

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:

YOU WERE CALLED BY— YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. FTS

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

① are you policy point person on SS?
② If so, will you meet w/ him?

① yes — no ✓

② yes — no ✓

Pres.'s Comm on SS Reform doing report -- no policy position will be taken by anyone until report comes out

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

12-6 2:40

63-109

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

★GPO: 1981 0 - 361-529 (152)



FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE

1050 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W., SUITE 520
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 • 202 785-3269

November 30, 1982

Mr. Jim Cicconi
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Cicconi:

For your review I have enclosed a copy of the Financial Executives Institute's (FEI) proposal to correct the financial problems of the Social Security System. FEI believes our proposed "self-correcting" mechanism is a fair and workable approach to resolving the Social Security dilemma, and would be very interested in discussing this proposal with you at your earliest convenience.

Yours very truly,

James A. Kaitz
Technical Associate-Gov't. Relations

JAK/lb
Enc.

FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE

633 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 • 212 953-0500

ROBERT W. MOORE
PRESIDENT

October 26, 1982

Mr. Alan Greenspan, Chairman
National Commission on
Social Security Reform
736 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Greenspan:

The Financial Executives Institute* is deeply concerned about the problems of the Social Security system, both short and long term -- particularly the Old Age and Disability Insurance Funds (OASDI). Recent discussion in the press concerning the near-term cash short-fall appears to have concentrated on a payroll tax increase as the only practical solution.

In lieu of such tax increase, our Employee Benefits Committee has developed a proposal which we believe is worthy of consideration by the Commission. The proposal is not intended to address all the problems of the OASDI Funds but rather is designed to correct the near-term cash short-fall problem and to restore a modest reserve over the next several years.

This proposal does not address the problems which will result from long-term demographic shifts projected to impact the system beginning in the 21st century. It would, however, restore liquidity to the OASDI Funds and maintain the basic financing concepts of the Social Security program; namely, to be solely financed by payroll taxes (no use of general revenues), and continued parity between employees and their employers in sharing the tax burden. We consider these basic financing concepts to be fundamental to a sound ongoing Social Security system.

The immediate liquidity problem results in large measure from the unusual economic volatility of recent years -- particularly the CPI escalator raising benefits faster than increasing wages raised the tax revenues of the system. Accordingly, we believe

*Financial Executives Institute is the professional association of 12,000 senior financial and administrative officers of over 6,000 organizations, large and small, throughout the United States and Canada.

Mr. Alan Greenspan

October 26, 1982

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the financial solution to this immediate problem should be borne partially by the beneficiaries and partially by the taxpayers. Our proposal provides a mechanism for this rough equity to occur and for modest levels of reserves to be built over the next few years.

The second part of our proposal provides a self-correcting mechanism, whereby, once modest reserves are developed, they can be maintained regardless of short-term economic volatility -- merely by raising or lowering the tax rates as needed to maintain liquidity with modest reserves.

This type of solution to the immediate problems of the system would provide time for more detailed consideration of the long-term problems facing the Social Security system. These problems need to be addressed and significant modifications may have to be made in order to maintain system solvency in the 21st century. We believe adoption of a proposal such as ours will give your Commission and others more time to carefully study these serious long-term problems.

Attached is a description of our proposal together with a projection of how it could work using the Trustees' intermediate II-B assumptions over the next 10 years. It is important to note that such projection indicates that liquidity can be restored to the system under our proposal with tax rates only slightly higher than those in the present law during most of the 1980s -- and in 1990 and thereafter, with tax rates significantly lower than those now mandated.

We suggest that any action along the lines of our proposal have a 10 year sunset provision so that it can be reviewed to ensure that it is meeting the needs of the system.

The attached proposal is only a skeleton outline of a concept -- even though it is the carefully thought-out product of many months of work by our Employee Benefits Committee. More work will have to be done on the details by those more experienced with the operation of the OASDI system. For example, as indicated above, our proposed concept has been tested against only one set of economic assumptions. Accordingly, we would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter in more detail with the Commission and its staff at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

R.W. Moore

attachment

FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE

Proposal to Correct Short-Term Financial Problems of the Social Security System

The Old Age and Survivors (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Funds of the social security system are insolvent; only temporary inter-fund borrowing from the Hospital Insurance Fund (HI) allows it to continue to pay monthly benefits through June 1983. In the absence of legislative action, the trust funds will be unable to honor their checks in July 1983.

In the face of mounting evidence that the American people are losing faith in the ability of the social security system to survive as the mainstay of our national retirement income system, some equitable solution to the serious short-term financial crisis must be developed on a bi-partisan basis.

Social security is essentially a pay-as-you-go system with benefits to current beneficiaries financed by the current payroll tax revenues. Recent volatility of the economy -- principally the high inflation rate causing significant cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) for beneficiaries -- have all but eliminated the cash reserves of the Funds. Thus, there are projected short-fall of revenues to finance the OASDI funds; reserves are now less than two months' benefits.

FEI continues to believe that the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and the Disability Insurance (DI) funds should be exclusively financed by payroll taxes; general tax revenues should not be used. We also believe that parity in payroll taxes borne equally by employees and their employers should continue.

We believe the solution to the present insolvency should be financed equitably between the taxpayers and the beneficiaries of the OASDI funds. We have developed a proposal which not only corrects for the present insolvency but also self-adjusts to solve any future financial short-falls resulting from volatility in the economy. This proposal would also self-adjust in the opposite direction; when reserves recover to an adequate level, tax rates would be reduced.

The result of implementing such a proposal would have modest impact on each individual. The monthly impact on the average beneficiary would be about \$8.12 in the first year. The tax increase would be about \$5.40 per month for each employee earning the statutory maximum and his employer. Yet these modest amounts would provide solvency of the OASDI trust funds for the remainder of the 20th century; no further legislative action would be required.

This proposal does not envision corrective action sufficient to solve problems resulting from major demographic shifts that will occur in the 21st century. These types of corrections need to be carefully thought out with sufficient study and research. In fact, we propose the automatic adjustment procedure have a 10-year sunset provision so its effectiveness can be measured and maintained only if appropriate.

Nor does this recommendation address the very significant deficits projected for the Hospital Insurance fund beginning in 1987.

* * * * *

Specifically, this proposal would make very limited automatic annual adjustments in both the payroll tax rate and the COLA increase, either upward or downward depending on the state of the trust fund reserves. ⁽¹⁾ If reserves were below 25% of annual benefit payments (approximately three months' reserves) then the combined payroll tax would be increased by 0.2% (an individual employee's tax rate would be increased by 0.1% and matched by the employer) and the next annual COLA increase would be reduced by two percentage points of the COLA otherwise payable (if 10% was the scheduled COLA, then 8% would be added). The aggregate dollar impact of these two factors is roughly equal. We also propose the effective date for the annual COLA be changed to the September benefit checks beginning in 1983. These tax rates, as self-adjusted annually, would supercede presently legislated tax rates.

And this automatic feature also self-corrects when the trust funds reach a solvent position some time in the late 1980's. At that time, the tax rates would reverse by lowering taxes annually by 0.2%. Such annual adjustments would continue as long as the reserve ratio stayed above the 25% level, but never be permitted to fall below 1982 tax rates.

Detailed Explanation and Projection

The attached projection develops the impact of applying the FEI proposal by automatic annual adjustment to both the combined OASDI payroll tax rate and the annual cost-of-living adjustment of benefits (COLA). The annual automatic adjustment is triggered by the level of reserves. When the reserve ratio as of any June 30 is below 25%^(a), the combined OASDI tax rate is increased the next January 1 by 0.2% and the next scheduled COLA is reduced by 2 percentage points (a scheduled 10% increase would be paid at 8%). Initial adjustments would be the 1983 COLA and January 1, 1984 for the tax rates. We further propose the timing of the annual COLA be reflected in the September benefit payments (paid in early October).

When the reserve ratio exceeds 25%, then the automatic annual adjustment of the tax rate would reverse and be reduced by 0.2%. Such adjustments would continue until any post-1982 adjustments had been reversed.

(1)

If the reserve ratio is lower than 8.3% of annual payments (one months' reserve), then inter-fund borrowing from the Hospital Insurance Fund (HI) would be permitted.

(a)

The reserve ratio would be calculated by dividing net assets of the OASDI trust funds as of June 30 by the disbursements for the preceding 12 months adjusted as if the immediate COLA had been implemented for all of those 12 months.

Based on the average individual monthly benefit of \$406, an annual COLA reduction of 2 percentage points would amount to \$8.12 each month in the first year. Equivalent adjustments would be made for any subsequent years for which the adjustment procedure is effective.

Based on an employee whose annual earnings were equal to the maximum taxable wages (presently \$32,400), the increase in the combined tax rate of 0.2% would amount to \$5.40 per month.

As shown on the attached projection, the combined OASDI tax rate would advance from the present level of 10.8% in annual increments to a high in 1988 of 11.8%. It would then remain below the level that is presently legislated for 1990.

The annual COLA increase for beneficiaries would likewise be reduced until 1988 at the rate of two percentage points each year.

Borrowing from the HI fund would be necessary until 1984; such borrowing would be fully repaid by 1986.

The cash reserves held by the system would increase throughout the period of this projection reaching over 70% of annual disbursements at the end of fiscal 1992 (a reserve of over 8 months of benefit payments).

