman, U.S. Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms.

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STATEMENT BY RICHARD PERLE
THE FREDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG
28 JUNE 1984

*Arms
Control*

I am pleased and honored to have been invited to participate in the 5th annual security discussion of the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung. I have enjoyed and been enlightened by our previous encounters, by the vigor and candor of the discussions, by the opportunity to contribute to the sort of constructive dialogue that alone can narrow our differences and enlarge our areas of agreement.

The differences between us are many; and some of them are deep and far-reaching. But so are the points on which we agree. At the most fundamental level we share a common dedication to the great principles of individual freedom and institutional democracy, and to social justice at home and peace abroad.

Despite the differences in our analysis of the international security situation, I feel at home among social democrats. Two days ago I attended a ceremony at the White House at which the medal of freedom, my country's highest civilian honor, was posthumously awarded by President Reagan to my friend and mentor Senator Henry Jackson. It was at his side that I acquired whatever political education I now possess; and Scoop was a social democrat of the old school: an untiring defender of freedom who understood that the security of the democratic west was the foundation on which the dream of a just society might be made a reality in our time. Scoop Jackson never believed that there was any conflict between the domestic agenda of social democracy and the maintenance of a sensible, prudent security policy for the North Atlantic Alliance. And neither do I.

If what I have to say today is critical of some recent SPD pronouncements on matters of international security and Alliance policy, it is because I believe that, among friends, it is better to speak plainly than to obscure issues of importance to us all in a haze of diplomatic ambiguity. We won't get at the truth by dancing around our respective views of it; and an attempt to do so would indicate nothing so much as a lack of seriousness in what is, after all, a serious discussion with a great political party whose views I, for one, take very seriously indeed.

The strength and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is fundamental to the security of Europe and to the maintenance of a stable peace. Ours is an alliance in which the people of my country, thousands of miles away across the Atlantic, are pledged to go to war in the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, or any other NATO partner, in the event that an attack is made on a member state by the Warsaw Pact. This is a commitment that has always carried with it the possibility that the people of Kansas or California or New York or Arkansas might become victims in a nuclear conflict arising out of the defense of Germany or the Netherlands or Denmark or the United Kingdom. It is a commitment that is reinforced by the presence of 300,000 American troops in Europe. And it is one that we mean to keep.

Our pledge to the European members of the Alliance is built upon the solidarity that exists among us. It has prevailed over controversy. It has weathered the storms of those inevitable differences of policy or politics that will always arise within an alliance of free and sovereign and independent states. But it cannot hope to survive a divergence as deep and fundamental as that foreshadowed in the motions adopted by the Social Democratic Party Conference on May 19th.

I use the word "foreshadowed" advisably -- and, I hope, correctly. For one thing the May 19 resolutions are so unrealistic, so caught up in internal contradictions, and so sketchy as to give rise to the hope that, as your deliberations mature and as you reflect, not on vague and insubstantial images of reality and of NATO policy, but on the facts as they are and the world as it is, you will rejoin the consensus on which Alliance policy is founded. For another, I know, and I hope and trust that you would agree, that Party conference declarations are one thing and the burdens of government are quite another. Every President, every Prime Minister, every Chancellor has come to understand that the declarations of party platforms and conferences are marked by the excesses of opposition, and give way quickly to the realities of responsibility.

Without any sense of condescension, for I certainly intend none, it is perhaps best to regard the declarations of May 19 as a step in the process of the formulation of a Social Democratic security policy -- a process that is neither complete nor a reliable guide to the conduct in office of a Social Democratic Federal Chancellor. It is in this spirit that I hope I might be permitted to comment on the more egregious positions set out on May 19.

The declaration gets off to what can only be called a bad start by stating -- and I quote -- that "Western Europe's security interests do not coincide with those of its Atlantic partners". I should have thought that, like our own, Western Europe's security interests are the attainment of a stable peace through deterrence and defense. In all the doctrinal controversy that the Alliance has faced over the years -- forward defense versus defense in depth, preparation for a long versus a short war, the role of nuclear weapons, and the like -- there has never been a serious challenge to the coincidence of interests across the Atlantic. We both desire to deter conflict at any level. We are both committed to flexible response. We share a common desire to strengthen our conventional capabilities and to raise the nuclear threshold. We have long since decided on a strategy, expressed in MC 14/3, that has served the Alliance well and guided the structure of our armed forces. We have seen the success with which the Alliance has accommodated national differences in that common strategy.

What useful purpose is served by the statement that Western Europe's interests do not coincide with those of its Atlantic partners?

The resolution goes on to imply, quite wrongly, that it may be in the interest of the United States to conduct a proxy war with the Soviet Union on European territory. Nothing in the history of American conduct of Alliance security policy justifies this damaging and misleading implication.

The declaration continues by stating the unacceptability of "an armaments policy which, from a position of superiority, seeks to force the opponent to yield". There is nothing in that statement to which one could object -- were it intended to apply to the Soviet Union, whose policy it succinctly captures. But the clear implication is that it is the United States that is pursuing such an armaments policy. And that is a characterization of American policy that President Reagan has repeatedly rejected. It serves no useful purpose, and certainly no constructive one, to suggest yet again that American armament policy aims at military superiority -- it does not.

We are embarked on a program to modernize our strategic forces -- forces that were built in the 1950's, 1960's and the early 1970's. They are fast approaching obsolescence and must be replaced. Our strategic bomber forces include aircraft built in the 1950's. They are older than the pilots who fly them. This administration, like its predecessor, has developed, as any administration would, a program to replace those aging aircraft. We operate strategic submarines built, on the average, 15 years ago. 75% of all of the warheads on American strategic systems are on systems that are 15 years old or older; and by contrast 75% of Soviet strategic warheads are on delivery systems that have been built in the last 5 years or less.

These figures are not new to you. I have used them here before. How often must we repeat the underlying technical realities before the unfounded charge that we are seeking superiority in our strategic modernization gives way to the fact that we seek stable deterrence at the lowest level of armaments to which we can gain Soviet agreement?

The declaration goes on to accuse the United States of deviating from agreed NATO strategy, citing army doctrine and manuals and linking field tactics that make eminent good sense to a phantom concept of the United States initiating hostilities in Europe to cope better with another conflict elsewhere in the world. How often over the years did we alert our forces in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe to assure that the Soviets would not exploit a crisis somewhere else by the resort to adventure in

Europe? A document that confuses American with Soviet policy had better be sent back for re-drafting. And what is it about the air-land battle concept that is inconsistent with NATO strategy as set forth in MC 14/3? Has anyone troubled to read the documents? One can only conclude that the absence of any specific analysis is deliberate -- because no such analysis has been done. The matter is too important for shallow generalities that reflect ill-informed impressions and the absence of any substance.

The document calls for a new security concept that must "lead away from nuclear deterrence," presumably to be replaced by a "defensive conventional structure". And, under this general heading, it declares that "The structure and equipment of the Federal Armed Forces must be clearly defensive". The implication that the Federal Armed Forces are anything other than defensive in nature, mission and orientation is simply wrong; and to the extent that the public is led to believe otherwise it is politically corrosive. NATO has always been, and constantly declares itself, a defensive alliance. Your party declaration makes it sound as though you don't believe it. Yet there is not a shred of evidence to support that skepticism. Is this the same party that governed the Federal Republic for 13 years, that presented 13 defense budgets to the Bundestag, that participated in countless meetings of the Alliance where strategy and policy were developed and implemented?

With what would the party Congress have us replace nuclear deterrence -- faced, as we are, by over 30,000 Soviet nuclear weapons? We have been working hard to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons. The United States has today some 8,000 fewer nuclear warheads than we had in 1967, and only one quarter of the megatonnage we possessed in the mid-1960's. Last October the Alliance decided to reduce the number of nuclear weapons based in Europe by 1,400, in addition to a thousand withdrawn unilaterally following the two track decision of December 1979. When that withdrawal is complete we will have in the future (as we have today) the lowest level of nuclear weapons in Europe in the last 20 years. But the Soviet number is growing steadily, and now greatly exceeds the US inventory.

We have worked hard to encourage the strengthening of NATO's conventional capability. But nowhere on May 19 was there even a suggestion that the SPD party conference is willing to support the sort of defense budget that would make that hope a reality. On the contrary, there is a hopelessly unrealistic suggestion that the Alliance can achieve conventional strength, in the face of overwhelming Soviet forces, by "restructuring". To quote precisely, ". . . at most a restructuring, not an expansion of conventional armaments".

The simple fact is that you have not given your allies any reason to believe that you are serious about reducing the dependence of the Alliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces. Indeed, the May 19 declaration calls for freezing defense spending as a percentage of the Federal budget at the 1983 level. If you may have wondered about American concerns about the direction you have taken, to say nothing about the motives behind France's new fond embrace, there's your answer. Like the French we are worried about whether you are prepared to give substance to your desires. And your failure to face up to the realities of the costs of improving conventional defenses lies at the heart of our concern.

The questionable depth of your commitment to improving conventional forces puts me in mind of the Tennessee farmer who sought to explain the differences between casual involvement and a real commitment. "Its like bacon and eggs for breakfast," he said. "The hen is surely involved; but the hog is committed."

With your call for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons we can only agree emphatically. We have proposed precisely that. In so doing we have made a far reaching proposal for international inspection and verification. We hope and trust that as those negotiations take place, and they will be long and doubtless difficult, you will stand with us behind the principal that international inspection of the kind that has been proposed is essential to develop confidence in any ban on chemical weapons that may be negotiated.

Chemical weapons are not an important part of western military strategy. They are not an important element in America's own forces. But they are important and the resources devoted to them express that to Soviet tactics and Soviet strategy. Today there are some 70,000 Soviet Forces trained specifically in the application and defense against chemical weapons. There are four service academies that devote major senior training courses to that single purpose. If we are effectively to ban chemical weapons, as we hope it may be possible to do, we must be sure that the Soviet Union, in claiming it has destroyed its stocks of chemical weapons, actually does so. Because without a firm basis for verification we could never know until the war began if the Soviets were in compliance or not. And if one wishes, as we surely do, to deter the use of chemical weapons, we must be certain that they really have been eliminated on both sides.

