

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: JAMES W. CICCONI *JWC*

SUBJECT: Black Strategy

At this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking to outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions. In that vein, I would offer the following points:

1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for the President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our problem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is anti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to blacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it also points out the need to correct current misperceptions at the same time we are looking forward.

We can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly defining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I have already written a memo on the civil rights policy problem, which includes some specific recommendations, and will be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here, though, is that much of our problem is based on a fear, abetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go in rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years. We can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy (thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil rights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain that the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions, determine our policy).

2. We must begin to lay out a "new agenda for black America". This requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not only of our political supporters, but also of conservative black thinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun some contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have been less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented and have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We have taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging formation of a private, conservative black "think tank."

3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of people with whom we can deal. This should not be totally Republican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--

the key is simply that they not be hostile to the President, or to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the people we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their groups, and providing them access within the Administration. This is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics. Black leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the beholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity White House recognition provides. Change will only come slowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable blacks is important to its overall credibility.

4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the established black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon Jordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this President, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their status as leaders is dependent on their continued public criticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with them, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks, thereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White House to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity. We must also put them in the position of responding to our "new agenda," since they will be hard put to oppose many of the issues we could put forward.

5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste. A time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the best time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should begin to put the "infrastructure" of such an effort in place. This would include preparation of a "new agenda" of policy ideas; the ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminating in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech on civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private "think tank" of black conservatives; and identification and promotion of an alternative black leadership.

6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like ethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the President in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel we are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.

7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow, and difficult to measure since we are starting from such a small base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain). Moreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a period of years if we hope to show any significant progress. The political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and the increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a moral argument, as well.

cc: James A. Baker, III

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1984

TO: JIM CICCONI  
FROM: Frank Donatelli  
SUBJECT: Tentative List of Black Leaders for  
Proposed White House Meeting

Attached is the list of suggested invitees from Mel Bradley for a proposed White House meeting.

Also attached are proposals for similar Ethnic and Hispanic events. As I told you, it would be a major error in my judgment to do only the black event.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK DONATELLI

FROM: MEL BRADLEY *mb*

SUBJECT: Tentative List of Black Leaders for Proposed White House Meeting

The attached list represents the category of persons to be invited. They would be (1) supporters of the President or helpful to him, (2) drawn from all major geographic or political regions of the country, and (3) well regarded either nationally or in their communities. This is a tentative list -- names may be added or deleted.

Attachment

Proposed White House Meetings

Tentative List of Invitees

Ben Andrews	<u>City Councilman (Rep.) Hartford, Connecticut,</u> National Board Member of NAACP
Dr. Gloria Toote	<u>New York City,</u> Active supporter of the President and former assistant secretary under Nixon/Ford Administration
Dr. Henry Lucas	<u>San Francisco,</u> Chairman, New Coalition for Economic and Social Change
Elaine Jenkins	<u>Washington, D.C.,</u> President, Council of 100
Reverend E.V. Hill	<u>Los Angeles,</u> Vice President, National Baptist Convention
William Pickard	<u>Detroit,</u> businessman
Leroy Tombs	<u>Bonner Springs, Kansas,</u> businessman
C.J. Patterson	<u>Oakland,</u> President, C.J. Patterson Company
LeGree Daniels	<u>Washington, D.C.,</u> Chairman, National Black Republican Council
Robert Brown	<u>North Carolina,</u> Former Special Assistant/Nixon
Arthur Fletcher	<u>Washington, D.C.,</u> President, Arthur Fletcher & Associates
Wendell Gunn	<u>Connecticut,</u> Former Special Assistant to President Reagan
John Wilks	<u>Washington, D.C.,</u> President, Wilks & Associates
Arthur Teele	<u>Washington, D.C.,</u> President, National Business League

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK DONATELLI

FROM: MEL BRADLEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Meetings with Black Americans

Per our discussion last week I think we should move ahead with a meeting involving selected black leaders and certain members of the President's senior staff. Since this will be the first such meeting leading into the new term, the participants should be selected primarily from among those who have been our friends and supporters. We can and should meet with others afterwards. In addition to recognizing and expressing appreciation to those who have been helpful, the purpose of the meeting would be to assist in fulfilling the need for Black Americans to be reassured that we are sensitive to their concerns. For this reason, the format of the meeting should provide the participants with an opportunity to make suggestions regarding second term priorities and methods of addressing those priorities.

Frank, we have had these meetings before and, as well as speeches before black audiences, identification with black human interest events, etc. -- they have proven beneficial in demonstrating that we are just as concerned about the problems, needs, interests and well-being of Black Americans as we are of those of other Americans. In practically each case there has been a positive response from the Black community.

However, if we are to solve this crisis of black confidence in the Administration on a permanent basis we should resolve to pursue these events within the context of a well-developed, well-defined and well-executed strategy which is designed to accomplish this precise objective. I am personally convinced -- and a great many Black Republicans will concur -- that given an appropriately conceived and implemented strategy, President Reagan can complete his second term with a level of support from Black Americans that is at least equal to the average of other groups which have defected from the traditional Democratic coalition.

I recommend that we forge such a strategy and that in doing so we draw upon the input of blacks themselves. The forum for this input would consist of a series of informal consultations with a large number of Black Americans from across the country. The

informal consultations would take place at the White House in a non-public setting with small groups of persons (3-4 per session). At the end of this series of meetings, three or four persons whose views were reasonably representative of the groups would be invited to have a private conversation with the President.

