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Last Updated: 11/06/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 4/27/2010

File Folder CO071 (IRAN) (511000-517999)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 93

SYSTEMATIC

531

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
90147 NOTE	RE: POSSIBLE DEATH IN IRAN	1	7/10/1987	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT: **Withdrawer**
SUBJECT FILE DLB 4/27/2010

File Folder CO071 (IRAN) (511000-517999) **FOIA**
S10-0306/01

Box Number 93 **SYSTEMATIC**
53

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	LETTER	MICHAEL METRINKO TO NADER MOGHADAM 511246	1	8/17/1987	B6
2	FORM	WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE OFFICE REFERRAL FORM 511246	1	8/13/1987	B6
3	LETTER	MOGHADAM TO HOWARD BAKER 511246	1	7/21/1987	B6
4	FORM	CTRK DOCUMENT FORM 511246	1	5/15/1987	B6
5	FORM	CTRK DOCUMENT FORM 511246	1	3/23/1987	B6

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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 05, 1987

No response per John Tuck 8/6/87

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. NADAR MOGHADAM

SUBJECT: INQUIRY REGARDING STUDY OF SITUATION IN IRAN
REQUESTS MEETING TO DISCUSS FUTURE OF IRAN
AND U.S. RELATIONS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
HOWARD BAKER	ORG	87/08/05	<u>NAN</u>	C 87/08/05
REFERRAL NOTE:				
FRANK CARLUCCI	RSI	87/08/05		C 87/08/05
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

CJ

CJ

COMMENTS: SEE ID #480732

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                        *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
 (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
 LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
 MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

Co 071

INCOMING

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	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
HOWARD BAKER REFERRAL NOTE: _____	ORG	87/08/05		C 87/08/05
FRANK CARLUCCI REFERRAL NOTE: _____	RSI	87/08/05		C 87/08/05
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		1 1		1 1
STATR REFERRAL NOTE: _____	CJ R	87/08/13		A 87/08/13
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		1 1		1 1
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				

COMMENTS: SEE ID #480732

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
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| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
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| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
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| *X-INTERIM REPLY | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8723352

DATE August 18, 1987

FOR: MR. GRANT GREEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

REFERENCE:

TO: Howard Baker FROM: Mr. Nader Moghadam

DATE: July 21, 1987 SUBJECT: Inquiry regarding study of
situation in Iran requests meeting to discuss future of Iran and
and U.S. relations


REFERRAL DATED: August 13, 1987 ID# 511246
(IF ANY)

_____ THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
_____ A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.
_____ A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.
 AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
_____ WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
CITED BELOW.
_____ THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSED TRAVEL.
_____ OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

REMARKS:



DIRECTOR
SECRETARIAT STAFF

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT:
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CO071 (IRAN) (511000-517999)

FOIA

S10-0306/01
SYSTEMATIC

Box Number

93

53

DOC Document Type

*No of
pages*

Doc Date

*Restric-
tions*

NO Document Description

1 LETTER

1 8/17/1987 B6

MICHAEL METRINKO TO NADER MOGHADAM

511246

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOC Document Type

*No of
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Doc Date

*Restric-
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2 FORM

1 8/13/1987 B6

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE OFFICE
REFERRAL FORM
511246

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DOC Document Type

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Doc Date

Restric-

NO Document Description

pages

tions

3 LETTER

1 7/21/1987 B6

MOGHADAM TO HOWARD BAKER

511246

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DOC Document Type

No of Doc Date Restric-
pages tions

NO Document Description

4 FORM

1 5/15/1987 B6

CTRK DOCUMENT FORM

511246

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SEARCH - QUERY

00004 NADER WITH MOGHADAM

474524 DOCUMENT= 1 OF 3

ACTDATE = 870625
ADDNUMB =
CREFDATE = 870625
DOCDATE = 870508
DSPDATE = 870625
NAME = CARLUCCI
RCVDATE = 870625
RECID = 474524
STATE = DC
UPDATE =
ZIP = 20506
OPID WS
DOCDATE 870508
RECTYP HBA
MEDIA O
STAFF HOWARD BAKER
CSBAK1
NAME MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
ORG NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADDR WASHINGTON DC 20506
SUBJECT LETTER FROM NADER MOGHADAM
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBCODE CO071
FG006-12
INDCODE 3500
ACTION RM RSZ 870625 C 870625
COMMENTS NSC 8703431

END OF DOCUMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
REMOVAL
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
DATE 4/26/10

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WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 06, 1987

Thanks for sharing with me the editorial by Lee Anderson in The Free Press.

