



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

January 12, 1982

To: Ed Harper  
From: Annelise Anderson *aa*  
Subject: Fort Chaffee

I've met with HHS and Justice budget examiners, and arranged for everything to be tracked closely.

The Glasgow population will include all the Cubans now at Fort Chaffee (about 400), all those now in St. Elizabeth's hospital (50 to 60), and some people from other INS detention locations and the Atlanta prison. The average population will be 702 people.

The population initially will include 367 anti-social, non-mental cases; 210 in-patient mental health cases; and 125 out-patient mental health cases.

There is no construction to be done at Glasgow; only a fence needs to be built. Justice will be instructed to move forward with signing the contract. It will be divided into two portions, so that neither exceeds the \$500,000 that requires review by the public works committees. They will also be instructed to get the fence built and move the Ft. Chaffee Cubans first, within 30 days. They will be told that their 45-90 day estimate of time to move after signing the lease is unacceptable.

The Executive Order tasking INS is underway and is a simple matter.

HHS has provided cost estimates for 1983, and these can now be scrubbed by OMB without further input from HHS. This is being done. Justice simply needs to agree with us that they don't need \$85 million for this purpose, and can get along with something less--fewer psychiatrists.

The 1982 funds are available by transfer from HHS and we are ensuring that OMB has actually completed the paper that makes this transfer



# Memorandum

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

TO: Ed Harper

FROM: Kathy Collins *kc*

SUBJECT: Ft. Chaffee Status Report

DATE: January 12, 1982

Today's accomplishments toward closing Ft. Chaffee include:

Management. Justice met to establish project manager and necessary actions to close Chaffee by the end of February and to open Glasgow.

Glasgow Lease. OMB lined up GSA support for urgency of lease approval and expressed our preference to expedite by splitting the lease into two separable parts each under \$500K. OMB advised Assistant Deputy Attorney General Stan Morris of this procedure and he will be checking with other officials on this lease arrangement. (Dick Haase, Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service, is the GSA contact.)

Executive Order. Ron Kienlen has drafted Executive Order delegating authority to the Attorney General and sent copies today to DOJ and HHS for 24 hour review. If there are no problems, the Order could be signed by Thursday or Friday.

1982 Funding. OMB (HIM) asked the HHS budget office to prepare papers to transfer funds to INS in FY 1982.

*- DOJ Options Paper By Friday on month 1 Deadline*

1-5-82

10:30 a.m. - Talked w/ Jan Hamburg -  
referred him to Alan Nelson -  
501-371-3782  
Commissioner of Immigration,  
and Giuliani again. Informed  
me the article that raised <sup>\*</sup>questions  
for him was in NY Times / 1-3-82 -  
Mantha in library (7000) is  
sending over copy.  
(see attached article)

\* (questions about internal opposition --)  
(changing of minds)

Jim - FYI

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:

*Jim*

YOU WERE CALLED BY--  YOU WERE VISITED BY--

*John Hambrings*

OF (Organization)

*Arkansas Gazette 371 3782*

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT.  FTS

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*501 371 3782*

*Do there a prob- w/in Admin. to merge  
refugees from Ark. to Mont? - number  
of problems in "Times" what paper?*

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

5-109

*Alan Nelson / Justice*

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

*Division of Immigration*

# Politics Key to the Fate Of Camp's Last Cubans

Special to The New York Times

FORT CHAFFEE, Ark., Jan. 3 — Orestes Carrera Bravo, who is 53 years old, saw his first snow last winter, a light dusting that did not cover the soles of his boots, but he and the other Cuban refugees who remain here are soon to go to Glasgow, Mont., where snow is often measured in feet.

Mr. Bravo does not know anything about Montana, but the mention of heavy snow does not bother him.

"I'll go wherever the Americans want me to go," he said. "I hope they take me where there is some cane to cut." He was cutting cane at a prison farm in Cuba in the spring of 1960 when the captain asked those who would like to "go north" to step forward. He was imprisoned for being "dangerous," he said.

## 396 Political Symbols

Mr. Bravo and 395 other Cubans who came here after the Cuban exodus of 1960 are supposed to go to Glasgow this winter, fulfilling the campaign promises of Gov. Frank White of Arkansas. The Government is working out the details for transferring these Cubans and 135 others from the Federal Correctional Institute in Atlanta and St. Elizabeth Hospital in Washington to Glasgow, although there is some Administration opposition because of the cost.

