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Copy Number 41 Series

TS 790039

A STAFF REPORT

concerning

ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

submitted to

The Subcommittee on International Operations
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

* * *

January 18, 1979

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PREFACE


The following report is written in the present tense. Because of the inherent ebb and flow of the activities discussed, certain aspects of the report may now seem outdated, especially in light of recent events such as the turmoil in Iran and recognition of the People's Republic of China. Regardless of these events, however, its integrity and relevance remain intact; many of the highly questionable activities described herein continue, and there now exists no effective institutional structure for controlling them. For that reason, the reduction or even the cessation of foreign agent activities by such forces as, for example, the Iranian secret police, should not be viewed as a harbinger of the end of these activities; rather, it may simply have created a vacuum into which other foreign services will be drawn.

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SUMMARY

Non Responsive



- (1) Chile. Although no intelligence officer of the Government of Chile apparently is currently stationed in the United States, such officers have visited the United States using false

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identification, and their activities were not known. The Chilean intelligence service is a member of a consortium of South American intelligence services, "Operation Condor," which has, in the past, plotted assassinations in foreign countries and maintained files on anti-regime activists. This service maintains close liaison with the German Nazi colony of La Dignidad in Southern Chile, which makes its substantial resources available to it. (P. 7)

Non Responsive

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

Non Responsive



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II. Findings

A. Activities of foreign intelligence agencies in the United States

- (1) Chile. Although no intelligence officer of the Government of Chile apparently is currently stationed in the United States, such officers have visited the United States using false identification, and their activities were not known. The Chilean intelligence service is a member of a consortium of South American intelligence services, "Operation Condor," which has, in the past, plotted assassinations in foreign countries and maintained files on anti-regime activists. This service maintains close liaison with the German Nazi colony of La Dignidad in Southern Chile, which makes its substantial resources available to it.

The Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA, was established in early 1974 following the overthrow of the Allende regime. It was established as an arm of the presidency, under the direct control of President Pinochet. Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, a close friend of President Pinochet, was named as Director. DINA's initial mission was to identify and eliminate subversives in Chile, a problem which was regarded as a legacy of the Allende regime. DINA consisted largely of former police and army officers, numbering, by 1977, some 38,000 personnel and supported by a budget of \$27 million. It was organized in a manner similar to that of other intelligence services.

Shortly after DINA was established, Director Contreras came to the United States to seek American assistance. [REDACTED]

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By 1976, with "subversion" under control, DINA turned its attention abroad. In an effort to monitor the activities of Chilean dissidents outside Chile, DINA began to station agents in Europe and certain South American countries. Apparently, no DINA agents were stationed in the United States, although as described below plans were at one time made to do so.

In August, 1977, President Pinochet dissolved DINA and replaced it with the Central Nacional de Informaciones, or "CNI."* The publicly-announced reason was that DINA had completed its mission. In fact, however, the action was likely the result of pressure from within the United States, where sensitivity to Chilean repression was heightened by the assassination of Orlando Letelier, and also of pressure from within Chile. Church and army leaders there disliked the heavy-handedness of Contreras and were concerned about Chile's international image.

The new Director is the former chief of army intelligence and former ambassador to Uruguay, Odlanier Mena-Salinas. Upon taking over in 1977, Mena apparently carried out a major shake-up of the intelligence organization [redacted] A wholesale dismissal of personnel and a total reorganization

*To avoid confusion, "DINA" is used hereafter in reference

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seems to have taken place. CNI's arrest and detention powers were abolished and placed in the hands of the uniformed police. CNI now has no internal police functions, but does retain an intelligence-gathering mission. Moreover, unlike DINA, CNI is not directly under the President but is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. "Quite an improvement in the human rights record" has occurred in Chile since the shake-up, [REDACTED] the number of illegal detentions and political prisoners and the amount of torture have decreased.

Much of the information in the hands of United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies regarding DINA activities in the United States relates to the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Much, though not all, of that information the Executive Branch declined to provide the Subcommittee, and no effort was made to acquire it in the belief that its acquisition might, however inadvertently, interfere with the Justice Department's investigation and prosecution of that case.* Notwithstanding this embargo, it was learned that Chilean officials

*The indictment handed down by the Grand Jury on February 7, 1977, charged the then-Director of DINA, Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, DINA's then-Director of Operations, Pedro Espinoza, and a DINA agent, Michael Townley, with conspiring to murder Orlando Letelier. Contreras, the Grand Jury charged, ordered Letelier's assassination, and Espinoza conveyed the order to Townley.

-10-

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
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have entered the United States, purchased "bugging" equipment, and have brought it out of the United States using bogus passports. The 1976 entry involved the assassination of Letelier; in 1977, persons accompanying President Pinochet to the signing ceremony of the Panama Canal Treaty used false passports. In the case of one of those visits, the false passports were obtained in Paraguay by DINA officers who might have been acting under the umbrella of an organization known as "Operation Condor."

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Established in 1976, Operation Condor is an international consortium of the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.* Condor conducts joint operations against common targets in member countries for the purpose of countering what it regards as terrorism and subversion. Chile has been the center for Operation Condor, and, under Condor, Chilean intelligence has maintained officers in Chilean embassies in all member countries. Argentine and Chilean intelligence officers have agreed through Condor that if any Chilean is known to be involved in an Argentine terrorist group, Argentine authorities may kill him upon capture. DINA also maintains an officer in the Chilean embassy in Madrid who has responsibility for operations in Western Europe. In addition, DINA has tried to place representatives in France, England and West Germany to monitor the activities of Chilean leftists in those countries. DINA personnel in Condor use civilian, rather than military, cover.

A highly secret dimension of Operation Condor -- the so-called "phase three" operation -- involves the formation of special teams from member countries assigned to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out "sanctions" including assassination -- against Condor enemies. According to the plan, once a given Condor enemy is determined by a first

*Membership has varied from year to year.

-12-

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Condor team to be present in a certain country, a second team from Condor is dispatched to locate and surveil the target. A third team, composed of individuals from one member country or from several, is then issued false documentation from member countries of Condor and dispatched to carry out the actual sanction against the target.

Such a "phase three" operation was planned in 1974 following the assassinations of the Bolivian Ambassador in Paris, a Chilean official in the Middle East, and a Uruguayan attache in Paris. Condor thereupon planned an operation aimed at assassinating three well-known European leftists, one of whom was the notorious terrorist Carlos. The plot was foiled, however, when, during the first team's search for the three targets, it was discovered [REDACTED] warned the governments of the countries in which the assassinations were likely to occur -- France and Portugal -- which in turn warned possible targets ([REDACTED] aware of the identity only of Carlos) and called in representatives of Condor countries to warn them to call off the action. They did -- after denying that it had ever been planned.

The above-described plot is relevant insofar as it provides evidence of Condor's capabilities as well as its possible intentions in planning to open a station in Miami shortly afterwards. [REDACTED] unable to determine Condor's specific purpose in doing so, but [REDACTED] did discover the plan and inform

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the Department of State. The Department considered issuing a formal demarche to the governments involved but Secretary Kissinger objected. Instead, it was decided that [REDACTED] would inform Condor, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that the United States disapproved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Miami Condor station was never opened.

Condor may have become less active in recent months, but [REDACTED] has not, over that period, acquired any information concerning its activities. Whatever its current posture, Condor clearly has the potential of planning and executing drastic covert operations. Indeed, it was barely two years ago that the FBI concluded that "it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase of 'Operation Condor.'"

Another element with an uncertain relationship to DINA is the "Colony". Located in Parral, Linares Province, "La Dignida" was established by former Nazi Luftwaffe officers at the close of World War Two. The Colony is registered as a "farm property"

[REDACTED]

known in the Colony as "The Commander." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] residents must leave Chile through Argentina. The Colony's leadership maintains good relations with Chilean military officials, particularly officers of the Chilean Air Force, who have close ties to the Colony's former Luftwaffe pilots.

The Colony maintains complete autonomy over its territory. Investigations into its activities have always come to an abrupt halt. The Colony's primary source of livelihood is a large dairy farm, although it also produces other agricultural products and engages in some mining. It maintains good relations with the local peasant population, in part because an excellent medical facility maintained by the Colony is open once a week for free medical treatment and medicine to farm families in the area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DINA has maintained a detention center inside the Colony, and there are allegations that torture has taken place there. Allegations also have been made that German personnel, who are described as ex-Gestapo or ex-SS officers, have given instruction in torture techniques and have actually taken part in the application of those techniques. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Colony has received large amounts of money over the years, probably from German Nazis. DINA, which maintains two facilities

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nearby, makes use of the Colony's national and international contacts. Knowledgeable State Department officials believe that they "might very well indeed be part of the so-called network of German exiles in Latin America."

Precisely what actions have been carried out by DINA and Operation Condor, and what role the "Colony" has played, are unclear. "Our knowledge of DINA operations is almost nil," the CIA stated. What is clear is that DINA and Condor possess both the motive and capability to harm United States residents. The former director of DINA, Manuel Contreras, has said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DINA has representatives in all Chilean embassies abroad except behind the Iron Curtain. These agents, he said, served under civilian cover, and their mission included "hittin Chilean enemies in those countries. "We will go to Australia if necessary to get our enemies," he said.

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DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 6/26/2011 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT SHUM AR
SUBJECT: THREATS TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. MARIO GORENSTEIN (PLEASE PROTECT), PRESIDENT OF DAIA (THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY), TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER JUNE 26 THAT HE AND OTHER JEWISH LEADERS HAVE BEEN TOLD BY GOA "AUTHORITIES" THAT TIMERMAN'S ATTACKS ON ARGENTINA COULD PRODUCE ANTI-SEMITIC VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA. GORENSTEIN SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CAMILION TOLD HIM THAT WITH TIMERMAN SO EFFECTIVELY ATTACKING ARGENTINA'S REPUTATION, ANTI-SEMITIC ELEMENTS IN ARGENTINA ARE INCREASINGLY LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ARGUMENT -- PRESUMABLY FROM GOA MODERATES -- THAT ANTI-SEMITIC ACTS WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD. GORENSTEIN SAID THAT HE WAS PRETTY SURE THAT CAMKLION'S ADVICE WAS INTENDED AS FRIENDLY, GIVEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, OTHER JEWISH LEADERS HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT WAS DELIVERED IN A MANNER THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A KIND OF BLACKMAIL. (GORENSTEIN, WITHOUT NAMING THE GOA SOURCES, DESCRIBED THIS SITUATION TO VISITING

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41

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS HEAD, DANIEL BOORSTIN.)

3. COMMENT. WHETHER BLACKMAIL OR FRIENDLY ADVICE, GORENSTEIN SAYS HE IS CONCERNED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF DANGER. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME IN THE GOA MAY WANT TO ENLIST THE JEWISH LEADERSHIP IN AN EFFORT TO GET TIMERMAN TO HALT HIS ATTACKS. BUT ANTI-SEMITIC GROUPS AND ATTITUDES ARE A FACT OF LIFE HERE. VIOLA AND HIS FELLOW MODERATES HAVE DOMINATED THE HARDLINE, ANTI-SEMITIC ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY, BUT THEY MUST CO-EXIST WITH THEM. THE RECENT SPATE OF THREATS TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, THE ATTACK ON COMMUNIST MANFRED SHOENFELD AND THE BRIEF ARREST THIS WEEK OF ABOUT 60 LEFT-OF-CENTER POLITICIANS ATTENDING A POLITICAL MEETING ARE WIDELY AND PROBABLY CORRECTLY RETARDED AS THE WORK OF GROUPS OPERATING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIGHLY PLACED HARDLINERS. AN EDITORIAL IN "LA NACION" AND AN ADVISOR OF VIOLA BOTH USED THE SAME WORDS TO DESCRIBE THE MEN TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS: "GROUPS WHICH OPERATE WITH IMPUNITY."

4. FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT JEWISH TARGETS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTACKED OR THREATENED, DESPITE WHAT FAR RIGHT ELEMENTS HERE REGARD AS TIMERMAN'S "PROVOCATIONS." WE BELIEVE THE GOA MODERATES HAVE PROBABLY MADE AN EFFORT TO RESTRAIN THE POTENTIAL ATTACKERS, USING THE ARGUMENT THAT CAMILION MENTIONED TO GORENSTEIN. THAT RESTRAINT MAY NOW BE WEARING OFF AS TIMERMAN CONTINUES TO SALLY FORTH.

5. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE BEST COURSE FOR NOW IS TO REINFORCE THE MODERATES' WILL TO RESTRAIN THEIR HARDLINE ASSOCIATES. WE SUGGEST THAT A DEMARCHE ON THIS SUBJECT BE MADE BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON -- WITH CARE TAKEN NOT TO EXPOSE GORENSTEIN OR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AS THE SOURCE OF OUR INFORMATION OR CONCERNS. SEE ALSO SEPTEL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CAMILION'S DISCUSSION WITH CHARGE.
RUSER

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Argentina

HAS NO LIAISON WITH THE ARMY RANGER-TYPE COMPANIES; THE ONLY FORM OF LIAISON THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE PFA AND THE ARMY ON COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS TAKES PLACE AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR-MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LEVEL.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

THE ARMY MUST REMAIN

IN THE BARRACKS AND CONCERN ITSELF ONLY WITH CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND NOT WITH SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM. [REDACTED] ALSO BELIEVE THAT A FEAR, OR A "PARANOIA" AS THEY CALL IT, THAT THE

ARMY COULD REVERT TO THE KINDS OF ACTIVITIES WHICH IT CARRIED OUT DURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S IF GIVEN OTHER THAN PURE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES LED TO THE CREATION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE COUNTERTERRORISM UNIT.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 22 FEBRUARY 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: COUNTERTERRORISM ORGANIZATIONS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. THE ARGENTINE ARMY MAINTAINS A COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITY IN THE GREATER BUENOS AIRES AREA. THIS CAPABILITY CONSISTS OF TWO RANGER-TYPE COMPANIES TRAINED TO REACT TO TERRORIST

INCIDENTS, AS OF MID-FEBRUARY 1985.

2. EARLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN), MINISTER OF INTERIOR ANTONIO (TROCCOLI) CREATED A SPECIAL 300-MAN UNIT IN THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA, A SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATION TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR) WHICH HAS THE MISSION OF REACTING TO TERRORIST PROBLEMS ANYWHERE IN ARGENTINA. THIS UNIT CARRIED OUT THREE TRAINING EXERCISES IN 1984. THE PFA UNIT



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29

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A FARM WHICH IS LOCATED IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE AN ESTIMATED THIRTY TO FORTY KILOMETERS IN AN AS YET UNKNOWN DIRECTION FROM BUENOS AIRES CITY, IN SEVERAL GROUPS IN ENCLOSED TRUCKS. ARMY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ARE TRYING TO LOCATE THE FARM, AND THEY ARE USING HELICOPTERS IN THIS EFFORT.)


