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The Soviet Record on Arms Control

Richard Perle

MR. CHAIRMAN, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased and honored to have been invited to address this distinguished gathering of men and women whose dedication to peace is so admirably reflected in the public lives and careers of those assembled, from all over the world, in this place so long associated with the search for peace. There is no higher calling than the search for peace and freedom; and there is no path to their attainment more important than free and open discourse conducted with clarity and candor. I shall endeavor in these remarks to be both clear and candid. I should prefer to be diplomatic as well—in this city of diplomacy; but in the twenty minutes allotted to me there is no time to treat, in the gingerly manner customary in international diplomacy, those ideas and arguments, some of which we have heard yesterday and again this morning, that are misleading, or malicious, or just simply false. Yesterday morning, Professor Gromyko contributed arguments of all three types, and Dr. Arbatov has done so again this morning.

In a single breath, Professor Gromyko managed to celebrate “the great victory over

Richard Perle is assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. He delivered this speech at the Groupe de Bellerive conference in Geneva, Switzerland on June 29, 1985.

Japanese militarism in World War II” while condemning as “an indefensible, immoral action” President Truman’s use of atomic weapons to bring that war to a close. The use by the United States of the atomic bomb against Japan came at a moment when the Soviet army was busy consolidating its hold over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that it continues to occupy to this day. And it was motivated, not as Professor Gromyko suggests, to impress upon the Soviet Union that the United States had succeeded in developing the atomic bomb (a charge repeated by Dr. Arbatov this morning), but to save the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Americans and Japanese who would doubtless have perished in the prolongation of a bitter war. Professor Gromyko referred in his speech to President Truman’s desire to exhibit the American monopoly of nuclear weapons in order to acquire, for itself, “a special role of world leadership.” But nowhere did he acknowledge that, in a manner unprecedented in human history, the United States never used its unique possession of atomic weapons to attack, or threaten, or intimidate any other nation. It is fair to ask whether Joseph Stalin or his successors would have done the same, or whether Germany or Japan would have been spared with atomic weapons in Soviet hands in 1945.

Professor Gromyko would have us believe that the Soviet build-up of strategic nuclear weapons has been forced upon them by American efforts to achieve what he calls “unilateral

advantage." But it is the Soviet Union, alone, that today possesses a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a combination of yield and accuracy sufficient to attack and destroy hardened military facilities that are essential elements of the American nuclear deterrent. The United States has no comparable hard target offensive capability. It is the Soviet Union alone that has deployed a system of anti-ballistic missile defense. It is the Soviet Union alone that has a fully tested and deployed anti-satellite system. It is the Soviet Union alone that has mobile missiles with multiple warheads of intercontinental range. And until the North Atlantic alliance began a modest offsetting deployment of intermediate ballistic missiles in Europe a year ago, it was the Soviet Union alone that possessed such weapons, which it continues to deploy in numbers that vastly exceed the American equivalents. We know, from Dr. Andrei Sakharov—a man whose immense personal courage and internationally recognized scientific and moral stature stands in sharp contrast to the deplorable cruelty and isolation he has experienced at the hands of his own government—we know from Andrei Sakharov that he was drafted to begin work on the Soviet hydrogen bomb a full year before President Harry Truman made the decision to proceed with the development of an American hydrogen weapon.

WHILE I am on the subject of U.S. and Soviet weapons developments let me cite a few examples of the different U.S. and Soviet trends in weapons development over the past two decades. The last of our B-52 bombers rolled off the production line in 1962, 23 years ago; and some of our active fleet of strategic bombers were built as far back as 1956. We began deploying our newest land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles fifteen years ago. And during the same year we began deploying the Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We did not field another new strategic system until 1978, when we began deploying the Trident I submarine launched missiles. Since then we have begun to deploy air and sea-launched cruise missiles and to build the Trident I ballistic missile carrying subma-

rine at the rate of about one a year. By contrast the Soviet Union has, since 1971, deployed at least three, and probably four new types of ICBMs, eight improved versions of existing ICBMs and SLBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and we are about to see a new intercontinental bomber. And the Soviet Union is continuing to develop new strategic weapons of all types. Professor Gromyko told us yesterday that the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe "constitutes a real threat to African countries" and the Middle East. And yet the cruise missiles to which he refers are, as I trust he knows full well, targeted on the Soviet Union. Indeed, their guidance system is such that they can only be directed against targets that have been surveyed and stored in their guidance computers. And there will be, at most, 464 of them if an agreement is not reached in Geneva, as we hope one will be, to limit the deployment of medium-range systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

But can the same be said of the Soviet SS-20? There are now well over 1,200 warheads on Soviet SS-20s (probably closer to 2,400 if one counts re-fire missiles) and the range of them is twice that of the American cruise missiles. They can reach well into Africa and the Middle East; and unlike the American cruise missiles, there is no technical limit on their targeting. And while the United States would gladly abandon its entire force of medium-range missiles, as President Reagan has proposed, the Soviet Union has rejected the proposal to eliminate this entire class of weapons on both sides. The effort to frighten countries in Africa and the Middle East by raising the false specter that American missiles, reluctantly deployed in Europe, and in the interest of European security, might be used against them, is propaganda pure and simple, as is Professor Gromyko's suggestion that the forces of the United States Central Command might be equipped with neutron weapons.

Dr. Arbatov this morning, even while invoking the name of George Orwell, has rewritten post-war history in a manner that reminds one of Orwell's description of the Soviet Union as "a place where yesterday's weather can be changed by decree." I doubt that Orwell's

writings are wide Union, but Dr. A what he likes; I w he thinks serves as the awesome totali teen Eighty-Four.

Ladies and ge most of the worl strategic relationsh and the Soviet Un spiraling arms ra significantly differ today, deployed a fewer nuclear wea 1967. And as Sen the megatonnage force is barely one late 1960s. Morv agreed, at a meet year ago, to redu the number of our Europe. By cont years consistent forces: 8,000 new 1969, when the S way, 4,000 of w 1979 when SAL

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writings are widely available in the Soviet Union, but Dr. Arbatov is privileged to read what he likes; I wonder whose political system he thinks serves as the model for *Animal Farm* or the awesome totalitarian state depicted in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Ladies and gentlemen, we in this room, and most of the world, accept an image of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that is characterized by a spiraling arms race. And yet the facts are significantly different. The United States has today, deployed around the world, some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than we had deployed in 1967. And as Senator Stevens indicated earlier, the megatonnage of this diminished American force is barely one-quarter of what it was in the late 1960s. Moreover, the Western alliance agreed, at a meeting in Canada a little over a year ago, to reduce further, by 1,400 weapons, the number of our nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. By contrast, we have seen in recent years consistent additions to Soviet nuclear forces: 8,000 new strategic warheads alone since 1969, when the SALT I negotiations got under way, 4,000 of which have been added since 1979 when SALT II was signed.

NOT ONLY have the treaties of the past failed to achieve the limitations that we in America, and I trust most of you, had hoped for, but even those agreements that have been reached are now being violated. The SALT II treaty, for example, permits the deployment of one new type of ICBM. The Soviets are currently deploying two new types of ICBMs and there are strong indications that we will see further new types as time goes on. The SALT regime has required (and it has been understood well on both sides) restraint in the concealment of information so that we might verify performance under the agreements. And yet the Soviet Union has consistently been obscuring the information upon which clear judgments necessary for verification must be based.

Senator Stevens has already referred to the Radar Krasnoyarsk, a radar that practically completes the comprehensive radar coverage of the Soviet Union in a manner that would permit

a rapid deployment of short lead time, and highly mobile elements of a comprehensive territorial defense.

Now Dr. Arbatov has said this morning that the Radar Krasnoyarsk is for space tracking purposes. Radars for space tracking purposes, ladies and gentlemen, are oriented towards space, where the objects to be tracked are to be found. The Radar Krasnoyarsk is not oriented towards space; it is oriented towards the horizon, which is precisely how one would orient a radar that was intended, in due course, to support the infrastructure for a nation-wide system of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The radar at Krasnoyarsk is identical to a radar already completed at Pechora, a radar that the Soviets have acknowledged is for the purpose of long-range detection of ballistic missiles. And the Krasnoyarsk radar happens to be situated, in violation of the treaty, in the precise location that one would have anticipated if one were looking for comprehensive radar coverage of Soviet territory. With respect to space tracking, there are many other radars in the Soviet Union that can perform the space track function far more efficiently and effectively than the radar at Krasnoyarsk. Space track radars, ladies and gentlemen, unlike radars that may become part of a system of anti-ballistic missile defenses, are not surrounded by thousands of tons of concrete and hardened to resist the blast over-pressures of a nuclear war.

I was not surprised that Dr. Arbatov reserved most of his remarks for the American program on strategic defense. And I must say to you that Soviet comment on the American strategic defense research program has yet again, in his remarks, reached an extravagant hypocrisy. In the spring of 1983, a few days after President Reagan's speech announcing the initiation of the American program, there appeared in *Pravda*, reprinted elsewhere in other papers around the world, an open letter from a group of Soviet scientists deploring the American SDI, deploring the use of science for military purposes, and in passing, suggesting that it would not be possible to achieve an effective result. There was a large number of signers of the letter; let me recall some of them to you: one was Mr. P. D. Grushin, who was the head of

the design bureau responsible for anti-aircraft and ABM systems in the Soviet Union. Another was V. S. Semenkhin, a leading figure in the development of command, control, and communications systems for anti-aircraft and ABM use. Another was B. V. Bunkin, an important figure in the development of radars and other key components of weapon systems for strategic defense. I can go on; the list is long. For among the signers of that letter, ladies and gentlemen, were the principal architects of the Soviet SDI program, a program that has been underway since the mid-1960s, at increasing levels of investment and research following the ABM treaty of 1972.

The Soviet Union has long been working on directed energy weapons, on particle beam weapons, on lasers both ground and space-based. And this Soviet effort, far from tapering off when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to abandon anti-ballistic missile defense in 1972, has increased significantly ever since. In January, in this city, Secretary of State Shultz met with Foreign Minister Gromyko. It was agreed by the Soviet foreign minister that there is a Soviet research program on SDI and that it will continue just as the Soviets expect the American research program will continue. And the Soviet foreign minister acknowledged that it is impossible to verify research.

In my judgment, Soviet insistence in the various disarmament negotiations now under way that the United States abandon its SDI research program, as a precondition for progress in other areas—something they know we will not do—is simply a device for justifying the Soviet's unrelenting build-up of offensive weapons and Moscow's refusal to move towards satisfactory agreements limiting those offensive weapons. Dr. Arbatov has said this morning that it is impossible to overcome the laws of physics. I assure you, Dr. Arbatov, that we will bear your advice in mind and instruct our scientists accordingly that they should conduct their research with the laws of physics firmly in mind.

I SHOULD LIKE to conclude with a few words about arms control. Throughout the first Reagan administration,

there were questions from a number of quarters, including at home, about the administration's commitment to arms control. I might say in passing that the program of today's event, which describes the morning presentations as "a view from the South," "a view from the East," and "a view from the West," must contain a typographical error. There is the view from the East, and you have heard it from the Soviet delegation, but there are *many* views from the West. And some of the criticism of the new administration's approach to arms control came from within the West, and questions were raised about the seriousness and the sincerity of the United States in its approach to arms control. By now, I think the record of our proposals speaks for itself. Because on one issue after another, on a wide variety of issues of disarmament and arms control, the United States has put forward proposals that we believe could and should lead in the normal course of negotiation to agreements that are militarily significant, verifiable, fair, and equitable. We believe that such agreements would achieve greater stability than we would expect to achieve in the absence of a collaborative effort. We have, as many of you know, proposed deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces in the START talks. Dr. Arbatov now says that it will not be possible to reach an agreement along those lines because the United States is continuing its program on strategic defense. But we saw no progress in achieving significant reductions in those offensive forces before we announced our program of strategic defense research in 1983. And I am sorry to say the Soviet Union seems determined to cling to its large and growing force of destabilizing intercontinental ballistic missiles and has thus been unwilling to respond positively to the American proposal to reduce to the still awesome level of 5,000 the number of such warheads on the ballistic missiles on both sides. In the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces, as you know, we have proposed to eliminate them entirely. And when the Soviets rejected that proposal, we offered to reduce them to *any equal level* that the Soviet Union would accept.

With respect to chemical weapons, again in Geneva, the United States has proposed to ban

them completely, in the way of chemical weapons production. And in the unprecedented pruned international anywhere, at any opinion that one sic ban. The Soviets national inspectio

I think I shou as we might desi the obsessive secr real and practical it is reasonable to risks of uncertainr comprehensive a pecially where is limitation are con that before the li now, following t study by all ag government, that major provision exist between us

With respect mentioned a nun yesterday, the U is a good likelih ceeded the 150 k exists between made a simple scientists of each areas where the the appropriate we could be cor treaty would be familiar with th two countries v mote locations t intelligence that

them completely, and the only thing that stands in the way of concluding a treaty banning chemical weapons is the difficult issue of verification. And in this regard we have made an unprecedented proposal: that inspectors organized internationally should be permitted to go anywhere, at any time, in order to verify suspicion that one side or the other is violating that ban. The Soviets reject this proposal for international inspection.