The 396 Cubans, a handful of the 25,000 who came here, have become more important as political symbols than as individuals. They say they do not much care where they go so long as there is work and some hope of freedom. Around Fort Chaffee, local residents are now raising no clamor for their removal, and some who work there are actively campaigning to keep the refugee center.

Such acceptance is a recent phenomenon, however. Soon after the Cubans were brought to Fort Chaffee, a rarely used army installation near Arkansas' western border, in May 1980, there were riots in the crowded compound. Many Cubans ran through the streets of nearby communities.

That is when former Gov. Bill Clinton, a Democrat, won a promise from President Carter that no more refugees would be sent to the post. Subsequently, however, Mr. Carter made Fort Chaffee the consolidated refugee resettlement center, and other Cubans came.

Mr. White, a Republican, used Mr. Carter's broken promise to good effect in his campaign against Mr. Clinton in November 1980, with television commercials showing rioting Cubans. Saying that Mr. Clinton had not "stood up" to the White House, he promised that he would do so. After he won, Mr. White said that he would get President-elect Ronald Reagan to send the Cubans elsewhere.

Throughout 1980, as the Cuban population here dwindled through resettlement, Mr. White announced one new

deadline after another for the departure. Meanwhile, concern about the Cubans dwindled with their numbers.

Almost 60 people worked with the Cuban Task Force here, and in an area with an unemployment rate of 9.3 percent, the closing will do some economic harm. The employees trying to rally local support to the keep the Fort open as a permanent refugee relocation center have some business backing.

Mr. White has insisted that Arkansas has had to carry the refugee "burden" alone and that other parts of the country ought to do their share.

"I'm not sure what Arkansas' burden has been other than bearing an infusion of about \$150 million into the economy of this area," one official of the refugee program, who asked not to be named, said yesterday. Of the 127,000 Cubans who came to the country in 1960, only about 525 have resettled in Arkansas.

Mr. White has said repeatedly that the President is keeping his commitment to him and that the delays do not bother him. Last June 16, however, Mr. White sent a letter to Richard S. Schweiker, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, pleading with him to meet an August deadline for removing the Cubans. The Arkansas Gazette printed the letter in September. "I don't need to tell you how important it is to the Republican Party and to my own political future that these people be moved," Mr. White wrote.

At that time, the refugees were to be moved to Glasgow, but the Government later settled on Fort Drum in northern New York State. Then last month, Glasgow became the prime site again.

## 209 Are 'Sponsorable'

Resettlement of the Cubans has slowed to about four a week. Gunther O. Wagner, deputy director of the Cuban task force here, said that 209 of the 396 Cubans were considered "sponsorable."

"Nearly all of them have a background of severe antisocial behavior, but they can be placed in projects through halfway houses, and in six to nine months they can be integrated successfully into society," Mr. Wagner said. The others are severely mentally ill, handicapped or elderly or have severe alcohol or drug problems.

The Cubans who remain are frustrated with their inability to get sponsors and bored with the barracks routine. With each report of impending transfer, their hopes rise that their chances of freedom will alter with the scenery.

Emilio Rafael Juarez, 33, said he was discouraged with the delays.

"I don't care where we go: wherever there are the right living conditions," he said. "I just want to get out and make a living. I like to work in any kind of job."

*Hamburger questions how high up in the Admin.*

10  
Jury  
C. Brown  
FY - 1000

f IMMIGRATION

## FORT DRUM FACT SHEET

Subject - Considerations for Use of Fort Drum, New York, Department of Defense, post facilities as an interim processing center for Cuban entrants and Haitian illegal aliens.

Several areas of consideration must be taken into account regarding the use of the Fort Drum facility. These areas, expanded below, include federal consolidation issues, community economic benefits, political benefits, military benefits and of course, some downside effects.

### 1) Federal Consolidation

The cost to open Fort Drum facilities would be minimal; facilities and spaces currently used at Fort Chaffee, Fort Allen, Building "B", several BOP and INS centers and correction insitututes would be either phased out or freed-up for other uses; the military impact on the Fort Drum facilities is negligible during the period October through April; this impact could be diminished with prior proper planning from May through September; the government would have the required spaces if further additional population problems evolved; and the cost could be quickly reduced in the event of judicial actions which would return the Haitians to their country of origin.

### 2) Community Economic Benefits

A. Approximately 200-400 jobs would immediately become available to the local community. At \$12,000 per person, this represents an annual sum of \$2.4M to \$4.8M dollars which would flow into the community. An additional \$15M to \$20M would insure to the local areas in the form of contracts such as food, laundry, electrical, telephone, water, sewerage and administrative equipment.