ESTIMATED OPERATIONS OF THE COMBINED OASI AND DI TRUST FUNDS

Fiscal Years Ended September 30 (\$ Amounts in billions)
(Using 1982 Trustees Report II-B Assumptions)

Fiscal year	(2) Income	Borrowing from HI Fund		(2) Disbursements	Net change in funds	End of Year		Combined OASDI tax rate		CPI benefit adjustment	
		Current Year	Cumulative			Assets	Reserve Ratio	Present Law	Proposed	Present Law (2)	Proposed
1982	\$148.4	--	--	\$156.6	-\$8.2	\$19.1	12.2%	10.8%	10.8%	7.4%	7.4%
1983	160.1	\$6.1	\$6.1	168.1	- 1.9	17.1	10.2	10.8	10.8	7.5	5.5
1984	178.8	2.0	8.1	181.5	- 0.7	16.4	9.0	10.8	11.0	7.7	5.7
1985	198.9	--	8.1	196.8	+ 2.1	18.5	9.4	11.4	11.2	6.9	4.9
1986	220.8	(8.1) (1)	--	211.3	+ 1.4	19.9 (1)	9.4 (1)	11.4	11.4	6.1	4.1
1987	244.0	--	--	225.7	+18.3	38.2	16.9	11.4	11.6	5.6	3.6
1988	271.2	--	--	240.0	+ 31.2	69.4	28.9	11.4	11.8	5.4	3.4
1989	292.1	--	--	249.8	+ 42.3	111.7	44.7	11.4	11.6	5.1	5.1
1990	310.7	--	--	269.6	+ 41.1	152.8	56.6	12.4	11.4	4.7	4.7
1991	328.5	--	--	289.9	+ 38.6	191.4	66.0	12.4	11.2	4.2	4.2
1992	343.6	--	--	310.3	+ 33.3	224.7	72.4	12.4	11.0	4.0	4.0

(1) The build-up in the OASDI assets from 1987 forward could be adversely affected through continued inter-fund borrowing since the HI fund is expected to reach a deficit position in 1987 and continue to accrue deficits throughout current projections periods.

(2) Amounts developed using 1982 Trustees' Report II-B assumptions

Kimberlin, Sam

SAM O. KIMBERLIN, JR.
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT



**TEXAS
BANKERS
ASSOCIATION**

November 18, 1982

Dear Aileen:

Many thanks for the list of Texans working in the White House. I hope you and all of the others can attend our reception for the Texas Congressional delegation in January. It will be on Thursday evening, January 27, so mark your calendar.

Just to prove that I wasn't balmy about the Texas vs. Houston game on ESPN, enclosed is an article from the Austin paper explaining why it wasn't shown at the previously assigned time. I guess a 50 to zip game really would not have much national appeal.

By the way, Ann Armstrong very graciously offered to check on the British Embassy reception possibilities. It should be quite interesting and enjoyable, if it works out.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Sam'.

Sam O. Kimberlin, Jr.

Enclosure

Ms. Aileen Anderson
The White House, West Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

LSU-Alabama's appeal doomed UT to late slot

Football fans who expected to see the University of Texas-Houston game replay over ESPN (Cable 5) Tuesday night should have stayed up late. The third and last showing was moved to 11 p.m. instead of being aired at the announced 7 p.m. time.

Dave Ogreaan, communications representative for ESPN, said that LSU's 20-10 win over Alabama was moved to the earlier time slot because the game had more

national appeal than UT's 50-0 defeat of Houston.

The LSU-Alabama was originally scheduled for prime-time showing Sunday, but much of the game wasn't seen because a tennis match ran long.

The Tuesday switch of the football games was announced during the last part of the LSU-Alabama game Sunday and at other times, Ogreaan said, but Charles Gramlich, general manager of

Austin CableVision, said he received no official notification and was unaware of the switch.

Had he known, Gramlich said he would have alerted local news sources and might have been able to arrange to show the game on prime time on the local programming channel (Cable 15). Such a showing still would be possible if interest were strong enough, he said.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 11, 1982

Dear Mr. Kimberlin:

Per our conversation, listed below are Texans who are working in the West Wing of the White House (one address for all: The White House, West Wing, Washington, D. C. 20500). You are thoughtful to consider including us in festivities in Washington for the Texas delegation.

James A. and Susan Baker	
James Cicconi (Patricia)	(Jim Baker's office)
Margaret Glasscock	(Jim Baker's office)
Aileen Anderson	(Jim Baker's office)
George and Barbara Bush	
Chase Untermeyer	(George Bush's office)
Emily Ford	(John Roger's office)
Pete Roussel	(Larry Speakes' office)
Flo Taussig	(Larry Speakes' office)
Debby Rundell	(Dave Gergen's office)
Carol Hallene	(Ken Duberstein's office)

Hope you will enjoy Austin (and Texas) a little extra for those of us who expect to go through another hard winter up here!

Sincerely,



Aileen Anderson

Mr. Sam Kimberlin
203 West 10th Street
Austin, Texas 78701



COMMITTEE ON RULES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

RICHARD BOLLING
CHAIRMAN

13 December '82

Klein, Michael

(picture was not signed
due to appearance of
"face-off" between
O'Neill & President -
picture was returned)
A. A. SAYERS, JR.
STAFF DIRECTOR

Dear Jim -

I really enjoyed talking with you the other day, and certainly appreciate your help on this.

I had originally intended this autographed photograph as a Christmas present for my father, but ~~time~~ time has run out, so there is no rush at all about getting this done. If there is any problem at all, I'll understand completely. Otherwise, I'll be out of town until after the New Year, and will look forward to hearing from you sometime then.

I hope you and your family have a very Merry Christmas, and please send our side of the family's love to your grandmothers and Great Aunt in particular!

With Much Thanks,

Michael Klein

P.S. The name on the picture should read STEWART KLEIN, and should be signed on the TOP of the matting.

Handwritten notes: "10/1/82" and "C"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1982

Dear Ken:

Enclosed is the letter I mentioned in our telephone conversation. We would appreciate it if your Department would respond directly to Mr. Brown on Jim Baker's behalf.

Thanks again for your help.

Sincerely,

James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President

Mr. Kenneth Klinge
Office of the Secretary
Department of Transportation
400 7th Street, S.W.
Room 10200
Washington, D. C. 20590

1164 Bishop Street
Suite 1102
Honolulu, HI 96813
May 4, 1982

Gentlemen:

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention an incredibly expensive and wasteful project which the U. S. Department of Transportation proposes to permit at the same time that the Reagan administration is trying to get a handle on government spending. In fairness it should be said that the commitment to build this project was made by the Carter administration in a series of "midnight hour" approvals before leaving office.

First, let me briefly describe the project in question. Interstate Highway H-3 is a proposed "interstate" highway intended to be a third four-lane highway connecting the windward and leeward sides of Oahu (the island which in its entirety comprises the City and County of Honolulu). This highway is to be 10.7 miles long and includes two tunnels through the Ko'olau mountain range, each of which is one mile long.

The Department of Transportation of the State of Hawaii has stated that the cost to build this highway will be \$386,152,000. However, this figure is very misleading since it is based on 1979 costs for the roadway construction (\$242,201,000) and 1977 costs for tunnel construction (\$127,371,000) and an unspecified base year for calculating the cost of right-of-way acquisition (\$16,580,000). 1/ By referring to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Construction Cost Indexes, 2/ if the 1977 costs are adjusted to reflect cost increases between 1977 and 1979 (35%), the cost in 1979 dollars for the tunnels increases by \$44,579,850 to \$171,950,850 for a total project cost adjusted to 1979 dollars of:

roadway construction	\$242,201,000
tunnel construction	171,950,000
right-of-way	<u>16,580,000</u>
TOTAL	\$430,731,000

Between 1979 and the end of the second quarter of 1980, the last year for which the FHWA Construction Cost Index is available to me, costs for highway construction increased by another 22%, an increase of \$133,537,800 for a total project cost of \$564,268,000 expressed in mid-1980 dollars.

The Hawaii State highway department currently projects a highly optimistic completion date for H-3 of 1989 [±] 3/ Every previous estimate which the highway department made indicated at least nine years would be necessary to complete construction of H-3 in North Halawa Valley. 4/ If

that is true, then completion would not be before mid-1991. Assuming, as we all hope, that President Reagan will successfully slow down the rate of inflation to as little as 8 percent per annum, based upon calculation used by the Hawaii Department of Transportation in previous estimates, the cost of the highway would escalate another sixty percent, adding an additional \$338.5 million to the cost of the highway for a total of \$902.8 million. 5/ If inflation exceeds 8%, the cost will top one billion dollars. Since 1973 the average rate of inflation in the highway construction industry (as measured by FHWA's Bid Price Index) has been 12.5% a year--a pace that doubles cost every six years. 6/ If inflation continues at its historical rate, one billion dollars may turn out to be a conservative estimate of the cost of H-3.

