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*Last Updated: 11/07/2023*

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CO 071



December 1st, 1981

Pahlavi, Ashraf  
(Sister of late Shah)

Dear President Reagan

I have the honor to enclose for your personal attention the summary of an analysis on the chaotic situation in Iran which has reached such magnitude that it cannot but lead to the inevitable collapse of Khomeini's tyrannical and communist-infiltrated regime.

The ensuing political vacuum added to the existing socio-economic calamities will surely invite the communists to take over with the direct or indirect intervention of the Soviets.

However, in a situation so replete with dangers, all hope is not yet lost and I am convinced that by carefully planning for the future, forces in Iran friendly to the West can still be successfully mobilized in a unified front to fill the void which will be left by Khomeini's departure from the scene.

As for myself, I have no personal ambition beyond witnessing my country's liberation and its honor, integrity and thousands of years of rich cultural heritage, once again restored.

I await your response.

sincerely yours  
Ashraf Pahlavi



December 1st, 1981

*Dear President Reagan*

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I await your response.

*sincerely yours*  
*Achraf Pahlavi*

Re 0046

February 19, 1982

TO: NSC/S  
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

NO ACTION NECESSARY.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

0046

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED

82 JAN 6 PM 36

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	_____	_____
BUD NANCE	_____	_____
JOHN POINDEXTER	_____	_____
JACQUE HILL	_____	_____
JUDGE CLARK	_____	_____
JANET COLSON	_____	_____

*70*  
*Staffing*  
*1/6/82*

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
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
COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: MAMIE McDONOUGH 

SUBJECT  LETTER ABOUT IRAN

Attached is a letter for the President from the (son) of the late Shah of Iran, which someone sent to Joe.

I believe this comes under your jurisdiction; and am passing it on.

Many thanks.

I am writing this report to you at a critical juncture in the history of my country, and possibly at that of yours, with the intention of submitting to your administration the gist of many months of my deliberations, intensive consultations, and much soul-searching regarding the future of my country. I am speaking from years of experience and from the vantage point of a person who has some intimate knowledge of the workings and the twists and zags of the psyche of my countrymen-subtilities, sometimes referred to as "soft facts", factor, as or more crucial than the so-called "hard-facts" in any political equation. The knowledge of the "hard-facts" alone, in the words of Harold Isaacs, is confronted with the "soft-facts" of human experience, remembrances of things past, emotions, behaviors, so much more difficult to grasp, much less take effectively into account.

I have been pleasantly surprised to learn that my own analysis of events, leading to the departure of my brother, the meaning and nature of the present anarchy and the danger it poses for the stability of the region, and the best prognosis I can offer an allied government, coincide with your views and the views of many knowledgeable Iranians.

This paper, therefore, is an attempt to appeal to you directly, in the hope that your personal attention may be called to the increasingly urgent Iran problem. My guiding principle in doing so is my abiding faith in the lasting ties which link your country and mine together, and in our collective drive toward a better and brighter future for all mankind, the "Islamic" rebellion notwithstanding.

I must say at the outset, your remarks on world political pictures, in general, and on Iran, in particular, reflected an unusual perceptiveness, insight, and an unwavering resolve to right the wronged, to rectify the fallen, to regain the lost ground, and to stand firm in the face of the rising tide of the world terrorism and anarchy which, unchecked, may engulf us all.

Many analysts would tend to support your views that had there been a more cohesive U.S. foreign policy, less confusion among the top U.S. ranks, and, at the time, a more supportive American administration, my brother's government would probably not have fallen. Several corollaries would have also been valid: The Shah's Iran was indeed an island of stability

and a bulwark against communism in the region and in the vital Persian Gulf. Having the same interests as the free world, Iran might keep a highly volatile area from dangerous explosions. The West did not need to worry about the Strait of Hormuz or the reliability of its oil routes. There was no need for huge Indian Ocean carrier task forces, for the creation of rapid deployment forces, or the expression of nuclear intent if Russia were to invade Iran or unsettle the Gulf. Russia would never have invaded Afghanistan if the Shah had reigned, nor would Saudi Arabia feel the cold chills of encroaching radicalization. The world oil markets would not have turned on their heads and the possibility of an Iran invasion was non-existent. Finally, the prospect of physical disintegration of Iran and its takeover by communists was not even a leftist dream while the Shah ruled. In short, the fall of the Shah upset the balance of power and created a most testing period for the free world.

Naturally, all this is gone now. Iran, and the West, face a most trying period in their history and an agonizing time of unsettling disturbances, requiring a fool-proof recognition of realities, discarding of wishful thinking, and quick, but well-calculated responses. In my estimation, Iran is now half-lost, but it certainly is retrievable. To retrieve Iran, as the rear-guard of the Western alliance necessitates a hard look at facts (many of them "soft") and face the realities eye-ball to eye-ball.

In this discourse, I seek your permission to make an attempt, to first, point to the basic dynamics of the events of 1979, leading to the Shah's departure, briefly analyze the most important psycho-political factors, take a telescopic view at the current situation and what it may mean, and finally, proceed to outline a possible "retrieval" proposal for joint discussion and cooperative operation.

I believe the basic forces of unrest and an inclination to revolt, stem from the perpetual clash between the forces of renovation, modernization, on one hand, and a "cultural lag" or a "cultural lethargy" on the other. In other words, any ruler of any developing country faces this crucial dilemma of either forcing modernization on his people, or else, see them recede further and further into the niches and crevices of a forgotten, uncivilized era. The secret of success, it appears is to hold long enough to the "modernization position" until the "no-return"



threshold is reached. Iran also was certainly in the throes of such perennial conflict, about to reach the threshold of "no-return", when forces, much beyond our control, took us by surprise. The introduction of modernizing forces produced many economic and social dislocations and heightened the clashes between the old and the new values. As a result, the edges between the Westernized class and the old, traditionally-minded people sharpened to the cutting point. In hindsight, there were some tactical errors committed by the Iranian government, many of them, presumably, avoidable. But the revolt, which basically stemmed from a resistance to modernize, and a refusal to leap the gap (natural to many a human nature), together with the disturbing psychological turbulence it caused in many a human psyche, found a convenient refuge in two, traditionally-hostile centers; i.e., the mosques of the fanatic mullahs and the underground clubs of the international Marxists.