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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 09 APRIL 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: TRAINING GIVEN TO MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST "MONTONERO" MOVEMENT IN REGARD TO THE TAKING OVER OF BUILDINGS

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] SIXTY MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST "MONTONERO" MOVEMENT RECEIVED A FULL DAY OF TRAINING ON PROCEDURES TO TAKE OVER -- THAT IS, TO SEIZE -- FACTORIES, BANKS, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS. ADDITIONALLY, THE "MONTONEROS" RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE USE OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES IN CARRYING OUT THESE

KINDS OF TAKEOVERS. THEY ALSO HAD INSTRUCTION ON THE WAY TO DEAL WITH FACTORY WORKERS AND BANK AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ENCOUNTERED IN THESE ACTIVITIES. FINALLY, THE "MONTONEROS" WERE GIVEN GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF HOSTAGES AND ON NEGOTIATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

2. [REDACTED] THE "MONTONEROS" WHO RECEIVED THE TRAINING DESCRIBED ABOVE HAD ARRIVED AT THE TRAINING SITE,



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PAGE 01 OF 02
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RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/IN01;
HQS DSA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRW/IN; NPIC FOR PB
CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCN XPNN; HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL FOR INZ; CDR
ITAC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING HOWARD AFB IN IN; 8AF BARKSDALE AFB
LA/INZE; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ/INZE; 92BHW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN, 12 TIS
BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI, INS ATTN COINT, 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//,
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
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FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

CONTENTS

1. ARGENTINA: TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENTS BEGINS

Argentina



1. ARGENTINA: TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENTS BEGINS

//THE TRIAL OF NINE FORMER MILITARY JUNTA MEMBERS THAT BEGINS
TODAY BEFORE A CIVILIAN COURT WILL RAISE POLITICAL TENSIONS AND
AGGRAVATE THE GOVERNMENT'S UNEASY RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES.//

//THE JUNTA LEADERS--INCLUDING THREE EX-PRESIDENTS WHO RULED
FROM 1976 TO 1983--ARE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES COMMITTED DURING THE "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST TERRORISM. RETIRED
AND ACTIVE-DUTY OFFICERS FEAR THE TRIAL WILL TURN INTO AN
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACK ON THE ARMED FORCES AND SET THE STAGE FOR

PROSECUTING SUBORDINATE OFFICERS WHO, IN THE MILITARY'S VIEW, WERE
ONLY OBEYING ORDERS. PROMINENT CIVILIAN POLITICIANS ASSOCIATED WITH
THE MILITARY ARE FANNING THESE FEARS BY ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF
TRYING TO ISOLATE AND PUNISH THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE.//

//THE FAR LEFT HOPES TO USE THE TRIAL FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES.
SEVERAL EXTREMIST GROUPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS PLAN TO
DEMONSTRATE AT THE COURTHOUSE TO ANGER THE ARMED FORCES AND TO
INFLAME THE PUBLIC BY FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO DISPERSE THE
PROTESTERS VIOLENTLY.//

COMMENT: //THE TRIAL WILL PRODUCE A STREAM OF BAD PUBLICITY

8TH AF BARKSDALE AFB
USCINCPAC HONOLULU H
FEMA WASHDC
CINCUSNAVEUR
15TH AF MARCH AFB
NPIC
92BHW FAIRCHILD AFB
CHDR 193RD INF BDE
24 COMPW HOWARD AFB
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR
USCINCLANT NORFOLK V
FICELRANT NORFOLK V
HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL
CDR ITAC
DEPT OF LABOR
DIRNSA
TWO SIX MAU
USREDCOM MACDILL AFB
INS
OLBB 24AD GRIFFIS AF

25AD MCCORD AFB
26AD MARCH AFB CA
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HQ DA
USAFSO/LA
3AD/IN ANDERSEN AFB
CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
CG SECOND HARDIV
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PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 220544Z APR 85 PSN: 041954

ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE MILITARY THAT WILL STRAIN PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S ALREADY POOR RELATIONS WITH THE SERVICES. IF THE PROCEEDINGS DEGENERATE INTO AN ANTIMILITARY DIATRIBE, SOME OFFICERS MAY CONSIDER MOVING AGAINST ALFONSIN WITH EITHER A COUP OR -MORE LIKELY--BACKSTAGE POLITICAL MANEUVERING. // [REDACTED]

//TO MITIGATE THESE DANGERS, ALFONSIN PROBABLY WILL URGE THE COURT TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE TRIAL AND TO DAMPEN INFLAMMATORY

RHETORIC. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY PLEDGED NOT TO PROSECUTE THE OFFICERS WHO ACTUALLY FOUGHT THE "DIRTY WAR," AND IT IS CONTEMPLATING AN AMNESTY THAT WOULD COVER BOTH LEFTISTS AND RIGHTISTS. SUCH A MOVE WILL COME ONLY AFTER THE JUNTA MEMBERS HAVE BEEN CONVICTED, HOWEVER, THEREBY PRESERVING AT LEAST SOME OF ALFONSIN'S STANDING WITH THE LEFT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT. // [REDACTED]

2. GUATEMALA: CHALLENGES AHEAD

//OPPOSITION BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO ECONOMIC REFORMS HAS SEVERELY DAMAGED CHIEF OF STATE MEJIA'S REPUTATION, AND HIS DETRACTORS ARE TRYING TO EXPLOIT HIS WEAKENED POSITION. // [REDACTED]

//MEJIA HAS REPEALED THE UNPOPULAR TAX MEASURES BUT THUS FAR REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S DEMANDS TO REMOVE ECONOMY MINISTER HERNANDEZ AND OTHER OFFICIALS. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAS THREATENED TO CALL A GENERAL STRIKE UNLESS BOTH DEMANDS ARE MET, BUT US EMBASSY REPORTING INDICATES THAT ITS LEADERSHIP MAY BE DIVIDED OVER THIS ISSUE. HERNANDEZ, MEANWHILE, HAS

INDICATED HE MAY ACCEPT A JOB WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. // [REDACTED]

//SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS REPORTEDLY ALSO WANT MEJIA TO REMOVE HERNANDEZ AND OTHER KEY ADVISERS, INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRADE. [REDACTED] THAT JUNIOR OFFICERS REGARD BOTH AS LEFTISTS. THE OFFICER CORPS, HOWEVER, CONTENDS THAT IT REMAINS LOYAL TO MEJIA. // [REDACTED]

//LEADERS OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES RECENTLY MET WITH MEJIA TO DISCUSS ADVANCING THE DATE FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NOW SCHEDULED FOR 27 OCTOBER. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS ARE DEMANDING THAT THE VOTE BE MOVED UP TO JULY AND THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT BE INSTALLED IN SEPTEMBER. // [REDACTED]

COMMENT: //MEJIA'S REPEAL OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS APPEARS TO HAVE TEMPORARILY APPEASED MOST BUSINESS LEADERS. THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S APPARENT INABILITY TO AGREE ON THE STRIKE ISSUE SUGGESTS THAT ITS LEADERS MAY BE LESS INTRANSIGENT IN FUTURE TALKS WITH THE
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PAGE 01 OF 02 DTG: 011039Z MAY 85 PSN: 061156
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OFFICERS INTENDED TO ACT, AND TO REESTABLISH THE COT WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL, AND HE CALLED A 12 APRIL MEETING OF THE ARMY "CRISIS CABINET," DURING WHICH HE ADDRESSED POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES AND AGREED TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE COT -- WITHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S KNOWLEDGE. PARTICIPANTS IN THE 12 APRIL MEETING CIRCULATED AMONG THEMSELVES A LIST OF SEVEN ACTIONS, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF LEFTIST PARTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE COT WOULD CARRY OUT:

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Argentina

TEXT: 1. SEVERAL SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS BROUGHT PRES-
SURE TO BEAR ON BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) HECTOR (RIOS) ERENU,
CHIEF OF THE EMGE, IN THE LATTER PART OF MARCH AND THE FIRST PART
OF APRIL 1985 TO ESTABLISH SOME TYPE OF AN ORGANIZATION TO DEFEND
THE PRESTIGE OF THE ARMY AND THAT OF ARMY OFFICERS WHO WOULD FACE
CIVILIAN COURT TRIALS BECAUSE OF EXCESSES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. THE OFFICERS
PUTTING THE GREATEST PRESSURE ON RIOS ERENU INCLUDED BG IGNACIO
ANIBAL (VERDURA), COMMANDER OF III CORPS; BG JORGE PEDRO (MALA-
GAMBA), DEPUTY COMMANDER OF V CORPS; AND BG ERNESTO ARTURO
(ALAIS), SUBINSPECTOR FOR TRAINING AND ASSIGNED TO THE CAMPO
DE MAYO ARMY BASE.

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2. AGREED TO FORM A "CRISIS CABINET," AS THE EMGE COLONEL CALLED IT,
IN THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF. THIS GROUP HAS THE ROLE OF ATTEMPTING
TO DEAL WITH WHAT THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS SEE AS THE WORSENING
SITUATION OF THEIR SERVICE. THE "CRISIS CABINET" CONSISTED OF

RIOS ERENU; BG MARIO (SANCHEZ), DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE EMGE;

COLONEL (COL) ROBERTO (BOCCALANDRO), SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
ARMY WHO WAS GIVEN THE ROLE OF THE GROUP'S SECRETARY; BG ENRIQUE
BRAULIO (OLEA), CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE (G-2) SECTION OF THE
EMGE; BG LEOPOLDO HECTOR (FLORES), CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONS (G-3)
SECTION OF THE EMGE; COL LUIS (CORDOBA), MEMBER OF THE EMGE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL; COL ARTURO RICARDO (PALMIERI), CHIEF OF
SOCIAL COMMUNICATION FOR THE EMGE; AND COL'S PASCUAL (GUERRIERI)
AND ROBERTO RICARDO (CAMBROSI), THE CHIEF AND DEPUTY CHIEF,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE ARMY COMMISSION FOR INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS.

3. IN A 2 APRIL MEETING, MEMBERS OF THIS ARMY "CRISIS CABINET"
DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD WORK UP AND CARRY OUT A GENERAL STRATEGY
OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) AND THE NATIONAL
CONGRESS TO MAKE DECISIONS FAVORABLE TO THE ARMY. THEY ALSO DE-
CIDED TO SET UP A TACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ("COMANDO DE OPERA-
CIONES TACTICAS" - COT) TO HANDLE TASKS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEIR
GENERAL STRATEGY. THEY ESTABLISHED THE FOLLOWING SUBGROUPS IN THE
COT:

A. OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS - HEADED BY GUERRIERI. THESE ELEMENTS

HAVE THE MISSION OF CARRYING OUT WHAT THE "CRISIS CABINET" CALLS
"SPECIAL ACTIVITIES" TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TION.

B. POLITICAL ELEMENT - HEADED BY CORDOBA.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION ELEMENT - HEADED BY PALMIERI.

THIS ELEMENT HAS THE MISSION OF USING THE MEDIA AND OTHER RESOURCES
TO PLACE THE ARMY IN THE BEST LIGHT POSSIBLE.

4. ON 8 APRIL, THE ARMY "CRISIS CABINET" MET AGAIN, AND RIOS
ERENU ANNOUNCED HE HAD LEARNED THAT CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION OF-

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 01 MAY 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF, AND PLANS FOR, AN
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; VIEWS OF THE CHIEF
OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF AND OTHER SENIOR ARMY
OFFICERS ON POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES

DOI: LATE MARCH TO 12 APRIL 1985

SUMMARY: AS A RESULT OF PRESSURE IN LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL
1985 TO ESTABLISH AN ORGANIZATION TO DEFEND THE PRESTIGE OF THE
ARMY AND OF ARMY OFFICERS AWAITING TRIAL, BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG)
HECTOR RIOS ERENU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE), AGREED

TO THE FORMATION OF A "CRISIS CABINET" IN THE EMGE TO DEAL WITH
THE WORSENING SITUATION OF THE ARMY. MEETING ON 2 APRIL, THE
"CRISIS CABINET" DECIDED (1) TO WORK OUT A STRATEGY TO TRY TO
INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS TO MAKE DECISIONS FAVORABLE
TO THE ARMY, AND (2) TO ESTABLISH A TACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
(COT), WITH THREE SUBGROUPS, TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TION. AFTER LEARNING THAT PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE ARMY HAD FOUND OUT
ABOUT THE COT, RIOS ERENU OBTAINED ITS APPARENT DISSOLUTION. THE
CHIEF OF THE EMGE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE ARMY

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47

PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

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FICIALS HAD HEARD ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE COT AND THAT A NEWS-
PAPER HAD MENTIONED THE COMMAND. HE ADDED THAT, CONSEQUENTLY,
THE COT MUST BE DISSOLVED. WITH SUPPORT FROM SANCHEZ AND BOCCA-
LANDRO, RIOS ERENU SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
COT -- EVEN THOUGH THE OTHER COLONELS IN THE "CRISIS CABINET"
OBJECTED. [REDACTED]
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41

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2

NEWSPAPER "AMBITO FINANCIERO" REPORTED THAT ACTIVE DUTY AND RE-

TIRED OFFICERS HAD CREATED A TACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROTECT THE IMAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) DURING THE TRIAL (BEGUN ON 22 APRIL) OF NINE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER JUNTAS OF THE PRECEDING ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT. A DISPATCH FROM THE WIRE SERVICE "NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS" (NA), WHICH APPEARED IN BUENOS AIRES NEWSPAPERS ON 9 APRIL, REPORTED THAT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) AND ARMY SOURCES HAD DENIED THE REPORT.)

5. ON 9 APRIL, RIOS ERENU RECEIVED REPORTS THAT "OPERATIONAL GROUPS," AS THE REPORT CALLED THEM, OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMY'S 601ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (601ST MI BN) AND TO THE "CAMPO DE MAYO" BASE WERE GOING TO ACT, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE ENGE CHIEF SAID OR DID. HE ALSO RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE COT WOULD BE REESTABLISHED, WITH OR WITHOUT HIS APPROVAL.

6. IN A MEETING RIOS ERENU GAVE A WELL-RECEIVED SPEECH IN WHICH HE SAID THE FFAA MUST GRADUALLY RECLAIM ITS INSTITUTIONAL PLACE IN THE ARGENTINE SOCIETY. HE SAID ALFONSIN'S RADICAL CIVIC UNION (OCR) ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONVINCED THAT ITS FUTURE DEPENDS ON BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE FFAA, ESPECIALLY WITH THE ARMY. HE ALSO SAID THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMY RECOGNIZE THAT, OVER

THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND BY THE COUNTRY WOULD CAUSE THE REVISION OF MANY THINGS. THE CHIEF OF THE ENGE HAD ELABORATED ON, OR HAD GIVEN EXAMPLES OF, THE "MANY THINGS" WHICH HE MENTIONED.)

7. ALSO IN THE MEETING, RIOS ERENU WAS ASKED BY FLORES THAT THE COT BE REESTABLISHED SECRETLY. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THE CHIEF OF THE ENGE AGREED TO REESTABLISH THE COT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION. AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION AT THE 12 APRIL MEETING, RIOS ERENU APPARENTLY

OPTED TO JOIN WITH THOSE ARMY OFFICERS WHO WANT TO TAKE A STRONGER POSITION AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION.)

8. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING CIRCULATED AMONG THEMSELVES A LIST OF SEVEN ACTIONS WHICH THE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE COT WOULD CARRY OUT. THESE ACTIONS INCLUDE ATTACKS ON TARGETS SUCH AS THE HEADQUARTERS OF LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES AND OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. RIOS ERENU SAID HE DISSOCIATED HIMSELF FROM ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE PLANNED ATTACKS.

9. AS OF MID-APRIL, A GOOD BIT OF MANEUVERING APPARENTLY IS GOING ON BETWEEN RIOS ERENU AND MOST OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS (ALL BRIGADIER GENERALS), INCLUDING VERDURA, NALDO (DASSO) (HEAD OF THE LOGISTICS COMMAND), JOSE DANTE ((CARIDI)) (COMMANDER OF V CORPS), AND FLORES. SUPPOSEDLY, THE ARMY'S MAJOR COMMANDERS BELIEVE THAT THE LOW PAY OF ARMY PERSONNEL AND PLANNED CUTS

IN THE SERVICE'S ALREADY LOW BUDGET, COMBINED WITH THE TENSION

WHICH THEY EXPECT THE TRIAL OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS TO PRODUCE, WILL LEAD TO RIOS ERENU'S DOWNFALL AND TO HIS REPLACEMENT AS CHIEF OF THE ENGE BEFORE THE END OF 1985. RIOS ERENU HAS SHOWN HIMSELF VERY SKILLFUL, HOWEVER, IN AVOIDING MEETINGS WITH MAJOR COMMANDERS WHICH COULD WEAKEN HIS POSITION. AS A WAY OF PROTECTING HIS POSITION, RIOS ERENU HAS RECOMMENDED TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOSE HORACIO (JAUHARENA), THE SECOND-RANKING MOD OFFICIAL, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF THE FFAA'S LEADERSHIP. HE HAS MADE THE POINT TO JAUHARENA THAT FREQUENT CHANGES OF THE ARMY'S LEADERS WOULD ONLY BRING CLOSER TO POWER THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE MOST CRITICAL OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION.)

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PARTY/GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE PEOPLE AND A LARGE, CLANDESTINE FLOW OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT INTO ARGENTINA AS INDICATIONS THAT SERIOUS SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES COULD AGAIN OCCUR IN ARGENTINA. HE NEXT CRITICIZED THE WAY IN WHICH THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S WAS CONDUCTED. AND HE BLAMED INEXPERIENCE, THE LACK OF CLEAR AND DECISIVE DIRECTION, AND A LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG GOVERNMENT FORCES FOR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING AND AFTER THE CAMPAIGN. HE THEN MADE THE POINT THAT, FOR THE NEXT COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN, HE WANTS A WELL-SUPERVISED, CENTRALIZED PROGRAM, AND HE ADDED THAT THE COOPERATION OF THE PFA WOULD BE INDISPENSABLE IN ANOTHER COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN.



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Argentina

2. SUAREZ WENT ON TO SAY HE BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

BATTALION MUST PROCEED CAREFULLY IN ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH THE PFA, IN ORDER THAT THE BATTALION CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM IT CHOOSES TO COOPERATE ARE DISCREET AND TRUSTWORTHY. BASED ON SUAREZ' LATTER REMARK, THE BATTALION OBTAINED A LIST BY NAME AND POSITION OF HIGH-LEVEL PFA OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO REVIEW IT AND TO CONDUCT CHECKS THAT WOULD ENABLE IT TO IDENTIFY THE PFA OFFICERS WHO WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE CONTACTS.



