

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Andrea  
This can go to  
Central Files.  
JC

Attention Terry Good

These are the 2 files you pulled out of Jim Cicconi's files for me last week -- you said to return them directly to you.

He found what he wanted -- and sends his thanks -- very much.

Nancy Meinking 12/24

The above notes were found, at time of processing, attached to 2 folders that were sent to Terry Good (White Ra Howe Records Management):

World Population Conference [II]  
World Population Conference [III]

COB 6/7/01

Introduction

For many years, the United States has supported, and helped to finance, programs of family planning, particularly in developing countries. This Administration has continued that support but has placed it within a policy context different from that of the past. It is sufficiently evident that the current exponential growth in global population cannot continue indefinitely. There is no question of the ultimate need to achieve a condition of population equilibrium. The differences that do exist concern the choice of strategies and methods for the achievement of that goal. The experience of the last two decades not only makes possible but requires a sharper focus for our population policy. It requires a more refined approach to problems which appear today in quite a different light than they did twenty years ago.

First and most important, population growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon. It is not necessarily good or ill. It becomes an asset or a problem only in conjunction with other factors, such as economic policy, social constraints, need for manpower, and so forth. The relationship between population growth and economic development is not a negative one. More people do not necessarily mean less growth. Indeed, in the

economic history of many nations, population growth has been an essential element in economic progress.

Before the advent of governmental population programs, several factors had combined to create an unprecedented surge in population over most of the world. Although population levels in many industrialized nations had reached or were approaching equilibrium in the period before the Second World War, the baby boom that followed in its wake resulted in a dramatic, but temporary, population "tilt" toward youth. The disproportionate number of infants, children, teenagers, and eventually young adults did strain the social infrastructure of schools, health facilities, law enforcement and so forth. However, it also helped sustain strong economic growth, despite occasionally counterproductive government policies.

Among the developing nations, a coincidental population increase was caused by entirely different factors. A tremendous expansion of health services -- from simple inoculations to sophisticated surgery -- saved millions of lives every year. Emergency relief, facilitated by modern transport, helped millions to survive flood, famine, and drought. The sharing of technology, the teaching of agriculture and engineering, and improvements in educational standards generally, all helped to reduce mortality rates, especially infant mortality, and to lengthen life spans.

This demonstrated not poor planning or bad policy but human progress in a new era of international assistance, technological advance, and human compassion. The population boom was a challenge; it need not have been a crisis. Seen in its broader context, it required a measured, modulated response. It provoked an overreaction by some, largely because it coincided with two negative factors which, together, hindered families and nations in adapting to their changing circumstances.

The first of these factors was governmental control of economies, a development which effectively constrained economic growth. The post-war experience consistently demonstrated that, as economic decision-making was concentrated in the hands of planners and public officials, the ability of average men and women to work towards a better future was impaired, and sometimes crippled. In many cases, agriculture was devastated by government price fixing that wiped out rewards for labor. Job creation in infant industries was hampered by confiscatory taxes. Personal industry and thrift were penalized, while dependence upon the state was encouraged. Political considerations made it difficult for an economy to adjust to changes in supply and demand or to disruptions in world trade and finance. Under such circumstances, population growth changed from an asset in the development of economic potential to a peril.

One of the consequences of this "economic statism" was that it disrupted the natural mechanism for slowing population growth in problem areas. The world's more affluent nations have reached a population equilibrium without compulsion and, in most cases, even before it was government policy to achieve it. The controlling factor in these cases has been the adjustment, by individual families, of reproductive behavior to economic opportunity and aspiration. Historically, as opportunities and the standard of living rise, the birth rate falls. Economic freedom has led to economically rational behavior.

That pattern might be well under way in many nations where population growth is today a problem, if counterproductive government policies had not disrupted economic incentives, rewards, and advancement. In this regard, localized crises of population growth are, in part, evidence of too much government control and planning, rather than too little.

The second factor that turned the population boom into a crisis was confined to the western world. It was an outbreak of an anti-intellectualism, which attacked science, technology, and the very concept of material progress. Joined to a commendable and long overdue concern for the environment, it was more a reflection of anxiety about unsettled times and an uncertain future. In its disregard of human experience and scientific sophistication, it was not unlike other waves of cultural anxiety that have swept through western civilization during

times of social stress and scientific exploration.

The combination of these two factors -- counterproductive economic policies in poor and struggling nations, and a pseudo-scientific pessimism among the more advanced -- led to a demographic overreaction in the 1960's and 1970's. Scientific forecasts were required to compete with unsound, extremist scenarios, and too many governments pursued population control measures, rather than sound economic policies that create the rise in living standards historically associated with decline in fertility rates. This approach has not worked, primarily because it has focused on a symptom and neglected the underlying ailments. For the last three years, this Administration has sought to reverse that approach. We recognize that, in some cases, immediate population pressures may require short-term efforts to ameliorate them. But population control programs alone cannot substitute for the economic reforms that put a society on the road toward growth and, as an aftereffect, toward slower population increase as well.

Nor can population control substitute for the rapid and responsible development of natural resources. In commenting on the Global 2000 report, this Administration in 1981 repudiated its call "for more governmental supervision and control," stating that:

"Historically, that has tended to restrict the

availability of resources and to hamper the development of technology, rather than to assist it. Recognizing the seriousness of environmental and economic problems, and their relationship to social and political pressures, especially in the developing nations, the Administration places a priority upon technological advance and economic expansion, which hold out the hope of prosperity and stability of a rapidly changing world. That hope can be realized, of course, only to the extent that government's response to problems, whether economic or ecological, respects and enhances individual freedom, which makes true progress possible and worthwhile."

