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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**Withdrawer**

DLB 4/27/2010

**File Folder** CO071 (IRAN) (473200-475999)

**FOIA**

S10-306

**Box Number** 92

SYSTEMATIC

528

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
90135	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO CHIEF OF STAFF, RE: LETTER FROM IRANIAN <b>R 5/19/2023 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS</b>	1	5/8/1987	B1 B6
90136	LETTER	IRANIAN TO HOWARD BAKER	2	4/21/1987	B6

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 31, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. JOHN REAGAN "TEX" MCCRARY

SUBJECT: MAKES SUGGESTION FOR IRAN CONTRA HANDLING

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ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD		ORG	87/03/31		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
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87/04/01

AB

COMMENTS: TEX, P3

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ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:T INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *                OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE     *C-COMPLETED        *                CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF   *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                *                OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                *                *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                *                *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                *                *
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*Cont. in part*

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PMS PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

PLEASE DRAW ON THAT "STRANGE LAST COURAGE" THAT SUSTAINED LINCOLN AND EISENHOWER AND FAILED JOHNSON AND NIXON. ON WEDNESDAY, DON'T GO OVER THE HEADS OF CONGRESS AND AROUND THE PRESS WITH A TELEPROMPTER. THAT ONLY MAKES EVERYBODY WONDER WHO SCRIPTED YOUR PERFORMANCE. GO DOWN ON THE FLOOR OF CONGRESS WHERE NOBODY WILL CAST THE FIRST STONE. IN THAT ARENA, REPEAT EISENHOWER'S "THE FAULT IS MINE AND MINE ALONE" AND THEN TAKE QUESTIONS AS JERRY FORD DID AFTER HE PARDONED NIXON. ONLY THERE AND THEN CAN THE HEALING BEGIN. SUCCESSION HAUNTS ALL LEADERS. PAUL LAXALT AND HOWARD BAKER HAVE SOLVED SUCCESSION FOR YOU. GET

WELL. BE WINNER AGAIN. COPY TO LAXALT

JOHN REAGAN TEX MCCRARY 385 SOUTHEND AVE GATEWAY 500 NEW YORK NY  
10280

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NEW YORK NY 10280

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W. J. Wickham

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Copy of USIA Foreign Media Analysis with  
Article entitled "West European Press Apprehensive  
that the Iran Affair May Paralyze U.S. Foreign Policy.

# Foreign Media Analysis

United States Information Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

January 21, 1987

## WEST EUROPEAN PRESS APPREHENSIVE THAT THE IRAN AFFAIR MAY PARALYZE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

This analysis is based on USIS reporting of the major West European press, covering November 11, 1986 through January 14, 1987. It reviews 215 editorials, commentaries and news analyses in 81 selected papers of 14 countries.

### The major findings:

1. Almost all papers questioned the ability of a "weakened" President Reagan to maintain strong leadership of both the U.S. and the West. Most were concerned that the Iran affair may paralyze U.S. foreign policy.
2. Despite acknowledging Soviet violations, almost all papers were critical of the U.S. breakout from SALT-II.
3. Almost all papers viewed Reykjavik as a flawed meeting, but hoped for new arms agreements in Geneva.

### SUMMARY:

The West European press expressed growing concern that the Iran/Contra affair may paralyze U.S. foreign policy and shelve chances for arms control. Editorials questioned President Reagan's ability to lead the U.S. as well as NATO.

The papers portrayed a Western Europe insecure and skeptical following Reykjavik and the Iran affair. Several called on Europe to formulate its own foreign and defense policies.

Most papers predicted that the President will grow weaker and the Democratic Congress stronger in determining domestic and foreign policies.

While the Iran affair has overshadowed Reykjavik issues, concerns remain that the Reagan-Gorbachev talks went too far. Most editorials said NATO INF missiles should not be traded away for elimination of SS-20's without cuts in Warsaw Pact conventional forces and negotiations in short-range missiles, especially if all ballistic missiles were eventually to be abolished. SDI was rarely mentioned, but its demise was predicted by some papers. While downplaying Soviet violations, the papers were almost unanimous in criticizing the U.S. SALT-II breakout. They said the new Geneva session could be productive if both sides upon reflection put aside the dreams of a nuclear-free world.

END SUMMARY

## Papers Say Iran Affair May Cause U.S. Foreign Policy Paralysis

West European editorials, across the political spectrum, were concerned that U.S. foreign policy may become paralyzed and the U.S. vulnerable because of the Iran/Contra affair. The papers were especially upset about its effects on NATO, arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations. They said the affair had damaged U.S. policies in the Middle East and Central America. Many analysts also suggested that "the Reagan Revolution" had come to an end and that the Reagan Doctrine of aiding democratic movements around the world had been irreparably damaged.

The leftist press predicted a collapsed presidency, unequal to a newly vigorous Soviet leadership, and an ascendant Democratic Congress wielding stronger influence in foreign policy. The major conservative papers, usually strong supporters of the President, turned sharply critical. West Germany's Frankfurter Allgemeine noted: "It is feared that a President who must save his skin in domestic politics could be paralyzed in foreign policy. [There is] concern about the ability of the leading Western power to take effective action in the coming two years."

Most of the European press called "for an early return to normalcy" in the U.S. because the commentators agreed that a weakened American presidency is not in the interest of the West. The papers called on President Reagan to prove that he is still able to run the country, in order to show that he can be counted on to lead the West.

### "A Presidency In Dire Straits"

From Thanksgiving to Christmas, most papers agreed with Italy's centrist La Stampa that "a presidency begun triumphally seems to have come to dire straits." Some positives emerged during the holiday lull, extended slightly by the President's hospital stay. Commentators saw the White House moving to a counter-offensive. But this perception did not last long. Spain's conservative ABC said typically that "there is open hostility between the White House and Congress, with the Democratic majority firing at him even before his departure from the hospital." France's pro-Socialist Le Matin predicted that, for the next two years, "a large part of U.S. political life will take place in a context of scandal, suspicion, questions and revelations by the press."