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
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ:

OOI: LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL 1985

TEXT: 1. AS OF LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL 1985, COLONEL LUIS

FAUSTINO ADOLFO (SUAREZ), THE CHIEF OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S 601ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (601ST MI BN), WAS INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING INFORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA). IN A LATE MARCH MEETING, SUAREZ EXPLAINED TO A FEW MEMBERS OF THE 601ST MI BN -- INCLUDING MAJOR RODOLFO (DELLATORRE), THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH -- HIS REASON FOR WANTING TO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE POLICE. HE FIRST CITED, AS HE PHRASED IT, APPARENT LARGE-SCALE MILITARY PREPARATIONS BY THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS'



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
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2. [REDACTED] THAT IN RESPONSE TO CAPUTO'S ARGUMENTS, ON 19 OCTOBER 1985 ALFONSIN ASSEMBLED CAPUTO, MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND JUSTICE, DR. CARLOS ROMAN SANTIAGO (ALCONADA) ARAMBURU, AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR, DR. ANTONIO (TROCCOLI), FOR AN ALL NIGHT SESSION DURING WHICH THEY PUT TOGETHER THE LIST OF NAMES OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS TO BE ARRESTED. [REDACTED] THE LIST WAS HASTILY PUT TOGETHER, RESULTING IN ERRORS THAT CAUSED EVEN MORE ANGER AMONG MILITARY RANKS WHEN THE ARRESTS WERE CARRIED OUT. THE WORST INSULT WAS THE IMPLICATION IN THE LISTING THAT ACTIVE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS INCLUDED IN THE LIST WERE ALL SOMEHOW CONNECTED WITH THE SUSPECTED DRUG AND ARMS TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES OF FORMER ARMY

GENERAL GUILLERMO (SUAREZ) MASON. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT AND HIS AIDES DISCUSSED ALL THE POSSIBLE ELECTORAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARRESTS, THEY COMPLETELY FAILED TO REALIZE THE EXTENT OF THE NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO THE

LIST AND THE ARRESTS).



REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 25 OCTOBER 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: BACKGROUND BEHIND THE DECISION OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN TO ARREST MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT BOMBING INCIDENTS

DOI: 23 OCTOBER 1985



TEXT: 1. ON 23 OCTOBER 1985 [REDACTED] ARGENTINE PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) COMMENTED THAT ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER DANTE (CAPUTO) WAS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ARREST MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT BOMBING INCIDENTS. [REDACTED]

THAT FOR TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE ARRESTS TOOK PLACE, CAPUTO CONTINUALLY URGED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE STRONG STEPS AGAINST THE SUSPECTED PERPETRATORS OF THE BOMBING INCIDENTS. CAPUTO, [REDACTED] STRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT HE TAKE STRONG ACTIONS, IN THE FORM OF ARRESTS, IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT STAND FOR THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY.

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31

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PAGE 01
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TOR: 301/2231Z CSN: E1A729

BE CAREFUL NOT TO ATTEMPT ADDITIONAL HAPHAZARD AND UNJUSTIFIED ACTIONS SUCH AS THE ARREST DECREE THEY HAD FIRST ISSUED FOR THE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS.

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Argentina

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 28 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: DESIRE ON THE PART OF SENIOR ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS TO AVERT THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT

DOI: OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: LATE IN THE WEEK OF 20 OCTOBER 1985 A [REDACTED]

EFFORTS BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO DETAIN SIX ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS, THE ARMY SHOULD FOLLOW THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION AND SHOULD PUT TO REST ANY THINKING WITHIN THE SERVICE CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT A COUP D'ETAT. [REDACTED] THAT BASED ON CONVERSATIONS EARLIER IN THE WEEK WITH COMPANY GRADE AND

JUNIOR FIELD GRADE ARMY OFFICERS, HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJORITY OF JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF THE 'ARMED FORCES' TAKING OVER THE GOVERNMENT. HE AND THE GENERAL OFFICER BOTH SAID THAT ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ARMY HAS BEEN UNDUPLY HUMILIATED IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT IF THE INSTITUTION IS "BACKED FURTHER INTO A CORNER," IT MAY PERCEIVE THAT IT HAS NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO STRIKE BACK. THE TWO OFFICERS SAID INDEPENDENTLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD

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43

PAGE 01
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MANNER, REFUSING TO EVEN CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE G-2
INFORMATION WAS VALID.

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Argentina

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[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJECT: CLAIM THAT ARMY INTELLIGENCE HAS INFORMATION LINKING
THE CIVILIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT TO RECENT
BOMBINGS AND BOMB THREATS

DDI: LATE OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO LATE OCTOBER 1985

ITS IS UNDERTAKING

WHY THE SECTION CALLS A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION OF RECENT BOMBING
INCIDENTS IN ORDER TO FIND OUT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THE
G-2 SECTION CLAIMS IT HAS INFORMATION LINKING BOMB THREATS
AGAINST SCHOOLS TO AT LEAST TWO TELEPHONE LINES OF THE CIVILIAN
STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE). G-2 OFFICERS SAY THAT
THEY TOOK THIS INFORMATION TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE ROQUE
(CARRANZA), BUT HE REACTED IN AN EXTREMELY ANGRY AND EMOTIONAL

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Argentina

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, AR
SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY REPORTEDLY
-- CONSIDERING ARMED ACTIONS AGAINST
-- GOVERNMENT

1. ~~REDACTED~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DEPARTMENT IS RECEIVING OUR REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY MAY BE CONTEMPLATING ARMED ACTION AGAINST THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. THE SURREAL ASPECTS OF SO INCOMPREHENSIBLE AN ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE FOLLOWING LIGHT. ARGENTINA IS ONLY FOUR DAYS AWAY FROM GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR CONGRESS AND LOCAL OFFICES. THE OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS IS THAT ALFONSIN'S PARTY WILL BE STRONGER AFTER THE ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE SEEN AS A PLEBECITE ON ALFONSIN, WITH ALFONSIN AND HIS PARTY STRENGTHENED THE HARD LINE MILITARY SEE THEIR FUTURE IN BLEAKER TERMS. CURRENTLY THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO LIVE WITH DEEP SALARY AND OPERATING FUND CUTS. THE TRIALS OF NINE FORMER MILITARY JUNTA LEADERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES ARE ENDING. MOST, IF NOT ALL, WILL BE GIVEN PRISON TERMS. HUNDREDS OF OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS ARE FEARFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL BE PUT ON TRIAL AND SUBJECT TO PUNISHMENT. THE BUMBLING AND REPEATED ARRESTS, COURT RELEASES AND RE-ARRESTS OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS AND THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SEIGE APPARENTLY AIMED AT THE MILITARY HAS BROUGHT REACTIONS BY MANY MILITARY OFFICERS TO A FEVER PITCH. DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE INTERPRETED BY MANY MILITARY, AIDED AND ABETTED BY RETIRED OFFICERS AND SOME CIVILIANS, AS DEFILING THE ARMY'S HONOR. TO LARGE NUMBERS OF OFFICERS "HONOR" OFTEN TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER COMMON SENSE. THEREFORE THERE EXISTS AN INCREDIBLE POSSIBILITY THAT A SMALL GROUP MAY DECIDE TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES WOULD REACT VERY STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH AN ATTEMPT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN COUNT ON ANY SIGNIFICANT ARMED UNITS TO DEFEND HIS ADMINISTRATION EVEN AGAINST A SMALL BAND OF ZEALOTS BECAUSE OF THE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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35

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8994 DTG: 291614Z OCT 85 PSN: 062723

GENERALIZED STATE OF REJECTION OF AND ANGER AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE WHO ALSO ARE ON SHORT RATIONS. THUS ANY SERIOUS MILITARY ACTION, EVEN IF IT WERE A DESPERATE LAST-DITCH ACTION BY A SMALL BAND OF CRAZED FANATICS COULD RESULT IN INCALCULABLE DAMAGE TO ARGENTINA JUST AT THE TIME WHEN THINGS HERE SEEMED TO BE WORKING OUT.

EXDIS

3. TRADITIONALLY COUPS IN ARGENTINA HAVE MAJORITY POPULAR SUPPORT WITH A POPULAR MANDATE OF SORTS FOR SPECIFIC CHANGES. WE NOW FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF COUP -- TO PROTECT THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION AND PARTICULARLY THE LIFESTYLES OF ITS OFFICERS. THERE IS NO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL OR POLITICAL PROGRAM FAVORED BY THE MILITARY THAT MIGHT TAKE OVER ALTHOUGH THEY MAY FIND CIVILIAN ALLIES AMONG EXTREME CONSERVATIVES AND SOME LABOR LEADERS WHO HAVE LONG SEEN THE MILITARY, NOT THE BALLOT BOX, AS THEIR ROAD TO POWER. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PROGRAM WITH ITS SHARPLY INCREASED TAXES AND FORCED SAVINGS IS SEEN AS A DIRE THREAT BY SOME OF THESE BUSINESS INTERESTS.

EXDIS

4. DURING THE PAST 48 HOURS I MET FOR FRANK SESSIONS WITH THE FOUR KEY CIVILIANS, THE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY. IN EACH CASE I ASSURED THEM OF OUR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND URGED A LEVEL-HEADED APPROACH. THEY COMPLAINED THAT THEY HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE ON THE DOMESTIC SITUATION AND ASKED FOR OUR HELP. I TOLD THEM WE WOULD PROVIDE ANY INDICATION WE PICKED UP OF WHAT SEEMED TO US TO BE SERIOUS THREATS TO DEMOCRACY. LAST NIGHT JUST BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH THE MILITARY

EXDIS

HIGH COMMAND WE PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UNCORROBORATED REPORTS INDICATING SOMETHING MIGHT BE AFOOT.

5. SOME, APPARENTLY INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY, BELIEVE THAT THE RADICALS STARTED THIS WHOLE SCENARIO THEMSELVES AS AN ELECTION PLOY. CAPUTO AND ALFONSIN REPORTEDLY TOLD THE URUGUAYANS THAT THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THEY ACTED CAME FROM US, AND EVEN INVOLVED URUGUAYAN MILITARY COOPERATION. HOWEVER THIS SITUATION MAY HAVE STARTED, THE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY HAS DUG ITS HOLE DEEPER AND IT WILL REQUIRE GOOD MANAGEMENT AND SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE MILITARY TO AVOID A SITUATION NOW -- OR ONE BUILDING -- WHICH WILL BRING NEW VIOLENCE.
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PAGE 01
EOB012

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EXDIS

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT PASS USCINCSO

E. O. 12356; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, AR
SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY REPORTEDLY

EXDIS

6. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO REPORT THESE INEXPLICABLE AND LAMENTABLE DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE WE SHALL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE STEPS OPEN TO US -- OUR INFLUENCE OVER THE MILITARY IS LIMITED -- TO HELP ASSURE ARGENTINA'S TENDER DEMOCRACY SURVIVES THIS LATEST IN A LONG SERIES OF TESTS. ORTIZ
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PAGE 01
EOB:16 AN007754

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Argentina

~~SECRET~~

DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/CUBA

SUBJ: REQUEST BY MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH, LEADER OF THE
LEFTIST ARGENTINE "MONTONERO" MOVEMENT, THAT CUBAN
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO RUZ HELP WITH RESOLVING
INTERNAL MOVEMENT PROBLEMS


DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: 1.

... THAT DIVISIONS
AMONG SENIOR MOVEMENT LEADERS HAD REACHED A CRITICAL POINT. HE
POINTED OUT THAT AS A RESULT, DETAINED "MONTONERO" LEADER
MARIO EDUARDO (FIRMENICH) SOUGHT CUBAN ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING
THE MOVEMENT'S DIVISIONS. HE NOTED THAT FIRMENICH HAD SENT A
LETTER TO CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL (CASTRO) RUZ IN WHICH HE ASKED

THE CUBAN LEADER TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH KEY "MONTONERO" FIGURES
ROBERTO CIRILO (PERDIA) AND FERNANDO (VACA) HARVAJA TO
CONVINCE THEM TO SUBMIT TO FIRMENICH'S DIRECTION OF THE
MOVEMENT. THE "MONTONERO" ADDED THAT FIRMENICH HAD COMPLAINED
IN HIS LETTER TO CASTRO THAT THE DEDICATION OF PERDIA AND VACA
HARVAJA TO THE PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTION IS IMPERILING THE
POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE "MONTONEROS."

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PAGE 01
EOB142

DTG: 312208Z OCT 85 PSN: 066681
TOR: 304/2209Z CSN: EIA780

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THAT THE OFFICERS IN QUESTION COULD BE REMOVED BY MEANS OF "RETIREMENT" FROM ACTIVE DUTY; RATHER THAN BY MEANS OF A POTENTIALLY TRAUMATIC DISMISSAL.

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
2. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN STRESSED TO THE FOUR SENIOR OFFICERS THAT HE IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN END TO THE TRIALS OF FFAA OFFICERS ON CHARGES RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. HE NOTED, THOUGH, THAT THE SENIOR OFFICERS MUST BE REMINDED THAT IN ADDITION TO SERVING AS PRESIDENT, HE IS A POLITICIAN AND THEREFORE CANNOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF TRIALS UNTIL AFTER THE 3 NOVEMBER OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS.

OP IMMED
DE RUEAIIA #4626 3042207
O 312208Z OCT 85

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Argentina

~~SECRET~~



DIST: 31 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: REMARKS OF PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES CONCERNING THE DOMESTIC SITUATION AND THE SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

DOI: 28 OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT TOLD THE [REDACTED] SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) WHEN HE MET WITH THEM ON [REDACTED] THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS FULLY AWARE OF THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN EACH SERVICE BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL WHO FAVOR A COUP D'ETAT. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN THANKED THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF EACH OF THE THREE SERVICES FOR THE INFORMATION WHICH THEY HAD PROVIDED TO

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS IN THE SERVICES. ALFONSIN THEN MADE THE POINT THAT GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION, HE FELT IT APPROPRIATE TO ORDER THE CHIEFS OF STAFFS OF EACH SERVICE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REMOVE OFFICERS INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE MOST EXPEDIENT MANNER POSSIBLE. HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE WANTED THIS DONE CALMLY AND QUIETLY, AND THAT HE SAW NO NEED FOR UNDUE HASTE OR FOR THE CREATION OF "TRAUMA." HE SUGGESTED

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COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH INFANTRY BRIGADE IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF TUCUMAN; AND VICTOR (PINO), FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SECOND CORPS IN ROSARIO WHO NOW SERVES AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT. [REDACTED] THE AIR FORCE IS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION WITH GREAT CARE IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT RUMORS AND TALK OF PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT ARE PART OF AN ARMY PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION INTO CHANGING ITS CURRENT POLICIES TOWARD THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA).

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
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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



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DIST: 31 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: BELIEF IN THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE THAT "SECTORS"
OF THE ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN PLANS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT

DOI: LATE OCTOBER 1985



TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE AIR FORCE IS CONVINCED THAT "SECTORS" IN THE ARGENTINE ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN PLANNING ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. HE CLAIMED HE COULD PERSONALLY CONFIRM THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS GOING ON BECAUSE HE HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION--WHICH HE DECLINED--FROM AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY COLONEL, WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, TO ATTEND MEETINGS HELD TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE FAA GENERAL STAFF HAS INFORMATION INDICATING THAT HIGH-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS REGARD, THE NAMES OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY BRIGADIER GENERALS HAVE APPEARED IN THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE AIR FORCE: MARIO JAIME ((SANCHEZ)), DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE); LEOPOLDO HECTOR ((FLORES)), CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (G-3) OF THE EMGE; JUSTO ((ROJAS)) ALCORTA,



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 [REDACTED] DTG: 312250Z OCT 85 PSN: 066769
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
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Argentina

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DIST: 31 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: A PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNING
RADICAL CIVIC UNION FOR THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS
DOI: 1985



SUMMARY: A DOCUMENT [REDACTED] PRESENTS A PLAN FOR

THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC

UNION (UCR) FOR THE ARGENTINE 3 NOVEMBER 1985 OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS. THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UCR CAMPAIGN CONSISTS IN ACHIEVING A VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISK OF THE PARTY'S LOSING ITS MAJORITIES IN LEGISLATURES AND COUNCILS AT THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS. THE DOCUMENT SETS TWO PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES FOR THE CAMPAIGN: AS THE MAXIMUM OBJECTIVE, TO GENERATE AMONG THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE A STATE OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL ALARM" ON THE GROUNDS OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT; AND AS A MINIMUM, TO CREATE A SENSE OF INSECURITY ABOUT A NEW OUTBREAK OF INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. IT GIVES AS THE PARTISAN OBJECTIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN THE POLARIZATION OF "ALARMED" CITIZENS AND THE PROMOTION OF THE FIGURE OF RAUL ALFONSIN AS THE ONLY GUARANTOR OF DEMOCRACY. IN SIXTEEN PAGES THE DOCUMENT DETAILS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE UCR COULD CONDUCT A

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO A DOCUMENT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PREPARED A PLAN BY WHICH THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) COULD CONDUCT ITS CAMPAIGN FOR THE ARGENTINE 3 NOVEMBER 1985 OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS. THE DOCUMENT SETS FOUR OBJECTIVES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, AS FOLLOWS:

- A. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. TO ACHIEVE A PERCENTAGE OF VOTES WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISK OF THE UCR'S LOSING MAJORITIES IN LEGISLATURES AND COUNCILS, AT THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS.
- B. ELECTORAL OBJECTIVE. TO PICTURE THE UCR AS THE ONLY ELECTION OPTION TO SUCH ALTERNATIVES AS A COUP D'ETAT, FASCISM, AND CHAOS.