B. With a work force of some 700 persons, the local community would reap additional monetary benefits in terms of support and recreational services which would be used by base personnel.

C. Through this tremendous additional dollar flow, the community as a whole, through its tax base dollars, will be able to consider uses for monies which would not otherwise be available.

### 3) Political Benefits

If handled properly, both Congress persons and Senators could take subdued credit for any benefits derived as well as passing problem areas upward to "the appropriate authorities". The local citizens must be prepped on the economic issues, especially in hard pressed or depressed areas, prior to reading the news in print or seeing themselves as TV spectacles. Most importantly, the government must be able to adequately insure the citizens that: the timetable set up will be basically adhered to; and the aliens will not be released from detention into their immediate community.

### 4) Military Benefits

While not evident immediately, several events could actually be in the DOD's interest regarding Fort Drum.

A. The proven ability to house persons for significant periods of time during the winter months.

B. The ability to keep the fort functioning at a high level year round.

C. The completion of renovations of the barracks facilities prior to the withdrawal of all aliens.

D. The consideration of stationing additional troops subsequent to the departure of the alien population since the community impact would have been overcome through the HHS/INS permanent workforce population.

### 5) Downside Effects

Negative reactions would occur:

A. If all considerations were to be announced outside the political lines or outside the community leaders areas of responsibility.

B. If timeframes were not adhered to for the termination of such a project.

C. If aliens were to be allowed to congregate in the local community.

D. If perceived problems were not attacked directly and the resultant reaction would have an impact on the tourist trade.

*Handwritten notes:*  
-TAB  
...  
...  
...

*Handwritten notes:*  
Mosey  
Fisher  
handing

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
November 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: James A. Baker III  
FROM: Kate L. Moore *KLM*  
SUBJECT: Fort Drum Implementation

The White House should not be further burdened with the alien detention issue.

A team leader, with clout, is required to co-ordinate the process. DOJ/INS in theory should have the lead, but Dave Martin is very skittish about working with DOJ, because DOJ showed absolutely no political sensitivity to Martin when it located a prison facility in his district.

Recommendation

I recommend that Gene Miller, now a consultant in the Office of Refugee Resettlement at HHS be designated team leader and detailed to DOJ.

I am bringing this to your attention because if he has White House as well as DOJ endorsement for his role, he will have the clout to co-ordinate all concerned agencies - Defense, INS, DOJ, OMB and HHS.

I am recommending this detail for the following reasons:

1. Miller has Dave Martin's confidence -- the two traveled to Fort Chaffee and Martin was favorably impressed. (Further, both Miller and Martin are former Marines). This rapport is very important because of Martin's complete lack of confidence in DOJ.
2. Gene Miller is the one person involved in the detention issue who has demonstrated ability to co-ordinate this tricky interagency process -- (I have confidence in no one else.) He is a consultant at HHS, brought in to deal with the Mariel Cubans. He is also politically savvy.
3. Miller is available on a project basis.
4. DOJ thinks well of Miller and I believe would be amenable to assigning him to this task.

If you concur, DOJ would work with HHS to arrange assignment, and would notify all concerned agencies that Miller has DOJ/WHO approval for this mission.

*Jim C. - pls. let E.M. know if he has any objection.*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

cc: Jim Cicconi

*but please let Craig Fuller know about this also.*

*11/12*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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\_\_\_\_\_ Approve

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

cc: Jim Cicconi

Coord - detail Gene  
Miller to DOJ

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1981

Note for: Jim Baker  
From: Kate Moore  
Subject: Phone Call to Dave Martin

This is to recommend that you telephone Dave Martin this morning as a means of helping to achieve our goal of his willingly taking Cubans who are in the mental health program at Fort Chaffee into Fort Drum (allowing us to close Fort Chaffee).

Background

Per Gene Miller's suggestion to you Tuesday night, Gene accompanied Martin and his staff to Fort Chaffee yesterday to take a look at the population.

Miller reports that the visit went very well -- Martin was positively impressed with what he saw -- and realized that this population would not pose a threat to his community.

Martin will go to his district today to smooth political waters and determine whether it is politically feasible -- from constituents standpoint -- to take in the Cubans. Martin wants to be a team player, but needs to see what will be the implications.

Your phone call will help demonstrate our continued commitment to insuring Martin is not hurt politically and thus help sell the idea of his taking all Fort Chaffee Cubans.