I think I should say at this point that, much as we might desire far-reaching arms control, the obsessive secrecy of the Soviet Union puts real and practical limits on the extent to which it is reasonable to expect the West to accept the risks of uncertainty associated with broad and comprehensive approaches to arms control, especially where issues of research or qualitative limitation are concerned. And if we didn't think that before the last year or two, we surely do now, following the determination, after careful study by all agencies of the United States government, that the Soviet Union is violating major provisions of most of the treaties that exist between us.

With respect to nuclear testing, which was mentioned a number of times this morning and yesterday, the United States believes that there is a good likelihood that Soviet tests have exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold limit that now exists between us. For this reason, we have made a simple proposal: that we permit the scientists of each other's country to go to the areas where these tests are conducted and take the appropriate measurements of yield so that we could be confident that ratification of that treaty would be justified. Those of you who are familiar with the testing establishments of the two countries will recognize that in those remote locations there is no conceivable military intelligence that could be obtained by techni-

cians with measuring devices competent to establish test yields. Thus far the Soviets have not responded favorably.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, that I have found it necessary, considering what was said earlier by Professor Gromyko and Dr. Arbatov, to say some things in direct response that some will regard as too explicit for diplomatic dialogue; but I believe we will not get very far in our deliberations here if we obscure the fundamental differences of fact on which we and the Soviet Union disagree. I hope that we will find mechanisms for resolving those differences in fact, and still other mechanisms, however difficult it may be, for composing the relationship between us, based on a common understanding of what forces are possessed on both sides leading to a radical reduction of those forces. The world has far too many nuclear weapons. The reductions that are possible on both sides could be dramatic; and there is now no obstacle except the artificial Soviet linkage between reductions in offensive forces and a demand that the U.S. terminate its SDI research, that stands in the way of those deep reductions.

Postscript

UPON READING the transcript of these remarks I am struck by the apparent absence of hope, or optimism, in my exchange with the Soviet speakers. I suspect that this derives, at least in part, from the ease with which Professor Gromyko and Dr. Arbatov yielded, in their presentations (which preceded mine), to the temptation to propagandize their audience. I like to believe that in the privacy of the negotiations between us, in Geneva and elsewhere, a more constructive dialogue may be found and agreements reached.

NYT 7/14

Reagan and the Arms Race

Up until a few weeks ago, we had an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit strategic nuclear forces.


But now, due to a rash White House decision to abandon SALT II and hang more nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on B-52s, all bets are off.

Killing SALT II, Reagan shattered national and international consensus on the need to maintain nuclear stability. The treaty embodied a pragmatic recognition that whatever suspicions divide the superpowers, we share a mutual interest in survival.

And it was an agreement the Soviets took seriously enough to disable or dismantle more than 1,366 missile launchers, long-range bombers and missile-firing subs to stay within its terms.

Without the treaty's moderating influence, a renewed arms race is inevitable. We may have gained the freedom to expand our strategic arsenal beyond all bounds of reason. But so have the Soviets, who, according to experts, are in a position to expand their arsenal faster than we are.

In fact, thanks to Reagan's shocking move, our nation will be forced to rely solely on Soviet forbearance to keep the lid on a



#1 in a series

potentially catastrophic nuclear build-up.

Vital bilateral security agreements dating back fourteen years, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have been nullified or imperiled. And we have nothing—repeat, nothing—to replace them.

Except, the Administration says, for Star Wars.

Which even its most optimistic boosters admit cannot possibly be deployed in less than twenty years, if it can be made to work at all.

Between now and then, unfortunately, we face a full generation of exposure to unmitigated nuclear competition.

Including an unconstrained and deadly spiral of escalation that will, in itself, make a strategic defense like Star Wars impossible to implement.

How big is Mr. Reagan's blunder? The answer next week.

Union of Concerned Scientists

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SALT II
DECISION

Reagan Calls SALT II Dead; U.S. to Seek a 'Better Deal'

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan yesterday declared the SALT II strategic arms treaty dead, but said the United States would push for a "better deal" with the Soviet Union to reduce superpower arsenals.

In a day marked by repeated White House efforts to clear up confusion caused by the president's remarks at his news conference Wednesday night, Reagan endorsed a statement by his chief spokesman, Larry Speakes, that the SALT II limits "no longer exist."

"If we take future actions in the area of arms control, it would be for reasons other than the SALT

agreement," Speakes said. "Our strong preference is to enter into a regime of mutual restraint and reductions with the Soviet Union."

Several hours after Speakes declared the SALT II limits to be nonexistent, another White House spokesman, Edward P. Djerejian, issued a statement saying, "Restraint from our point of view is not dead. We hope mutual restraint is not dead, but that depends on Soviet actions."

Confusion over the president's intentions was evident on Capitol Hill yesterday, where the House Foreign Affairs Committee spent most of the day debating arms control issues before approving a non-binding resolution urging him to

comply with SALT II as long as the Soviets do. For the past seven years, both superpowers have said they are abiding by the treaty, which was signed in 1979 but never ratified by the Senate. The administration contends the Soviets have violated the treaty.

Also yesterday, Assistant Defense Secretary Richard N. Perle said the Soviet Union would gain no military advantage from the scuttling of the SALT II limits. In a luncheon with Washington Post reporters and editors, Perle said "there is no military rationale for deployment by the Soviets of more weapons than they are permitted to have under the SALT II treaty."

He conceded that the Soviets might not dismantle older SS11 and SS13 missiles once released from the treaty obligations, but described the significance of this as "trivial."

Reagan, in his nationally tele-

vised news conference Wednesday, suggested that his May 27 announcement on the SALT II treaty was not final. Yesterday, White House officials emphasized that Reagan did not intend to suggest that he would back away from the announcement.

Reagan has said the United States will not actually exceed the SALT II limits until the 131st B52 bomber is armed with air-launched cruise missiles later this year, and that he would take Soviet actions on arms control into account before going over the limits.

Speakes said the United States "indicated that we will no longer be bound by the numerical limits" of the treaty. "We have not violated it yet. We may not go over it in the fall."

"The decisions we make on arms reductions on our side will be based on Soviet behavior in three categories," Speakes said.

The first, he said, is the "prospects for true arms reduction" at the Geneva talks. The second is "the superiority question. We won't let them have superiority over us, and we will continue to modernize." The third "is their continuing pattern of violations, whether there is any abating of violations of the SALT treaty."

Speakes suggested that the administration would continue to use the SALT limits as criteria for Soviet behavior even though the United States has declared that the limits no longer exist.

At a picture-taking session yesterday, Reagan endorsed Speakes' statement that the treaty limits "no longer exist" and said, "We are going to try and replace it with a better deal."

Paul H. Nitze, a top administration arms control adviser, told reporters yesterday there have been no discussions with the Soviets about new interim restraints on strategic weapons but there would be if the superpowers began "serious negotiations." Nitze said the Soviets "appear recently to have given some greater indications of potential movement in their position," but said it appeared to predate Reagan's May 27 announcement.

Speakes said "we do find it very interesting" that the Soviets have recently made several new arms control proposals "in view of" Reagan's May 27 announcement.

Speakes and Perle both refused to comment on a new Soviet proposal on strategic arms presented in Geneva on Wednesday.

But other officials said that the issues of how and when to respond to the new offer, which was first broached informally in Geneva May 29, are widely seen within the government as the next intra-administration battle over arms control.

Under the Soviet proposal, according to U.S. sources, the United States would agree to continue its adherence to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty for 15 to 20 more years, in return for Soviet concessions on sharp reductions in offensive arms. Under the Soviet proposal, this would be done in a protocol to the ABM treaty that might not require passage by two-thirds of the Senate.

One source said there are unofficial indications the Soviets might agree to a guaranteed time period for the ABM treaty well short of the numbers originally proposed.

In the interview at The Post yesterday, Perle said critics in Congress have greeted Reagan's announcement on SALT II with "near hysteria" out of fear that it would launch a new arms race. "In fact," he said, "we don't project any significant differences in the Soviet force in the absence of the SALT agreement, nor is our force going to be different."

"The difference between SALT II and no SALT II is likely to be in the retirement by the Soviets of some SS11s and SS13s," he said. "It seems to me trivial if they keep those SS11s and SS13s." He added, "If they think it's in their interest to build more weapons, then they will even if SALT II is still in effect."

Perle also said the Soviets have been backing away from statements made at the Geneva summit. He recalled the pledge by Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to seek progress on arms control in areas where there is common ground, and said the Soviets have since been "introducing proposals at a furious pace that have detracted from that rather narrow . . . set of objectives."

He also described Reagan's decision to abandon the SALT II limits as important because it demonstrated to Moscow that Reagan was not a weak president and would follow through on his previous vows to do so if the Soviets continued to violate the treaty.

In the House committee vote, four Republicans joined the Democratic majority in adopting the resolution by a 29-to-11 vote. The

measure is expected to be on the House floor next week, and is seen by House Democratic leaders as a prelude to a possible later attempt to enact binding legislation that would prohibit spending to deploy weapons that would exceed the SALT II limits. A bipartisan group of senators is considering a similar two-track strategy.

To meet Republican objections, the original House resolution was revised by the committee to acknowledge administration claims of Soviet violations of the treaty.

"What's confusing now is where we are," committee Chairman

Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.) said of the various statements coming from the White House.

Replying to a charge by John H. Hawes, deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, that the resolution would undercut the administration's flexibility in arms control negotiations, Fascell said, "I gather the president is preserving his options, and this [resolution] doesn't affect his flexibility."

Staff writers Don Oberdorfer and Edward Walsh contributed to this report.

Dropping SALT II Pact Eases Curbs on Moscow

Concealment, Unannounced Tests Possible

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union, freed from the provisions of the SALT II agreement by President Reagan's decision to consider the pact a dead letter, could now test-fire a dozen of its ICBMs from concealed launchers simultaneously without first informing the United States.

That test, which might look much like a real attack to American satellites and radars, could only have been conducted after Moscow informed Washington under a little-publicized SALT II provision requiring advance notification of any test

NEWS ANALYSIS

involving multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles or one that sent test warheads outside Soviet borders. The provision was proposed by U.S. negotiators so "neither side would be frightened when they saw more than one missile being launched," according to a former State Department official who was involved in arms control matters.

Since the president has said the United States will no longer be bound by the SALT II strategic arms limitation treaty, "it is difficult for us to argue that [the Soviets] are bound," Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle said yesterday. "No one" in the American government, he added, "has been cast to go out and think of diabolical ways to depart from the [treaty's] provisions."

There is no assurance, however, that the Soviets will continue to observe the treaty's provisions—either those governing the number of permitted weapons on each side, or the many less-publicized sections of SALT II designed to stabilize and regularize the competition between the superpowers.

Roger Molander, a former White House aide who worked on arms control issues in the Nixon, Ford and Carter White Houses, said yesterday that the SALT II rules had the effect of making new modernization of strategic weapons "predictable and increasingly boring."

As a result, he said, proposals to build ever more offensive weapons lost much of their appeal. Molander also said that when both sides could see and assess the other's nuclear programs, both felt relatively secure.

That could now change. One provision in SALT II praised by its supporters prohibited deliberate concealment of weapons tests and deployments by both nations. The Reagan administration has charged that the Soviets have violated the treaty provision that prohibits encoding essential data from missile tests, but there are many other important concealment provisions with which they have, to date, complied.

If they now decide to change that policy, the Soviets could begin to cover over silos of deployed missiles, hide the locations of their new generation of SS20 and SS25 mobile ICBMs and severely limit what U.S. spy satellites can see from space, including whether new holes are being dug anywhere in the Soviet Union for new missile launchers.

The Soviets "can blind those KH11 [U.S. photoreconnaissance] satellites anytime someone gives the order," said Molander. "That closed society will have a lid on it" if the Soviets opt for concealment, he added.

"One of the most important losses [from abandonment of the SALT II agreement] would be in the denial of information," according to Jack Mendelson, deputy director of the Arms Control Association and a former Foreign Service officer on the SALT II delegation during the Carter administration and the START (strategic arms reduction talks) delegation under Reagan.

He said it would be impossible to measure the effects if "we let offensive missiles be concealed."

Another SALT II provision prohibits the Soviets from putting more than 10 warheads on their presently deployed, giant SS18 ICBMs, considered by Perle and others to be the most dangerous Soviet missiles. A basic part of the Reagan administration's arms con-

trol policy up to now has been to get deep reductions in the SS18 force.

Without SALT II, however, the Soviets could increase the number of warheads carried by the SS18, a step that could be taken fairly quickly since the Soviets established with tests in the late 1970s, according to U.S. intelligence, that the missile could carry up to 14 warheads.

Perle said yesterday he believes the Soviets may already have put 14 warheads on some SS18s. Lacking SALT II, they could openly test that capability and quite quickly add 1,200 new warheads to their force.

The Soviets have also been developing a successor to the SS18, and according to one former U.S. official, they "are on the verge of the first test flights." That missile has probably been developed to carry 10 warheads because of the SALT II limits but, he added, it "shouldn't take more than two years to develop the capability for it to carry far more than that number." Theoretically, a missile the size of the SS18 could carry as many as 20 warheads.

The SALT II rule that limited the number of warheads on land-based missiles to 10 was done "to protect our own missile force," according to a former aide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on arms control matters.