Each session would involve persons who:

- (a) understand and feel comfortable with the President's program, including the general direction in which he is taking the country,
- (b) are from each of the major geographical regions of the country,
- (c) have their fingers on the pulse of blacks in their communities,
- (d) are well regarded in those communities, and
- (e) have no overriding interest in such meetings other than broadening the President's support and enhancing his esteem among Black Americans.

Based upon the output of these sessions a written strategy would be pulled together and put in place within four to six weeks.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK DONATELLI

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS *LK*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Ethnic Leaders

Frank, I have given a great deal of thought to the proposal of a Presidential meeting with ethnic leaders and have come to the conclusion that it could be both workable and productive. The main problem is, of course, that there is no national "ethnic council" which serves to hammer out a common agenda for the various groups. Nonetheless, I believe that there is a host of issues (education, civil rights and especially appointments) on which the groups tend to agree and where it would be very useful for the President to have an exchange of views with the President. The key to a successful meeting would be in focusing the meeting from foreign policy issues where you would have as many agendas as we have groups, to domestic issues where you have a certain commonality of views.

If you agree, I will draft a scheduling proposal to recommend a presidential meeting with ethnic leaders. Of course I would also recommend that the meeting be preceded by high level briefings (NSC, OPD, OMB) on overall foreign and domestic policy goals of the second Administration.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK DONATELLI

FROM: CATHI VILLALPANDO *Cathi*

SUBJECT: HISPANIC OUTREACH '85

Hispanics must be one of the first groups to be invited to The White House for a show of appreciation event, since we obtained tremendous support from this major and growing group.

I also recommend they not be brought in with other minority groups.

Attached is a copy of a 90 day proposed schedule of Presidential events regarding Hispanics.

Also attached is a brief report on the Hispanic vote.

Attachments

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS:  
1984 - (December, January, February)

December:

We do not recommend any briefings with Hispanics due to holidays and upcoming Inauguration.

January 17th or 18th:

Luncheon with President and Administration Representatives -  
(State Room for 75 or 50 top 1984 supporters)

- Second meeting with the Hispanic Republican, Democrat and Independent supporters  
(Note: Similar meeting was held on January of 1981 at the Hay Adams before the President took office)  
The 17th & 18th is recommended so some of the attendees can stay for Inauguration.

January 18th, 19th or 20th:

Host: Hispanic Inaugural Ball

In 1981, the first Hispanic Inauguration Reception to ever be sanctioned by a Presidential Inauguration Committee was held at the Capital Hilton Hotel for 850 people. The Vice President attended. This year, I strongly recommend the President attend such an event.

28th - Anniversary of birth of Jose Marti. Message or a small briefing for Cuban Americans on Foreign Affairs.

February:

Hispanic Roundtable Discussion for groups of 25 on topics such as:

- o Central America  
This should be aimed at separate subgroups; one for Cuban Americans; one for Mexican Americans and one for Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics.
- o The Economy
- o Employment Trends
- o Education
- o Health issues and other social issues

The President could drop by for 15 minutes following senior White House staff and/or Federal agency representatives after they address the group.

## HISPANIC VOTE TOTALS IN THE 1984 ELECTION

According to White House calculations regarding the Hispanic support for the President on the November '84 election, the national vote averaged to 46%.

We derived at this figure by taking the average from various polls, including the major media polls.

### National Hispanic Support Average

1980	17% - 35%
1984	35% - 50%
1984	White House Average - <u>46%</u>

We have one Hispanic organization that claims the Hispanic support is between 30-40% -- Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project's estimates are out of line with all other major polls. Willie Velasquez, SWVRP Executive Director traditionally down plays GOP support on every general election.

When you are asked to explain why SWVRP figures are lower than all other pollsters, these are the reasons:

- o The SWVRP survey gives greater weight to poorer Hispanic precincts (ignoring the "new growth" areas or rapid demographic shifts in that Hispanic population. In other words, the GOP does much better among Hispanics living in more integrated and upwardly-mobile areas.)
- o SWVRP is funded by more liberal groups and favor the Democratic Party.
- o Velasquez and his staff have been quoted in the media stating that the President improved his Hispanic support significantly compared to 1980.

If asked whether the media polls and other major pollsters' estimates are reliable remind people that -

- o The Gallup Poll projected before election day that Hispanic support was at -

47%

Actual overall average taken post election of all non-partisan polls placed our support at -

46%

Thus proving that their polling methodology is accurate.

The White House's best estimates in four key states regarding Hispanic vote are as follows:

	<u>Total State Hispanic Population</u>	<u>GOP Vote</u>	=	<u>Votes for R/B</u>
California	4.5 million	46%		2,070,000
Texas	3.0 million	43%		1,290,000
New York	1.7 million	49%		833,000
Florida	860,000	80%		688,000

Note: Of the four (4) key states mentioned above, the most surprising outcome is New York State. Since the major group of Hispanics is composed of Puerto Ricans, this group of Hispanics, the second largest, has been historically the weakest for Republican support.