Talking Points - Note: important to avoid pressuring him.

1. I'm glad that you went to Fort Chaffee yesterday to take a first hand look at the people we are talking about.
2. I know that you need to talk to your constituents about what you saw - I understand you are headed to the district today.
3. We are working very hard on the feasibility of getting the initial contracts into your district so economic benefits will be directly evident. (Jim: do not promise due to possible legal contracting restraints - Martin is aware of these.)
4. I understand you have already spoken to Cap Weinberger - I trust that he will continue to be cooperative.
5. We'll want to hear how the weekend goes.

cc: Jim Cicconi

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

November 10, 1981

The federal facilities at Fort Drum near Watertown, New York, will be utilized as a temporary holding facility for aliens arriving illegally in this country, pending construction of a permanent facility. A thorough search was conducted by the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Defense. All these Departments agreed Fort Drum was the one site that met the key criteria, including capacity, availability, and minimal impact on defense operations.

Use of this site will allow the Immigration and Naturalization Service to continue the Administration's policy of detaining aliens arriving illegally in the United States, pending resolution of their status.

In connection with this decision, the President today met with Representative David Martin of New York who has been particularly concerned with the preservation of Fort Drum's role in national defense plans. The President reassured him of the Administration's commitment to the long term development and use of the base as a key defense installation. The President also indicated that the temporary use of Fort Drum as a detention facility will in no way compromise current activities at the base. No decision has been made for the location of a permanent facility.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 9, 1981

MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVE MARTIN (R-NY)

DATE:

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME:

FROM: James A. Baker

I. PURPOSE

To lessen Dave Martin's concern about our using Fort Drum, an army reserve base in Martin's district (30th), as a temporary detention site for holding aliens -- primarily Haitians and Cubans -- who have entered the U.S. illegally.

II. BACKGROUND

As part of this Administration's overall immigration policy, you have authorized a decision to detain aliens arriving illegally at U.S. shores and borders, pending resolution of their status. Detention combines with interdiction at sea and legislation to streamline asylum procedures as part of an overall effort to stem the flow of illegal aliens -- primarily Haitians -- to this country, and South Florida in particular.

After a thorough search, Defense, Justice, HHS, and the White House have determined that Fort Drum in Watertown, New York, is the only site available with required capacity (5,000 to 10,000) and a minimum of impact on Defense activities.

Dave Martin, freshman Republican Congressman from the Watertown district and a strong supporter, has written to you to express his opposition to the selection of this site. He has energized the New York Republican delegation to write on his behalf; Congressman Trent Lott has telephoned on Martin's behalf as well.

Martin acknowledges that there would be economic benefits for the depressed Watertown community, but has expressed the following concerns:

1. Weather: Winters are very severe in Fort Drum -- 12° average in January, with annual average snowfall of 60 inches. The Administration will be perceived as treating these Haitians inhumanely by locating them in (currently) uninsulated barracks.
2. Defense Activity: Martin's goal is to facilitate a build-up of Defense activity at Fort Drum to bring economic benefits to his district. He is very concerned that use of Fort Drum for Haitians will set back these efforts.

Attached are talking points which address these concerns, describe the economic benefits, and indicate our desire to work with him on other needs he may have as a Congressman. It is hoped that we will be able to win his acceptance for this effort, which will defuse the opposition from other members of Congress.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

President Reagan  
Congressman Dave Martin

White House Staff  
James A. Baker  
Max Friedersdorf

### IV. PRESS PLAN

No press.

### V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- Greet Martin
- Note his support
- Inform him of our decision to use Fort Drum; attempt to persuade him not to oppose our decision; offer to help him.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
CONGRESSMAN DAVE MARTIN (R-NY)

A. Introduction

- We have a major problem -- inherited from the Carter Administration -- of a steady flow of illegal aliens to our shores and borders. Haitians, in particular, have been flowing to South Florida in increasing numbers since Carter stopped the policy of detaining them pending resolution of their status.
- After a nationwide search over a period of several months, we have determined that Fort Drum is the only site with the capacity required and with minimal impact on our defense activities.
- Fort Drum would be the temporary site for detaining 5,000 (a maximum of 10,000) aliens for a period of 12 to 24 months while we build a permanent facility.
- I recognize this strongly affects you -- we have had to decide on Fort Drum, but would want to do anything we can to help you. We have, for example, had a conversation with Secretary Weinberger.
- Secretary Weinberger has indicated to me that he will work to build up further Defense activity at Fort Drum and he could talk to you about that.