A billion dollars is an unconscionable amount of money to spend to construct a highway which will serve windward Oahu, a Honolulu bedroom community with a population in 1975 of only 115,441 6/ and with a projected maximum population in the year 2000 of only 150,500. 7/ A billion-dollar highway to serve an increase in population of only 35,059 people must be the worst cost/benefit ratio ever for a highway. It must be kept in mind that Honolulu's trans-Ko'olau highway demand is only a problem during peak hours for commuters. There are already two four-lane highways in use to serve the windward side of Oahu and the Hawaii Department of Transportation's own traffic use studies indicate that the two existing highways will not reach capacity until the year 2000. 8/ The U. S. Department of Transportation in a paper entitled, FHWA 1981 Highway Legislation: Programs and Revenue Options Discussion Paper #1, dated June 26, 1980, notes at Page 15 that, "Energy limitations and the high cost of highway construction make it essential that careful consideration be given to the cost effectiveness of adding new capacity to our existing systems in order to reduce congestion. Traffic system management, increased auto occupancy, and better public transportation services are, in many instances, more effective solutions to the problem of handling increasing local peak period travel demand." 9/

Hawaii is a state in which the Democratic party has controlled the legislature since 1954. William F. Quinn, a Republican who had been appointed Governor of Hawaii by President Eisenhower, became the first elected Governor of Hawaii after statehood. He was elected for one term in 1960. However, since 1964 the Democratic Party has also controlled the governorship. As a result, the Democratic Party machine has had an iron grip on the government of the State of Hawaii for a quarter of a century. Today the Republican Party is less of a force than in any other state in the union. Hawaii is the only state with no Republican Senators or Congressmen. The Hawaii Democratic Party machine delivered the State of Hawaii to Carter at the Democratic convention and even succeeded in delivering the popular and electoral vote to Carter in the presidential election in spite of President Reagan's landslide victory everywhere else.

The 4(f) Statement which was required because the H-3 highway would use land from a major park on the windward side of Oahu was approved on November 21, 1980, by the outgoing Assistant Secretary of Transportation

for Policy and International Affairs (a Carter political appointee). Subsequently the FHWA Administrator approved the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the highway. On December 10, 1980, these approvals were transmitted from the Washington, D.C. office of FHWA to the FHWA Region 9 office in San Francisco. Although supposedly precluded from approving the EIS until receipt of material from the Washington FHWA office, it is instructive to note that the San Francisco office gave its approval on December 10, 1980, even though that office could not yet have received the material which was not even forwarded until that day by Washington headquarters of FHWA. Moreover, on that same date (December 10, 1980) in Hawaii, the State of Hawaii Department of Transportation already had its location and design approval application prepared and dated December 10, 1980. Because the last location and design hearings for the H-3 highway were held commencing December 12, 1977, unless location and design approval was applied for before December 11, 1980, new location and design hearings would have been required by DOT regulations (23 CFR § 790.5) and the entire H-3 project would have had to be resubmitted to the Reagan administration for its independent evaluation and approval. The "midnight hour" approvals by the Carter administration are a patently obvious attempt to prevent the Reagan administration from implementing its transportation task force's recommendation that most of the unfinished remaining 2% to 4% of the interstate system should be abandoned (with few exceptions) as being far too costly for the limited service it would provide.

Although the Reagan administration has inherited the situation, it has all the authority necessary to undo what the Carter administration has done and force a re-examination of the project. Although normally not a matter with which the Secretary of Transportation would be concerned, PS&E (Plans, Specifications & Estimates) approval by the Department of Transportation is necessary before work on the project can begin. Until PS&E approval is received, the U. S. Department of Transportation is not contractually obligated to the project.


All of the foregoing considerations are alarming because of the incredible cost of the H-3 project and the apparent political shenanigans involved in its approval. However, even more alarming has been the discovery that the highway is to be built in a location which will expose motorists and workmen building the highway to serious, possibly lethal hazards. The route of H-3 will be from an intersection with an existing highway on the leeward side of Oahu through North Halawa Valley to the Ko'olau Mountains via mile-long tunnels. The H-3 will emerge from the tunnels onto the windward side at the rear of Haiku Valley. Occupying the entire rear half of Haiku Valley is an Omega station which is operated by the Coast Guard as part of a global navigation system. The Omega station is an extremely high powered, very low frequency radio navigation system. It consists of a valley span antenna system with six wire cables 7,200 feet long which extend completely across the valley and which connect in the center to a 1,200-foot long down lead which feeds the antenna with 135,000 watts of transmitter power. There is an antenna ground system consisting of a dense network buried copper cables which radiate outward from the

May 4, 1982
Page Four (4)

transmitter building for a distance of 1,700 feet. Of the 135,000 watts of power, approximately 125,000 watts of power is "lost". The final broadcast power is only 10,000 watts. Most of the 125,000 watts which are lost are radiated from the antenna to the ground system. H-3 is to be built on viaducts above the antenna ground system and below the antennae. In other words, the highway will be routed right between the antenna and ground systems through which will be radiated most of the "lost" 125,000 watts of power. This much power presents a hazard at two levels. First, there is the danger of being exposed to massive radio waves, for a short period in the case of a motorist to a very long period in the case of workmen who will be working, constructing the required tunnels and viaducts for up to ten years. Second, such a massive amount of radio power is "reconverted" to electricity when it encounters a suitable conductor such as a metal car. This electricity will be enough to cause a severe shock and could easily ignite gasoline unless the individual and the car are grounded or insulated. The rubber wheels of a car insulate the car but not in the case of accidents and/or flat tires in the rain or even in dry weather when mechanical breakdowns require leaving one's car. To alleviate this serious shock and spark hazard, they propose to build a webbing of copper cable 30 feet high and up to a mile long on either side of the highway, leaving the metal roof of the vehicles to absorb the electricity from above (which presents a problem for convertibles and canvas topped military vehicles). Of course even if we were to assume that the copper webbing will adequately shield motorists (at least those in metal roofed vehicles) and if we were to also assume that there will never be accidents which impact upon the sides of the viaduct, nevertheless there remains the serious problem of prolonged exposure of workmen to both the radiation and the shock hazard. Extensive material, including medical studies, expert testimony and political documents uncovered through years of investigation are attached. The H-3 case is the longest and biggest environmental battle in Hawaii's history. This July 19, 1982 will mark the 10th anniversary of the lawsuit, the decision of the latest round in Federal Court also included.

Although I represent the Plaintiffs in litigation to stop this highway, I want to assure you that my opposition is based upon my sincere belief that this highway is a waste of taxpayers' money. I invite you to check the accuracy of what I have said. It is my hope that you may feel that this is such a billion dollar boondoggle that it warrants exposure to the country.

Aloha,



Boyce R. Brown, Jr.
Attorney
Stop H-3 Association
Phone: (808) 521-2302

Attachments

FOOTNOTES

1/ Enclosed with this letter as Enclosure #1 is a copy of page 37 from the final supplemental environmental impact statement for the proposed North Halawa Valley alignment of H-3 (hereinafter the NHVeis) which was approved on December 10, 1980 by outgoing officials of the Carter administration. The quoted costs were derived from that page.

2/ The FHWA Construction Cost indexes utilized in calculating current costs are attached as Enclosure #2.

3/ Enclosure #3 is page 38 of the NHVeis indicating construction can begin within 12 months after removal of legal restrictions and construction will require at least six years thereafter for a total of seven years at the earliest. At the present time trial is scheduled for October 6, 1981. Therefore it is doubtful that construction could start until late 1982 assuming the legal issues are resolved in favor of building the highway.

4/ Enclosure #4 consists of two pages (23 and 24) from the final 4(f) statement which was prepared in 1976 for the proposed Moanalua Valley route which they originally intended to use. A 4(f) statement is required whenever a highway will use land of historic importance or public park land. The purpose of a 4(f) statement is to determine whether or not there are feasible and prudent alternatives to the use of such land. Enclosure #4 is from a comparison of the Moanalua and North Halawa routes. The cost study assumed a mid-1977 commencement of construction and estimated completion for the North Halawa route would be mid-1987-- a ten-year period. This particular study assumed a longer tunnel would be built so a slightly shorter construction time should be assumed.

5/ Page 24 of Enclosure #4 contains a calculation of total cost (escalated). This calculation is necessary because the construction contracts will be entered into over the seven to ten year construction period and not all at once. Therefore allowances must be made for inflation. The table found at page 24 of enclosure 4 indicates that the cost of the North Halawa Valley route would escalate 59.66% ASSUMING EIGHT PER CENT INFLATION. Obviously an assumption of only 8% inflation is very (perhaps unrealistically) conservative.

6/ Enclosure #5 is page 49 from the NHVeis indicating an estimated 1975 population of 115,441.

FOOTNOTES
(continued)

7/ Enclosure #6 is page 15 from the NHVeis indicating the Oahu General Plan projects the windward Oahu population for the year 2000 at 150,500.

8/ Enclosure #7 consists of pages 1 and 31 from the NHVeis, Vol. III, appendix B (Traffic Study). Page 1 shows that the traffic study is to predict use in the year 2000. Page 31 indicates that existing facilities will not reach capacity until the year 2000 even if H-3 is not built.

9/ Enclosure #8 is a copy of page 15 of the cited U.S. Department of Transportation Discussion Paper #1.

COSTS

Costs for the North Halawa Valley alternatives including the entire remaining portion of Interstate Route H-3 not yet constructed have been estimated on the basis of the preliminary plans included with this Supplement. These costs are as follows:

	<u>ROADWAY</u>	<u>TUNNELS</u>	<u>RIGHT-OF-WAY</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
TH-3	\$308,381,000	\$217,289,000	\$ 16,754,000	\$542,254,000
H-3	\$242,201,000	\$127,371,000	\$ 16,580,000	\$386,152,000

The estimated roadway costs are based on the latest construction prices available for the year 1979. Costs for the tunnels were estimated by using the 1975 bid price for the Red Hill Tunnel of \$40 million and pro-rating the cost of the North Halawa tunnel based upon the additional length. The 1975 pro-rated cost was then inflated by 40 percent to arrive at a 1977 construction cost. To this cost was added fixed costs such as vent buildings, portals, interior finish, etc. Future costs of the project can probably be expected to increase, based upon historical inflation trends for the construction industry. It is not expected that this inflation trend will change during the period of this project.