NATIONAL TOTALS OF HISPANIC POPULATION  
As Per U.S. Census 1980

Mexican American	-	8.7 million
Puerto Rican	-	2.0 million
Other Hispanics	-	3.0 million
Cuban American	-	<u>800 thousand</u>
All Hispanics - Total	-	14.6 million

(Estimated 1984 Total = 15.9 million)

Dan J. Smith  
5300 Columbia Pike, No. T-10  
Arlington, Virginia 22204

December 14, 1984

The Honorable James W. Cicconi  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim,

This letter is my response to your recent request as to the circumstances which have lead to 72 percent of Black Americans and 31 percent of White Americans believing President Reagan is prejudiced, according to an August, 1984 Gallup survey.

Given my personal knowledge of the nature of the man, I find the wide-spread misperception that our President is a bigot totally unacceptable. Should history paint him and his Administration as being anti-Black, as now appears likely, it will be a real injustice.

A few thoughts before I get to my response... As you will see, candor has been my guide in expressing my beliefs as to how we have arrived at these misperceptions. Thus, I trust you use will use this letter with discretion and where it can do the most good. Also, I have not attempted to suggest ways to overcome these perceptions, as you did not ask for them. I have a few thoughts on that subject and would be happy to share them with you should you want them.

Immediate causes...

First, throughout our Administration civil rights has not been deemed a "Presidential issue"; it has not been the subject of Cabinet Council review; there is no Presidential policy on civil rights; civil rights has been delegated to the Justice Department to handle. Except for periodic civil rights crisis, the White House does not become publicly involved. To my knowledge ours is the first Administration in American history not to consider civil rights a Presidential issue. For Black Americans, particularly those who have "made it", civil rights remains the watershed issue. All other issues are secondary. To distance the President from the issue has been to make him even more vulnerable. Because...

Second, there has been gross insensitivity at the Civil Rights Division of Justice. By taking a "strict constructionist" view of civil rights (and addressing only "overt" racial discrimination and ignoring disparate treatment and systemic discrimination) the Civil Rights Division has not only misread public opinion, black and white, but perhaps has also misread its charter. In August, 1980 before the National Urban League, the President as candidate pledged to "protect

Page Two  
Mr. James Cicconi  
December 14, 1885

the civil rights of black Americans." Most Black Americans took him at his word. Now, however, after that Division's dilatory treatment of the voting rights issue, simplistic and provocative approaches to affirmative action, and constitutionally unsound approaches to tax exempt schools (Bob Jones et. al.), all major national issues that have somehow escaped the Cabinet Council process, most Black and many White Americans now view Ronald Reagan as a clear and present danger to the civil rights of minority Americans. A remarkable state of affairs...

Third, the absence of an effective, designated Black operative at the White House. This has been a powerful negative signal inside the Administration and left us especially vulnerable to the machinations of the Civil Rights Division. Ours is the first Administration since Truman's not to have a senior black White House official to handle black concerns. During years one and four of the Administration this was explicitly true. In years two and three implicitly so as Mel Bradley, not suited for that role to begin with, was only given a half-hearted mandate and no resources to be that person. His slow demotion out of Policy Development into Public Liaison has left the black affairs sector of the White House operation paralyzed while leaving the President vulnerable to further embarrassments in this area -- in year two there were as many as three blacks in senior positions in OPD who could at least do damage control on black-related policy issues (Bradley, Gunn, and myself). Today there are none. Our "early warning" capacity on black issues today is virtually non-existent.

Underlying causes...

Fourth, an apparent senior White House staff belief that out-reach to Black America is illegitimate. Whereas Presidential outreach to Hispanic and Jewish Americans seem to occur smoothly and regularly, efforts to do the same for Blacks are rare and often awkward. Even when the President himself steps in and attempts to send a clear signal that his is concerned about Black America, senior staff intervenes. Witness the events of September 15 and 16, 1982. Wednesday night the President makes a forceful and persuasive speech on Black concerns to the National Black Republican Council. In Thursday morning's Washington Post David Gergen says that the President was only attempting to allay the fears of moderate Whites. On three different occasions (May 20, 1981; February 11, 1982; and March, 1983) thoughtful analyses of the President's relationship with Black America together with workable recommendations were presented to senior Administration officials (the first two went to the West Wing, the third to the RNC) by different Blacks, all of whom were long-time confidants of the Administration. All were ignored.

This fourth cause, not viewing Black concerns as deserving Presidential attention, even extends to situations where outrageous accusations concerning Black issues are made against the President. Silence is our standard reply, except for when the Vice President speaks up. It is as if the philosophy, the objectives, the very

Page Three  
Mr. James Cicconi  
December 14, 1885

nature of the Reagan Administration is viewed by the West Wing as fundamentally at odds with Black America. Having examined the President's program and the concerns of Black America up close and personal, I know no fundamental conflict exists. Our failure to translate the Economic Recovery Programs into terms Blacks could understand; our failure to make clear that our budget cuts were not directed against Blacks; our failure to explain why Black unemployment is so high and seems to come down so slowly; our failure to seek new and effective channels to get our view to Black Americans -- all combine to leave us in a situation where the President is unfairly damned by default.

Fifth, we have failed to empower a credible group of Blacks outside the Administration to act serve as effective "public friends" of the President. Every other President has had a group of visible independent, credible Blacks who could be counted on to support the President when spokesman of the civil rights industry got out of hand and attempted to paint a President Ford or a President Carter as a friend of the devil. In the 1980 election we started off with Ralph Abernathy and Hosea Williams, two excellent Black leaders -- albeit not easy ones to "program", but then when the election was over we did not continue to "court" them. Nor did we attend diligently to their concerns when they had reasonable requests to make of us during years one and two. Other Blacks have championed the President only to be forgotten later. The list is not short. Had we kept these Blacks close, had the President meet with them, had him be seen listening to them, had him be seen taking their advice, he would not stand alone in his relations with Black America and he would not be viewed as harshly today.