### Focus Is On the President Himself

For the first time, a majority of the papers began to question the President's personal ability to govern. Leftist papers were in the forefront of some of the more vitriolic personal attacks. European papers across the political spectrum said

the President's image had seriously deteriorated. They said that suddenly, he lacked self-assurance and appeared withdrawn. They suggested that his age was a factor and his health was in question. Where, they asked, is the triumphant, self-assured Reagan with the smile of the eternal winner?

The papers strongly urged the President to drop what they saw as isolation and aloofness, to speak up and at least admit responsibility for any mistakes. Many blamed him directly for what they termed his apparent lack of knowledge or disinterest in what was going on at the White House. Britain's liberal Guardian said the President engaged "in an ultimate cop-out: no-one was in charge of the clattering train. That is Reagan's fundamental offense." The papers said the only way to resolve the crisis was for the President to take the initiative. But they said it may not happen because of the "President's apathy."

By mid-January, many West European papers ran commentaries contrasting reports of the President's good physical health with uncertainties about his political future. They said the Democrats will keep him under constant pressure.

Most papers held that the President was mistaken in the weapons sale to Iran. They were often appalled by the contradictory statements on the Iran affair, coming out of the White House and Congress, and revealed in the press. But some suggested the affair was a political mistake which can and must be corrected quickly. They said the President must pay the political price and "start being the President again." Many conservative papers hoped President Reagan recovered his authority quickly because the "Europeans are terrified by the confusion and panic" at the top of the U.S. leadership.

#### Admiration For the American Democratic Process

There was widespread admiration in the press for the American checks-and-balances system and the "self-cleansing process."

At the same time, a number of papers said the U.S. public may be getting weary of the "enormous emphasis given the scandal by the U.S. media." Italy's conservative Il Tempo added that it would be a mistake to follow overzealously the criticism expressed by some American newspapers. It said those papers are inspired by domestic factors and anti-Reagan sentiments. It said that to ape such polemics is a dangerous game.

Italy's conservative Il Giornale, after delivering stinging criticism of the Administration policies and the Iran affair, professed admiration and gratitude toward America: "It saved us three times from becoming Hitler's colony, Stalin's colony, and collapse and hunger after the war. If we were able to keep our freedom -- including the freedom to criticize America -- we

owe it to America. We cannot and do not want to forget that. Unfortunately it is America that sometimes forgets its role and forces us to wonder how reliable it is when it uses its marvelous energy against itself in torrents of masochist fury."

#### Papers See Dangers and Opportunities In U.S.-Soviet Relations

Many West European commentators predicted the "dawn of a new international situation," full of dangers as well as opportunities. Some even suggested that the Soviet role in world politics will increase in the future, citing the political crisis in the U.S. as a major reason.

Many papers, across the political spectrum, said the Iran crisis has left a vacuum in international relations, one that Gorbachev is only too eager to fill. They said the Soviets can only rejoice at the impotence of the leader of the West and could make sudden moves for advantage.

At the same time, some independent and centrist papers said the relative silence on the Iran issue, hints for a new summit and the appointment of a new Geneva arms negotiator may mean that Gorbachev still wants to deal with President Reagan. These papers said that Gorbachev had "bet" almost everything on arms control and needs a success to strengthen his world image as well as his power within the Soviet hierarchy.

There were serious notes of caution. Some papers said that Gorbachev may take advantage of the President's domestic problems and issue proposals that would "corner" the U.S. and force the President to act without proper reflection. These papers said the "lighthearted attitude with which the U.S. bargained Western Europe's security at Reykjavik" was a precedent which now forces Europe to view American actions with closer scrutiny. There were also deep concerns that the President might initiate dangerous foreign policy or "Rambo" military moves, especially along the line of Grenada, to try to regain his popularity with the American public. Still other papers suggested that the best tactic for the USSR may now be to wait for an increased U.S. willingness to compromise.

Many European papers also suggested that President Reagan may be more receptive to contacts with Gorbachev and arms control agreements as a way to divert attention from the Iran affair. Italy's centrist Corriere della Sera noted that "the U.S. President needs a positive development on the international scene to regain consensus on the domestic front."

#### Editorials Predict An Inward-Looking U.S. In 1987

Most European papers predicted that the U.S. will be pre-occupied most of 1987 with the Iran/Contra investigation. They

said the President will be weaker and the Congress stronger. The greatest fears expressed by most papers about the new Congress were isolationism and enactment of protectionist trade laws. A few even suggested that health and age may force the President to resign during the year. Some said that despite encouraging signs at the start of the new arms session in Geneva, there may not be a U.S.-Soviet summit or agreements on arms control.

The papers said that 1986 was not a good year for President Reagan, in contrast to his many successes during the first five years. They said the list of disappointments in 1986 was unusually long, producing greater East-West tensions.

Many papers said the President's claim that 1987 may be a good year for U.S.-Soviet relations can only be proven by serious negotiations on arms control. They said both countries must realize that it is the last productive year in which some agreement could be reached before a new paralysis may be created by U.S. Presidential elections.

#### Continued Concerns About Reykjavik Results

As the Iran story grew in scope in mid-November, there was a sharp decline in press emphasis on the Reykjavik meeting and arms control issues in general.

Nevertheless, the European press continued to express grave concern over the outcome of U.S.-Soviet arms discussions in Reykjavik. Britain's conservative Daily Telegraph was typical: "Were the U.S. less preoccupied with [the Iran affair], there would be searching inquiries on the implications of Reykjavik. This took place without an agenda, without reference to allies, and came dangerously close to a result which would have sown confusion in the West." The papers said that while Western Europe wants arms control, the talks at Reykjavik went too far too fast, potentially leading to a defenseless Western Europe.

