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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: JOHNATHAN S. MILLER *JSM*
SUBJECT: Abshire Requests

I feel sheepish about bothering you with such a trivial request which you will find on the attached memo from Ambassador Abshire, but it is getting to be a daily routine. The bottom line on this request is that Brower feels that we must decorate his office at the level of Abshire's (it is regrettable that we cannot find as intense a commitment to support the President in Judge Brower's daily regimen as we do in his desire for the proper accoutrements).

I will be happy to provide him with the finest furniture and furnishings available to us, but will not go on an emergency procurement for him. In addition, let me note that I was able to secure an additional office for Ambassador Abshire that was handed over to the Task Force last Friday. Apparently, that additional office is not adequate for the Ambassador and he is requesting yet more office space. If the Ambassador is adamant that more space be provided to him, I suggest that he be patient and we will move his entire office on February 20 to the suite in the New Executive Office Building that is presently occupied by Senator Tower, Senator Muskie and General Scowcroft.

I wish I could say that this will be the last time you will hear from me on these absurd matters, but I am confident that you will continue to get requests from Ambassador Abshire (unless, of course, you admonish him and ask him to direct all his requests to me and not to you, Dennis Thomas or anyone else in the West Wing).

Attachment
Abshire Memo

NOTED BY DTR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 1987

NOTE TO: Donald T. Regan

FROM: Ambassador David M. Abshire



I appreciate your support as I have put my staff together. Those arrangements are now complete and I do not anticipate additional staff requirements beyond those we have already agreed upon.

As you know, I asked Judge Charles Brower to be my deputy because I believe his international reputation and stature are essential to the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts in dealing with the Congress and public. I have taken Charlie with me on my calls to the Hill where his presence has contributed directly to Congressional confidence in the President's position and policy for full disclosure. I believe strongly that he should be situated in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, a tastefully appointed office is of immense value. In this context I ask your support for outfitting room 440 appropriately.

Lastly, to house my staff I need one additional (small) room. My preference is that this room be adjacent to the office complex we currently occupy, but I understand the space limitations and would be satisfied with an office in the general vicinity.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *Jonathan*

FROM: DONALD T. REGAN
CHIEF OF STAFF

What say

GPH

1/26/87

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER SOVEREL

FROM: JOHNATHAN MILLER *JM*

SUBJECT: Staff Support

Don Regan has asked me to review and comment on Dave Abshire's memo of January 16, which I will do today. Until Don replies to Dave's memo, however, please do not take steps to bring Michael Bailey, Eileen Giglio and Razvigor Bazala on board tomorrow. As soon as Regan and Abshire come to an agreement, I will process the papers for those non-EOP personnel that have been approved by the Chief of Staff.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact either Charlie Kupperman or myself.

✓ cc: Tom Dawson

January 17, 1987 1987 JAN 20 AM 7: 58

MEMORANDUM

To: ; Johnathan Miller
From: Peter Soverel *AS*
Subject: Staff Support

Attached you will find a copy of a memorandum from Ambassador Abshire to Don Regan outlining his staff requirements. You will note that the Ambassador is adding six officers and three secretaries to his staff. Three officers, Michael Bailey, Eileen Giglio and Razvigor Bazala, will report for duty on Wednesday 21 January. I expect the other three will report before the end of the week.

With the foregoing in mind, I request office space in the EOB for these six officers and three supporting secretaries, with appropriate word processing equipment. I would prefer three adjacent offices but I suppose we could make do with two adjacent offices in a pinch.

I will work with Charles Kupperman on passes. I understand the difficulties with other "perks." I would like parking spaces for the additional staff, although I understand the limitations.


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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: DAVID M. ABSHIRE 

SUBJECT: Staff Organization/Support

I have developed an outline for a staff to support me in my duties as Special Counsellor to the President. I need 13 officers, including Judge Brower, and 6 dedicated secretaries. I have made every effort in developing this staff to meet your wish to use people either on the White House or NSC staff, or at least within government to avoid start-up delays and additional costs.

In general, I envision a staff with these main clusters: Counsel, Congressional Liaison/Public Information, and Information Support. Additionally, Judge Brower will chair the Iranian Task Force which will be made up of members from my staff and representatives from State, Defense, CIA, Justice and NSA.

This staff consists of seven officers who are in place or available:

Judge Charles Brower
Peter W. Soverel
Dennis Kloske
Dean McGrath

Alan Raul
Lyn Withey
Roman Popadiuk

I need six other officers, three of whom I have identified: Lt Colonel C.M. Baily, USA, Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Razbigor Bazala, USIS, and Eileen Giglio, State Department (Legislative Affairs). I will identify the three additional officers in the near future.

I appreciate especially the cooperation and support provided by Peter Wallison and Johnathan Miller in helping us meet our requirements. I am most concerned about secretarial support which is so critical to efficient operation. Except for Elise Callaghan (whom I brought with me) the "system" has not yet identified secretaries to support us.

Attachment

Tab A Staff Organization/Support

cc: Johnathan Miller

STAFF ORGANIZATION/SUPPORT

Front Office:

Judge Charles N. Brower, Deputy to the Special Counsellor
Peter W. Soverel, Executive Officer
Elise M. Callaghan, Executive Assistant and Personal Secretary
to the Special Counsellor
Personal Secretary to Judge Brower - to be identified
Office Secretary - to be identified

Counsel:

Judge Brower
Dean McGrath
Alan Raul
Secretarial support will be provided within existing
arrangements.