I must point to two important factors at this juncture. The first point is that religion and religious fervor took over Iran not because of the religion per se, or, the religious-minded people, but because religion provided the disturbed with a convenient, and "holy", cover, and an acceptable vent through which much of the hatred, jealousy and feelings of inferiority could be expressed. Khomeini's enormous and unfathomable hatred and his own personalized brand of Shiism provided an excellent and "sanctified" focus for the accumulated feelings of revenge. In essence, what many people meant to say (albeit unconsciously), was that what they considered loveable, but unattainable (because of their own natural resistance and anxiety-producing ventures) was bad, corrupt and damned. By so doing, not only did they relieve themselves of much anxiety (which by definition is highly disturbing), but also clothed their destructive and base impulses into the "holy" religious precepts. Khomeini, in a sense, is not a person. He is a phenomenon, a social-psychological movement that the Western world must understand and be prepared to deal with. At this writing, the rumblings of similar forces are heard in much of the muslim world. The secret of success is not (to the dismay and unhappiness of the faint-hearted sentimentalists and romantic liberals) to relax, but to press ahead, until the critical threshold of "no-return" is reached. Naturally enough, coupled with the social-psychological turmoil modernization causes and the "receptive" environments it creates, the Soviet forces find it opportune to act and exploit the situation. There are now, and there have been few, so-called "liberation" movements behind which the Soviets, directly, or indirectly, have not had a hand.

Be it as it may, what is now before us is not so much as to what might have happened had we adopted a different policy than we did, but what the current situation portends for Iran, and for the West, the presentation of an educated guess as to what lie ahead, and what opportunities, as well as common interests exist between the two countries which may necessitate a joint action.

A more intimate knowledge of the workings and the intricacies of a Khomeini-style government (with a view toward "soft-facts), at the very outset, led many analysts to believe that the regime itself had very little chance of survival, much less a chance to build a new Iran and fulfill its many promises. Part of the reason for such a pessimistic prognosis was the rigid doctrine upon which Khomeini based his model of a "good" society, and an anachronistic nature of the applications deduced from such premises. Such rigidity, it was obvious, was inconsistent with the demands and exigencies of the last quarter of 20th century civilization, and incompatible with the wishes and aspirations of the "technocratic" classes, who had become irrevocably westernized. Further, his persistence on the righteousness of a handful of Islamic jurists and his insistence to rule over millions of others whom he regarded as "minors", was bound to have highly damaging consequences, resulting in the establishment of a ruthlessly totalitarian regime and a murderous government.

Our prediction all along was that his government would crash, and that the "big bang", left unchecked, would create seismic reverberations of such magnitude that it would blow Iran to pieces. We figured that in the process some of the choicest pieces would go to the Soviet Union.

It is possible, as many analysts have pointed out, that the Soviet Union, at the outset, faced difficult choices in its dealings with the Islamic fanatics. But now, the outlines and contours of Soviet policy is quite evident. Although hard and irrefutable evidence is almost impossible to obtain (that kind of evidence is certainly kept in K.G.B. safes under tight security), experience, common sense, observation, and a rather close "neighborly" dealings with the Soviet Union necessitate the adoption of the assumption of the "worst possible scenario". We believe any hesitation in assuming anything less could lead to irretrievable losses and sorry consequences. The late Shah of Iran, after 40 years of personal and intimate experience with the Russians kept warning the western leaders of the ultimate aims of the Soviet Russia, and of its particular and specific designs in the Persian Gulf. In his

"Answer to History", he eloquently expresses his last warning, and wishes that they be heeded. He writes: "The western inability to see and understand clearly the grand design of the Soviet expansionism had never astonished me more than in the first months of my exile. I had lived as neighbor to the masters of the Kremlin my whole adult life. In forty years I had never seen any wavering of Russian's political objectives: a relentless striving toward world domination. Moscow had time. It could wait fifty years, accept a step or two backward, deal, accomodate, but never lose sight of its final aims. I favored detente and accomodation, but not from the position of weakness and indecision that marked the policies of American and European governments.....The 1980's promise to be a decade of harrowing danger. Russia will reach the apogee of her strength in 1983 and if current trends continue, the U.S. will reach its nadir, weaker than it has ever been as a world power".

Based on experience, we refuse to believe that the Russians would easily give up on Iran and withdraw from their ambitions without a stiff fight (probably covert, clandestine fight). Russian understands very well the significance, implications, and unprecedented opportunities made available to it by an unbelievable lapse of western memory and weakening of its resolve. We also are of the opinion that the Russians are carefully, but feverishly, charting the future course of their tactics and designs. It seems to us that the Soviets, ironically are basing their hopes on total discrediting of religion in Iran. Looking upon religion as a natural defense against the inroads of communism, they probably believe that Khomeini and company are excellent candidates to fulfil this promise. Alongside with this, they are relying on the Tudeh Party to furnish them and their agents (very possibly the top leadership of the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen and Marxist Fedayeen) with strategic, tactical, and psychological information and guidance, valuable information the Tudeh Party has gained through half a century of trial and terror. I think, as many others do, the ultimate beneficiary of an unchecked "crash" of Khomeini regime would be the Russians. The easiest way they could achieve their objectives is the establishment of several independent "people's republics. They could then move in as "advisors" and later on, if necessary, move in more obvious ways.