By early January, however, some papers suggested that a review of Reykjavik by both sides may "set the arms control talks on a more realistic and productive course after the heady dreams of a nuclear-free world."

A commentator in Britain's independent Financial Times said that "the Reykjavik meeting remains a puzzling vortex of ambiguity. How would you verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons? Any fool knows that the two superpowers would not in practice sign such an agreement. However, it is hard to imagine that the two men were playing an empty game. So my hunch is that the talk of total nuclear disarmament was a metaphorical negotiation to explore the

possibility of a radical transformation of superpower relations, starting with an effective renunciation of the nuclear threat."

#### Large Missile Reductions Evoke Concern

The papers said that as long as a broad range of political, military, economic and ideological differences exist between East and West, NATO should retain some INF forces. They said "the U.S. must accept the premise" that nuclear retaliatory forces should not be cut as long as NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force imbalances remain and the Soviets enjoy a monopoly on short-range nuclear missiles. Most papers argued that the proposed removal of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe would be dangerous if all ballistic missiles were eventually abolished. They said the existence of nuclear weapons has been the primary reason why there has been no direct U.S.-Soviet war.

The European papers generally endorsed the proposal to cut ICBM's and SLBM's by 50 percent over the next five years. Editorial concerns were somewhat alleviated after British Prime Minister Thatcher received assurances from President Reagan that the strategy of deterrence would not be abandoned.

#### Concerned About U.S. Reliability, Europeans Stress Own Role

Despite U.S. assurances, West European editorials continued to express widespread concern that both Washington and Moscow were intent on making unilateral decisions without consulting the Europeans. Most of the liberal suspicion and conservative criticism were directed at the U.S. for failing in the past to seek the views of its European allies. Many papers, across the political spectrum, said that at stake is the reliability of the United States as a partner of Western Europe.

Some papers, led by France's conservative Figaro, said the time has come for Europe to adopt a common position and decide on its own defense policies. The paper added that "Western Europe and especially France must assume new responsibilities because of the feeling that the White House leader is not holding the helm firmly for the Western world." The papers also said that Europe needs to act because "it is afraid of becoming a puppet in the hands of the superpowers."

#### While Downplaying Soviet Violations, Papers Criticize the U.S. SALT II Breakout

West European papers, across the political spectrum, were almost unanimous in criticizing the U.S. deployment of the 131st B-52 bomber carrying cruise missiles. Many editorials

suggested that the Administration, engulfed in the Iran arms affair, broke with SALT-II in a calculated gesture of defiance toward its domestic critics and the Kremlin. They said a more flexible President would have delayed such provocative action.

Several editorials listed Soviet violations or exploitation of treaty loopholes. They said that no one denies the shortcomings of SALT-II and its violations by Moscow. But the papers held that there is general agreement that SALT and ABM are the only existing tools for arms control.

Many papers said the U.S. should have honored the SALT-II agreement despite Soviet violations. West Germany's independent General-Anzeiger was typical: "Regardless of the correctness of complaints about Soviet treaty violations, it would have been possible to live with this problem for awhile." Only the conservative Times of London said the U.S. move "had not made Armageddon seem much more imminent. The SALT treaties have served their purpose. It is now time for something better."

The papers said the Soviets will be sure to exploit the U.S. breakout in an attempt to generate doubt in Western Europe about the reliability and consistency of U.S. foreign and security policies. Most held that the U.S. had made an unnecessary move that will increase East-West tensions.

#### Papers Skeptical Despite NATO Show of Unity

Many European editorials remained skeptical about U.S. policies even after the NATO ministers in mid-December declared strong unity with and support for the U.S. on defense and arms control issues. They said that despite U.S. assurances of continued commitments to NATO, many issues remained unresolved.

Italy's centrist La Stampa said the European allies gave their support to U.S. policies in a "discordant choir of voices that showed doubts and uncertainty." Many papers said the ministers ignored all differences in public because, in the face of Soviet challenges, it was more important to show unity and support for a U.S. "shaken with scandal." However, some papers agreed that the NATO meetings helped the Alliance "to digest the Reykjavik shock."

#### SDI Rarely Mentioned

References in the West European press to the Strategic Defense Initiative were relatively rare during the period under review, compared to widespread commentary earlier in the year.

Leftist papers generally predicted SDI's demise because of a possible lack of support by the new Democratic Congress and "the waning zeal of the weakened Reagan Presidency." The award of some SDI contracts received only passing mention. In West Germany, some leftist papers demanded that any SDI contracts be rescinded.

Several papers hoped that the Soviets would stop linking all arms proposals to the confinement of SDI research to the laboratory. A few conservative and independent papers especially urged the Soviets "to delink the INF issue from its SDI demands and not to increase its lead in short range missiles."

#### No Major Reaction To Gorbachev's Threat To Renew Nuclear Tests

Beyond straight news reports, comments on Gorbachev's announced intention to renew nuclear tests [along with the first U.S. test in 1987] were rare. Only Britain's liberal Guardian suggested that "the onus is on the U.S. to make clear the grounds for its opposition to a comprehensive test ban."