Congressional Liaison/Public Information:

Dennis Kloske
Lyn Withey
Roman Popadiuk
Razbigor Bazala (to be detailed from USIS)
Eileen Giglio (to be detailed from State Department)
Office Secretary - to be identified

Information Group:

Lt Colonel Charles M. Baily, USA
Information/Action Officer - to be identified
Documents Control Officer - to be identified (military E6/7)
Security Officer - to be identified
Office Secretary - to be identified

This group will coordinate the flow of information to the
Congressional Select Committees and provide staff support for me
on public and Congressional issues related to Iran-Contra
matters. I prefer a senior enlisted rating, experienced in
documents control as my document control/security officer.


Iranian Task Force:

Judge Charles N. Brower
Executive Secretary: to be identified
Membership: representatives from General Counsel's Office of
White House, CIA, State, Justice, NSA and DOD.
Office Secretary: to be identified

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

469300
COO'LL

December 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: Special White House Unit for Iran

Per our meetings yesterday and this morning, I would like to again outline my viewpoint.

The first step is to make a strategic assessment now on where the Iran issue will be next year. If the collective judgement is the situation will grow in intensity, then I believe a special unit within the White House is essential. With any important decision an analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the recommendation must be analyzed.

Clearly, the effectiveness of the recommendation (doing the right thing) depends on our assessment of the durability of the issue. If we assume the intensity level will grow in late January/early February and continue into spring, we now have a window of opportunity to continue to do the "right thing" and show the President is in control and exhibiting leadership and independence. The right things so far have been the Tower Special Review Board, Frank Carlucci, the radio address and next a pre-emptive move to appoint an individual and create a special White House unit to coordinate with the Independent Counsel and the Select Committees. They would monitor, assess, and analyze day-to-day events and offer recommendations and options for the President and White House Staff to decide. Another charter for them should be to begin to plan for the "final" phase of the cycle which will be Congress' inevitable desire to legislate solutions which will have a lasting negative impact on the Presidency.

Two lessons from the history of 1973-1974 were the failure to assess until too late the growth of the issue and later misappropriating personnel resources and energies on factors outside of the White House's control. The White House tried to fine tune Watergate issues and events over which they should have known they could not while activities that could be controlled suffered neglect. This is particularly important for us because the President can rebuild his special relationship with the American people if we efficiently manage the Iran issue while he leads the country.

Page two

As I stated yesterday, the efficiency of the White House operations will be in jeopardy if key players are constantly directing an inordinate amount of time and attention to the Iran issue in the next year. Control of the issue must not consume the President and his senior staff for the next year. The President's success has been the product of his willingness to publically fight for his agenda and principles backed by a highly efficient staff operation.

It is my assessment from the discussion this morning, while you were in attendance and after you left, there is general acceptance of the concept of a dedicated unit. The major point of disagreement is over the independence and stature of the head of the unit and his working relationship with the President, you and the other members of the senior White House staff.

I honestly believe that an independent perspective is absolutely essential in order to serve the interest of the President. It is my recommendation that a highly respected individual come on board to coordinate the activities of those individuals detailed full-time to the unit from the Wallison, Ball and Speakes operations. He or she will become part of the team.


Please see a memorandum I sent on November 13 to some of my colleagues on the 1987 agenda. I believe many of the observations are still valid and deserve our renewed attention while the best specialized talent available deals with Iran allowing you and the senior staff to continue and insure continued progress toward a more prosperous, safer and secure America under the leadership of the President. We can and must do both.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THOSE LISTED BELOW
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: 1987 Agenda

The following points appear to recur in the White House News Summary's Special Edition and Analyses of the 1986 Election results and describe some of the perceptions we will need to consider as we plan for 1987.

- One effective year is left in the President's term as 1988 will focus on the Election.
- Election night exit polls showed more confidence in the President and Republicans on the key issues of managing the economy and handling relations with the Soviet Union.
- The President will continue to use his skills as a communicator to go over heads of Congress.
- Byrd and Wright are not telegenic figures but will not abdicate leadership of the Democrats during 1987 to the more media oriented '88 Democratic candidates.
- Foreign policy and arms control will emerge as a primary focus of the White House. The time for major domestic initiatives is over.
- The President has the responsibility for deciding what is in the best interest of all Americans - he must continue to define the national interest.
- Democrats do not intend to challenge the President "personally" because he remains too popular.

Learning from history (recent history) is a good way to start our effort. We should recognize the similarities between now and this time four years ago. The key goal established then was to achieve political goals in a "non-political" way. 1983 became a very "Presidential" year. The key to '83 was focusing the President's energies and schedule on building his popularity and support. Therefore, in planning for 1987 I propose we assume that the President is running in 1988 - running for history,

running to insure a Republican successor and most importantly, running to maintain his high job approval ratings (which clearly help the former). The President's popularity is his big stick and must be maintained to prevent lame duckism and a host of domestic and foreign problems.