TALKING POINTS (con't)

B. Weather

I know you are concerned about the perceived treatment of the Haitians:

- Army has noted that coal-generated heat in these barracks is so intense that during the winter, soldiers throw open the windows to bring down the heat.
- Secretary Weinberger has assured me that heating for these buildings -- sufficient for the Haitians -- will be provided.
- We will do whatever we can -- perhaps you have some suggestions here -- to make sure citizens understand that the Haitians are indeed being cared for properly.
- Use of Fort Drum will allow us to alleviate the very overcrowded conditions at Krome North in Miami -- resulting overall in more humane treatment.

C. Economic Benefits

- I know Watertown is economically depressed and there are numerous economic benefits that will accrue to your district as a result of this decision.
  - o Approximately 200 to 400 jobs would immediately become available: security personnel, administrative staff, coal stokers, etc. At the rate of \$12,000 per person, this represents an annual sum of \$2.4 to \$4.8 million.

TALKING POINTS (con't)

- o At least \$15 million would ensue in the form of local contracts: food, laundry, administrative equipment.
- o With a work force of over 500 persons, the local community would reap additional benefits in terms of support and recreational services used by base personnel.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
CONGRESSMAN DAVE MARTIN (R-NY)

A. Introduction

- We have a major problem -- inherited from the Carter Administration -- of a steady flow of illegal aliens to our shores and borders. Haitians, in particular, have been flowing to South Florida in increasing numbers since Carter stopped the policy of detaining them pending resolution of their status.
- After a nationwide search over a period of several months, we have determined that Fort Drum is the only site with the capacity required and with minimal impact on our defense activities.
- Fort Drum would be the temporary site for detaining 5,000 (a maximum of 10,000) aliens for a period of 12 to 24 months while we build a permanent facility.
- We recognize that this will be difficult for you politically. You have supported us in the past, and we at the White House want to do what we can to help you politically.
- For example, we have spoken with Secretary Weinberger who has indicated that he will work to build up further defense activity at Fort Drum and he could talk to you about that. Specific activities might include:
  - o Increasing the frequency of scheduled guard and reserve combat exercises at Fort Drum;
  - o Enhancing the facilities available at Fort Drum resulting in an increase of permanent active duty personnel stationed there;
  - o Accelerating the process of relocating an active-duty engineering battalion to Fort Drum.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III  
FROM: KATE L. MOORE  
SUBJECT: Alien Detention Site

Attached is an options paper regarding selection of a detention site for Cuban, Haitian and other aliens. Detailed costs estimates are still forthcoming from INS, but this paper surfaces the basic issues associated with each option.

The four options emerged after an exhaustive search by Defense in the eight States we agreed to investigate. These options are:

1. Fort Drum, New York
2. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
3. Glasgow, Montana
4. Westover AFB, Massachusetts

A decision is required in the next several days, because each day of delay now threatens our ability to implement an option due to the approach of winter -- some construction will be necessary. Furthermore, the lack of a decision will strain relations with the politicians involved, and we will need their cooperation.

Each of the three agencies involved favors a different option:

DOJ: Fort Leonard Wood

HHS: Fort Drum

DOD: Westover AFB

My recommendation is to utilize Fort Drum. (See separate memo attached for my rationale.)

Once a "leaning" is developed by the White House, we need to consult immediately with the relevant political parties before finalizing the decision. We also need to initiate procedural steps required by the National Environmental Protection Act before finalizing the decision.

It may be necessary to combine a meeting of principals to reach a decision; I hope you would read the attached as soon as possible in order to determine if a meeting should be called. I would like to see a "leaning" developed by Monday.

Many thanks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III  
FROM: KATE L. MOORE  
SUBJECT: Fort Drum, New York

As noted in the attached memo, Fort Drum is an army reserve facility which could accommodate 10,000 Haitians, as well as Fort Chaffee and other Cubans. It would allow us to achieve efficiencies of consolidation and to maintain our detention policy.

However, Congressman Dave Martin has expressed strong opposition to the use of Fort Drum, citing concerns over humane treatment of the Haitians, given severe weather conditions in Watertown, New York.

Reducing the level of his opposition would be key to selection of this site -- and I think it may be possible. Martin is the lynchpin. Other New York Congressmen would, I think, withdraw their opposition if Martin backed off.

Here would be a way to address his concerns:

Humane treatment

1. Army has noted that coal-generated heat is so intense in these barracks during the winter (when 1,000 soldiers are based there) that the soldiers throw open the windows to bring down the heat.