Those principles underlie this country's approach to the International Conference on Population to be held in Mexico City in August.

#### Policy Objectives

The world's rapid population growth is a recent phenomenon. Only several decades ago, the population of developing countries was relatively stable, the result of a balance between high fertility and high mortality. There are now 4.5

billion people in the world, and six billion are projected by the year 2000. Such rapid growth places tremendous pressures on governments without concomitant economic growth.

The International Conference on Population offers the U.S. an opportunity to strengthen the international consensus on the interrelationships between economic development and population which has emerged since the last such conference in Bucharest in 1974. Our primary objective will be to encourage developing countries to adopt sound economic policies and, where appropriate, population policies consistent with respect for human dignity and family values. As President Reagan stated, in his message to the Mexico City Conference:

"We believe population programs can and must be truly voluntary, cognizant of the rights and responsibilities of individuals and families, and respectful of religious and cultural values. When they are, such programs can make an important contribution to economic and social development, to the health of mothers and children, and to the stability of the family and of society."

U.S. support for family planning programs is based on respect for human life, enhancement of human dignity, and strengthening of the family. Attempts to use abortion, involuntary

sterilization, or other coercive measures in family planning must be shunned, whether exercised against families within a society or against nations within the family of man.

The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) calls for legal protection for children before birth as well as after birth. In keeping with this obligation, the United States does not consider abortion an acceptable element of family planning programs and will no longer contribute to those of which it is a part. Accordingly, when dealing with nations which support abortion with funds not provided by the United States Government, the United States will contribute to such nations through segregated accounts which cannot be used for abortion. Moreover, the United States will no longer contribute to separate non-governmental organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations. With regard to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the U.S. will insist that no part of its contribution be used for abortion. The U.S. will also call for concrete assurances that the UNFPA is not engaged in abortion or coercive family planning programs; if such assurances are not forthcoming, the U.S. will redirect the amount of its contribution to other, non-UNFPA family planning programs.

In addition, when efforts to lower population growth are deemed advisable, U.S. policy considers it imperative that such

efforts respect the religious beliefs and culture of each society.

U.S. Government authorities will immediately begin negotiations to implement the above policies with the appropriate governments and organizations.

It is time to put additional emphasis upon those root problems which frequently exacerbate population pressures, but which have too often been given scant attention. By focusing upon real remedies for underdeveloped economies, the International Conference on Population can reduce demographic issues to their proper place. It is an important place, but not the controlling one. It requires our continuing attention within the broader context of economic growth and of the economic freedom that is its prerequisite.

#### Population, Development, and Economic Policies

Sound economic policies and a market economy are of fundamental importance to the process of economic development. Rising standards of living contributed in a major way to the demographic transition from high to low rates of population growth which occurred in the U.S. and other industrialized countries over the last century.

The current situation of many developing countries, however, differs in certain ways from conditions in 19th century Europe and the U.S. The rates and dimensions of population growth are much higher now, the pressures on land, water, and resources are greater, the safety-valve of migration is more restricted, and, perhaps most important, time is not on their side because of the momentum of demographic change.

Rapid population growth compounds already serious problems faced by both public and private sectors in accomodating changing social and economic demands. It diverts resources from needed investment, and increases the costs and difficulties of economic development. Slowing population growth is not a panacea for the problems of social and economic development. It is not offered as a substitute for sound and comprehensive development policies. Without other development efforts and sound economic policies which encourage a vital private sector, it cannot solve problems of hunger, unemployment, crowding or social disorder.

The U.S. program as a whole, including population assistance, lays the basis for well grounded, step-by-step initiatives to improve the well-being of people in developing countries and to make their own efforts, particularly through expanded private sector initiatives, a key building block of development programs.

By helping developing countries slow their population growth through support for effective voluntary family planning programs, in conjunction with sound economic policies, U.S. population assistance contributes to stronger saving and investment rates, speeds the development of effective markets and related employment opportunities, reduces the potential resource requirements of programs to improve the health and education of the people, and hastens the achievement of each country's graduation from the need for external assistance.

The United States will continue its longstanding commitment to development assistance, of which population programs are a part. We recognize the importance of providing our assistance within the cultural, economic and political context of the countries we are assisting, and in keeping with our own values.

#### Health and Humanitarian Concerns

Perhaps the most poignant consequence of rapid population growth unaccompanied by economic growth is its effect on the health of mothers and children. Especially in poor countries, the health and nutrition status of women and children is linked to family size. Maternal and infant mortality rises with the number of births and with births too closely spaced. In countries as different as Turkey, Peru, and Nepal, a child born less than two years after its sibling is twice as likely to die

before it reaches the age of five, than if there were an interval of at least four years between the births.

Complications of pregnancy are more frequent among women who are very young or near the end of their reproductive years. In societies with widespread malnutrition and inadequate health conditions, these problems are reinforced; numerous and closely spaced births lead to even greater malnutrition of mothers and infants.

It is an unfortunate reality that in many countries, abortion is used as a means of terminating unwanted pregnancies. This is unnecessary and repugnant; voluntary family assistance programs can provide a humane alternative to abortion for couples who wish to regulate the size of their family, and evidence from some developing countries indicates a decline in abortion as such services become available.

The basic objective of all U.S. assistance, including population programs, is the betterment of the human condition--improving the quality of life of mothers and children, of families, and of communities for generations to come. For we recognize that people are the ultimate resource--but this means happy and healthy children, growing up with education, finding productive work as young adults, and able to develop their full mental and physical potential.