I might say a word or two about arms control; there are arms control themes throughout the May 19 declaration. We have nothing to apologize for in the record of our effort to achieve sensible arms control agreements in negotiation with the Soviet Union. The zero option was, after all, at one time the policy of the

Social Democratic Party. It began to lose support within the SPD when it was actually put forward by the Reagan Administration. And through the whole of that negotiation, as many in this room know, we worked in the closest possible collaboration within the Alliance in developing common positions and taking them to the Soviets. But the Soviets walked out of those negotiations and I cannot see how we can hope for results if we are divided among ourselves both within the Alliance and within governments that are vital members of the Alliance. We cannot succeed with the west divided.

In the strategic arms negotiations the United States put forward a series of proposals--10 in all--that sought to identify areas in which we might negotiate further in an effort to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union. And the Soviets have walked out of that negotiation as well. And they have been very clear about the reason behind their walkout. They have walked out of both negotiations because they consider unacceptable the deployment of even a modest response to the SS20. And on that basis they have not been prepared to continue arms control negotiations. Yet there is not a word in the document of May 19 that regrets or laments or in any way reflects upon the Soviet walkout from those critical negotiations.

I cannot possibly conclude without saying a few words about an amendment that was brought before the Senate of the United States last week by Senator Sam Nunn. It was fundamentally different from an amendment that Senator Mansfield used to offer from time to time, proposing to cut in half or withdraw entirely, the American troops based in Europe. It was different in a number of respects. First, Senator Nunn, unlike Senator Mansfield, is a friend of NATO whose credentials on issues of European security are well known to all of you. He is a serious man and he had in mind a serious purpose although the Administration profoundly disagreed with his method. The Nunn Amendment will not go away because it addresses a problem that will not go away. Senator Nunn proposed that, beginning three years from now, the commitment of American forces to the defense of Europe would be reduced in number unless the Alliance as a whole did three things: first, maintain real growth in defense spending. In arguing for this point Senator Nunn repeated again and again the importance of minimizing the dependence of the Alliance on nuclear weapons and raising the nuclear threshold. And he is right in suggesting that that cannot be done without an increase in defense spending throughout the Alliance. Second, he asked that the Alliance, through its infrastructure fund, provide the money for those minimum essential facilities without which it will not be possible for the United States to meet its wartime commitment to reinforce NATO. And as you know NATO strategy is based on the assumption that urgent reinforcements will arrive and contribute to the

battle in time, and they cannot do that if the airfields and ports and the underlying logistics and other facilities do not exist. And at the level of infrastructure spending to which the Federal Republic is today prepared to agree, we cannot acquire those minimum essential facilities, and we cannot therefore expect to reinforce Europe in a timely fashion. And third, Senator Nunn asked that the Alliance live up to the commitment that the Alliance itself has adopted of providing 30 days of supply of ammunition. If you run out of ammunition within six days either the war is over or it goes nuclear. Senator Nunn is aware of that; General Rogers is aware of that; and it is an urgent priority in this Alliance to raise the level of NATO ammunition stocks. We must provide the ammunition that we need to have any reasonable prospect of maintaining our position in a conventional war. Senator Nunn's Amendment, unlike the Mansfield Amendment of a decade ago, was not an expression of isolationism. It was a call for help from the European partners of the Alliance, a call to recognize that we cannot maintain an adequate defense posture unless we do so together and unless we share the burden equitably.

What is perhaps most disturbing about the declaration of the 19th of May, is the clear tendency that emerges from almost every paragraph to set the security policy of the SPD apart from the consensus that exists today within the Alliance. I hope that as you engage in further deliberations you will recognize that no Alliance can survive without that consensus. It is for all of us to nurture, develop, expand and protect it. Thank you.

EUROPE

been told to convert to other products, such as starch from potatoes, or jam from fruit.

According to a recent report in the weekly *New Times*, the whole problem can be blamed on the West: the ordinary Russian was a pure honey-drinking soul, it said (apparently choosing to ignore the evidence to the contrary in early chronicles), until foreign merchants brought alcohol to the country in the fourteenth century and spread the vice among noblemen. The West is still part of the picture, at least for some Russians. At the Soviet dinner for President Reagan during last month's Geneva summit, the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Edward Shevardnadze, contemplating the traditional caviar and vodka, turned to his neighbour and whispered that these days top Russians had to come to Geneva to get a glass of vodka.

West Germany

Handshake too far?

FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

West Germany's opposition Social Democrats regard the *Ostpolitik*, the country's developing contacts with Eastern Europe, as their particular preserve. They have been both flattered and a little unsettled to see Mr Helmut Kohl's centre-right coalition in Bonn carry on successfully the policies set out during the chancellorships of Mr Willy Brandt and Mr Helmut Schmidt. Mr Brandt, now the Social Democrats' chairman, is therefore encouraging his party to push the *Ostpolitik* that much farther, that much faster.

On his foray to Poland on December 6-9, after earlier visits to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Mr Brandt faced an awkward choice between not offending the Polish government and expressing sympathy for the banned Solidarity trade-union movement. Mr Brandt chose to play his visit by the government's rule book. Fresh from his meeting with President Mitterrand in Paris, Poland's General Jaruzelski could feel well satisfied.

The Social Democrats see their closer relations with the communist regimes of Eastern Europe as part of a plan to bring all Europeans closer together. By that test, the great goal outweighs the value of a talk with Mr Lech Walesa. One of Mr Brandt's close associates, Mr Egon Bahr, told a forum in West Berlin on December 5th that last month's American-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva had made it all the more important for Europeans to take their security into their own hands, since Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev had really only dealt with their own security interests. The two Germanies in particular, Mr Bahr added, enjoyed a natural

"security partnership".

The first step towards Mr Bahr's partnership was presumably the agreement reached this summer between the Social Democrats and East Germany's ruling communist party on a draft for a treaty banning chemical weapons from German soil. On December 6th, the Social Democrats opened talks in East Berlin on a nuclear-weapons-free zone, which they would like to see stretch from Scandinavia to Austria. It evidently does not bother them that solemn agreements to get rid of American and Soviet chemical and nuclear weapons in Germany between a West German party out of power and a communist party powerless to act independently of the Soviet Union on such issues amount to wishful thinking.

In private, many Social Democrats recognise that, if they return to office in Bonn after the election of 1987, their vow to get rid of the American cruise and Pershing missiles being deployed under Mr Kohl's government would be modified. The party's likely candidate for chancellor, Mr Johannes Rau, stresses his attachment to the Atlantic alliance. The party's leadership has virtually disowned a working paper by its security-affairs committee which looked forward to the eventual withdrawal of American as well as Soviet troops from central Europe. Even for a party in opposition, there can be such a thing as too much *Ostpolitik*.

Arms control

Santa clause

In a pre-Christmas-holiday attempt to break the deadlock in the Vienna talks (now in their 13th year) on cutting the two sides' armies in Europe, NATO has made an offer which the Warsaw Pact should find hard to refuse, but probably will.

The two alliances have already agreed on a number of things. Both are willing to cut their ground forces in the "reduction zone" (see map) to 700,000 men apiece, with the first cuts being made by Russia and America (and the Russians making the bigger first cut). The two remaining problems—which have dogged the talks throughout—are how to establish the number of men the two sides actually have at the moment, and how to check that the promised cuts are really carried out. NATO is now offering to finesse the first of these problems.

Under its new proposal, the Russians would remove 11,500 men and the United States 5,000 within a year of signing. Each side would send inspectors to designated "exit points" in the other side's territory to watch the withdrawers withdraw. Neither side could then make any increase for three years. Each would furnish the other with the number of men it still had in the area, by unit down to division level, and each would provisionally accept the other's figures. (This would solve, at least temporarily, the problem that the Warsaw Pact has up to now said it has only 800,000 men, instead of the 975,000 that NATO claims it has.) This is virtually the same proposal as the Warsaw Pact made in February, so this much at least will presumably be accepted.

However, the NATO proposal wants further checks to make sure that the remaining units are no bigger than they are claimed to be, and that they are not surreptitiously reinforced. Each side would be entitled to inspect the other's formations 30 times a year, with only six hours' notice. Each inspection would be limited to a divisional area and be carried out by up to 16 inspectors over a period of not more than 60 hours. Besides the normal satellite photography, some aircraft reconnaissance would also be allowed.

On past performance the Russians are



the president can deny his opponents their hoped-for two-thirds majority. So he will almost certainly remain in office until 1988.

There were several reasons for AKEL's setback. Many of its supporters believed that the communist party was indeed willing to appease the Turks; they distrusted its alliance with the conservatives; and, since Cyprus had prospered under Mr Kyprianou, they did not want to rock the economic boat. The voters may also have been influenced by a forceful intervention from Greece's prime minister, Mr Andreas Papandreu. Two days before the voting, he had declared that "we shall consider that Greece's national interest is being harmed" if the Greek Cypriots were to agree that Turkey should be a co-guarantor of a Cyprus settlement, and that its troops need not leave the island until a loose new confederal system of government had been set up. That was taken as a thinly veiled attack on AKEL and the conservatives.

The main casualty of the election, apart from the communists, may be the hope of resuming negotiations between Cyprus's two communities in the near future. On December 10th Mr Rauf Denktaş, the president of the Turkish Cypriot part of the island, announced a postponement of talks between his officials and United Nations ones that were to have been held this week. He said he would now be "more careful than ever" about offering concessions to the Greek Cypriots; and he withdrew the offer he had made to let some of them return to the Turkish-occupied north of the island as part of a general settlement.

Soviet Union

No place for the drinking classes

FROM OUR MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT

Once upon a time people in the Soviet Union used to comfort themselves through the long, cold winter with the thought that in this land of chronic shortages at least the vodka never ran out. Yet this month many Muscovites heaved a sigh of relief when the city's few surviving liquor stores opened their doors as usual: there had been a rumour that December was to be declared a dry month.

Nobody would have taken such an idea seriously until Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign began in June. Even then, sceptics confidently wrote it off as just another in a long line of half-hearted efforts by Russia's rulers, since the eighteenth century, to rid the country of its oldest scourge. But Mr Gorbachev's



The collapse of drink in Russia

teetotal team means business.