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ALEX GUERRY

I think it's right on the mark. I've taken the liberty of sharing it with several others who will assist

SUBJECT: FORWARDS EDITORIAL BY LEE ANDERSON REGARDING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

*the President in preparation of his remarks for next week
cc: Tom Guicom w/ inc.*

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
HOWARD BAKER		ORG	87/08/06	HB	87/08/07 TR
<i>Briscom</i>	<i>CMGRIS</i>		<i>A 87/08/10</i>	<i>TR</i>	<i>C 87/08/10</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:					
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COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

- *ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
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- *X-INTERIM REPLY *

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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

August 7, 1987

Dear Alex:

Thank you for sharing with me Lee Anderson's editorial pertaining to the Iran-Contra affair.

I think it's right on the mark and I've taken the liberty of sharing it with those assisting the President in preparing his remarks for his address on this matter.

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. Alex Guerry
Chairman of the Board
and President
Chattem, Inc.
1715 West 38th Street
Chattanooga, TN 37409

HHB/WJB/CAD/jz 8HHBA

~~cc:~~ Lorraine Camarano - Rm. 61 OEOB
~~cc:~~ w/incoming to Tom Griscom

Dear Alex:

Thank you for sharing with me Lee Anderson's editorial pertaining to the Iran-Contra affair.

I think it's right on the mark and I've taken the liberty of sharing it with those assisting the President in preparing his remarks for his address on this matter.

Howard

hhb/wjb/cad

z cc: with incoming to Tom Griscom



Alex Guerry
Chairman of the Board
and President

August 5, 1987

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Howard:

Enclosed is an editorial by Lee Anderson regarding the Iran-Contra affair which appeared in The Free Press yesterday afternoon. I am sending it to you in case it might be of some interest and help to the President and you as he prepares his speech to the nation on this matter.

Lee is a gifted and widely-acclaimed editorial writer, as I am sure you know, and his editorials have won many significant awards. At a time like this when so many members of the media seem primarily interested in sensationalism and political motives, we are very fortunate to have a person like Lee Anderson who understands all of the facts clearly and has the ability to write in such a clear and understandable fashion.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Alex". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Alex Guerry

CHATTANOOGA NEWS-FREE PRESS

ROY McDONALD
Publisher

FRANK McDONALD
President

LEE ANDERSON
Editor

Tuesday, August 4, 1987

Big—But Not That Big

The public testimony in the congressional hearings involving the Iran-Contra affair has ended after 41 days. So what do we know as the senators and representatives and their staffs retire to write their reports (plural, because there are sure to be divergent views)?

We know that it all was big — but really not so big as the opportunists trumpeted in trying to take political advantage of our nation's difficulties in international affairs. We know that good men tried to do good things and that mistakes were made. And we have responded with public self-flagellation from which some have sought to make political capital.

In a nutshell:

1. Congress did the wrong thing — but in legitimate ways.
2. Some in the executive branch did the right things — but sometimes in wrong ways.

The obvious goal of the Democratic majority was to prove President Ronald Reagan was (1) a liar or (2) an incompetent. It did neither. President Reagan said he did not know in advance of the plan to divert Iranian funds to aid the anti-Communist Contras in Nicaragua. There was not a bit of evidence indicating President Reagan did know. And his lack of knowledge was not a result of incompetence but of mistaken though honest decision by Adm. John Poindexter, the national security adviser, not to tell the president, to let "the buck stop" with him rather than with Mr. Reagan.

It is easy to be sidetracked by the extensive testimony and speeches, to become confused from sometimes conflicting testimony that may not be deception but just reflect different perceptions and different memories of people involved in these and other major affairs from different perspectives. But there were really just three basic elements of the whole controversy:

1. President Reagan sought improvement of U.S. relations with potential future leaders of Iran who might be less radical than those now in power. In this, he was right. In the course of negotiations, he made a mistake, we believe, in approving limited sale of arms to Iranians. It was a legal, honest decision, though we wish no U.S. arms of any kind had gone to any Iranians.

2. President Reagan was deeply concerned about the Americans held hostage by terrorists in Lebanon. In this, he was right. He correctly sought to encourage Iranian influence on the Lebanese terrorists to get the hostages released, with mixed results. Though he has been badly misunderstood, the president was correct in insisting he did not "swap guns for hostages" — since the arms went to Iranians who held no hostages and the Lebanese who did hold hostages got no guns, no money, no reward of any kind.