"There was a linkage [between the size of their forces] and the survivability of our systems," he said, referring to the fact that SALT put an upper limit on the number of accurate ICBM warheads the Soviets could aim at U.S. targets.

The SALT agreements also made use of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, established in Geneva under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, as the forum for raising questions of compliance with the arms agreements.

Administration officials have acknowledged that they will no longer raise any challenge to Soviet behavior at the consultative commission meetings on the grounds that it violated SALT II. Meeting with reporters and editors of The Washington Post yesterday, Perle predicted that the Soviets would commit additional "violations" in the future, but under questioning he acknowledged that the word violations could no longer be applied since Reagan decided to cease respecting SALT II.

Armed Services Stay Flexible On Compliance With SALT II

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

128/60
Despite President Reagan's statements that his administration is moving to exceed the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty later this year, the timing of such an event is uncertain.

The Air Force and the Navy are keeping options open that would permit the United States to continue to remain in technical compliance with the agreement, according to Pentagon officials.

Reagan threatened to exceed the SALT II limits later this year by building more B52 bombers capable of carrying air-launched cruise missiles than permitted by the pact.

But the president left open the possibility that he could make other reductions that would keep the United States in technical compliance by saying he would "take . . .

into account" any "constructive steps" taken by the Soviets to satisfy U.S. concerns about their alleged violations of the SALT II agreement.

"I wouldn't be surprised if they changed direction [on the B52 modification program]," one Pentagon officer associated with the cruise missile program said of his civilian superiors yesterday. "I read the papers and see opposition growing to exceeding the limit," he said.

The Air Force cannot say for certain when the United States will exceed the SALT II limit of 1,320 multiple-warhead systems by producing its 131st B52H equipped to carry cruise missiles, a Pentagon spokesman said yesterday.

"We are not sure when that number will come up," the spokesman said, noting that by counting two cruise missile-capable test B1B aircraft and one test B52H, the total

may be reached in late November or December. Previously, the Strategic Air Command has not been counting those three test planes against the SALT II limit. The tally can also be affected by accidents. A cruise missile-carrying B52G crashed in October 1984, reducing the number of counted bombers by one.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger reflected the Pentagon's confusion on the timing of new deployments by telling journalists the day after the president's decision that he thought it would be "August or September, somewhere in there" when the SALT II limit would be breached. A day later he changed his guess to later in the year.

The date is important for diplomatic and political reasons. The Soviet Union has announced it will not take any new military steps in response to Reagan's abandoning of the SALT II pact until after the United States actually goes over the limit. On the political front, the president will have to review his decision in the September-October period, in the midst of a key con-

gressional election that could shift control of the Senate to the Democrats, and possibly on the eve of a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

At one point, the Air Force was prepared to keep the bombers within the original SALT II limits by introducing basic wiring in B52s to enable them to be modified quickly for use on cruise missile carriers without completing the conversion.

In a related development, Navy officials said that their service was far from certain it would keep two 20-year-old Poseidon submarines, scheduled for overhaul next year, as ballistic missile-firing boats once they are refurbished and refueled. "We have not made provision for the four crews that would be necessary to operate those boats" as missile-carrying submarines, one Navy officer said.

Instead, he said, the service is studying the possibility of using the refurbished submarines as transports for special forces or even cruise missile carriers.

If these submarines are not returned to duty with their intercontinental missiles, they will no longer count against the SALT II limits.

Taking them out of service in this way may restore technical compliance with the treaty for at least another 1½ years, even if new deployments of cruise missile-carrying bombers continue on schedule.

Edwin M. Yoder Jr.

A Diplomatic Blunder

The Reagan administration's capacity for borrowing nuclear trouble has been exercised once again in the threat to dispense later this year with the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty.

The timing is horrible—as if some gremlins in Caspar Weinberger's shop could hardly bear the sight of the Russians stewing on the nuclear griddle after Chernobyl and had jumped to seize the spotlight for us.

Every NATO ally is alarmed and annoyed. Yet with truly sublime obtuseness, Secretary of State George Shultz dismisses this fraternal unrest as having more to do with "imagery" than with "content."

Depending on what one means by "imagery," Shultz's distinction falls somewhere between absurd and untenable. Nuclear policy, especially in matters relating to deterrence, is 80 percent a question of impressions—or "imagery," if you prefer. Despite the occasional burst of madcap talk about the feasibility of successful nuclear war, nuclear weapons exist only to prevent their own use. In that connection, "imagery" is all-important.

For Europeans, the primary value of the SALT II treaty likewise has less to do with the esoteric technical limits it imposes than with what it symbolizes. In European eyes, arms control agreements betoken that the United States and the Soviet Union, with their globe-busting arsenals, can observe modest regimes of restraint.

The untimely U.S. threat to renounce the SALT II

limits seems to be the byproduct of a struggle in the administration. After strenuous debate, President Reagan recently decided to observe the limits by scrapping two old nuclear submarines as the latest Trident begins sea trials. The anti-arms-control faction wanted the two Poseidons mothballed. It would appear that they extracted a presidential vow that this would be the last gesture of self-restraint—that the United States will jump the fence next December when bombers armed with new cruise missiles will enter the fleet and push total U.S. "launchers" through the SALT ceilings.

The declared excuse for the breakout, however, is a remarkably hackneyed one—Soviet "violations" of SALT II of which Perle, Weinberger & Co. have been complaining for years. One compliance issue is a Soviet missile that we call the SS-25. We claim that it is a second new heavy missile, violating SALT restraints. The Russians insist it's a remodeled SS-13.

But even if the violations are substantial, and resistant to the usual consultative procedures, they need balancing against the treaty provisions that are observed.

In the 1980 campaign, Reagan denounced SALT II as "fatally flawed." But by May 1982, he had been persuaded that it included limits of genuine value to the United States—even in the view of hard-headed military and intelligence professionals.

Those limits are still working. SALT II sets missile ceilings that the United States has been able to build up to, while the Soviets were forced to build down to them. The "counting rules" make the Soviet arsenal easier to verify. And the limitation on the numbers of missiles that can be "MIRVed" (armed with multiple warheads) is advantageous, as is the limitation of "MIRVed" missiles to 10 warheads. (U.S. experts believe the Soviet monster missiles are capable of carrying more than 10. That's part of what the throw-weight debate has been about.)

In the event of a breakout from the SALT II limits, the Russians could more easily and quickly augment their missile-striking power. Even if this merely stacked redundancy upon redundancy, in the usual Soviet fashion, it would not be reassuring to those who gauge nuclear dangers in quantitative terms.

But again, the greater danger is political. The embers of unilateralism in Europe are there to be fanned by abrupt and ill-considered changes of U.S. policy. European discontent could express itself in jeopardy to the strongly pro-NATO governments in Britain and West Germany, both of which face elections next year.

Thus the "imagery" that Shultz dismisses is terribly important. We can revoke this serious diplomatic blunder now, or pay the price for it later.

Lawmakers Seek Reversal On SALT II

Limits to Be Sought For 'Excess' Weapons

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

6/11/78

House and Senate critics of President Reagan's decision to abandon the SALT II limits on long-range nuclear weapons say they are working on a three-step legislative plan to reverse that policy.

The first measures to be introduced would limit funds for weapons exceeding the SALT II limits. Sponsored by Norman D. Dicks (D-Wash.) in the House and Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) in the Senate, the proposals are intended to unite the opposition by attracting cosponsors for future votes.

The second measures will be nonbinding resolutions expressing the view of Congress that SALT II limits should be maintained. Such measures are likely to have broad appeal, thereby providing leaders of both houses with an estimate of how many votes they could expect for a subsequent bill—the third step in the strategy—that would be attached to next year's defense authorization bill and require adherence to SALT II limits.

The House resolution will be drafted by Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is scheduled to be discussed at a hearing Thursday, with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Kenneth L. Adelman, former ACDA director Paul Warnke and retired SALT negotiator Gerard Smith expected to appear.

Congressional strategists expect the Fascell resolution to be approved Thursday. It will probably call upon the president to remain within the SALT II limits this fall.

In the Senate, one source said a resolution is "brewing" and that moderate Republicans in the Senate "want to give the president a chance to overrule his advisers."

The resolutions "will have an educational purpose," House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday. The resolutions would give pro-SALT members a chance to explain their positions to their colleagues and the public.

Although bipartisan majorities in both houses—221 House members and 54 senators—signed letters to Reagan before his decision urging him to maintain the SALT II limits, "there is no guarantee they would vote to make him live within those limits," a Senate aide said yesterday.

Asked yesterday what Reagan thought of the congressional criticism, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said: "We don't like it. The president will take the congressional views in consideration, but his decision has been made."

The real political battle on Capitol Hill is likely to be fought on amendments to next year's defense spending authorization that is expected to come before both houses in July. Other opponents would like to "hold hostage" some military program dear to the president, by refusing to finance the Strategic Defense Initiative, for example.

A more likely strategy is contained in the Dicks and Biden bills, which would prohibit funds for deploying or maintaining more than 820 land-based intercontinental missiles with more than a single warhead; more than 1,200 land- and sea-based multiple warhead ICBMs; and more than 1,320 multiple-warhead ICBMs and bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles.

The measures contain waivers permitting Reagan to exceed the limits if the Soviets breach them.

David S. Broder 252/178/60

SALT II: An Issue Handed to the Democrats . . .

It is hard to see how anything good will come from President Reagan's announcement that the United States will no longer be limited by the SALT II nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union. It takes the cap off the arms race at the moment when Congress and the American public show signs of wearying of its pace. As far as relations with our allies are concerned, it is a real loser. And it is likely to be a political loser for the Republicans here at home as well.

In a damage-control operation, the administration sent Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger out to do "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" on Sunday. They made reasoned cases for the decision. The treaty signed by Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev in 1979 had never been ratified, they said, and some of its terms had been violated already by the Russians. If the Russians demonstrate their sincerity by this autumn, the United States may yet agree to observe the limits.

But when all was said and done, viewers knew that a president who in more than five years has not come close to negotiating any new arms-control agreement had unilaterally decided to ignore numerical limits on nuclear missiles that the Russians and the United States had accepted and observed for the past seven years.

Canada's Conservative foreign minister Joe Clark was shown saying on television, "This is a profoundly disturbing development which we had hoped would not occur." And reports from last week's NATO meeting in Halifax were that the United States had no support among the 15 allied nations for this decision.

European countries that two years ago accepted a new generation of medium-range nuclear missiles on their territory, in return for Reagan's pledge to seek arms control, were vehement. Even Britain's Margaret Thatcher, the president's best buddy, took a walk on this one.

The attempted cover-up of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident a few weeks ago had reminded Europe and the rest of the world of the Soviets' callousness. Now Reagan has taken them off the hook and handed them an issue they well know how to exploit.

Predictably, the Russians said that if the lid is off for the United States, they will accelerate their side of the nuclear arms race as well. The higher level of competition makes sense only if you believe that the United States will shovel in dollars faster than the Russians do rubles. Weinberger left no doubt Sunday that he believes we can—and should.

But Weinberger has not been persuasive to the

majority of members of Congress of either party for at least two years. The budget resolutions passed by the House and Senate this year allow the Pentagon barely enough of an increase to cover inflation. Two weeks ago, 46 senators signed a letter saying that spending for the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) should rise only 3 percent next year—not the 74 percent Reagan had asked.

In the face of the budget deficit, the only way the president and Weinberger can blackjack Congress into raising the ante for new military hardware is to whip up a big war scare. And that is extremely dangerous to the health of the Republican Party and its chances of keeping control of the Senate this year and of the White House in 1988.

A Gallup Poll released last week (but taken in early March) showed Republicans enjoyed the biggest lead over the Democrats as the party of prosperity in the 35-year history of the survey. By a 51-33 margin those polled said they thought Republicans were better bets to keep the nation's economy healthy.

But the same poll showed the parties at a virtual standoff (39 percent Republican; 36 percent Democratic) on keeping the peace. For all his popularity, Reagan never has convinced a majority of the voters that he is a good bet for avoiding war.

In that respect, he is unlike other Republican presidents in modern times. In 1952 and 1956 under Dwight D. Eisenhower's banner, the Gallup Poll showed Republicans had gained the party of peace label by wide margins. They did so again under Richard M. Nixon in 1968 and held it even in 1972, when the Vietnam war continued and George McGovern ran as a Democratic "peace candidate."

Today's serious doubts about the Republicans' handling of the war-and-peace issues are particularly striking because the Democrats have not mounted any broad attack on Reagan's foreign policy in the past 18 months. While opposing specific actions, such as the arms sale to Saudi Arabia and assistance to the contras in Nicaragua, opposition spokesmen have not pushed their demands for a "nuclear freeze" or other approaches to arms-control as Democratic presidential contenders did in the two years before the last election.

Ever since arms talks resumed in Geneva early in 1985, Reagan has had a free ride at home on his handling of nuclear issues and the Soviet-U.S. relationship. That domestic truce is sure to break down over his SALT II decision. Reagan has handed the Democrats an issue when they really needed one.