This letter is longer than I intended. Let me stop here. While things are bleak, there is no doubt in my mind that the real Ronald Reagan, the man without prejudice, the man who wants Black Americans to share equally in the recovery as well as America's future, can be made vivid for all Black Americans to see.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dan".

Dan J. Smith  
5300 Columbia Pike, No. T-10  
Arlington, Virginia 22204

December 14, 1984

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Special Assistant to the President  
and Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
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Washington, D.C. 20500

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Page Two  
Mr. James Cicconi  
December 14, 1885

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Sincerely,



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: JAMES W. CICCONI 

SUBJECT: Civil Rights Policy

During the President's first term, a pattern emerged in the area of civil rights which has been disturbing, and which has continually led to problems. In short, it boils down to this: our Administration has not formulated a specific civil rights policy framework. Instead, our policy has been determined on a case-by-case basis by the Civil Rights Division, with little or no White House involvement.

Civil Rights Policy-Making

Over the past four years, with only occasional exceptions, major civil rights policy decisions have not been brought before the President prior to some executive branch action which either constrained his options, or rendered any discussion purely informational. The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy was created in the wake of controversy over Administration civil rights policies, and was designed as a forum for identifying such issues and bringing them before the President for policy decision. This was expected to involve the normal debate of opposing viewpoints and consideration of options that the Cabinet Council system has produced in most other policy areas. The President, hearing the different positions and options, would then decide. Unfortunately, the CCLP has failed utterly in fulfilling this function.

In the absence of a White House system for setting Administration policy in the multitude of areas encompassing the term "civil rights," a vacuum has developed. This has understandably been filled by the Civil Rights Division, which has been quite clearly making such decisions in place of the White House. Policy decisions are reflected in speeches, amicus briefs, interventions, and positions in various lawsuits which not only reverse longstanding Justice Department policy, but, in many cases, defy legal precedent.

To be sure, the Civil Rights Division cannot be faulted for these developments. There has indeed been a vacuum in the civil rights policy area which the White House has not moved to fill. Failing White House insistence that policy be decided here, the decisions in any policy area will, predictably, be made at the departmental level. The "vacuum" is more than a problem of systems, though: it extends to the particulars of our policy itself. We have not fleshed out the President's philosophy in this area, and, after four years, are still left with only certain statements, expanded somewhat by last year's ABA speech (e.g. favoring affirmative action, against rigid quotas and busing). The Civil Rights Division has thus been free to interpret their preferred courses of action as being consistent with the President's philosophy largely due to the absence of contrary Presidential pronouncements. This has given the division a degree of policy leeway enjoyed by few, if any, comparable offices. In contrast, White House involvement has invariably been limited, ad hoc, and often after-the-fact. The White House usually receives information in one of the following ways:

- a. consultation limited to a few individuals in the White House or OMB who tend to be sympathetic with the Civil Rights Division's position;
- b. limited information provided to either the Counsel's Office or Cabinet Affairs, often at the last minute; or
- c. particular White House staffers will hear of an issue "through the grapevine," and will request more detailed information from Justice.

Since the necessary information reaches the White House senior staff either right before, or right after a particular action is taken by DOJ, options are constrained accordingly. Meetings are set up to brief appropriate White House officials and to answer questions. However, our options are usually limited:

- a. Justice is given tacit approval to proceed, usually when a position has already been filed (the Dade County example);
- b. the Justice position is modified in some way to satisfy significant White House concerns, while remaining consistent with the overall DOJ thesis (the Grove City example); or

- c. the Justice position remains intact, but a different, and more politically palatable rationale for the stance is presented (the Bob Jones example).

The point here is not whether we ended up in a proper or ill-advised position on a particular issue. It is that the civil rights policy process (if it can be called that) is operating beyond White House control or Presidential involvement, and without any considered, coherent strategy except, perhaps, on the part of the Civil Rights Division.

### Policy Consequences

Beyond the issues of busing and quotas, there is a good deal of confusion about what this Administration stands for. As an example, the President has often spoken in a supportive way about affirmation action, yet DOJ actions can, in many cases, be interpreted as opposing affirmative action. Similarly, the President has supported minority set-aside programs on the federal level (even going so far as to reject agency goals, and impose higher ones), at the same time his Justice Department is fighting them on the state and local level. The President seems to distinguish between "goals" and "quotas," while DOJ files briefs equating the two.

These are symptoms of ad hoc policy-making. It is confused because we are confused. It is often contradictory because we often contradict ourselves (Bob Jones is one example; our position on the Voting Rights Act is another).

Instead of identifying and focusing on specific policy objectives, we have repeatedly found ourselves skirmishing over issues that were not of our choosing, as in Grove City and Bob Jones. Ill-considered positions in court have led to unnecessary controversy which, even when we prevailed legally, required us to confront legislation worse than the situation we sought to correct.