U.S. aid is designed to promote economic progress in developing

countries through encouraging sound economic policies and freeing of individual initiative. Thus, the U.S. supports a broad range of activities in various sectors, including agriculture, private enterprise, science and technology, health, population, and education. Population assistance amounts to about ten percent of total development assistance.

#### Technology as a Key to Development

The transfer, adaptation, and improvement of modern know-how is central to U.S. development assistance. People with greater know-how are people better able to improve their lives. Population assistance ensures that a wide range of modern demographic technology is made available to developing countries and that technological improvements critical for successful development receive support.

The efficient collection, processing, and analysis of data derived from census, survey, and vital statistics programs contributes to better planning in both the public and private sectors.

#### The U.S. at Mexico City

In conjunction with the above statements of policy, the

following principles should be drawn upon to guide the U.S. delegation at the International Conference on Population:

1. Respect for human life is basic, and any attempt to use abortion, involuntary sterilization, or other coercive measures in family planning must be rejected.
  
2. Population policies and programs should be fully integrated into, and reinforce, appropriate, market-oriented development policies; their objective should be clearly seen as an improvement in the human condition, and not merely an exercise in limiting births.
  
3. Access to family education and services is needed, especially in the context of maternal/child health programs, in order to enable couples to exercise responsible parenthood. Consistent with values and customs, the U.S. favors offering couples a variety of medically approved methods.
  
4. Though population factors merit serious consideration in development strategy, they are not a substitute for sound economic policies which liberate individual initiative through the market mechanism.

5. There should be higher international priority for biomedical research into safer and better methods of fertility regulation, especially natural family planning, and for operations research into more effective service delivery and program management.

6. Issues of migration should be handled in ways consistent with both human rights and national sovereignty.

7. The U.S., in cooperation with other concerned countries, should resist intrusion of polemical or non-germane issues into Conference deliberations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER  
JACK SVAHN

THRU: M.B. OGLESBY, JR. *so*

FROM: W. DENNIS THOMAS *W.D.*

Congressman John Porter (R-Illinois) has asked that I forward this material to you for your information.

*To Cicconi*

STATEMENT OF  
THOMAS W. MERRICK, Ph.D.  
AT  
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON WHITE HOUSE POPULATION  
POSITION PAPER

The Capitol  
June 27, 1984

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Thomas W. Merrick

Dr. Thomas W. Merrick is the Senior Research Scholar and Director of the Center for Population Research of the Joseph & Rose Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University. He also holds the position of Associate Professor in the Department of Demography. Dr. Merrick is a past member of the Public Affairs Committee of the Population Association of America. An economist, Dr. Merrick devotes much of his research to the relationship between population and development - specifically in Latin America. He has extensive experience in overseas technical assistance on demographic analysis and population policy and has worked/consulted for the World Bank, AID, Ford Foundation and the U.N. Dr. Merrick was a member of a recent United Nations Fund for Population Activities Mission to Mexico, as well as the Panel on Brazil of the Committee on Population and Demography of the National Academy of Sciences.

I want to address three arguments about population and economic development presented in the position paper which the White House has prepared for the International Population Conference in Mexico City. The draft falls far short of providing an adequate assessment of population problems in the developing countries. In setting the future direction of U.S. policy on international population assistance, we need to get the facts straight.

The first point is the paper's premise that there is no question of the ultimate need to stabilize world population growth. Few would disagree. Yet, saying only that, the paper ignores the real question -- which is when stabilization will occur. Demographic change has great momentum. Children born now will be needing jobs and starting their own families in 15-20 years. Nearly nine out of ten births today are in the Third World, so most of the impact of future population growth will occur in the developing countries. A five-to-ten year delay in population stabilization would add hundreds of millions to the populations of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The reason for this is demographic momentum. Population stabilization occurs when fertility reaches the level at which each generation just replaces itself. What is important to remember is that the eventual size of that stable population will be determined by the size of the generation of children at the time fertility reaches replacement rather than the size of the parent generation. Achieving demographic stabilization sooner rather than later is thus an important development objective.

These countries are already experiencing substantial social and economic pressures from rapid population increase. The headlines tell us about these countries' immense foreign debts to the international banking system. What is not reported is the enormous social debt to their own people. I'm talking about inadequate housing, health care, education, and frustrated economic aspirations. In about two weeks the World Bank will release its new World Development Report, which includes an in-depth review of population and economic development issues. It explains how inequality and poverty have been exacerbated by rapid population growth, and spells out the human costs of

further delays in slowing population growth in developing countries. One of its main concerns is that the most rapidly growing segments of many of developing country populations is young people seeking jobs that their recession-plagued economies cannot supply. The success or failure of efforts to slow population growth in this decade will have an enormous impact on the developing countries' ability to pay these social debts.

The second topic in the White House paper that concerns me relates to this. The document states that slowing population growth will not solve the problems facing developing countries. It also states that concern about rapid population growth may have tempted some to exaggerate the cause-effect relation between high rates of population growth and Third World poverty. Both are true. But the paper's effort to downplay the role of population in development problems ignores the crucial role that population does play. Rapid population growth is not the root cause of underdevelopment. The root causes are complex and rooted in a history of mismanagement and neglect of people and resources. But rapid population growth has aggravated these problems.

The point is amply illustrated by the current situation in Central America. The root causes of the present conflict have existed for decades. But it was a doubling of the population in two decades that broke the fragile balance between people and limited resources that allowed the system to survive in the past. Slower population growth would not have brought a more equal distribution of land and other resources. But it might have given political and economic forces an opportunity to bring about orderly changes in those institutions, as well as buying time for the development and application of technologies to raise productivity. Slower population growth is no substitute for adequate economic and political development, but rapid population growth can frustrate those efforts if the development strategy does

not address the population issue frontally.