2. Conditions at Krome North -- severely overcrowded now -- are unacceptable and are inhumane vs. relocation to Fort Drum, which could improve the environment of these Haitians.

3. A local editorial has questioned the wisdom of placing Haitians in such a northern climate. If Martin were seen as the one who had obtained special assurances from this Administration as to the way Haitians are cared for in Fort Drum, it could be a plus for him.

Economic benefits

1. Watertown, a depressed community, with an 8% unemployment rate, would benefit from the 200 to 400 jobs created by this location. Further funds - several millions - would be inferred locally due to contracts generated (food, laundry, etc.)

2. The proven ability to function through the winter might encourage further DOD activity on the base -- a goal Martin has sought.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER III

FROM: KATE MOORE, WHO  
KATHY COLLINS, OMB

SUBJECT: Selection of an Immigration Detention Site

This paper presents four site options for detention of 800 Cubans (470 from Fort Chaffee) and up to 10,000 Haitians and other illegal aliens, pursuant to our announced policy of detaining illegal aliens.

Given that existing detention facilities are now at capacity, and the Administration is committed to close Fort Chaffee, a decision on subsequent facilities is needed. Political sensitivities urge a speedy resolution. Further, delay would hamper our ability to implement a decision due to the approaching winter weather.

I. BACKGROUND

- A. Cubans -- Currently, 470 Cubans are housed at Fort Chaffee, and 330 others need to be relocated (from Atlanta Penitentiary, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, etc.). Providing for these anti-social and/or mentally ill Cubans comprises a part of the overall need for detention facilities.
- B. Detention Policy -- As part of the Administration's immigration policy, a decision was made to detain aliens arriving illegally on our shores and borders.

The continued arrival of Haitians drives our current policy. The Haitians do not fit the "profile" of the standard INS detention population since large numbers seek asylum, and refuse to return voluntarily to Haiti. Few Haitians are deported since court injunctions requiring counsel for each alien and attorneys' pressures to delay hearings for continuances, motions and appeals have effectively slowed the exclusion process.

C. Budget Impact of Detention Policy

Currently, about 2800 Haitians are in detention, at the following locations, all of which are at or above capacity.

	<u>Population</u>	<u>INS Annual Costs (\$ Million)</u>
Fort Allen, Puerto Rico	800	26.6
Krome North, Miami	1300	6.5
Misc. Fed. Corr. Inst./BOP	700	--
	<u>2800</u>	<u>33.1</u>

INS has estimated the costs associated with operating a detention facility at \$45 to \$70 million for Fiscal '82 depending on population size. Justice points out that to make funds available for handling additional aliens, it is necessary to close Fort Allen, where capacity is limited -- in order to free up funds for operating a facility large enough to allow the detention policy to be continued. Even so, at higher detention population levels, Justice may be required to reallocate funds and/or to seek a supplemental funds request -- as would Public Health Service. OMB has indicated it is unlikely to look favorably on a 1982 supplemental request.

Consolidation of Cubans and Haitians -- in one large facility (allowing us to close Fort Allen) -- will permit a more efficient use of limited detention and Public Health Service dollars.

The budget impact on Justice will be notably reduced if Defense would agree to bear the marginal increase in operating costs and necessary start-up costs associated with INS use of Fort Drum or Leonard-Wood.

D. Facility Requirements

1. Immediate needs -- Justice notes that a multi-purpose facility like Fort Chaffee, with capacity of up to 10,000 aliens is needed during the next eighteen to twenty-four months while legal challenges are overcome and a permanent facility for 5,000 or more aliens is constructed. At the same

time, it is agreed that a detention policy must be implemented within a total strategy of interdiction and expedited exclusion and asylum processing.

The facility requirements therefore are based on the following:

- o Detention is a necessary deterrent to future illegal arrivals; while the policy may result in some unfavorable political reaction, there is also political cost to inaction (e.g., economic impacts on South Florida).
  - o Resolution of legal challenges against exclusion procedures is unlikely before March 1982 (and possibly later). Thus, additional space is needed to house those who are anticipated to arrive in the interim, projected to reach at least 4000 in March and more if current litigation remains unresolved.
  - o By the end of FY 1982, INS projects the population to be 9700 in a worst case scenario, and only 900 in a best-case. Current detention capacity for all illegal aliens, not just Haitians, is 2,300 (although the use of Fort Allen and other special holding centers has effectively increased the capacity to 3,540).
  - o One large facility is more cost-effective and efficient than several small facilities. Moreover, a large facility allows for population expansion.
2. Permanent Facility: The effort to locate an "immediate" facility has been accompanied by efforts to develop a permanent INS detention center capable of housing 5000 or more aliens. INS and the Office of Refugee Resettlement have investigated a site in McAlester, Oklahoma, where citizens have expressed an interest in