PRESS SOURCES

Independent

AUSTRIA	<u>Die Presse</u>
BELGIUM	<u>Le Soir</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Financial Times</u>
FINLAND	<u>Helsingin Sanomat; Hufvudstadsbladet</u>
FRANCE	<u>France-Soir</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>NRC Handelsblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Dagbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>Diario de Noticias; Tempo</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Expressen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>La Suisse; Le Matin</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>General-Anzeiger; Westdeutsche Allgemeine; Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger; Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin)</u>

Centrist

BRITAIN	<u>Independent; Observer</u>
FINLAND	<u>Suomenmaa</u>
ITALY	<u>Corriere della Sera; La Stampa; Stampa Sera</u>
SPAIN	<u>La Vanguardia</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tribune de Geneve</u>

Conservative/Rightist

BELGIUM	<u>Gazet van Antwerpen; La Libre Belgique</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Times; Sunday Times; Daily Telegraph</u>
DENMARK	<u>Berlingske Tidende; Jyllands-Posten</u>
FRANCE	<u>Figaro; Quotidien; Les Echos; Le Parisien</u>
ITALY	<u>Il Giornale; Il Tempo; Il Sole-24 Ore</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Telegraaf; Algemeen Dagblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Aftenposten; Verdens Gang; Vaart Land</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>O Dia</u>
SPAIN	<u>ABC</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Svenska Dagbladet</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Neue Zuercher Zeitung; Journal de Geneve</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Welt; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Berliner Morgenpost</u>

Liberal/Leftist

AUSTRIA	<u>Kronen-Zeitung; Neue Arbeiter Zeitung</u>
BELGIUM	<u>De Morgen; De Standaard; La Wallonie</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Guardian</u>
DENMARK	<u>Information; Politiken; Aktuelt</u>
FRANCE	<u>Le Monde; Liberation; Le Matin</u>
ITALY	<u>La Repubblica; Avanti; Il Messaggero</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Volkskrant; Trouw</u>
NORWAY	<u>Arbeiderbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>A Capital; Diario Popular</u>
SPAIN	<u>El Pais; El Dia</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Dagens Nyheter; Aftonbladet</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tages-Anzeiger</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Zeit; Frankfurter Rundschau; Stuttgarter Zeitung; Sueddeutsche Zeitung</u>

q/ Pat - -

F.Y.I.

*[Handwritten signature]*

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Hyde, Cong. Henry

Copy of Article "Hyde seeks truth on Iran but not  
"to Club Reagan" "

# Hyde seeks truth on Iran but not 'to club Reagan'

By Jerome R. Watson  
Chief, Washington Bureau  
Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON—Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), one of President Reagan's strongest supporters on the House committee that will investigate the Iran-contra affair, says he is determined to "get at the truth" even if it hurts the administration.

But Hyde, a respected practitioner of the art of combative oratory, also is signaling partisan Democrats that he is prepared to fight any efforts to use the congressional investigations as a club to wreck the Reagan administration.

The Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran is expected to begin hearings in February, but its inquiry and a parallel one in the Senate could drag on for months.

In an interview in his office, which is decorated with photos of himself and the president, Hyde said, "You cannot absolve Reagan of responsibility. If he's going to take credit for salutary developments, he must take responsibility for failures [of policy]."

Hyde, a Chicago native whose 6th Congressional District covers parts of Du Page and northwest Cook counties, questioned the competence of Reagan's second-term staff, and said he wants to find out whether the president was bluntly warned that if he sold arms to Iran and it was discovered, Congress would explode in anger.

Hyde distanced himself from White House Communications Director Patrick J. Buchanan's fierce defense of Reagan and his attacks on critics.

"In Congress, we have a different constituency than Pat does," Hyde said. "The voters don't expect us to

engage in blind partisanship."

At the same time, Hyde maintained that some Democrats never concede that Reagan does anything right. Their goal, he said, is "to attack and delegitimize Reagan's Central America policy and to destroy the contras. If the hearings become a forum for attacking the [Central America] policy, I'll defend it."

Hyde said Reagan's actions have to be kept in context. He said former President Jimmy Carter in October, 1980, offered Iran money and airplane parts to release U.S. hostages then being held in Tehran, and he noted past Israeli arms deals with the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Although Hyde said the Iran policy was mistaken, he expressed sympathy for Reagan's action.

"Unless you've sat with hostage families and been accused of doing nothing, and ached with them, it's very easy to be detached," he said. "But you can't sit with people and say, 'Your flesh and blood isn't as important as a policy [of not dealing with terrorists].'"

Hyde said he could understand how Reagan might have been susceptible to the suggestion that "just one little shipment of arms" might result in freeing the hostages.

Hyde said that, like Democrats on the panel, he wants to know whether Reagan broke any laws; whether funds were diverted to the contras; how Reagan's Iran policy evolved, whether it was wise, and whether it was professionally carried out; details of Reagan's role in the affair and whether he was privy to key details, and exactly where funds from the arms sales went.

A lawyer and contra supporter, Hyde said he saw "no justification" for diverting arms sale profits to the rebels, in violation of law.

He said the Boland amendment barring U.S. military aid to the contras (which is no longer in effect) "was an ill-advised law and a monument to Congress's inability to make foreign policy ... but nonetheless the law."

Hyde said he is convinced at this point that Reagan did not lie when he said he knew nothing about the contra aid scheme.



Henry J. Hyde



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



December 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ALTON KEEL  
ACTING ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: PETER J. WALLISON   
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

As we discussed yesterday, I have asked Dean McGrath of my staff to coordinate legal advice and other questions relating to the on-going inquiries by the Special Review Board, by the Justice Department or Independent Counsel, and by Congressional committees with respect to NSC matters and personnel.

Please advise the staff of the National Security Council of this arrangement. Dean's extension is 6257.

NSC # 8608633

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

FOR: ROD MCDANIEL

FROM: Wilma Hall

Dr. Keel has scanned the  
attached and asked me to pass  
on to you for action.

