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WIS

March 23, 1987

Dear Mr. Fowls:

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. It was kind of you to write as you did and I'm most grateful.

You are right that it was unfortunate that the story broke in the press. That dashed any hope of getting additional hostages released. The leak came from an Iranian official hostile to those we were dealing with and by way of a radical weekly paper in Beirut. I urged our press to hold off because of possible danger to the people we were dealing with, but they pressed ahead. There has been no word from some of those I mentioned and I fear the worst.

Again, my heartfelt thanks to you.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Mr. J. F. Fowls
25 Manhasset Avenue
Port Washington, New York 11050

RR:AVH:pps

RR Dictation

870325

HANDWRITING FILE

Patsy - I'm holding the original here.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 23, 1987

That dashes
any hope of
getting additional
hostages released.

Dear Mr. Fowls:

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. It was kind of you to write as you did and I'm most grateful.

~~It was~~ ~~that it was unfortunate that~~
You are right about the possibility of success, ~~up until~~ the story broke in the press. The leak came from an Iranian official hostile to those we were dealing with and by way of a radical weekly paper in Beirut. I urged our press to hold off because of possible danger to the people we were dealing with, but they ~~pack was off and barking~~. There has been no word from some of those I mentioned and I fear the worst.

~~As~~ pressed ahead.

Again, my heartfelt thanks to you.

Sincerely,

Mr. J. F. Fowls
25 Manhasset Avenue
Port Washington, New York 11050

To Mr. J. F. Fawcett 25 Manhasset Ave,
Port Washington, N.Y. 11050

Dear Mr. Fawcett —

Thank you very much for your letter & your generous words. It was kind of you to write as you did & I'm most grateful.

You are right about the possibility of success up until the story broke in the press. The leak came from an Iranian official hostile to those we were dealing with and by way of a radical weekly paper in Beirut. I urged our press to hold off because of possible danger to the people we were dealing with but the pack was off and barking. There has been no word

— from some of those I mentioned & I fear the
wrest.

Again my heartfelt thanks to you,
Sincerely RR

(8-1)
J. F. Fawcett

25 HAWKWOOD AVENUE
PORT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK
11050.

The President of the United States

3/18/87.

Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed reading the entire Towers Report. In my judgement you should receive the Nobel Peace Prize for your efforts to end the Iqan-Iranian War and to commence friendly negotiations with the Iranian Government for future peace in the world and for your valiant attempts to gain the freedom for the Americans held hostage in Lebanon.

I believe the media and the Congress have taken this all out of proportion to the real purpose of Lt. Col. North, Dir. McFarland, Admiral Poundstone, C.I.A. Chief Kelly and the others who gave so freely of their efforts and long hours to attain your goals. I believe your policy was just on the verge of success when the story was leaked to an Iranian Newspaper. It's a shame that your valiant efforts came so close to success and are now under questioning by every Reporter and Congressman in an effort to gain their own popularity with the American People.

I firmly believe the truth will prevail and certainly history will record your efforts in their true light and meaning. In the meantime there are millions of Americans who respect you and your judgement, just stand tall as

You always have done, you were twice elected
by large margins by the American people and don't
forget "The show isn't over until the fat lady
sings!"

I hope that you have recovered successfully
from your operation and that you will continue
to give to the American People your splendid
leadership that has over the past six years
once again made the United States the strongest
and most influential nation in the world.

I pray to the Almighty that he may
give you strength and wisdom in these dark
hours when you are under constant media
and Congressional attack. May the Almighty
Bless You in your hour of need.

Respectfully,
Joe F. Lawls

March 23, 1987

Dear Paul:

Thanks very much for your letter and your kind words about me and your proper words about our friends (?) in the media.

Someone sent me a clipping from an Illinois paper. It carries quotes going back to 1858 in the press of that time about Lincoln. One paper called him everything from a thief to a gorilla. But when he was shot the same paper went into a mix of crocodile tears and an eulogy about this "great and good" man.

I hope I can avoid such a change of heart by today's press, considering the price.

Nancy sends her best.

Sincerely,

RON

Mr. Paul Trousdale
500 South Sepulveda Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90049

RR:AVH:pps

RR Dictation

870325

HANDWRITING FILE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 23, 1987

Dear Paul:

Thanks very much for your letter and your kind words about me and your proper words about our friends (?) in the media.

Someone sent me a clipping from an Illinois paper. It carries quotes going back to 1858 in the press of that time about Lincoln. One paper called him everything from a thief to a gorilla. But when he was shot the same paper went into a mix of crocodile tears and an eulogy about this "great and good" man.

I hope I can avoid such a change of heart by today's press, considering the price.