In Congress, too, we sometimes "missed the boat" because of unrealistic assessments of what could be achieved. For example, in early 1981, instead of supporting a straight extension of the Voting Rights Act, which would have been applauded, we sought significant changes which were unjustly portrayed as an attempt to gut the law. The resulting controversy allowed the civil rights lobby to "up to the ante." Though we ultimately decided to support a straight extension, it was too late: the bill that reached the President contained provisions far worse than the original Act.

Thus, in a number of civil rights areas, we have found ourselves in battles, by virtue of DOJ decisions, which continue to have repercussions in Congress, in the courts, and in the political arena. Yet, the most striking aspect of the situation is that, for all the political damage sustained by the President, we have achieved very little of substance in such battles. In fact, our main achievements have been in those areas where the President's policy is clearest and least controversial: busing and "true" quota cases.

Unfortunately, it is not our civil rights achievements, but, instead, our often unsuccessful "rollback" actions which have been more likely to stick in the public mind. This is particularly true with blacks, the media, and those who view themselves as sensitive to civil rights. From a policy standpoint, this has made even our initiatives (e.g. fair housing enforcement) suspect, and vulnerable to being "trumped" by the civil rights lobby. From a political standpoint, the damage is more severe, and perhaps not reversible for many years. In effect, we have incurred the enmity of 90% of America's blacks, and cemented them to the Democratic Party. To be sure, voting trends among blacks have not been promising for the GOP. However, we have squandered our opportunities by a perceived assault on the civil rights laws--an "assault" that was not planned, but was instead stumbled into through a lack of White House attention, and a failure to assert our coordinative prerogatives.

Future Republican candidates may not be capable of carrying the South, as President Reagan did, while losing 90% of black voters. It is politically imperative that we cut into this bloc vote in the coming years, even if our efforts yield only several percentage points difference. Thad Cochran and Strom Thurmond have both proven that such efforts, rooted in more sensitivity to civil rights concerns, can turn a close election into a safe one.

More important, though, is that Republicans begin to identify what we are for in the area of civil rights, in addition to what we are against. Otherwise, we risk being viewed as reactionaries seeking to undermine civil rights, mostly in a sub-rosa fashion. By and large, Americans are proud of the civil rights progress we have made in the thirty years since Brown. Republicans have every right to share in that pride--Kennedy may have sent federal marshals to Birmingham, but Ike sent the National Guard to Little Rock. By appearing negative today, we belie our own Party's contribution to the decline of state-sanctioned racism in the U.S. In fact, the subliminal message is that we could envision rolling back the clock, if only because our actions, combined with a failure to articulate limits, raise questions about how far we would go.

### Civil Rights Policy in the Second Term

There are a number of steps that I would recommend be considered in a second term:

1. We should revitalize the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy so that it indeed serves as a forum for developing policy options in the area of civil rights. For such discussions, both the chairman of the Civil Rights Commission and the chairman of the EEOC should sit as members.
2. It should be clearly directed that policy questions (as distinct from enforcement actions or case filings where there is ample precedent) must be brought to CCLP for discussion. The Administration has tended to allow Justice more discretion than necessary in deciding civil rights policy because of our unwillingness to interfere with their decisions about what, or whether, to file in particular cases. Unless our policy is already clear (and in most cases, it has not been), the Cabinet Council and the President should decide what the policy is; Justice would then file in accord with that policy. Simply because DOJ has broad discretion in its judicial filings does not mean the White House must also abdicate policy decisions to them.
3. A policy statement on civil rights should be drafted and then debated not only within the White House, but among Party leaders. Frankly, some black academic thinkers like Thomas Sowell have done a far better job of articulating a conservative civil rights policy framework than this Administration has. We simply must define what we are for, as well as what we are against, and why. This would counter the irrational fears conjured by our opponents, and may be the only way we can give blacks a reason for rallying to our Party. It would also provide the Justice Department with the type of central policy guidance that has been lacking in the civil rights area.
4. The President should be engaged directly. He should be at the center of discussions on what our policy is, and what we stand for in the area of civil rights. The President should also be exposed periodically, in small sessions, to the views of the black community. Too often in the past, the President has been surprised by outcry among blacks about his Administration's policies. Exposure to black viewpoints on such issues (including Republicans such as Bill Coleman and Ed Brooke) will give the President a direct understanding of how certain civil rights issues are viewed by the black community.

5. Legislative strategy on civil rights issues must be controlled by the White House. On a number of occasions, we have been insufficiently attentive to such issues in Congress, leaving them in DOJ's hands until they have passed beyond our power to control (e.g. the Voting Rights Act). In the past year, we have done better on several potentially volatile issues (insurance equity, comparable worth, Title IX/Grove City legislation) because we have asserted White House control at an early stage.

I will be happy to discuss these points further if you desire.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Deaver  
FROM: J. Steven Rhodes  
SUBJECT: Elaine Jenkins, Council of 100,  
letter to Senator Dole.

Attached is a copy of the letter Elaine Jenkins sent to Senator Dole in which she has highlighted five points of importance to black Republicans. I thought you would be interested in reviewing them.

You may note, with particular interest, points two and four, concerning 'outreach' to blacks and its handling and a reference to Mel Bradley.

The Vice President has also received a copy of this information.

*Bill*  
*discuss*  
*with JC*  
*if get back*  
*to me*

3 DEC 1984

100

## AN ORGANIZATION OF BLACK REPUBLICANS

1523 L Street, NW, Seventh Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Telephone: (202) 628-2216

## FOUNDER

The Late  
SAMUEL C. JACKSON, Esq.