My last comment on the position paper is about its assumption that population increase is a problem that will solve itself. Again, there is a grain of truth in the statement. But again it ignores the question: at what cost in human misery, aggravation of existing social and economic problems, and potential political unrest does one achieve inevitable population stabilization by letting nature take its course rather than taking appropriate public action when it is called for in specific situations? The position paper takes a stand in defense of human values and individual initiative. It ignores conflicts between individual interests and societal interests.

Again, demographic momentum comes into play. The fact that today's demographic behavior has its main effects in the future makes it difficult for free market forces to provide the right signals. Market incentives may eventually lead people to control their reproduction, but concern for human welfare moves us to look for ways to speed up the process and reduce its costs to the poor of the Third World. Organized programs can and have played a major role in the diffusion of knowledge and access to family planning in developing countries. Today, most of the population of the Third World lives in countries that want slower rates of population growth and are trying to achieve them.

The issues are ones of balance. I work in an Institute that seeks to balance concerns about ethics and values with the facts of the real world. One of the hardest lessons is that values cannot be protected by denying the facts. In the ten years since the last world population conference in Bucharest there has been much progress in achieving a balanced view of the relation between population growth and economic development, and in designing and implementing population programs that meet the needs of individual

families in developing countries while respecting their individual autonomy. The United States has contributed in an important way to the achievement of this balance, in large part because of the guidance that the U. S. Congress has provided to our international population assistance program. It would be regrettable if these efforts were to be abandoned at precisely the moment in which they were achieving their objectives. It is hard to interpret the views expressed in the White House position paper in any other terms. For that reason, I join my colleagues in urging that it be revised to reflect a more balanced view of the question.

STATEMENT OF  
JANE A. MENKEN, Ph.D.  
AT  
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON WHITE HOUSE POPULATION  
POSITION PAPER

The Capitol  
June 27, 1984

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

### Jane Menken

Dr. Jane Menken is Assistant Director of the Office of Population Research of Princeton University and Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton. She is currently President-Elect of the Population Association of America. Dr. Menken has served on committees and advisory groups of the National Institutes of Health, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and the American Public Health Association. She served on the Committee on Population and Demography (1977-1983) and is a member of the Committee on Population (1983 - ) of the National Academy of Sciences. She has held positions at Harvard University, Columbia University and the National Institutes of Health. Dr. Menken has devoted much of her research to biological and health aspects of fertility and fertility regulation; her expertise on these matters has been demonstrated in testimony to the House Select Committee on Population and the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. She has her Ph.D. in Sociology and Demography from Princeton University.

My name is Jane Menken. I am a Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University and Assistant Director of the Office of Population Research there. It is also my privilege to serve this year as President-Elect of the Population Association of America. My own research has primarily been in the areas of fertility, including infertility, and the biological and health aspects of fertility change.

My purpose this afternoon is to comment on the statements about family planning programs found in White House Office of Policy Development draft U.S. position paper for the International Conference on Population to be held in August in Mexico City. The statements fall into two groups: comments on the value and effectiveness of family planning programs and comments on the types of family planning programs and organizations the U.S. will support if this position is adopted. I will address each of these in turn.

There is a clearcut implication in the White House draft that voluntary family planning programs do not work and that as economic opportunity rises, birth rates fall, and perhaps they fall only then. In fact, the record of family planning programs is encouraging, although not, of course, without its disappointments. My reading of recent evaluations agrees with a new report, prepared by two experienced and respected population scientists, which concluded that both the extent of economic development and the strength and quality of family planning programs are related to decline in the birth rate and that the combination of higher social setting and a strong program leads to the greatest change. Programs do exist that clearly have reached the poorest strata--those for whom there was little reason to expect rapid family planning acceptance. After all, contraceptive use was limited to the more privileged in our own country until rather recently.

In Bangladesh, in a very poor and uneducated rural population, an actual experiment was carried out in the late seventies. A program of comprehensive care was introduced in one of two matched areas. Fertility was almost identical at the start; within one year it dropped by 25 percent but only in the program area. It did not decline at all in the matched area. It has remained at these levels since that time.

In Indonesia, especially in the large populous area of East Java, with a vigorous family planning program, fertility has dropped decisively, again among the poor, the uneducated, the rural population. It should be noted that the Indonesian government has contributed increasing amounts from its own funds to its family planning program, so that out of a budget of 120 million dollars in 1982, over 70 percent came from Indonesia itself. The story of fertility decline without substantial economic change in Thailand seems similar.

Until satisfactory means of contraception are available, it is often difficult to tell the extent of unwanted births or the extent to which families recognize the benefits of spacing births to improve the health of infants and their mothers.

Family planning programs do not and cannot substitute for economic development. Rather, good programs can both contribute to and draw upon such development.

What we have seen is that well-designed programs can facilitate fertility change. The great challenge now is to take advantage of what has been learned about the ingredients of successful programs to adapt and apply them in new situations.

The draft also contains a new policy statement: the United States "does not consider abortion an acceptable element of family planning programs and will not contribute to those of which it is a part. Nor will it any longer contribute directly or indirectly to family planning programs funded by governments or pri-

vate organizations that advocate abortion as an instrument of population control."

Let me at the outset state emphatically that the Population Association of America takes no position whatever on the moral and political issues surrounding abortion. Our members have their individual views. They disagree about abortion as a political and moral issue. However, as scientists, they do study the numbers of abortions performed, whether legally or illegally, and the effect of family planning and of abortion on fertility; they study the effect of changes in the extent of contraceptive use or abortion and they study the facts about decisions by specific countries regarding abortion.