The strengthening of a nation's "natural" and indigenous values, traditions, and general beliefs, to act as defenses against communism, is basically a sound idea. But overstretching the idea, especially if it has to deal with religion, has its own dangers. This is especially so when religion takes the reigns of temporal

power in its own hands.

The rule of the clerics denotes more than inhuman cruelty, savagery, and murder. It also means an unrelenting effort to rob man of his spirituality and to leave him in the barren desert of faithlessness. The danger Khomeini-style government poses, therefore, goes far beyond the immediate. It creates unhealing wounds of rebelliousness, radicalization, and eventually, of despair. It is precisely this state of human personality the Kremlin rulers desire most. It is also this aspect of religious rule which worries us most, and which, should be carefully considered when "Islamicization" is considered in such countries as Pakistan, or used as a defense mechanism among the Afghan resistance movement.

If history is any guide, we think religion best serves its purpose, and endures the longest, when its sanctity is shrouded by the ambiguities of human imagination. With monarchy, as a time-honored, "natural" defense of the Iranians gone, at least temporarily, with nationalism discounted by Khomeini and his associates, the sole remaining barrier may also be destroyed soon.

In this long report, it is not my desire to dwell on the global foreign policy or philosophical questions. But I should like to take the liberty to comment briefly on the notion of "strategic consensus" and examine its implications as it may relate to Iran. From there on, I should like to offer a "plan", as basis for joint discussion, and hopefully, later on, cooperative action.

I must say I concur with the views of some analysts to the effect that the concept of "strategic consensus", is basically sound, in that it tries to revitalize the old alliances, yet, it suffers from some inherent weaknesses, in that it neglects the unique characteristics (and problems) each potential individual participant faces. Besides, the U.S. has to overcome a lingering image of an unreliable ally, whose basic "business" motivations have tarnished, and largely overshadowed, its principal image of a country, standing mainly for human freedom and dignity.

The world must still remember the strange and bizarre episodes surrounding a staunch friend and ally of the west, wandering from country to country, while his former friends bowed before a bunch of international terrorists. The unfolding of

such events must have made deep impressions on the minds of many a Middle-Eastern ruler.

In addition, unless a concerted effort is made to bring the various and disparate groups of many Middle-Eastern "sub-cultures" into the mainstream of westernization, and thus create socially homogeneous societies, the long-term effect of these otherwise well-intentioned efforts would remain in doubt.

With regard to Iran, a country intrinsically important for western interests, and extrinsically, crucial to the outcome of the perennial conflict between east and west, we have witnessed, unfortunately, very little, in the way of a coherent and realistic policy, beyond a widespread neglect, "benign" or otherwise.

We think the present situation in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran, as the rear-guard of the "strategic consensus", is replete with dangers - and opportunities. From the point of view of a non-involved outside observer; somewhat intimately familiar with the ups and downs of the political, and cultural nuances of the region, I venture to suggest a four-stage policy, in which each stage would logically follow the preceding one. In brief, these include, (1) the securing of Iran and returning it to the fold of the western partnership, (2) formulation of reasonable, rational, and realistic solutions for the problems of the region, including the Palestinian issue, (3) extension of "strategic consensus" to a "grand alliance" which may include countries as diverse as Iran and Israel. And finally, the formulation of a joint economic and military program, which, by means of an "osmosis" of manpower and economic resources, the countries of the region would be able to close the "window of vulnerability" in the face of internal subversion, and external blackmail.

If we agree that the establishment of a Khomeini-style government is prone to subversion and a cause of constant agitation, facing a bloody end, and an inevitable crash, I propose to make certain plans which may place us in control of the "crash". To do so, we have to take a look at and recognize the value of the potential of the "opposition" elements. Almost all information now reaching out of Iran confirms the notion of Khomeini's distinct isolation and a steep plunge of his "popularity". Further, we tend to regard his as an aberration, rather than a general trend, an overwhelming deluge, which is bound to self-destruct, but also leave tremendous amount of devastation in its path. The important point to recognize is that Iran is reaching a point in the development of events when the emergence of a "saviour" becomes both timely and desirable. Now, more than ever, people remind themselves of the "good old days", when they enjoyed

an overabundance of goods and services, full-employment, self-pride, security, and above all, personal safety and liberty, commodities so scarce in many parts of our present day world. I submit that the evolution of the thinking of the people provides us with an excellent point of departure and the regaining of a practical leverage. Rather than allow forces unfriendly to the west, ( such as the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen) to fill the vacuum, I propose action and joint planning, to enable us, i.e., secular, middle-class, forces and the military, to organize, for eventual recovery. It is pertinent at this juncture to point one of the quirks, peculiarities, or "soft-facts", of Iranian perception, a perception at once replete with dangers and opportunities. Iranians, even the highly educated, and even the fanatics, share one common perception that without the blessing of the U.S., no movement, and no plan is going to succeed, no matter how ingeniously it is conceived. The U.S.'s lack of support, and enthusiasm, thus far, partly accounts for lack of a visible, credible, mobility on the part of the "opposition". One prominent columnist in a recent article, correctly made the following observation, in examining the possibilities. He wrote:

"One possibility is steadily growing chaos that will invite intervention by Moscow. But a pro-western outcome is also possible. It would take the form of a military regime supported by the bazaar, the tribes, and the conservative clergy.

The United States has available various means conducive to that outcome. It can encourage states that border Iran and are friendly to Washington, notably Turkey, Oman, and Pakistan, to help the Iranian opposition. Washington can also use its influence to discourage infighting among Iranian exiles who by the mere fact of being in exile, cannot successfully lead the opposition in replacing Khomeini.

Such actions, of course, cannot be brayed aloud at the daily State Department briefings. But for my own part, I hope the Reagan Administration has not stopped groping for the key to Persian Gulf security in the darkness of Iran."