Our planning should embrace the fact that after six years the American public sees the President as a leader with solidly held convictions and with a clear view of where he believes the country should be heading. The President's two principle, unambiguous goals have been to limit government and maintain a firm foreign policy. The November 5 goals of a more prosperous America, a more productive America and a more peaceful world are totally consistent but need to be focused and more narrowly defined. Also, the President is perceived best when he is above the fray and day to day battles with Congress - let others conduct the fight in the trenches. The President must be viewed as an active and involved President doing events that dramatize his broad goals and agenda and put him in touch with the people and the nation's problems.

A review of the basic strategy for '83 will, I believe, help us develop an agenda for 1987. While the past clearly should not be the only blue-print for the future, some of our successful past approaches could be adopted in 1987. The President's 1983 schedule was designed to show America was on the mend and to reinforce three basic objectives: enhance the President's image as an international statesman, build support with politically vital groups and exploit Wirthlin identified issues to show the President's leadership was working.

In 1983 the President conducted 34 state and official working visits with foreign leaders at the White House. I have not counted Oval Office courtesy meetings with heads of government or foreign ministers. The foreign policy schedule centerpiece for the first half of 1983 was the President hosting the Williamsburg Summit. The schedule highlight of the second half was the President's trip to the Far East. In addition, the President addressed both the Commonwealth Club and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on his foreign policy, plus a two day UN visit including five bilateral meetings.

The President's White House, in-town and out-of-town travel schedule placed heavy emphasis on doing events associated with women, Hispanics, Jews, senior citizens, religious groups (especially Catholics), important ethnic groups, blue-collar workers, etc.

Another major tool in 1983 was addressing prestigious forums, conventions, conferences, annual meetings and, often in conjunction with the fixed event, developing a secondary event. These created or spontaneous events associated the President with

an important group or issue in a realistic people oriented setting. These "color" events were designed to compliment the overall theme/message of the day, week or cycle. Some of the groups addressed:

- National Association of Manufacturers
- National Association of Evangelicals
- National Rifle Association
- American Bar Association
- American Legion
- VFW
- American Farm Bureau Federation
- American Newspaper Publishers Association Convention
- National Association of Home Builders
- Medal of Honor Society
- National League of POW's and MIA's
- American Federation of Teachers
- International Longshoreman Association
- International Federation of Business and Professional Women
- National Conference on Dislocated Workers
- Cuban/American National Foundation Anniversary

Some of the people/issue oriented events included: drop-by a Boston pub for a beer, cafeteria lunch and dialog with autoworkers, Q & A with former steelworkers in a Pittsburgh re-training center, visited a New York City Police Precinct, lunch in a Cuban diner in Miami, visit Sun City, Arizona senior citizen volunteer law enforcement training session, etc.

The two consistent Wirthlin generated areas were events highlighting the economic recovery/America on the mend theme (visiting plywood factory, Chrysler assembly line, high tech plants, etc.) and publicizing the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (you name it, we tried it and it worked!).

With the above as background, I would propose our discussion of the 1987 agenda focus on three areas:

I. Foreign Policy and the National Defense

- A. Determine level of probability of a Reagan/Gorbachev Summit in 1987. Either scenario - summit or no summit - will require a high level of allied and other foreign leader consultation and foreign policy activity.
- B. Explore expanding June Economic Summit trip to make overall trip more interesting.
- C. Develop strategy to maintain a strong national defense, including SDI. Conceive event activities to explain and build support for SDI.

- D. Develop public and Congressional strategy to protect our Central America goals.

II. Prioritize Domestic Issues

- A. Redefine and narrow concepts of a more prosperous and productive America focusing on measurability of our goals.
- B. Rank order of major domestic problems and goals.
- C. Drug Initiative

III. Politically Vital Groups

- A. Identify groups that will:
 - 1. Help sustain the President's goals through 1988
 - 2.. Help secure Republican success in 1988
 - 3. Hurt us in 1986 and can be turned around

After we have accomplished the above, match priorities with schedule proposals (the easy part).

cc: W. Ball
M. Daniels
A. Kingon
D. Thomas
P. Wallison
D. Chew
T. Dawson
A. Keel

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MEMORANDUM -- Dealing with Iran/Advancing the 1987 Agenda

As we prepare to move into the seventh year of the Reagan Presidency, we face a major challenge - dealing with Iran while advancing the 1987 agenda. Though substantively unconnected, the ability to deal with one will have a major effect on achieving the second.

The Iran controversy has resulted in not only questions regarding what happened but also questions regarding this Administration's ability to lead the country, and in what direction. If we are to be successful in advancing our 1987 agenda we must also demonstrate our ability to manage the "process" of the Iran issue.

Initially the Iran controversy included only the sale of arms to Iran and the use of monies from that sale to advance the cause of the contras. Very quickly those initial events will be seen as only a part of an Iran process including resignations, dismissals, inquiries, testimony, refusals to testify, and Presidential statements. As a consequence there is a need not only to get to the bottom of what happened but to show that it can be accomplished simultaneous with the regular business of governing.

This memo attempts to review:

1. the current status of our efforts to manage Iran and our new initiatives; and
2. a strategy to deal with both.

Iran

The post-Iran revelation activities - personnel changes, Tower Board, call for coordinated Congressional inquiry, urging of independent counsel, approval of testimony by Chief-of-Staff, Presidential statements and the naming of a Special Counsellor - can now be seen as a positive pattern, demonstrating the Presidents commitment to learn what happened and share that information with the American people.