Under current U.S. policy, no American funds are used to provide abortions.

But if the U.S. were to stop, altogether, supporting family planning programs in all countries in which abortion is legal, what would happen? If the effectiveness of family planning programs is reduced by the cut-off, three consequences are inevitable: the birth rate will go up; ironically enough, the number of abortions will rise, and tragically, infant mortality will increase.

Effective family planning reduces abortions because fewer unwanted pregnancies occur. If the availability of methods of contraception plummets, pregnancies follow. Those brought to term increase the birth rate. Some women inevitably will resort to abortion, with all the dangers of back-street abortionists. If the intent of U.S. policy is to reduce abortions, withdrawing support from family planning programs certainly will have exactly the opposite of the desired effect.

Finally, it has been estimated that new family planning programs could prevent over 5 million infant deaths every year by preventing conceptions in high risk mothers and by allowing longer spacing between births so that infants receive adequate care, adequate feeding, and a better start in life. Tragically, reducing family planning programs would have exactly the opposite effect.

In response to your invitation to come here today, I examined the abortion policies in all countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance. In one of these is abortion viewed as a primary means of fertility control. In few is it intended to curb population growth. Abortion as a primary means of fertility regulation makes little sense--in moral terms, in human terms, and even, although far less important, in economic terms. In the absence of effective family planning, abortion is a very poor way to control fertility. To give some idea of the importance of contraception in preventing abortion, it is reasonable to ask how many abortions a woman would require to prevent unwanted births. If her last wanted child were born when she was 25, she would have to prevent births for the next twenty years. It is a generally agreed upon conclusion that she would have to have nearly twenty abortions, nearly one a year. Unsurprisingly, in those few countries that do rely primarily on abortion, none of which receive any American foreign assistance, reports of women having as many as 15 or 20 abortions are not rare. In

my professional judgment, such an approach to fertility regulation is unjustifiable on medical, economic, and social grounds at the very least. Family planning, using effective contraceptives, reduces unwanted childbearing and reduces the numbers resorting to abortion.

It is a matter of public record that no country receiving U.S. support relies primarily on abortion in its family planning program and that very few have even mentioned a desire to curb population growth as a reason for legalization abortion. Abortion is legal only on restricted grounds in many countries, usually for reasons of public health or other concerns, not as population policy. These countries have adopted their own laws regarding abortion after difficult decision-making, frequently after long deliberations. Certain grounds have been accepted into the legal codes: risk to the life of the mother, endangering her health, pregnancies resulting from rape or incest, and health of the child.

The draft statement in its final paragraph quotes an approach outlined by President Reagan: "Trust the people, trust their intelligence and trust their faith." Many countries have, in the context of their own cultures and after assessing their own health and population needs, introduced family planning programs. As a citizen, I believe we must listen to these people; as a demographer, I am convinced that to do otherwise and reduce family planning assistance is at best counterproductive.

STATEMENT OF  
MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM, Ph.D.  
AT  
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON WHITE HOUSE POPULATION  
POSITION PAPER

The Capitol  
June 27, 1984

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

### Michael S. Teitelbaum

Dr. Michael S. Teitelbaum is Program Officer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and currently serves as Chair of the Public Affairs Committee of the Population Association of America. He was formerly Staff Director of the Select Committee on Population, U.S. House of Representatives, and has served on the faculties of Princeton University and Oxford University. Dr. Teitelbaum was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he earned his doctorate in demography. His research interests and publications cover topics such as population and development, European fertility trends, domestic consequences of population changes, and immigration.

Remarks of Michael S. Teitelbaum  
Chairman, Public Affairs Committee  
Population Association of America

Briefing on Population and Economic Development  
for Honorable John Porter, M.C.  
June 27, 1984

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I am Michael S. Teitelbaum, Chairman of the Public Affairs Committee of the Population Association of America. My own research over the past 15 years has been about evenly divided between the demographic experiences of developing and industrialized countries. Mr. Chairman, you have invited us to comment upon the adequacy of the Draft Position Paper on Population, prepared by the White House Office of Policy Development. I have reviewed a draft dated May 30, 1984 and have the following comments for your consideration.

First, the draft paper reflects a surprisingly unbalanced interpretation of our current knowledge. I am sure that if the President were aware of how distorted it is, he would be both embarrassed and irritated. The editorial board of the New York Times used the harsh words "ignorant and dangerous" to characterize the document, words that I cannot recall being used recently by a leading national newspaper about a White House product. I do not know who the author of the White House paper was, but he or she is either unaware of 50 years of demographic research, or deliberately ignored it. To put it bluntly, the paper would receive a failing grade in any undergraduate demography course in the country.

The evidence from history is nothing like what the draft position paper would have us believe. Take, for example, its assertion that fertility declines occurred in the world's more affluent nations because of "economic freedom", while similar fertility declines were hindered in the third world due to "statist" governmental control of their economies. Ironically, the evidence from history is that among the most rapid fertility declines were those of the Marxist-Leninist economies of Eastern Europe after World War II. Compared to these, the earlier fertility declines of Western Europe and the United States were very slow and gradual indeed. Would the White House authors therefore conclude that greater "economic freedom" and "economically rational behavior" prevailed in postwar Communist Czechoslovakia than in Victorian America and Great Britain? I doubt if such a conclusion drawn from their theory would be attractive to the authors, nor would it be warranted by the facts.