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES.

(1) TO GENERATE AMONG THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE A STATE OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL ALARM" BASED ON THE PROBABILITY OF AN EVENTUAL COUP D'ETAT AND, AS A MINIMUM, TO CREATE INSECURITY ABOUT A NEW OUTBREAK OF INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM;

(2) TO OBTAIN THE "ATOMIZATION" OF THE VOTERS WHOM THE UCR CANNOT WIN.

D. PARTISAN OBJECTIVE. TO POLARIZE THE "ALARM" OF CITIZENS, AND PUT FORTH THE FIGURE OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) AS THE ONLY GUARANTOR OF DEMOCRACY.



A. THE THREAT OF A COUP D'ETAT. IF FEASIBLE--

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PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 312250Z OCT 85 PSN: 066769

SHOULD AN OPPORTUNITY ARISE, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SHOULD CHARGE AT SOME POINT BETWEEN 19 AND 22 OCTOBER THAT THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT. THE IDEAL SITUATION FOR THIS ACTION COULD BE SOME UNUSUAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE ARMY OR THE NAVY. IF SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE, AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD CONSIST IN RAISING THE PERCEPTION THAT AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC GROUP EXISTS, BY SETTING OFF A NUMBER OF BOMBS IN ONE NIGHT AT OFFICES OF THE UCR, OF LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES, OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF OTHER LIBERAL ORGANIZATIONS. ✓

B. OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE. THE PLAN SAYS THE UCR SHOULD ADVOCATE FEWER CONSCRIPTS AND SHORTER TERMS OF SERVICE. //

[REDACTED]

C. THE ATONIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORATE. IN SUPPORT OF THIS THEME, THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DOCUMENT INCLUDE GIVING THE APPEARANCE THAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF PERONISM ARE EXACERBATING.

D. THE DEFENSE LAW. THE DOCUMENT RECOMMENDS THAT THE UCR POINT OUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED DEFENSE LAW WOULD DO AWAY WITH THE "DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY," UNDER WHICH THE PRECEDING MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATED. IT ADDS THAT THE CAMPAIGN COULD PICTURE PERONIST OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION-SPONSORED LAW AS SUPPORT FOR THE "DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY."

E. THE LABOR MILITARY PACT. THE DOCUMENT RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTY CONTINUE WITH THIS THEME WHICH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN USED IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE 1983 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

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PAGE #2 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 312250Z OCT 85 PSN: 066777

7. IN DISCUSSING THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE UCR ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE DOCUMENT POINTS OUT THAT THE GAC AND

THE GPC SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCR CAMPAIGN AT THE LEVEL OF THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY. IT ADDS THAT A COORDINATOR FOR THE GAC/GPC SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO EACH SIDE OFFICE IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. IT NOTES THAT SIP SHOULD ADD A COORDINATOR TO WORK WITH NEWS AGENCIES, RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION, AND NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES.

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THAT THE DOCUMENT DISCUSSED ABOVE IS CIRCULATING AMONG OFFICERS OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE). [REDACTED] EMGE OFFICERS ARE DIVIDED IN THEIR OPINIONS OF THE DOCUMENT, WITH SOME BELIEVING IT IS AUTHENTIC AND OTHERS BELIEVING THAT IT IS A FORGERY.)

9. [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]
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TOR: 318/0359Z CSN: EIA130

TEXT: 1. IN LATE OCTOBER 1985, [REDACTED]

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Argentina

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DIST: 13 NOVEMBER 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE AND ALLEGATIONS OF A
RIGHT WING CONSPIRACY

DOI: END OCTOBER 1985

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT ALFONSIN IS FURIOUS AT THE OFFICIAL
INEPTITUDE WHICH MADE THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE
NECESSARY ON 25 OCTOBER TO COVER UP VARIOUS TRANSGRESSIONS OF
LEGAL PROCEDURE COMMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT ARRESTED 12
PEOPLE IN RESPONSE TO A RECENT WAVE OF BOMBINGS DURING THE
RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS ON 3 NOVEMBER. THE 12 WERE CHARGED
WITH RIGHT-WING CONSPIRACY ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION OBTAINED
THROUGH TELEPHONE TAPS. MAXIMUM GOVERNMENT PRESSURE IS BEING

EXERTED ON THE JUDGES WHO ARE DEALING WITH RESULTING HABEAS
CORPUS SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DETAINEES. BECAUSE SIX OF
THEM WERE ARMY OFFICERS, CHIEF OF STAFF RIOS ERENU HAS
SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION IN PROTEST. IT IS EXPECTED THAT
SEVERAL OF THE MINISTERS INVOLVED IN THE ARRESTS WILL BE
REPLACED. END OF SUMMARY.

[REDACTED] PRESIDENT RAUL
(ALFONSIN) HAD NOT INTENDED OR WANTED THE 25 OCTOBER
DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE AND HAD BEEN INFURIATED WITH
OFFICIALS WHOSE INEPTITUDE HAD MADE THE MOVE NECESSARY. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ALFONSIN WAS BY NATURE HIGHLY IMPULSIVE
AND HAD FELT THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE
TAKING SOME ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT WAVE OF
BOMBINGS. THE 21 OCTOBER DETENTION OF SIX MILITARY MEN AND SIX
CIVILIANS AS RIGHT-WING CONSPIRATORS HAD BEEN THE CHOSEN

RESPONSE AND THE STATE OF SIEGE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN REQUIRED
TO COVER UP ERRORS AND LEGAL TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S
CASE. [REDACTED] ALFONSIN WAS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SPATE OF BOMB THREATS MADE TO
SCHOOLS BECAUSE HIS GRANDCHILDREN ATTENDED ONE OF THE
ESTABLISHMENTS AFFECTED.)

2. AS FAR AS THE DOZEN ARRESTEES WERE CONCERNED, THE
AUTHORITIES WERE EXERTING MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO BRING INTO LINE
THE JUDGES WHO WERE DEALING WITH RELATED HABEAS CORPUS
SUBMISSIONS. THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THOSE DETAINED RESTED
UPON THE PRODUCT FROM TELEPHONE TAPPING, WHEN THE HARSH
EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS WAS OPEN TO EXAGGERATED INTERPRETATION.
THIS WAS EVIDENT WITH REGARD TO COL. PASCUAL (GUERRIERI), WHO
HAD BEEN INVOLVED, AT THE BEHEST OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF COL.
HECTOR (RIOS) ERENU, IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENSE OF
THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS, CURRENTLY ON TRIAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS DURING COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS. GUERRIERI COULD
CONSEQUENTLY HAVE MADE SOME OUTSPOKEN REMARKS, BUT HE DID NOT
APPEAR TO BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO ANY RIGHT-WING COUP PLOTS.

ALTHOUGH HE HAD LAST YEAR ORGANIZED THE RAID ON THE ROSARIO

COURTHOUSE, IN WHICH INCRIMINATING "DIRTY WAR" DOCUMENTS HAD
BEEN STOLEN, HE HAD DONE SO WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF
THE THEN DEFENSE MINISTER, RAUL (BORRAS). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHAOS CONTINUED TO REIGN IN THE
ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY
SERVICE SET UP BY THE RADICALS HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A BOMB
THREAT IN A TELEPHONE CALL TRACED BACK TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF
THE 601ST BATTALION ARMY, INTELLIGENCE. THE AUTHORITIES ALSO
SUSPECTED THAT UNFAVORABLE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAD BEEN
ASSEMBLED ABOUT THE SEXUAL AND COMMERCIAL DEALINGS OF PROMINENT
RADICAL ELECTORAL CANDIDATES SUCH AS LEOPOLDO (MOREAU) AND
MARCELO (STUBRIN), AND THAT THESE WERE BEING LEAKED TO THE
PRESS.)

3. APART FROM THE TELEPHONE INTERCEPTS, THE AUTHORITIES
HAD NO HARD EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DETAINEES. THE GOVERNMENT
HAD, HOWEVER, DRAWN UP A FURTHER LIST OF SOME 40 SUPPOSED
SUBVERSIVES WHO HAD A REPUTATION FOR RIGHTWING NATIONALISM.
THESE INCLUDED ABOUT 30 SERVING OR RETIRED ARMED FORCES

OFFICERS, ONE OR TWO JOURNALISTS AND, QUITE MISTAKENLY, CERTAIN
FIGURES WHOSE POLITICAL INCLINATIONS SHOULD NOT BE CALLED INTO
QUESTION.

4. IN VIEW OF THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE FIRST
DETENTIONS, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACT ON
THE BASIS OF THIS CATALOGUE, BUT A CAMPAIGN OF CHARACTER
ASSASSINATION WAS TO BE EXPECTED, IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THE
IDEA THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD EARLIER BEEN JUSTIFIED IN
TAKING DRASTIC STEPS. IN THAT RESPECT, THE FORMER
NATIONALIST/PERONIST LEADER, GUILLERMO PATRICIO (KELLY), WOULD

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 140029Z NOV 85 PSN: 011899.

PLAY A PART, SINCE HE HAD PUBLISHED A LIST OF ABOUT 40 ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS. SOME OF THESE, SUCH AS THE LAWYERS JAIME (SMART), RETIRED COL. OSVALDO (RIVEIRO) AND CARLOS (ACUNA), WERE ALSO MARKED DOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. THE ISSUE OF THE DETENTIONS AND THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE HAD BEEN HANDLED PRIMARILY BY CARLOS (ALCONADA) ARAMBURU, MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND JUSTICE;
BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
ANTONIO ((TROCCOLI)), MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR; ROQUE ((CARRANZA)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE; AND DANTE ((CAPUTO)), MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ALCONADA ARAMBURU WOULD PROBABLY

PAY THE PRICE FOR HIS BUNGLING AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY NATIONAL DEPUTY JORGE ((VANOSSI)) IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, GEN. RIOS ERENU HAD BEEN PLACED IN A PAINFULLY DIFFICULT POSITION FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF ARMY PERSONNEL AMONG THE SUPPOSED CONSPIRATORS, AND HAD PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION ON 25 OCTOBER. THE GOVERNMENT HAD URGED HIM TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL AFTER THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, SINCE THEY COULD NOT AFFORD A CHANGEOVER AT SUCH A CRITICAL TIME AND, ANYWAY, HAD NO OBVIOUS CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED HIM.



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Argentina

Argentina: Grappling With Intelligence Reform

When President Alfonsin took office in December 1983 he inherited a chaotic intelligence apparatus whose mission and mind-set was out of step with Argentina's new democratic system. The President soon made clear in public statements that he had little confidence in these services and would make intelligence reform a priority. Alfonsin began several reforms, but military resistance to change and a lack of capable intelligence officials loyal to the government have hampered these initiatives. Moreover, a string of scandals has raised charges of corruption and incompetence and reinforced the public's conviction that Alfonsin does not fully control the intelligence services. The President is now trying to reorganize the intelligence community and has proposed legislation that would severely restrict the military's autonomy. We believe, however, that military intransigence and civilian weakness will frustrate efforts at change and that the military intelligence services in all likelihood will continue to serve their own interests—rather than those of the elected government—for the remainder of Alfonsin's term.

A Tarnished Image

Argentina's many intelligence services (see inset) enjoyed favored status under the 1976-83 military government. According to academic and press accounts, the services operated virtually independently of the military junta, seldom coordinated their activities or shared information, and frequently tried to discredit and sabotage one another. Testimony from ongoing military trials indicates that all the services committed human rights abuses during the "dirty war" against terrorism, and heavy press coverage of the court proceedings has reinforced the public's negative opinion of the intelligence community.

Civilian Services. Alfonsin announced publicly early in his administration that cleanup of the intelligence services would be high on his agenda. The President used charges that the civilian intelligence service,

SIDE, had conducted illegal surveillance of Argentine legislators to justify a purge of all senior staff officers with military rank or who had been appointed during military rule. he replaced many key officials with loyalists from his own Radical Civic Union who would represent administration interests and implement reforms. These moves, in our view, enhanced Alfonsin's control over SIDE, but did so at the cost of the service's professionalism. many career officers resented the appointment of inexperienced individuals to senior positions and resigned from the service.

We believe that these losses gutted SIDE's operational capability and left Alfonsin with no dependable, nonmilitary, source of intelligence. Alfonsin tried to fill this breach by organizing his own parallel intelligence organizations. he established extraofficial groups within the Ministries of Defense and the Interior that operated for roughly two years before being exposed in a scandal referred to by some Argentine political commentators as Alfonsin's "Watergate."

The case hit the Buenos Aires' headlines early this year when relatives of real estate magnate and kidnap victim Osvaldo Sivak alleged that elements within SIDE and the Federal Police had inadequately investigated his case and extorted ransom money from the family. Heavy press coverage forced Alfonsin to order an investigation that subsequently revealed the involvement of members of his parallel groups, according to the US Embassy. This evidence unleashed a deluge of criticism from the opposition; Congress demanded that Interior Minister Troccoli and then Defense Minister Lopez explain these

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ALA LAR 86-022
12 September 1986

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Argentine Intelligence Services

State Intelligence Secretariat (SIDE) . . . serves as central repository for internal/external intelligence . . .

. . . directly responsible to the President.

Army Intelligence Service (SIE) . . . reports directly to Army General Staff and Ministry of Defense . . . its staff . . . is the largest in the military services . . .

. . . all intelligence is reported to the Military Intelligence Collection Center (CRIM)—formerly the 601st Army battalion—which has responsibility for processing the information.

Air Force Intelligence Service (SIFA) . . . reports directly to Air Force General Staff and Ministry of Defense . . . operates through officers within Argentina and attaches abroad . . .

Navy Intelligence Service (SIN) . . . reports directly to Navy General Staff and Ministry of Defense . . .

. . . worst record of human rights abuses during the dirty war.

Superintendency of the Interior . . . reports to Federal Police and the Ministry of Interior . . . main central repository of criminal information . . . responsible for enforcing all federal laws . . . under National Defense Law, will assume internal intelligence collection duties from military.

Naval Prefecture Intelligence Service . . . reports to Naval Prefecture (roughly equivalent of US Coast Guard) and Ministry of Interior.

Gendarmerie Intelligence Directorate . . . reports to National Gendarmerie (border police) and the Ministry of the Interior.

irregularities. The Embassy reports that Troccoli weathered the storm largely because of extensive support from Radical Party leaders, but that Lopez resigned to protest what he called the administration's mishandling of the affair.


Other scandals have also damaged the civilian service's reputation. A SIDE officer accused of involvement in the 1983 kidnaping of an Argentine magazine editor, for example, easily eluded law enforcement officials and escaped to Spain, according to US Embassy and press reports. Chagrined SIDE officials subsequently urged Alfonsin to negotiate his extradition with Madrid. The Embassy reports, however, that SIDE was unable to provide the evidence necessary to convict him when he returned to Buenos Aires, causing the courts to release him.

Finally, another case that is now unfolding in the Argentine press reveals that at least one of Alfonsin's political appointees was a traitor. The SIDE officer, named to a post in Geneva in 1983, recently vanished; the government has accused him of selling SIDE codes to the British, according to the US Embassy. This scandal cast doubt on Alfonsin's judgment and led to a round of public name calling among Radical Party officials. Former Defense Minister Lopez publicly denounced the head of SIDE for covering up the case, the SIDE chief blamed Lopez for appointing the accused, and both pointed the finger at Alfonsin.

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A series of intelligence community scandals has forced Alfonsín to step up his lagging reorganization plan. [REDACTED] The Economist ©

Military Intelligence. Although overshadowed in the press by SIDE's blunders, the military services have been implicated in several scandals, according to Embassy and defense attache reporting. In September 1985, a wave of terrorist bombings afflicted Argentina. The government—advised by SIDE that extremist elements within the military were trying to foment trouble prior to the November elections—arrested six active duty and retired officers for masterminding the violence. Although evidence against the alleged perpetrators was inconclusive and they were eventually released, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] tended to substantiate SIDE's contention that elements within military intelligence had engineered at least some of the bombings to give the impression that Alfonsín was not in complete control of the country. [REDACTED]



Interior Minister Troccoli was called to testify in Congress on the SIVAK case. Only a show of support from Radical Party leaders kept him in office. [REDACTED]

Ambito Financiero ©

There is other evidence of military intelligence's uncertain loyalty to Alfonsín. In May of this year, police discovered a bomb along Alfonsín's route to visit an Army headquarters in Cordoba. Press reports indicate that Army intelligence carried out a cursory investigation, after which military officials publicly implied that the incident was only a mildly dangerous

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A failure by military intelligence to identify those responsible for an attempt on Alfonsin's life has raised serious questions about its loyalty to the government. Buenos Aires Herald

prank. The Cordoba corps commander resigned rather than comply with the administration's demands that he identify the perpetrators.

the military then alleged that the bomb was the brainchild of Radical Party leaders who wanted to use the incident to justify a purge of the Cordoba corps—a longtime locus of antidemocratic activities. Several courts continue to investigate the case, but the US Embassy reports that, as with last year's bombings, convictions are unlikely.