3. When the Iranians got the limited weapons, they were overcharged. The United States got the full price it had set for the arms. Several million dollars of Iranian money gained through the overcharging and left after operational expenses was earmarked for the Contras. As Lt. Col. Oliver North commented, he thought it was a "neat" idea to have Iranian money financing the anti-Communists. The trouble was that this was not cleared with the president. It appears the decision was primarily Adm. Poindexter's, since Col. North repeatedly asked him for assurance of proper authority.

What about Congress? It was wrong in meddling too deeply in the conduct of foreign affairs, a subject left constitutionally and by precedent primarily to the president. Congress first correctly voted aid to the Contras. But with their necks stuck out, Congress wrongly voted to cut off anti-Communist aid. The Boland Amendment banned use of appropriated funds by the Defense Department and U.S. intelligence agencies — but did not prohibit unnamed officials, individuals and other agencies from aiding the anti-Communists with non-tax money.

The Boland Amendment mistake by Congress generated the mistakes that followed.

What about the president? He clearly acted within his powers, being on sound ground in overtures to the Iranians and for the hostages, though being carried by heart rather than head into the arms transfer.

What about Adm. Poindexter? He should not have acted on his own without telling the president. His motives were good — keeping Nicaraguan anti-Communism alive — but his methods were bad.

What about Col. North? He acted with honest purpose but with mistaken deception and sometimes lies to conceal his operations, feeling all the while that all he did was within the law and serving the best interests of the country, skirting rather than violating the Boland Amendment.

What about the late CIA Director William Casey? We will never know. A brilliant, dedicated, effective servant of American freedom, his death left many questions forever unanswered.

What about former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane? He conscientiously did dangerous duty in secretly negotiating with the Iranians as he was asked to do, but without desirable results.

What about Gen. Richard Secord and Albert Hakim? They acted in private, civilian capacities, Gen. Secord says patriotically without a profit motive for himself, while Mr. Hakim sought to earn a profit, both serving what they believed to be U.S. interests.

What about Gen. John Singlaub, an ardent anti-Communist in military retirement; Mrs. Helen Clayton Garwood, a patriot who gave a helicopter to the Contras; the sultan of Brunei, the Republic of China on Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and others? They legally and admirably sought to keep resistance to Communist expansion in Latin America alive — while Congress encouraged the Communist aggressors by denying official aid to the anti-Communists.

What about Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger? They gave honest and good advice to the president not to go through with the Iranian arms sale. Unfortunately, the advice of others prevailed. They had no part in the aid to the Contras.

What about the money? We really don't know. How much went to the Contras? How much remains in Swiss bank accounts? And then there is the irony of the Brunei money deposited in an account with the wrong number, thus hitting a dead end.

What have we learned?

1. No major foreign policy operation should go forward without full knowledge and specific approval by the president.

2. Congress should not try to dictate foreign policy.

3. Ordinarily non-operational agencies of government such as the National Security Council should not engage in operations, but should be restricted to presenting options in policy advice and information.

4. While secrecy is often essential, there should be guarded and limited sharing of information by the president and a few key members of Congress.

5. While covert operations require efforts to keep our enemies confused, in proper communications among American officials, there should be no lies. The end does not justify the means.

But have we learned these things?

1. The Soviet Union is sponsoring Communist "revolution without borders" in Latin America and is in deadly earnest about what it is doing.

2. Sadly, some in the United States are not equally determined to prevent Communist victory.

Let us not allow the Iran-Contra affair be only a disruptive episode in American life. Let us do what it takes to guarantee this will be a constructive experience rather than a destructive one.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 28, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. MICK ARNOLD

SUBJECT: FORWARDS REPORT ON IRAN

Reading file CO 071
Dear Mick,
Thank you for your
note. I appreciate
hearing from you.
Best wishes
Howard

8729086

ACTION DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
HOWARD BAKER		ORG	87/08/28	HB	A	87/09/29 TR
<i>N/S Carl V</i>	REFERRAL NOTE:	A	87/10/02 TR		C	87/10/05 TR
<i>DOS</i>	REFERRAL NOTE:	B	87/10/07	NAN-	C	87/10/15 <i>see attached</i>
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS:

State

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOb) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S. 8729086DATE October 15, 1987

FOR: MR. GRANT GREEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

REFERENCE:

TO: Hon. Howard H. Baker, Jr. FROM: Mr. Mick Arnold
DATE: August 25, 1987 SUBJECT: Specific Report - Iran

REFERRAL DATED: October 7, 1987 ID# 511449
(IF ANY)

 THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
 A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.
 A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.
 AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
 X WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
CITED BELOW.
 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSED TRAVEL.
 OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

REMARKS: Mr. Baker has already written and expressed his appreciation to Mr. Arnold for subject report. The Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau (NEA/NGA) will maintain a copy on file.