Dick Wirthlin's numbers confirm the remedial steps that were taken not only checked the negative fall in overall approval ratings but contributed to a positive though not complete recovery. The challenge now is to reinforce the positive nature of those actions.

To this end, our focus should now be on one theme - getting all the facts out and setting things right. We should avoid additional statements that describe what happened. No matter how complete, those kind of statements contribute to even more criticism of the President. Criticism that he is "providing incomplete or inaccurate information" the result of which will only compound our difficulties. Rather, we should begin to place the President separate and apart from the day-to-day Iran

inquiry. His attention should be directed to advancing arms reduction, reducing the deficit, catastrophic illness, and the other issues that are important to his agenda. In short, our strategy should be to put Iran "beside us." The Iran process will not allow a quick solution to the problem, no matter what we do. The Congressional hearings will go on, and the independent counsel will require an extended period of time to complete his work.

The new year allows a clean break between Iran, those actions taken in November and December and getting on with the business of governing.

The appointment of David Abshire to coordinate White House activities on Iran should free the other White House staff to focus on the President's 1987 agenda. Iran issues will still require our attention but it allows us to take the same multi-track approach that recognizes the White House process requires the handling of a series of issues at the same time.

What follows, outlines the key issues we expect to address and a rough calendar of events that reflect those priorities.

1987 Agenda

The challenge to 1987 will be selecting from among a number of good issues those issues which deserve the President's time and attention. Our challenges will be selecting the issues that reinforce Ronald Reagan's agenda, and the offensive nature of the last two years without conceding important issues to the Democrats. On issues like trade and agriculture we will find our best defensive strategy will be to have a good offensive initiative. We must also bring focus and coherence to a diverse range of domestic issues and integrate them into the national security/foreign policy priorities.

The range of domestic issues "teed up" for action is substantial and includes:

- o Catastrophic Health Insurance
- o Welfare Reform
- o Drugs/"Just Say No"
- o FY88 Budget and Deficit Reduction
- o Budget Reform
- o A More Competitive and Productive America
 - Trade
 - VP's Task Force on Deregulation
 - Liability Insurance
 - Insider Trading/Wall Street Reforms

- o Agriculture/Farm Bill
- o Right to Life
- o Environment

On the foreign policy front, the list of key issues includes:

- o Arms Reduction
- o Nuclear Testing Treaties Ratification
- o SDI
- o Support for Freedom Fighters
- o Middle East Efforts
- o Maintaining Adequate Defense Spending
- o 3rd World Debt
- o Arms Sales Legislative Packages

The combined list of potential Presidential initiatives is great. Success will depend on carefully picking just a few for major emphasis so that we can keep our agenda focused; our resources both internal and external sharply honed and our Congressional allies firmly aware of our real priorities.

We no longer have control of the Senate and are unable to push a legislative agenda with any certainty. Therefore, our 1987 Agenda should include some issues that can be successful without a legislative component. In dealing with the Congress either on our initiatives - welfare and catastrophic - or on

Democratic initiatives like trade and agriculture, we will be essentially in an "asking" posture with little opportunity to set the schedule. We should expect no breaks in the timing of issues (hearings, testimony, or floor consideration) and will need behind the scenes legislative finesse in order to arrive at acceptable compromises.

Rather than planning our agenda to respond to the Congressional priorities, we need to fix our 90 day January/February/March Agenda so that we start our 1987 Agenda with a specific plan in mind.

The agenda calendar sets out a central theme for each week proceeding through March. In addition to the central theme, there are also suggestions for added secondary activities designed to generate press coverage.

AGENDA CALENDAR

	Central <u>Theme</u>	Other <u>Options</u>	Fixed <u>Events</u>
Jan. 3rd	Budget Message		Hospital
Jan. 12th	Arms Control	M.L.King Event Radio Address- Arms Control	NST Event
Jan. 19th	Trade	Radio Address Trade	Ex Forum
Jan. 26th	SOTU/Legis Msg.	Shuttle disaster anniversary event	
Feb. 2nd	Catastrophic		
Feb. 9th	For. Policy Speech		
Feb. 16th			Shamir Visit
Feb. 23rd	Welfare		Mubarak Visit
Mar. 2nd			
Mar. 9th	NATO Meeting		Kenya Visit
Mar. 16th			

Issue Roll Out Schedule

Below is a standard timing of a series of events that could be put in motion for any of the issues on the 1987 Agenda.

o "Decision Making Events"

o Meet with Admin. Officials

- with outside experts

- with Congressional types

o Issue Orientation/Background Paper/Talking Pts. for the President

o PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT/LAUNCH EVENT - of the major initiative

- Speech

- Legislative Message

- White House Press Briefing by Key Surrogate

o PRESIDENTIAL POST LAUNCH EVENT

- Out of White House Event that emphasizes people aspects of the issue

- Do week of or week following the Launch Event

- Type of Event depends on nature of issue

o speech

o visit to site

o SPECIALIZED PRESS INTERVIEWS BY PRESIDENT

- Written intrviews for special press
- General press interviews on specific topic

o SUPPORTERS/EXPERTS MEETINGS

- 450/Cabinet Room Events with Presidential dropbys
- Do every 10 days

o KEY CONG. TYPES MEETINGS

- Meet the week of launch w/supporters in Congress
- Follow on with key subcommitteers and undecideds

o ADMIN SPOKESMEN ACTIVITIES

- Identify key spokesmen on the issue
- Assign them to cover key regional, special press
- Draft oped pieces by principal Cabinet spokesman
- Major speech by Cabinet officers