Few people expect him to succeed in breaking a habit of centuries in just a few months. Yet the new restrictions are severe. Raising the age at which Russians can legally buy alcohol from 18 to 21 was aimed at kicking the drinking habit before it starts: Soviet reports show that most of those who end up worse for alcohol wear in later life start drinking in their teens. A ban on the sale of alcohol before 2pm and a tough police crackdown have all but cleared Moscow's streets of drunks. Those desperate for a legal bottle to drink at home must queue for anything up to three hours in the cold outside the city's few remaining liquor outlets. And there has been a torrent of anti-drink publicity; a new temperance monthly is to be launched on January 1st.

Mr Gorbachev is a firm believer in the power of example. Gone are the toasts in vodka at official occasions. From the Kremlin downwards the raised glasses are now filled with lemonade or mineral water. Mr Gorbachev will probably be pleased to hear that Russians have changed his title of *generalny sekretar* (general secretary) to *mineralny sekretar*. Officials in the provinces, out to impress their new boss, are proclaiming dry months in their towns (although this has been known to boost travel to neighbouring towns where a legal drink can still be had).

The restrictions are having some effect. There is reported to have been a drop in the rate of serious crime and of absenteeism in industry, both of which have in the past been blamed partly on drunkenness.

It is hoped that in future there will also be a drop in the high divorce rate in the Soviet Union, since many marriages fall victim to heavy drinking by one partner or the other, or both. Some press reports claim that as much as a third of family income in the Soviet Union used to go on drink.

But making vodka harder to get may in the long run only drive hardened drinkers to desperate measures. Police have already unearthed a string of illegal alcohol rackets. Some people will drink anything: illicit home brew, known as *samogon*, appears to be enjoying a boom; Moscow shops have had to stop morning sales of eau de cologne to men; and the demand for perfumes and industrial alcohol has risen. Not surprisingly, the incidence of alcohol poisoning, already high in the Soviet Union, has increased sharply. In the worst recent case, six Muscovites died after drinking methanol on the eve of last month's Revolution Day holiday. According to the government newspaper, *Izvestia*, the police had to be called out to control demented methanol drunks in suburban Moscow hospitals.

Parts of the economy are also feeling the strain. The tax on vodka sales used to be a prime source of government revenue, and price rises announced this autumn have not made up for the shortfall. But it is the grape-growing southern regions of the country that are suffering most. Farmers complain bitterly that their crops cannot be sold, as the state has closed many wineries and distilleries. So far nearly 650 alcohol-making factories have

US Nuclear Testing Policy

May 1986

Background: During the past three decades, the US has sought agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that can strengthen the security of all countries. In 1963, the US and Soviet Union signed and ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, as well as underground if the explosion would result in the presence of radiation debris beyond the boundaries of the testing nation. In 1974, they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which bans underground nuclear weapon tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. Then, in 1976, they signed the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), which, among other things, sets a 150-kiloton limit on nonweapon nuclear explosions. Neither side has ratified the TTBT or PNET, but each has stated that it would respect the 150-kiloton limit. In addition, from 1977 to 1980, the US conducted unsuccessful negotiations with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban (CTB). The US is discussing verification-related issues at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Administration initiatives on TTBT and PNET: The US believes the highest priority for nuclear testing limitations is effective verification of agreements--the unratified TTBT and PNET--and the resolution of our compliance concerns. The Soviet record of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements increases those concerns. President Reagan's December 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements noted that the Soviets have repeatedly and unambiguously violated the LTBT and on several occasions probably have violated the 150-kiloton TTBT limit. The President's report also points out that the Soviets would derive military advantages from testing substantially above the 150-kiloton limit. Underscoring the inadequacy of the monitoring regime are the questions expressed officially by the Soviet Union concerning the yields of certain US tests, all of which have been below the 150-kiloton threshold.

In an effort to increase mutual confidence in compliance with existing limitations, the US has taken numerous initiatives:

- On three separate occasions in 1983, the US attempted unsuccessfully to discuss essential verification improvements with the Soviet Union;
- In September 1984, President Reagan proposed an exchange of Soviet and US experts to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests at each country's testing sites. The Soviets rejected this proposal.
- In July 1985, President Reagan invited Soviet experts to observe a US nuclear test in Nevada and to bring with them any instruments they deemed necessary to measure test yield. The Soviets declined the invitation.
- In December 1985, President Reagan proposed to General Secretary Gorbachev that US and Soviet experts meet in February 1986 to

discuss our respective verification approaches and to take the first tangible steps to resolve this issue. The Soviets did not respond.

- President Reagan's most recent initiative, in March 1986, was another attempt to build confidence and cooperation on nuclear testing limitations. The President described for the General Secretary a technical method, known as CORRTEX, that we believe is the most accurate and least intrusive means of directly calculating the yield of nuclear explosions.

The President also proposed that Soviet experts visit our Nevada test site in April to discuss verification methods, examine the CORRTEX system more closely, and monitor a planned US nuclear weapon test. The President stated that if the US and Soviet Union could agree on an effective verification system incorporating CORRTEX, the US would be prepared to move forward on ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

Administration policy: This Administration, like its predecessors, believes that testing limitations must be effectively verifiable and consistent with our security interests.

While we are investigating the technologies that could eventually make us less dependent on nuclear weapons for our security, nuclear weapons will remain a key element of our deterrent. Thus, where both the US and our allies rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression, a moderate level of testing will continue to be required. A carefully structured testing program--as permitted by existing agreements--assures that our weapons are safe, reliable, and effective. It also improves our capability to modernize our systems, needed to balance the continued Soviet nuclear arms buildup.

The US has learned from hard experience that moratoriums such as those proposed by the Soviets cannot be counted on to lead to increased security. They are not acceptable substitutes for negotiated, verifiable agreements, which should focus now on reducing arms levels.

Comprehensive test ban: A CTB remains a long-term US objective. It must be considered in the context of a time when we are less dependent on nuclear deterrence than we are now to ensure international security and after we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and a greater balance in conventional forces. At present, a CTB would not be effectively verifiable, would be militarily advantageous to the Soviet Union, and would not increase Western and international security. For these reasons, the US has not agreed to return at this time to the CTB negotiations.

Soviet response: The President's initiatives on TTBT and PNET verification and compliance provide an opportunity for the Soviets to demonstrate whether they are serious about nuclear testing limitations. Through April 1986 the Soviet Union has not responded constructively to any of our initiatives. If the Soviet Union wants to make real progress on this question, President Reagan's longstanding proposal that our experts meet should be accepted. If Moscow responds positively to our offers, we can move forward in this important arms control area.

U.S. Agrees To Meeting On SALT II

Decision Marks Effort To Respond Positively To Soviet Proposals

By David Hoffman and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Reagan informed the Soviet Union yesterday that the administration has agreed to Moscow's request for a meeting in Geneva to discuss his decision to stop observing the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty, White House officials said.

The decision marked a shift from the administration's initial reaction to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Standing Consultative Commission, a joint U.S.-Soviet group established in 1972 to monitor the first SALT agreement. Top administration officials have been sharply critical of the commission, and at first talked about rejecting the Soviet proposal as a propaganda move.

The White House decision to attend the meeting is the latest in a series of attempts by the administration to send positive signals to Moscow concerning arms control and American desires for a second summit meeting between the president and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Recently, for example, Reagan publicly described the latest Soviet arms control proposal as "the beginning of a serious effort" toward negotiations.

A White House official said Reagan informed the Soviets that the United States does not want the meeting to become a vehicle for publicizing Moscow's criticism of Reagan's May 27 decision on SALT II. The official said the U.S. role in a meeting, which the Soviets want to begin next week, would be to listen to Soviet questions about the SALT decision.

In a move that brought sharp criticism from Congress and the

See MEETING, A13, Col. 5



NEZAR HINDAWI
...accused of planting bomb.

British Cite Syria in Case Of El Al Bomb

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, July 14—British authorities today directly implicated the Syrian government for the first time in the attempt three months ago to plant concealed explosives aboard an Israeli airliner leaving here for Tel Aviv with nearly 400 aboard.

A 31-year-old Palestinian, charged with trying to place the bomb aboard the El Al flight last April, was "acting on instructions, apparently from the Syrian government," a British prosecutor alleged today.

The prosecution said that Nezar Hindawi had admitted responsibility for the unsuccessful bombing attempt. It said that after planting the bomb in the suitcase of his unsuspecting girlfriend who was due to board the flight, Hindawi had followed instructions to go to the Syrian Embassy in London, where he met with Ambassador Loutof Haydar.

Today's proceedings, a preliminary hearing for the prosecution to demonstrate that sufficient grounds exist to bring the case to trial, marked the first time British authorities have accused Syria publicly of complicity in the April 15 incident.

NASA Sees New Delay For Shuttle

Agency Officials Cite Redesign Problems in Solid Rocket Booster

By Kathy Sawyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

NASA officials yesterday announced that the next shuttle launch will be delayed another six months, at least until early 1988, because of unexpected difficulties with the redesign of the flawed solid rocket booster that caused the Challenger disaster.

The announcement, which could worsen the backlog of commercial, scientific and military payloads and mean more layoffs in the space program, came in a report to President Reagan yesterday outlining how the agency plans to implement the Rogers Commission's recommendations for overhauling the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and fixing booster problems.

Along with the report, according to a White House source, NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher handed the president a personal appeal for his support in building a fourth orbiter to replace Challenger, which disintegrated Jan. 28, killing its crew of seven. The White House has been unable to resolve the divisive question of how to pay for the proposed \$2.8 billion spacecraft.

White House officials have said the decision is at least two weeks off.

At a news conference yesterday after he delivered the report, Fletcher said, "There is no guarantee when it's all done that there will be a fourth orbiter, because financing is a real problem."

Until yesterday, NASA officials had held to a target date of July 1987 for the next shuttle launch, although outside experts and some inside NASA had said that was overly optimistic.