Democrats Vow Push For SALT II

Sen. Exon Says SDI Support May Suffer

6/3/86
By Lou Cannon and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Congressional Democratic leaders warned yesterday that they will pressure President Reagan to stay within the limits of the SALT II arms control agreement and that his decision to abandon the unratified treaty later this year could further jeopardize funding for his favorite Pentagon program, the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Sen. J. James Exon (D-Neb.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services subcommittee that will approve the budget of the missile defense program, said he "may have to waver in my generally strong support of SDI" if as a result of the president's statement last week both superpowers ignore the SALT II limits "and the arms race takes off on a new fast track."

Bipartisan groups in the Senate and the House said they would draft proposals to restrict the administration from spending more for missiles than would be allowed by the SALT II treaty, which was signed in 1979 but never ratified by the Senate.

Meanwhile, U.S. allies continued to object strongly to both the substance of Reagan's decision and the manner in which they were informed of it. The allies were told in advance about Reagan's two-edged decision, which called for dismantling two missile-firing submarines to keep the United States within the SALT II limits for the present. They also were told that the United States was likely to exceed the limits late in the year when more B52 bombers are equipped with air-launched cruise missiles.

However, this advance notification by ambassadors Paul H. Nitze and Edward Rowney did not include the information that Reagan would make a complete break with the principles of SALT II, according to diplomatic sources.

"We are now facing a six-month internal debate within the alliance," said a high-ranking NATO diplomat yesterday.

The Soviets, meanwhile, sought to gain advantage from the dispute in world opinion by asking the Western allies to seek U.S. adherence to SALT II. Soviet President Andrei Gromyko met with members of the British Parliament and asked them to try to influence the United States to keep SALT II. Reagan has said Moscow systematically violates the accord.

A delegation member quoted Gromyko as saying, "SALT II has been dealt blow after blow by Washington. This latest action is a high explosive charge under it. This is a major American blunder."

White House spokesman Edward P. Djerejian yesterday repeated U.S. charges that Soviet violations have discredited SALT II. He complained that major newspapers gave "very little coverage" to White House reaction to Soviet statements denouncing the president's decision.

But in comments later in the day Djerejian and other White House officials left the door open to a change in the president's position this fall if the Soviets correct treaty violations and negotiate "seriously" on arms control proposals being considered in Geneva.

"The Soviet Union has another opportunity here to give us pause to rethink our position," Djerejian said. "It depends on what they put on the table in Geneva. We've gone the extra mile, but there's a few more inches in it."

White House legislative liaison William Ball, saying the administration was aware of some congressional discontent with the decision, said the president will be "monitoring Soviet behavior and reacting to it."

Congressional attempts to force the administration to remain in compliance with SALT II could face constitutional problems because the treaty was never ratified, according to both congressional and White House sources. Congressional sources said they hope to overcome these problems with an amendment to the defense authorization bill.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), yesterday denounced Reagan's decision and called it "a triumph of ideology over common sense." He said that if the administration was engaging in a "ploy to wring greater concessions from the Soviet Union and enhance the prospects" for a successful summit, it is playing "a dangerous game."

Administration officials disputed the contention of Reagan critics that the abandonment of SALT II would intensify the arms race. Djerejian said the Soviets have sufficient nuclear missiles and are constrained by economic conditions. Secretary of State George P. Shultz said Sunday on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" that he did not anticipate "any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces."

Staff writer Helen Dewar
contributed to this report.

DO NOT RELEASE

THE FOLLOWING
PAPERS.

JUSTICE PARNESS

6/27/86

INTERIM RESTRAINT
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

-- The U.S. will continue to exercise utmost restraint.

-- While modernizing our strategic forces is the highest national security priority, we will meet our strategic needs by means that respond to the Soviet threat but provide no incentive for a further Soviet buildup.

-- The President seeks to substitute a relevant and operational foundation of restraint for one that was not working and increasingly obsolete.

-- The U.S. plans no appreciable numerical growth in strategic missiles and bombers.

- Unless there is a significant change in the threat, the President has pledged not to deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads or strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than the Soviets.

-- No policy of interim restraint is an adequate substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be confident of Soviet compliance.

- The President's highest arms control priority is significant, verifiable and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

- We have endeavored to engage the Soviets in serious negotiations to achieve such cuts.

-- SALT II, on the other hand, endeavored to limit increases.

- It focused on the wrong things; it was a treaty about launchers and did not prevent increases in the number of warheads and throw-weight.

- Since SALT II was signed seven years ago, the Soviets have gone from approximately 5000 strategic warheads to 9000 today.

- Under SALT II only prospects for continued increases in warheads and continued potential for instability. There had to be a change.

-- At the same time, the Soviets engaged in a persisting pattern of militarily significant violations, including: deployment of a second new type of ICBM, the SS-25; encrypting test missile telemetry; and construction of the large, phased-array, missile tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.

-- We face very serious budget constraints. If the U.S. is to be responsible for NATO's strategic retaliatory capability, it makes little economic sense for us to tear down modern systems if the Soviet Union is not showing the same quality of restraint.

-- Because the President decided on economic grounds to dismantle two Poseidon submarines, we will be in technical compliance with SALT II until the 131st heavy bomber is equipped for ALCMs toward the end of this year.

-- If the Soviets take corrective action, we will certainly take this into account.

-- Therefore, final decision on retention of individual U.S. systems has not been made. If Soviets exercise restraint and other constructive steps, the President will exercise restraint when the next modernization milestone is reached.

-- It is not a matter of whether SALT is dead or alive. Restraint is alive for our part. We encourage Soviets also to exercise restraint and constructive arms control steps.

Drafted:PM/SNP:DMozena
06/16/86 EXT. 647-5097

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14 - 24 OCTOBER 1983

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I am deeply honored to have been asked to give this year's Herscu Oration. And in accepting your invitation I am mindful, not only of the distinguished men who have preceded me, but that, were it not for his sudden and tragic death last month, one of America's truly great men, Senator Henry Jackson, would have delivered this oration in 1984.

Some months ago, when I began thinking about what I would say on this occasion, I decided to comment on three nations: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel, and on the relationships among them - not only those geopolitical relationships that are the subject of daily headlines, but on what each has come to represent in a world as much divided by the clash of moral values as political alignment or strategic posture.

When I sat down to put these thoughts in writing, Scoop Jackson seemed a natural, even an inevitable part of what I wanted to say. For, in a public career that began before WWII (for more than 10 years of which I was privileged to work alongside him as a member of his Senate staff) he believed deeply in, and fought tirelessly to protect, a conception of individual liberty, that binds together the United States and Israel and sets both apart from the Soviet Union. His abiding concerns were the strength of the Western democracies in the face of totalitarian power of both the left and the right, and in marshalling that strength for the protection of individual liberty and social justice.

So it was natural that he should have championed the great causes of safety for Israel, freedom for Soviet Jewry and the security of the alliance of democratic nations in which my country and yours are joined. And as these are the subjects of my remarks tonight, I hope I may be permitted, in what I have to say, to honor his memory by sharing with you the public vision of this great and good man.

Without, I am quite sure, ever thinking about whether he was a Zionist, in 1945 Congressman Jackson, a young member in his third two-year term, spoke on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives in support of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. It was enough for him that the suffering of the Jewish people in the modern diaspora made the establishment of a Jewish national homeland a matter of simple justice. That conviction took on a profound permanence when, in 1945, Jackson, together with some fellow Congressmen, joined American forces in Germany as they liberated the concentration camps and saw at first hand the unspeakable horror of Hitler's brutality. In Jackson's case it was Buchenwald, and he arrived there within a day or two of its liberation. Years later, when people were at a loss to explain the passionate interest in Israel of an American Senator whose home state had only a miniscule Jewish constituency, he would point to that day in 1945 and the remembrance that never ceased.

In his early support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Scoop was like many for whom the holocaust left debts that remained to be paid. The establishment of Israel was one of them. But for him there was more. As the son of Norwegian immigrants, the existence of a place to which one could go, for the realization of whatever one held dear, was a matter of special importance. I can recall an occasion some years ago when in a conversation with Itzhak Rabin, who was then the Israeli ambassador in Washington, Scoop produced an understandable astonishment by remarking that, "We small countries have to stick together." Rabin turned to Jackson and said: "Israel is indeed a small country. But the United States?" "No," Jackson said, "I don't mean the United States. I mean Norway." Like many Americans, Scoop always had a soft spot for the underdog, for the small and the weak. And for the first two

decades of Israel's existence, that fledgling state, surrounded by hostile Arab armies drawn from a population of tens of millions, enjoyed the natural affinity that Americans have always had for the little guy. Thus the suffering of the holocaust and sympathy for a small, beleaguered nation built in large part from its remnant, became a wellspring of political support for Israel, in the United States, and in other countries as well.

For many Americans the young Israel was an island of democracy in a sea of traditionalist, often authoritarian anti-democratic forces. If people know anything at all about the holy land, they were likely to know that Israel held elections and its neighbours did not. For Scoop Jackson, and a majority of his Senate colleagues, the democratic character of the Jewish state was fundamental. Support for Israel was more than an act of geo-politics; it was as well, an affirmation of our most deeply held beliefs. And in the 1950's and 60's that support advanced like a great wave sweeping before it the views of experts for whom the nature of a state's political system is only one factor, and often not the most important, in developing and managing one's foreign policy. To this day the overwhelming support that Israel enjoys in the United States derives from the undeniable fact that it is the only Democracy in the Middle East.

The experts, in State Departments and foreign ministries around the world, have usually believed that it is too simple, too unsophisticated, to base national support for another state principally on whether it is a democracy or its enemies are authoritarian. Moreover, there has been little disposition on the part of foreign office experts to be much moved by sympathy of the underdog, or a sense that there is some entitlement to Jewish Statehood that has risen from the ashes of the holocaust.

Thus it was inevitable that, over time, controversy would develop

between the experts and the politicians, like Scoop Jackson, about American policy toward Israel.

And arise it did. The specifics took different forms and they changed almost constantly. For a while, when I first went to work for Scoop Jackson, in 1969, the issue was whether Israel should somehow be compelled to negotiate a return to its 1967 borders, giving up Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, despite the obvious vulnerability to attack that any return to a pre-1967 borders would inevitably entail. Scoop organized a broad coalition of his congressional colleagues behind a call for defensible borders for Israel - borders that could be protected with a standing army of manageable proportions.

He would point to the map of Israel, noting how artillery in the Golan Heights could - as had so often been the case before 1967 - rain destruction on Israeli farms and villages and kibbitzim below, or how, at its narrow points Israel is so utterly lacking in geography width - and therefore strategic depth - as to invite attack from Arab armies seeking to cut Israel in half and destroy its internal lines of communication.

I can recall one Washington meeting between a visiting Israeli cabinet minister and his staff and a group of a dozen important American Senators in which it was Henry Jackson, gentile Senator from the Pacific Northwest who, in the middle of the Minister's sometimes confused exposition of Israeli policy, asked that a map of Israel be produced so that he might explain the geographic dimension of Israel's security concerns to his colleagues - something he did with convincing clarity.

Those security concerns, by the way, have not changed very much over the years. A map of the region is still the best refutation of the argument that the establishment of a Palestinian state

on the West Bank would provide the basis for a durable peace in the Middle East. The simple fact is that a Palestinian state in the West Bank, dominated as it would almost surely be by irredentist movements armed to the teeth, would be a constant threat to Israel - and therefore to peace and stability to the region.

By early 1970 the Soviet Union, which had aligned itself with Nasser's Egypt from the beginning, had become so deeply involved in the Middle East that Soviet pilots were actually flying missions out of Egyptian airfields. And some of you may recall an engagement between Russian Migs and Israeli Phantoms in 1970 in which several Migs were shot down while all the Israeli F-4's returned safely to their base in the Negev.

For Jackson, the deepening involvement of the Soviets in the Middle East in 1970 was a cause for alarm. He believed that Israel could defend itself in any conceivable conflict with the confrontation states, but the Soviet Union was another matter. And while he relished hearing the young Israeli commander whose squadron had just shot down eight Soviet piloted aircraft, he came away from a 1970 visit to Israel more convinced than ever that Israel could not survive without massive American assistance and an unquestionable American commitment to the security of Israel in the face of Soviet intimidation and possibly, even, Soviet intervention.

Jackson's view of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was rooted in history. He used to remind audiences that as far back as 1788 Catherine the Great had attempted to outflank Iran, and gain its cherished warm-water port, by cultivating an alliance with the Bey of Egypt. Support to Egypt and Syria in their confrontation with Israel was but a later chapter in a long history of Russian attempts to establish hegemony, or at least

a predominating influence, in the Middle East. He believed that far from wishing to see the recurring turmoil of the Middle East stabilized, the Soviets preferred to keep the pot boiling, looking to foment trouble whenever possible in a deeply cynical effort to destabilize the region and exploit the instability to build their influence. He could never accept the tendency of diplomatic experts who wished to bring the Soviets into the on-again off-again peace process in the Middle East; and he believed that inviting the Soviets to participate in the Geneva negotiations following the Yom Kippur war was a profound mistake. He could never understand why one would invite to the peace table a country whose policy was to prevent the conclusion of any stable peace and whose every action reflected a preference for conflict rather than co-operation.

Jackson understood that security for Israel had to mean more than the United States simply supplying guns and tanks and aircraft to the Israeli Defense Forces. That was important - and he was the author of legislation in 1970 that made available the first \$500 million Israel received from the United States for the purchase of Phantom aircraft - but it was not enough. The United States had also to be strong enough to deter the Soviet Union from intervening on the side of the confrontation states, and that meant a strong NATO, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, and a strong American strategic capability.