Central Themes of Individual WeeksBudget Week (January 3)

With the Budget going to the Congress before it actually returns (January 6) and the President in the hospital, the task of highlighting its significance becomes a challenge. Congress is expected to start hearings on the Budget almost immediately and their focus is expected to be almost exclusively on raising taxes, raising domestic spending and cutting defense. Last year we adopted a Budget strategy of low key, get along discussions that avoided a showdown with Senate Republicans. This year we need to agree upon our overall approach to the Budget -- is it confrontational or bi-partisan cooperation; do we make the Budget a #1 issue or do we want to primarily emphasize something else such as catastrophic/welfare/SDI? The Budget will be launched with the January 3 Radio Address on that subject. The regular Budget Press Conference launch is set for January 5.

Activities for the Week of January 3

- 1) Photo of President (hospital stay permitting) of the signing of the Budget.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 2) LSG on getting the overall Budget strategy and tone.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 3) Presidential phone call from Congressional leaders saying that Congress is in session (hospital stay permitting)

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 4) Presidential letter to Budget Committee Chairman urging them to meet the G-R-H targets and the Budget timing deadlines.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Arms Control Week (January 12)

The Nuclear and Space Talks are to reconvene January 15 in Geneva. To highlight that fact and to afford the President an opportunity to reemphasize his approach to nuclear arms reduction a meeting with our arms negotiators would be appropriate. Monday, January 12 would be a good day (the Congress probably will not be in session that day, thus reducing the competition for news coverage) for the President to meet briefly with Max Kampelman and the other negotiators and give them instructions for the next round of talks. They could then go to the Press Room and brief on the current status of arms negotiations. (This meeting would be conditioned upon the President's medical recovery.)

Activities for the Week of January 12

1. Presidential meeting in Oval Office with Arms
Negotiators Monday, January 12.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

2. Release wire photo of meeting.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

3. Press Room briefing by negotiators.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

4. Radio Address Saturday, January 17, on Arms Control.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Observance of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday

January 15 is the birthdate of Martin Luther King, Jr, although January 19 is the Federal holiday. Given the recent race tensions in Queens there is a good opportunity for the President to give an address on racial tolerance. Ideally he

could travel to a multi-racial school in the Washington area and speak to young people on the importance of racial harmony and the special responsibility they have.

This could afford the President a leadership opportunity on an issue of growing importance and attention and do so as his observance of Dr. King's birthday on January 15. If it would not be possible for the President to travel an alternative would be to have a cross-section of students come to the White House for a seminar. Participants could include Bill Bennett and other Administration officials with the highlight being remarks by the President.

- 1) Explore possible High School sites for a Presidential visit on January 15.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 2) If no to above, create a White House event with students from multi-racial school.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Trade Week (January 19)

There will be no issue that is upon us faster with more lasting implications than trade. Recent trade figures indicate the problem is getting worse, not better. Mari reports that this is the number one issue with her business constituents. The Democrats are expected to start immediately with House and Senate hearings on trade and to move their bills quickly for floor consideration. Trade remains a defensive issue for us. The LSG before Christmas decided that it was feasible to prepare an Administration bill that could be introduced and that would receive some Congressional support. Our challenge will be to get the maximum possible attention on our proposal, to have it viewed as our initiative rather than a response to the Democrats and to give us negotiating leverage during Committee markups and floor consideration.

We should concentrate the activities surrounding the announcement of our proposal into a single week in order to get the maximum amount of focus and attention. Meetings should be held with business types, outside experts, Congressional allies, a message dispatched to our trading partners around the world. Our trade proposal should be ready to be announced during January.

- 1) Presidential Meeting to discuss issue and prepare trade proposal that is Administration bill.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 2) Schedule series of Cabinet Room meetings with key business outsiders and Congressional allies to demonstrate broad support for our proposal.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 3) Prepare Presidential speech or Radio Address that speaks to the Trade environment, the wisdom of his proposal and the dangers of protectionism as proposed by the Democrats. Specifics of speech or radio address to be determined at a future date.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 4) Schedule major trade speech by Senior Administrative officials following upon President's initiative. Baker, Baldrige, Shultz, Brock and Yeutter should all be asked to prepare and schedule major speeches on trade.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

State of the Union Week (January 26)

The week of January 26 is the week to firmly reestablish the perception that Reagan is back. The week will be focused around the State of the Union (SOTU) address scheduled for 9:00 p.m., January 27, which should be viewed as part of an ongoing process rather than a single, major event speech that has no pre or post connections. Work on that major speech is proceeding on a separate track. And Dick Wirthlin's interesting memo on the speech is attached at the end of this memo. As is usual the full compliment of pre and post speech briefings, TV and interview appearances are contemplated again this year.

The SOTU speech is expected to have uplifting, philosophical values oriented address highlighting the agenda items for the next two years. The speech is expected to be somewhat longer than last year. It is not expected to be a "laundry list" of important issues. Like last year we are preparing the President's legislative message to be submitted to the Congress the next day. It will outline the numerous Administrative initiatives both foreign and domestic that Congress is expected to address during its 100th session.