I also basically agree with the notion that, in the final analysis, the solution to Iran's problem, would have to be military. Right now, the potential for such massive mobilization of nationalistic forces do exist. Outside Iranian borders live thousands of some of the best officers of our armed forces, talented, educated, and sophisticated, who, would prefer to have died in a battle for their country than having been forced to

abdicate their honour and their homeland. Thousands of other members of Iran's armed forces are either chafing under the mullahs, or else, languishing in forced retirements. Plan could be arranged to induce mass exodus of members of our armed forces, to settle them in pre-designated training and staging areas. One other factor which has been responsible for the retardation of a unified and thriving movement is the financial factor. Naturally, undertaking such massive operations require the infusion of large sums of money. Ventures of such magnitude are beyond the financial means of any private individual or organization. We propose the encouragement of some of our wealthy and friendly neighbors to assist us financially, by extending us loans, payable, with interest, upon our return to our homeland.

The potential manpower available to our opposition, of course, includes some of the best educated and highly trained technocrats and professionals, various tribes, many mullahs and members of the armed forces who could pool their talent and utilize it in preparation for the final take-over and provide us with invaluable reservoir of human ability.

The role the U.S. could and should play is that of catalyst. Any direct and obvious role for America is certainly not desirable. But the U.S., in its "supervisory" role, could provide us with moral support, intelligence coverage, technical know-how, and friendly advice. Such role keeps the U.S. immune from any risks and minimizes any potential damage to it.

I refuse to liken the mullah rebellion in Iran to that of Bolshevik revolution, as some responsible Americans privately do, and the Iranian exiles to the white Russians. There are material and consequential differences. Our times are materially different from the decade of 1910's, and the international situation has irreversibly changed since Stalin's era. In my opinion, the problem I face in convincing our American friends to help lies in my yet-to-achieve goal of producing a convergence between our two perceptions of events, and the relative ease with which operations of this nature could succeed. To undertake operations of this type, naturally, requires imagination, boldness, and a desire to leave lasting impressions on human history. I see signs of all of these qualities in you, from your speeches and comments.

Today, Iranians are extending their hands toward their American friends, whom they regard as the only powerful source

of succorance. They realize full well that the future of Iran, and the best interest of their country, lie in their partnership with the West. They abhor living under the yoke of totalitarianism, be it a religious fascism, home-grown marxism, or an outright annexation by Moscow. They hope, as I do, that America will reciprocate by shaking their still extended hands.

To sum up, many analysts believe that the crash of the mullah-dominated, communist-infiltrated regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini is all but inevitable. My proposal is that by taking up joint planning, we make the inevitable crash a "controlled" crash. I submit that the only friendly forces to the West, with awesome potentials, a coalition of our armed forces, many tribes, the bazaar people, the minorities, the middle-class, should (and could) be mobilized in a unified front to fill the vacuum of Khomeini's receding power and influence.

To refuse to act and succumb to the temptations of "spontaneous recovery" could, at best, leave Iran under the influence of random factors, and at worst, drive it into the Soviet orbit. I certainly do not discount the risks involved. But I submit that great historic ventures take shape - and succeed - when to skeptics, the chances for success appear dim.

I do hope that the thoughts I have just submitted will deserve your kind attention. They are by no means a final or finished proposal. But I do not see why they cannot be turned into a carefully devised scheme once you agree with the basic principles.

I am seeking your approval for a serious consideration for future deliberations, the opening of a high-level channel of communication, and permission for the onset of intensive joint negotiations until an agreement could be reached which may with your approval. Needless to say, many fine points can only emerge and many details hammered out when a process of serious give-and-take starts between our two sides.



RECEIVED 07 JAN 82 08

TO PRES

FROM PAHLAVI

DOCDATE 01 DEC 81

MCDONOUGH, M

05 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: IRAN

*SISTER*

SUBJECT: LTR & RPT FM SON OF LATE SHAH RE SITUATION IN IRAN

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 08 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*C 2/19 No Action Required per Kemp*

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*W/D (C) MN*

2321

064267

ID #

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

COO 71

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 82103 VO

Name of Correspondent: Thomas M. Foglietta

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Writes on behalf of Mrs. Virginia Chapin, who is concerned about her son, Terry Graham, regarding reports that indicate he is being held in prison by the Iranian government.

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA</u>	<u>Dube</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>82103 VO</u>	<u>KD</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82103, 30</u>
<u>NS SECRETARIAT</u>		R	<u>82104101</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>8210403</u> JV
<u>99DOS</u>		R	<u>8210403</u>		<u>B</u>	<u>1 1</u> JV
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			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: 23 acknowledgements  
NSC # 8202321 JV

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Prime Subject Code: 0021 ----- Secondary Subject Codes: JL003 -----  
BE003.04 -----  
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## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence
  - n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
  - n - 3 - Ron
  - n - 4 - Dutch
  - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
  - n - 6 - Ronald
  - n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
  - n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Nancy
  - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
  - n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

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- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

REFERRAL

DATE: 03 APR 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: WEISS, TED

DATE: 05 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: IRAN

CO

GRAHAM, TERRY

SUBJ: TERRY GRAHAM REPORTEDLY BEING HELD IN PRISON BY IRANIAN GOVT

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 06 APR 82

COMMENTS:

*Michelle E. Norton*  
FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER  
STAFF SECRETARY

----- FOR NSC USE ONLY -----

FOR INFO KEMP

F WH O N C N

March 30, 1982

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your March 5 letter to the President, cosigned by twenty-two of your colleagues, on behalf of Ms. Virginia Chapin and her son, Terry Graham, a journalist who is reportedly being held by the Iranian government.

We appreciate receiving your statement of concern in this matter and knowing of your efforts thus far to obtain information for Ms. Chapin. Please be assured that I have contacted the appropriate advisory staff members and requested that they provide a thorough review of this situation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Ted Weiss  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMP:KIR:Lpt(KMD-7:31)

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL INC.

THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA  
1ST DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
ARMED SERVICES  
MERCHANT MARINE AND  
FISHERIES



1217 LONGWORTH BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-4731

WILLIAM J. GREEN BUILDING  
SIXTH AND ARCH STREETS  
ROOM 10402  
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19106  
(215) 925-6840

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 5, 1982

064267

37  
KD  
President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Recently, we were contacted by Ms. Virginia Chapin, who has a problem that we believe needs and merits your immediate personal attention.

Ms. Chapin's son, who travels under the name of Terry Graham, has been living in Iran for approximately ten years as a journalist. His passport identification bears his given name, which is Arnold Cumbrinck Graham III.

Recent newspaper reports have indicated that Mr. Graham is being held in prison by the Iranian government. He was, according to some reports, arrested on December 8, 1981, for carrying anti-government material.

The Overseas Citizens Emergency Office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs has been most courteous, both to our offices and to Ms. Chapin. That office has not, however, been able to provide any confirmation as to the veracity of these reports.

If Terry Graham is indeed being held captive, then his mother, Ms. Chapin, would like to communicate with him. At a minimum, we would like to confirm whether or not Mr. Graham is, in fact, being held at all.

We ask that you intercede in this matter through our friends the Swiss, through the United Nations, or any other proper diplomatic channels to bring the strongest possible pressure to bear on the Iranian government.

Ms. Chapin and the American people deserve to know whether Terry Graham, who in this country would be protected by the First Amendment, is being held captive in Tehran.

We anxiously await your reply.

Sincerely,

Ted Ted Weiss

✓ Ted Weiss

Tom Tom Foglietta

✓ Thomas M. Foglietta

Mr. Bill Hughes

✓ William J. Hughes

Walter Walter E. Fauntroy

✓ Walter E. Fauntroy

Dick Richard Ottinger  
✓ Richard L. Ottinger

John John LeBoutillier  
✓ John LeBoutillier

Mr. Tom Harkin  
✓ Tom Harkin

Jim James K. Coyne  
✓ James K. Coyne

Shirley Shirley Chisholm  
✓ Shirley Chisholm

Buddy Buddy Roemer  
✓ Buddy Roemer

Joe Joseph P. Addabbo  
✓ Joseph P. Addabbo

Tom Thomas J. Downey  
✓ Thomas J. Downey

Mr. George E. Brown, Jr.  
✓ George E. Brown, Jr.

Bob Robert A. Roe  
✓ Robert A. Roe

Mr. Martin Frost  
✓ Martin Frost

"Senator" Claude Pepper  
✓ Claude Pepper

Mr. Baltasar Corrada  
✓ Baltasar Corrada

Ms. Barbara A. Mikulski  
✓ Barbara A. Mikulski

Mr. Millicent Fenwick  
✓ Millicent Fenwick

Gene Eugene V. Atkinson  
✓ Eugene V. Atkinson

Dan Dan Glickman  
✓ Dan Glickman

Dan Dan Lungren  
✓ Dan Lungren

copies to: General Alexander Haig, Secretary of State  
Ms. Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Representative to the United Nations

next ↓ page

President Ronald Reagan

Page Three

March 5, 1982

Mr. Albert Gore, Jr.

✓ Albert Gore, Jr.



RECEIVED 03 APR 82 10

TO PRESIDENT FROM FOGLIETTA, THOMAS M DOCDATE 23 FEB 82  
 WEISS, TED S 05 MAR 82  
 DUBERSTEIN, K 30 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: IRAN CO GRAHAM, TERRY

SUBJECT: LTR FRM MRS VIRGINIA CHAPIN RE HER SON ARNOLD CHUMBRINCK GRAHAM III  
 WHO IS REPORTEDLY BEING HELD IN PRISON BY THE IRANIAN GOVT

ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY DUE: 06 APR 82 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION  
 STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
 KEMP

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( N / N )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH *ed 4/3 mw* W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY BEARG DYKE

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER *MW*  
 SUBJECT: Response to Virginia Chapin

*Box 95, Solebury PA 18963  
 Bucks County, PA 18963*

We approve the proposed reply (at Tab A) for use in responding to the letter from Virginia Chapin who has written to the Vice President (at Tab B) requesting assistance on behalf of her son, Terry Graham, who is being held prisoner in Iran.

## Attachments

Tab A - Proposed Response  
 Tab B - Incoming Correspondence

NSC # 8201211

(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S# 8204078

Date FEB 25 1982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. William P. Clark  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: The Vice President FROM: Jinny Chapin  
DATE: February 12, 1982 SUBJECT: Son - Terry Graham - held  
prisoner in Iran

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: \_\_\_\_\_ NSC# \_\_\_\_\_

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.  
 A draft reply will be forwarded.  
 A translation is attached.  
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.  
 Other

REMARKS:

*Mary M. Seguntis for*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

(CLASSIFICATION)

Re 1211

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

March 1, 1982

TO: MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

The attached is for your signature  
to Nancy Bearg Dyke.

*MW*

Attachments

*00071  
J2003*

Dear Ginny:

I was distressed to hear about Terry's situation in Iran. I have checked with our people in the Department of State who look after the protection and welfare of American citizens abroad and they assure me that the Swiss are doing everything possible to gain access to Terry and learn as much as possible about the intentions of the Iranian authorities in his case.

The publication of Terry's name in the press was something over which we had no control since the media picked it up from news services in Iran. I am enclosing a copy of a story written about Terry by the associate editor of the Pacific News Service who knows Terry personally. I am told by some experts in such matters, however, that publicity in these cases could do more harm than good. Others, of course, have a different view. The Swiss in Tehran, in general, do not favor publicity in such cases and for the time being at least, I believe we are best advised to follow the judgment of those, like the Swiss, who caution against media attention.

In the meantime, Joyce Gunn at the State Department with whom you are in touch will keep you current on any developments. You can be sure that we are doing everything possible through the Swiss for Terry's welfare.