having a permanent facility, due to favorable economic impacts. An INS team, accompanied by Army engineers, has investigated a site and it is estimated that a permanent facility could be ready in 18 to 24 months from the date that a decision to go to McAlester was made. The Southwestern location is suitable for INS purposes, because most illegal alien traffic is located in the southern half of the country.

Continued priority must be placed on the development of such a facility to alleviate the continued short-term pressures.

D. Facilities Search:

The White House enlisted the support of the Defense Department to help locate a site that could potentially house up to 10,000 aliens. This effort has resulted in the following alternatives:

1. Fort Drum in Watertown, New York, with capacity for 10,000 aliens.
2. Fort Leonard Wood near Jefferson City, Missouri, with capacity for 10,000 aliens.
3. Combination of Glasgow Air Force Base in Glasgow, Montana; Fort Allen in Puerto Rico; and assorted Federal prisons with capacity for 800 Cubans and 2650 Haitians (but with a chance of expansion to 4200).
4. Combination of Westover Air Force Base in Chicopee, Massachusetts, Fort Allen in Puerto Rico, and assorted Federal prisons, with capacity for 800 Cubans and up to 3300 other aliens.

II. OPTIONS

- A. Fort Drum -- This reserve training base meets essential operating criteria. World War II barracks can house 20,000, while the training population averages 10,500 during the summer, and only 1,000 during the winter months. The training population is expected to peak in 1982 at 11,000; an alien population -- forecast at less than 9,000 during the summer -- would cause some disruption for the flow of training units arriving and leaving on weekends, for the period of May through September.

The location is isolated, seven miles from Watertown, a depressed blue collar area which has the labor force to accommodate the support of the facility (creation of 300 or more jobs, i.e., maintenance, food supply, etc.). The economic benefits for this depressed area are a potential means of turning around initial political opposition.

Fort Drum is the only option that is both in an isolated location and capable of handling up to 10,000 aliens. HHS supports this option.

However, Army opposes the use of Fort Drum:

- o Fort Drum is the only place in the Northeast U.S. large enough to accommodate training maneuvers for a full Army division.
- o It is the primary training area for National Guard and Reserve Units from all the Northeast U.S.
- o In a national emergency, Army's ability to mobilize would be impaired.
- o Alien housing would be in close proximity to the reserve barracks.

Weather conditions are extreme:

- o Mean daily temperature in January averages 12°.
- o Snowfall averages over 60 inches.

There is political opposition:

- o The local Congressman, Republican Dave Martin, strongly opposes the use of Fort Drum, citing the extreme weather conditions.
- o Martin and the entire New York Republican delegation have written to the President to object to the use of Drum, based on the potential inhumane treatment of Haitians.
- o Trent Lott telephoned twice to express his opposition to Fort Drum because ignoring Martin's opposition will lessen our ability to mobilize House members in the future.

- B. Fort Leonard Wood -- Like Fort Drum, this active army base meets essential operating criteria. World War II barracks, scattered in four locations on the base, provide capacity for 10,000 aliens; airport and hospital facilities are suitable. The presence of the aliens would be evident to the military community of 20,000 on the base, but not to a civilian population. INS has proposed operating under "emergency condition" standards -- reduced space allocation per alien -- to minimize the number of buildings occupied on the base. Displacement of active army personnel would occur, but much less than at other sites which Defense reviewed.

However, the Army opposes the use of Fort Leonard Wood:

- o Alien population of 10,000 would eliminate training opportunities for 8,500 recruits.
- o The loss of the reception center would significantly detract from training activities on the base.
- o The two to four alien detention centers would be visible to military personnel and the 9,000 dependents on the base.

There is political opposition to Fort Leonard Wood:

- o Senator Danforth, Congressman Wendell Bailey (R) and Governor Kit Bond strongly oppose the use of Fort Leonard Wood, but would work with the Administration to minimize political losses.

- C. Glasgow, Montana -- This former SAC base, now owned locally by a nonprofit organization, has barrack capacity for 800 Cubans and 1150 Haitians. Facilities are in good condition and are located 18 miles from the town of Glasgow.