Nancy sends her best.

Sincerely,



Mr. Paul Trousdale
500 South Sepulveda Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90049

To Mr. Paul Trousdale 500 So. Sepulveda Blvd

L.A. Calif. 90049

Dear Paul

I thank very much for your letter & your kind words about me & your proper words about our friends (?) in the media.

Someone sent me a clipping from an Illinois paper. It carries quotes going back to 1858 in the press of that time about Lincoln. One paper called him everything from a thief to a Morilla. But when he was shot the same paper went into a mix of crocodile tears & a eulogy about this "great & good" man. ~~I hope~~

I hope I can avoid such a change of heart by today's press, considering the price.

Nancy sends her love.

Sincerely Ron

PAUL TROUSDALE

500 South Spaulden Blvd.
L.A. Calif. 90049

March 20, 1987

Ronald Reagan
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. President:

You handled yourself magnificently with the so called "ladies and gentlemen of the press". I don't know how you hold your temper with such idiots. The type of questions they ask are insulting, unpatriotic, and the American public are absolutely fed up with the press of the United States. They should get on to asking questions about more important business.

Just sounding off. I don't know what I can do about it.

Best wishes,


PAUL

PT:cw

Name	Date
Gaylon Ellis	5/19/88

outgoing

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

0787



FEB 04 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Iran Affair and European Public Opinion

Enclosed is an advance copy of a paper presenting findings from recent USIA surveys of British, French and West German public opinion on the Iranian arms issue and arms control topics.

Although large majorities of those familiar with the Iranian arms issue say the incident has damaged U.S. credibility, confidence in the U.S. ability to deal responsibly with world problems has risen in Britain and West Germany and has remained stable in France.

NSA 8400184

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87 FEB 5

P 7: 28

Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

February 6, 1987

IRAN AFFAIR AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION: ALTHOUGH U.S. CREDIBILITY IN QUESTION, CONFIDENCE IN U.S. HOLDS UP

This analysis is based on a USIA-sponsored national telephone poll (January 19-22) in Great Britain, France and West Germany. Where appropriate, results are compared to findings from telephone polls conducted earlier in these same countries.

Iran Affair Saps U.S. Credibility But Not Overall Confidence in U.S.

Although majorities in all three countries have heard at least a "fair amount" about U.S. arms sales to Iran, one-third or more have heard little or nothing. Among those familiar with the Iranian arms issue, large majorities say the incident has damaged U.S. credibility. (Tables 1 and 2)

Nevertheless, since last June confidence in the U.S. ability to "deal responsibly with world problems" has risen in Britain (35% to 45%) and Germany (28% to 37%) and has remained stable (at 50%) in France. In all three countries, more people express confidence in the ability of the U.S. to deal responsibly with world problems than in the ability of the Soviet Union to do the same. But the U.S. rating is still below the level of confidence (48-64%) expressed after the Geneva meeting. (Tables 3 and 4)

Arms Control and Trade Issues Overshadow Iran Arms Sales

In all three countries, arms control or trade-related issues overshadow the Iran arms sales as the most important international issue. When given a choice, only one-in-five or fewer named U.S. arms sales to Iran as the most important international issue today.

In France, international economic issues are a far greater concern than arms control while in Germany the two issues are of equal concern. In Britain, trade-related issues fall somewhat short of arms control as the most important international issue. (Table 5)

Soviets Maintain Edge in Perception of Arms Control Effort

Pluralities in Britain (39%) and Germany (37%) continue to believe that, by comparison with the U.S., the Soviet Union is "making a greater effort to bring about a nuclear arms control agreement." Only in France, where arms control is a lower priority, does a plurality continue to view the U.S. as making the greater effort.

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British and French Publics Say INF Missiles Should Remain; West Germans Prefer Their Removal

The predominant opinion in Britain and France is that INF missiles should remain in Europe to counterbalance Soviet forces. In West Germany, by contrast, a solid majority says these missiles should be eliminated.

A solid majority (58%) in West Germany believes their Government should rely only on conventional weapons to deter a Soviet attack. (Table 6) In Britain and France, half or more now say that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter an attack, a notable increase since June when a plurality in each country preferred to rely only on conventional forces for their security. In Britain, this shift augurs poorly for public acceptance of the Labour Party's anti-nuclear defense plank.

Attitudes Toward SDI Remain the Same

Little change has occurred in attitudes toward SDI since last November. Prevailing opinion among the British (50%) and West Germans (62%) continues to oppose U.S. SDI research, while the French remain divided (42% to 41%) over the issue. (Table 7)

Majorities in Britain (59%) and Germany (64%) and a plurality in France (44%) also continue to say that the U.S. "should give up SDI if that were necessary to reach any nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union." The number who contend SDI is "too important to give up" remains steady (31% in Britain, 38% in France and 21% in Germany).