Table E-1H.-Construction Cost Indexes, 1915-78

(1972=100)

Year	Department of Commerce composite cost index*	American Appraisal Company	Engineering News-Record		Environmental Protection Agency		Federal Highway Administration		Bureau of the Census new one-family houses excluding Census lot value	Bureau of Reclamation
			Building	Construction	Sewers	Plant	Structures	Composite		
1915	13	8	9.1	5.3						
1916	15	9	12.4	7.4						
1917	19	11	15.9	10.3						
1918	23	13	15.2	10.8						
1919	26	17	15.2	11.3						
1920	33	20	19.8	14.4						
1921	26	16	15.9	11.5						
1922	24	15	14.8	9.9			21.4	32.9		
1923	26	16	17.7	12.2			24.5	43.3		
1924	26	16	17.8	12.3			24.2	41.6		
1925	26	16	17.5	11.8			23.4	39.5		
1926	26	16	17.7	11.9			23.4	38.1		
1927	26	16	17.7	11.8			22.9	37.5		
1928	26	16	17.9	11.8			21.7	35.0		
1929	26	16	18.3	11.9			21.4	34.9		
1930	25	15	17.8	11.7			20.2	31.5		
1931	23	13	18.2	10.4			18.1	28.2		
1932	20	12	13.4	9.0			15.4	22.4		
1933	22	11	14.0	9.7			16.3	28.1		
1934	24	12	16.0	11.3			18.2	30.9		
1935	24	12	15.9	11.2			18.4	29.6		
1936	24	12	16.4	11.8			20.3	30.5		
1937	26	14	18.7	13.4			20.6	29.2		
1938	26	14	18.7	13.4			19.6	26.8		
1939	24	15	18.9	13.5			19.3	26.7		
1940	25	15	19.5	13.9			19.8	26.3		
1941	27	16	20.2	14.7			22.7	29.9		24
1942	31	18	21.2	15.8			27.5	40.0		27
1943	33	18	21.8	16.6			30.3	45.9		32
1944	33	20	22.6	17.1			30.8	41.6		36
1945	34	20	22.9	17.7			27.9	40.1		37
1946	40	23	25.0	19.8			37.1	43.8		39
1947	47.7	32	29.8	23.6			44.4	49.6		43
1948	52.4	36	32.9	26.3			50.5	55.6		45
1949	52.3	36	33.8	27.3			47.4	53.6		50
1950	53.2	36	36.0	29.3			42.8	48.2		52
1951	58.0	39	38.5	31.1			53.2	59.2		49
1952	59.6	40	39.9	32.6			54.3	60.9		53
1953	59.9	42	41.3	34.4			54.2	58.6		56
1954	59.4	43	42.8	36.0			50.7	55.3		58
1955	60.5	44	45.0	37.8			50.4	53.8		55
1956	64.1	46	47.1	39.7			58.8	60.8		55
1957	65.8	48	48.8	41.5	52.2	57.0	62.2	63.5		60
1958	65.2	50	50.3	43.5	54.1	59.0	56.8	61.9		64
1959	65.0	51	52.6	45.6	56.5	61.4	54.3	59.3		64
1960	64.8	53	53.7	47.2	57.2	61.0	52.8	58.0		63
1961	64.7	54	54.5	48.5	58.3	61.6	53.3	58.4		63
1962	65.5	55	55.7	49.9	59.1	62.2	53.8	61.0		65
1963	65.0	57	57.0	51.6	61.0	63.1	57.0	62.5	70.2	66
1964	65.9	59	58.7	53.7	61.8	64.0	58.0	62.9	69.9	67
1965	67.2	60	60.1	55.6	62.8	65.1	60.7	65.3	70.5	69
1966	69.8	63	62.4	58.4	64.9	67.5	65.0	69.5	73.4	70
1967	72.4	66	64.4	61.3	67.1	69.4	71.1	72.4	75.7	73
1968	76.1	71	69.2	66.1	69.8	71.9	72.2	74.8	76.7	76
1969	82.7	77	75.8	72.8	74.7	77.2	84.1	80.9	85.3	80
1970	88.6	83	80.2	79.1	80.7	83.5	94.0	90.9	89.1	82
1971	94.8	92	90.5	90.0	90.1	92.9	98.5	95.3	94.0	85
1972	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	93
1973	108.7	111	108.5	108.3	107.5	106.2	111.3	110.3	109.5	106
1974	126.9	117	114.9	115.5	124.2	126.3	152.6	146.0	120.8	109
1975	138.4	125	124.5	126.2	139.5	145.3	149.7	147.5	131.6	119
1976	143.9	137	135.9	137.1	148.2	152.5	140.5	144.2	141.1	139
1977	156.5	146	147.3	147.2	157.6	161.8	147.1	156.6	158.1	149
1978	175.7	159	159.6	158.5	172.6	177.1	173.5	191.7	180.2	158

See footnotes at end of table.

COSTS AND PRICES

Table E-1. Construction Cost Indices
(1972=100)

Period	Department of Commerce composite cost index*	American Appraisal Company	"Blue-Book Indices," The American Appraisal Company, Inc.			Engineering News-Record		Federal Reserve Board		
			Residences	Apartments, hotels, and other buildings	Commercial and factory buildings	Building	Construction	Buildings	Plant	
Annual averages										
1975	138.4	175	125.9	127.2	130.4	124.5	126.2	129.5	145.3	
1976	143.9	137	126.7	137.3	141.5	135.9	137.1	145.2	152.5	
1977	156.3	146	148.5	148.6	152.8	147.3	147.2	157.6	161.8	
1978	175.7	159	161.8	158.2	164.3	159.6	158.5	172.6	177.1	
1979	199.6	172	179.6	170.5	179.0	173.5	171.5	194.1	194.8	
Monthly indices										
1979	January	168.8	165	171.6	164.9	172.2	165.9	164.0	165.8	157.2
	February	190.7	166				168.0	164.4		
	March	192.1	167	172.0	165.8	173.2	169.9	166.8		
	April	192.6	167				167.0	164.9		
	May	196.1	170	173.9	169.3	178.3	167.5	165.2	164.0	154.2
	June	197.4	172				172.4	170.3		
	July	199.8	174	179.2	172.3	181.5	174.2	174.2		
	August	203.2	175				176.5	175.5	166.8	166.4
	September	204.2	176	182.8	174.0	182.9	181.1	176.2		
	October	206.6	178				181.1	178.3		
	November	207.8	178	182.2	176.9	185.9	181.4	176.9	203.8	201.2
	December	208.0	177				182.1	179.4		
1980	January	211.4	177	182.5	178.5	188.2	181.0	178.8		
	February	215.4	178				180.9	179.0	205.4	207.8
	March	216.0	178	182.7	179.9	189.3	182.9	180.4		
	April	216.2	177				182.1	179.9		
	May	218.7	178	185.0	183.1	191.7	180.3	179.3	209.7	210.5
	June	222.4	183				183.1	182.6		
	July	224.0	185	185.7	187.8	197.3	186.2	186.2		
	August	224.2	186				188.2	188.7		
	September	224.6	186				188.9	190.6		
	October									
	November									
	December									
Percent change										
Latest period 1979-80	+10	+6	+4	+9	+9	+4	+7	+8	+8	

Period	Federal Highway Administration		Bureau of the Census new one-family houses excl. Census lot value	Water and Power Resources Services	Turner Construction Company	Handy-Whitman Public Utility		Bell System Telephone Plant		Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Pipeline
	Structures	Composite				Buildings	Electric light and power	Buildings	Outside plant	
Annual averages										
1975	149.7	147.5	131.6	139	129	147	149	138.6	129.9	155
1976	140.5	144.2	141.1	149	132	150	158	147.7	141.1	163
1977	147.1	156.6	158.1	158	137	158	169	157.5	147.6	167
1978	173.5	191.7	180.2	167	145	173	179	170.4	154.6	186
1979	222.7	223.1	203.3	184	161	192	197	184.8	171.2	201
Quarterly indices										
1979	1st quarter	203.8	200.6	195.1	177	154				
	2nd quarter	211.6	213.4	201.9	181	158	181	187		
	3rd quarter	220.6	237.9	208.7	187	162				
	4th quarter	243.7	254.8	211.7	191	167	190	197		
1980	1st quarter	246.6	243.8	216.9	186	172				
	2nd quarter	249.9	260.6	224.1	201	176	205	200		
	3rd quarter				208	180				
	4th quarter									
Percent change										
Latest period 1979-80	+18	+22	+11	+11	+11	+13	+10			

*An implicit price deflator, computed by the Bureau of the Census, which is the ratio of the estimate of total new construction put in place in current dollars (seasonally adjusted) to the corresponding estimate in 1972 dollars. In form, the index is a weighted harmonic mean of the deflators used for various categories of construction (and, hence, of the basic cost indexes which make up these deflators), with weights proportionate to the value put in place estimates (seasonally adjusted) for these categories. Since this "implicit price deflator" is in the form of a changing weight index, it measures the combined result of cost changes as well as monthly changes in the weights of different types of construction in the current dollar construction activity aggregate. Sources as stated. *Revised.

It should be noted that these data represent total production in the United States and not amounts used in the construction industry. According to the Engineering News-Record, they were used as a guide, but the proportions of the items were adjusted to their importance in the construction industry with the aid of experienced construction men. An expenditure of approximately \$100 on the four items in these proportions was assumed for 1913 (the ENR base period) and the quantities of the three materials and the man-hours of labor that could be purchased for these amounts were computed. Purchases of similar quantities of these four items were assumed to be made at each successive period.

The expenditure of \$100, at 1913 prices, for the proper quantities of each item in the Construction Cost Index is given below, and it may be noted that the "adjustment" mentioned above is an important factor.