The site provides almost immediate relief for Cubans -- a place to house and rehabilitate them. It would allow us to close down Ft. Chafee directly. However, it would be necessary to continue to operate Fort Allen in Puerto Rico, and to maintain Haitian populations in Bureau of Prison facilities in order to fully house the anticipated detention population.

The community is in favor of this site, recognizing the economic benefits. If a decision is made not to go to Glasgow, we will severely disappoint Republican Congressman Ron Marlenee, as well as local citizens.

If a decision to go to Glasgow is made, it may be possible to negotiate expanded use of the SAC base to accommodate eventually 3600 Haitians; this option would be dependent on community approval and Public Health Service scrutiny. This configuration was not part of the original negotiations because these began as a resettlement grant for Cubans, evolved into a Fort Chaffee solution, and finally included Haitians, as Glasgow pressed for a larger facility and more space was needed for Haitians. HHS & INS advise that injection of this element at this point would undermine the offer we now have, and should be pursued after a go-ahead decision. Furthermore, both agencies agree that expanded use would be costly and not result in a desirable configuration of facilities.

However, DOJ opposes this site:

- o The limited capacity will not provide continuous relief for the steady flow of aliens. In about four months facilities will again be at capacity, and the detention policy will be threatened.
- o There is risk of a reduction of this limited capacity. Under our current contract, Ft. Allen must be closed by August, 1982. We would need to negotiate, with the consequential risk of significantly increased costs, or loss of the site.

The Glasgow/Ft. Allen option is inefficient:

- o The costs associated with opening Glasgow will utilize INS funds that could be applied to operating a large facility that would a) be capable of handling a sustained flow, and b) allow us to close down the costly operation of Fort Allen in Puerto Rico.

There is some political cost associated with this option:

- o Due to limited capacity, we would continue to maintain Haitians in Bureau of Prison facilities in Texas and Kentucky, although we have already indicated we would relocate these Haitians in the next several months.

Weather conditions are extreme: temperatures are about equal to Fort Drum, but snowfall averages 40 vs. 60 inches at Fort Drum.

Access to lawyers to represent Haitians will be very limited in Glasgow, thereby slowing down the exit process and creating a risk that the Administration will be perceived as attempting to deprive the Haitians of their rights. As a result, the government's efforts to demonstrate to the courts "good faith" in solving the Haitian problem may be undermined.

- D. Westover AFB -- The Westover AFB in Chicopee, Massachusetts, is now partially deeded to the city of Chicopee, used by Army Reserves and excessed by GSA. The 3200 acre site has barracks capacity for 1800, and single-family housing for 8000. The barracks are readily habitable; the housing is in poor condition, requiring two months to refurbish.

The facility is located in a more reasonable climate than either Drum or Glasgow and use would not significantly interfere with Defense operations. Defense favors Westover.

However, DOJ and HHS oppose Westover:

- o The configuration is inadequate: individual housing units are not suitable for rendering secure either the Haitian or Cuban population so that Haitian capacity is effectively limited to 1800. (To use individual housing units, INS estimates that an additional 400 guards would be required.)
- o The site -- close to an elementary school and Job Corps program -is located directly in a blue-collar suburban area that has experienced racial tension.

There is political opposition:

- o Representatives Silvio Conte and Ed Boland (D-whose district contains Westover) object strongly to the use of Westover. [Conte reports that this area may come into his district pending census results.]

	<u>FORT DRUM</u>	<u>FT. LEONARD WOOD</u>	<u>GLASGOW/FT. ALLEN</u>	<u>WESTOVER</u>
<u>CAPACITY</u>	10,000	10,000	800 Cubans 2650 other aliens (4200)	800 Cubans 3300 other
<u>WEATHER</u>	extreme 12° average - Jan. 60° " snow	very cold in winter less snowfall	equal to Ft. Drum less snowfall (40° " vs. 60° " )	milder than Ft. Drum & Leonard Wood
<u>POLITICS</u>	Dave Martin opposes - with Lott & N.Y. Republican delegation	Danforth <sup>up for re - e in '82</sup> , Bond, Bailey oppose	Marlenee supports	Conte and Boland oppose
<u>ISOLATION</u>	very isolated	isolated from civilians, integrated with military	somewhat isolated	not isolated
<u>DEFENSE IMPACT</u>	Medium	High	None	Low
<u>APPROXIMATE ANNUAL COST</u> \$ millions	74.1 <i>4500 av. pop</i>	79.2	92.4	