*Stall*  
~~THOMPSON~~  
Action THOMPSON  
FBI: RSM  
WRP  
REIGER  
PENNY

*Have just cy in Paul Thompson's  
in box*

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

05 DEC 5 P 6: 17

**URGENT**

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 8633

ACTION OFFICER: THOMPSON DUE: 8 DEC

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / <b>Keel</b> | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____                                   | to _____  |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\* PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 2562

- | FYI                                    | FYI   | FYI                                  |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks        | <input type="checkbox"/> Lavin  | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns         | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard  | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major  | <input type="checkbox"/> Small       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock  | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> May  | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle   | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> Morton   | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar        | <input type="checkbox"/> Murdock  | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> North  | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry  | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly         | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt  | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell       | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi   | <input type="checkbox"/> _____       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond  | <input type="checkbox"/> _____       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____       |

- |             |   |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|---|
| INFORMATION | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> McDaniel  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
|             | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman               | <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell            | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |
|             | <input type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Keel (advance)     | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |

COMMENTS

RECEIVED 05 DEC 86 18

TO KEEL FROM WALLISON, P

DOCDATE 05 DEC 86

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS: NSC SYSTEM LEGAL ISSUES MCGRATH, D

SUBJECT: APPT OF MCGRARH TO COORDINATE LEGAL LEGAL ADVICE & QUESTIONS RE INQUIRIES

=====

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR KEEL DUE: 08 DEC 86 STATUS X FILES WH

=====

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
THOMPSON		REGER
		MCDANIEL
		PEARSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( JF )

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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	C 213	OBE / ONR		
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DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE        *Et.*

4

SUSPENSE

\*GAO

United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

473379  
1140  
CC071  
8537  
FG045  
FG006-12

National Security and  
International Affairs Division

DEC 1 1988

Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Bldg.  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. McDaniel:


We have been requested by the House Foreign Affairs Committee to review the recently disclosed transfer of arms to Iran and the disposition of the funds resulting from these sales. The committee has asked that our review be of a continuing nature in conjunction with its investigation. We will begin this review immediately under assignment code 463751 to assist them in a series of upcoming oversight hearings, and continue our work in accordance with their needs.

The work will be conducted in Washington, D.C. and at various sites in the United States and overseas.

Mr. Stewart Tomlinson, Group Director, and Mr. Alan Bennett, Evaluator-in-Charge, of the National Security and International Affairs Division's Security and International Relations Group will be responsible for this assignment. They will contact your designated representative to discuss their needs further as the scope of this review is developed. In the meantime, if you have further questions, they can be reached on 695-1713.

We have also notified other U.S. government agencies and departments of this review. Your assistance in making the necessary information available to complete this assignment will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

  
Joan M. McCabe  
Associate Director

NSC # 8608537

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 DEC 1 P 7: 28

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

8537

ACTION OFFICER: THOMPSON DUE: 4 DEC

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President         | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____                 | to _____  |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. X2562

- | FYI                                    | FYI                                       | FYI   |
|--|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks        | <input type="checkbox"/> Lavin            | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sable           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns         | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine           | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard          | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley           | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major            | <input type="checkbox"/> Small                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel           | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock          | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> May              | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle           | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> Morton           | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar        | <input type="checkbox"/> Murdock          | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> North            | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry            | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly         | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt            | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell       | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>YAN ERON</u> |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond          | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                      |

- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| INFORMATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> McDaniel | <input type="checkbox"/> Pearson                   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman                          | <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell                   | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance)            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Keel (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |

COMMENTS

\*\*\* APPROPRIATE ACTION \*\*\*

Return to Secretariat

RECEIVED 01 DEC 86 20

TO THOMPSON

FROM MCCABE, J

DOCDATE 01 DEC 86

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF NSC RECORDS RE TRANSFER ARMS TO IRAN

\*\*\*\*\*

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE: 04 DEC 86 STATUS S FILES WH

\*\*\*\*\*

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

THOMPSON

REGER

SABLE

VAN ERON

MCDANIEL

COMMENTS

REF# 463751

LOG

NSCIFID

( CF )

\*\*\*\*\*

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	2/13	OBE/ONR		

*C 2/13 OBE/ONR*

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_

*7*  
(C)

3

SUSPENSE

ID # 473413

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

*00071*

*fyt*

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 87103130

Name of Correspondent: Kader Moghadm

*CS* MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Drau

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CSBARI</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>87103130</u>		<u>C 87103130</u>
<u>TISCARL</u>	A	<u>87103130</u>		<u>C 87103130 AB</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

*Book retained by srcks*

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

87 MAR 31 P 2: 30

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: \_\_\_\_\_ Individual Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

**CPn - Presidential Correspondence**

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

**CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

**CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**

- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

C.F. 90135  
3431

474524  
3500  
C0071

WVS

May 8, 1987

FG100612

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM:

FRANK C. CARLUCCI *cc*

SUBJECT:

Letter from Nader Moghadam

Moghadam is the son of the former chief of SAVAK, who was executed shortly after the Iranian Revolution. He has also written to me, enclosing the same study that he sent to you. Bob Oakley of the NSC staff has met with Moghadam on my behalf. I do not believe that you need to respond to his letter.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Nader Moghadam

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC/state. Waivers  
BY de NARA DATE 5/19/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC#8709431

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

*Withdrawer*

DLB 4/27/2010

*File Folder*

CO071 (IRAN) (473200-475999)

*FOIA*

S10-306  
SYSTEMATIC

*Box Number*

92

528

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
90136	LETTER  IRANIAN TO HOWARD BAKER	2	4/21/1987	B6

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 7, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 8, 2001  
BY NARA *ab* 4/18/10

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: Letter to Howard Baker from  
Nader Moghadam

Moghadam, who wrote to you earlier this year, has now written along the same lines to Howard Baker. I do not believe a response to the letter to Baker is necessary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the Chief of Staff.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*WA*

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Baker
- Tab A Letter from Moghadam to Baker

National Security Council  
The White House

*JM*

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # 3431

DOCLOG: JM A/O \_\_\_\_\_

87 MAY 7 09 PG: 19

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson

1

P

A

Marybel Batjer

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Grant Green

2

EA

\_\_\_\_\_

Colin Powell

3

EA

A

Paul Thompson

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Frank Carlucci

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Grant Green

\_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_

NSC Secretariat

4

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D

NSC Secretariat

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Situation Room

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I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Baker Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

3431

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1987

**TO:** NSC Staff

**FROM: HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.**  
**CHIEF OF STAFF**

The attached letter came to me at my home. I do not know this individual, and if you believe it warrants a response, a general one is fine.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8703431