"I guess we're all disappointed" about the schedule slip, Fletcher said, adding that the agency is being



HARRY MORRIS—THE WASHINGTON POST
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the Pentagon, however, re moderate officials be- United States should take int the most recent Soviet on that both parties agree e to the 1972 Antiballistic (ABM) Treaty for 15 to 20 me strategists believe that ed States could safely observe the treaty for five ars, since SDI research is ough advanced to permit ent during that time period

Reagan and his top advis- scribed in news accounts ling over how to respond to Gorbachev's most reer and the latest Soviet r, interagency specialists evels are still arguing over ng of the technical details v's proposals.

urrent situation suggests romide about U.S.-Soviet r, that the toughest nego- ke place not between the in Geneva but in Wash- ng the various U.S. gov- ncies and officials.

For example, State and Defense Department officials do not even agree on the extent to which the recent Moscow offer represents concessions.

The Soviets dropped their earlier insistence that U.S. nuclear-capable fighter-bombers in Europe be included in the total tally of strategic forces. Some officials considered that a concession. However, Pentagon strategists argue that the new Soviet proposal is seriously flawed because it would freeze the number of bombers and prohibit their movement to other bases, and may prevent modernization.

Another aspect of the Soviet offer that some see as a concession is Moscow's apparent willingness to permit SDI research, in conjunction with a pledge by Washington to continue adhering to the ABM Treaty.

So-called hard-line strategists, however, argue that U.S. agreement to such a provision would undercut SDI funding on Capitol Hill. Also, there are objections to proposed Soviet restrictions on testing and development of SDI weapons.

In addition, the latest Soviet offer calls for a ban on antisatellite weapons and any space-based system that could hit targets on Earth. The Reagan administration has consistently opposed an antisatellite ban and one of the leading SDI systems now under study envisions destroying enemy missiles with mirrors which would reflect laser beams toward Earth.

U.S. Agrees to SALT II Meeting

MEETING, From A1

allies, Reagan decided that the United States would no longer be bound by the limits in the treaty—which was signed in 1979 but never ratified by the Senate—but would wait until later this year to determine whether the United States actually surpasses the limits.

Reagan said his action was based on Soviet violations of the treaty and indicated he would review Soviet actions in Geneva, and any change in Moscow's compliance practices, before deciding to actually exceed the treaty limits when the 131st B52 bomber is outfitted with air-launched cruise missiles, now scheduled for mid-November.

White House officials said the Soviets were notified through diplomatic channels yesterday of Reagan's acceptance. Separately, the president is preparing a letter to Gorbachev responding to the latest Soviet arms control proposals.

The Soviets sought the meeting on SALT II to get a clarification of Reagan's plans, in part because the U.S. decision on whether to break through the treaty limits in November or December appears to coincide with the time frame for a possible summit meeting.

It could not be learned yesterday whether U.S. officials intend to use the Geneva meeting to repeat administration charges that the Soviets already are in violation of the SALT agreement. A White House official said, "We have to see what they are coming up with first."

Deputy White House press secretary Edward P. Djerejian said yesterday that Reagan already has discussed his SALT II decision in public and private, and is willing to talk about it "obviously with the Soviets also." But Djerejian, in a briefing for reporters, refused to disclose the nature of Reagan's re-

sponse to Moscow, saying the commission meetings are held in "strict confidentiality . . . even the fact that a meeting at times takes place is kept in confidence."

One explanation for Reagan's shift on the Geneva meeting is congressional debate over the SALT II decision and a Senate vote expected later this month on a nonbinding resolution calling on the president to reverse it. The resolution has bipartisan support from 48 senators, and backers predicted that if Reagan had turned down the Geneva meeting, the resolution would almost certainly get approval.

Top Reagan administration arms control policy-makers have looked with contempt in the past at this commission, saying it was ineffectual at resolving what Reagan alleges are serious Soviet violations of the treaty. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger called for the panel to be abolished in a report to Reagan before last November's summit with Gorbachev.

However, officials yesterday cited an instance before Reagan came to office when a special session of the commission called by the United States was used to get Moscow's explanation for several alleged violations. In 1983, the Soviets turned down a Reagan administration request for a special session to discuss violations.

Gen. Richard H. Ellis, former commander of the Strategic Air Command and the U.S. representative to the commission, has repeatedly been criticized by top Pentagon officials for attempting to use the panel to resolve U.S. charges of Soviet violations without specific instructions from Washington.

Ellis is scheduled Tuesday to brief a group of senators who monitor the Geneva arms talks on Reagan's decision to allow U.S. representatives at the meeting.

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Some Chernobyl Women Are Seeking Abortions, Others Refuse to Return

United Press International

MOSCOW, July 14—Some pregnant women caught in the fallout of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster have requested abortions, and others are refusing to return to their homes for fear of losing their babies, the Pravda Ukraine newspaper said yesterday.

The paper said some pregnant women have refused to return from evacuation camps although officials have told some of the 100,000

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'Star Wars' Debate

Question Is Whether to Accept Limits On Research as Part of a Soviet Deal

NEW YORK TIMES
3 July 1986
Pg. 8

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2 — Recent Soviet initiatives at the Geneva arms talks have stirred a debate within the Reagan Administration over whether it is prepared to accept limits on its antimissile research program in return for cuts in strategic arms.

Up to now, the United States has not confronted such a decision. Previously the Soviet Union did not make an offer that is so attractive that the United States feels compelled to rethink its position on the space-based missile defense program. The program is known officially as the Strategic Defense Initiative and popularly as "Star Wars."

When the Soviet Union first said last year that it would agree to deep reductions in strategic weapons, as the Americans had proposed, it asked for too much in return: a total ban on all antimissile research. Neither the Administration nor most of its critics were prepared to abandon research.

Stumbling Blocks Removed

But with the recent Soviet proposals, the situation may be starting to change, officials say.

To be sure, they note that the Soviet proposals are not acceptable in their entirety. The offer, which pertains to strategic or long-range weapons, is noteworthy because it removes stumbling blocks and hints at the possibility of further concessions.

"There are no breakthroughs," an official said of the Soviet proposals. "But they have the look and smell of opening moves in a real negotiation."

It is the Soviet change on "Star Wars" research that has generated the most interest, and debate.

The Russians, in a slight shift, would allow some research under the terms of an arms treaty, and have suggested that there could be an even greater shift on tolerating such research.

At the same time, to the consternation of the United States, the Soviet Union is now proposing somewhat higher limits on strategic arms. But the Soviet proposal also contains other shifts on strategic systems that are being welcomed by the Americans.

Concessions on Cruise Missiles

It drops its insistence, for example, that all long-range air-launched cruise missiles be banned. And it says that sea-launched cruise missiles could be permitted on submarines.

The Soviet Union has also dropped its requirement that so-called forward-based systems in Europe, meaning American fighter-bombers based in Western Europe and on carriers, be reduced as part of a treaty. But Moscow

wants a ceiling on these forces.

The issue of antimissile research has been among the most vexing for the arms negotiators.

Historically, the development of defenses by one side has usually encouraged the other side to maintain a large arsenal of offensive arms to overcome the defenses. When the Soviet Union improved its air defenses, for example, the United States responded with plans for two new bombers and the deployment of thousands of cruise missiles.

But now it is the United States that wants to reduce offensive arms and improve defenses. And to allow for the development of the new space-based defenses, the Americans have been talking of the possibility of seeking amendments to the antiballistic missile treaty of 1972 or of moving to a looser interpretation of its provisions.

Two Goals Called Incompatible

The Soviet Union contends that the two goals are not compatible.

Its first offer to reduce offensive arms and ban research on space-based defenses called for a reduction in the overall total arsenal of warheads and bombs to 6,000, including a limit of 3,600 warheads on land-based missiles.

The limit of 3,600 was of interest to the United States because it suggested that Moscow was prepared to cut its force of 308 SS-18 land-based missiles.

The SS-18 is counted as having 10 warheads. While the Soviet Union would not necessarily be compelled to reduce its SS-18 force, such a cut would be required if it wanted to deploy other land-based missiles.

However, the Soviet demand for a ban on antimissile research made the entire package unacceptable to the United States.

In the latest offer, the Soviet Union is proposing less extensive reductions, to 8,000 warheads and bombs, including a limit of 4,800 warheads on land-based missiles.

ABM Pledge Is at Issue

In return, Moscow is asking for a pledge not to withdraw from the ABM treaty of 1972 for 15 to 20 more years, in an evident effort to prevent the United States from developing new types of missile defenses.

In addition, Soviet officials have proposed that the terms of the treaty be interpreted in a strict way. But the Russians would allow some laboratory research as opposed to their earlier position that all research pertaining to "Star Wars" be banned.

American officials say that the proposed Soviet interpretations are more limiting than the strictest American interpretations and would block testing of antimissile components in space.

But they also note that Soviet officials have indicated in Geneva that the matter of how exactly the treaty terms is to be interpreted is negotiable.

American officials offer various interpretations of the meaning of the Soviet concessions. One view is that the Russians are signaling that they will tolerate some antimissile research if the United States takes steps to strengthen the ABM treaty.

Some American officials propose doing exactly that.

"There is a general recognition among realists that something has to be done on the defensive side," one official said.

These officials generally dismiss the prospect that the United States would agree to sharp limitations on antimissile research. But they say the problem may be finessed, perhaps by proposing temporary measures that would strengthen the ABM treaty but would expire before critical decisions on the "Star Wars" program are made five or more years from now.

Officials who see promise in the Soviet offer express unhappiness with the proposed new limit on land-based missile warheads, raised by the Russians from 3,600 to 4,800, and say that it will have to be negotiated downward.

The officials believe that the raising of the limit in the latest proposal reflects resistance by the Soviet military to deep cuts in ICBM warheads. According to this view, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in the previous Soviet proposal, was able to win military concurrence for deeper cuts only by asking for a total ban on "Star Wars" research.

Other American officials are skeptical. They see the revised Soviet proposal simply as another way of trying to block the Americans' space-based defense program. These officials contend that the program is of such potential importance that the United States should do nothing to strengthen the ABM treaty, even if it means forgoing an opportunity for arms reduction.

They also say that slowing down the research program for the sake of an arms agreement could hurt its political momentum.