Depending upon the initiatives contained in the SOTU, one or perhaps two should be singled out for follow-up attention that week. The point here is not to select those initiatives now, but

to agree that one or perhaps two post speech events will occur that week -- hopefully out of the WH complex, if not out of Washington, to highlight RR SOTU ideas.

To promote grassroots support for the President's message to Congress it is suggested briefings for Republican political leaders would be useful. The Office of Political Affairs is prepared to coordinate such a briefing and invitations to leaders from around the country. This would take place the day before/of or after the SOTU.

In addition, the remainder of the Budget details are expected to be sent to the Congress that week. Departments and Agencies administrative and programmatic budget will then become public. Cabinet officers will then hold their traditional press conference on the Budgets for their agencies. Depending on our overall budget strategy we may want to consider some Presidential involvement in this "2nd" Budget submission. The week will also include the one year anniversary of the Challenger disaster and some appropriate recognition of that occasion will have to be identified.

Activities for the Week of January 26

- 1) Arrange the traditional pre-post SOTU special press and TV appearances.

-- TV anchors lunch

-- Morning talk shows

-- Sunday Shows

-- Pre-Speech press briefing

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 2) Proceed with preparation of the President's Legislative Message to cover foreign and domestic issues the President wants Congress to address. To be released January 27 and submitted to Congress on January 28.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 3) Identify and propose for approval an appropriate Challenger memorial event.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 4) Depending upon the overall Budget strategy, propose for approval a "2nd Budget Submission" event for Presidential involvement.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 5) Invite Republican Political Leaders from around the country to the White House for SOTU briefing.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Catastrophic Illness Week (February 2)

This, the first full week after the SOTU will be an excellent time to highlight one of our key initiatives for 1987. The advance office is reviewing possible sites for Presidential visits -- both in and out of Washington.

We can anticipate the Hill Democrats to have hearings and try to jump out ahead of us. They clearly can make the first move given their ability to control the Hearing schedule -- however, we can have the overall association with the issue, like tax reform, if we have well-thought activities to illustrate the President's concern on the issue.

Accordingly the identification of an appropriate senior citizens center or related activity would be good. You will receive shortly recommendations for your review.

Foreign Policy Speech Week (February 9)

Following the Iran affair, RR needs to reassert and reaffirm that he is in charge of and directing our foreign policy. In addition to adopting specific initiatives and taking specific actions the timing of which we cannot firmly control, one clear way to reassert his authority is a major state of the world speech. The speech would give the President the opportunity to restate his foreign policy objectives and allow him to put his Iranian initiatives, Soviet relations, freedom fighters commitment and SDI/Arms Control policies in the perspective of his overall objectives and agenda. The speech would build upon the national security strategy report that is now required by Congress, as well as allow Secretary Shultz, Weinberger, Baker and Ambassador Yeutter to each schedule events and speeches that expand upon in their areas of expertise.

- 1) Agree to have a broad foreign policy address, in the nature of the "State of the World" rather than on a specific foreign policy topic.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Welfare Reform week (February 23)

This issue provides an opportunity to focus not only on a new Administration initiative but do so in a way that highlights a political gain for Republicans -- Governorships. The National Governors Conference will convene in Washington February 22-23. This session would be an excellent opportunity to speak to the Governors and promote the Administration's welfare proposal.

In addition a visit to a State Capitol to address a State legislature would provide us yet another good forum. The date for the event could be adjusted to the President's schedule and other travel plans.

The above could be complemented by White House meetings with key Congressional leaders, constituent groups and experts on welfare reform.

- 1) Explore Presidential Remarks to National Governors Conference.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

- 2) Explore Presidential Visit to State Legislature.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

N.A.T.O. Meeting (week of March 9)

Consistent with past practice, periodic meetings/discussions with our NATO allies would be in order. This would be the first such meeting since the Reykjavik Summit. Such a meeting could be held in Bermuda, mid-March. Here again the President convening the leaders of the NATO countries would establish his role as a world leader. Iran would surely be an agenda item but along with arms reductions -- an issue that is a known plus for the President.

This meeting would precede the President's trip to Canada in early April and serve as a good bridge to the Economic Summit in June. We can expect a series of challenges to the President's leadership in international affairs by the Congress. A meeting of the NATO allies would be important in stating only one person is ultimately responsible for conducting foreign policy.

Dr. Keel concurs in this recommendation.

- 1) Explore the possibility (through NSC) of a NATO Meeting in mid-March.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

GeneralPresident's Citizens Medals

One of the principal hallmarks of the Reagan Presidency has been the emphasis on acknowledging individual accomplishments and heroism. This emphasis has been consistent with the President's philosophy of limited government and recognition of individual and community responsibilities to help effect change and the well being of our fellow man.

To highlight the President's commitment to recognizing outstanding individual accomplishments, he should be more active and regular in the awarding of the President's Civilian Medal. This Medal is the 2nd highest award the President can voluntarily bestow, but the President's history of awarding it has been sporadic. The Voyager people each received the medal, but the immediate previous recipient was John Rogers in an Oval Office ceremony when he changed jobs in February, 1985.