RECEIVED 06 MAY 87 08

TO BAKER, H

FROM MOGHADAM, NADER

DOCDATE 21 APR 87

BAKER, H

05 MAY 87

OAKLEY

07 MAY 87

KEYWORDS: IRAN

SUBJECT: LTR TO CHIEF OF STAFF FM MOGHADAM / PRIVATE CITIZEN / RE IRAN

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE: STATUS X FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

OAKLEY

BURNS

TAHIR-KHELI

PUGLIARESI

ROSS

ROSTOW

PEARSON

GREEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( AK *DL* )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 5/9*

*Power sqd memo*

*RBO*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *WH* (C) *DL*





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0071

5250

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1987 JUL 13 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI   
SUBJECT: Letter to the UN Secretary General

Issue

To sign letter to UN Secretary General emphasizing your commitment to prompt, effective UN action to end Iran-Iraq war.

Facts

The State Department has recommended and we agree that a letter from you to United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar would be an important contribution to our strategy for diplomatic action to reduce tensions in the Gulf and eventually end the Iran-Iraq war.

Discussion

The most recent reports from our Mission to the United Nations and Ambassador Walters indicate that the first resolution will be adopted unanimously, probably on July 15. The next step, if momentum is to be maintained, will be a mission by Perez de Cuellar to try and persuade Iraq and Iran to accept the resolution, as well as take interim steps to reduce tensions. In a meeting with him last week, he had some reservations about such a mission. Your letter would encourage him to undertake it.

Recommendation

OK                      No                      That you sign the letter to the UN Secretary General at Tab A.  
\_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_

cc Vice President  
Chief of Staff

1222122  
1222122

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1954

MEXICO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Mr. C. CARLUCCI

SUBJECT: Letter to the UN Secretary General

Issue

To sign letter to UN Secretary General endorsing your commitment to prompt withdrawal UN action to end Korean war.

Facts

The State Department has recommended and we agree that a letter from you to United Nations Secretary General Hauer de Guelian would be an important contribution to our strategy for diplomatic action to reduce tensions in the East and eventually end the Korean war.

Discussion

The most recent reports from our Mission to the United Nations and Ambassador's letter indicate that the latest resolution will be adopted unanimously probably on July 14. The next step, if momentum is to be maintained, will be a motion by Hauer de Guelian to try and persuade Iraq and Iran to accept the resolution, as well as take interim steps to reduce tensions. In a meeting with him last week, he had some reservations about such a motion. Your letter would encourage him to undertake it.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to the UN Secretary General at 12:45.

123574

Chief of Staff  
Vice President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

The UN Security Council is about to take a momentous and unprecedented step toward putting an end to the tragic and senseless eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq. Adoption of a resolution mandating an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces is a monumental achievement. We are confident it will be adopted unanimously, judging from Ambassador Walters' reports of his talks in Moscow and Beijing. By this action, the United Nations is living up to the highest purposes set for it by its founders so many years ago. I wish to convey personally to you my support, and that of all Americans, for this resolution.

At the same time, we must all recognize that adoption of a mandatory resolution is only the first step. Without effective implementation and, if necessary, enforcement, this historic decision of the Security Council would be rendered meaningless. Failure to follow through would damage the credibility of the Security Council and the United Nations itself, and thus would set back, rather than further, efforts to bring peace to this vital region of the world.

Much of the responsibility for implementation, including persuading the two parties to accept the resolution, will fall upon your shoulders. The task is formidable, but I do not know anyone to whom it could be better entrusted. Over the years, the United States has fully supported your mediation efforts in this war. I can assure you that our support, including my personal help where needed, will be even greater in the crucial weeks ahead. Moreover the support of the

Security Council as a whole also appears significantly greater. This should create more favorable circumstances than ever before for a positive result from your efforts, and an end to the conflict.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Secretary General of the United Nations  
New York





# MEMO

DATE: April 6, 2010  
FROM: Diane Barrie  
RE: OA 14187  
TO: File

The material described in case file 475533, OA 14187 are the staff and office files for the David Abshire collection within the White House Counsel's office.

Ronald Reagan Library & Museum  
40 Presidential Drive – Simi Valley, CA 93065  
800 – 410-8354

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR A.B. CULVAHOUSE  
BIFF HENLEY ✓

FROM: DAVID M. ABSHIRE, SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

As part of the process of closing up shop as of today, I have enclosed for your records copies of the list of files we have transferred to White House Counsel, the list we have transferred to White House Records Management, and the memorandum transferred our Codeword document file (consisting of only one document) to Bill Lytton.

Enclosures: As stated.

475533

W/S

C0071

C0114

F0003-02  
WH004

*David*

ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIZE ATTACHMENTS 14187

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1987

*Comments:*  
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

IRAN-CONTRA

FILES TRANSFERRED TO THE OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

Chron-Incoming  
Chron - Outgoing  
Clearance Sheets  
9:15 Briefing Summaries  
Cabinet Council Meetings  
Congressional - General  
Congressional - letters  
Congressional Meetings  
General Counsels Coordinating Group  
General Counsels Coordinating Group - Secretary's working file  
General Counsels Coordinating Group - DoD  
General Counsels Coordinating Group - Justice  
General Counsels Coordinating Group - State  
Independent Counsel  
Iran - General  
Iran - Radicals & Moderates  
Iran - House  
Iran-House Committee Documents Produced  
Iran - Senate  
Maintenance  
MemCons  
Memos for the File & Record  
National Security Council  
Organization File  
Outside Letters  
President's Intelligence Oversight Board  
Presidential Notes  
Press Guidance  
Press Releases  
Project Democracy  
Questions & Answers  
Receipts  
Security  
Strategy  
Talking points  
Testimony  
Tower Board

FILES IN CABINET MARKED "Judge Brower"