Sincerely,

George Bush  
Vice President

Enclosure:

Pacific News Service article

**pns**

**PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE**

604 Mission Street, room 1001 • San Francisco, California 94105 • (415) 986-5690

JAIL

Opinion/Analysis

TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE--

WHY THE MULLAHS HAD TO JAIL AN AMERICAN WHO LOVED IRAN

By William Beeman  
Pacific News Service

EDITOR'S NOTE: Terry Graham is one of six Americans still held in an Iranian jail. Unlike other Americans who ran afoul of the Iranian Revolutionary government, Graham was a passionate supporter of the revolution and an ardent devotee of Iranian culture and the Islamic Sufi religion. PNS associate editor and Mideast specialist William Beeman, a longterm acquaintance of Graham's, speculates on the distorted logic that branded Graham an enemy of the country he grew to love. Mr. Beeman, who teaches anthropology at Brown University, worked and studied for seven years in Iran.

The names of three of the six Americans still being held in Iranian prisons recently have come to light. Of the three, Zia Nassary, an Afghan-born naturalized American citizen working on behalf of Afghan refugees, and Erwin David Rabhan, President Jimmy Carter's former political crony, will undoubtedly attract the bulk of public interest.

However, pondering why the third incarcerated American, Terry Graham, now lies in prison may provide analysts with a greater understanding of the nature of the Iranian Revolution, and perhaps give others some insight concerning the difficulties involved in breaking out of the "ugly American" stereotype in developing nations throughout the world.

Terry Graham, whom this writer has known for over a decade, is truly enamored of Iran, its culture and its people. There are not many like him--people who become so engrossed in another culture that they want nothing more than to be allowed to live in close contact with it.

Even among Iranophiles, Graham is a rare individual. He has travelled widely in Asia and Africa, speaks several languages, and has held a variety of jobs as a journalist, writer, entertainer and teacher. On coming to Iran, however, he became engrossed by what he called "the sheer spiritual power of the culture." He converted to Islam, making a special pilgrimage to the shrine city of Mashhad to formalize his vows.

Graham speaks fluent Persian, writes the language with a beautiful calligraphic hand, and can quote the classic poets with the best. With far less knowledge, others have made successful academic careers for themselves. But Graham felt he had a higher calling, while writing for English language newspapers in Tehran for a pitifully small salary, occasionally doing scraps of consulting work for Tehran's pre-Revolutionary international television station, he spent his spare hours translating the writings of the founder of a major modern Sufi sect into English for international distribution. As far as his friends knew, Graham never received a penny for this work. He did it out of the conviction that Iran had an important spiritual message which the world needed to hear. The head of the sect, Ali

Nurbakhshy, incidentally, now has a large apartment in New York, and is still distributing Graham's translations to his Western followers.

Graham was one of the first Americans to come out vocally in support of the Iranian Revolution. He was almost violently outspoken at times concerning the excesses of the Shah's regime. When it became clear that Americans were not going to be able to stay in Iran after the resignation of Shahpour Bakhtiar, he made a monumental decision. Faced with the fact that his visa was due to expire, he declared that he would stay in Iran and become an Iranian citizen.

The plan seemed to work for while. Those who knew him would hear from time to time that he was still in Tehran, writing or working in some publishing venture. At some point in 1980, however, he dropped out of sight. This was probably when he was arrested.

But it is not difficult to guess why Terry Graham is being detained. He is an embarrassment to a revolutionary regime that preaches daily that the United States hates Iran and its Islamic Revolution, that Americans are interested in only one thing in Iran--economic exploitation.

Graham, who stands six feet, five inches and is blond, cannot be hidden. He gave the lie to those statements every time he walked down the street and talked to his greengrocer. Clearly, there is only one reason from the standpoint of the authorities that he stayed in Iran: He must be a spy. By the logic of the Revolution, there is no other conclusion possible.

Undoubtedly, many Americans will find the view of the Iranian authorities eminently plausible. Graham must be a mole. Why else would a red-blooded American boy want to live with the wogs? The question is worth asking seriously, since it reveals one of the paradoxes of our time in a world where Americans are being pressed more and more to extend themselves into the international sphere--in business, scholarship and international politics.

Sadly, the world has come to expect U.S. citizens to behave as "ugly Americans" wherever they go to live outside of their own land. They are especially expected to be either patronizing or contemptuous of exotic religions and social customs.

Since Americans are thought to be constitutionally unable to accept a foreign culture, one who does manage, like Terry Graham, can only have done so because of ulterior motives. The only category readily available for such a person in many parts of the world is, sadly, that of C.I.A. agent.

Parenthetically, the State Department actually seems to punish career officers who develop foreign expertise. Those who understand a culture well enough to interpret it with some accuracy are accused of developing "clientitis" and are quickly quarantined to some other part of the world. The folly of this policy has been seen too often in recent years.

Thus, Americans seem to be damned if you do, damned if you don't situation. Behave like a stereotypical American abroad and be thought a pig; assimilate and be thought a spy.

As the United States reaches out to the increasingly interdependent world, something will have to be done to improve the situation. It's not nice to be a pig abroad, but it's even less nice to be thrown in jail because the American way of living in foreign lands leave no other place for people like Terry Graham.

address file and branch =  
#304 Osage Ave.  
Philadelphia, Pa 19104  
Tel: 215-387-5811

8204078

Box 95  
SOLEBURY  
BUCKS COUNTY  
PENNSYLVANIA  
18963  
215-297-5450

REC'D FEB 16 1982

2/12/82

The Honorable George Bush  
U.S. Senate  
Washington, DC

Dear "Poppy"

I remind you of our Andover connections -  
through Bartlett Hayes - and our meeting at  
The United Nations when you just became U.S.  
Ambassador and visited me in my office - The Hospi-  
tality Committee to U.S. Delegations!