The proposal would be to regularize the President's awarding of this prestigious honor. While it is not possible to suggest a schedule -- one medal per month -- Fred Ryan, Bill Henkel and other staff members should be encouraged to identify deserving individuals as potential recipients. The criteria should

emphahsize outstanding individual accomplishments with a focus on that individual having made a "national" contribution rather than an exceptional local or regional accomplishment.

- 1) Agree to regularize the presentation of the President's Citizens Medal to recognize outstanding individual contributions on a national scale.

Yes _____ No _____ Other _____

Presidential Luncheon Series

In addition to our planned events to promote key issues, it would be useful to build into the schedule a continuation of our regular luncheon meetings with outside experts in academia, literature, medicine, etc. These sessions would be a continuation of those luncheons held during this past year that were so successful, and could be expanded to include a broader range of subjects and held on a more frequent basis.

Subject matter could range from agriculture to scientific research to outer space and marine exploration to sports. Participation could range from political scientists to labor leaders. In addition to being informative the presence of leaders from a variety of fields would reinforce the perception of this President being future-oriented and seeking new answers to the country's problems and hearing a wide-range of views from diverse groups of people.

Conclusion

The preceding is not meant to be an all inclusive outline of either the issues we will engage or the schedule to advance them. It does recognize that if we are to be successful in handling Iran it will require an aggressive and coordinated plan to advance our own agenda. There is a very real need to "take the message to the people," by doing more events outside of Washington.

We must have the President's schedule conform to the key issues we chose over the next week to highlight domestic and international issues. Additionally creative scheduling of positive/people events is essential. The presentation of the medals to the Voyager crew and the half-time Fiesta Bowl interview are but two examples of this type activity. Movement/travel and taking the President to the people should be central to 1987. State legislatures, Senior Centers, high-school youths/drug events all provide great potential and should be utilized.

On the international front there is a real need to take advantage of the President as the "leader of the free world." Our calling meetings, dispatching envoys, and engaging head-on arms reduction, trade initiatives and regional meetings, all will reinforce that view.


In short we must rely far less on the Congress and far more on the actions we generate to provide the success stories for 1987. To retain the agenda we cannot be reactive or predictable. Rather there must be new ground broken -- from trade to catastrophic illness, or in our relations with Nicaragua or in debating arms reduction bold decisive executive action is needed. And there must be new and continued creative scheduling and events to advance that agenda.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1986

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NOTED BY DTR

MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD T. REGAN
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: Special White House Unit for Iran

Per our meetings yesterday and this morning, I would like to again outline my viewpoint.

The first step is to make a strategic assessment now on where the Iran issue will be next year. If the collective judgement is the situation will grow in intensity, then I believe a special unit within the White House is essential. With any important decision an analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the recommendation must be analyzed.

Clearly, the effectiveness of the recommendation (doing the right thing) depends on our assessment of the durability of the issue. If we assume the intensity level will grow in late January/early February and continue into spring, we now have a window of opportunity to continue to do the "right thing" and show the President is in control and exhibiting leadership and independence. The right things so far have been the Tower Special Review Board, Frank Carlucci, the radio address and next a pre-emptive move to appoint an individual and create a special White House unit to coordinate with the Independent Counsel and the Select Committees. They would monitor, assess, and analyze day-to-day events and offer recommendations and options for the President and White House Staff to decide. Another charter for them should be to begin to plan for the "final" phase of the cycle which will be Congress' inevitable desire to legislate solutions which will have a lasting negative impact on the Presidency.

Two lessons from the history of 1973-1974 were the failure to assess until too late the growth of the issue and later misappropriating personnel resources and energies on factors outside of the White House's control. The White House tried to fine tune Watergate issues and events over which they should have known they could not while activities that could be controlled suffered neglect. This is particularly important for us because the President can rebuild his special relationship with the American people if we efficiently manage the Iran issue while he leads the country.

Nov 19, 86 William Henkel memo
re: 1987 agenda also attached.

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As I stated yesterday, the efficiency of the White House operations will be in jeopardy if key players are constantly directing an inordinate amount of time and attention to the Iran issue in the next year. Control of the issue must not consume the President and his senior staff for the next year. The President's success has been the product of his willingness to publically fight for his agenda and principles backed by a highly efficient staff operation.

It is my assessment from the discussion this morning, while you were in attendance and after you left, there is general acceptance of the concept of a dedicated unit. The major point of disagreement is over the independence and stature of the head of the unit and his working relationship with the President, you and the other members of the senior White House staff.

I honestly believe that an independent perspective is absolutely essential in order to serve the interest of the President. It is my recommendation that a highly respected individual come on board to coordinate the activities of those individuals detailed full-time to the unit from the Wallison, Ball and Speakes operations. He or she will become part of the team.


Please see a memorandum I sent on November 13 to some of my colleagues on the 1987 agenda. I believe many of the observations are still valid and deserve our renewed attention while the best specialized talent available deals with Iran allowing you and the senior staff to continue and insure continued progress toward a more prosperous, safer and secure America under the leadership of the President. We can and must do both.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THOSE LISTED BELOW
FROM: WILLIAM HENKEL 
SUBJECT: 1987 Agenda

The following points appear to recur in the White House News Summary's Special Edition and Analyses of the 1986 Election results and describe some of the perceptions we will need to consider as we plan for 1987.