Officials say that the United States may respond to the Soviet proposal through diplomatic channels before the beginning of the next negotiating round in Geneva in September. Two critical issues are whether the United States will suggest any measures to strengthen the ABM treaty and whether the United States will insist on a deeper cut in offensive arms.

SEE CHART...Pg. 6

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CHART... from Pg. 5

Bargaining Over Arms: How Kremlin and White House Proposals Compare


The Soviet Union has recently made some significant shifts in its position at the Geneva arms talks. Administration officials say that the Soviet offers still cannot be accepted in their entirety, but that they may pave the way for progress in the talks. Some previous offers, such as the U.S. offer on medium-range forces and the Soviet offer on strategic forces and the Strategic Defense Initiative, remain on the negotiating table as an alternative approach. Here is how the latest Soviet offers compare with previous proposals and with past and present ones from the United States.

	Soviet positions		U.S. positions	
	Latest	Previous	Latest	Previous
Strategic weapons Total number of missile launchers and bombers	1,600 for each side (but would also freeze U.S. medium-range forces in Europe and fighter-bombers on aircraft carriers close to the Soviet Union)	U.S.: 1,660 (would count U.S. medium-range forces in Europe and fighter-bombers on aircraft carriers close to the Soviet Union), Soviet: 1,250	Breaks them down as indicated below	Breaks them down as indicated below
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's)	Included in totals for all missiles and bombers	Same	1,250-1,450 for each side	1,250 for each side
Long-range bombers	Included in totals for all missiles and bombers	Same	350 for each side, including Soviet Backfires	400 for each side, including Backfires
All missiles and bomber warheads	8,000 for each side	8,000 for each side	Broken down as indicated below	Same
ICBM and SLBM warheads	Included in total for all warheads and bombs	Same	4,500 for each side	5,000 for each side
Long-range air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's and SLCM's)	Limits long-range ALCM's and SLCM's on submarines. Bans long-range cruise missiles on ships.	Bans all long-range ALCM's and SLCM's	1,500 ALCM's for each side. Does not address SLCM's	Implicit limit of 8,000 ALCM's for each side. Does not address SLCM's
Limits on ICBM warheads	4,800 for each side	3,800 for each side	3,000 for each side	2,500 for each side
Missile throw weight	No proposal; reductions would follow from overall cuts	Same	Reduces Soviet throw-weight by 50 percent, to about 3,000 tons for each side	About 2,000 tons for each side
New systems	Bans all new types of ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers with cutoff dates to be negotiated	Same	Bans all new "heavy" ICBM's (modernized Soviet SS-18) and mobile missiles (modernized Soviet SS-24, SS-25 and U.S. Midgetman)	Bans all new "heavy" ICBM's (such as Soviet SS-18)
Medium-range forces	Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, freezes Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia. British and French must agree to limit their missiles to current levels. U.S. must agree not to transfer missiles to "third parties" such as Britain. Does not limit short-range missiles.	Equal number of warheads for U.S., British and French forces. No increase in Asian based SS-20's if "strategic situation" unchanged. Same on short-range missiles. U.S. allowed 100 to 120 ground-launched cruise missiles, but Pershing 2 missiles banned.	A 3-part plan calling for eventual elimination of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in three years. Short-range systems would be restricted. British and French systems excluded.	A limit of 140 on U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Total number of warheads would be between 420 and 450 for each side. Proportional reductions of Soviet missiles in Asia.
Strategic Defense Initiative	Each side to pledge not to withdraw from ABM treaty for period of 15 to 20 years. Some anti-missile research can be conducted in laboratory. Proposes a strict interpretation of ABM treaty terms in order to block significant testing of ABM systems in space. Ban on anti-satellite weapons	A ban on all "Star Wars" research, including that in laboratory.	Rejects notion that progress on reducing arms should be contingent on limits on anti-missile research. Seeks to discuss a cooperative transition to a world in which both sides have anti-missile defenses	Same

Source: Arms Control Association, Reagan Administration officials and Soviet and American Government statements.

PIEDMONT

The Third-Largest Airline in New York



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THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 15, 1986

TALK

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A Tug of War Erupts on Missile Treaty Data

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 14 — In recent months, key senators and Reagan Administration officials have been engaged in a simmering dispute over the Administration's new interpretation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty.

Now that debate may be reaching the boiling point.

Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and other senators have questioned the validity of the new interpretation, which is looser than the standard interpretation of the treaty and thus would allow more development and testing of anti-missile systems for President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as "Star Wars."

Mr. Nunn and other senators have asked the Administration to give the Senate, which approved the treaty back in 1972, access to the detailed record of what actually went on in the treaty negotiations with Soviet officials so legislators can decide for themselves if the Administration's new interpretation is valid.

So far, the Administration has refused this request with assertions of executive privilege.

And that has aggravated concerns that senatorial prerogatives are being infringed on.

Funds May Be Threatened

The debate is more than theoretical. Senator Nunn has prepared a meas-

Richard N. Perle, an assistant Defense Secretary, in fact has urged the Administration to do precisely that. He recently said he expected the Administration to shift to the looser interpretation in "the lifetime of this Administration."

All this has caused considerable consternation in the Senate, which approved the 1972 treaty with the understanding that it was sharply restrictive in limiting anti-missile research.

The concern of some is that by

on the issue. Some in the Senate say that access is being refused not out of legal concern but because the negotiating record does not in fact support the Administration's new interpretation.

One focus of Congressional interest is a classified study of the negotiating record that was carried out for the Pentagon by experts from the System Planning Corporation, a private consulting concern. One author of that study, Sidney N. Greybeal, was involved in the actual negotiations as a member of the American delegation.

A Government expert who has read the System Planning Corporation report said it had no firm conclusions but contained "considerable evidence to support the traditional and strict interpretation" of the ABM treaty. He said that in making its case for a new interpretation, the Administration has selectively picked some statements by Soviet negotiators and has overlooked other statements that were made in the course of the complex negotiations.

Compromise Ideas Rejected

But the Administration has refused to send a copy of the study to the Senate or to allow the Senate direct access to the negotiating record.

In addition to Senator Nunn, other members of the Armed Services Committee who have been involved in the issue include Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Carl



The Senate has been refused access to the detailed record.

testing and development of future exotic anti-missile systems that are "based on other physical principles." Such systems would include lasers and particle beam weapons, which are part of the "Star Wars" research program.

This new interpretation did not sit

changing its interpretation without consulting the Senate, the Administration has usurped the Senate's authority to approve treaties.

Senator Nunn has contested the Administration's contention that the treaty record is protected by executive privilege.

On Casey's Phones

What are those special phones on officials' desks connected to? Where, especially, does the red phone ring?

Ralph Nader, the consumer activist, thinks he has at least one answer, and it concerns a telephone that is supposed to be on the desk of William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence.

The passage occurs in "The Big Boys: Power and Position in American Business," by Mr. Nader and William Taylor, which is being published by Pantheon. It quotes William G. McGowan, chairman of MCI Communications Corporation, as saying: "You know that red phone in Casey's office? That's not to the President. That's to his broker."

Mr. Nader found that an appropriate connection, since some questions were once raised concerning Mr. Casey's stock market transactions. The questions, however, were later resolved in Mr. Casey's favor.

Asked for comment on Mr. Nader's description of Mr. McGowan's statement, a spokesman for the Central In-



On Casey's Phones


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Drawings by Tom Bloom

telligence Agency, Sharon Foster, looked into the matter and responded, "There is no red phone on Mr. Casey's desk, and there's no phone — of any color — to his broker."

In an unrelated matter, Mr. Nader said recently that he had received many home-remedy suggestions ever since word got out that he is suffering from a pinched facial nerve, a condition known as Bell's palsy.

Mr. Nader stressed that the condition was a temporary one and that he hoped for rapid improvement.

Meantime, when he appears on television news programs, it seems that as much attention is drawn to what he says as to his appearance, since the pinched nerve has led to a puffy-looking jaw and a need for Mr. Nader to wear dark glasses.

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

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So far, the Administration has refused this request with assertions of executive privilege.

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Funds May Be Threatened


The debate is more than theoretical.

Senator Nunn has prepared a measure that would block the spending of money appropriated for the Star Wars project if the Administration refuses to let the Senate have access to the negotiating record and some important studies of that record that the Pentagon has sponsored. And the Georgia Democrat may propose the measure soon as an amendment to legislation that approves military spending plans for the fiscal year 1987, which begins Oct. 1.

The basis for the current confrontation was laid last year when officials in the Defense Department and the State Department reviewed the treaty and the complex negotiating record that led up to it.

After these reviews were completed, the White House and other Administration officials declared that the anti-ballistic missile treaty, in fact, allowed more anti-missile research than was previously thought.

Specifically, the Administration argued that, in drafting the treaty, the Soviet and American negotiators had not worked out tight limits on the



The Senate has been refused access to the detailed record.

testing and development of future exotic anti-missile systems that are "based on other physical principles." Such systems would include lasers and particle beam weapons, which are part of the "Star Wars" research program.

This new interpretation did not sit well with the original United States negotiators of the treaty, who say that the treaty has all along set such tight limits on testing and development.

Gerard C. Smith, the chief United States negotiator on the treaty, said that adopting the new interpretation would seriously undermine the agreement and turn it into "a dead letter." And some supporters of the treaty complained that by offering the new interpretation, some Administration officials were trying to dilute the meaning of the treaty so that it could open the door for an expanded "Star Wars" program.

In response to this criticism, the Administration beat a partial retreat and said it would continue to abide by the original, more restrictive interpretation for practical purposes for the time being. But that did not put the issue to rest.

This is because the Administration has also insisted that the new, looser interpretation is legally justified and has reserved the right to adopt that interpretation in the future.

Richard N. Perle, an assistant Defense Secretary, in fact has urged the Administration to do precisely that. He recently said he expected the Administration to shift to the looser interpretation in "the lifetime of this Administration."

All this has caused considerable consternation in the Senate, which approved the 1972 treaty with the understanding that it was sharply restrictive in limiting anti-missile research. The concern of some is that by

changing its interpretation without consulting the Senate, the Administration has usurped the Senate's authority to approve treaties.