Democratizing the Intelligence Services

The Embassy reports that Alfonsin is extremely sensitive to public and Congressional criticism of the intelligence services. He has publicly acknowledged the need to coordinate and control intelligence activities to avoid future "operational disorders," and

[REDACTED]

He is also promoting a National Defense bill—currently being debated in the Senate—aimed, in part, at defining the responsibilities of each service and establishing checks on their activities. The most controversial provision of the bill, in our view, gives civilian authorities sole responsibility for domestic intelligence activities and restricts the military services to foreign and strategic matters. In our view, Alfonsin hopes that this division of intelligence functions will limit the influence of any one service.

The proposed law addresses the issue of accountability by centralizing authority over the entire intelligence community in a single government agency, the National Intelligence Center (CNI). The head of the CNI—appointed by, and directly responsible to, the President—would coordinate all intelligence tasking, collection, and processing. The government has not yet determined the exact structure of the CNI,

[REDACTED]

The Military Response


We believe that the armed forces are the biggest obstacle to lasting reform of the intelligence community. The civilian intelligence agencies, in our view, are at present too weak and ineffective to take over the duties currently performed by the military services. Moreover, many midlevel SIDE and Federal Police officials would even welcome subordination to the military, hoping that it would restore some of their professionalism.

Military intelligence chiefs represent the administration's attempts to alter their role and organization and oppose Alfonsin's efforts to subordinate them to elected authorities. most military officers have little respect for Alfonsin's

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ARGENTINA: PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION
AND COLLECTION RESPONSIBILITIES



civilian appointees, citing their lack of experience in intelligence matters and the litany of errors they have committed as evidence of their incompetence. More fundamentally, the military—and especially its intelligence branches—in our view, has pledged only conditional loyalty to democratic rule. It remains primarily concerned with protecting its institutional interests and countering leftist influence, not with protecting the still fragile Argentine constitutional system.

the proposal to give civilian agencies sole responsibility for domestic collection has become the rallying point for the military's resistance to Alfonsín's reforms. military leaders met recently to coordinate a lobbying campaign to persuade the Senate to alter this provision of the defense law. Although they are confident they can muster the support they need,


several of the chiefs indicated that they will continue to collect domestic intelligence even if legally prohibited from so doing.

Finally, longstanding rivalries between the services are fueling opposition to reform. Alfonsín's proposed changes call for the intelligence agencies to share information and coordinate data processing. The services, however, have historically been pitted against one another by military governments and the resulting mistrust permeates them as they scramble to protect well-established and hard-won power bases.


any supposed favoritism Alfonsín displays toward one of the services quickly prompts the others to demand equal treatment. For example, when the press reported that


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the Air Force Chief of Staff had presented an intelligence reform plan to the President, the Army and Navy chiefs quickly countered with their own proposals. 

Outlook

In our view, problems over intelligence reform are likely to plague Alfonsin for the remainder of his term. The Senate probably will decide to water down the provisions for civilian control in the National Defense bill, leaving the military with substantial responsibility for domestic collection. We believe that, under these conditions, the military—with its antidemocratic ethos and adversarial view of the Alfonsin government—will continue to place a low priority on monitoring the activities of antigovernment rightwing extremists, and may on occasion, even abet these activities. 

Senate passage of the intelligence reforms as they now stand would not substantially improve the situation either, in our view. Under such circumstances, the military probably would continue its domestic operations illegally, while the President would be forced to rely on SIDE and the Federal Police—services of proven ineffectiveness—for internal intelligence. The President's only option would be to risk more scandals by once again organizing extraofficial groups to keep tabs on civilian extremists and the military's political activities. 

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ARGENTINA: Confrontation With the Military

Argentina


President Alfonsin is coming under increasing pressure from the military to reverse a civilian court decision to arrest an active-duty officer on charges of human rights abuses committed during the period of military rule. [REDACTED] The judge involved has apparently thwarted Alfonsin's attempts to calm the situation by denying the President's request that the charges be dropped or at least that the case be delayed on grounds of insufficient evidence. The officer charged has refused to surrender to authorities, and his supporters have allegedly vowed to use force to protect him. Several active-duty general officers are threatening to resign if the arrest order is carried out. [REDACTED]

Comment: This confrontation has been brewing since the transfer of such cases to civilian courts in June. The armed forces believe that the administration's handling of this matter will set a precedent for all cases pending against active-duty officers. They are, therefore, challenging Alfonsin to show his support. The military's stand could lead the President to circumvent the civilian courts by issuing an amnesty for all but the worst offenders, although doing so would be politically unpopular. [REDACTED]



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ARGENTINA: Move To Resolve Human Rights Issue

President Alfonsin is urging civilian courts, in effect, to acquit the vast majority of Argentine military officers accused of human rights abuses during the years of military rule on the grounds that they were following orders. [REDACTED] If the courts fail to adopt this approach voluntarily, [REDACTED] Alfonsin may introduce legislation to require it. Alfonsin's decision follows an episode in which proceedings initiated by a provincial court against an active-duty officer aggravated civilian-military tensions. [REDACTED]

Comment: This approach would be tantamount to an amnesty. The increasing independence of the judiciary, however, makes voluntary compliance by the courts unlikely. The President would face stiff congressional opposition to legislation that would enforce compliance. Nevertheless, discontent in the military will mount as more such cases enter civilian courts, leaving Alfonsin with few alternatives to the politically risky step of seeking congressional action on the issue. (S NF) [REDACTED]

~~The Court~~
[REDACTED]
2 October 1986

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Articles

*Argentinian
Communists*

**Argentina: Prospects for
Leftist Terrorism**

The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has again focused public attention on the danger of a resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina. Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of political instability in Argentina and has played a central role in undermining the authority of both military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's response to the first inklings of terrorist reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands the gravity of the threat.

We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist movement emerging over the next six months. Nevertheless, the political scene is volatile and the Alfonsin government may not be able to contain the social, economic, and political pressures that could ignite leftwing violence at a later date.

Return of the Montoneros

The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s, have long sought to convert Peronism into a movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly with the Peronist party's conservative leadership and were expelled from the movement by his widow and successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism," becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest, and most deadly terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the armed forces were forced into exile, where they launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign against the military.



Exiled Montonero at a press conference: the movement's military ethos endures.

Cambio ©

estimated that there were approximately 300 Montoneros in the country and some 500 abroad, although we believe these figures were somewhat inflated.

numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the months following the election in October 1983 of the new civilian government. Any expected lenience from the authorities, however, did not materialize. Alfonsin, who personally abhors terrorism and needs to hold the left accountable for its crimes if he is to

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21 December 1984

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successfully prosecute the military for its excesses during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s, took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar Bidegain, were arrested soon after returning to Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by government officials indicate that Alfonsin—despite cutbacks in military spending—intends to preserve the military's ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.

Internal Divisions

These arrests, in our view, dealt a severe blow to the Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at reorganization. With their most experienced leaders in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros' once solid chain of command has broken down.

two basic currents have emerged: a relatively moderate majority faction loyal to Firmenich, and more violence-prone groups whose leadership is unclear.

The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence, asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon announced the Montoneros' dissolution as an armed force and their reconstitution as the Authentic Peronist Party.

instead of forming an independent party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP) faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer whose newspaper, *La Voz*, was formerly subsidized by Montonero ransom money.

We believe that the Montoneros' current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade unions and rural cooperatives.

We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of violence is a tactical maneuver and that it would

return to armed struggle under more favorable circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly reverted to violence when conditions shifted.

Furthermore, members of the group are rearming and continue to train in terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando Vaca—the top Montonero leaders not in prison—have hinted at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to “persecute” the movement.

The immediate danger, however, stems from those Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious stance. Although not formally structured into an anti-Firmenich group and divided among themselves, these Montoneros doubt that they can ever dominate Peronism and are eager to resume violence.

Reorganization of the ERP

Argentina's other significant leftist terrorist group is the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros, the ERP is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-Leninism and has drawn inspiration more from Castro and Mao than Peron. Emerging concurrently with the Montoneros, the ERP was smaller and was concentrated in Argentina's interior provinces, where it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla warfare until the late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the group was ravaged by the military's post-1976 crackdown.

the ERP lost 85 percent of its cadre and close to 95 percent of its weapons, safehouses, and vehicles during that period.

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3



Enrique Gorriaran Merlo

An Argentine of Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran, about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). A founder of the ERP in 1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year later and imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972 he escaped to Cuba, returning to Argentina the following year to participate in the ERP's rural guerrilla campaign. US diplomats report that, by the late 1970s, Gorriaran led the ERP's military wing, which attacked businessmen and labor leaders and assassinated police and military personnel. He fled the country following the 1976 military coup and resurfaced in Nicaragua, fighting alongside the Sandinistas.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He currently lives in
[REDACTED] Managua. *[REDACTED]*



Mario Eduardo Firmenich

Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for kidnaping and homicide. A founder of the Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early 1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts: the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President Pedro Aramburu and the kidnaping of two Argentine businessmen, which resulted in a record \$60 million ransom. After the 1976 military crackdown, he moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe.

[REDACTED] he
remains friendly with Sandinista leaders and in 1981
was involved in smuggling Cuban arms to El
Salvador. *[REDACTED]*

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Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP—probably no more than 100 persons—returned to Argentina in the wake of Alfonsin's election. As with the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and radical sectors. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the ERP appears to be fairly cohesive and well organized, with orders issued by exiled leaders in Managua, Nicaragua.

These leaders—chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran—evidently believe that the moment is not ripe for the resumption of armed struggle in Argentina.

exiled ERP chiefs have justified their failure to return home by alleging that Alfonsin wants to arrest them to complement the Montoneros already imprisoned. Gorriaran pledged at a press conference in Managua earlier this year that, for the time being, ERP members in Argentina will use violence only in self-defense.

the ERP is seeking to expand its political base by infiltrating the small but influential far left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP has chosen the PI because the two groups are ideologically compatible and, because the ERP wants to avoid competing with Montonero penetration of the Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human rights organizations. Its overall success in these efforts is unclear, but penetration of the Intransigents has been extensive and that many ERP members hold important PI leadership posts.

We share the judgment that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the group's more moderate sector has effectively reigned in unruly elements who want to initiate violence immediately. exiled leaders recently denied permission for an ERP cell to recover an arms cache in Argentina dating from the late 1970s. While reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions,

this may indicate that the ERP has at least a rudimentary capability to undertake terrorism if and when it abandons its current policy of relying solely on political infiltration.

ERP-Montonero Contacts

One of the more disquieting developments is a trend toward ERP-Montonero cooperation; the two movements recently have set aside longstanding ideological disputes and have begun to work together. An ERP-Montonero meeting was held in Cordoba Province in April 1984, according to press reports, and

the two groups have agreed to cooperate in order to infiltrate labor unions. The political organizations with which the Montoneros and the ERP are linked have also been moving closer together: the IMP and the PI are trying to coordinate efforts to politicize and manipulate several human rights groups.

Foreign Support

Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease logistic barriers—such as lack of sufficient weapons and funds—to a resumption of terrorism, in our view, the radical left would require considerable foreign support to mount a serious threat to Argentine democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are dim:

- The PLO, which previously trained and funded the Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in mid-1983,
- Mexican officials are terminating safehaven arrangements and government jobs they formerly provided for exiled Montoneros,
- The Cubans, according to a source with good access, want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will therefore use their considerable influence over the

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Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the ERP may be similarly
constrained by the Cubans.

- Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the Sandinistas, Chilean MIR, and the remnants of the Uruguayan Tupamaros are highly unlikely to compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and East Bloc backing. [REDACTED]

Outlook

We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will concentrate on political activity over the medium term. Both groups recognize that, in the wake of the terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the 1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for political violence. And the Alfonsin government's arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism will bring swift retribution. [REDACTED]

The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in wresting control of the Peronist movement from the center right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be losing status within the party. At best, the Montoneros can hope to retain a voice on the Peronist left via the IMP or, if the movement splits, dominate a small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP has slightly better prospects for expanding its political influence through the Intransigent Party. The PI did well in recent student elections, and polls show that it could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist discontent with Alfonsin. The party, however, lacks a national structure and following, and its radical ideology has historically precluded it from attracting more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate. [REDACTED]

Although leaders of both the ERP and the Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political machinations over the coming months, violence by dissident elements of both organizations cannot be discounted. This is especially true in the case of the Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weakest. We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does have some capability to conduct kidnappings and assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by

further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in the trial of Firmenich, or provocations by rightwing terrorists. But we also believe that, under present circumstances, isolated acts of leftist violence can be effectively contained by the security forces. [REDACTED]

Over the long run, however, there is a danger that the radical left could resume full-scale terrorism. Argentina's new democracy remains fragile and has not yet been fully tested. Severe and prolonged economic pressures, or a power vacuum stemming from the assassination or incapacitation of Alfonsin, could jeopardize political stability. Such a scenario would probably include militant labor unrest, widespread social disorder, and a growing disaffection with democratic institutions on both the right and the left. Under these conditions the ERP and the Montoneros might be tempted to take up arms once again. The press reports that rightwing terrorists are also reorganizing and were responsible for several recent bombings of leftist and government targets; further attacks could spur a response from the radical left. The consequences of such developments are uncertain, but the stage would then be set for escalating left-right violence, growing political polarization, and a possible reentry by the military into the political system. [REDACTED]

Secret

Argentina / Communist

**Argentina: Current Prospects
for Leftist Terrorism**

The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has again focused public attention on the danger of a resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina. Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of political instability in Argentina and has played a central role in undermining the authority of both military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's tough response to the first inklings of terrorist reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands the gravity of the potential threat. For this reason—and because most of the radical leftists doubt that the current political climate is suitable—we foresee little chance of serious terrorism emerging over the next six months.

Return of the Montoneros

The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s, have long sought to convert Peronism into a movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly with the Peronist Party's conservative leadership and were expelled from the movement by his widow and successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism," becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest, and deadliest terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the armed forces were forced into exile, where they launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign against the military.

that there were approximately 300 Montoneros in the country and some 500 abroad, although we believe these figures were somewhat inflated.

numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the months following the election in October 1983 of the new civilian government. If they expected any lenience from the authorities, however, it did not

materialize. Alfonsin, who personally abhors terrorism and needs to hold the left accountable for its crimes if he is to successfully prosecute the military for its excesses during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s, took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar Bidegain, were arrested soon after they returned to Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by government officials indicate that Alfonsin—despite cutbacks in military spending—intends to preserve the military's ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.

Internal Divisions

In our view, these arrests dealt a severe blow to the Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at reorganization. With their most experienced leaders in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros' once-solid chain of command has broken down. two basic currents have emerged: a relatively moderate majority faction loyal to Firmenich and a number of splinter groups more prone to violence.

The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence, asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon announced the dissolution of the Montoneros as an armed force and their reconstitution as the Authentic Peronist Party. however, that instead of forming an independent party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP) faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer whose newspaper, *La Voz*, was formerly subsidized by Montonero ransom money,

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24 January 1985

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██████████ We believe that the Montoneros' current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade unions and rural cooperatives. ██████████

We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of violence is only a tactical maneuver and that it would return to armed struggle under more favorable circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly reverted to violence when conditions shifted.