The early 1970's was a period when the war in Vietnam colored the thinking of many Americans toward all things military. There was an upsurge of what today would be called pacifist sentiment. The U.S. defense budget was hotly debated. It used to puzzle Scoop Jackson that a significant segment of the American Jewish community was hostile to the American defense effort, aligned with the left on issues of the defense budget and nuclear policy, yet deeply and genuinely concerned about

the security of Israel and eager to see Israel provided with arms and ammunition. It seemed self-evident to him then - as it seems to me now - that if the United States were weak in relation to the Soviet Union the whole equation of power between Israel and her hostile neighbors would change dramatically and adversely. In short, Israel cannot be strong if America is weak.

Nowhere was this proposition more evident than in October, 1973, in the closing days of the Yom Kippur war, when Brezhnev delivered an ultimatum to the United States: the Soviet Union would intervene on the side of Egypt and Syria if Israel did not accept a cease fire and spare the encircled Egyptian Third Army.

At the time we had incontrovertible intelligence that seven Soviet airborne divisions had been placed on alert, ready to intervene in the fighting should the order come. The brutal tone of the Brezhnev ultimatum, delivered the night of October 25/26, shocked a great many officials in Washington. But it didn't shock Jackson. It was precisely what he had expected, exactly what he had warned about. The Soviets, he believed, would not hesitate to use their military power in situations they thought favorable to themselves. Hence the need for the United States to maintain its military strength.

In response to the Soviet threat to intervene the United States combined an intense round of diplomacy with an alert of U.S. nuclear forces. The nuclear alert was a crucial element in the diplomacy that accompanied it, and an act whose profound significance has not received the attention it deserves. For on the night of October 25/26, 1973, the United States was saying to the Soviet Union that if it attempted to exploit its superior ability to intervene directly in the fighting in the Middle East the United States would be ready for any ensuing escalation

of the conflict that would result. For years Jackson had argued for a strong American nuclear posture. For years he had done battle in the Congress with coalitions that sought to cancel or delay strategic nuclear programs - coalitions that invariably included large segments of the American Jewish community. Now a crisis had developed in which the survival of Israel was directly menaced by the Soviet Union, and the invocation of that same nuclear deterrent for which Scoop had long argued was a crucial element in keeping Soviet forces out of the Middle East fighting. If his lesson had not always been learned, it had at least been well taught.

For it seems to me as clear today as it was a decade ago that the long term survival of Israel continues to depend on the strength of the West in general and the United States in particular. And if this proposition should be understood by anyone it should be understood by those who cherish the state of Israel and desire to nurture and protect it.

American perspectives about Israel and the Middle East have become vastly more complex in the decade following the early 1970's. The expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt, the shift in Egyptian policy under Sadat, the controversy surrounding the policies of the Begin government with respect to the West Bank and, more recently, Lebanon, have all complicated the once simple image of democratic Israel on one side and Soviet supported confrontation states on the other.

As always the experts could be found arguing that American support for Israel has become an unduly costly encumbrance on the flexibility and agility of American middle east policy under the changed circumstances of the realignment of Egypt, the rise

of OPEC, the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that has engulfed Iran and threatens to spread throughout the Gulf and beyond, the appeal on the left in many countries of the Palestinian cause and sometimes even the PLO.

Jackson never found the PLO issue particularly difficult. The PLO, by its very charter, is dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel. And it is prepared to use terror and violence to accomplish that purpose. He used to watch with a certain bemusement as various European governments flirted with the PLO, either because it had become fashionable in certain intellectual circles or in the vain hope that some national advantage would result.

While he was profoundly aware of the complexity of Middle eastern and world politics, Scoop Jackson rejected categorically the idea that America's interests, or the cause of peace, would be advanced by hedging in any way America's historic support for a strong Israel. For one thing he believed that it was fundamental to America's role in the world, to America's perception of itself, that we stand by our friends, in good times and bad.

You stood by your friends even when there were areas of disagreement. I am quite certain that there were elements of the policies of the Begin government that Jackson thought short-sighted and unwise. On occasion he expressed those views privately to senior Israeli officials. But when Israel was in trouble, Jackson was always there.

There have been times in the last few years when important figures in the American Jewish community have sought to distance themselves from Israeli government policies, particularly the policies of the Begin government. Scoop never did. For him a friend was a friend, and the underpinnings of that friendship, rooted in history, experience, moral values and even global politics, were

so durable and so deep as to dwarf any minor point of difference.

Jackson believed in getting his priorities right, and in the Middle East he believed that the first priority was the containment of Soviet power and influence. This meant endeavouring to build a coalition of Israel, Egypt and the Shah's Iran. The collapse of a pre-Western Iran and the death of President Sadat of Egypt rekindled his conviction that America's most dependable ally in the Middle East was its only democracy - and he never wavered in his defense. He admired greatly the skill and courage of the Israeli defense forces. He drew inspiration from the spirit and the determination of the young men and women (sometimes boys and girls, really) in uniform who he never tired of meeting on his several trips to Israel. "Give them the tools to do the job," he would say to his fellow senators as he argued for an amendment to the defense bill that made low interest credits available to Israel for weapons procurement in the United States.

Jackson's great vision for Israel was a country at peace. He was a realist, though, and he understood that if peace ever came to Israel it would be an armed peace, a peace made secure through strength - in Israel and in America.

In 1972, after two and a half years of allowing a slowly increasing flow of Jews to leave the Soviet Union for Israel, the Kremlin suddenly imposed an education tax on would-be emigrants. Ranging up to 30,000 rubles or more in the case of persons holding degrees, the tax threatened to stem, or even close down, the flow to Israel of long oppressed Russian Jews whose Jewish identity had been ignited by a triumphant Israeli victory in the Six Day War.

The device of the education tax was but one of the seemingly endless number developed by the Soviet leadership to manipulate

emigration from the Soviet Union. As part of a conscious state policy of cruelty and discrimination, the 1972 education tax threatened the first glimmer of hope that visas issued to Jews in 1970 and 1971 had inspired.

There was confusion both among the Jews of Russia and their friends in the West. Protests were organized. Appeals were made. Friendly governments made low key diplomatic representations urging the Soviet authorities to reconsider.

At about this time the American administration in Washington, in the belief that expanded commercial relations between East and West would moderate Soviet international behaviour, had prepared legislation authorizing the President to extend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. This would have permitted Soviet goods to enter the United States at favorable tariff rates. There were also indications that the Administration was preparing to extend substantial long-term credits to the Soviets, something for which it required legislative authority.

Henry Jackson saw an opportunity, and he seized it. He introduced in the Senate a bill that prohibited the extension of most-favored-nation status or credits to any country that prevented its citizens from emigrating, either by imposing prohibitive taxes or by any other means. And then he began the slow process of rounding up support for a bill that the Administration, along with the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce and most of the American business community, vehemently opposed.

The odds in favor of prevailing against those who opposed the linkage of trade and emigration seemed slight. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were at the height of their power and influence and they were determined to press ahead with an expanded US - Soviet Commercial relationship. Neither wanted the emigration

of Russian Jews and other dissidents to encumber their plans. And they propounded a theory that quiet diplomacy alone would achieve better results.

But Jackson, despite the opposition, introduced his amendment, with a number of co-sponsors, on March 16, 1973. On March 20 there was an official announcement out of Moscow that, while it would remain on the books, the diploma tax would not be enforced anymore.

The diploma tax was not, of course, the only means by which the Soviets sought to limit, and at times virtually halt, emigration. Applicants seeking exit permits lost their jobs; their children were expelled from schools; jail was a real possibility.

The Jackson amendment was drafted broadly enough to condition trade benefits for the Soviets on an end to all these various abuses. The Soviets knew that, and they tried by every device they could conceive to frustrate its passage.

One such device was to increase the number of exit visas granted in the hope that the Congress would reward some temporary liberalization by defeating the amendment. Thus the number of visas granted in 1973, while the amendment was pending before the Congress, reached what was they a record high of 35,000.

When the amendment finally passed into law late in 1974 it was after extensive negotiations between the Administration in Washington and the Soviets. At one point a deal was struck - in exchange for a Soviet commitment to liberalize its emigration practices they could receive trade benefits on a year to year basis. As long as people flowed West the Soviets could expect goods and services to flow East. The Soviets later denied that

they had ever agreed; and to this day they remain ineligible to receive American trade benefits unless the President of the United States certifies that they have taken action to permit freer emigration. For the first time in the history of the United States a matter of human rights has been written into a law that has some consequences. And President Reagan has said that "...it was right and proper to link trade concessions to the Soviet Union with significant movement toward free emigrationI am proud indeed of the extraordinary bravery of those seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Jews have shown the world what courage and the determination to be free can mean even for men and women who could be imprisoned as a result of their desire to emigrate."

It is impossible not to be moved by the bravery and the persistence of the Jews of Russia. Listen to these words spoken by Anatoly Scharansky at the trial at which he was sentenced to 13 years on trumped-up charges of espionage:

"I am told that if I agreed to collaborate with the KGB in order to destroy the Jewish emigration movement, then I will be given a short sentence, quick release and even the possibility of joining my wife.....It might appear that I must have regrets about what has happened. But this is not so. I am happy. I am happy that I have lived honestly, in peace with my conscience, and have never betrayed my soul, even when I was threatened with death."

Some years ago, when the Jackson amendment was still pending before the Senate, Andrei Sakharov took the unprecedented - and obviously dangerous step - of sending an open letter to the U.S. congress urging that the amendment be passed. A failure to enact the amendment, he said, would constitute "a betrayal

of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camp and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin wall."

Let me say to Andrei Sakharov that the U.S. congress did the right thing in 1974; and the Reagan Administration today remains faithful to that great act of legislation.

My country will continue to deny trade benefits to the Soviet Union - credits and most-favored-nation status - until they meet the test of law as set down in the Jackson amendment. That is the least we can do to remain true to our own ideals and to mark the admiration that men like Anatoly Scharansky must inspire in every one of us.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 14, 1986

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I want to make an announcement today concerning the question of limitations on nuclear testing, an important arms control area which has been the subject of special correspondence which I have had recently with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the leaders of six nations known as the New Delhi Group, and Senate Majority Leader Dole.

I have conveyed to General Secretary Gorbachev today a new, very specific and far-reaching proposal concerning nuclear testing limitations, a proposal which could be implemented immediately. In this new initiative, I urged the Soviet Union to join us without delay in bilateral discussions on finding ways to reach agreement on essential verification improvements of the Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

In the field of nuclear testing, as in arms control generally, effective verification is a central element. It has also long been one of the most difficult problems to resolve. We are seriously concerned about the past pattern of Soviet testing as well as current verification uncertainties, and have determined that a number of Soviet tests constitute likely violations of obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. The inadequacy of the monitoring regime provided for in that agreement is underscored by the Soviet Union's own questions concerning the yields of particular U.S. tests, all of which in fact have been below the 150 kiloton threshold.

The U.S. places the highest priority in the nuclear testing area on finding ways of ensuring effective verification of the TTBT and PNET. I have already made several specific suggestions to the Soviet Union in this regard. My new initiative is a further attempt to build the necessary basis for confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding such limitations.

As a reflection of our resolve to make tangible progress, in my new proposal I identified to Mr. Gorbachev a specific new technical method--known as CORRTEx--which we believe will enable both the US and USSR to improve verification and ensure compliance with these two treaties. This is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from a nuclear explosion. I provided to Mr. Gorbachev a technical description of CORRTEx designed to demonstrate how this method will enhance verification procedures.

MORE

To allow the Soviet Union to examine the CORTEX system more fully, I further proposed that Mr. Gorbachev send his scientists to our Nevada test site during the third week of April, 1986. At that time, they could also monitor a planned US nuclear weapons test. I would hope this would provide an opportunity for our experts to discuss verification methods and thus pave the way for resolving the serious concerns which have arisen in this area.

In making this offer, I made clear to General Secretary Gorbachev that if we could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating such a method to verify the TTBT, I would be prepared to move forward on ratification of both the TTBT and PNET.

What is unique about this new initiative is its specificity and concreteness, and the detailed new technical information we have provided to the Soviet Union in trying to solve these verification uncertainties. It is important that the Soviet Union engage with us now in this first practical step to improve the confidence we each must have in treaty compliance with the 150 kiloton threshold on underground tests. If this can be achieved, we believe we will have significantly improved the prospects for verifying other arms control agreements as well through improved verification regimes.

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THRESHOLD.

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APPROVED BY: PH:NAHOLMES

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D:JPTIMBE

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TAGS: PARM, MNUC

SUBJECT: FURTHER GUIDANCE ON US NUCLEAR TESTING
LIMITATIONS POLICY

REF: (A) 1985 STATE 254986 (DTG 202040Z AUG 85)
(B) STATE 049461 (DTG 152056Z FEB 86) (NOTAL)

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS TODAY RELEASED THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENT ON A NEW US NUCLEAR TESTING INITIATIVE.
ADDRESSEES SHOULD MAKE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
AVAILABLE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS OFFICIALS AS APPROPRIATE
AND MAY DRAW UPON THE TEXT, SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND
PARAGRAPHS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND REFTELS IN RESPONSE
TO QUERIES ON INITIATIVE AND US NUCLEAR TESTING POLICY.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:

I WANT TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY CONCERNING THE
QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, AN IMPORTANT
ARMS CONTROL AREA WHICH HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SPECIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WHICH I HAVE HAD RECENTLY WITH SOVIET
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, THE LEADERS OF SIX NATIONS
KNOWN AS THE NEW DELHI GROUP, AND SENATE MAJORITY LEADER
DOLE.