I have recently completed a book on the 19th Century fertility decline in Great Britain, which anyone who has studied history knows was perhaps the least "statist" and most rapidly developing economy one could imagine. Yet the facts are that in this creator of the Industrial Revolution, this paragon of non-involvement by the State in the economy, fertility decline was very late when compared to that of France, with its highly centralized and statist government -- in fact the French fertility decline preceded the British one by over 100 years. Now, I would not conclude from this that laissez-faire capitalism prevented or delayed fertility decline in Britain, or that state intervention in the economy accelerated 18th Century fertility decline in France. Far from it. But it is virtually impossible to conclude the opposite, as the White House staff have managed to do.

Second, the paper contains some reasonable criticisms of unwise economic policies in many developing countries, such as those that have (in the words of the paper) "devastated" agriculture "by government price-fixing that wiped out rewards for labor." In this respect the paper embodies quite reasonable conservative opposition to government economic planning, price controls, dependency on the state, etc. But when the paper moves on to population impacts of such government policies, it becomes more a radical than a conservative document. If you appreciate irony, Mr. Chairman, there are some wonderful examples here.

Irony #1 is that this document emanating from the Reagan White House follows a line very similar to that advocated by radical third world states and the Soviet bloc at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest, Romania. Their position was that economic development would "take care" of population, and hence that there was no need for direct government efforts to affect demographic trends. Their favorite slogan was: "Development is the Best Contraceptive". The opposing position was that rapid population growth retarded economic development by directing resources into immediate consumption rather than investment in productive capacity. This position therefore favored direct efforts by governments to lower high fertility rates as part of overall development efforts. Irony #2 is that the leading spokesman for this position was the Chief of the U.S. delegation --- Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon Administration, and now Secretary of Defense.

Since 1974, most third world leaders have seen that rapid fertility declines do not occur "naturally" with economic development, as confidently predicted by their slogan. They therefore have moved toward direct policies aimed at lowering birth rates -- in effect they have now accepted that the U.S. position in 1974 was essentially correct. Irony #3 is that if the draft paper under discussion here were to be adopted as official U.S. policy, the Reagan Administration would be taking a position similar to that of the radical posture of 1974, but by now abandoned as unrealistic by most of its third world proponents.

The White House draft paper does note, correctly in my view, that reduction of population growth is no panacea. Very few things in this world turn out to be "a remedy for all evils and difficulties", which is the dictionary definition of "panacea". But it moves from this commonsense to flagrant nonsense on the relationships between demographic increase, unemployment and migration. Once again, the document proves its radical credentials, for its argument that the high unemployment and out-migration rates of many developing countries have nothing to do with rapid growth of their populations and labor forces could come directly out of the writings of Karl Marx. Marx argued that unemployment and poverty were caused not by population growth, but instead by Capitalism. Under Socialism, he said, there would be no population problems; whatever the number of people might be would have employment and prosperity. Irony #4, Mr. Chairman, is that if you take this simpleminded Marxist argument and substitute the words "economic freedom" for "Socialism", you have the equally simpleminded argument of the White House draft paper.

As to international migration, it is abundantly clear that the growing pressures for outmigration from countries such as Mexico, El Salvador, India, Bangladesh and Egypt have at least something to do with their rapid demographic growth during the 1960s and 1970s. Increases in migration pressures lag behind rapid population growth by at least 15-20 years, as surviving children reach labor force age. For this reason, it is correct to say that fertility declines over the next decade will have little impact upon out-migration during the same period -- but they inevitably will affect such pressures two decades later, other things being equal. Labor force projections for world regions such as Latin America demonstrate the point clearly. The labor forces of Mexico and Central America are projected to increase by about 100 percent over the coming 20 years -- about 20 million additions to the Mexican labor force between 1980 and 2000, compared to a total Mexican labor force of 20 million in 1980. (Comparable figures for Central America show 6 million additional workers added between 1980 and 2000 to the 7 million in 1980.) Put simply, this means a need to create as many new jobs in 20 years as the total jobs generated during all of their economic development to date. If they do not do so, either unemployment and underemployment will rise, or there will have to be largescale out-migration.

I greatly regret, Mr. Chairman, that the President has been let down and seriously embarrassed by members of his own staff. If the goal of the exercise was to prepare a pro-life statement on population and family planning programs, a perfectly respectable one could have been written, reflecting fully the well-established knowledge that prevention of unwanted pregnancies is the most effective way to prevent resort to abortion. I myself have had the pleasure of working closely with several knowledgeable and responsible supporters of the pro-life movement who could have written a pro-life paper without distorting five decades of scientific evidence. This can still be done, but there will have to be a new start, with a new cast of authors, if the President is not to be further embarrassed in an election year.

STATEMENT OF  
T. PAUL SCHULTZ, Ph.D.  
AT  
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON WHITE HOUSE POPULATION  
POSITION PAPER

The Capitol  
June 27, 1984

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

### T. Paul Schultz

Dr. T. Paul Schultz is a Malcolm K. Brachman Professor of Economics and Demography at Yale University, and Director of Yale's Economic Growth Center. He is a member of the Public Affairs Committee of the Population Association of America and Chairman of the Census Advisory Committee on Population Statistics. He served on National Academy of Science study groups on population growth and economic development in 1969-71 and a current group formed last year. Dr. Schultz was a member of a Research Advisory Panel of the Center for Population Research of the National Institutes of Health as well as held the position of Chairman of the Population Research Committee. Dr. Schultz has received numerous Honors, Scholarships and Fellowships and has published extensively. He has his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was the first director of The Population Research Program at the Rand Corporation.