2,500 pounds of structural steel at \$0.015 (Pittsburgh base) (see next paragraph below)	\$37.50
6 barrels of cement at \$1.19 (net barrel, f.o.b. Chicago) (see 2d paragraph below)	7.14
600 board feet, Southern pine, 3" x 12" to 12" x 12" at \$28.50 per M ft. (New York base) (see 3d paragraph below)	17.10
200 man hours at \$0.19 (common labor, average for country)	38.00
Total	99.74

The adoption of the three-mill average for structural steel shapes in August 1938 did not necessitate any change in the weighting of this component.

In July 1948, when cement went off basing point pricing, the 20-city average cement price was substituted; no adjustment in the weight factor was necessary.

For the Southern pine lumber series prior to 1936 the weight was 600 board feet. In linking this series with the series for 2" x 4" pine and fir, the 1936 average value of lumber of the old type as included in the index was first determined (quantity weight, 600 board feet, times the average price for the year). The equivalent 1936 average value of the new type was represented by 1,088 board feet of lumber, which quantity is now used as the weighting factor.

The Building Cost Index is computed in the same manner as the Construction Cost Index, except that the skilled labor trend is substituted for common labor. Since the skilled rate is considerably higher than the common rate, a weight of 68.38 man-hours was substituted for the common labor weight of 200 man-hours used in the Construction Cost Index, as shown in the table above, in order to have the same labor component in the base period when the rate was multiplied by the weight. The computation for labor in 1913 for the Building Cost Index is 68.38 x \$0.555, which gives approximately \$38.00. The trends of the two indexes reflect the divergent movements of wage rates for common and skilled labor.

Monthly data for 1967-72 for Building and Construction Cost Indexes appear in the 1971, 1973, and 1975 editions of BUSINESS STATISTICS; those for 1951-66 are available upon request.

³ Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. The index is a composite derived from average contract prices for fixed amounts of the following items: Common excavation; surfacing (portland cement concrete pavement and bituminous concrete pavement); and structures (reinforcing steel, structural steel, and structural concrete). In more exact terms, the index is a price index, measuring price changes for fixed amounts of the items represented.

The base quantities for 1967 involved in these data are as follows: 1,656,655,000 cubic yards of roadway excavation; 79,942,000 square yards of portland cement concrete surfacing with an average thickness of 8.7 inches; 51,230,000 tons of bituminous concrete surfacing; 981,587,000 pounds of reinforcing steel for structures; 885,235,000 pounds of structural steel; and 5,572,000 cubic yards of structural concrete.

The annual figures are weighted averages derived from quarterly data. Quarterly data for 1967-72 are in the 1971, 1973, and 1975 editions of BUSINESS STATISTICS; those for 1962-65 are available from the source upon request. Data back to 1939 for the index on the 1957-59 = 100 base appear in the 1969 edition of BUSINESS STATISTICS. Detailed discussions of the index appear in Public Roads

Magazine, volume 31, No. 10, October 1961 and volume 36, No. 4, October 1970.

⁴ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic Commerce, Construction and Forest Products Division. Through 1971, the composite index of output of construction materials measures changes in the combined output of 10 groups of construction materials (data for 8 groups are compiled monthly and for 2 groups quarterly). The groups represented in the composite, in addition to the groups shown here (i.e., iron and steel products, lumber and wood products, and portland cement), are as follows: Millwork; paint, varnish, and lacquer; asphalt products; heating equipment; clay construction products; gypsum products; and plumbing fixtures (data for last two groups compiled quarterly). Beginning January 1972, the composite measures changes in the combined output of 7 groups of construction materials (millwork, asphalt products, and heating equipment no longer included). The items used in deriving the composite index are weighted in 1947 for approximately 50 percent of the estimated value of shipments of all construction materials.

The index for each group of construction materials represents the production, sales, or shipments of one or more specific materials. The source data consists of monthly or quarterly production, shipments, or sales for each item. The monthly or quarterly physical output of each material is multiplied by its 1947 price to provide the value of such a quantity of materials if it had been produced or shipped in 1947. The resulting values of all materials constituting each group are added together to yield aggregates for the group. The aggregates are converted to index numbers by equating the 1947-49 monthly or quarterly average to 100.

The seasonally adjusted composite index results from the weighted aggregation of the seasonally adjusted group indexes. It is calculated by the following procedure: (1) A monthly seasonally adjusted composite series is derived from the 5 groups (8 groups through 1971) for which monthly data are available; (2) a quarterly seasonally adjusted composite series is derived from the preceding series; (3) a quarterly seasonally adjusted composite series including the two quarterly series (gypsum products and plumbing fixtures) is then calculated; (4) the ratios of the indexes in the 7-group series (step 3) to their comparable indexes in the 5-group series (step 2) are then used to adjust the respective monthly index values of the series worked out in step 1.

The 5 monthly seasonally adjusted series (8 through 1971) are derived and statistically evaluated by the electronic computer method developed by the Bureau of the Census and modified by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The electronic computer method provides a basis for more detailed analysis than is possible by the usual ratio-to-moving-average method. Its significant features are: (1) The ratio-to-moving-average technique is first applied to derive a preliminary seasonally adjusted series (the procedure starts with ratios computed by dividing the original observations by a 12-month moving average; moving seasonal adjustment factors are computed from these ratios, and a seasonally adjusted series is obtained by dividing these preliminary seasonal adjustment factors into the original observations); (2) a graduation formula (a weighted 15 month moving average) is used as the estimate of the trend-cycle curve used to obtain the final seasonally adjusted series; (3) a measure of the irregular component of each series is utilized to determine the type of moving average to fit the seasonal irregular ratios (the larger the irregular component, the larger the amount of smoothing that is carried out).

Monthly data for 1959-72 (except for 1961 data for lumber and wood products) appear in earlier editions of BUSINESS STATISTICS (see reference note, p. 1 of this section). For monthly indexes for 1947-54 see "Construction Materials Statistics," published by the source agency; 1955-58 (and 1961 for lumber and wood) monthly indexes are available upon request.

⁵ Beginning January 1972, data are not completely comparable with those for earlier periods; see 1st paragraph of note 4 for this page.

¹ Sources: Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA). The data on applications for FHA home mortgage insurance represent requests by an approved lender for FHA to insure a mortgage on a proposed one- to four-family home, or home newly constructed while under FHA inspections. To make application

SCHEDULE

Subsequent to the public hearing an alternative will be selected and a final version of this draft Supplement to the approved H-3 Environmental Impact Statement will be prepared for the selected alternative. Once approved, the design phase of the project will be initiated.

Assuming approval of the final Supplement by January 1980, design of a selected "build" alternative could begin soon after, and roadway construction could begin as early as the latter part of 1980. In the interim period topographic surveys and geological and substrata surveys will be conducted for design and environmental assessments; stream monitoring will also take place.

The total construction period could take six years and possibly longer, depending upon conditions encountered or revealed by sub-strata investigation.

Halawa Valley on September 2-4, 1976. In a letter report Dr. Stallenberger concluded that the facility will pass through the best of the valley's bird population. Dr. Stallenberger further indicated that while there is no evidence that elimination of North Halawa Valley as a bird habitat would in itself lead to the extinction of any bird species, the effect of disturbance in any one area must be considered in the context of the cumulative effect of urbanization in conservation lands.

- c. On August 20-24, 1976 the Bishop Museum conducted an archaeological reconnaissance survey of North Halawa Valley. Eight archaeological sites were located during the survey. The State Historic Preservation Officer feels that before any evaluation of the cultural resources of North Halawa Valley can be made that an intensive archaeological survey needs to be conducted to determine the location, significance, preservation or research potential of archaeological resources.
- d. This corridor is the longest corridor and is approximately 3,000 feet longer than the recommended route through Moanalua Valley. Based on 1990 travel demand as presented in the FIS (Vol. I, p. 12) this additional length of facility can result in added energy consumption due to added vehicle-miles of travel. The added vehicle-miles of travel will be approximately 23,000 vehicle miles per day or 7 million vehicle-miles annually. Using a figure of 20 miles per gallon, an additional 350,000 gallons of gasoline will be consumed annually.
- e. Because North Halawa Valley is narrow and meanders, six major cuts will be required. These cuts will be from 200 feet to 800 feet long and will be from 20 to 40 feet high. The steepness of the valley walls will require that these cuts be artificially retained (cribbing, retaining wall, shotcrete). Cuts of this size will result in permanent scarring of the valley walls and will have an adverse visual impact on the valley.
- f. In Haiku Valley the U.S. Coast Guard operates a large communication facility which is part of a worldwide navigation system for ships and aircraft. Part of the facility consists of a very large ground antenna system, the air space over which must be avoided. Therefore, the Haiku tunnel portal and windward viaduct based on prior negotiations with the U.S. Government must be on the same alignment as the recommended alignment. Thus the North Halawa Valley route will require a tunnel approximately 9,500 feet long. In addition to a long tunnel, approximately two-thirds of the facility in North Halawa Valley will be on viaduct averaging 50 feet in height. Because of the time required for redesign and construction of the longer tunnels and viaducts, this alternative will be very costly. For purposes of comparing the costs of the North Halawa Valley alternative and the recommended alternative through Moanalua Valley, a cost study was conducted. It was assumed that work on both alternatives will commence in mid-1977. For each alternative a 1976 dollar cost was determined, a

design/construct schedule was developed, and then using an assumed annual construction cost escalation factor of eight percent an escalated total project cost was determined. The results of the study are as follows:

Alternative	1976 Cost	Estimated Completion Date	Total Cost (Escalated)
Moanalua Valley (Recommended Route)	\$253 million	mid-1982	\$339 million
North Halawa Valley	\$358 million	mid-1987	\$600 million

- g. This alternative will take approximately five years longer (estimated completion date of mid-1987) to construct than the recommended alternative, which means that trans-Koolau transportation will be severely impacted for five additional years. Congestion on the existing facilities (Pali and Likelike) will worsen, and the life styles of the residents of windward Oahu and those living along Pali and Likelike Highways will be changed.
- h. The tunnel for the North Halawa Valley route will require the removal and disposal of 1.5 million cubic yards of tunnel muck, which is 500,000 cubic yards more than that for the recommended route (Red Hill and Trans-Koolau tunnels). Approximately one million cubic yards of the tunnel muck could be used as fill to build up the Kaneohe Interchange and the Haiku Portal area. Disposal of the remaining 500,000 cubic yards of tunnel muck will be a problem since land fill disposal sites are becoming scarce on Oahu, and the cost of disposing of the tunnel muck in the ocean will be very high. In either case of land fill or ocean disposal, environmental impacts will be involved.
- i. The present General Plan shows TH-3 proceeding up South Halawa Valley from the Halawa Interchange. All existing and planned development at the mouth of the Halawa Valleys has recognized this fact (see Figure 42). Because of this the North Halawa Valley corridor will impact the State's Animal Quarantine Station, the rock quarry, the plant development center, and the City's new bus maintenance facility. The plant development center will be totally displaced, the quarry's administration building will be displaced, and storage area for approximately 40 buses will be lost to the City during construction of TH-3. The quarantine station will lose its sewage plant, necropsy building, 500 kennels, and the new Animal Industry Administration building. The impact on the quarantine station and quarry will be temporary since the facilities to be removed can be rebuilt on adjacent land.

6. Increasing the Capacity of an Existing Trans-Koolau Facility

An alternative was considered which would increase the capacity of an existing trans-Koolau facility while minimizing the disruption to the people living along the facility. This alternative is the construction of a two-lane reversible viaduct in the median of Likelike Highway in Kalihi Valley.

TABLE III-3

DISTRIBUTION OF WINDWARD OAHU RESIDENTIAL
POPULATION 1975 and 2000¹

Location	1975 Population	% of Oahu	2000 Population	% of Oahu
Urban Fringe				
Kailua	40,722	5.8	49,000	4.7
Kaneohe-Ahuimanu	51,394	7.3	69,000	6.6
Rural				
Waimanalo	8,435	1.2	12,500	1.2
Kahaluu-Kahuku	14,890	2.1	20,000	1.9
	115,441	16.4	150,500	14.4

1. *General Plan, City and County of Honolulu Statement of Objectives and Policies, January 18, 1977*

(or impossible) to even generalize about long-range goals for the other eight areas.

The tabulation of the population objectives has provided the basis for decisions regarding the remaining eight areas of concern, including that area dealing with transportation and utilities.

The broadly stated objective of the General Plan for transportation is:

"To create a transportation system which will enable people and goods to move safely, efficiently, and at a reasonable cost; will serve all people, including the poor, the elderly and the physically handicapped; and will offer a variety of attraction and convenient modes of travel."

This broad objective is subdivided into various policy statements which deal with more specific areas of concern. Policy 4 expresses concern for the transportation needs of the Ewa and windward communities:

"Improve transportation facilities and services in the Ewa corridor and in the trans-Koolau corridors to meet the needs of Ewa and windward communities."

In order to effectively plan service requirements, the General Plan projects the windward Oahu population for the year 2000 at 150,500.

I. INTRODUCTION

Several years have elapsed since the original travel demand analysis was conducted for the Interstate Route H-3 project. During these years there have been changes in travel habits as reflected by new traffic data that are available. In addition, a new Oahu General Plan was officially adopted in early 1977.

In view of the above, a study was commissioned for the purpose of developing updated travel demand forecasts for the Interstate H-3 Alternatives Analysis and to provide various technical data for the air quality and noise analysis elements of the supplemental draft environmental impact statement. The results of this study and the procedures used to develop them are documented in the following pages of this report.

SCOPE OF WORK

The scope of work for this study included the preparation of the necessary data for four alternative plans. These alternatives are:

- Alternative 1 - TH-3 through North Halawa Valley with four lanes for autos and a two-lane busway in the median.
- Alternative 2 - H-3 through North Halawa Valley with four lanes for autos supplemented by a one-lane bus facility on Likelike Highway.
- Alternative 3 - Two-lane busway facility through North Halawa Valley with no auto lanes.
- Alternative 4 - Do nothing.

Traffic and transit patronage was prepared for the Oahu General Plan year of 2000 for each alternative. The data necessary for the EIS was developed for existing conditions, the estimated opening year of the

should we, instead, change our criteria for defining a deficiency to account for normal depreciation of the highway facility? Since the starting point for estimating needs is a set of criteria which identifies what is unacceptable, it is easy to see that the cost of future needs is very sensitive to what we are willing to accept. Currently, these criteria are based on decisions which balance engineering concerns of safety, efficiency, etc., with cost constraints. It may be that these criteria should be reexamined in light of current economic conditions and energy concerns.

Specifically related to the issue of criteria for making highway improvements is the question of how much congestion we will accept. Improvements to the highway plant which provide new or additional capacity are the most expensive, particularly in urbanized areas where right-of-way costs are high both in terms of dollars and social impact. Throughout the late 1950's and 1960's, the practice of adding highway capacity to accommodate peak period demand accounted for well over one-half of all highway capital improvement dollars in urban areas. While this trend has been changing throughout the 70's, peak period demand and the resulting congestion is still viewed as an unsatisfactory operating characteristic.



Energy limitations and the high cost of highway construction make it essential that careful consideration be given to the cost-effectiveness of adding new capacity to our existing systems in order to reduce congestion. Traffic system management, increased auto occupancy, and better public transportation service are, in many instances, more effective solutions to the problem of handling increasing local peak period travel demand. In the long run, a decision must be made between investment in new highway capacity to accommodate single-occupant work trips or investment in highway improvements which will rehabilitate the systems and keep them safe.

Section I describes the changes in highway conditions and usage, investment patterns, and the impacts of these changes. Supporting data were furnished by the States through the Highway Program Monitoring System (HPMS), a data system that samples conditions and performance on the system nationwide and reports investments on these roads. Greater detail will be provided in the 1980 biennial report to Congress, "The Status of the Nation's Highways: Conditions and Performance," now in preparation.

This information is summarized below:

will be the antiemetic of choice for all chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting.

There is mounting evidence that chemotherapeutic agents trigger emesis via different or multiple pathways.³ Studies in dogs⁴ have suggested that a peripheral pathway is the most likely mechanism responsible for cisplatin-induced nausea and vomiting, since administration of a potent pharmacologic blocker of the chemoreceptor trigger zone did not appreciably reduce the occurrence of emesis. Thus, it appears that it is metoclopramide's unique peripheral action on the gastrointestinal tract that makes it an effective antiemetic for cisplatin.

The efficacy of metoclopramide in multi-drug regimens depends largely on the agents used. In a study by Kahn et al. a single dose of 20 mg of oral metoclopramide given three hours after intravenous chemotherapy with cisplatin, bleomycin, and high-dose methotrexate gave 92 per cent antiemetic control.⁵ Metoclopramide's activity, however, was found to be of no therapeutic value when the drug was taken orally in doses of 10 to 20 mg three times daily in patients receiving intravenous cyclophosphamide, methotrexate, and fluorouracil⁶ or combinations of mitomycin, carmustine, and fluorouracil.⁷

The rationale for high-dose metoclopramide is also derived from the study by Gyllys et al., in which dogs received doses of 1 or 3 mg per kilogram of body weight subcutaneously in two doses given 30 minutes before and 120 minutes after intravenous administration of cisplatin.⁴ Although this study reported 99.1 per cent protection from emesis in relation to controls given 3 mg per kilogram subcutaneously, how does this result relate to doses given intravenously to human beings every two to four hours? There is also a potential problem with giving such high doses at frequent intervals, since 70 to 80 per cent of metoclopramide is excreted unchanged in the urine,⁸ and there are no established guidelines for dosage adjustments in patients with renal impairment. In view of the excellent results obtained by Kahn et al. with metoclopramide in low doses,⁵ and the concern for its use in patients with renal insufficiency, future studies should be designed to test metoclopramide in low doses given intravenously just before and after cisplatin administration.

In 1975 Whitehead made a plea to all cooperative chemotherapy groups to undertake a search for effective antiemetic therapy as an additional and integral part of current and future chemotherapeutic trials.⁹ Oncology groups should therefore critically evaluate the efficacy of metoclopramide in different regimens, for only then can we clearly define its role as an antiemetic in cancer chemotherapy.

Metoclopramide thus appears to be a new weapon in the arsenal against chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. Although it is highly effective for cisplatin, its effectiveness against other chemotherapeutic agents depends on their relative potentials for emesis,¹⁰ the pathways for stimulating emesis,³ and the overall efficacy of metoclopramide as a dopamine antagonist at the chemoreceptor trigger zone.