I HAVE CONVEYED TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TODAY A
NEW, VERY SPECIFIC AND FAR-REACHING PROPOSAL CONCERNING
NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS, A PROPOSAL WHICH COULD BE
IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. IN THIS NEW INITIATIVE, I URGED
THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN US WITHOUT DELAY IN BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS ON FINDING WAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON
ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST
BAN (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET).

IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR TESTING, AS IN ARMS CONTROL
GENERALLY, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS A CENTRAL ELEMENT.
IT HAS ALSO LONG BEEN ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
TO RESOLVE. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAST
PATTERN OF SOVIET TESTING AS WELL AS CURRENT VERIFICATION
UNCERTAINTIES, AND HAVE DETERMINED THAT A NUMBER OF
SOVIET TESTS CONSTITUTE LIKELY VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974. THE
INADEQUACY OF THE MONITORING REGIME PROVIDED FOR IN THAT
AGREEMENT IS UNDERScoreD BY THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE YIELDS OF PARTICULAR US TESTS,
ALL OF WHICH IN FACT HAVE BEEN BELOW THE 150 KILOTON

THE US PLACES THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR
TESTING AREA ON FINDING WAYS OF ENSURING EFFECTIVE
VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET. I HAVE ALREADY MADE
SEVERAL SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS
REGARD. MY NEW INITIATIVE IS A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BUILD
THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN OUR NATIONS REGARDING SUCH LIMITATIONS.

AS A REFLECTION OF OUR RESOLVE TO MAKE TANGIBLE
PROGRESS, IN MY NEW PROPOSAL I IDENTIFIED TO MR.
GORBACHEV A SPECIFIC NEW TECHNICAL METHOD--KNOWN AS
CORRTEX--WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL ENABLE BOTH THE US AND
USSR TO IMPROVE VERIFICATION AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
THESE TWO TREATIES. THIS IS A HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE THAT MEASURES THE PROPAGATION OF
THE UNDERGROUND SHOCK WAVE FROM A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. I
PROVIDED TO MR. GORBACHEV A TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF
CORRTEX DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THIS METHOD WILL
ENHANCE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES.

TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO EXAMINE THE CORRTEX SYSTEM
MORE FULLY, I FURTHER PROPOSED THAT MR. GORBACHEV SEND
HIS SCIENTISTS TO OUR NEVADA TEST SITE DURING THE THIRD
WEEK OF APRIL, 1986. AT THAT TIME, THEY COULD ALSO
MONITOR A PLANNED US NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST. I WOULD HOPE

THIS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR OUR EXPERTS TO
DISCUSS VERIFICATION METHODS AND THUS PAVE THE WAY FOR
RESOLVING THE SERIOUS CONCERNS WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN THIS
AREA.

IN MAKING THIS OFFER, I MADE CLEAR TO GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV THAT IF WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THE USE OF
AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM INCORPORATING SUCH A
METHOD TO VERIFY THE TTBT, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE
FORWARD ON RATIFICATION OF BOTH THE TTBT AND PNET.

WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THIS NEW INITIATIVE IS ITS
SPECIFICITY AND CONCRETENESS, AND THE DETAILED NEW
TECHNICAL INFORMATION WE HAVE PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET
UNION IN TRYING TO SOLVE THESE VERIFICATION
UNCERTAINTIES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION
ENGAGE WITH US NOW IN THIS FIRST PRACTICAL STEP TO
IMPROVE THE CONFIDENCE WE EACH MUST HAVE IN TREATY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD ON UNDERGROUND
TESTS. IF THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED, WE BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THE PROSPECTS FOR VERIFYING OTHER
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AS WELL THROUGH IMPROVED
VERIFICATION REGIMES.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE INFORMATION POSTS MAY USE
FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION AS APPROPRIATE.

-- IN SEEKING PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR TESTING AND ALL AREAS
OF ARMS CONTROL, IT REMAINS FIRM US POLICY THAT ANY
LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH US
AND ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING THREAT THAT WE FACE NOW AND
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF THE US, ITS
FRIENDS AND ITS ALLIES MUST RELY UPON A CREDIBLE AND
EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. A LIMITED LEVEL OF TESTING
ASSURES THAT OUR WEAPONS ARE SAFE, EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE
AND SURVIVABLE, AND ASSURES OUR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO
THE CONTINUED SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS BUILDUP. SUCH TESTING,
WHICH IS CONDUCTED UNDERGROUND, IS PERMITTED UNDER THE
EXISTING AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATIONS, ALL OF
WHICH THE US FULLY COMPLIES WITH--THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN

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TREATY (TTBT), THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY
(PNET), AND THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (LTBT).

-- THE US PLACES THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA ON FINDING WAYS OF ENSURING EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET. THE US HAS ALREADY MADE SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS REGARD.

--- IN 1983, THE US GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN A DISCUSSION OF ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS.

--- IN SEPTEMBER 1984, PRESIDENT REAGAN PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIET AND US EXPERTS TO MEASURE DIRECTLY THE YIELDS OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES.

--- IN JULY 1985, PRESIDENT REAGAN UNCONDITIONALLY INVITED SOVIET EXPERTS TO OBSERVE A US NUCLEAR TEST AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE, BRINGING WITH THEM ANY INSTRUMENTATION DEVICES THEY DEEMED NECESSARY TO MEASURE TEST YIELD.

--- IN DECEMBER 1985, PRESIDENT REAGAN PROPOSED TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV THAT US AND SOVIET EXPERTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS MEET IN FEBRUARY 1986 TO DISCUSS OUR RESPECTIVE VERIFICATION APPROACHES, AND TO ADDRESS INITIAL TANGIBLE STEPS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

-- THUS FAR, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT RESPONDED TO ANY OF THESE INITIATIVES, WHICH WERE AIMED AT CONSTRUCTIVELY ADDRESSING OUR MUTUAL CONCERNS. PRESIDENT REAGAN REMAINS CONVINCED THAT OUR TWO NATIONS MUST FIND COMMON GROUND ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE.

-- ALTHOUGH A BAN OR MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING IS NEITHER EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE NOR A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY AND PEACE UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) REMAINS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE US. THIS MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING BROAD, DEEP AND VERIFIABLE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, A GREATER BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND AT A TIME WHEN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS NO LONGER AS ESSENTIAL AN ELEMENT AS CURRENTLY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

4. BEGIN Q&S AND AS:

Q. THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY INVITED SOVIET EXPERTS TO OBSERVE A NUCLEAR TEST AND THE SOVIETS HAVE REJECTED IT. WHAT'S NEW ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL?

A. -- THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE SEVERAL OFFERS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST TO JOIN US IN VERIFICATION

MEASURES WHICH CAN REMOVE THE SERIOUS STUMBLING BLOCK TO VERIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG TURNED A DEAF EAR TO OUR VERIFICATION CONCERNS IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA. THEY HAVE OFFERED ONLY THE MOST GENERAL ASSERTIONS OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION.

-- THERE ARE TWO NEW ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. ONE IS ITS SPECIFICITY. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS CONCRETE IN THAT WE HAVE PROVIDED A TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CORTEX TECHNIQUE, HAVE OFFERED TO BRIEF SOVIET EXPERTS ON THE TECHNIQUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE,

AND HAVE PROVIDED A SPECIFIC TIMEFRAME IN APRIL FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO COME TO OUR NEVADA TEST SITE AND EXAMINE MORE FULLY THE CORTEX SYSTEM. WHILE THERE THEY CAN ALSO OBSERVE FIRSTHAND A NUCLEAR TEST.

-- THE SECOND IS OUR COMMITMENT TO MOVE FORWARD ON RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM INCORPORATING THE CORTEX METHOD TO VERIFY THE TTBT AND PNET.

-- WE HOPE THIS WILL BEGIN A RECIPROCAL DIALOGUE LEADING TO IMPROVED CONFIDENCE IN THE VIABILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN GENERAL AND VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD IN PARTICULAR.

Q. WHY DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT THIS ONE WHEN THEY HAVEN'T ACCEPTED THE OTHERS?

A. -- I AM NOT GOING TO TRY AND ANTICIPATE THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL.

-- THE SOVIETS SAY THEY WANT PROGRESS ON TESTING. THEY RECENTLY HAVE EMPHASIZED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. ON BOTH BASES THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. THIS IS A CONCRETE PROPOSAL WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, COULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN RESOLVING OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION TREATIES.

-- WE SEEK A REASONABLE AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM BY WHICH WE CAN VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES.

-- WE HOPE THE SOVIET UNION WILL ACCEPT OUR OFFER TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING VERIFICATION ISSUE, AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

Q. DOES ANY OF THIS CHANGE THE US POSITION ON A CTBT?

A. NO, THIS DOES NOT ALTER LONG-STANDING US POLICY CONCERNING A CTBT OR A TESTING MORATORIUM WHICH BANS ALL TESTING. THE PRESIDENT HAS POINTED OUT THE ASYMMETRICAL IMPACT SUCH A HALT WOULD HAVE ON US AND SOVIET FORCES. JUST WITHIN THE LAST WEEK, IN A LETTER TO SENATOR DOLE, THE PRESIDENT AGAIN MADE CLEAR THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING THREAT WE FACE NOW AND IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS ALLIES AND ITS FRIENDS MUST RELY UPON A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT, WHICH REQUIRES A LIMITED LEVEL OF TESTING SUCH AS THAT PERMITTED BY EXISTING TREATIES. THUS, A CTBT REMAINS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CONTEXT OF ACHIEVING BROAD, DEEP AND VERIFIABLE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS, SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, A GREATER BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND AT A TIME WHEN A NUCLEAR DETERRENT IS NO LONGER AS ESSENTIAL AN ELEMENT AS CURRENTLY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

Q. WHAT IS CORTEX OR THE CORTEX TECHNIQUE?

A. -- CORTEX IS AN ON-SITE HYDRO-DYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE THAT MEASURES THE PROPAGATION OF THE UNDERGROUND SHOCK WAVE FROM A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

-- USING THE CORTEX METHOD, A COAXIAL CABLE IS PLACED IN A HOLE PARALLEL TO THAT CONTAINING THE NUCLEAR DEVICE BEING TESTED.

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-- WHEN THE NUCLEAR DEVICE IS DETONATED, A SHOCK WAVE EMANATES THROUGH THE GROUND CRUSHING AND SHORTENING THE CABLE.

-- THE RATE AT WHICH THE CABLE LENGTH CHANGES IS RECORDED VIA MEASUREMENTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGING ELECTRONIC PULSE.

-- THIS RATE IS A MEASURE OF THE PROPAGATION OF THE EXPLOSIVE SHOCK WAVE THROUGH THE GROUND WHICH IS IN TURN A MEASURE OF THE YIELD OF THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

Q. ARE US PLANS AND PROGRAMS FOR UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS IN NEVADA GOING AHEAD AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED OR HAS THERE BEEN SOME DELAY IN FURTHER TESTING?

A. -- WE DON'T COMMENT ON OUR PLANS OR SCHEDULE FOR UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS IN NEVADA.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, WE HAVE INVITED THE SOVIET UNION TO SEND EXPERTS TO THE NEVADA TEST SITE DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF APRIL TO EXAMINE THE CORTEX TECHNIQUE MORE FULLY AND TO MONITOR A PLANNED US NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST.

Q. WHEN WILL THE US TEST AGAIN?

A. -- IT IS A MATTER OF POLICY THAT WE DO NOT PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE OUR TESTING SCHEDULE IN ADVANCE.

S. FOLLOWING TECHNICAL DETAILS ON THE CORTEX MEASUREMENT SYSTEM IS PROVIDED FOR POSTS' INFORMATION AND MAY BE USED AS APPROPRIATE OR IF QUERIED REGARDING THIS DIRECT MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE.