- One effective year is left in the President's term as 1988 will focus on the Election.
- Election night exit polls showed more confidence in the President and Republicans on the key issues of managing the economy and handling relations with the Soviet Union.
- The President will continue to use his skills as a communicator to go over heads of Congress.
- Byrd and Wright are not telegenic figures but will not abdicate leadership of the Democrats during 1987 to the more media oriented '88 Democratic candidates.
- Foreign policy and arms control will emerge as a primary focus of the White House. The time for major domestic initiatives is over.
- The President has the responsibility for deciding what is in the best interest of all Americans - he must continue to define the national interest.
- Democrats do not intend to challenge the President "personally" because he remains too popular.

Learning from history (recent history) is a good way to start our effort. We should recognize the similarities between now and this time four years ago. The key goal established then was to achieve political goals in a "non-political" way. 1983 became a very "Presidential" year. The key to '83 was focusing the President's energies and schedule on building his popularity and support. Therefore, in planning for 1987 I propose we assume that the President is running in 1988 - running for history,

running to insure a Republican successor and most importantly, running to maintain his high job approval ratings (which clearly help the former). The President's popularity is his big stick and must be maintained to prevent lame duckism and a host of domestic and foreign problems.

Our planning should embrace the fact that after six years the American public sees the President as a leader with solidly held convictions and with a clear view of where he believes the country should be heading. The President's two principle, unambiguous goals have been to limit government and maintain a firm foreign policy. The November 5 goals of a more prosperous America, a more productive America and a more peaceful world are totally consistent but need to be focused and more narrowly defined. Also, the President is perceived best when he is above the fray and day to day battles with Congress - let others conduct the fight in the trenches. The President must be viewed as an active and involved President doing events that dramatize his broad goals and agenda and put him in touch with the people and the nation's problems.

A review of the basic strategy for '83 will, I believe, help us develop an agenda for 1987. While the past clearly should not be the only blue-print for the future, some of our successful past approaches could be adopted in 1987. The President's 1983 schedule was designed to show America was on the mend and to reinforce three basic objectives: enhance the President's image as an international statesman, build support with politically vital groups and exploit Wirthlin identified issues to show the President's leadership was working.

In 1983 the President conducted 34 state and official working visits with foreign leaders at the White House. I have not counted Oval Office courtesy meetings with heads of government or foreign ministers. The foreign policy schedule centerpiece for the first half of 1983 was the President hosting the Williamsburg Summit. The schedule highlight of the second half was the President's trip to the Far East. In addition, the President addressed both the Commonwealth Club and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on his foreign policy, plus a two day UN visit including five bilateral meetings.

The President's White House, in-town and out-of-town travel schedule placed heavy emphasis on doing events associated with women, Hispanics, Jews, senior citizens, religious groups (especially Catholics), important ethnic groups, blue-collar workers, etc.

Another major tool in 1983 was addressing prestigious forums, conventions, conferences, annual meetings and, often in conjunction with the fixed event, developing a secondary event. These created or spontaneous events associated the President with

an important group or issue in a realistic people oriented setting. These "color" events were designed to compliment the overall theme/message of the day, week or cycle. Some of the groups addressed:

- National Association of Manufacturers
- National Association of Evangelicals
- National Rifle Association
- American Bar Association
- American Legion
- VFW
- American Farm Bureau Federation
- American Newspaper Publishers Association Convention
- National Association of Home Builders
- Medal of Honor Society
- National League of POW's and MIA's
- American Federation of Teachers
- International Longshoreman Association
- International Federation of Business and Professional Women
- National Conference on Dislocated Workers
- Cuban/American National Foundation Anniversary

Some of the people/issue oriented events included: drop-by a Boston pub for a beer, cafeteria lunch and dialog with autoworkers, Q & A with former steelworkers in a Pittsburgh re-training center, visited a New York City Police Precinct, lunch in a Cuban diner in Miami, visit Sun City, Arizona senior citizen volunteer law enforcement training session, etc.

The two consistent Wirthlin generated areas were events highlighting the economic recovery/America on the mend theme (visiting plywood factory, Chrysler assembly line, high tech plants, etc.) and publicizing the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (you name it, we tried it and it worked!).

With the above as background, I would propose our discussion of the 1987 agenda focus on three areas:

I. Foreign Policy and the National Defense

- A. Determine level of probability of a Reagan/Gorbachev Summit in 1987. Either scenario - summit or no summit - will require a high level of allied and other foreign leader consultation and foreign policy activity.
- B. Explore expanding June Economic Summit trip to make overall trip more interesting.
- C. Develop strategy to maintain a strong national defense, including SDI. Conceive event activities to explain and build support for SDI.

- D. Develop public and Congressional strategy to protect our Central America goals.

II. Prioritize Domestic Issues

- A. Redefine and narrow concepts of a more prosperous and productive America focusing on measurability of our goals.
- B. Rank order of major domestic problems and goals.
- C. Drug Initiative

III. Politically Vital Groups

- A. Identify groups that will:
 - 1. Help sustain the President's goals through 1988
 - 2.. Help secure Republican success in 1988
 - 3. Hurt us in 1986 and can be turned around

After we have accomplished the above, match priorities with schedule proposals (the easy part).

cc: W. Ball
M. Daniels
A. Kingon
D. Thomas
P. Wallison
D. Chew
T. Dawson
A. Keel

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