Chron File - Incoming  
Chron File - Interoffice  
Chron File - Outgoing  
Abshire "Charter" and Related CNB NOTES  
Administrative File  
5th Amendment Privileges  
Fact Sheets  
Game Plan  
General Counsel's Coordinating Group  
House Select Committee  
House Select Committee  
House and Senate Select Committee Bios  
House Select Committee Document Request  
House and Senate Select Committee Resolution and Rules  
Independent Counsel  
McFarlane, Robert C.  
Miscellaneous Bio, Info  
National Security Council  
Newspaper Clips, Media Rpts., etc.  
LTC O. North - Memorandum Re: Counsel  
President's Intelligence Oversight Board  
Presidential Notes  
President's Press Conference Preparation  
Presidential Strategy  
"PROF" Notes  
3/4//87 - Ronald Reagan Speech  
Security Clearance Procedures Congress  
Senate Select Committee  
Swiss Bank Problem  
Swiss Bank Accounts-Briefing book Record Access  
Senate and House Intelligence Committees  
Tower Board  
Tower Board - Meeting with the President  
Travel Folder  
Time and Attendance - Brower  
Various Legal Memoranda

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1987

*Comment:*

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

IRAN-CONTRA-FILES

TRANSFERRED TO WHITE HOUSE RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Administration  
Chron-Interoffice  
Pageboys  
Personnel Staff Files  
Personnel  
Security  
Talking Points


THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

April 6, 1987


I certify that the following documents were retired from the Office of the Special Counsellor to the President (David M. Abshire) and turned over to the White House Counsel Legal Task Force on Monday, 6 April 1987.

ER TS-0235/86, Ser B, Cy 7 (TS/V)

  
Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick

  
Linda S. Green

Received of:

  
Bill Eytton

cc: Brian Merchant  
Security Officer  
Room 300, O/EOB

cc: A. B. Culvahouse

Attachment:  
List of Documents/Files



1639

# Board of Supervisors County of Los Angeles

475611  
2300  
0071



CJ

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

PU

February 25, 1987

FEB 27 1987

LG Lewa  
FG 006-12

Mr. Frank Carlucci  
National Security Advisor  
White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

I enclose an article from the January 30 issue of National Review. If the information in this article is correct, it will cast the Iranian arms controversy in an entirely different light.

I would appreciate your comments.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH  
Chairman of the Board  
Supervisor, Fifth District

MDA:bn

Enclosure

NSC # 8701639

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## NOTES & ASIDES

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□ Memo to our readers:

The article in this issue by Mr. Neil Livingstone is very hot stuff, if its revelations are correct.

Efforts to confirm Mr. Livingstone's story were, under the circumstances, impossible. Colonel North's lawyers would not even agree to ask their client to confirm or deny that he had breakfasted with Mr. Livingstone on November 14, the day after President Reagan's first televised speech on the Iran affair. Needless to say, they would hardly have agreed to permit Colonel North to tell us whether indeed he gave Mr. Livingstone the account we publish here.

What are we left to go on?

The author is an acquaintance of the publisher of *NR* and has been for a number of years. He is an accredited expert on arms control, and has held and continues to hold responsible positions. In short, we trust him to have written down what he heard.

There is left the possibility that Colonel North was having his breakfast guest on: that Ollie North was romancing, dealing in surrealisms, testing hypotheses. And then of course there is the possibility that he was describing a situation he actually experienced, in which case the least implication of this story will be a Pulitzer Prize for Livingstone and *NR*. —WFB

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## What Ollie North Told Me Before He Took the Fifth

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NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE

**O**N FRIDAY, November 14, 1986—the morning after President Reagan's first speech on the Iran affair—I had breakfast with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver "Ollie" North at the Hay-Adams Hotel. I did not realize at the time that the issue would soon be approaching the status of a national scandal. But this was before the disclosure by Attorney General Meese that some of the profits from the Iran arms transaction had been diverted to the Contras fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

As a writer on terrorism and commentator for six years on the Reagan Administration's anti-terrorism policies, my breakfast was part of a regular ritual of meetings with senior Administration officials to get their perspectives on current developments and policies. My most recent book on terrorism, edited with Terrell Arnold, had carried an introduction by then National Security Advisor Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane.

As I told Colonel North, I was extremely disturbed by reports of an arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, long one of the chief terrorism-sponsoring states. In response to my concerns, Ollie walked me through the chain of events that led to the secret diplomacy with Iran. I was also shown copies of documents from the speaker of the Ira-

nian parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, purportedly delivered to President Reagan only the day before.

Because much of North's story is based on events and intelligence reports that I cannot independently verify, I can only report it as it was told to me. However, if true, his account provides a unique insight into the Administration's decisions with respect to Iran. In my judgment, nothing less than the potentially catastrophic confluence of events depicted to me would have compelled such hard-line anti-terrorists as John Poindexter, Bud McFarlane, and Ollie North to mute their long-standing hostility toward Iran for a risky alliance with so-called "moderate" Iranian leaders. What follows is, I believe, the true story behind the secret diplomacy with Iran, as told to me by Ollie North.

**F**OR THE PAST year and a half there has been a good deal of reportage in the West suggesting that Iran was on the verge of undertaking a "final offensive" against Iraq. The Iranians were prepared to throw everything they had at the Iraqis, confident that Saddam Hussein's armies would crumble under the assault. Not only did some Iranian military commanders suffer from an excess of religious zeal and a corresponding lack of appreciation of military realities, but it appears the Soviet Union influenced Iranian perceptions, leading Teheran to overestimate its own strength and underestimate that of the Iraqis. Far from being on the ropes, the Iraqis, who had been trading territory for staggering Iranian casualties for some time, had massive armor and aircraft reserves waiting to engage the Iranians once they had been drawn into the trap. Moreover, the Iraqis were prepared to make extensive use of chemical agents against the ill-equipped Iranians, who had, at best, one antiquated respirator for every dozen soldiers.