Senator Nunn has contested the Administration's contention that the treaty record is protected by executive privilege. And he has cited a 1979 study by the Library of Congress to support his point.

The study concluded that there is no absolute answer as to whether the Senate is entitled to have access to the notes and internal negotiating record for a treaty. But it went on to add that the President has generally provided "confidential information concerning the development" of an agreement when asked by the Senate.

Senate experts also say that the Reagan Administration's position on the matter of access appears to be inconsistent. While the Administration has refused to give the Senate access to the record for the 14-year-old ABM treaty, it has allowed Senate observers access to the current talks with the Russians in Geneva on a new arms treaty.

Abraham D. Sofaer, the State Department's legal adviser, who has been deeply involved in the issue, declined to discuss the justification for denying the Senate access to the record on the ABM treaty. And a State Department spokesman said that agency would have no comment

on the issue.

Some in the Senate say that access is being refused not out of legal concern but because the negotiating record does not in fact support the Administration's new interpretation.

One focus of Congressional interest is a classified study of the negotiating record that was carried out for the Pentagon by experts from the System Planning Corporation, a private consulting concern. One author of that study, Sidney N. Greybeal, was involved in the actual negotiations as a member of the American delegation.

A Government expert who has read the System Planning Corporation report said it had no firm conclusions but contained "considerable evidence to support the traditional and strict interpretation" of the ABM treaty. He said that in making its case for a new interpretation, the Administration has selectively picked some statements by Soviet negotiators and has overlooked other statements that were made in the course of the complex negotiations.

Compromise Ideas Rejected

But the Administration has refused to send a copy of the study to the Senate or to allow the Senate direct access to the negotiating record.

In addition to Senator Nunn, other members of the Armed Services Committee who have been involved in the issue include Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Carl Levin of Michigan and Gary Hart of Colorado, all Democrats, and William S. Cohen of Maine, a Republican. Others who are not members of the committee, including Senator Albert Gore Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, have also questioned the Administration's new interpretation.

Congressional officials say that various compromises have been floated by the Administration and that Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican chairman of the committee, has been involved in trying to broker a resolution of the differences between the Administration and members of his committee.

But all proposals for compromise broached so far would limit the number of senators who could see the record and would restrict what they could see.

In a June 18 letter to Senator Goldwater, Senator Nunn rejected the suggested compromises.

Said Mr. Nunn, "As long as the Administration insists on deciding what parts of the record we can and cannot see, we cannot reach an independent and objective judgment as to the validity of its recent reinterpretation."

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
As a leader in your state, you can make a tremendous difference in forcing the politicians in Washington to build an anti-missile defense which can protect all Americans from the threat of nuclear annihilation. The goal of the Conservative Action Foundation in launching the Coalition (CANA) is to coordinate a national grass-roots effort to make a "Peace Shield" a reality.

This cannot be accomplished from Washington. That is why the CANA program is providing local leaders such as yourself with the tools necessary to generate pro-Space Shield resolutions and referendums. But we need you to make the difference. We are merely coordinators for this national campaign. Should you choose to become involved in this important program, be assured that CAF's national headquarters will do everything in its power to make your work as effective as possible.

CAF will be publicizing your activities on a national level--and in particular we will be notifying those SDI-related industries in your state on your efforts on behalf of the Space Shield. In publicizing your important contribution, the CAF national office will place your efforts where they properly belong--in the forefront. It is important to us that you not only approve of our program, but also receive the publicity your commitment deserves. Our staff will work to tailor all publicity to your individual needs.

Working together, we can bring the day closer when America and her people can cast aside the nuclear nightmare which has plagued us for decades. We thank you for joining the CANA effort to build for humanity's future.

With Warmest Personal Regards,



Lee Bellinger
President

Lee Bellinger
President

Jeffrey L. Pandin
Vice-President

Mark Smith
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I. Introduction

The purpose of this manual is to provide the basis for a program of legislative and citizen action at the state level to support the drive for an anti-nuclear space defense. This document contains the arguments and talking points in favor of such a concept, and an outline of the suggested legislative strategy.

We anticipate that this manual will be used by experienced state legislators and their staffs, so we have not gone into great parliamentary detail. The reader will know more about these specifics and how they apply directly to the situation in his state than we ever could.

Rather, we have attempted to convey a sense of the overall vision of space defense and our strategy for promoting it to the American people. Our belief is that just as the nuclear freeze was the product of local and state initiative, support for a peace shield must come from there as well. As a part of the CANA initiative, you will be a key leader in cultivating and generating that grassroots support.

II. The Problem

Regardless of political persuasion or ideology, all Americans, indeed all humanity, are deeply concerned with the threat of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail. As recent events in Chernobyl proved, nuclear fallout respects no boundaries.

In the event of a nuclear war, the destruction will not be limited to guilty parties. All mankind will suffer. There is no neutrality in a nuclear war, and there are no winners.

Today trillions of tons of explosive power can be launched with one order from the Kremlin, and the only choice available to the United States in the face of such blackmail is to either compromise our independence or unleash more trillions of tons of explosive power on the people of the Soviet bloc. Since the 1970's when the Soviet Union surpassed American nuclear superiority, the forces of freedom have faced this Hobson's choice and have looked for a way out.

People throughout the world realize that the present retaliatory policy of mutual assured destruction is totally immoral. It is insane to hold the oppressed and long suffering Soviet population hostage against the actions of their Kremlin masters.

Continuing down the road of building offensive nuclear weapons as opposed to defensive systems presents many unnecessary dangers:

- *The Soviet leaders may doubt our will to retaliate and think they can successfully launch a first strike against us.

- *They may even successfully threaten a weak American President into submission by the mere threat of a nuclear attack.

- *American willingness to resist Soviet imperialism by conventional means is weakened by the threat of nuclear conflict.

- *An accident, like Chernobyl, might release nuclear missiles unintentionally, leading to the destruction of one or more cities and possible massive escalation.

- *Other countries, perhaps less stable than the Soviets, may soon pose a nuclear threat. Already, many Third World countries have, or are on the verge of having, the ability to build nuclear warheads. In the wake of the Challenger disaster and the resultant grounding of the U.S. space program, many countries are developing and selling rocket technology. Such technology can easily be adapted for producing intercontinental missiles.

In any of these situations, there is nothing to defend the American people or our allies from nuclear devastation or the threat of nuclear blackmail. For years, our only answer to this problem has been to pursue arms control treaties with the Soviets. Like all past attempts to control arms by treaty, this effort has failed to reduce the weapons stockpiles on either side.

One key Soviet tactic is the use of treaties to lull and placate Western suspicion. It is a given that Marxists often make treaties that they have no intention of keeping; in fact, Stalin once said, "Promises, like pie crusts, are made to be broken." The Soviets have consistently violated arms control treaties. Unfortunately, the current process gives the United States no recourse to such violations except to abrogate the treaty and invite charges of renewing the arms race.

Fortunately, advanced technology (which got us into this mess) is now beginning to provide a solution to this nuclear treadmill.

III. The Solution

Just as the United States developed the technology necessary to achieve President Kennedy's dream of placing a man on the moon, space-based technology can be developed to finally provide an effective defense against nuclear weapons -- a **Peace Shield**.

Such a shield would, for the first time since the development of the intercontinental missile in the early sixties, provide protection for the American people against the nuclear threat, whether from belligerent intent or accident. It has the potential to protect against any nuclear missile, regardless of its point of origin, and defuse the potential for nuclear blackmail.

In addition, the shield would provide enforcement to the arms control process. Instead of relying upon Soviet goodwill and honesty to keep the peace, we could rely upon our own technological might.

Additional stability would come from ending the offensive arms race. Instead of competing to develop more efficient ways of destroying people on earth, our scientists will be developing ways to destroy missiles in space, far from our centers of population.

The problem now is to marshal the political will to develop such a defense.

This effort will not be easy. Such a radical departure from our current policy of mutual assured destruction will meet with extensive bureaucratic resistance in Congress, the Pentagon, and within the powerful "arms control" lobby. Already, many seem willing to forego development of a space shield to chase after the chimera of arms control by treaty.

President Reagan successfully resisted those pressures during the Reykjavik summit, but they can be expected to intensify as time goes on. At the same time, President Reagan's ability to control the debate will fade as his term draws to a close.

Knowing this, the Left will be mounting a major effort to derail strategic defense before it can be developed. Tremendous pressures exist in the Congress to ban any funding for such an effort.

Our only hope of success is to go directly to the American people using existing networks at the state and local level to create a political tide that sweeps aside all obstacles in its path. Because only an active and vocal grass-roots constituency can ensure that the dream of space defense is kept alive in the post-Reagan era.

The **Coalition Against Nuclear Annihilation (CANAA)** was formed for that purpose.

IV. The Program

A. Strategy

In 1982, the international Left mounted a massive drive for a **nuclear freeze**. The goal of this effort was to prevent President Reagan from deploying Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe to counter Soviet SS-20's.

The genius of this campaign, which ultimately forced President Reagan to deal with the Soviets, was a gradually escalating series of "freeze resolutions" passed by local governments, churches, and student groups. The standard freeze resolution called for a mutually verifiable, bilateral freeze on the design, production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.

While none of these resolutions were binding on either the Soviets or Americans, the public relations pressure of the entire campaign was keenly felt in Washington. Once the campaign began to snowball, several state legislatures jumped aboard. Before it was over, the U.S. Congress came within an eyelash of passing a freeze resolution of its own. The Left's grass-roots campaign so strengthened the hand of opponents of the President's military program that they were able to tie progress in "arms control" to the level of defense spending.

The non-binding nature of the freeze resolution was pivotal to its success. Because it didn't really mean anything legally, it gave people a chance to "do something" about the arms race without having to worry about the effects.

The hypothetical nature of the nuclear freeze resolution was another strength for freeze proponents. They knew that no practical nuclear freeze could be verifiable, but they didn't worry about that, instead asking: "What if it was? What then?"

The nuclear freeze campaign deftly put freeze opponents in the position of "defending the arms race," of being nuke-loving warmongers without any human compassion. **The CANA program uses this same strategy in framing the issue of a space-based defense.**

Past efforts to promote the Peace Shield succeeded in convincing pro-defense advocates in and out of government of its importance, but now that the audience is the general American public, the sales pitch must change.