It has recently been made known that my  
son, Terry Graham (Arnold M. COMBRINCK - GRAHAM <sup>3rd</sup>)  
is a prisoner in Iran. I have spoken with the  
Iranian desk at The State Department - as well as  
a long list of U.S. citizens, Iranian student refugees,  
etc - including Bob Bennett of Congressman Tom  
Foglietta's office of the First District, Philadelphia.  
Mr. Bennett has assured me that he will contact  
The offices of the Pennsylvania senators Speck and  
Helm - as well as local congressmen, to see what  
can be activated toward making contact with the  
Swiss Embassy in Tehran in Terry's behalf.



I understand that no charges have so far  
been brought. Considering the temper of the  
Jamaican government. I suspect it is healthier  
for the prisoner if his conditions are reasonable  
during his incarceration. That charges be de-  
layed as long as possible. Particularly if they  
are considered to be of an anti-government nature.  
Terry has been in Jamaica for some years. Knows  
the country well. Speaks Patois fluently. Was stayed  
as a free lance journalist.

His family (no wife. children) - father. Sister.  
etc. will be grateful if we could have your con-  
cern. Most of all. of course. we do not want to  
increase his jeopardy - but are hoping <sup>at least</sup> that with  
the proper influence. The Swiss Embassy may gain  
entrance. be allowed visits and to convey messages  
back and forth between him and us.

With best personal regards

Sincerely

Jimmy Chapin

(Virginia CHAPIN)

P.S. Tho' Terry is an Exeter-Harvard graduate. I trust  
that this friendly "antagonism" will not influence  
your taking an interest in his welfare! rc

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8201211

066568

RECEIVED 26 FEB 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 25 FEB 82

ATZERT, W

18 FEB 82

CHAPIN, VIRGINIA

12 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: IRAN

GRAHAM, TERRY

BUSH, G

SUBJECT: LTR TO VP RE SON HELD PRISONER IN IRAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO WHEELER TO DYKE DUE: 02 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF# 8204078

LOG 8201169

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 3/01 update and memo to Dyke GK</i>			

*C 3/01 update and memo to Dyke GK*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

C0071

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 82103120

Name of Correspondent: B.M. RHETT, M.D.

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: SUGGESTIONS RELATING TO RELATIONS WITH IRAN

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>COHADY</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>82103130</u>			<u>C 82104106</u>
	<u>✓ Dos</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>82104101</u>			<u>A 82104105</u>
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
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- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
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- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 4630 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: C0071 Secondary Subject Codes: C0 165 \_\_\_\_\_  
Hu 040 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

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- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

S/S # 8208881

Date: 4/5/82

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. William P. Clark  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Dr. B. M. Rhett

Date: 3/17/82 SUBJECT: Suggestions Relating to  
Relations with Iran

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 4/1/82 NSC # 068785

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- Others.

REMARKS:

*L. Paul Bremer III*  
L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary

April 5, 1982

B. M. Rhett, M.D.  
Leyherstrasse 56  
8500 Nurnberg  
Germany

Dear Dr. Rhett:

Your letter to the President dated March 17, 1982 was referred to this office for reply.

I appreciate your sharing your views with us on developments in Iran and the region as a whole. As you know the Reagan Administration is keenly aware of the Soviet threat to the region and is doing everything possible to block Moscow's ambitions. We are in contact with our close allies and friendly countries in the area on how best to handle the situation. Your views as well as the views of many other American citizens who convey their concerns to us are factored into our policy deliberations.

Sincerely,

CS/

Ralph E. Lindstrom  
Director  
Office of Iranian Affairs

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

8208881

APRIL 1, 1982

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 068785

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 17, 1982

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. B. M. RHETT  
LEYHERSTRASSE 56  
NURNBERG GERMANY

SUBJECT: SUGGESTIONS RELATING TO RELATIONS WITH IRAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 62, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Received in S/S-I  
4/1 at 11:50 A.M. (CJ)*

8208881

068785

17 March 1982

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20005

Dear Mr. President:

Reading William Safire's "Looking to the Day When Iran Blows Its Lid" (March 82) gives you an entre to your second term, which one needs to complete a reasonable program as President.

Russia is moving on Iran, and the cause was and is former President Carter's failure to support our man, the Shah. I wrote to Mr. Carter from the south of France five months prior to his desertion of the Shah, warning him, to no avail. His Iranian and Nicaraguan withdrawals were Russian 'lullabies'.

I am still the only American to be Chief Officer, later Captain of a Moslem ship (16,000 T) from Egypt to Bangladesh - with favor. The company wanted me to stay - offering me my own ship. The fact that heavy water was an illicit cargo on board my ship, and that I knew of it by our arrival at port - meant nothing to them. This heavy water was reported to the U.S. State Department via our Embassy at Dacca. Now, before Russia moves into Iran and bottles the Arabian Gulf, in the least, I feel that an American with association, input, knowledge and sympathy with the Bangladesh should try to move into 'our gap' created by Khomeini.

This can be done by me, providing I have an independent action and represent the President only. The satellites, the intelligences, the State Department and its divisions spend so much time in jealous clashes.

All I could do is begin a dialect of open communication, the end result of which would be the acceptance of U.S. arms and aid (should that deter the Russians). I would suggest a 'shipping program' entry as our Washington ears and eyes are too open. If we wait one day longer! - when the Russians sense readiness - they will move with or without Khomeini!

Respectfully,

B. M. Rhett, M. D.  
Leyherstrasse 56  
8500 Nurnberg - Germany



# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 071

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 820412

*advised to off with Jones, 10 5/15*

Name of Correspondent: Salim W. Ewing

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Requests the President improve the lot of our religionists in Iran.