Furthermore, ██████████ members of the group are rearming and continuing to train in terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando Vaca—the top Montonero leaders not in prison—have hinted at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to "persecute" the movement. ██████████

The immediate danger, however, stems from those Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious stance. Although not divided among themselves about other issues, such as leadership, they all doubt that the Montoneros can ever dominate Peronism and are eager to resume violence. ██████████

Reorganization of the ERP

Argentina's other significant leftist terrorist group is the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros, the ERP's ideology is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-Leninism and has drawn inspiration more from Castro and Mao than from Peron. Emerging concurrently with the Montoneros, the ERP was smaller and was concentrated in Argentina's interior

provinces, where it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla warfare until the late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the group was ravaged by the military's post-1976 crackdown. ██████████

██████████ the ERP lost 85 percent of its cadre and close to 95 percent of its weapons, safehouses, and vehicles during that period. ██████████

Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP—probably no more than 100 persons—returned to Argentina in the wake of the election of Alfonsin. As with the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and radical factions. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the ERP appears to be fairly well organized and cohesive, and it follows the orders issued by exiled leaders in Nicaragua. ██████████

██████████ the exiled ERP leaders—chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran—have declined to return home because they believe that Alfonsin would have them arrested just like the Montonero leaders. ██████████

The ERP is reportedly seeking to expand its political base by infiltrating the small but influential far-left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP has chosen the PI because the two groups are ideologically compatible and, ██████████ because the ERP wants to avoid competing with the Montonero penetration of the Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human rights organizations. Its overall success in these efforts is unclear. ██████████

We share the judgment ██████████ that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the group's more moderate sector has effectively reined in unruly elements who want to initiate violence immediately. Recently, for example, exiled leaders reportedly denied permission for an ERP cell to recover arms from a cache established in the late 1970s. While reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions, this may indicate that the ERP retains at least a rudimentary capability to undertake

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Enrique Gorriaran Merlo

An Argentine of Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran, about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). One of the founders of the ERP in 1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year later and imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972 he escaped to Cuba, but the following year he returned to Argentina to participate in the ERP's rural guerrilla campaign. By the late 1970s Gorriaran was the leader of the ERP's military wing, which attacked businessmen and labor leaders and assassinated police and military personnel. Following the 1976 military coup, he fled the country and resurfaced in Nicaragua, where he fought alongside the Sandinistas.

[REDACTED]
He currently lives in
Managua, [REDACTED]

Mario Eduardo Firmenich

Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for kidnaping and homicide. One of the founders of the Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early 1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts: the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President Pedro Aramburu and the kidnaping of two Argentine businessmen, which resulted in a record ransom of \$60 million. After the 1976 military crackdown, he moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe. Firmenich

[REDACTED]
remains friendly
with Sandinista leaders. In 1981 [REDACTED] was
involved in smuggling Cuban arms to El Salvador.
[REDACTED]

terrorism if it decides to abandon its current policy of relying solely on political infiltration. [REDACTED]

ERP-Montonero Contacts

The ERP and the Montoneros have begun to set aside longstanding ideological disputes and work together. Representatives of the two groups held a meeting in Cordoba Province in April 1984, according to press

reports, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Foreign Support

Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease logistical barriers—such as the lack of sufficient weapons and funds—to a resumption of terrorism, in our view, the radical left would still require considerable foreign support before it presented a serious threat to Argentine democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are dim:

- The PLO, which previously trained and funded the Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in mid-1983, [REDACTED]
- Mexican officials are terminating safehaven arrangements and government jobs they formerly provided exiled Montoneros, [REDACTED]
- The Cubans [REDACTED] want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will therefore use their considerable influence over the Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts. [REDACTED] the Cubans may be trying to restrain the ERP in similar fashion.
- Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the Sandinistas and with various South American terrorist groups are not likely to compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and East Bloc backing. [REDACTED]

Outlook

We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will concentrate on political activity for at least the next few months. Both groups recognize that, in the wake

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of the terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the 1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for political violence. And the Alfonsin government's arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism will bring swift retribution. [REDACTED]

The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in wresting control of the Peronist movement from the center-right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be losing status within the party. At best, the Montoneros can hope to retain a voice in the Peronist movement left via the IMP or, if the movement splits, dominate a small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP has slightly better prospects for expanding its political influence through the Intransigent Party. The PI did well in recent student elections, and polls show that it could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist discontent with Alfonsin. The party lacks a national structure and following, however, and its radical ideology has historically prevented it from attracting more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate. [REDACTED]

Although leaders of both the ERP and the Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political machinations over the coming months, the possibility of violence by dissident elements of either organization cannot be discounted. Such evidence is more likely in the case of the Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weaker. We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does have the capability to conduct kidnappings and assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in the trial of Firmenich, or provocation by rightwing terrorists. But we also believe that, under present circumstances, such leftist violence can be contained by the security forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Argentina

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 1 FEB 85
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: COMMENTS BY A SENIOR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIAL ON ARMED FORCES-RELATED TOPICS, ON ARGENTINE-U.S. RELATIONS, ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S RELATIONS WITH THE LEFT AND WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, AND ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

DOI: EARLY JANUARY 1985

SUMMARY: ARGENTINE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOSE HORACIO JAUNARENA SAID IN THE WEEK OF 6 JANUARY 1985 THAT HE AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS WERE THINKING ABOUT CARRYING OUT A CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD WIN FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION FOR CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF SENIOR ARMED FORCES (FFAA) OFFICERS AND OF SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS ON CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND EXCESSES, CALM THE CONCERNS

OF SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHO ARE WORRIED THAT PROSECUTION OF FFAA OFFICERS COULD LEAD TO A COUP D'ETAT, AND, ULTIMATELY, PERMIT THE ADMINISTRATION TO WIN APPROVAL OF A LAW OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. JAUNARENA WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE CIVILIAN LEADERS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA) DO NOT PLAN ANY MORE CHANGES IN SENIOR ARMED FORCES ASSIGNMENTS UNTIL MARCH, BUT WILL PROBABLY MAKE CHANGES IN THE CHIEFS OF THE SERVICES' GENERAL STAFFS BY THE END OF 1985. HE ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE REORGANIZATION OF, AND THE BUDGETS OF, THE ARMED FORCES, SAYING THAT ONLY THE AIR FORCE WOULD EXPAND UNDER THE REORGANIZATION AND THAT THE BUDGETS WOULD NOT CHANGE OFR THREE YEARS. JAUNARENA WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE IS A CRISIS IN

ARGENTINE-U.S. RELATIONS, AND THAT THE GOA WOULD ACT TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE GOA AND THE U.S. AND WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CHANGES IN ITS POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA. HE INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THE ARGENTINE LEFT AND WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP. FINALLY, HE OPINED THAT, EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN IS DEDICATED TO IMPOSING AN AUSTERITY PROGRAM ON ARGENTINA AND TO REVAMPING THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE GOA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP ALL ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

TEXT: 1. JOST HORACIO ((JAUNARENA)), THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (THE SECOND-RANKING OFFICIAL) IN THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD), COMMENTED TO A CONTACT EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 6 JANUARY 1985 THAT HE AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL ((BORRAS)) WERE THINKING ABOUT STARTING WHAT HE CALLED A MAJOR PROPAGANDA, OR OPINION-INFLUENCING CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PURPOSE OF MAKING ALL ARGENTINES AWARE OF, AS HE PHRASED IT, THEIR "SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES" FOR THE EXCESSES COMMITTED BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. JAUNARENA EXPLAINED THAT BORRAS HAD

HOPED THAT SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD HAVE TWO POSITIVE EFFECTS. HE SAID, FIRST, THAT, WITH WHAT HE TERMED FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION, THE ADMINISTRATION COULD MORE EASILY TRY, AND SEEK CONVICTIONS OF, SENIOR FFAA OFFICERS ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT WITH EXCESSES. HE ADDED THAT A CLIMATE OF FAVORABLE PUBLIC OPINION WOULD ALSO PERMIT THE ADMINISTRATION TO SEEK TRIALS AND CONVICTIONS FOR SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO COMMITTED PARTICULARLY GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE PRECEDING ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENTS. JAUNARENA WENT ON TO SAY THAT, SECONDLY, THE CAMPAIGN OF WHICH HE SPOKE SHOULD HELP WITH CALMING WHAT HE CALLED THE FEAR OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO BELIEVE THAT ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS, OR THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS, TO TRY ARMED FORCES OFFICERS FOR EXCESSES WOULD PROVOKE A COUP D'ETAT. FINALLY, HE ASSERTED THAT, IF THE CAMPAIGN WORKS AS HE EXPECTS, HE FORSEES THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIALS OF FFAA OFFICERS CHARGED WITH EXCESS BY THE END OF 1985 AND THAT, AFTER THESE TRIALS, THE ADMINISTRATION COULD WIN APPROVAL OF A LAW OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

2. TURNING TO INSTITUTIONAL ARMED FORCES MATTERS, JAUNARENA SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO PLANS TO REMOVE ANY OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFF OR TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CHANGES IN THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGCS) OF THE FFAA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE ADDED, THOUGH, THAT BORRAS AND PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) MAY MAKE SOME SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES IN MARCH, BUT HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THIS REMARK. HE NOTED, TOO, THAT BORRAS AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY REPLACE TWO OF, OR ALL, THE SERVICE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

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CHIEFS OF GENERAL STAFF BY THE END OF 1985.

3. JAUNARENA CLAIMED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE ITS PLAN FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES FINALLY READY BY JUNE 1985 AND WOULD THEN IMPLEMENT IT IMMEDIATELY. HE FORECAST THAT, OF THE THREE SERVICES, THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE (FAA) WOULD LEAST OPPOSE THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FFAA. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONLY THE AIR FORCE WOULD EXPAND UNDER THE REORGANIZATION, AND WOULD DO SO AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY. JAUNARENA ADDED THAT THE REORGANIZATION PLAN WOULD FAVOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRMOBILE AND RAPID INTERVENTION

FORCES. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FFAA WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL 1987 OR 1988 BECAUSE OF BUDGET RESTRICTIONS: HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THE BUDGET FOR THE FFAA FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS.

[REDACTED]

4. SWITCHING TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JAUNARENA COMMENTED THAT, IN REGARD TO ARGENTINE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, THERE CONTINUES TO EXIST WHAT HE CALLED "AN OLD CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE" BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE (GOA) AND U.S. (USG) GOVERNMENTS. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS CRISIS WAS THEN, IN HIS WORDS, "VERY ACUTE" AND THAT THE GOA HAD DONE LITTLE TO REDUCE TENSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ARGENTINA. JAUNARENA DID NOT DEFINE THE CRISIS OF WHICH HE SPOKE, BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, DURING 1985, THE GOA SHOULD, AND WOULD, ACT TO ESTABLISH A SOLID BOND OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE

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6. IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC MATTERS, JAUNARENA SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOA WOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE UP TO ALL PORTIONS OF ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF). HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS OF THIS BELIEF, BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN IS DEDUCATED, HOWEVER, TO IMPOSING A STRICT AUSTERITY PROGRAM ON ARGENTINA AND TO REVAMPING THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL SECTOR. HE ADDED, THAT IN REGARD TO MEETING THESE TWO COMMITMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD BE NO DECEIT, NO WAVERING, AND BACKING DOWN.

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


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USG. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, BECAUSE OF RECENT SIGNS THAT ARMS TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BEGIN, THE U.S. WOULD PROBABLY HAVE, AS HE SAID IT, A FREER HAND IN DEALING WITH NICARAGUA. ONCE AGAIN, JAUNARENA DID NOT EXPLAIN HIS REMARK, AND HE ADDED ONLY THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS POSSIBLY FREER U.S. HAND, THE GOA WOULD HAVE TO MAKE WHAT HE TERMED CERTAIN "PRO-U.S. CORRECTIONS" TO ITS POLICY TOWARD THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT.

5. JAUNARENA NEXT COMMENTED ON THE RELATIONS OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION WITH THE ARGENTINE LEFT. HE NOTED FIRST THAT, BECAUSE OF LEFTIST PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION, IT HAD MADE SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE LEFT, AND HE INDICATED THAT THESE CONCESSIONS INCLUDED ALLOWING A GROUP OF YOUNG ARGENTINES TO GO TO NICARAGUA AS MEMBERS OF A "COFFEE BRIGADE." HE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION OF THE LEFTIST PRESSURES HE ALLEGED, AND HE DID NOT DISCUSS FURTHER THE GOA'S CONCESSIONS. JAUNA-

RENA NEXT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S RELATIONS WITH THE "MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO" HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP ARE BAD AND ARE GETTING WORSE, AND HE ADDED THAT HE EXPECTS TO SEE AN OPEN BREAK BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE GROUP; BUT, AGAIN, HE DID NOT EXPAND ON HIS REMARKS.

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COLONELS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION, COVERAGE WHICH INDICATED THE
ARMY OFFICERS HAD PLACED DEMANDS ON THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

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DIST: 7 MARCH 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: LISTING BY A SENIOR OFFICER OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S
601ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION OF FACTORS
WHICH RESULTED IN THE RETIREMENTS OF TWO KEY ARMED
FORCES OFFICERS AND IN SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN SENIOR
ARMY ASSIGNMENTS

DOI: 6 MARCH 1985

B. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES
(THE SENIOR COURT MARTIAL) TO RELEASE A NAVY LIEUTENANT CHARGED
WITH CRIMES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S.

C. PRESSURE ON BORRAS FROM LEFTISTS IN THE GOVERNING RADICAL
CIVIC UNION (UCR) WHO VIEW HIS MEETING WITH THE ARMY GENERALS AND
COLONELS AND THE RELEASE OF THE NAVY OFFICER AS AN INDICATION OF
WEAKNESS ON THE PART OF BORRAS IN DEALING WITH THE ARMED FORCES
AND WHO PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO DO SOMETHING TO SHOW HIS LEADERSHIP
OF THE FFAA.

D. THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) TO
DEMONSTRATE TO CIVILIANS BEFORE HE VISITS THE UNITED STATES THAT
HE IS IN CONTROL OF THE FFAA.

E. ILL FEELINGS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
(MOD) OVER THE REORGANIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE ARMY. THE
SENIOR BATTALION OFFICER SAID THE ARMY BELIEVES THAT ANY MOVE TO
REORGANIZE AND RESTRUCTURE THE SERVICE WOULD DRAW DOWN TOO MUCH
ON THE SERVICE'S ALREADY LIMITED BUDGET.



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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 8 MARCH 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: EVENTS LEADING TO THE RETIREMENTS OF TWO SENIOR
ARMED FORCES OFFICERS

1. MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS
2. REFUSAL OF THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC) TO SUPPORT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SUPREME COUNCIL
3. REFUSAL OF THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF TO BECOME CHIEF OF THE EMC

DOI: 25 FEBRUARY AND EARLY MARCH 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. TWO SPECIFIC EVENTS PRODUCED THE SITUATION WHICH LED TO THE 4 MARCH 1985 RESIGNATIONS OF ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL (LTG) JULIO ALFREDO (FERNANDEZ) TORRES, THEN SERVING AS CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC) OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FAA), AND OF MAJOR GENERAL (MG) RICARDO GUSTAVO (PIANTA), ASSIGNED AT THE TIME AS CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE). THE 25

FEBRUARY MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL (BORRAS) AND THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICERS AND ITS COLONELS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION CONSTITUTES ONE OF THESE EVENTS. IN THE MEETING, THE ARMY OFFICERS MADE KNOWN TO BORRAS THEIR CONCERN AND RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE ARMY'S BUDGET, ABOUT THE REORGANIZATION OF THEIR SERVICE, AND ABOUT JUDICIAL ACTIONS INVOLVING ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF EXCESSES DURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S.

2. THE SECOND EVENT BEGAN WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES -- THE SENIOR COURT MARTIAL -- TO

RELEASE AN ARGENTINE NAVY LIEUTENANT ACCUSED OF COMMITTING CRIMES

DURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN. THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THIS DECISION WORSENERED WHEN FERNANDEZ TORRES, SAYING THAT THE SUPREME COUNCIL WAS NOT UNDER HIS COMMAND, REFUSED BORRAS' REQUEST TO INTERVENE WITH THE COUNCIL AND HAVE IT REVERSE ITS DECISION.

3. IN THE WAKE OF THESE INCIDENTS, BORRAS MET WITH PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN), WHO DECIDED TO REMOVE FERNANDEZ TORRES AND TO REPLACE HIM WITH PIANTA. WHILE MEETING WITH THE ARMY'S OTHER GENERALS, HOWEVER, AND HEARING THEM MAKE CLEAR THEIR FEELING THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR HIM TO ACCEDE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO REASSIGN HIM AS CHIEF OF THE EMC, PIANTA TOLD THE GENERALS THAT HE AGREED WITH THEIR POSITION; HE THEN ADVISED BORRAS THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEW ASSIGNMENT. PIANTA'S DECISION LED THE GOVERNMENT TO REACH DOWN INTO THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICER CORPS AND CHOOSE BRIGADIER GENERAL HECTOR LUIS (RIOS) ERENU, AT THE TIME THE COMMANDER OF III CORPS, AS THE CHIEF OF THE SERVICE'S GENERAL STAFF. WITH THIS MOVE, THE GOVERNMENT GAVE

THE SENIOR ARMY POSITION TO THE GENERAL MOST CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE FROM ACTIVE DUTY ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN OUT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Current Analysis Series

12 March 1985

South American Highlights

ARGENTINA: ANOTHER SHAKE-UP OF SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS

On 4 March, Lt. General Julio Fernandez Torres, head of the Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff, retired for reasons which are not entirely clear. President Alfonsin asked Army Chief-of-Staff Pianta to replace Fernandez Torres, but Pianta refused, choosing retirement. Alfonsin appointed Air Force General Teodoro Waldner as new Joint Chief, despite advice from Defense Minister Borrás that the army--the most powerful service and already hostile to the joint staff--would not accept subordination to an air force officer. This may be a tacit admission that the joint staff idea is going nowhere. Alfonsin appointed Brigadier General Hector Luis Rios Erenu, Commander of III Corps in Cordoba, as new Army COS. This forced the retirement of six officers senior to Rios Erenu.