Growing Numbers Aware of Soviet Anti-Missile Research

Since November 1986, the number of people who believe the USSR is conducting research on an anti-missile defense system has increased in all three countries. Growing majorities in all three countries are now aware of Soviet research. (Table 8) But these increases have not been accompanied by growing support for U.S. SDI.

Prepared by: Steven K. Smith

M-2/6/87

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director
Office of of Research 485-2965

Table 1. Awareness of U.S. Arms Sales to Iran

"How much have you heard or read about the United States selling arms to Iran -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u> <u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>FRANCE</u> <u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>GERMANY</u> <u>1/87</u> (498)
Great deal	18%	8%	12%
Fair amount	<u>48</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>42</u>
subtotal	<u>66</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>54</u>
Not very much	28	19	39
Nothing at all	<u>5</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>5</u>
subtotal	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>44</u>
Don't Know	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
	100%	100%	100%

Table 2. U.S. Credibility and Iran Arms Sales

"Some people say that U.S. credibility has been damaged as a result of the stories surrounding U.S.-Iranian arms shipments. Others say U.S. credibility has not been damaged. Which view is closer to your own?"^a

	<u>BRITAIN</u> <u>1/87</u> (950)	<u>FRANCE</u> <u>1/87</u> (422)	<u>GERMANY</u> <u>1/87</u> (461)
U.S. credibility damaged	78%	60%	75%
U.S. credibility not damaged	17	23	17
Don't Know	<u>5</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>8</u>
	100%	100%	100%

^aAsked only of those who had heard or read at least something about the issue.

Table 3. Confidence in U.S. Ability

"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

	BRITAIN			FRANCE			GERMANY		
	<u>12/85</u> (504)	<u>6/86</u> (973)	<u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>12/85</u> (500)	<u>6/86</u> (509)	<u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>12/85</u> (510)	<u>6/86</u> (500)	<u>1/87</u> (498)
Great deal	8%	7%	8%	16%	12%	9%	7%	8%	8%
Fair amount	43	28	37	48	38	40	41	20	29
subtotal	<u>51</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>37</u>
Not very much	40	43	41	26	25	32	43	49	45
None at all	8	18	12	6	13	12	7	19	15
subtotal	<u>48</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>60</u>
Don't know	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4. Confidence in Soviet Ability

"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal responsibly with world problems -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?"

	BRITAIN			FRANCE			GERMANY		
	<u>12/85</u> (504)	<u>6/86</u> (973)	<u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>12/85</u> (500)	<u>6/86</u> (509)	<u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>12/85</u> (510)	<u>6/86</u> (500)	<u>1/87</u> (498)
Great deal	3%	5%	5%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Fair amount	32	31	35	28	16	20	23	9	22
subtotal	<u>35</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>24</u>
Not very much	47	41	42	39	30	41	55	50	47
None at all	14	17	13	26	39	30	16	34	23
subtotal	<u>61</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>70</u>
Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 5. Important Issues on the International Scene

"In your opinion, of the following, which is the most important issue on the international scene today: (A) the controversy over U.S. arms sales to Iran; (B) nuclear arms control; or (C) international economic/trade issues?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u> <u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>FRANCE</u> <u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>GERMANY</u> <u>1/87</u> (498)
U.S. arms to Iran	20%	15%	15%
Arms control	40	21	37
Econ/trade issues	33	54	37
Don't Know	<u>7</u> 100%	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>11</u> 100%

Table 6. Necessity of Nuclear Weapons

"Some people say that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a Soviet attack. Others say that we should rely only on conventional weapons for our security. Which view is closer to your own?"^a

	<u>BRITAIN</u>		<u>FRANCE</u>		<u>GERMANY</u>	
	<u>6/86</u> (973)	<u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>6/86</u> (509)	<u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>6/86</u> (500)	<u>1/87</u> (499)
Nuclear weapons necessary	43%	54%	34%	49%	30%	28%
Rely on conven. forces	49	40	40	36	51	58
Don't Know	<u>8</u> 100%	<u>6</u> 100%	<u>26</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>14</u> 100%

^aQuestion wording 6/86: "Some people say that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a Soviet attack. Others say that we should rely only on conventional weapons. Which view is closer to your own?"

Table 7. Continuation of SDI Research

"What is your opinion of the United States continuing this research on anti-missile defenses? Do you favor this research strongly, or favor it somewhat, or do you oppose this research strongly or oppose it somewhat?"