Peace shield supporters have gotten bogged down in discussions of technical specifics and neglected the overall vision of a satellite shield as a way of removing the nuclear "sword of Damocles" from over humanity's head. Further, they have erred by using military men as their spokesmen, allowing the Left to label the program "Star Wars" and make it sound like just another bloated Pentagon toy.

Even the term "SDI" falls short of our needs, as it sounds like another esoteric product of the military-industrial complex, evoking images of hundred dollar hammers and thousand dollar toilet seats.

Fortunately, the refusal of the Soviet government at the recent "mini-summit" at Reykjavik to accept space defense has opened a floodgate of public discussion. Opinion polls show three-to-one public support for the Peace Shield. We must now translate this favorable public opinion into active political support. **In order for space defense to survive in the Post-Reagan era, steps must be taken now to make it a permanent policy issue, in the 1988 Presidential sweepstakes and beyond. That's why CANA is so important.**

The centerpiece of this effort is the CANA question: **"Would you support a viable satellite space shield that would increase your chances of surviving a nuclear attack?"**

Our central point is: Since its too late to "ban the bomb", let's "ban the boom."

This hypothetical question is obviously "loaded". Like the Nuclear Freeze, it is non-binding. It is also hypothetical, concentrating on the abstract concept of space defense, rather than delving into technical specifics. It also forces our opponents to defend the indefensible.

Once on the defensive, Peace Shield opponents will have to explain their "pro-annihilation" stand. Think of it: they get to choose between defending the insane concept of mutually-assured destruction and advocating a technological way to prevent nuclear war. In this way, CANA will separate sincere liberals who are concerned with nuclear survival from the hard-core Soviet apologists whose only goal is to weaken and destroy the West.

CANA's spokesmen are ordinary citizens concerned about their children's future. Unlike past efforts to promote space defense, The CANA program sidesteps a political trap by avoiding questions of technical workability, and concentrates instead on the grand vision of ending nuclear terror. Instead of SDI, we talk about the "Peace Shield."

At the national level, CAF will coordinate and supply activists, sympathetic members of city councils, county commissions and state legislatures through massive mailing and telephone campaigns. Once such opinion leaders are identified, CAF will provide them with support and guidance on how to fight the battle in their local area.

CAF will also play a supporting role in coordinating national strategies and media campaigns to put steady pressure on Congress, where the ultimate fight for the space shield will be won or lost.

B. The Role of State Legislatures

1. The CANA Resolution

The centerpiece of the CANA effort in the state legislatures is the CANA resolution (Appendix I), which provides the parliamentary vehicle for debating the need for the Peace Shield. The CANA resolution is specially worded to allow debate to be conducted on humanitarian terms and to allow proponents of the peace shield to take the moral "high ground" on space defense. Properly used, your local CANA resolution, as well as our national CANA program, will be effective not only in selling the space shield concept to the public, but also in placing opponents of space-based missile defense in the "pro-annihilation" camp—where they belong.

The suggested text in the CANA resolution can of course be modified to conform to the rules of your particular state. However, the key to national CANA efforts will be nationwide publicity generated around the "resolution clause" at the end of the resolution, which reads: "THEREFORE, BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED THAT this body endorses the concept of A VIABLE SATELLITE SPACE SHIELD WHICH WOULD INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING A NUCLEAR ATTACK." Thus, we suggest that no change be made in this portion of the language in the resolution.

Any success in selling the space shield concept to ordinary Americans rests with the simplicity of the sales pitch. The idea behind CANA is to simply force the ordinary American to ask himself if he wants American technology and the American to protect him from nuclear attack. Don't let liberal opponents of the space shield maneuver debate away from this simple "pro-human survival" concept and toward the endless technical arguments which have confused the issue in Washington.

2. Maximizing CANA Impact through Media Coverage

a. Introduction of the CANA Resolution

The introduction of the CANA resolution is the only time during the legislative process that you can have sure and complete control over the timing and publicity of the effort. Decisions must be made as to when to introduce the legislation, who to have co-sponsor the legislation, and what kind of publicity the introduction can command.

In some states, the deadline for introduction of binding legislation differs from that of non-binding resolutions; in other states, the deadlines are the same. Introduction of CANA too close to any such deadline will hinder any efforts to publicize the resolution, because the resolution is liable to get caught up in the last-minute rush of legislation to beat the deadline. It may also be wise to avoid introducing the resolution during times of predictable "big" events, like the governor's State of the State address or the passage of some landmark legislation. This avoids having CANA compete for publicity. The best time to introduce the legislation is early in the week during a "dead period" or slow news time.

There is a strategic opportunity in your choice of co-sponsors of your bill, since CANA is designed to allow pro-defense members of each party to co-sponsor the CANA resolution. You should, of course, extend the opportunity to conservative and moderate supporters of space defense in your political party, but don't forget about possible supporters in the "other party". It should pay political dividends to extend the offer to liberal members of the legislature, especially any member who represents a district that includes high concentrations of young people or of members of organized labor (rank-and-file union members are very pro-defense). Also, you should consider bringing in any liberal who represents a district in which a Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") contractor is located. Having a well-known liberal as a co-sponsor not only broadens your base of support, but adds an additional element of appeal in the eyes of the media.

Your main avenues of publicity for the introduction are: 1) news release, and 2) news conference.

A news release is almost a must. It will be the first public exposure to the fact that their state legislature will be considering the on-the-record endorsement of space defense. The news release (sample news release included in Appendix. II) should be in the hands of the press and media by the day before introduction. Thus, you might want to mail them two days before introduction. The news release should include CANA-style rhetoric about the need to protect Americans from the threat of nuclear attack, and should avoid dwelling on such things as the technical detail or the feasibility of space defense.

You may want to hold a news conference on the introduction of the legislation. Many state legislators feel uncomfortable with the idea of setting up a news conference, thinking it requires some great media skill. It doesn't. All it requires is about twenty minutes of your time and an hour of your secretary's time. Most state capitol buildings have a room equipped to handle media activity. Reserve this room, write up a one paragraph announcement of the time, place and reason for the conference, and send it to all radio, television, and print media people about a week ahead of time. Show up at the designated time. A portion of those who were alerted will show up; more if you scheduled the introduction of the resolution at a slow news time. As in the introduction of the legislation, the news conference should be timed so as not to conflict with another news conference or big event. Also, news conferences should be timed with the deadlines of the press and media in mind.

Conservative Action Foundation has on staff experienced professionals in the art of publicity who will on request be glad to personally assist you in CANA resolution publicity efforts. State legislator's and their staffs are encouraged to use our toll-free telephone number, 1-800-423-7976, if they have any questions concerning the CANA program or the CANA resolution.

b. Hearings on the Space Shield Concept

Depending on your strategy for the CANA resolution in your state, you may choose to hold hearings on the resolution and on the concept of space defense.

Hearings on this matter are simply another opportunity for publicity. As you know, only very rarely does a member of the legislature decide how to vote based on what he or she hears at a hearing. The nature of hearings is to give experts from both sides a chance to present their cases and to be questioned on their arguments. Thus, instead of trying to "win" a hearing, or to stack it in our favor, you should instead treat a hearing as an opportunity to put the issue in the eyes of the people through fifteen- and thirty-second bites of media on television or radio, and through print media coverage of the hearing.

Your side should be represented with both in- and out-of state witnesses. In-state witnesses would include people who work with S.D.I. research contractors in your state, as well as just ordinary citizens who don't want their children to be annihilated by nuclear weapons. Possibly the best local witness you can have is an elderly grandmother with her grandchildren who just came to testify that she has lived half her life under the fear of nuclear attack, and that she is for any defense that "would free these young people from having to live in this same fear.", etc. You may have other ideas for in-state witnesses to call.

Conservative Action Foundation can help you line up out-of-state experts who can come to your state and testify at hearings.

The media will be interested in the hearings on the "national issue brought to a local level". If you choose to forego hearings, one other opportunity for publicity is to get an opponent of space defense to join you in writing a "point/counter-point"

article on space defense. Send the article to all of your state's newspapers.

c. Passage of the CANA Resolution

Your floor strategy will begin as soon as the resolution is introduced. It will include that normal things that go with the steering of legislation, including assignment to an acceptable committee, early indication of support or opposition among fellow legislators, lobbying of undecided votes, and timing of floor consideration of the resolution.

Conservative Action Foundation offers hands-on assistance in the passage of CANA resolutions. Also, we appreciate your assistance in keeping us informed and up-to-date as to when the resolution will be considered, floor strategy, etc.

It is advisable to alert the media as to when the vote is scheduled, as this serves to generate more publicity. You should also prepare a statement to be given to the media quickly after the vote. If you win and the resolution passes, express your admiration of the assembly's good judgment, and outline your plans to take the battle to the other chamber. If you lose, express your disappointment, and outline your intention to fight the battle in the other chamber, and in the next session in your chamber. Remind the media that this is a nationwide effort.

3. Left Counter-Tactics

Depending on how much publicity your efforts receive, you may find an organized left-wing response to your resolution. They will try to counter your pro-space defense resolution with actions designed to spread often-untrue information about the nature of the issue. This can consist of as little as counter-statements or as much as organized demonstrations against space-based defense.

Some of the arguments you will hear are listed below, with the counter-arguments suggested:

*Space Defense is unsound from a global military standpoint; why not stick with arms control talks? Space defense and arms talks are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but past arms talks with the Soviets have produced agreements that only curbed the growth of nuclear weapons. The space shield will make nuclear weapons obsolete. And, if the choice is to trust the Soviets to live up to a treaty, or to trust American technology to build a space defense, it would be advisable to pursue the latter option. If there is a scientific possibility that nuclear warheads can be made obsolete, then our government has the moral obligation to pursue it.

*Space defense will never work, because the technology does not exist. Although technological breakthroughs toward the space shield are being made regularly, the resolution at hand does not deal with technology or any particular proposal for space defense. The question is simply: If a way is found to eliminate nuclear weapons through space technology, will you support it? This question is more toward whether we should develop and deploy a system that would work, not whether such a system currently exists.