CORTEX (CONTINUOUS REFLECTOMETRY FOR RADIUS VERSUS TIME EXPERIMENT) IS A HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE THAT MEASURES THE PROPAGATION OF THE UNDERGROUND SHOCK WAVE FROM AN EXPLOSION. THIS TECHNIQUE USES A COAXIAL CABLE WHICH IS SHORTED-OUT BY THE SHOCK WAVE AS IT PROPAGATES FROM THE CENTER OF THE EXPLOSION. THE COAXIAL CABLE IS EMPLACED IN A HOLE PARALLEL TO THE DEVICE EMPLACEMENT HOLE. PRECISE MEASUREMENTS ARE MADE OF THE LENGTH OF THE CABLE BY TIMING THE RETURN OF LOW ENERGY ELECTRICAL PULSES SENT DOWN TO, AND REFLECTED FROM, THE CABLE END. WHEN THE NUCLEAR DEVICE IS DETONATED, A SHOCK WAVE EMANATES THROUGH THE GROUND, CRUSHING AND SHORTENING THE CABLE. THE RATE BY WHICH THE CABLE LENGTH CHANGES IS RECORDED VIA MEASUREMENTS OF THE CHANGING PULSE TRANSIT TIMES. THIS RATE IS A MEASURE OF THE PROPAGATION RATE OF THE EXPLOSIVE SHOCK WAVE THROUGH THE GROUND WHICH IS, IN TURN, A MEASURE OF THE YIELD OF THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

CORTEX HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE ACCURATE TO WITHIN 30 PERCENT OF MORE DIRECT, RADIO-CHEMICAL YIELD MEASUREMENTS FOR TESTS OF YIELD GREATER THAN 50 KILOTONS AND IN THE GEOLOGIC MEDIA OF THE US TEST SITE. THIS IS BASED ON ITS USE IN OVER 100 TESTS WITH THE SENSING CABLE IN THE

DEVICE EMPLACEMENT HOLE AND FOUR TESTS WITH CABLES IN A SATELLITE HOLE. THE ACCURACY OF THE TECHNIQUE IS BELIEVED TO BE RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT OF THE GEOLOGIC MEDIUM, PROVIDED THE SATELLITE HOLE MEASUREMENTS ARE MADE IN THE QUOTE STRONG SHOCK UNQUOTE REGION NEAR THE NUCLEAR DEVICE EXPLOSION. AT GREATER SEPARATION DISTANCES, THE PROPERTIES OF THE MEDIUM BECOME MUCH MORE IMPORTANT FACTORS. A SATELLITE HOLE SEPARATION DISTANCE OF 14 METERS (46 FEET) IS APPROPRIATE FOR A TEST NEAR 150 KT.

THE ELECTRONIC DEVICE THAT PROVIDES THE TIMING SIGNALS IS A BATTERY-POWERED SUITCASE-SIZED UNIT THAT MAY BE REMOTELY CONTROLLED. ALL EQUIPMENT FOR POWER, RECORDING, AND DATA REDUCTION CAN BE CONTAINED IN A SMALL TRAILER.
WHITENHEAD

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Africa

- "Ethiopian Famine," December 1985
- "African Refugees," December 1985
- "Southern Africa: US Policy," September 1985
- "Chad: US Policy," May 1985
- "US Response to Africa's Food Needs," February 1985
- "Africa: US Policy," May 1984

Arms Control

- "NPT Review Conference," November 1985
- "Arms Control: Confidence-Building Measures," November 1985
- "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," October 1985
- "US Nuclear Export and Nonproliferation Policy," July 1985
- "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," June 1985
- "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative," March 1985
- "Geneva Arms Control Meeting," February 1985
- "US and NATO Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reductions," November 1984
- "Conference on Disarmament in Europe," November 1984
- "Arms Control: MBFR Talks," April 1984

*Do we
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East Asia and Pacific

- "The ANZUS Alliance," June 1985
- "Korea: Status Report", May 1985
- "American Servicemen Missing in Indochina," May 1985
- "US-Japan Trade," April 1985
- "US-China Science and Technology Exchanges," April 1985
- "US Export Controls and China," March 1985
- "The US and Oceania," March 1985
- "US-China Agricultural Relations," August 1984
- "US-China Relations," July 1984
- "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," July 1984
- "US-China Educational and Cultural Exchanges," June 1984

Economics

- "The World Bank," December 1985
- "Foreign Indebtedness to US Government," October 1985
- "Oil and Energy," September 1985
- "International Commodity Agreements," August 1985
- "International Aviation," August 1985
- "US Export Expansion," July 1985
- "Agriculture in US Foreign Economic Policy," May 1985
- "US Trade Policy," April 1985
- "OECD's Arrangement on Export Credits," April 1985
- "Controlling Transfer of Strategic Technology," April 1985
- "Bonn Economic Summit," April 1985

- "US Export Controls," March 1985
- "US Shipping Policy," February 1985
- "Generalized System of Preferences," February 1985
- "International Investment Policy," February 1985
- "International Monetary Fund," January 1985
- "US Prosperity and the Developing Countries," January 1985
- "Multilateral Development Banks," November 1984
- "International Antitrust Enforcement," March 1984
- "World Food Security," February 1984

Europe and Canada

- "Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting," December 1985
- "CSCE Process: An Overview," September 1985
- "Helsinki Final Act: Tenth Anniversary," July 1985
- "Austrian State Treaty of 1955," May 1985
- "US-Federal Republic of Germany Relations," April 1985
- "European Parliament," April 1985
- "US-Soviet Relations," April 1985
- "Northern Ireland," March 1985
- "US-Canada Relations," March 1985
- "US-USSR Exchanges," August 1984
- "US Policy: The Baltic Republics," August 1984

General

- "UN's Fortieth Anniversary," October 1985
- "International Narcotics Control," September 1985
- "International Terrorism," August 1985
- "The Drug Problem: Americans Arrested Abroad," March 1985
- "US Withdrawal from UNESCO," February 1985
- "Human Rights," September 1984

Latin America and the Caribbean

- "Central America: US Policy," November 1985
- "US-Mexican Relations," July 1985
- "El Salvador's Land Reform," February 1985
- "Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative," March 1984
- "Grenada Collective Action," January 1984
- "US-Brazil Relations," January 1984
- "Caribbean Basin Initiative," January 1984

Middle East

- "Arms Sales to Jordan," October 1985
- "Afghanistan," September 1985
- "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," July 1985
- "Iran-Iraq War," May 1985
- "Israel: An Overview," May 1985
- "US-Relations with Saudi Arabia," December 1984
- "Human Rights in Afghanistan," December 1984
- "Plight of the Iranian Baha'is," October 1984
- "Indian Ocean Region," August 1984
- "US-Egyptian Relations," August 1984

GREGORY A. FOSSEDAL

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cont'd

If Reaganites Decide To Propose Defense Cuts, Here Are Some Possibilities

WASHINGTON

Should Reaganites propose cuts in the defense budget? Even hawks are pondering the idea as Congress prepares further reductions in Ronald Reagan's incredible shrinking defense buildup.

It's not necessarily a bad strategy — even though President Reagan's buildup, contrary to conventional wisdom, is now running behind the levels recommended by Jimmy Carter in 1980 and 1981, and will shrink as a share of the U.S. economy if a plan proposed by leading Republican senators is adopted.

"The budget is going to get cut," reasons Adam Meyerson, editor of *Policy Review* magazine, published by the Reaganite Heritage Foundation. "We'd better come up with some ideas that won't hurt."

Fortunately, such cuts do exist. Here are just some:

● Close unneeded bases:

When the Grace Commission studied the issue of base closings in 1982, it concluded almost \$3 billion could be saved over three years. According to the Pentagon's public affairs office, that figure is too modest today, and base closings could save more than \$6 billion over the same period.

● Retire the paper pushers:

By one estimate, the services and the Pentagon's central agencies maintain a bureaucracy of some 400,000 military and civilian bureaucrats. No doubt most of these people work hard and some of their jobs are essential.

Most of these waste-and-fraud checkers, however, would not be needed — if they were replaced by a lean, but accountable, staff of a few thousand officers.

In fact, today's vast complex lies behind much of the waste in defense spending. When stories of a \$110 diode being bought for the Navy were scrutinized, for example, it turned out that the outrageous price — the item can be bought for about 25 cents at your local Radio Shack — had been estimated by cautious bureaucrats who followed faithfully the elaborate procedures laid down to prevent waste and fraud.

Eliminating this red tape, from central bureaucracies like the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency to the more than 30 committees of Congress that oversee weapons building, would save \$10 billion to \$15 billion annually, in direct costs alone. And really, the replacement of a nameless, faceless superstructure with small,

accountable program offices would liberate creative energies both within the Pentagon and in the weapons industry it attempts, vainly, to regulate.

● Eliminate the Midgetman missile:

While the Soviets are cranking-out nuclear missiles with three and 10 warheads each, Congressman Les Aspin, D-Wis., proposes a missile with just one. The result is a weapon which, even if it survives, has little strategic utility.

And Midgetman, according to reports from the Pentagon and the General Accounting Office, might not survive. Even if it could, at \$50 billion for a handful of warheads, it is much more costly than keeping our offensive force level where it is — but enhancing its survivability with a defensive shield that would protect cities as well.

Indeed, such experts as Robert Jastrow and Daniel Graham, and even the anti-Star Wars Pentagon bureaucracy, have estimated that an effective defense layer in space could be built for \$15 billion to \$50 billion. Forced to give up Star Wars or Midgetman, the United States should scrap Midgetman.

Unfortunately, the above ideas are precisely not the places Congress is likely to cut. Base closings and cuts in the military-congressional complex threaten well-defined constituencies in a given state or district. And cutting Midgetman would mean repudiating the pet project of anti-defense warlord Aspin.

Ironically, even as they hack away at defense, congressmen will talk of putting money back in to replace President Reagan's wasteful spending with needed programs — as Aspin promised to do in 1985. A closer inspection last summer by *The New York Times*, however, suggested that most of the money being added back in by Congress involved special pork barrel projects, such as the dredging of a strategically vital harbor near Kenosha, Wis., a town in guess-who's district.

Alas, Ronald Reagan has failed to give Congress a rationale to do anything but cut his defense budget. Thus even his supporters are forced to play me-too in the hope they can preserve vital defense programs until 1989.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL 5 MAY 1986 Pg.58

Democrats Gear Up to Forge New Defense Policy to Prove Their Seriousness on National Security

By TIM CARRINGTON

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — Democrats used to have a tried-and-true formula on national defense: Find a weapons system Republicans favored and fight to cancel it.

Now, however, many congressional Democrats instead are trying to find their own weapons systems and get them funded. So far, the Democrats have been pushing the Midgetman mobile missile, and are looking for others to endorse. "We have to be perceived as being for some weapons," says Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and the point-man in the Democrats' search for likable weapons.

That drive is part of a much broader effort within the party to define a new defense policy and to redress what many Democrats consider their greatest single weakness—a perception that they don't take national-security needs very seriously.

Once it's thrashed out, the new Democratic stance will be free of the isolationist, anti-spending attitudes that have dominated mainstream Democratic thinking on defense since the Vietnam years, planners say.

Groups and think-tanks working on the issue proliferate. There are the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the Democratic Leadership Council and the Democratic Policy Commission, to name three of the most active ones. "It reminds me of the environmental movement 10 years ago when that was hot," says Rep. Aspin. "You've got as many organizations as there are people."

The pursuit of a new defense posture may become something of a mine field for the Democrats, however. For one thing, some party members remain more closely aligned with the post-Vietnam attitudes than with the new, pro-weapons positions of Rep. Aspin and others. Moreover, criticism of President Reagan's defense policies—particularly after the widely supported air strikes against Libya—might be

perceived as a desire to retreat from military strength.

Already there have been squabbles between traditional, post-Vietnam Democrats and those seeking a fresher image. A national-security paper being worked up by Rep. Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.) has drawn criticism within the party because it carries "a faint whiff of the past," says one adviser to the effort.

One perceived problem in the Democrats' historic approach to national-security matters is that they focused more on Americans with whom they disagreed than on military threats around the world. The campaign for a new defense posture will likely fail if "you convince yourselves that the only problem is Patrick Buchanan and Ronald Reagan's rhetoric," says Penn Kemble, coordinator of the defense task force at the Coalition for a Democratic Majority.

To avoid seeming like a party of naysayers and critics, Democrats are opting for a conspicuously upbeat approach. For example, Sen. Gary Hart's just-published book on military reform is titled "America Can Win," rather than, say, "What's Wrong at the Pentagon," which would have been as apt a description of the book's contents.

If there is a model the Democrats have in mind, it is the presidency of John Kennedy, who assumed office on a platform of revived military strength and anti-communism. "Something like that general attitude has to be rekindled," says James Woolsey, a former Navy undersecretary who's working with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. He thinks that Democrats can capture the Kennedy "spirit of rejuvenation" by embracing high-technology defense systems and streamlined acquisition practices.

Pentagon restructuring is central to the Democrats' new posture. Recent disclosures about wasteful procurement policies have left the Reagan administration vulnerable to charges of mismanagement. "We have to make the case that we can do

the job better," says Will Marshall, policy director for the Democratic Leadership Council. "We've got a good, healthy skepticism about the Pentagon, while (Defense Secretary) Caspar Weinberger fights the slightest and smallest changes ferociously."

However, the Reagan administration has recently been less resistant to Pentagon reorganization plans. It set up a White House commission that recommended many changes long pushed by senior Democrats such as Sen. Sam Nunn (D., Ga.). "They've stolen some of the thunder from the Democrats," says Tom Kahn, assistant to the president of the AFL-CIO. Even Secretary Weinberger recently endorsed most of the commission's suggestions.

A paper prepared for a Democratic Policy Commission meeting stresses another theme prominent in the party's defense stance: the need for the U.S. to beef up its conventional defenses substantially to make it less likely that it would resort to nuclear weapons during a war. Such a program promises to be hugely expensive, however, and would come at a time when budgets are leveling off. "The military-reform approach may cost more money," concedes Sen. Hart. "This is not a way to cut the budget."