	BRITAIN			FRANCE			GERMANY		
	<u>12/85</u> (504)	<u>11/86</u> (993)	<u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>12/85</u> (500)	<u>11/86</u> (501)	<u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>12/85</u> (510)	<u>11/86</u> (501)	<u>1/87</u> (498)
Favor strongly	18%	20%	18%	25%	7%	8%	10%	9%	8%
Favor somewhat	36	18	22	33	33	34	23	18	20
subtotal	<u>54</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>28</u>
Oppose somewhat	22	15	20	13	26	26	23	20	20
Oppose strongly	16	32	30	13	18	15	25	44	42
subtotal	<u>38</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>62</u>
Don't know	8	15	10	16	16	17	19	9	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table 8. Soviet Anti-Missile Defense Research

"As far as you know, is the Soviet Union conducting research on an anti-missile defense system, or is it not conducting such research?"

	BRITAIN		FRANCE		GERMANY	
	<u>11/86</u> (993)	<u>1/87</u> (1002)	<u>11/86</u> (501)	<u>1/87</u> (509)	<u>11/86</u> (501)	<u>1/87</u> (498)
Conducting res.	46%	52%	52%	66%	46%	59%
Not conducting	12%	10	7%	9	5	6
Don't Know	42	38	41	25	49	35
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

National Security Council
The White House

87 FEB 5

P 7: 28

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Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>Staff</u>
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I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

FRP (Info Only)

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4/27/10*

RECEIVED 06 FEB 87 08

TO CARLUCCI

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 04 FEB 87

KEYWORDS: USIA GREAT BRITAIN
 FRANCE GERMANY F R
 IRAN ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: IRAN AFFAIRS & EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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KRAEMER

HANLEY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1987

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
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CJ

Dear Charlie:

I appreciate your note and the enclosure about Joe Allbritton. (S. 22-11-87)

Sincerely,



Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. Charles Z. Wick

Director

U. S. Information Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director



~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

March 19, 1987

Dear Howard:

Joe Allbritton recently visited Saudia Arabia at the invitation of the Saudi Government. During that visit, he had dinner with our public affairs officer and shared with him his views about The Washington Post's coverage of the Iran arms transfers which are outlined in the enclosed letter. I thought you would be interested in reading his perspective on this issue.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

**United States
Information
Service**

Embassy of the United States of America
P.O. Box 865
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 11421

Tel: 488-3800



March 9, 1987

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
~~OFFICIAL-INFORMAL~~ 4/27/87

Mr. Charles Z. Wick
Director
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Dear Mr. Wick:

Last week I had the pleasure of having dinner with Mr. Joe L. Allbritton who visited Riyadh at the invitation of the Saudi Government. Mr. Albritton was hosted by the Minister of Finance, Muhammad Abalkhail, at the behest of the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar.

During the dinner, Mr. Allbritton made several comments which he indicated he wanted me to pass along to you. They concern the Iran arms transfers and the U.S. Press. It was Mr. Allbritton's very strong feeling that the American press was much at fault for letting the administration continue with the arms transfers as long as it had. Had the U.S. media, and especially the Washington Post, lived up to its responsibilities early in the game, he said, they would have exposed the project before it got so far out of hand, thus saving the administration a major embarrassment. He stressed that the Washington Post had had the story two years ago, and it was their obligation to report what they knew then. But they had passed on it because of a warm personal relationship with the White House and thus eventually hurt the administration and the country far more than would have been the case at the outset.

Earlier in the evening I had mentioned to Mr. Albritton that I worked for USIA, and he brightened considerably, saying that you and he are old friends. After dinner he urged me to be sure to report to you his comment about the Washington Post and the Iran arms transfers. When you next see Mr. Allbritton, please tell him your staff keeps you well informed.

I hope you are well and fit as ever. Warm regards from Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely,

Ellsworth Miller
Country Public Affairs Officer

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

3

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA, CHAIRMAN

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GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

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FG036-10
FG00612
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JAN 27 1987

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 22, 1987

The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

During his January 16, 1987 appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane revealed that, as his brief for his mission to Tehran, he received four pages of instructions, or "terms of reference," from Mr. Poindexter. Mr. McFarlane briefed the Committee on the content of these instructions, as best he could recall.