The Soviet plan for the Iranians was a replay of the Russian army's disastrous Tannenberg campaign during the First World War, in which the Russians undertook a "final offensive" to knock Germany out of the war. Instead, the Russians saw their own forces shattered in the ensuing debacle, with losses running ten times those of Germany. The Russians never recovered from the Tannenberg disaster; the seeds of the collapse of the Czar and the rise of the Bolsheviks were sown on the plains of East Prussia.

The Soviets had made extensive preparations to capitalize on the anticipated Iranian disaster, knowing that the Iraqis would be too weak to follow up their victory by driving into Iran. Soviet troops were massed near the border, in what U.S. intelligence at first mistakenly regarded as maneuvers associated with Afghanistan. This concentration of troops was coordinated with the insertion of Spetsnaz (special operations) forces into Iran and the intro-

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*Mr. Livingstone, president of the Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict, and adjunct professor at Georgetown University's National Security Studies Program, is an international consultant on terrorism and national-security affairs. He has published numerous articles and monographs on terrorism and foreign policy and two books: The War against Terrorism and Fighting Back: Winning the War against Terrorism (with Terrell Arnold). His forthcoming book (with Dr. Joseph D. Douglas) is titled America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare.*

duction of as many as six hundred KGB operatives into Teheran.

Once the Iranian military was destroyed and the Revolutionary Guards were drawn out of Teheran, Moscow's Iranian allies would seize the government and, as in Afghanistan, request Soviet assistance to protect them from "imminent" Iraqi invasion. In the event the Soviet-backed proxies in Teheran failed, an alternative plan called for a Soviet-sponsored revolt in Azerbaijan, which would immediately call for recognition by and assistance from Moscow.

The key to the Soviet plan was Moscow's absolute belief that the U.S. was so estranged from Iran that it could not counter the Soviet gambit: There would be virtually no popular support in the United States for fighting the USSR over Iran, even if the U.S. had sufficient assets in the region—which it did not—to check the Soviet advance. The Soviet strategy was bold and, if successful, would have permanently altered the map of the world as Moscow extended its influence to the Persian Gulf, realizing a centuries-old dream.

What happened to stop the Russians? A number of American allies—Turkey, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel—had intimations of the unfolding catastrophe. One by one they undertook secret missions to the United States to plead with the Reagan Administration to do something. At first, Administration decision-makers were reluctant to get involved, both because U.S. intelligence did not initially confirm the gravity of the situation, and because the U.S. had little, if any, influence in Iran that could be brought to bear on the situation. But as Administration officials recognized the seriousness of the potential threat, they decided to make direct contact with one of the "moderate," or more correctly "pragmatic," factions in the Iranian government. U.S. intelligence estimates of the disaster that would befall Iran on the battlefield if it undertook its "final offensive" were given to the Iranians, predicting forty to fifty thousand dead and as many as a quarter of a million wounded. Additional intelligence on Soviet preparations to seize the government resulted in arrests and internal shifts of power that benefited the pragmatists.

**A**S THE RELATIONSHIP with Iranian pragmatists led by Rafsanjani developed, the U.S., acting in concert with Israel, transferred military hardware and spare parts to the Iranians, both as an expression of good will and to buttress Iran's sagging military might. Many of the TOW missiles, in fact, were positioned on the Soviet border, not deployed against Iraq. U.S.-Iran contacts continued, and the "final offensive" was indefinitely postponed as the pragmatists consolidated power, waiting only for the Ayatollah's demise before taking control of the government and purging his hand-picked successor, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. During this period the pragmatists assisted the U.S. in pre-empting a number of terrorist attacks supported by Iranian hard-liners and were instrumental in the resolution of the TWA flight 847 hijacking. Rafsanjani personally intervened to secure the freedom of the last four hostages from the TWA flight.

Both sides perceived the issue of American hostages being held in Lebanon by Shiite extremists as a potentially  
*(Continues on page 67)*

## LIVINGSTONE

(Continued from page 38)

troublesome matter in the event the emerging U.S.-Iran dialogue became public knowledge. Accordingly, Rafsanjani and his allies in Teheran applied sufficient pressure to achieve the release of three hostages, despite efforts by hard-liners to prevent it. In desperation, the hard-liners ordered three additional hostages to be seized this past September and October, in hopes of derailing the emerging relationship. Thus, the hostage issue became merged with the secret diplomacy with Iran. However, far from constituting ransom to achieve the freedom of the American hostages, the military goods provided Iran were part of a rapprochement process designed to deliver Iran from the clutches of the Soviet Union and to block the Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf.

It is true that an effort was made to ransom the CIA's Beirut Station Chief, William Buckley, although the money was to come from private sources. As the agency's top counter-terrorism expert in the Middle East, Buckley was privy to a great deal of information that would be extremely valuable to terrorists in the region and to their state patrons. Accordingly, when it was learned that he was being tortured by his captors, it was deemed vital that his release be secured by any means possible. Indeed, some highly placed U.S. officials believe that the information extracted from Buckley under torture was what enabled the terrorists to stay one step ahead of the United States in the TWA 847 hijacking and several other subsequent attacks. But attempts to win Buckley's release were always a sideshow next to the larger issue of developing U.S. relations with Iran.

In the final analysis, if Ollie North's description of the events precipitating the secret U.S. arms shipments to Iran holds up, then the "Iran arms scandal" could turn out to have been one of the Administration's finest hours rather than its foreign-policy nadir. □

RECEIVED 10 MAR 87 10

TO : CARLUCCI

FROM ANTONOVICH, MICHAEL

DOCDATE

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KEYWORDS: IRAN

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SUBJECT: LTR TO FCC FM BD SUPERVISORS COUNTY LA FWDING ARTICLE RE IRAN

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE: 17 MAR 87 STATUS S FILES WH

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