Amid the blur of differing policy positions, the chief certainty these days is that the Democrats are more preoccupied with defense issues than they have been for nearly 20 years. Mr. Woolsey recalls the much lower priority accorded defense questions just two years ago. "When we testified before the platform committee in 1984," he says, "we felt like we were given 1½ minutes just after Sister Boom Boom," a transvestite from San Francisco.

The flurry of meetings and papers on defense topics promises to continue apace. Having gone two weeks without attending a Democratic symposium on defense, the

tireless Rep. Aspin remarked the other day: "We have to regroup now and think what's next. When's the next conference?"

Arms
Control

Let Reagan Be Reaganized

Gorbachev, miffed because the United States has been beastly to a Soviet client, Kaddafi, may not soon do the United States the stupendous favor of attending a summit. Gosh. Into every life some sun must shine, but this is unseasonably sunny. Another agreeable aspect of current events is this. At a moment when the allies are behaving even more badly than usual, the president must make a decision that can only be made correctly if he is prepared to annoy the allies. The question is: will the president scrap two Poseidon submarines in order to continue his zany policy of unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II treaty?

Candidate Reagan denounced SALT II as "fatally flawed." President Reagan says the Soviet Union has violated SALT II seriously and continuously. And now, for the second time in 10 months, the entry into service of a new Trident submarine requires Reagan to decide whether to continue the policy of not "undercutting" SALT II (which, even if it had been ratified, would have expired by now). Last June he ordered the dismantling of a Poseidon to keep below the 1,200 ceiling on multiple-warhead missiles. He explained this decision, which dismayed supporters of his embattled defense program, as going an "extra mile" for arms control. How such a nonresponse to Soviet noncompliance helps arms control is a mystery. If Reagan now scraps two Poseidons, he will make SALT II immortal, himself incredible and a portion of the Constitution trivial.

Reagan should say simply: we are no longer bound by SALT II. However, he is being advised to respond to Soviet violations by putting the Poseidons in dry dock indefinitely rather than dismantling them. This would be a microscopic protest: the Poseidons would not be directly destroyed, so the United States would not be strictly complying with SALT II. But dry dock would render the boats incapable of performing a military function. Besides, such boats are complex organisms and dry dock would amount to slow destruction through decay. So dry dock would amount merely to a slow-motion version of unilateral compliance. Remember, Reagan has spoken of SALT II the way Dizzy Dean spoke of his injured toe: "Fractured, hell! The damn thing's broken!"

Double standard: The Poseidons are not what is crucial. The following is. Having ordered a report on "proportionate responses" to substantial Soviet violations, Reagan will look ludicrous if he merely adopts a temporary and trivial technical violation, such as dry-docking. Ten months ago he declared the United States could not continue to live by a double standard. Dry-docking is continuation. If he sacrifices two more submarines, he probably will serve eight years in unilateral compliance. Then SALT II will no longer be Jimmy Carter's treaty. (Carter was president only 18 months after it was signed in Vienna.) It will be Reagan's treaty. And if Reagan, who campaigned against ratification of it, and who has documented

violations of it, cannot bring himself to abandon it, no president will feel free to do so.

Worse, continued compliance would release future presidents from the Constitution's requirement regarding ratification of treaties. Eight years of compliance with an unratified treaty would constitute the Reagan Precedent. Future presidents would feel free to treat Senate consideration of arms-control agreements as a dispensable formality. There would be no check on the president's power to bind the nation to whatever he and the Soviet leader decide.

Put up or shut up: The very senators most eager to bind presidents to collaboration with Congress in foreign policy through things like the War Powers Resolution are urging him to evade constitutional due process by complying with an unratified treaty. Fifty-two senators have urged Reagan to continue compliance by scrapping two boats. Fine. Let's put up or shut up.

Perhaps Reagan should negotiate with the Soviets a new expiration date of SALT II—say, 1989. Then he should send SALT II to the Senate for ratification. Of course 34 senators, including Majority Leader Robert Dole, have signed letters opposing destruction of the two submarines. Thirty-four votes would defeat ratification of SALT II. But it would be entertaining to hear the president explain why a fatally flawed and frequently violated treaty is now indispensable. Reagan's explanation probably would call to mind the baseball manager of



An effective policy sometimes requires a healthy disregard for 'world opinion'

whom a player said: "He does things that there is no justification for, and then refuses to explain them."

Reagan has dispatched envoys to ascertain what the allies think about ending compliance with SALT II. Is the suspense killing you? The allies will urge continued unilateral compliance. The allies always favor U.S. passivity. Regarding Libya, U.S. policy toward the allies was correct. It was to listen very nicely, then go out and do precisely what U.S. interests required. In his sixth year Reagan is getting the hang of something important: selective unilateralism.

The Reaganization of foreign policy requires three things. One is the Reagan Doctrine: support for resistance movements at the margin of the Soviet Empire (Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan). The second involves demonstrating willingness to use military force (Grenada, Libya), even—no, especially—without allied consensus. The third involves restoring realism by displacing the arms-control "process" as the "centerpiece" of U.S.-Soviet relations. All three policies, but especially the third, require a healthy, even jaunty disregard for "world opinion." Jefferson, a judicious writer, did not use adjectives carelessly. He spoke (in the Declaration of Independence) of a "decent respect" for the opinion of mankind. Jefferson knew there could be slavishness about opinion. The decision about SALT II, like the decision about Libya, tests Reagan's ability to rise above unworthy concern for mere opinion.

MARY MCGRORY

An Epic Struggle Against Facts

Caspar W. Weinberger is very like his boss, President Reagan. He displays the same indifference to reality, dismisses or ignores his own mistakes and, when the occasion calls for it, repeats them.

Another secretary of defense might be defensive in the light of the waste fraud and abuse revealed within his domain. Not Weinberger. He stoutly maintains that his own alert watchdogs unearthed the scandals, although this has rarely been the case—and the record shows that Pentagonians who bark about highway robbery among contractors or defects in weapons systems are regularly exiled to Alaska or reassigned to desks where they can't see the books or the duds.

Like Reagan, Weinberger sticks to a few simple themes: The Soviets are ahead; they are cheating. After five years and a trillion dollars in Pentagon spending, we are dangerously behind.

He and his principal differ only in tactics. While the president is almost always a model of "gee-whiz" amiability, Weinberger is like a defense attorney in a criminal case. He fights for every inch of ground. He treats his adversaries to a bristling, edgy hostility and when challenged, suggests witheringly that his questioner is someone who is willing to put the country at risk of Soviet domination.

Members of Congress rail against Weinberger's obduracy. But predictions that Reagan will have to divest himself of Weinberger, as is often rumored, are hollow and false. When Reagan listens to Weinberger, he hears himself talking.

The secretary of defense is anathema to arms controllers; he shares the president's aversion to accords—and is,

paradoxically, the last best hope of those who hope to avoid a hot war in the here and now.

He is the one member of the Cabinet who has demonstrably learned the lesson of Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have told him that we must never again start a war without popular support. While some hotheads want to invade Nicaragua and "get it over with," Weinberger demurs. He was opposed to the dispatch of the Marines to Lebanon. He collects weapons the way Imelda Marcos acquired shoes, but he does not want to use them. Weinberger likes to look at his arsenal. But he hates to hear shots fired in anger.

He is probably the best secretary of defense that could be hoped for in a Reagan administration.

He is currently engaged in a new and epic struggle against the facts. The whole government is facing drastic cuts under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget law. He is asking for a 12 percent increase. Weinberger will not designate a single gun, bullet or body to be given up.

He says that the solution is to adopt the president's budget. Several members of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, where Weinberger testified yesterday, pointed out that the president's budget got just 12 votes on the House floor.

But he briskly says he has authority only to talk about the increases.

Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.), a hawk, told him that he should be out peddling a tax increase to cover the rising costs.

Weinberger paid scant respect to that heresy: "I haven't heard anybody say it [a new levy] would go to defense. We

don't have to have Gramm-Rudman. There is simply no way we can absorb cuts of this kind."

One way to reduce the Pentagon purse, of course, would be arms control. Weinberger will have none of it.

Rep. Norman D. Dicks (D-Wash.) brought up the possibility and was brusquely put down by Weinberger. He turned to Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Did he know if the president would abide by the SALT II treaty?

The admiral, a heavy-faced man, said the chiefs had given the president advice, but declined to say what it was.

"It is pretty clear that the Soviets are violating SALT II. I am convinced of it," he said as Weinberger beamed at him.

Hadn't the Soviets dismantled 14 Yankee Class submarines? Dicks asked.

"I don't know the exact number," said the admiral negligently, his tone indicating that the Pentagon has no time for such fripperies.

Rep. Les AuCoin (D-Ore.), an inveterate arms controller and author of the one arms control advance in the last five years, an amendment banning antisatellite weapons testing, asked if "Star Wars" was really necessary.

"It is extremely important," Weinberger said. "The Soviets have been working on it [a space-based defense system] for 17 years."

And he said, echoing one of Reagan's biggest whoppers, "We don't want it for unilateral advantage. When we get it we will share it."

Star Wars will cost another trillion dollars. But with Weinberger, as with the president, on defense there is never enough.

In a recent Sunday New York Times Magazine article entitled "American Jews and the Holocaust" (April 18, 1982), Holocaust historian Lucy Davidowitz aptly asked: "But if another terrible crisis should arise to threaten the survival of Jews anywhere in the world, will American Jews have any more resources than they had in 1943?" Perhaps the answer must still be: "Not much." On the other hand, if the threat should be to the American Jews themselves, and also if American Jews will have studied and understood the history and meaning of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights and will have acted accordingly, perhaps then they at least would be able to say more confidently: IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE.

Nuclear Excitement

by Seymour Siegel

The juices are running again. The campus activists, the new class organizers, the hand-wringing liberals have a new cause—nuclear disarmament. It may be a coincidence, but it is interesting that the hue and the cry is being raised just when the Reagan Administration is gearing up to make sure the Soviets do not achieve permanent military superiority over the United States.

There seems to be a proliferation of groups calling attention to the horrors of nuclear war and proposing various solutions: ranging from unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States to a nuclear freeze.

It is important to analyze the basic principles which should guide our discussions on this vital and crucial topic.

First of all, there is no one who wants a nuclear war with anyone. Most of all, the military personnel are aware of the unspeakable terrors which would ensue should such a conflict take place. President Reagan and other administration officials have repeatedly expressed their aim in avoiding an atomic war. To view the current leadership of the United States as trigger-happy atomic warriors just waiting for a chance to use their atomic "toys" is wrong and malicious.

The question, therefore, is not whether one is pro-war or anti-war, the question is what is the best strategy to avoid war. The appropriation by the so-called "peace" movement of the sacred word—peace—is another example of the triumph of propaganda over truth. The simple fact is that the best way to increase the possibility of a holocaust is to promote the policies of the "peace" movement.

We must understand why this is so. History and a realistic appraisal of human nature show that when adversaries face each other, the best way to avoid an armed conflict is strength. If the adversary knows that if he attacks he will be grievously hurt as a result, he will certainly hesitate to start an aggression. If, however, the

adversary believes that he can attack and, though suffering losses, will prevail, then he will be most likely to attack. This principle is certainly the basis of Israeli military strategy. It is also expressed in the famous verse—May God give strength to His people; may God bless His people with shalom (peace). If the people have strength they are more likely to have peace. This is a lesson which Jews especially should have learned. There is no doubt that the Hitlerian juggernaut rolled over Europe, thereby dooming millions of Jews and others, because of the weakness of the democracies. The "peace" movements of the thirties contributed mightily to the horror and tragedy of the forties.

Turning back to the nuclear dilemma which faces us as a nation and as members of the free world, we must make sure that the United States is sufficiently armed that any contemplation of a nuclear strike by the USSR will be dissolved by a realization of the consequences. In other words, we need enough strength to convince our enemies that we can survive a first strike with enough resources to retaliate and retaliate with force. If we follow the advice of our "peaceniks" and weaken ourselves we increase the possibility of what we all rightfully fear—a nuclear holocaust.

The fact that we already have enough weaponry to obliterate the wide world, means very little if the adversary develops, as he is seemingly doing, the capability of removing all our resources in a first strike—thus making the consequences of his actions tolerable. That is why we cannot allow the Soviet Union to enjoy nuclear superiority. The continuation of that state will provide a strong temptation to do the "unthinkable."

President Reagan has refused, wisely, to renounce a first strike option. This is wise because if the Soviet Union were to overrun Western Europe with the thousands of tanks they already possess and destroy the NATO military forces, then our best alternative would be to threaten a nuclear attack. This would probably result in a backdown and a modicum of peace.

Again this seems to be the Israeli strategy in piling up some nuclear capability in order to insure that Arab armies, God forbid, not overrun Israel without any hope of turning them back.

In other words, preparation for war is the best way to insure peace. This might sound paradoxical, especially in contrast with the sentimental slogans of the "peace" movement. Digging beneath the sloganeering and the moral posturing, the tragic truth is that the "peace" movement is fomenting war and those of us who support strong national defense are promoting real peace.

What should be done? We should work for mutual reduction of armaments with adequate inspection opportunities to check on compliance. The President has already repeated many times that this is his aim. Let us lend him and the Administration whatever support we can give.