These instructions appear highly relevant to the Committee's inquiry into the Iran initiative. I therefore request that these instructions be made available to the Committee so as to complete the record of the January 16 hearing.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell
Claiborne Pell
Chairman

NSC 817005-P9

81 JAN 27 6:35
Letter to Carlucci from Senator Pell
requesting Documents re: Iran

87 JAN 27 P 2: 32

RECEIVED 29 JAN 87 11

TO CARLUCCI

FROM PELL, CLAIBORNE

DOCDATE 22 JAN 87

KEYWORDS: ACCESS
CCO

IRAN

MCFARLANE, ROBERT

SUBJECT: LTR TO CARLUCCI FM SEN PELL REQUESTING DOCUMENTS RE IRAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CARLUCCI DUE: 10 FEB 87 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

REGER

PEARSON

OAKLEY

STARK

FORTIER

TAHIR-KHELI

STEIDL

RODMAN

GREEN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

		cc Den McGrath WH Counsel		
		for response 1/30/87		
		Action completed		
	C	2/26/87 NFAR per Reger		

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Quality Operations

1090 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-5800

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September 4, 1986

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F6002-38

Vice Admiral Jon Poindexter
National Security Adviser to
President Reagan
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jon:

Ever since I departed Iran in late February 1979, Iran, its people, and its strategic importance to the United States have been of great concern to me. I have written to both former President Carter, to Secretary of State Shultz, President Reagan, and Cyrus Vance, plus numerous members of the Senate and House, and as yet have not really received an answer that causes me to believe that anyone on the Hill is doing anything of a positive nature to ensure that Iran does not fall into the Soviet camp upon the termination of the Iran-Iraq war. As a fellow Naval officer, I'm writing to you in hopes that you will understand both my concern and the very critical nature of that particular situation.

My first flag duty when I was selected in 1978 was as the Chief Naval Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Iranian Navy. I relieved RADM Robert Connolly who had the job at the time. My reason for selection, I presume, was based primarily on my having introduced the 963-class destroyer to the Pacific Fleet in 1974-76, and I assumed the tie-in was made since Iran had ordered four of the 993-class Kourish-class destroyers and I was a logical choice to ensure that they were ready to receive these very advanced surface ships when they were delivered to Iran.

I worked very closely with the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Habibollahi, and his flag officers and O-6's to ensure that there was an integrated logistics support program ready to support not only the 993-class destroyers but, in addition, the submarines they had purchased from us and the frigates they were negotiating for with the Dutch and Germans. I enjoyed a very close and cooperative relationship with my Iranian peers and would have enjoyed the tour tremendously had not the tragic deposition of the Shah occurred in early 1979.

U.S. - Iranian Relations

NSC 8606586

Vice Admiral Jon Poindexter
Page Two

I was there during a period of time when it appeared that the Persian empire would go on for another 2500 years, a Persian empire that was making vast strides in entering into the 20th century as a result of the Shah's foresight and his desire for his nation. Our lack of support of him in 1978-79, of course, spelled the end of that dream and the beginning of the complete chaotic situation which has prevailed in Iran since the spring of 1979. It is difficult for me to believe that we are now in the eighth year of seeing a nation which had so much potential being reduced to shambles and hopelessness by a bloody, incompetent dictatorial regime, exacerbated by the absolutely pointless struggle going on between Iran and Iraq.

As I said, I've written numerous letters bringing to the attention of our leaders the fact that there are many very fine, intelligent, capable Iranian officers and civilians with excellent credentials in this nation who would be thrilled with the thought of working with our government to come up with a plan for removing Khomeini and rebuilding Iran as our ally in a very troubled portion of the world. Looking back two decades, it is obvious that while the Shah lived, our problems in the Middle East were very minimal. While not loved, the Shah was well respected, and he certainly put his money where his mouth was as far as building a strong nation that militarily influenced that part of the world significantly. Iran was at peace with Iraq at the time, and all of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms were enjoying a period of stability and tranquillity. Since the Shah's departure from the scene, we've seen the advent of terrorism, fostered by Qadhafi and Khomeini principally, which has brought us considerable grief and caused us substantial amounts of money which have produced no guarantee that Americans can travel with any degree of security in that part of the world. Why we have allowed this situation to go on as long as we have is a mystery to me. We certainly took action against Qadhafi recently, and I think the world applauded that very bold and forthright approach. Why have we been so remiss in our intervention in Iran? Iran was our friend, and I believe there still is a substantial percentage of its population which considers America as its friend. A few more years of the Khomeini rule, though, and I doubt that this same situation will prevail. Currently, Iran is in the throes of shortages of everything from food to fighting men, and the war with Iraq continues to grind out its toll on the latter irreplaceable commodity.

I am clearly convinced that Iran is ready for a change, but without some outside assistance, this change will never occur. Khomeini knows full well how to keep control of a nation. While the American press has been very quiet about the executions during the despotic rule of Khomeini -- unlike the press given to the Shah's excesses -- the executions and the repression of human rights continues at a very significant rate under Khomeini.