Whether or not Alfonsin planned it this way--and many officers are convinced he did--he has in less than 18 months retired all but two Army generals who were promoted before he took office. Many observers will see this as too convenient to have been a coincidence. Some also note that this second housecleaning in the army in less than a year will also inhibit the rise of coherent opposition or a service strongman.

Fernandez Torre's retirement may have resulted from:

-his unhappiness at the ineffectiveness of his position--the services continue to view themselves as city states rather than participants in a joint staff operation;

-his inability to forestall large cuts in the military budget;

-military unhappiness over government human rights policy and handling of the infamous Astiz case.

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
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General Pianta's refusal to accept the post was reportedly the result of pressure from a group of general officers who told him that they would resign en masse and precipitate a crisis if he accepted. Their reasons can only be surmised at this stage, but probably center around unhappiness with Pianta's previous performance, opposition to the entire joint staff concept, and a desire to show discontent with government policies. Rios Erenu reportedly refused to join this group.

A large question mark hangs over Rios Erenu. Press reports characterize him as pragmatic and politically astute, and respected in the military. [REDACTED] Rios Erenu is close to Defense Minister Borras and the ruling UCR, and is trusted by government officials. He was, after all, promoted to general by the Alfonsin government. Reports last year, however, linked him to rightist terrorist groups in the military. After rightists exploded several bombs in Cordoba, he reportedly sent an intermediary to Borras to cut a deal that tied cessation of terrorist actions to a halt in human rights prosecutions. He intervened to remove an accused officer from the jurisdiction of a civilian court. III Corps was said to be a hotbed of rightwing discontent and activity. The [REDACTED] study on terrorism in Argentina repeats the assertion that Rios Erenu has links to the extremists.

The evidence is not conclusive. It is difficult to imagine that Alfonsin would not know of such activities, and equally difficult to believe that he would elevate Rios Erenu if the reports were true. If Alfonsin's intent is to prevent the emergence of a military strong man and the new Army COS is closely associated with extremists, the move might have backfired. [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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97

PAGE #1 OF #2
EOB243 ANB09775

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BEARING ON, GOVERNMENT-ARMED FORCES RELATIONS.

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 16 MARCH 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO CHANGES
IN SENIOR ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES ASSIGNMENTS IN THE
FIRST PART OF MARCH 1985

DOI: MARCH 1985

SUMMARY: FIELD GRADE OFFICERS IN THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND
OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT GENERAL
STAFF (EMC) OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) BELIEVE THAT THE
PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN
AND THE FFAA -- PROBLEMS WHICH CAME TO A HEAD WITH THE CHANGES

IN A NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS IN THE FIRST PART OF
MARCH 1985 -- BEGAN EARLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S TERM WHEN, THE
ARMY AND EMC OFFICERS HOLD, CIVILIAN OFFICIALS DECIDED -- AS
PART OF AN EFFORT TO EXERT CONTROL OVER THE FFAA -- TO BACK THE
ARGENTINE AIR FORCE (FAA) OVER THE OTHER TWO SERVICES. THE LATEST
TURN OF EVENTS BEGAN WITH A 25 FEBRUARY MEETING BETWEEN THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE ARMY'S SENIOR OFFICERS. SEVERAL
EVENTS ON 1 MARCH CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVOLVING SITUATION. SEVERAL
MORE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 4 MARCH REFLECTED, AND HAD A

TEXT: 1. ARGENTINE ARMY FIELD GRADE OFFICERS AND OFFICERS
ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC) OF THE ARGENTINE
ARMED FORCES (FFAA) BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) AND THE ARMED
FORCES -- ESPECIALLY THE ARMY -- WHICH CAME TO A HEAD WITH THE
REASSIGNMENTS AND RETIREMENTS OF A NUMBER OF FFAA OFFICERS IN
THE FIRST PART OF MARCH 1985 BEGAN EARLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S
TERM WHEN, THESE OFFICERS HOLD, CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
DECIDED TO BACK THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE (FAA) AGAINST THE OTHER

TWO SERVICES AS PART OF THEIR APPROACH FOR EXERTING CIVILIAN CON-
TROL OVER THE FFAA. THESE OFFICERS SAY THAT THE CIVILIAN OF-
FICIALS ESTABLISHED A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH FAA BRIGADIER
GENERAL (BG, "BRIGADIER") ERNESTO H. ((GRESPO)) AS A MEANS OF
HAVING LEVERAGE IN THE AIR FORCE.

2. AFTER MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL ((BORRAS)) RETURNED TO
WORK FOLLOWING CONVALESCENCE, HE BEGAN IN MID-FEBRUARY 1985
HIS MANEUVERS, AS ESPECIALLY ARMY FIELD GRADE OFFICERS CALL HIS
NEXT MOVES. HE MET WITH THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICERS AND ITS
COLONELS SELECTED FOR PROMOTION ON 25 FEBRUARY IN WHAT ARMY OF-
FICERS CLAIM WAS A ROUTINE MEETING WITHOUT PROBLEMS. ALTHOUGH
NO CONTROVERSIAL TOPICS AROSE DURING THIS MEETING, LEADERS OF
THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) AND THE NEWSPAPERS SAID
-- FALSELY, ARMY OFFICERS ASSERT -- THAT, IN THE MEETING, THE
ARMY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION OVER A NUMBER OF ISSUES AND EVENTS.

3. ON 1 MARCH, BORRAS CALLED TOGETHER THEN ARMY LIEUTENANT

GENERAL JULIO ALFREDO ((FERNANDEZ)) TORRES, AT THE TIME SERVING
AS CHIEF OF THE EMC, AND THE THEN CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFFS
OF THE THREE SERVICES TO DISCUSS THE DECISION BY THE SUPREME
COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES -- THE SENIOR COURT MARTIAL -- TO
FREE AN ARGENTINE NAVY (ARA) LIEUTENANT ACCUSED OF CRIMES DURING
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. BORRAS EXPRESSED
HIS ANGER WITH THE DECISION AND SAID THAT THE CASE OF THE ARA
OFFICER WAS, AS HE PHRASED IT, A GOVERNMENT PROBLEM AND NOT AN
FFAA PROBLEM. IN THIS MEETING, FERNANDEZ TORRES MADE THE POINT
THAT THE SUPREME COUNCIL IS A MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD) ORGANIZA-
TION AND IS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

4. NEXT ON 1 MARCH, BORRAS MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME
COUNCIL AND ANGRILY DEMANDED AN EXPLANATION OF THE DECISION TO

RELEASE THE NAVY OFFICER. IN REPLY, RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL

HORACIO ANIBAL ((RIVERA)) SPOKE FOR THE COUNCIL AND TOLD HIM
THAT HE WAS ASKING THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS ACT AS POLITICIANS
WHILE THEY ARE ACTUALLY OLD MEN WHO ARE ACTING AS PROFESSIONAL
ARMED OFFICERS; RIVERA ADDED THAT THE COUNCIL MUST MAKE LEGAL
DECISIONS, NOT POLITICAL ONES. BORRAS ENDED THIS MEETING IN
ANGER.

5. STILL ON 1 MARCH, BORRAS MET WITH ALFONSIN. AFTER THAT,
HE MET WITH FERNANDEZ TORRES AND, IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFERED HIM THE POSITION OF MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT,
AN OFFER WHICH THE OFFICER TURNED DOWN. FERNANDEZ TORRES SAID

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PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

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THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY ADVISOR POSITION WOULD NOT
LEAD TO GOOD ADMINISTRATION-ARMED FORCES COOPERATION AND HE ADDED
THAT, IF ALFONSIN WANTED HIS RESIGNATION, HE WOULD OFFER IT AND
LEAVE QUIETLY. BORRAS ASKED FERNANDEZ TORRES TO RECONSIDER THE
OFFER OF THE ADVISORY POSITION AND TO INFORM HIM OF THE FINAL
DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY; AT 0100 HOURS ON 2 MARCH, FERNANDEZ
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39

PAGE 01 OF 02
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
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HAD COME AND HE STILL REFUSED THE OFFER. (FIELD COMMENT: IN OFFERING THE ADVISORY POSITION TO FERNANDEZ TORRES, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN AND BORRAS WERE RELIEVING HIM -- AND, IN EFFECT, FIRING HIM. FERNANDEZ TORRES WOULD HAVE BEEN SPLIT AWAY FROM THE FFAA AND WOULD HAVE BECOME ANOTHER OF THE PRESIDENT'S MANY ADVISORS, THE RANKS OF WHOM HAVE BEEN SWOLLEN BY FIRED OR OTHERWISE FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.)

6. SEVERAL MORE EVENTS REFLECTING, AND BEARING ON, ADMINISTRATION-ARMED FORCES RELATIONS TOOK PLACE ON 4 MARCH. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE EVENTS:

A. IN THE MORNING, FERNANDEZ TORRES SPOKE TO REPORTERS. [REDACTED] NEWSPAPER REPORTING COVERED ACCURATELY THESE REMARKS AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING ADMINISTRATION-FFAA TOPICS OVER THE WEEKEND OF 2-3 MARCH.)

B. ALL THE ARMY GENERALS MET TO DISCUSS THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION OF REASSIGNING PIANTA FROM CHIEF OF THE EMGE TO CHIEF OF THE EMC AND OF REASSIGNING RIOS ERENU FROM COMMANDER OF III CORPS

TO CHIEF OF THE EMGE. THE OTHER GENERALS ADVISED PIANTA NOT TO ACCEPT THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF POSITION BECAUSE, BY DOING TO, HE

WOULD INDICATE THE COMPLIANCE OF THE ARMY WITH WHAT THE GENERALS CLAIMED WAS A PLAN OF THE RADICAL CIVIC UNION TO HUMILIATE FERNANDEZ TORRES AND THE ARMY'S SENIOR OFFICERS.

C. PIANTA SPOKE WITH BORRAS AND REJECTED THE OFFER OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF.


D. ALL ARMY GENERALS WHOSE DATE OF RANK FELL BETWEEN PIANTA AND RIOS ERENU RESIGNED.

E. ON THE ORDER OF BORRAS THAT THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY MUST RETIRE PART OF THEIR SENIOR OFFICER CORPS, WALDNER RETIRED TWO OFFICERS HOLDING THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL, AND VICE ADMIRAL RAMON ANTONIO (AROSA), CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF, RETIRED FOUR FLAG OFFICERS.


7. AS OF THE LATTER PART OF THE FIRST WEEK OF MARCH, BORRAS

DID NOT SEEM TO WANT WALDNER TO BECOME CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. HE RECOGNIZED THAT MOVING WALDNER TO THIS POSITION WOULD LEAD TO CRESPO'S BECOMING THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, ALTHOUGH CRESPO IS, IN HIS OPINION, FRIENDLY TOWARD THE UCR AND HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE AIR FORCE OFFICER IS VIEWED AS A BIT UNSTABLE AND THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT WANT TO GIVE TO HIM THE POWER THAT WOULD COME WITH ASSIGNMENT AS CHIEF OF HIS SERVICE'S GENERAL STAFF. BORRAS OPINED THAT CRESPO WAS MORE USEFUL AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF.

8.



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32

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

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35

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Argentine Military

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 25 MARCH 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: CLAIMS THAT TWO RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE A
PLAN TO BRING PRESSURE ON AND ULTIMATELY TO REMOVE
THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN

DOI: MARCH 1985

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

A SECRET ELEVEN-POINT PLAN TO FORM A NATIONAL FRONT FOR TAKING
ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN).

BUT HE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. HE SAID THAT THE
NATIONAL FRONT HAS TWO GOALS: THE FIRST AND MORE IMMEDIATE OF
WHICH, HE EXPLAINED, CONSISTS IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION TO END ITS EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE ARMED FORCES (FFAA)
PERSONNEL FOR ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE
CAMPAIGN. CAMPS POINTED OUT THAT THE SECOND AND LONGER TERM GOAL

WOULD INVOLVE THE REMOVAL OF THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED
THAT ACTIVITIES BASED ON [REDACTED] PLAN SHOULD BEGIN ABOUT
2 APRIL 1985.

3. [REDACTED] LISTED THE POINTS BELOW
AS ACTION "AGREEMENTS" INCLUDED IN THE ELEVEN POINTS OF MENENDEZ'
AND HIS PLAN:

- A. UNDERTAKING A JOINT EFFORT TO RAISE MONEY.
- B. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT GENERAL
STAFF WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS.

[REDACTED]

C. UNIFYING AND COORDINATING [REDACTED] "ACTION GROUPS"
OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL, WHO REMAIN LOYAL [REDACTED]
WHICH WOULD BEGIN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE

ON THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] THESE OPERATIONS
WOULD INCLUDE THE BOMBING OF SELECTED TARGETS. HE MENTIONED
SPECIFICALLY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AS AMONG THE SELECTED TARGETS,
AND HE SAID OTHERS WOULD INCLUDE "ANTI-MILITARY" TARGETS.

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 252123Z MAR 85 PSN: 068403

36

[REDACTED]

D. LAUNCHING COORDINATED PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

E. COORDINATING THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION.

F. AGREEING ON A COMMON STRATEGY FOR THE NEAR TERM.

4. [REDACTED]

5. ALSO EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 17 MARCH, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS INVOLVED WITH [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT THE LONGER-TERM GOAL OF THE PLAN TO REMOVE THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT WOULD INVOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS IF POSSIBLE, OR A COUP D'ETAT IF NECESSARY.

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS SUPPORT IN VARIOUS AREAS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH CERTAIN ARGENTINE POLITICAL LEADERS, WHOM THE RETIRED GENERAL DID NOT NAME; WITH LEADERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTIST GROUPS; WITH UNION LEADERS; WITH A POLITICAL GROUPING HEADED BY HERMINIO ((IGLESIAS)) AND JORGE ((ARGENTO)); WITH ACTIVE, DUTY AND RETIRED ARMED FORCES AND

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37

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A. INITIATING A COORDINATED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARXISM IN ARGENTINA.

B. USING "SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS," AS THE OFFICER CALLED THEM, TO PROVOKE OR ENGINEER INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WEAKNESS. THE OFFICER'S DESCRIPTION OF THE MAKE-UP OF THE "SPECIAL ACTION GROUPS," THEY SEEM IDENTICAL WITH THE ACTION GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2C, ABOVE.)

C. UNDERTAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO GAIN THE SUPPORT

OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MAJOR FFAA COMMANDERS OR, IF THIS EFFORT FAILS, USING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS TO COMPROMISE THE COMMANDERS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES WITH NO CHOICE OTHER THAN

D. MAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF UNION AND POLITICAL LEADERS. AGAIN, IF THIS EFFORT SHOULD FAIL,



WOULD TURN TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

E. TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO VARIOUS SECTORS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY, TO THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TO JUNIOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS THAT THE FFAA ARE UNIFIED.

F. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATED PROBLEM-SOLVING AND FOR DEVELOPING STRATEGY.

G. SETTING UP A PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

H. COORDINATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT COULD ASSIST THE FRONT. THE FIRST TWO PRIORITIES IN REGARD TO THIS POINT INVOLVE THE SEEKING OF CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN WHAT HE CALLED "ANTI-MARXIST" COUNTRIES.



6. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE



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42

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 02 APRIL 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA)
1. INCREASED TENSION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND BETWEEN THE FFAA AND THE ADMINISTRATION;
2. LACK OF AN FFAA LEADER WHO COULD PULL TOGETHER OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION;
3. EXPECTATION OF INCREASING TENSION

DOI: LATE MARCH 1985

MENT OFFICIALS.

TEXT: 1. BY THE END OF THE FOURTH WEEK OF MARCH 1985, A SIGNIFICANT AND ALARMING LEVEL OF TENSION EXISTED IN THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) AND BETWEEN THE FFAA AND THE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE IS COMING FROM MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE FFAA TO STIFFEN INSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION. THIS PRESSURE COMES FROM A WIDELY-SPREAD BASE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; IT DOES NOT COME FROM JUST ONE OR A FEW

LOCATIONS -- CORDOBA OR GREATER BUENOS AIRES, FOR EXAMPLE -- AS HAS OCCURRED IN PAST CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE FFAA AND A GIVEN ADMINISTRATION.