November 29, 1984

## OFFICERS

ELAINE B. JENKINS  
ChairpersonTHEODORE A. ADAMS, Jr.  
Vice ChairmanEDWARD HAYES, Jr., Esq.  
SecretaryROBERT JEFFERS, Jr.  
TreasurerFLOYD B. McKISSICK, Esq.  
General CounselALBERTA THOMPSON  
Assistant SecretaryCLARA SMITH  
Assistant TreasurerSYLVESTER E. WILLIAMS, III  
Chairman of Advisory CommitteeMILTON BINS  
Communications DirectorHonorable Robert J. Dole  
U. S. Capitol  
Hart Building  
Room SH-141  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Dole:

Congratulations on your becoming the new Majority Leader. We the Council of 100 a private sector organization know of your leadership and your caring for our concerns. Our founder was the late Samuel C. Jackson from Kansas, who knew you very well.

We are committed to spending serious time to assure that never again are blacks so one sided in political support to the Republican Party. We have an agenda that we would like to share with you at your earliest convenience. This can be done as an Executive Committee meeting with you.

In addition, all of the last 2 years we have had very successful luncheons at which time both White House and Congressional persons were our speakers. We would like to have a luncheon reception in your honor sometime in February. This could be our Lincoln Day Celebration. If you would agree to be our honoree we would like you to select a date so that we can select a hotel.

Meanwhile, you should know that black Republicans have the following priorities:

1. No black should be appointed in this new time around that did not participate in the election.

We are contacting John Harrington to tell him this.

2. No black leadership should be invited to the White House until our leadership has presented our views.

November 29, 1984

Page 2

Honorable Robert J. Dole  
U. S. Capitol  
Hart Building

In previous occasions we have felt slapped in the face because we were not considered.

New black leadership must be developed then the "old" leadership will get a message.

3. Black businesses have not thrived. We do not feel in competition with Hispanics. There is enough to go around. Every agency should have a black person who is responsive to black Republicans. There still remain in place in some of the agencies black and white Democrats who are not responsive to our concerns.
4. We think that Mel Bradley's office at the White House should have increased staff to give him the support he needs to handle all of the demands channeled to him.
5. We are interested in having a black person at the Justice Department who has experience and vision regarding Criminal Justice.

This is truly a "full plate" that barely scratches the surface of our concerns. We know that you have always been a friend and a spokesman that we can trust. Please let us hear from you. There could be no greater Christmas present to our membership in terms of morale building than meeting with you and also having you as our February luncheon guest.

Please have your secretary contact Cynthia Brown in my office (628-2216) if you will be available as mentioned.

Sincerely,



Elaine B. Jenkins  
President

EBJ/rdl

cc: Mel Bradley  
Steve Rhodes ✓

11/28  
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mike,

Attached is the list of  
"Black Economists" who were  
present at Faith's  
meeting. Jim Cicconi  
was at the meeting as  
well.

Our observations were  
the same.

Steve

*J. Gould  
cc: [unclear]*

Meeting on Social and Economic Policy and its Relationship to the Black Community, Roosevelt Room, 11/28

Dr. Robert Woodson, President, National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, 1367 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036  
202-331-1103

Dr. Robert Hill, Assistant Director, Senior Research Associate, Bureau of Social Sciences Research, 1990 M St., NW, Washington, DC 20036, 202-223-4300

Dr. William Allen, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA, (H) 520 Baughman Ave., Claremont, CA 91711, 714-624-1964

Mr. Dan Smith, American Plus Company, 5300 Columbia Pike, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22204, 703-845-9362

Mr. Paul Pride, Pride, Roberts & Co., 1275 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20005, 202-371-6688

Mr. Jerreld Jones, Chairman, Courier Communications, 3820 N. 20th, Milwaukee, WI 53206, 414-444-2132

Mr. Arthur Fletcher, President, Arthur A. Fletcher Associates, Inc., 2025 Eye St., NW, Suite 212, Washington, D.C. 20006, 202-833-3516, 202-554-0573

Mr. John M. Perkins, John Perkins Ministries, 1581 Navarro, Pasadena, CA 91103, 818-791-7439

Mr. Wendel Gunn, 23 Joan Road, Stamford, CT 06905, 203-329-0807

Mr. Samuel H. Howard, VP and Treasurer, Hospital Corporation of America, 1 Park Plaza, Nashville, TN 37202, 615-373-5691(H), 615-327-9551(O)

Mr. Edward Williams, 1st Secretary of Economic Affairs, Assistant Treasury Attachee, U.S. Embassy, 100 Wellington, K1PST1, Ottawa, Canada, 613-238-5335

Mr. Michael Calhoun, Finley, Kumble & Wagner, 1120 Connecticut Ave., Suite 1128, Washington, D.C. 20036, 202-857-4434

Dr. Edward Irons, Mills B. Lane Professor of Banking and Finance, Atlanta University Graduate School of Business, Atlanta, GA 30314, 404-525-4388

Dr. Glenn Loury, Professor of Economics and Afro-American Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, 617-495-0807

Dr. E.V. Hill, P.O. Box 11219, Los Angeles, CA 90011,  
213-235-2103

Mr. William Keyes, Chairman, Black Pac, 1004 Broad Branch Court,  
McLean, VA 22101, 703-442-7510

Dr. Carl E. Singley, Temple University, School of Law, 1719 N.  
Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122, 215-787-7863