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>PL Bing</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>820413</u>	<u>JB</u>	<u>A 820421</u>
_____	Referral Note: _____	<u>  /  /</u>	_____	<u>  /  /</u>
_____	Referral Note: _____	<u>  /  /</u>	_____	<u>  /  /</u>
_____	Referral Note: _____	<u>  /  /</u>	_____	<u>  /  /</u>
_____	Referral Note: _____	<u>  /  /</u>	_____	<u>  /  /</u>
_____	Referral Note: _____	<u>  /  /</u>	_____	<u>  /  /</u>

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- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

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Prime Subject Code: C0071 Secondary Subject Codes: RM 039  
HU 013-99 \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

<u>Code</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>Form</u>
<u>C</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>P-</u> _____
<u>DSP</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>Media:</u> _____

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- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

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- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

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- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

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- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 21, 1982


Dear Mr. Ewing:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 7 to President Reagan regarding the Orthodox Baha'is in Iran.

Due to the issues you raised, I am forwarding copies of your correspondence to the appropriate policy officials at the Department of State for their attention. I am confident your views will be given every consideration.

Thank you for bringing these concerns to our attention.

Sincerely,



Jack Burgess  
Special Assistant to  
the President

Mr. Galen W. Ewing  
Orthodox Bahai Faith  
P.O. Box 1424  
Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701

37

# ORTHODOX BAHÁ'Í FAITH

*Jack Burgess*

National House of Justice

Of the United States and Canada

April 7, 1982

070878


President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Orthodox Baha'i community of the United States, I want to urge you to do all within your power to improve the lot of our coreligionists in Iran. Communications between Baha'is in Iran and in this country are so poor or nonexistent, that all we know is what we read in the press, but it is all too apparent that the rights of Baha'is to liberty and even to life itself are being obliterated. Only increasing the pressure of world opinion, it seems, may have any positive effect on the present government of Iran.

Any support that you can give will be appreciated by all Baha'is.

Respectfully yours,



Galen W. Ewing  
Secretary

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD)

82104112

*relief to office to JB 4/15*

Name of Correspondent: C. R. Cronk

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Urges the President to support the Bahais in Iran.

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>✓ PL Bing</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>820415</u>	<u>JB</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82104120</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				

#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 4800 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: C0071 Secondary Subject Codes: BM039 \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

<u>Code</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>Form</u>
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

### SIGNATURE CODES:

**CPn - Presidential Correspondence**  
n - 0 - Unknown  
n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan  
n - 2 - Ronald Reagan  
n - 3 - Ron  
n - 4 - Dutch  
n - 5 - Ron Reagan  
n - 6 - Ronald  
n - 7 - Ronnie

**CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**  
n - 0 - Unknown  
n - 1 - Nancy Reagan  
n - 2 - Nancy  
n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

**CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**  
n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan  
n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

### MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package  
C - Copy  
D - Official document  
G - Message  
H - Handcarried  
L - Letter  
M - Mailgram  
O - Memo  
P - Photo  
R - Report  
S - Sealed  
T - Telegram  
V - Telephone  
X - Miscellaneous  
Y - Study

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1982


Dear Mr. Cronk:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 6 to President Reagan regarding the Bahais in Iran.

Due to the issues you raised, I am passing along your correspondence to the appropriate policy officials at the Department of State for their attention. I am confident your views will be given every consideration.

Thank you for bringing these concerns to our attention.

Sincerely,



Jack Burgess  
Special Assistant to  
the President

Mr. C.R. Cronk  
Executive Director  
Project Concern International  
P.O. Box 81123  
San Diego, California 92138

# PROJECT CONCERN INTERNATIONAL

Nonprofit nongovernmental health care training and development organization

3550 AFTON ROAD, P.O. BOX 81123, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92138 • USA • Telephone 714/279-9690 • Cable: PROJCONUS

Telex: 695488



"Involved in Mankind"

April 6, 1982

070879

*J. Burgess*

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I ask that you take action. I don't know what action to recommend, but I know you know what can be done.

The Bahais in Iran deserve the support and protection of the U.S. through whatever means you can institute.

I am not a Bahai, but I admire their peaceful methods and peaceful goals, and don't believe the U.S. can stand by while they are slowly but surely annihilated in Iran.

You have the power - you have the influence - to bring pressure to help these people who ask for no more than the right to be peaceful.

Please do what you must and can, now.

Sincerely,

*Bob*  
C.R. Cronk  
Executive Director

CRC/ad

C. R. Cronk  
Executive Director

Quinn K. Matthewson  
Secretary

Shirley A. Sloop  
Chief Financial Officer

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072953CA  
1120  
C0071  
RS  
FGDIA

**CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

DATE: Oct. 18, 1982 NUMBER: 072953CA DUE BY: n/a  
SUBJECT: Report to Congress concerning Iran Emergency

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Baker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vice President	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Deaver	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Clark	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Darman (For WH Staffing)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Harper (original)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Attorney General	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jenkins	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HHS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HUD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Energy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Counsellor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CEA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCCT/Gunn	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CEQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCEA/Porter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OSTP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCFA/Boggs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCHR/Carleson	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCLP/Uhlmann	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCMA/Bledsoe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CCNRE/Boggs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

The attached is forwarded for appropriate handling.

RETURN TO:

Craig L. Fuller  
Assistant to the President  
for Cabinet Affairs  
456-2823

Becky Norton Dunlop  
Director, Office of  
Cabinet Affairs  
456-2800



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON 20220

October 18, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Under section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President is required to submit, once each six months, a report to Congress concerning the Iran emergency. A proposed report, which summarizes developments since your last report concerning the Iran emergency, is enclosed at Tab A. Your last report to Congress, dated May 6, 1982, is enclosed for your reference at Tab B.

I recommend that you forward the proposed report to Congress by November 14, 1982, the end of the current six-month period.

Respectfully,

Donald T. Regan

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Enclosures

BROUGHT FORWARD

073265 cu  
C0071

Previously filed

Date

Name R. Darman

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

073265 cu  
SP 283-23

New File Symbol

Date

Final Action \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_