T. Paul Schultz  
Yale University  
27 June 1984

## A BASIS FOR U.S. POPULATION POLICY

I shall address three issues raised by the White House draft position paper on the U.S. population assistance program. First, the basis for public sector intervention to accelerate the spread and availability of modern improved birth control techniques. Second, the national and individual level evidence of the benefits from family planning activities. Third, the counterproductive consequences of adopting the proposal that U.S. family planning assistance be made conditional on each country's opposition to abortion.

In the last three decades many low income countries adopted policies that distorted their relative prices of domestically produced and internationally traded goods, providing consumers and producers with misleading signals as to the true scarcity of goods. Private incentives and returns to savings and investments were thrown out of line and inefficiencies occurred. The draft position paper before you on U.S. population policy observes correctly that if these countries had intervened less in their economies to encourage import substitution, had taxed agricultural producers and exporters less, and had reduced their subsidies to capital intensive and urban-oriented industries, they would have grown on balance more rapidly in the postwar period.

However, adhering to this view, which is increasingly accepted today, has little bearing on population policy. "Getting prices right" is a good maxim, but it is not all there is to development or, particularly, population policy. There are a number of areas where the private sector is ill-equipped to provide

services to all segments of a poor society. Where these services have great value, public resources are regularly channeled into these high return activities. Basic education, family planning, and rural public health are three such sectors where the returns are thought to be high and the primary role of the public sector is unchallenged.

Private markets fail to perform these functions sufficiently because the benefits to society extend beyond the immediate consumer of these services, and these social benefits do not augment the profits of private firms in the marketplace. For example, an educated citizenry is believed to help the functioning of democracy, public health activities to reduce exposure of the public to contagious disease, and family planning to facilitate slower population growth and thereby to foster improved education and health for future generations. This is not to say that there is no room for the complementary and even competitive provision of family planning services in the private sector, but particularly in the diffusion of information about a new technology that cannot be embodied in a product and protected by a patent, the public sector is needed to assist this process through extension activity. Family planning extension may be viewed precisely as such a public informational service, which is frequently (and preferably) integrated with a child and maternal health program to subsidize the initial adoption and subsequent use of modern techniques of birth control.

## NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION GROWTH

There are a number of statements in the draft position paper as to the consequences of population growth on national economic development. Many of these are not in accord with the consensus of scientific knowledge today. Let me be more specific. Population growth has three general effects on the economy: (1) it increases the supply of labor which is one input into economic production; (2) it increases the density of the population; and (3) it increases the number of consumers and thus modifies the demand for goods.

Classical economists, including Malthus, emphasized the first effect, whereby population growth increases the number of workers relative to scarce fixed factors of production, such as land, and thereby depresses wages relative to land rents. This economic logic implies that, other things being equal, population growth reduces per capita income and increases income inequality by lowering wages relative to rents. Additional factors affecting the growth and distribution of income have become clearer in recent years, but nothing has modified the view that labor should experience diminishing returns to its efforts when other productive factors are held constant.

But of course the prediction that population growth will always be associated with declining wages is invalid, because of the creation and application of new knowledge to the production process that has accelerated remarkably since the Industrial Revolution. Closely linked to this technical change is investment in physical and human capital which has made machines and workers vastly more productive. Given these changing technical opportunities, the distribution of national income between labor, capital, and land becomes more

complex, and depends on the possibilities for substitution among these varied factors of production as well as on who owns the factors. There is no compelling evidence that this process of producing new knowledge and embodying it in productive capital is dependent on population size or density; rather, numerous studies of the research and development process link specific expenditures on different types of educated manpower and capital to the production of new useful knowledge.

In earlier historical periods, low population density may have represented a limitation to economic growth. It is speculated without empirical evidence that, even today, parts of Africa or the Amazon in Brazil would benefit more from denser settlement patterns than they would lose from the associated decline in the productivity of labor. But there is virtually no scientific evidence to suggest that greater population density would be of economic value in the majority of low income countries that contain the bulk of the Third World's population. Nor is there any accepted evidence for believing that growth in the size of the population, by merely expanding the numbers of consumers in the market, will create significant economies of scale for nations today. With access to international trade, the size of the domestic market is of secondary importance in determining comparative advantage, which is what can be produced in each country at lowest cost and hence most profitably.

When these three aggregate consequences of population growth are combined, the effects of diminishing returns to labor dominate the aggregate relationship, though these effects may at times be difficult to distinguish from other factors, both economic and political, that influence long term rates of economic growth. Any gains that may accrue from greater density or increasing the size of the national market are, by contrast, small and of localized interest.

Thus, the preponderant weight of economic evidence is that today's rapid population growth slows economic progress and increases income inequality in most low income countries. Therefore, voluntary measures that achieve a reduction in the rate of population growth in these countries are economically beneficial to future generations.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF VOLUNTARY FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

The microeconomic evidence justifying the priority assigned to family planning programs in international assistance is consistent with that marshalled at the national level, but of a different form. The last decade has shown a surprisingly widespread decline in fertility, which when studied in detail, suggests that the current structural changes in wages and prices and mortality that are associated with the development process are sufficient to create strong new private demands to restrict fertility. These demands can be satisfied more humanely and at less social and economic cost if the public sector subsidizes the dissemination of information about modern birth control technologies. These new technologies would not otherwise be accessible to most low income countries in the short run, outside of a small educated urban elite. The patterns we observe in fertility change suggest that several factors are particularly important in determining the timing and pace of the current fertility declines in low income countries that have been recently facilitated by family planning programs: (1) the sharp recent declines in infant and child mortality, (2) the gradual increases in women's education and employment opportunities, and (3) the increased private returns to educating both females and males. All of these demographic and economic changes in the environment of

families are associated with the fertility reductions that began to emerge across the developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign assistance to family planning programs has undoubtedly accelerated this ongoing process.