Vice Admiral Jon Poindexter
Page Three

Is Iran worth anything to us? Is Iraq worth anything to us? And yet, without U.S. intervention, it is my belief that those two nations will remain locked in a death struggle because neither side can afford to either win or lose. To win for either side means they will have to explain to their people why they got into that completely and incredibly stupid war which had absolutely no point to it. To lose, of course, means the end of their tenure.

I believe that with intervention by the United States, we could cause Iraq to withdraw and consider the war a draw, one in which they do not lose face; and I believe that Iran would consider America as a divine intervention which saved their nation at a very critical point in their history.

As I said before, we have a wealth of talent in this town which understands Iranian politics, Iranian military and the need in Iran. Why don't we use them? For instance, Admiral Kamal Habibillahi, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Navy, is here and lives in Fairfax. Admiral Nashollah Movaghari, the former assistant Commander-in-Chief for programs, plans, and personnel, and the last governor of Kuhistan Province in Busher, lives in Falls Church. Admiral Abol Ardalon, who was the president of the Iran Electronic Industries while on active duty with the Navy, lives in Vienna, Va. Dr. Assad Homoyoun, who was the charge' of the embassy here in Washington, lives in Potomac. Admiral Nasser Jahanbani, who was the admiral in charge of all the Iranian Navy training, lives also in Falls Church. In addition, there are a number of captains and other flag officers, both Army and Air Force, who live in the area who would be delighted to meet and give you their opinions on what needs to be done and how it might be best done.

Jon, again I stress I write to you as a fellow Naval officer who is interested in world peace but who is also interested in the humanity of this whole business. The people of Iran are being slowly ground up into small pieces by a despotic regime who makes the Shah look like the Prince of Light by comparison. These people were our friends for at least 50 years prior to the revolution, during which time we had very close relations. We encouraged them to make their big leap into the 20th century, and of course, they certainly did a great deal for our economy in all of the both consumer and military goods*they bought from us for many years. Also, the employment that they gave to our nation with the advisor groups which we sent over represented another significant contribution. And yet, when the Shah needed us, Mr. Carter turned his back on him and let him die a rather pitiful death. Were there excesses during the Shah's regime? No question about it. But, regrettably, show me a country in the world now in which there isn't corruption in high places, and I'll show you a place that does not exist.


Jon, heretofore, my letters to President Reagan and President Carter have been referred to someone in the Pentagon, and normally, I've gotten a

Vice Admiral Jon Poindexter
Page Four

bureaucratic reply which said nothing except "We're aware of the situation." I would really appreciate if this letter gets into your hands and you give it some serious thought and either drop me a note or give me a call. You can reach me at home at 998-5434 or at work, although I'm on the road much of the time now, at 289-5737. I currently am working as Vice President, Quality Operations, for Textron, Inc.

Best wishes to you for success in a job which certainly has a tremendous amount of potential but must be taking its toll on your family life and professional emotions. I'll keep you in my prayers.

Sincerely,



F. C. Collins, Jr.

ADM, USN (Ret)

Vice President, Quality Operations

FCC/mct

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8606586

RECEIVED 12 SEP 86 00

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COLLINS, F C

DOCDATE 04 SEP 86

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS IRAN

MP

SUBJECT LTR TO JMP FM TEXTRON RE US - IRANIAN RELATIONS

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE 20 SEP 86 STATUS S FILED WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TAHIR-KHELI

ROSS

TEICHER

RODMAN

COMMENTS WOULD YOU LIKE A PROPOSED DRAFT REPLY FR STAFF?

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

CHISEL

Name	Date
A. Pridmore	5-4-88

MEMO TO: DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: Pete Roussel

TR

NOTED BY DTR

488455
4620
C0071
F000302
FG001
PU

For your information.

Why Reagan can make it back

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

THE public reaction to the Iran arms controversy has been exceedingly difficult to read. President Reagan's performance rating took a big dip in the polls. And the most troubling finding for a chief executive who hopes to put this all behind him was evidence that a lot of Americans questioned whether Mr. Reagan was telling the truth — or at least the whole truth — about the affair.

But these are only surface readings. There is no vote of non-confidence out there among the people — not yet, at least, and one is not at all likely unless the trail leads to the President himself. Instead, there is a public resistance to losing Reagan as an effective President.

The polls from the beginning have shown this hard-core resistance. One survey showed that 53 percent of the polling sample did not believe Reagan when he denied all knowledge of the diversion of funds to the contra guerrillas and that only 26 percent did believe him. Yet that New York Times/CBS News poll also showed that 59 percent said they still thought that Reagan was more honest and trustworthy than most people in public life.