Ms. Gwen King Director, Washington Office, Commonwealth of PA.,  
400 North Capitol St., Suite 285, Washington, DC 20001,  
202-624-7828

Mr. J. Douglas Holladay, Associate Director, Office of Public  
Liaison, The White House, Washington, DC 20500, 202-456-6510

Ambassador Faith Ryan Whittlesey, Assistant to the President for  
Public Liaison, The White House, Washington, DC 20500,  
202-456-2270

Mr. Melvin Bradley, Special Assistant to the President, The White  
House, Washington, DC 20500, 202-456-6560

Mr. Richard Rahn, Vice President, Chief Economist, Economic  
Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 165 H St., NW, Washington, DC  
20062, 202-463-5620

Mr. Bruce Chapman, Acting Deputy Counsellor and Director of  
Planning and Evaluation, The White House, Washington, DC 20500,  
202-456-6590

Ms. Trudi Michelle Morrison, Associate Director, Office of Public  
Liaison, The White House, Washington, DC 20500, 202-456-2745

Mr. Clarence Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity  
Commission, 2401 E St., NW, Washington, DC 20507, 202-864-8116

Mr. James Cicconi, Special Assistant to the President and Special  
Assistant to the Chief of Staff, The White House, Washington, DC  
20500, 202-456-2174

Mr. J. Steven Rhodes, Assistant to the Vice President for  
Domestic Policy, The White House, Washington, DC 20500,  
202-456-2173

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Deaver

FROM: J. Steven Rhodes *Steve*

SUBJECT: "Thank you" Luncheon for Black  
Supporters of the Administration.

*J. P. Coomi*  
*Can I have*  
*your*  
*thoughts.*

As you well know, the black Republicans who supported the President in the last election had a very difficult assignment. The results of their efforts were not fairly reflected in the vote the President received from black community members. The approximately 8% of the black vote that supported the President was not typical of the other minority groups throughout the Nation.

For this reason, it is critical that we:

- 1) Thank those supporters who worked with us in the 1984 election effort as soon as possible.
- 2) Ask the people for their ideas on ways we can change for the good of the President and the Nation's future.

I have attached a schedule proposal that I feel would begin this process. The luncheon would be a working one which would afford the President the opportunity to say thank you to these dedicated individuals as well as provide the time to to ask them for their suggestions as to what we can do to be certain that the President is given a fair chance in the future.

After this event we would then be open to do more in the way of Outreach. I do feel that the first attempt should be made with our people.

Finally, there are a few other items that I would appreciate the opportunity of speaking to you about at your convenience.

cc: The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel Murphy

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE: November 26, 1984

FROM: J. Steven Rhodes

MEETING: Luncheon meeting with key black Republican supporters who were involved with the 1984 campaign.

DATE: Available date between December 3rd and December 21st, 1984.

PURPOSE: To thank black Republican supporters for their assistance in the campaign and to begin the "Outreach" into the black community.

BACKGROUND: The outcome of the 1984 election saw approximately 8% of the black community voting for the President. The black community was the only minority group that voted so stridently against President Reagan. As a result, the black Republicans had a far greater amount of difficulty than other minorities in the task of campaigning for the President.

Based on first hand experience of active involvement in the campaign in the black community, if questioned, we could gain tremendous insight into the three leading issues of this community. This would result in reducing the polarization.

FORMAT: - Location: State Dining Room  
- Participation: See attached list  
- Time: 1 hour in length

CABINET  
PARTICIPATION: Vice President  
Secretary Weinberger  
Secretary Baldrige  
Secretary Heckler  
Secretary Pierce  
Secretary Dole  
Trade Representative Brock

FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION: Advised

SPEECH  
MATERIALS: Talking Points

PRESS: Photo-op

STAFF: J. Steven Rhodes

RECOMMENDED PARTICIPANTS

Administration/Party Leadership

James Baker  
Michael Deaver  
Paul Laxalt  
Margaret Hance  
Ed Rollins  
Frank Fahrenkopf  
Margaret Tutwiler  
Mel Bradley  
Clarence Pendleton  
Clarence Thomas

Recommended Guests

Thaddeus Garrett  
Arthur Fletcher  
Willie Leftwich (Washington, D.C. Lawyer)  
LeGree Daniels  
Clarence McKee  
Elaine Jenkins  
Stanley S. Scott (New York, Philip Morris)  
John Wilkes  
C.J. Patterson  
Henry Lucas  
John Patnett (New Orleans Republican Party)  
William Coleman  
Edward Brooke  
Jewel LaFontain (Chicago Republican Party)  
Rev. E.V. Hill (L.A.)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

	ACTION	INFO	ROUTING SEQUENCE & SIGNATURE
TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3.
ADMIRAL MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2. <i>M</i>
BOYDEN GRAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
PETER TEELEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
JENNIFER FITZGERALD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
DONALD GREGG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
STEVE RHODES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1. <i>[Signature]</i>
DAN SULLIVAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SUSAN C. MOWREY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
JOE HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SUSAN PORTER ROSE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
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OTHER _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

*Steve*  
*Discuss with me!*  
*G.B.*  
*11-20-84*

FROM: J. Steven Rhodes

REMARKS: Tab A) Memorandum to the Vice President  
 Tab B) Arthur Fletcher telegram  
 Tab C) J. Steven Rhodes' memorandum to Micheal Deaver

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Admiral Daniel Murphy  
FROM: J. Steven Rhodes *Steve*  
SUBJECT: Economic Development within the Black  
Community.