The benefits from voluntary family planning are not only in helping the average parent avoid unwanted births, thus slowing the rate of population growth. The help provided by these programs is of greatest value to the less educated and low income parent, who would not otherwise understand the possibilities of modern birth control technology or have access to the required supplies and services to use the techniques. In this way, family planning programs achieve a more equitable distribution of the burden associated with unwanted fertility. As the traditional private incentives that promoted high levels of fertility are gradually replaced by the incentives of a more modern and mobile economy that encourages parents to want moderate sized families, this burden of unwanted fertility increases before it subsides.

In this regard, family planning extension activity as a means of spreading improved birth control technology is analogous to agricultural extension activity that seeks to accelerate the diffusion of new agricultural inputs and methods. Both extension activities, by bringing to people a wider choice of new technologies, improve private decision making while helping to narrow the advantages enjoyed by the more sophisticated and educated producers and consumers. Extension activity, in this sense, is an economic stimulant to growth and a means to reduce unequal opportunities. Farm extension agents are paid by the government to accelerate the spread of promising new agricultural inputs and to temporarily subsidize their adoption. We observe that the number of agricultural agents per thousand farmers is associated with both increases in the average income of local farmers, and also with a narrowing of income

differentials between the better and less well educated farmers. Similarly, family planning outreach activities increase the average use of contraception, lower fertility, and narrow the differences between educational classes of parents in their unwanted or excess fertility burden.

Fertility is generally lower for better educated women, but these educational differentials in fertility tend to first widen, and then contract, as the fertility transition proceeds over time. The evidence I have seen suggests that these educational differentials in fertility are closed more rapidly when the public sector is more actively involved in extending family planning services. Family planning extension, therefore, reduces the innovational advantage that accrues naturally to the more educated woman.

Today much of the poor rural population in low income countries does not have free or convenient access to modern techniques of birth control, or to sufficient information concerning these techniques to evaluate their worth. Bringing family planning services and extension activities to these people is undoubtedly more costly when health systems are initially rudimentary and populations are still illiterate. But this challenge should be met with international assistance, to the extent possible, for the national and individual private gains will repay the effort.

#### POPULATION POLICY AND ABORTION

The population boom was, and remains, a serious challenge to U.S. foreign assistance policy. It does not need to be a crisis, but our policy needs to be concerted and sustained with an appropriately sized budget. Relatively modest sums have been appropriated by the developed countries, including the United

States, in relation to the total costs involved in extending the options of modern birth control technology to vast populations in the world that do not now have the advantage of sufficient education, income, or a medical care delivery system that can provide them with cost-effective and culturally acceptable techniques for avoiding unwanted births. Poor parents in low income countries are capable of deciding when it is in their private interests to have more children, and when it is not. When parents realize that it is no longer in their interests to have additional children, they will act accordingly, regardless of the availability of family planning programs. They use whatever measures they have. Abortion provided by traditional non-medical personnel, passive neglect of children, even (historically) infanticide where culturally condoned, increased dissolution of marriages, and lower rates of stable unions—all are documented responses to this privately felt need to restrain excess reproductive capacity in a desperately poor environment. Given high economic, social, and psychic costs associated with these traditional methods of birth control, many parents will understandably opt to have more births than they would have had, if lower cost modern contraceptive techniques had been available to them. In Latin America, in Chile, Peru and Colombia, in the 1960s and 1970s it was discovered that the public provision of family planning services reduced the epidemic in abortions that flooded hospitals with women who had experienced complications from their illegal abortions.

If U.S.A.I.D. support of family planning programs becomes conditional on that country's endorsement of this Administration's belief that abortion is to be avoided at any cost, the resources available for family planning abroad will diminish as these countries forego our assistance. More women who would have otherwise chosen reliable modern contraceptive methods from these curtailed

programs will be forced to resort to abortion. Moreover, these women will undergo abortion under circumstances where medical services are primitive. Their prospects are not good; we face a moral dilemma.

Consequently, the proposed imposition of the values of the Administration on such countries as Bangladesh, Tunisia, Indonesia, and others is not likely to reduce abortion; rather, it will very likely increase abortion among the least educated, and poorest segments of these populations that do not now have access to a better solution. If one is interested in reducing abortion, encouraging the spread and use of contraception is appropriate, not the reverse.

There is no obvious economic or humane justification for the policy change proposed in the position paper for the Mexico Conference. It would increase abortion, while purporting to discourage it; it would reduce international assistance and thereby the overall resources employed in voluntary family planning programs which are relatively efficient in promoting accepted development objectives while respecting individual rights; and it would reduce support for one of the most equitable social welfare programs which benefits disproportionately poorer parents, raises wages, and thereby reduces personal income inequality.

Rarely is it the case that international assistance programs can be advanced as both cost effective and equitable. Voluntary family planning has the capacity to reduce the economic inequalities that frequently mount at the onset of modern economic growth and appear to increase across generations during the subsequent demographic transition. The widespread private gains that accrue from well administered family planning programs may thus also encourage the evolution of a stable pluralistic society. Societies

experiencing lessened inequalities and larger per capita income growth have improved prospects of achieving stability and providing an international environment which enhances regional, and even global, peace. Endorsing the Administration's draft position paper for the International Conference on Population and implementing it through our A.I.D. program would be both economically and politically counterproductive.