Then a recent Gallup poll shows that nearly three-fourths of the public still like the President. Thus, his personal popularity remains very high — despite widespread opinion that he has not measured up in all this.

The fact of the matter is that the American people are weary of losing their presidents. They want a successful two-term presidency. After all, they lived through the assassination of John Kennedy, the breakdown of the

Lyndon Johnson administration over Vietnam, the self-destruction of Richard Nixon, and the enfeebling of Jimmy Carter in the Iran hostage situation. Gerald Ford, of course, was an interim President.

Some Democratic leaders sense this public support for Reagan that lies there, still strong, despite the jolt in public confidence in him. Walter Mondale warns against an all-out Democratic attack on Reagan, saying it might well stir up public sympathy for a well-liked President

There is no vote of non-confidence among the people — and one is not likely unless the trail leads to the President himself.

and voter anger against the party in 1988. Democratic Sen. Edward Kennedy echoes this point of view, urging caution in the Democratic criticism of Reagan, lest it be construed as partisan picking on the President.

Pollster Peter Hart, who works mainly with Democrats, says he is convinced that the feeling of warmth for the President, while continuing, has lessened in intensity because of this falloff in confidence.

But the public glow for Reagan, however dimmed, is still there. GOP Sen. Richard Lugar, who says the President needs a thorough staff housecleaning to move forward now with an agenda of strong initiatives, believes that this is a President still able to function effectively. He thinks the questioners are asking the same questions over and over again. He thinks, too, that, barring some

new, highly damaging revelation, the attack on the President is running out of gas. And he sees the continued Reagan personal popularity forming a firm foundation on which the President can build back his ability to lead.

The Gallup poll is worth a second look. It shows that public approval of Reagan as a person outweighs disapproval by a 4-to-1 ratio, with 75 percent offering positive and 18 percent negative appraisals. This personal rating of the President represents only a five-percentage-point decline since mid-September, when 80 percent approved and 12 percent disapproved. At the same time, because of the Iran scandal, Reagan's job-performance rating has dropped from 63 percent approval in a Gallup poll in late October to 47 percent in early December.

Gallup points out that the strength of the President's popularity is attested to by the fact that among people who disapprove of his overall performance in office — 44 percent of the total sample — a 54 percent majority nevertheless approves of Reagan as a person. Among those who give the President a favorable job-performance rating, his personal-approval rating is a virtually unanimous 93 percent.

So we know the President's deep problems — and their potential for total destruction of his administration. And now we know of the counterforce that is working for him and buoying up his presidency during this time of adversity: this continued affection for Reagan the man. There add to that the public resistance to losing once again a President before his term is up.

Reagan is down — but he's not out.

Godfrey Sperling Jr. is the Monitor's senior Washington columnist.

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The Houston Post
Fri., December 26, 1986

TR

NOTED BY DTR

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F0003-02

PLU

News no good if it isn't your position


THE DESK — "Idiot." "Communist." "Fascist." "Running dog of Wall Street." "You have the brains of a retarded spatula." I'd know Mom's handwriting anywhere.

Ah, yes, the morning mail. This is one of the best parts of my job, starting each day with a song. My mail, as opposed to that which is addressed to Sound-Off, usually runs about 90 percent negative. Even the mass mailouts are that way: "Yes, Mr. Occupant, you may already be a loser!" The remaining 10 percent are from TDC inmates, most of whom apparently have lots of time and a typewriter.

The main subject matter in the mail these days is Irangate. No, not so much about what happened as about how it is being reported. People say that they are tired of reading about the scandal. Curiously enough, they never tire of reading about Chappaquiddick, even after more than seven years. We apparently have a lot more readers interested in small bridges than in trading with terrorists.

The other day I received a letter from a reader who wanted to cancel his subscription until The Post stopped running stories on the Iran/Contra matter. One must wonder if on Dec. 8, 1941, he stopped reading the papers until the press got off that World War II muck-raking.

Others object to reading anything at all negative about President Reagan. Here, for example, is a letter from Douglas B. Finch, minister, First Presbyterian Church of Liber-



ty. He objects strenuously to a UPI story we ran, headlined, "24% of Iowans polled say Reagan should quit."

Finch warns first of irate readers, then of disappearing advertisers if we make "an alliance with the crucifiers (Dan Rather, Sam Donaldson, etc.) of the media who are out to get the president." A nice biblical touch from one Presbyterian to another. Even so, remind me to temporarily convert to Zoroastrianism if I'm ever in Liberty on a Sunday morn.