GARY S. OGAWA, PHARM.D.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center

Los Angeles, CA 90048

1. Gralla RJ, Itri LM, Pisko SE, et al. Antiemetic efficacy of high-dose metoclopramide: randomized trials with placebo and prochlorperazine in patients with chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. *N Engl J Med.* 1981; 305:905-9.
2. Laszlo J, Lucas VS. Emesis as a critical problem in chemotherapy. *N Engl J Med.* 1981; 305:948-9.
3. Seigel LJ, Longo DL. The control of chemotherapy-induced emesis. *Ann Intern Med.* 1981; 95:352-9.
4. Gyllys JA, Doran KM, Buyniski JP. Antagonism of cisplatin induced emesis in the dog. *Res Commun Chem Path Pharmacol.* 1979; 23:61-8.
5. Kahn T, Elias EG, Mason GR. A single dose of metoclopramide in the control of vomiting from cis-dichlorodiammineplatinum(II) in man. *Cancer Treat Rep.* 1978; 62:1106-7.
6. Morran C, Smith DC, Anderson DA, McArdle CS. Incidence of nausea and vomiting with cytotoxic chemotherapy: a prospective randomised trial of antiemetics. *Br Med J.* 1979; 1:1323-4.
7. Moertel CG, Reitemeier RJ. Controlled clinical studies of orally administered antiemetic drugs. *Gastroenterology.* 1969; 57:262-8.
8. Teng L, Bruce RB, Dunning LK. Metoclopramide metabolism and determination by high-pressure liquid chromatography. *J Pharm Sci.* 1977; 66: 1615-8.

9. Whitehead VM. Cancer treatment needs better antiemetics. *N Engl J Med.* 1975; 293:199-200.
10. Sallan SE, Cronin C, Zelen M, Zinberg NE. Antiemetics in patients receiving chemotherapy for cancer: a randomized comparison of delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol and prochlorperazine. *N Engl J Med.* 1980; 302: 135-8.

To the Editor: Recently we completed a double-blind placebo-controlled study of the use of a dose of metoclopramide (1 mg per kilogram) lower than that used by Gralla et al. (2 mg per kilogram); our dose was infused intravenously over a 15-minute period beginning 30 minutes before the scheduled administration of cisplatin and was repeated 1½, 3½, 6½, 9½, and 12½ hours after cisplatin infusion. Cisplatin was administered in doses of either 50 or 100 mg per square meter of body-surface area, alone or in combination with other antineoplastic agents. The patients' regimens and responses are presented in Table 1.

Because of the marked difference in response between the two groups, the study was terminated after 21 patients had been evaluated. There were 28 episodes of vomiting in the metoclopramide group, as compared with 74 episodes in the placebo group. This difference, as well as the difference in the median and range of number of episodes of emesis, was significant ($P < 0.02$).

Table 1. Cisplatin Chemotherapy and Emesis in Patients Given Metoclopramide and Controls.

	METOCLOPRAMIDE GROUP	PLACEBO GROUP
	<i>no. of patients</i>	
Group total	11	10
Cisplatin therapy		
Alone	5	4
In combination	6	6
Dose *		
50 mg/m ²	8	8
100 mg/m ²	3	2
Emesis		
None	6	0
<5 episodes	3	3
6-10 episodes	1	5
>10 episodes	1	2
	<i>no. of episodes</i>	
Total	28	74
Median	0	7
Range	0-12	3-16

*Whether alone or in combination.

Our results confirm those of Gralla et al. and suggest that the lower dose of metoclopramide (1 mg per kilogram) used in our study is effective in patients given the lower dose of cisplatin. In our study there were no major adverse reactions; two patients were mildly agitated, and one had mild diarrhea. Thus, metoclopramide administered in this lower dose is an effective antiemetic associated with minimal adverse reactions for patients receiving lower-dose cisplatin chemotherapy.

HOWARD D. HOMESLEY, M.D.
JOYCE M. GAINEY, R.N., M.S.N.
VERNON W. JOBSON, M.D.
CHARLES E. WELANDER, M.D.
HYMAN B. MUSS, M.D.
H. BRADLEY WELLS, PH.D.
Bowman Gray School of Medicine

Winston-Salem, NC 27103

To the Editor: Gralla et al. discuss the use of high-dose metoclopramide for chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. However, the intramuscular prochlorperazine used in their study (50 mg) has an

Dr. Pieltre

oned. Marijuana prohibition began in the late 1930s in response to exaggerated claims of danger, both to individual health and to the moral strength of our society. Most physicians would agree that the use of any drug is associated with risk, but the major risk faced by the marijuana user is the risk of punishment in the name of laws written to protect us from a "dangerous drug." The present therapy is worse than the disease and is not effective as a preventive measure.

The medical community has the influence and obligation to support removal of the penalties associated with marijuana use, but we do not wish to condone its use. I propose that the medical community support the removal of penalties for the personal use and cultivation of marijuana, with the understanding that commercial cultivation and distribution of the drug, public intoxication, and driving while intoxicated would remain criminal offenses. With cultivation and distribution prohibited, the profitability would be reduced, the black market weakened, and the importation of potent foreign varieties reduced. The medical community could continue to warn users of potential effects on health without having to compete with advertisements similar to those that encourage us to consume alcohol and other fully legal products.

Audubon, IA 50025

JOHN A. BENNETT, D.O.
Audubon Medical Clinic

In reply to Dr. Nahas and his colleagues, I should explain that the IOM committee applied the usual and generally accepted standards of evidence in clinical investigation. We considered only published studies, and we looked for objective, statistically valid data. We did not ignore animal experiments; a large portion of our references and discussion deals with studies in animals. As for the ethics of carrying out clinical epidemiologic studies of people using marijuana, I see nothing unethical about that. Millions of people are using marijuana and will continue to do so, regardless of what we may say or do. Why not use the methods of epidemiologic research to find out what deleterious effects, if any, this practice is having?

Drs. A. A. Bennett and Milman, like Dr. Nahas and his colleagues, criticize the Committee for not being more strongly condemnatory of the use of marijuana, but the primary purpose of the study was to get at the facts, not to recommend social policy. We did our best to stay with the evidence, and the evidence does not justify any sweeping conclusions.

On the other hand, absence of conclusive evidence of harm is not proof of safety, and the Committee was careful to point out that there is much reason to be concerned about the widespread use of marijuana, particularly among the young. Dr. J. A. Bennett advocates a policy of limited decriminalization of marijuana — a step that many people now advocate — but the Committee was not asked to address that question or any other public-policy issues. My personal view is that nothing short of full legalization (and regulation) of the cultivation and sale of marijuana would weaken the criminal connection. Whether the net result of such a step would be in the public interest, however, is a difficult question that remains to be answered, despite a recent controversial report on this subject from another Committee of the National Academy of Sciences. — ED.

MORTALITY FROM LEUKEMIA IN WORKERS EXPOSED TO ELECTRICAL AND MAGNETIC FIELDS

To the Editor: In the course of updating a study of occupational mortality,* I noticed that among men whose occupations required them to work in electrical or magnetic fields there were more deaths due to leukemia than would be expected.

All deaths of Washington State resident men 20 years old or older from 1950 through 1979 were coded to occupation. Proportionate mortality ratios standardized by age and year of death were calculated for 158 cause-of-death groups in each of 218 occupational classes. In all, 438,000 deaths were analyzed.

*Milham S. Occupational mortality in Washington State, 1950-1971. Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies, 1976.

Table 1. Leukemia Mortality in Men Occupationally Exposed to Electrical and Magnetic Fields. (Washington State White Males, 1950-1979).

OCCUPATION	MORTALITY					
	ALL LEUKEMIA (204 *)			ACUTE LEUKEMIA (204.3 ^a)		
	observed	expected †	PMR ‡	observed	expected †	PMR ‡
Electronic technicians	6	4.0	149	3	1.9	162
Radio and telegraph operators	5	4.5	111	3	1.3	239
Electricians	51	37.0	138 §	23	12.9	178 §
Linemen (power and telephone)	15	9.4	159	6	3.3	183
Television and radio repairmen	5	3.2	157	4	1.4	291 §
Power-station operators	8	3.1	259 §	3	1.1	282
Aluminum workers	20	10.6	189 §	11	4.3	258 §
Welders and flame cutters	12	17.9	67	4	7.1	56
Motion-picture projectionists	4	1.7	234	1	0.9	111
Electrical engineers	7	6.1	114	2	2.1	97
Streetcar and subway motormen	3	1.7	175	0	0.4	0
	136	99.2	137 §	60	36.7	163 §

*Coded according to the *International Classification of Diseases* (7th ed.).

†Based on proportionate mortality for Washington state white males. (PMR values are exact; "expected" values have been rounded off.)

‡Proportionate mortality ratio (observed/expected × 100).

§P < 0.01.

Table 1 shows the mortality due to all leukemia and acute leukemia for 11 occupations with presumed exposure to electrical or magnetic fields. In 10 of the 11 the proportionate mortality ratio for leukemia was elevated.

Aluminum-reduction workers are exposed to strong magnetic fields induced by high-amperage direct current (75,000 A) used in the pots in the aluminum-reduction process. Arc welders and motion-picture projectionists work near step-up transformers. The other workers are exposed to electrical and magnetic fields associated with alternating current flowing in wires and power lines. The power-station operators work primarily in hydroelectric generating plants along the Columbia River. In these occupations leukemia has a proportionate mortality ratio of 138, and acute leukemia has one of 163.

The available literature on occupational exposure to electrical and magnetic fields has not mentioned carcinogenesis. I am unaware of obvious leukemogenic exposures in these occupations.

These findings suggest that electrical and magnetic fields may cause leukemia.