Attached is a copy of the telegram I received from Art Fletcher the day following the re-election.

If you will notice, the thrust of Mr. Fletcher's telegram is similar to the events I proposed almost one year ago.

We will be receiving more of this type of mail as time goes on - and I feel this makes sense.

1-013355A312 11/07/84

ICS IPMWGWD WSH

05751 11-07 0240P EDT

PMS WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

1-012437C312002 11/07/84

ICS IPMWGWF WSH

00541 WASHINGTON DC 11-07 0201P EDT

PMS MR. J. STEVEN RHODES ASST TO THE VPRESIDENT

FDR DOMESTIC POLICY

THE WHITE HOUSE ROOM 285

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20501

00541 WASHINGTON DC 318 11-07 0143P EDT

PMS PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

4 NOV 7 P 2: 54

WASHINGTON DC 20500

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR HISTORIC VICTORY. I AM DELIGHTED THAT AMERICA DECIDED TO SUPPORT YOUR VISION OF FOUR MORE YEARS OF PEACE, PROSPERITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. PLEASE KNOW THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU AND SUPPORTING YOUR EFFORTS TO MAKE THIS VISION A PERMANENT AND LASTING REALITY.

WITH REFERENCE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT BLACK AMERICANS HAVE THE PERCEPTION THAT YOUR VISION DOES NOT INCLUDE THEM. IT COULD BE THAT OTHER AMERICAN CONSTITUENCIES, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS -- VALID AND NOT SO VALID -- FEEL THE SAME. IT IS NOW EVIDENT, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU ARE NOT ONLY A STRONG LEADER, BUT

POSSIBLY THE STRONGEST TO OCCUPY THE WHITE HOUSE IN THIS CENTURY. IN ADDITION, AFTER A VICIOUS CAMPAIGN, YOUR IMAGE OF DECENCY REMAINS INTACT. MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS STRENGTH AND YOUR SENSE OF DECENCY THAT I APPEAL TO YOU NOW. I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY, YOU EMPLOY YOUR IMAGE TO REACH OUT TO BLACK AMERICANS AND ASURE THEM THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED IN YOUR VISION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT AMERICA.

NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE GOALS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY; AND ARE COMMON GOALS SHARED BY YOU. (I REFER TO MY MARCH 16, 1984 LETTER TO YOU, THAT MENTIONS A MOVEMENT WITHIN THE BLACK COMMUNITY SPEARHEADED BY DR. T. J. JEMISON AND THE 7 MILLION-MEMBER NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION, U.S.A., INC.) IT IS FOR THESE COMBINED REASONS THAT I URGE YOU TO ANNOUNCE YOUR PLAN TO

---

CONVENE AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUMMIT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND YOUR INTENTION TO INVITE A SELECT GROUP OF BLACK AMERICAN LEADERS TO EXPLORE THE STRATEGIES THAT WILL BE DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED TO SET THE PROCESS IN MOTION.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON. I STAND READY TO ASSIST YOU IN ANY AND EVERY WAY POSSIBLE.

RESPECTFULLY,

---

ARTHUR A. FLETCHER

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEAVER

FROM: J. STEVEN RHODES

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with the Reverend  
T.J. Jemison

---

As you recall, last year I proposed the President meet with T.J. Jemison, President of the National Baptist Convention, to explore ways in which the federal government could assist the National Baptist Convention in the creation of a black national "bank". At your recommendation, I talked with Fred Fielding and others and it was determined that a national bank would not be advisable, due to regulations and restrictions. It was therefore decided that a national fund would be far more advisable for the Convention's purposes and would in fact be much easier to administer. However, Reverend Jemison endorsed Jesse Jackson and I dropped any further action on this idea.

Presently, Reverend Cameron Alexander, head of the State Baptist Convention in Atlanta, Georgia, has become, for lack of a better word, the chief operating officer for the National Baptist Convention Development Corporation in Atlanta. This organization has grown out of Jemison's original idea. The Development Corporation has received a commitment from the city of Atlanta which will allow them to develop a 50 acre area of Atlanta for mixed use which would include housing, hotels, etc. Due to the inability to develop the original idea of the development fund, poor organization and poor management, the National Baptist Convention Development Corporation will probably be unable to develop this 50 acre property in Atlanta.

Reverend Jemison will probably make mention of this effort and seek some assistance in this development. Bankers at Citibank in New York say that without proper management and organization further investment in this corporation would be unadvisable. However, with proper management and organization, Jemison's original idea and the inclusion of the development corporation, the potential for meaningful and long-term development is tremendous.

I have attached last year's briefing sheets and the article from last year's Post which discusses Jemison's original idea.

If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

bcc: The Vice President

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Deaver

FROM: J. Steven Rhodes 

SUBJECT: "Thank you" Luncheon for Black  
Supporters of the Administration.

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LeGree Daniels  
Clarence McKee  
Elaine Jenkins  
Stanley S. Scott (New York, Philip Morris)  
John Wilkes  
C.J. Patterson  
Henry Lucas  
John Patnett (New Orleans Republican Party)  
William Coleman  
Edward Brooke  
Jewel LaFontain (Chicago Republican Party)

Rev. E. V. Hill (Los Angeles)