Lisa Kubische
for
DIRECTOR
SECRETARIAT STAFF

8729086

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 7, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 511449

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED AUGUST 25, 1987

TO: HOWARD BAKER

FROM: MR. MICK ARNOLD
HEATH END HOUSE
1, MONTAGUE GARDENS, PETERSFIELD
HAMPSHIRE GU31 4DT
ENGLAND

SUBJECT: FORWARDS REPORT ON IRAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE

(OR DRAFT) TO:

AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

September 29, 1987

Dear Mick:

Thanks for your note; it was good to hear from you. I appreciated receiving your report on the Persian Gulf situation, and I'll share it with the appropriate people.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. Mick Arnold
Heath End House
1 Montague Gardens
Petersfield
Hampshire GU31 4DT
England

HHB/LRC:CAD:NSC:ds 9HHBA

cc: Lorraine Camarano - Rm. 61 OEOB
Mr. Carlucci, with incoming

OFFICE OF HOWARD BAKER'S CORRESPONDENCE
REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE - COMMENTS

TO: *Ralph Bellamy/NSC*

DATE DUE:

ASAP

TYPE OF RESPONSE:

Multiple Mailing

Form Reply

One-Time Reply

SUBJECT:

Attached draft for Howard Baker's signature

REQUESTED BY/ADDRESSED TO:

Howard Baker/Mick Arnold

BACKGROUND:

Forwards report on the Persian Gulf situation

SIGNATURE:

Louaine R. Camarano

DATE:

9/25/87

Howard Baker's Correspondence
Old Executive Office Building
Room 61
(202) 456-6600

Your Recommendation/Comments:

*THE NSC CONCURS AS IS ✓ AS AMENDED _____
FOR
GRANT S GREEN JR.*

SIGNATURE:

Will G. Brown

DATE:

24 Sept 87

8729086

Heath End House,
1, Montague Gardens, Petersfield,
Hampshire. GU31 4DT England
Telephone: (0730) 66992

Private and
Confidential

August 25, 1987

My dear Howard,

A couple of days ago, I had an opportunity for a long talk with an Iranian friend on a short mission to Europe from Teheran.

I am enclosing the gist of information and thought from him, and I hope it may be of some interest. I would rate the information as reliable. The analysis is my own.

I hope all goes well,

Yours ever,

Mick

Mick Arnold

DEPT
ADMINIST
E.O. 12958, s2
BY NARA

dn

4/22/10

Dear Mick:

Thanks for your note; it was good to hear from you. I appreciated receiving your report,

Best wishes.

—
Sincerely,

Howard

on the Perain
Only Situation, and I'll share
it with the
appropriate people.

HHB/lrc / ~~lrc~~ / NSC /

<< w/ incoming to Carlucci

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Specific Report - Iran

Mick Arnold

August 25, 1987

Friction between the regular military and the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) is increasing. There are reports of a clash between them on the north-west front with some 300 casualties three months ago. The Pasdaran now number around 330,000, and consist of a large number of semi-autonomous groups, each with a mullah as 'guide'. They have an embryo airforce (helicopters and three Migs), a small naval arm of fast small boats and a corvette, and a missile section. There is little discipline, and virtually no overall control, other than general policy from the center. The mines in the Gulf, which potentially hurt Iranian oil exports, were laid based on local decisions. The regular forces, with the officer corps more than decimated by the religious authorities, are forced into a low profile, and a great resentment is building up, not least because the Pasdaran have priority with armaments and spares.

This friction is reflected in the Council of Guardians; it is not clear who leads the factions, but Rafsanjani is establishing a strong claim to the succession by backing the Pasdaran, while Khamenei, who appears to be more pragmatic, is leaning towards the regular military, and away from the fanatical, and ill thought out adventurism of the Pasdaran. Khomeini has his hands full balancing the claims of each.

Iran's reply to the UN resolution calling for peace was intelligently ambiguous. Both this, and the agreement to meet Perez de Cuellar, seem to be time-wasting policies, in the hope that US pressure on Iraq to refrain from restarting the 'tanker war' can be indefinitely prolonged. It seems unlikely (except for some lunatic Revolutionary Guard) that Iran should mount some overt strike at US forces, unless Iraq resumes attacks on Iran's oil export lifeline. After all, even Kharg Island has not been attacked since July 13. That is not to say that covert pinpricks will not be attempted, both for internal propaganda reasons and to try to make the US seem vulnerable in the eyes of Arab nations.