SAMUEL MILHAM, JR., M.D.
Washington State Department
of Social and Health Services
Olympia, WA 98504

METOCLOPRAMIDE AS AN ANTIEMETIC IN CHEMOTHERAPY

To the Editor: Several papers have been published recently on the usefulness of metoclopramide as an antiemetic in chemotherapy, and a point mentioned by both Gralla et al.¹ and Laszlo and Lucas² (October 15 issue) deserves emphasizing. Although metoclopramide is highly effective against cisplatin, the most emetogenic chemotherapeutic agent to date, it should not be assumed that metoclopramide

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Kraus, Larry

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

September 29, 1982

LAWRENCE B. KRAUS
GROUP VICE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL COUNSEL AND SECRETARY

1615 H STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20062
202/463-5335

Mr. James Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President and Assistant to
the Chief of Staff
The White House
First Floor, West Wing
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Jim:

I'm glad you could join us today for lunch and a brief tour of the studio. We find meetings of this type extremely helpful and look forward to a continuing dialogue with you and other members of the White House staff.

As I mentioned to you on the way out, we would like you to be our guest at our Forum luncheon on Thursday, October 21, when Jim Baker will be our guest speaker. The luncheon begins at noon and will be held in the Hall of Flags.

I look forward to seeing you there.

Sincerely,



Lawrence B. Kraus

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 1, 1982

Dear Larry:

I wanted to thank you again for a very enjoyable lunch last Wednesday at the Chamber, and for the interesting tour of the broadcast studio. I also appreciated the opportunity to meet and chat with some of your staff on issues that we will be facing in the near future.

I look forward to visiting with you again.

Sincerely,


James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President

Mr. Lawrence B. Kraus
Group Vice President
Administration
U. S. Chamber of Commerce
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20062

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

Washington

LUNCHEON

September 29, 1982

12:00 noon

Daniel Webster Room

GUEST:

James Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President and
Assistant to the Chief of Staff
The White House

U.S. CHAMBER STAFF:

Lawrence B. Kraus
Group Vice President, Administration

Richard L. Breault
Group Vice President, Policy

Robert L. Adams
Director, Broadcast Division

Harvey Alter
Manager, Resources & Environmental Quality Department

Stephen A. Bokat
Associate General Counsel

Jeffrey Joseph
Vice President, Domestic Policy

Milton A. Mitler
Division Director, Media Relations

Ronald Utt
Deputy Chief Economist

Richard R...
Group Vice President, Economic Policy

NA

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Kraus, Larry

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LAWRENCE B. KRAUS
GROUP VICE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL COUNSEL AND SECRETARY

September 16, 1982

1615 H STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20062
202/463-5335

Mr. James Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President and Assistant to
the Chief of Staff
The White House
First Floor, West Wing
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:


This will confirm our luncheon scheduled for
Friday, September 24, at 12:00 noon in the Chamber's
Executive Dining Room.

At the lunch will be key members of the
Chamber's staff who I think you will enjoy meeting.

Following lunch, we will take you on a tour of
our television broadcast facilities.

I am looking forward to seeing you on the 24th.

Sincerely,



Lawrence B. Kraus

LeMaster, Lisa

December 11, 1981

Dear Lisa:

Sorry for my delayed response to your kind letter, but as you can well imagine, my hands have been full with a whole series of adjustments!

Let me assure you that it was not dealing with Texans for a Conservative Congress that drove me away--in fact, the success of your efforts were a good argument to stay. I am afraid I just got tired of all the Texas sunshine, friendly people, good Mexican food, weekends at the lake, etc. Instead, I opted for D.C. snow and slush, rude cabbies, lousy Mexican food, and weekends at the office. Seriously, though, it is very exciting and challenging, and I am enjoying it immensely.

Thanks again for taking the time to write and for your offer of assistance.

Sincerely,

James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President

Ms. Lisa LeMaster
Executive Vice President
Fairchild/LeMaster, Inc.
1111 W. Mockingbird Lane
Suite 1208
Dallas, Texas 75247



**Fairchild / LeMaster
INCORPORATED**

1111 W. Mockingbird Lane, Suite 1208, Dallas, Texas 75247

(214) 634-7806

November 6, 1981

Mr. James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20050

Dear Jim:

Congratulations on your appointment as special assistant to the Chief of Staff. I hope it wasn't all the hassle with Texans for a Conservative Congress that drove you out of Texas! We're still returning contributions to a few people who don't realize the redistricting battle has been won.

Again, our best wishes and good luck in your new job. If we can ever be of assistance to you in any way, please let us know.

Sincerely,

Lisa LeMaster
Executive Vice President

LL/lr

P. S. All I really want to know is: Do you have to register as a lobbyist?

Lent, Norman

(JAB)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR AL KEEL

FROM: Jim Cicconi

SUBJECT: Attached Letter

We would appreciate it if you would prepare a response to the attached letter for Jim Baker's signature at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your help.



NORMAN F. LENT
4th District, New York

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
222 RIVERSIDE HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-7886

DISTRICT OFFICE:
BALDWIN PLAZA BUILDING
ROOM 308, 2280 GRAND AVENUE
BALDWIN, NEW YORK 11510
TELEPHONE: (516) 223-1616

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

September 16, 1982

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEES:
COMMERCE, TRANSPORTATION,
AND TOURISM
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
PANAMA CANAL AND OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

Honorable James A. Baker III
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Jim:


I have been informed that the Department of Defense is reluctant to release Fiscal Year 1982 long-lead funds for the A-10 program because the Armed Services Committees have not authorized A-10 production for Fiscal Year 1983. As you know, the President has directed the Secretary of Defense to maintain A-10 production in Fiscal Year 1983 either through foreign sales or a reprogramming request.

House Armed Services Committee lawyers are of the opinion that there is no impediment to the Department of Defense continuing to spend these long-lead funds.

The money has been appropriated and is to be spent for the purpose intended. There was nothing in the Fiscal Year 1982 Bill making the expenditure of these funds contingent upon the authorization of Fiscal Year 1983 airplanes. Furthermore, the Fiscal Year 1983 budget process is not complete and it is entirely possible that A-10s may be included in that budget before it is all over. Finally, the stated intention of the President to continue production requires that the production line be kept open.


It would be embarrassing to the Department of Defense, should there be a reprogramming in Fiscal Year 1983, to have to pay the penalties which would be incurred by stopping long-lead funds, allowing an interruption in the line, and then restarting.

Sincerely,


NORMAN F. LENT
Member of Congress

NFL/jm

1



NORMAN F. LENT
4TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2228 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-7896

DISTRICT OFFICE:
BALDWIN PLAZA BUILDING
ROOM 300, 2280 GRAND AVENUE
BALDWIN, NEW YORK 11510
TELEPHONE: (516) 223-1616

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

September 16, 1982

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
COMMERCE, TRANSPORTATION,
AND TOURISM
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

COMMITTEE ON
MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES

SUBCOMMITTEES:
PANAMA CANAL AND OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

Honorable James A. Baker III
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Jim:


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House Armed Services Committee lawyers are of the opinion that there is no impediment to the Department of Defense continuing to spend these long-lead funds.


The money has been appropriated and is to be spent for the purpose intended. There was nothing in the Fiscal Year 1983 Bill making the expenditure of these funds contingent upon the authorization of Fiscal Year 1983 airplanes. Furthermore, the Fiscal Year 1983 budget process is not complete and it is entirely possible that A-10s may be included in that budget before it is all over. Finally, the stated intention of the President to continue production requires that the production line be kept open.

It would be embarrassing to the Department of Defense should there be a reprogramming in Fiscal Year 1983, to have to pay the penalties which would be incurred by stopping long-lead funds, allowing an interruption in the line, and then restarting it.

Sincerely,


NORMAN F. LENT
Member of Congress

NFL/jm



Lewis, Scott

METALLIC-BRADEN BUILDING COMPANY

SCOTT C. LEWIS
President & Chief Executive Officer

January 21, 1982

James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President
Assistant to the Chief of Staff
The White House
First Floor West Wing
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:

I would like to thank you on behalf of Ed Greaves, Dave Hofstetter, and myself for taking us on a tour of the West Wing of the White House. I consider it the chance of a lifetime to see firsthand the offices of our President and Vice President and their immediate staff.

One cannot visit Washington without being impressed, and at times overwhelmed, by the beauty and majesty of our capital. A visit to the White House, and especially to the West Wing, gives one the same feelings about our President.

It was certainly a pleasure to meet you after being associated with your father this past year, and having heard so much about your work. Thanks again for having made this recent trip to Washington such a memorable one.

Best wishes for your future.

Sincerely,



cr

P. O. BOX 14240, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77021
TELEPHONE (713) 664-9492
OFFICES: 6300 WEST LOOP SOUTH, BELLAIRE, TEXAS 77401

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1982

Dear Tex:

Thanks for letting me know about the Attorney General's award as "the Nation's most effective conservative voice."

Though I saw that the Attorney General poked a little fun at himself regarding his speaking ability, I'm sure he realizes that effectiveness as a "voice" is also judged by the message conveyed and the reaction it draws. On many issues, but most especially on crime, the Attorney General's voice has stirred others to follow his lead and to take action. I think it's a well-deserved honor (and a good speech to boot--I knew you were waiting for that!)

Warm regards,



James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President

Mr. Tex Lezar
Office of the Attorney General
Justice Department, Room 5133
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20530



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

August 30, 1982

Honorable Jim Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

As you may know, the Attorney General recently received the James J. Kilpatrick Award of the International Platform Association as "the Nation's most effective conservative voice." I thought you might be interested in the remarks Mr. Kilpatrick and the Attorney General delivered on that occasion.

Best regards,

Tex

TEX LEZAR
Special Counsel to the
Attorney General

TL:lc
Enclosures