Now, certainly in this part of the nation Reagan remains enormously popular. He won by a landslide in Texas both times he was elected, and would do it again if he ran again. But it speaks poorly of us as a people that we cannot abide any discouraging word about our leaders. Are we so unsure of their abilities and superior smarts that we fear they may topple with the slightest breeze?

I like Ronald Reagan. The Post endorsed him for president and would probably do so

again if he ran again. His programs on defense, taxes, etc., etc., are almost daily supported in the editorials to my right (your left). But come on, folks, let us not be blind to the fact that he really screwed up this time. Be honest. Or, to put it another way, if Jimmy Carter had been found secretly trading with the Ayatollah in flat violation of U.S. policy, what would have been your reaction? In a word: "Impeach!" Of course it would have been. Don't flatter yourself into thinking you are objective and fair. I'm not, either.

However, I do agree with Finch that some members of the press won't give Reagan a break. He mentioned Sam Donaldson, who qualifies. But for me, Chris Wallace jumps to mind. He never has anything even neutral to say about Reagan, always emphasizing the negative. To rework an old story, if Reagan walked on water, Chris Wallace would announce, "Reagan can't swim."

Ah, more mail demanding an end to the news. "Quit writing about it." It is not that they think Reagan is right, it is just that they don't want to read any criticism of him. Oh, well, mail such as this goes with the territory. Besides, I collect stamps. But where, oh where, are all those Democrats who used to scream that we were Republican minions out to get Carter and/or Mondale? Why are they so silent? Why don't they write glowing letters of appreciation? I guess they're talking to their spatulas.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/5/87

MEMO TO:

Don Regan

FROM:

Pete Roussel

Fyi.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1110

00071

FD00302

FL000010

CJ

March 3, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ALISON B. FORTIER *ABF*

**Not Sec Advisor
has seen**

SUBJECT: Hill Meetings

I would like to recommend that you gear your next round of meetings with Members of Congress to the Contra issue. Since the general consensus of legislative affairs offices is that the Administration has a good shot at winning a majority vote in the Senate, it is most important to focus your efforts there.

Senators Kassebaum, Rudman, and Cohen together -- this group forms a phalanx of key moderate Republican supporters. It is important to keep them on board.

Senator Dan Evans: This moderate Republican is going to be central to most Senate votes -- a real opinion leader who carries weight with moderate Democrats as well. He co-sponsored the Dodd bill but has had reservations about the Hill's knocking out the \$40 million.

Senator Frank Murkowski: A Contra aid supporter who needs to be bucked up.

Senator Jay Rockefeller: A moderate Democrat we need to win over on the issue.

These meetings should be scheduled as quickly as your schedule permits.

JS
Jose Sorzano concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to schedule the proposed meetings on the Hill as soon as possible.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

NSC 8-10-87

27.

National Security Council
The White House

System # F

Package # 1462

DOCLOG 27. A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>GG</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>		
Paul Thompson	<u>4</u>		
Frank Carlucci	<u>5</u>	<u>FC</u>	<u>A</u>
Situation Room			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other M.B.

COMMENTS _____ Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

RECEIVED 04 MAR 87 17

TO CARLUCCI

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 04 MAR 87

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: HILL MEETINGS TO SUPPORT CONTRAS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CARLUCCI

COMMENTS

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Carlucci Approved Recon

Chron, ABF

DISPATCH

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FILE

(C)

NY Times
DT Reagan
February 23, 1987

488270

1. Why did you talk the President into changing his testimony? Q0071
2. Did you orchestrate a cover-up attempt in November? Q0114
F000306
FG00601
FG011
3. Can you comment on McFarlane's testimony that he doctored the North chronology to protect the President? FG436
RS
4. Why was the President so obviously unprepared for his November 19 news conference? Wed.
5. Why have you been keeping the President from speaking on the Iran issue?
6. What is the basis of your December testimony that the President approved the September shipment after the fact?
7. Is it true Shultz forced the President to change Casey's intended false testimony?
8. How can you claim, as Chief of Staff, that you did not know what Poindexter and North were up to? Isn't this an admission of incompetence on your part?

Questions re: the
Iran-Contra Issue

9. Fitzwater has said that the Tower Report will be critical of the Iran policy process? This means it will obviously be highly critical of you, as Chief of Staff. Comment?
10. What is your relationship like with the President?
11. How can you reconcile the varying statements on the Iran issue by various Administration officials?
12. It is one thing to have a problem. It is another to mishandle it. Do you believe your critics are correct when they say you have no political understanding of Washington in-fighting?
13. What is the status of your feud with the First Lady? Are you on speaking terms?
14. Are you going to resign?

① → What you / P say to each other

February 23, 1987

1. Why did you talk the President into changing his testimony?
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