There are reports of Soviet troop reinforcements on Iran's northern border, including Spetsnaz units, and some from the Far East (this makes sense in view of the Sino-Soviet talks on border problems, which have resulted in some agreements, therefore presumably freeing some troops from the area). It

is generally thought in Iran that any landing of US Marines in the Gulf would probably mean an equivalent move into Northern Iran by the Soviets; another reason not to tempt the US by serious military action.

There are also reports of growing military pressure on Saddam Hussein of Iraq to resume air strikes on Iranian marine targets. This should be prevented at all costs, and the Iraqi air superiority turned onto economic land targets in Iran. It is damage to Iran's oil exports which now could well spark off a major conflagration. Military and general economic targets seem unlikely to do so.

In summary, therefore, and based on the above information and analysis, the following comments may be relevant:

1. There should be no involvement of US Marines or troops by landings on Iranian territory. Retaliatory action, if necessary, should be in the form of pin-point, surgical air strikes on wholly military targets, or naval engagements.
2. An arms embargo should be actively pursued through the United Nations, with sanctions applied to countries which infringe the agreed regulations.
3. A firm undertaking should be obtained from Israel to avoid any involvement or activity whatsoever in the Gulf or with Iran.
4. The greatest pressure possible must be maintained on Iraq not to revert to attacks on Iranian tankers, but to keep up the pressure by air strikes against Iranian land-based targets, mostly non-oil related.
5. Covert action should be attempted to exploit the friction between Iranian regular forces and the Pasdaran.
6. Common policy should be formulated with European allies on passive (mine sweeping) activity in the Gulf.
7. There should be no negotiation, of any nature, on the release of hostages, either in Iran, or with terrorists in Lebanon under Iranian influence.
8. The Arab League, and any other major Arab forum should be encouraged to condemn Iranian activity in Mecca, to publicise Iranian actions which frequently contradict true Islamic rules, and to exploit the fact that Iranians are not Arabs.
9. Maximum effort should be exerted to give at least the appearance of a bi-partisan agreement not only in Congress, but also between Congress and the White House. Divisions are seen as weakness from outside.



9

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90147	NOTE RE: POSSIBLE DEATH IN IRAN	1	7/10/1987	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
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CJ

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

August 31, 1987

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FG006-12

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: PA - George B. High, Acting *H*

SUBJECT: Iran Tops List of Americans' Perceived Enemies,
Followed by USSR, Iraq

Summary

More than half the public thinks of Iran as an "enemy" of the United States, the highest negative rating scored by any country in the five years the Roper poll has asked Americans to rank nations on a five-point scale ranging from "close ally" to "enemy." This compares to one-third who think the Soviet Union is an enemy, down from one-half three years ago. Iraq is just behind the Soviet Union in being viewed as an enemy of the US. At the other end of the scale, only two countries--Great Britain and Canada--were predominantly viewed as "close allies."

End Summary

A May 1987 Roper poll asked respondents to rate 18 countries in terms of whether that nation "has acted as a close ally of the US, a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the US, has been mainly unfriendly--but not an enemy--or has acted as an enemy of the US?" Roper has asked this question for five years. Since Iran and Iraq were on the list for the first time this year, no comparison is possible with earlier perceptions of those nations.

Over four-fifths of those polled viewed Iran either as "unfriendly" (31%) or as an "enemy" (52%)--the highest such rating given any country since Roper introduced this question in 1982. Neither the Soviet Union, Vietnam, nor Cuba (not included by Roper on this year's list) has been deemed an enemy by as high a percentage of Americans. These findings were recorded before the attack on the U.S.S. Stark and the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers.

NSC # 8706445

Iraq ranked third from the bottom: Over three-fifths viewed it either as unfriendly (34%) or as an enemy (30%).

The Soviet Union ranked between Iran and Iraq. One-third of the public (32%) now perceive the USSR as an enemy--down from 40 percent in late 1985 and 49 percent in mid-1984. An additional 44 percent rated it as unfriendly in the latest poll.

Roper's poll produced these results about other nations and regions:

US Allies: About nine out of ten Americans viewed Great Britain and Canada positively ("close ally" or "friendly"), including about half or more who perceived them in the first category. This has been the case since Roper first asked the question.