*Why should we have nuclear weapons in outer space? We already have too many on Earth. The space shield is not a weapon. When deployed, it will be no more than a collection of satellites in space, just as other nations deploy their satellites in space. The space shield is not a weapon of offensive capability, but is instead a totally defensive system that will protect us from the nuclear weapons pointed at us by our enemies.

These, of course, are not the only arguments that you will hear. But these will give you an idea of what to expect.

Should you encounter organized left-wing opposition to the resolution or to space defense, you should look upon it as an opportunity. Their position is already unpopular with the majority of Americans, and it will become even more indefensible and unpopular when framed in the context of your "pro-human survival" side vs. their "pro-annihilation" side. Also, if there is a heated battle, this will attract more media coverage and public attention.

Remember: most of what the left does can also be done by the right. For example, letter-writing campaigns to undecided legislators (a common lobbying tactic of the Left) can be countered by a pro-space shield campaign. Demonstrations by the left can be met by pro-space defense counter-demonstrations. And planted questions at hearing, another favorite leftie tactic, can also be done by the right.

And, there are those tactics that can be used to dampen a left-wing surge. For example, if the opponents of space defense plan a massive rally for the morning of the vote, move on the day before the rally to have the vote postponed for a week. It will be too late to call off the rally, and thus the rally will become a non-event in the eyes of the media.

Don't fear the Left. Their opposition to space defense flies in the face of American willpower, American "can-do" spirit, American technological know-how, and last but not least, American public opinion. And, with the CANA initiative, the Left now must decide on whether to oppose a space shield which will make nuclear war obsolete.

V. About the Conservative Action Foundation

Committee Against Nuclear Annihilation is one of a number of projects sponsored by Conservative Action Foundation, an educational foundation dedicated to teaching conservative activists effective techniques for direct political action. We also provide materials and support for activist efforts.

Past CAF projects have included:

*The mounting of a flotilla led by CAF's "Freedom Warrior" boat in an attempt block the departure of a Soviet grainship in New Orleans carrying would-be defector Miroslav Medvid.

*A successful direct action and civil disobedience campaign which forced the Washington public relations firm of Gray & Company to drop a \$250,000 contract with Marxist Angola.

*Coordination of nationwide protests and prayer vigils in commemoration of the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007.

*Founding of Private Initiative War Against Moscow (PIWAM), a program which encourages private citizens to take direct action against Soviet interests in the United States. It is based upon the idea that opposition to tyranny is far more effective when American citizens provide the lead through direct political action.

*Organization of boycott's and demonstrations to protest Gulf/Chevron Oil Company's business links with and support of the Marxist regime in Angola.

Ongoing CAF programs include:

*The United States Campaign Academy, a comprehensive seminar which details the fundamentals of media strategy, fundraising, advertising and elections.

*A nationwide Activist Network, encompassing all fifty states and many foreign countries, to which CAF provides the material and technical expertise the activist needs to mobilize his forces in the war of ideas.

*Identification and development of the next generation of conservative activists, including a Campus Action Network, which specially targets college activists, and leadership in the World Youth Freedom League, the official youth arm of the World Anti-Communist League with chapters in over 127 countries on six continents.

Conservative Action Foundation stands ready to help people everywhere who fight for freedom and the ideals of America's Founding Fathers. Our toll-free number is (800) 423-7976. In the Washington metropolitan area and outside the continental United States, the number is (202) 547-0200.

APPENDIX I

Prototype of the CANA Resolution

SUGGESTED RESOLUTION LANGUAGE

WHEREAS, the United States being the model of Democracy in a world where the majority of its inhabitants are denied basic human rights by their respective governments; and,

WHEREAS, the threat of nuclear armageddon—either through accident or provocation—looms like a dark shadow over both the free and unfree peoples of the world; and,

WHEREAS, the number of nations capable of joining the nuclear club—regardless of their stability or the character of their government—is rapidly growing; and,

WHEREAS, as the nations which are nuclear-capable grow in number, the chances for international agreements and safeguards which limit the dangerous characteristics of such weapons becomes less and less realistic; and,

WHEREAS, the proliferation of nuclear technology to non-aligned terrorist states increases the chances of accidental nuclear war between the superpowers; and,

WHEREAS, as leader of the Free World and the guardian of the Western democracies, the United States should, to the extent that her technology and resources permit, employ its technology to hold the threat of nuclear blackmail or annihilation at bay; and,

WHEREAS, America should actively pursue the option of defending its people, rather than spending billions on weapons of mass destruction to avenge their deaths in the event of war; and,

WHEREAS, America's policymakers should move toward a strategy of defense rather than offense, to ensure that problems with the verification of existing or future agreements does not impinge upon the safety of freedom of her citizens and allies; and,

WHEREAS, the concept of space-based nuclear defense offers real hope that humanity can escape the specter of nuclear holocaust—or a tragic miscalculation by potential adversaries that could destroy all humanity in a nuclear conflagration; and,

WHEREAS, American leaders should emphasize to the rulers of Russia that the United States embraces the moral concept of defense over offense, and regards a satellite space defense as a prerequisite to world stability in the nuclear age; and,

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the United States Congress not overlook or fail to fully investigate the possibility of protecting our people against nuclear attacks of any sort,

THEREFORE, BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED THAT this body endorses the concept of A VIABLE SATELLITE SPACE SHIELD WHICH WOULD INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING A NUCLEAR ATTACK.

APPENDIX II.

Sample News Releases, Talking Points, Etc.

REP. SMITH INTRODUCES "PEACE SHIELD" RESOLUTION

Rep. John Smith (R-8th District) has introduced a motion in the (New York) State Assembly (or Senate) calling for the adoption of a resolution endorsing the concept of strategic defense to defend America from nuclear attack. The resolution centerpiece, if adopted, would state that "this body endorses the concept of A VI-
ABLE SATELLITE SPACE SHIELD WHICH WOULD INCREASE YOUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING A NUCLEAR
ATTACK."

According to Rep. Smith, "the adoption of this resolution sends a message to our potential adversaries that America is prepared to use her technological skills in pursuit of peace and a safer world for all. What could be more moral than a defensive system which seeks to protect our children and our country from ever witnessing the horror of nuclear war?"

The language of the resolution holds that "as leader of the Free World and the guardian of the Western democracies, the United States should, to the extent that her technology and resources permit, employ its technology to hold the threat of nuclear blackmail or annihilation at bay."

The resolution, although non-binding in application, strongly urges that the "the United States Congress not overlook or fail to fully investigate the possibility of defending against nuclear attacks of any sort."

Concluded Rep. Smith, "The peace shield enforces the arms control process by relying on America's own technological might rather than the empty promises of

MORE

Soviet leaders who have consistently broken treaties in the past. America deserves the best protection, and a satellite space shield provides it."

The resolution introduced by Rep. Smith is part of a project developed by the Conservative Action Foundation in Washington, D.C. to build grass roots support for President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. The project, known as Coalition Against Nuclear Annihilation or CANA, hopes to translate the moral appeal of a satellite space (peace) shield to defend America from nuclear attack into broad based public support to ensure the survival of strategic defense in the post-Reagan era.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TUESDAY JANUARY 21, 1987

Contact: Bill Brown
(999) 999-9999

REP. SMITH HOLDING HEARINGS ON "PEACE SHIELD" RESOLUTION

Rep. John Smith (R-8th District) will be holding open hearings during the week of January 22-26 on his proposed resolution endorsing the concept of strategic defense to defend America from nuclear attack. The hearings, to be held in the Johnson room adjacent to the legislative chamber, will feature a variety of guest speakers, many of whom are recognized as experts on SDI.

The resolution centerpiece, if adopted, would state that "this body endorses the concept of **A VIABLE SATELLITE SPACE SHIELD WHICH WOULD INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF SURVIVING A NUCLEAR ATTACK.**"

"What could be more moral than protecting our children from the threat of nuclear war? As for me, I would rather put my trust in American ingenuity than in Soviet integrity. The safety of our people is the federal government's most important role," stated Rep. Smith.

The language of the resolution holds that "as leader of the Free World and guardian of the Western democracies, the United States should, to the extent that her technology and resources permit, employ its technology to hold the threat of nuclear blackmail or annihilation at bay."

Explained Rep. Smith, "the focus of these hearings will be to provide ordinary citizens in addition to recognized experts on SDI with a forum to explain the imperative behind our push for this resolution. These hearings will help to divide the sincere liberals who are concerned with nuclear survival from the hard core Sovietologist whose only goal is to weaken and destroy the West."

MORE

The resolution introduced by Rep. Smith is part of a project developed by the Conservative Action Foundation in Washington, D.C. to build grass roots support for President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. The project, known as Coalition Against Nuclear Annihilation or CANA, hopes to translate the moral appeal of a satellite space (peace) shield to defend America from nuclear attack into broad based public support to ensure the survival of strategic defense in the post-Reagan era.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TUESDAY JANUARY 21, 1987

Contact: Bill Brown
(999) 999-9999

REP. SMITH'S "PEACE SHIELD" RESOLUTION PASSES ASSEMBLY

The New York State Assembly today voted yes to the question "Would you support a viable satellite space shield which would increase your chances of surviving a nuclear attack?" thereby adopting a resolution proposed by Rep. John Smith (R-8th District). The Assembly's passage of Smith's proposal endorses the concept of strategic defense to defend America from nuclear attack.

"This vote should send a message to the politicians in Washington that the American people are concerned about the Soviet military threat and want protection from nuclear missiles," stated Rep. Smith.

The resolution, although non-binding in application, strongly urges that "the United States Congress not overlook or fail to fully investigate the possibility of defending against nuclear attacks of any sort."

"Regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation, everyone is concerned about the chances of nuclear war," stated Smith. "America will soon have the technology to build space based defenses. Therefore, we have a moral obligation to protect ourselves and our children from the threat of nuclear missiles. A peace shield gives us that defense."

The resolution adopted by the Assembly is part of a larger project developed by the Conservative Action Foundation in Washington, DC to build support for President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. The project, known as Coalition Against Nuclear Annihilation or CANA, is working to ensure the survival of strategic defense the post-Reagan era.

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