There was a marked falloff in the perception of other countries as close allies: About 15 percent regarded Japan, France, and Israel in this category; less than 10 percent gave this rating to South Korea and the Philippines. These five countries were mainly viewed as "friends" of the US, getting that rating from roughly 40 percent of those polled.

Middle East/Persian Gulf: The public clearly differentiates friend from foe in the Middle East. In assessing nations other than Iran and Iraq; Syria was predominantly perceived as "unfriendly;" Saudi Arabia as "neutral;" Egypt as either "neutral" or "friendly;" and Israel as "friendly" to the US.

East Asia: The public distinguishes sharply between China and the USSR. Half perceived China either as being positive or "neutral" toward the US, while viewing the Soviet Union as negative ("unfriendly" or an "enemy"). Only one percent perceived the Soviet Union as either positive/neutral and China as negative. About one-fifth (18%) viewed both China and the USSR negatively.

Elsewhere in Asia, South Korea and the Philippines were characterized mainly as friends, while Vietnam was predominantly seen as unfriendly to the US.

Western Hemisphere: Mexico was predominantly seen as friendly to the US, while Nicaragua was predominantly seen as unfriendly.

Americans view their southern neighbor less favorably than their northern neighbor: Fifty-seven percent rated Mexico as a "close ally" or "friend," compared to 87 percent who accorded these ratings to Canada.

Roper asked this question:

"I'd like to have your impressions about the overall position that some countries have taken toward the U.S. (RESPONDENTS SHOWN LIST OF COUNTRIES.) Would you read down that list, and for each country, tell me if you believe the country has acted as a close ally of the US, has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the US, has been mainly unfriendly toward the US, but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the US?" ("Don't know" responses omitted.)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Close Ally</u>	<u>Friend</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Unfriendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
Great Britain	56% (85%)	29%	8%	1%	(1%) -
Canada	49 (87)	38	6	1	(1) -
Japan	17 (66)	49	21	4	(6) 2
France	16 (54)	38	28	8	(9) 1
Israel	15 (51)	36	23	11	(14) 3
Mexico	9 (57)	48	28	6	(8) 2
Philippines	8 (47)	39	28	11	(12) 1
South Korea	7 (39)	32	29	12	(16) 4
Egypt	3 (36)	33	34	10	(13) 3
Saudi Arabia	3 (25)	22	30	19	(26) 7
Mainland China	2 (26)	24	41	14	(19) 5
South Africa	2 (15)	13	33	29	(36) 7
Nicaragua	1 (9)	8	19	31	(49) 18
Vietnam	1 (9)	8	23	34	(55) 21
Syria	1 (8)	7	22	29	(48) 19
Iraq	1 (6)	5	15	34	(64) 30
Soviet Union	- (4)	4	13	44	(76) 32
Iran	- (2)	2	6	31	(83) 52

Most population groups were similar in the ally/enemy ratings they gave to different countries. For example, in every group a much larger proportion rated Iran as an "enemy" than accorded this rating to Iraq or any other country tested. At the other end of the scale, a much larger proportion in every group rated Great Britain and Canada as "close allies" than gave this rating to any other country.

AR
Drafted:PA/OAP:ARichman/JHCollinge:rg
8/27/87 Ext.76064 W0267H

PA/OAP:BRoshco *[Signature]*

6445

RECEIVED 03 SEP 87 14

TO GREEN

FROM HIGH, G

DOCDATE 31 AUG 87

KEYWORDS: IRAN

USSR

IRAQ

SUBJECT: IRAN TOPS LIST OF AMERS PERCEIVED ENEMIES FOLLOWED BY USSR IRAQ

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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September 22, 1987

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

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W/S

Iranian President's Speech Before UNGA

Iranian President Ali Khamenei, in a speech before the UN General Assembly this morning, rejected President Reagan's challenge to accept a cease-fire in their war with Iraq. He also accused the US of attacking an unarmed merchant ship yesterday, and stated that press reports that claimed the ship was laying mines was "a pack of lies." Khamenei said that the US bears direct responsibility for all ensuing events from the attack on the Iranian ship, and said the "US will soon receive a proper response (not specified) for this abominable action." He further stated the Iranian response will not be limited to the Persian Gulf. At this point, the US delegation left the auditorium.

The Saudi delegate left the auditorium after Khamenei claimed that the US played an influential role in last month's riots in Mecca in which over 400 Iranian pilgrims were killed. (U)

CNN live coverage

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM COPY

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Iranian President's Speech Before UNCA

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