2. NO ARMED FORCES OFFICER HAS YET SURFACED WITH THE QUALITIES NEEDED TO PULL TOGETHER, CONTROL, AND LEAD MILITARY OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. NO ARMY GENERAL OFFICER NOR ANY OFFICER OF EQUIVALENT GRADE IN THE OTHER TWO SERVICES HAS SHOWN SUPPORT FOR, OR A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE, A COUP D'ETAT. THE ARMY'S COLONELS WHO ARE DUE FOR PROMOTION IN 1985 AND 1986 ARE THE BEST OFFICERS IN THE ARMY, HOWEVER, AND SEVERAL OF THEM HAVE TRUE LEADERSHIP QUAL-

ITIES. AMONG RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS, RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (MG) LUCIANO BENJAMIN (MENENDEZ) RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE

AMONG MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS, BUT RETIRED BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) RAMON (CAMPES) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WITH ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL.

3. FFAA OFFICERS EXPECT THE TENSIONS IN THE ARMED FORCES AND BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE EVEN MORE ONCE THE TRIALS OF THE JUNTA MEMBERS OF THE PRECEDING ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT BEGIN. OFFICERS DO NOT SEE THE ISSUE AT STAKE AS ONE OF JUDGING THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS FOR THEIR LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S, BUT RATHER AS AN ISSUE OF USING THE TRIALS TO CONDEMN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION.

4. [REDACTED]

B. A SITUATION WHICH ARISES FROM PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF, AND FROM INSTABILITY IN, THE FFAA ALWAYS LEADS IN ARGENTINA TO TALKING AND PLANNING AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS OF OFFICERS, BUT THE LACK OF KEY INGREDIENTS (MONEY, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP) FREQUENTLY KEEP THESE GROUPS FROM MOVING TO AN ACTION STAGE. CURRENTLY, THOUGH, SOME GROUPS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PLANS.

C. BECAUSE OF THE WIDELY-SPREAD BASES OF PRESSURE IN THE FFAA, THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ARGENTINE COUP D'ETAT OF 1955 MIGHT SERVE AS A TYPE OF SCENARIO FOR ANY FUTURE FFAA ACTIONS AGAINST THIS GOVERNMENT; THAT IS, A SERIES OF REBELLIONS OR MUTINIES, RATHER THAN ONE IMMEDIATE DIRECT EFFORT TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT.

D. THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICERS AND ITS COLONELS HOLDING KEY TROOP-LEADING ASSIGNMENTS MUST TAKE CARE THAT THE PRESSURE FROM THE MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS DOES NOT GET OUT OF HAND AND THAT THEY DO NOT LOSE CONTROL OF THESE OFFICERS.

E. ULTRA-RIGHT PARAMILITARY GROUPS WHICH WORKED IN THE PAST WITH RETIRED GENERALS MENENDEZ AND CAMPES MAY WELL BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS TO TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSO).

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

49

Argentina

ARGENTINA: Military Trials. (U)

~~(C)~~ Nine former junta members, including three ex-presidents, went on trial this week for waging the "dirty war" against leftists and subversive guerrilla organizations.

~~(C)~~ The defendants face charges of human-rights violations during the 1976 to 1979 campaign against terrorism and miscellaneous charges resulting from Argentina's role in the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) conflict. President and Armed Forces Commander Raul Alfonsin brought the charges in December 1983 just 3 days after he assumed office. The purpose of the trials reportedly is to close out a tragic period of history and not to try the armed forces as an institution. Although the court proceedings have been orderly, huge numbers of demonstrators were on hand to call for justice and for punishment of the guilty and to seek redress for the alleged 9,000 "disappeared ones." The trials are apparently contributing to the heightened political tension in the capital. Moreover, the President has indicated the trials would not go substantially beyond the nine accused former general officer junta members, but the armed forces are worried the courts will want to involve the rank-and-file in the proceedings. The concern is that the inquiries will be expanded to include individuals who carried out military orders that provoked the human-rights violations and alleged excesses.

COMMENT: ~~(C)~~ Observers speculate that the court will deal differently with military personnel who gave the orders and those who carried them out. This possible precedent could assist in limiting the scope and perhaps the scale of the trials, relieving one of the current tensions between the military and the executive. Other speculation is circulating that the trial could take up to 6 months and become highly politicized as human-rights activists from national and international organizations take the stand to use it as a forum for their cause. President Alfonsin reportedly met with the newly installed military leadership to allay their fears and assure them that everything is being done to project an even-handed focus on the proceedings. Reports have also surfaced of possible amnesty after sentences have been passed. The trial should resolve an extremely sensitive and delicate emotional issue. What impact the outcome will have on politico-military relations is not clear, however, especially while the Alfonsin administration struggles to confront mounting problems that seem to threaten the tenure of the government itself. (DECL OADR)



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50

PAGE #1 BUENOS AIRES 3389 DTG: 301122Z APR 85 PSN: 061487
EOB860 AN001817 TOR: 121/1431Z CSM: HCE202

AUSTERITY. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER WILL
ALSO INCREASE POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND PLACE STRESS
ON ARGENTINA'S SOCIAL FABRIC.

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Argentina

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PIER, PINS, AR
SUBJ: TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA

REFS: (A) BUENOS AIRES 2902 (DTG 122039Z APR 85)
(B) BUENOS AIRES 1301 (DTG 152058Z FEB 85)
(C) 84 BUENOS AIRES 4965 (DTG 271642Z JUN 84)

1. SUMMARY: ARGENTINA IS RELATIVELY FREE OF
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE. THERE ARE NOW SIGNS
THAT THIS SITUATION MAY BE ABOUT TO END. THE COMING
PERIOD OF ECONOMIC AUSTERITY, RESENTMENT GENERATED
BY THE TRIAL OF THE NINE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS, AND A
GROWING FEELING THAT ARGENTINA IS ADRIFT EXACERBATE
THESE WORRIES. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED
VIOLENCE SINCE ALFONSIN'S INAUGURATION IN DECEMBER
1983.

POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE IS STILL AT A RELATIVELY
LOW LEVEL IN ARGENTINA, BUT THERE ARE INCREASING FEARS
OF AN UPSWING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN THIS REGARD,
THE "BUENOS AIRES HERALD" RECENTLY COMMENTED THAT THE
PUBLIC SEEMS "DISPOSED TO HEAR ECHOES OF THE PAST"
AS ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUGGEST HARD TIMES
AHEAD. POLITICAL TENSIONS ARE BEING GENERATED BY THE
TRIAL OF THE NINE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS AND THE COMING
PUBLIC TRIAL OF MONTONERO LEADER MARIO FIRMENICH.
PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN AND VICE PRESIDENT VICTOR
MARTINEZ BOTH RECENTLY PREDICTED THAT EXTREMIST
GROUPS "WILL TRY TO CREATE TENSIONS" TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE UPCOMING PERIOD OF ECONOMIC

3. ATTACKS OCCUR, HOWEVER

SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND PROPERTY ATTACKS, APPARENTLY
MOTIVATED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HAVE OCCURRED
THIS YEAR. ONE PERONIST, ONE INTRANSIGENT PARTY, AND
THREE RADICAL (UCR) DISTRICT OFFICES WERE BOMBED IN
THE CAPITAL, AS WAS THE HOME OF A PERONIST TOWN
COUNCILMAN. THE DEVELOPMENTALIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS
WAS ALSO BOMBED. BOMBS ALSO EXPLODED IN A SUBURBAN
BUENOS AIRES METALWORKERS UNION OFFICE AND A PROVIN-
CIAL COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICE IN THE NORTHERN TOWN OF
RESISTENCIA. GUNMEN FIRING FROM A CAR SHOT AT THE
SUPREME COURT BUILDING IN THE PROVINCIAL CITY OF
TUCUMAN ON APRIL 16. ON APRIL 29, AN EXPLOSION
DAMAGED THE FACILITIES OF A BUENOS AIRES RADIO
STATION. THOUGH NO SERIOUS INJURIES OCCURRED
DURING THESE EARLY MORNING INCIDENTS, THE ATTACKS
SPARKED WIDESPREAD COMMENTARY. CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
AUGUSTO CONTE CLAIMED THAT THE EXPLOSION AT THE
INTRANSIGENT PARTY'S OFFICE WAS THE WORK OF
"SECTORS CLOSE TO ARMY INTELLIGENCE." THE
PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (ADPH) STATED
ITS BELIEF THAT THESE ATTACKS WERE PART OF THE
"PERFECTLY-ORGANIZED PLAN OF THE AGENTS OF DEATH
AND TERRORISM" DESIGNED TO "CREATE CONDITIONS OF
INSECURITY" AND TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC INSTITU-
TIONS.

4. PERSONAL ASSAULTS ARE INCREASING

ASSAULTS ON PROMINENT OR POLITICALLY-ACTIVE PERSONS
ALSO ARE INCREASING. MANY OF THESE ATTACKS APPEAR
TO BE THE WORK OF COMMON CRIMINALS, BUT SOME MAY
HAVE A POLITICAL MOTIVATION. UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS
ASSAULTED A SOCIALIST AND TWO COMMUNIST PARTY
ACTIVISTS. A RASH OF ATTACKS ON PERONIST PARTY
MEMBERS ALSO OCCURRED RECENTLY. THESE INCIDENTS
SEEM TIED TO INTERNAL PARTY BICKERING. THE
KIDNAPPINGS OF PROMINENT CATTLE-BARON RICARDO
LANUSSE AND INDUSTRIALIST LUIS MEHOTI PESCARMONA
WERE ALSO BIG NEWS. LANUSSE WAS FREED UNHARMED;
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51

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HE DENIES HIS ABDUCTORS RECEIVED THE U.S. TWO MILLION DOLLAR RANSOM DEMANDED. PESCARMONA, KIDNAPPED ON APRIL 10, IS STILL BEING HELD FOR A U.S. FIVE MILLION DOLLAR RANSOM.

5. ~~SECRET~~ WEAPONS ARE READILY AVAILABLE

ARGENTINES ARE EVEN MORE CONCERNED OVER THESE EVENTS BECAUSE WEAPONS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE AMONG VIOLENT SECTORS OF SOCIETY. SEVERAL ARMS SHOPS WERE ROBBED EARLIER THIS YEAR. SOME OF THESE CRIMES, INCLUDING THE ROBBERY OF AN ARMORY, WERE SOLVED. POLICE SAY COMMON CRIMINALS WERE THE CULPRITS. CONCERN OVER ARMS SMUGGLING ACROSS ARGENTINA'S POROUS BORDERS IS ALSO HIGH. AN UNNAMED GOA OFFICIAL, HOWEVER, TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE FLOW OF ARMS MAY BE OUT OF ARGENTINA, NOT INTO IT. RECENT ARMS ROBBERIES, HE SAID, WERE DONE WITH THE GOAL OF SENDING THE WEAPONS TO BOLIVIA. TO SUPPORT HIS ALLEGATION, HE NOTED THAT BOLIVIANS WERE INVOLVED IN THE SOLVED ARMORY ROBBERY AND THAT THIS YEAR THE BORDER POLICE DETAINED TEN BOLIVIANS, IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS ALONG THE FRONTIER, SMUGGLING ARMS AND DRUGS.

6. ~~SECRET~~

COMMENT: MUCH OF THE ARMS SMUGGLING ACROSS ARGENTINE BORDERS DOES INVOLVE COMMON CRIMINALS. WHILE THE SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS CANNOT BE COMPLETELY

DISCOUNTED, TWO REPORTS SUGGEST THAT EXTREME LEFTISTS MAY HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS CACHES ON HAND FOR THEIR CURRENT STRENGTH. RIGHT-WING NATIONALISTS ALSO DO NOT APPEAR LACKING IN WEAPONS, PERHAPS DRAWING THEM FROM ARMY SYMPATHIZERS. END COMMENT.

7. ~~SECRET~~ GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMPS?

THERE ARE RUMORS, BUT NO HARD EVIDENCE, OF GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMPS IN THE INTERIOR PROVINCES OF CORDOBA AND TUCUMAN. UNPROVEN RUMORS ALSO CIRCULATED THAT THE PERUVIAN SHINING PATH (SENDERO LUMINOSO) REVOLUTIONARY GROUP IS ACTIVE IN TUCUMAN. IN ADDITION, SOME PEOPLE CHARGE THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE PEOPLE/WORKER'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (ERP/PRT) IS INFILTRATING THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY, ESPECIALLY ITS YOUTH WING. MONTONEROS ARE PERIODICALLY LINKED WITH PERONIST YOUTH GROUPS AND, ACCORDING TO PRESS STORIES, PARTICIPATED IN THE APRIL 22 MARCH OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORTED THE TRIAL OF THE EX-JUNTA MEMBERS. DEFENSE MINISTER RAUL BORRAS RECENTLY DENIED ALL THESE REPORTS PUBLICLY, THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT ARGENTINA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES "HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT PERSONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN LOOSELY TIED TO SUBVERSION (IN THE PAST) THAT ARE TODAY ACTING THROUGH POLITICS." BORRAS WARNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ALLOW A TERRORIST REBIRTH, WOULD MEET THE PROBLEM FIRST WITH THE POLICE, AND WOULD ONLY "IN THE LAST INSTANCE" CALL ON THE ARMED FORCES TO HELP. THE MILITARY, HE STRESSED, WOULD ACT WITHIN ALL LEGAL BOUNDARIES SHOULD IT BE CALLED UPON TO BATTLE TERRORISTS.

8. ~~SECRET~~

COMMENT: AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT AN ERP/PRT GROUP OF ABOUT 50 MEMBERS IS ACTIVE IN TUCUMAN. THESE PERSONS ARE CONCENTRATING ON PROSELYTIZING OTHERS AND ORGANIZING. THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT VIOLENT ACTIONS ARE BEING PLANNED FOR THE NEAR FUTURE. A MISIDENTIFICATION OF THIS GROUP IS PROBABLY THE ORIGIN OF REPORTS OF SHINING PATH'S INFILTRATION INTO ARGENTINA. THE ERP/PRT IS ACTIVELY INFILTRATING THE YOUTH WING OF THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY, WHILE THE LEFT-WING OF THE PERONIST YOUTH MOVEMENT SEEMS TO HAVE TIES TO THE MONTONEROS. THE MONTONEROS, LIKE ERP/PRT, ARE BT

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PAGE 01 BUENOS AIRES 3389 DTG: 301122Z APR 85 PSN: 061512
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THE MILITARY'S DISPLEASURE IS LIKELY TO GROW AS THE TRIAL OF THE NINE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS CONTINUES. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS MAY STAGE OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS DEMANDING CONVICTIONS OF ALL NINE EX-JUNTA MEMBERS AND EXTENSION OF THE TRIALS TO THE LOWER RANKS. SECTORS TIED TO THE ARMED FORCES ARE ACCUSED OF WAGING A CAMPAIGN ON BEHALF OF THOSE ON TRIAL. THE MAJORITY LEADER OF THE LOWER HOUSE, CESAR JAROSLAVSKY, TOLD THE PRESS THAT THIS CAMPAIGN IS DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER. UCR SENATOR ANTONIO BERTHONGARAY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT "KNEW THAT AS THE TRIAL OF THE EX-COMMANDERS MOVED CLOSER A CAMPAIGN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION WAS GOING TO OCCUR". REPORTS OF FOUR ATTACKS ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE FIRST HALF OF APRIL ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEFT-WING TERRORISTS ARE SEEKING TO PROVOKE THE ARMY. THREE OF THESE INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED GUNSHOTS FROM PASSING CARS, WHILE THE FOURTH REPORTEDLY CONSISTED OF A 20-MINUTE GUN BATTLE BETWEEN INTRUDERS AND SENTRIES.

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POSITIONING THEMSELVES FOR A TIME WHEN DISCONTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS HIGH ENOUGH FOR MORE VIOLENT AND NUMEROUS ACTIONS TO HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT.
END COMMENT.

9. CAN THE GOA HANDLE TERRORISM?

IF THERE IS AN UPSURGE OF TERRORISM AND THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION CALLS UPON THE MILITARY OR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FOR HELP, THEY MAY DISCOVER UNEASY ALLIES. THESE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO FEEL UNJUSTLY UPBRAIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND TROUBLED BY THE LOW PRESTIGE AND PAY OF THEIR WORK. RECOGNITION OF LOW MILITARY SALARIES LED THE DEFENSE MINISTRY TO CONSIDER GRANTING ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL A 15 PERCENT REAL SALARY INCREASE. THE POLICE ALSO RECEIVE MEAGER SALARIES THAT MAY MAKE THEM LESS WILLING TO RISK THEIR LIVES FOR THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SITUATION. PROBLEMS WITH POLICE SALARIES ARE LEADING TO SCATTERED PROTESTS, INCLUDING A RECENT ONE-DAY SIT-IN BY 100 TUCUMAN PROVINCIAL POLICE AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS BUILDING. AS TIGHT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS GO BEYOND PAY, MILITARY OFFICERS ARE ALSO INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL CUTBACKS THEIR SERVICES ARE SUFFERING.

10. HOW ARE THE MILITARY REACTING?

11. COMMENT: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA ESCALATED SINCE REFTEL C TEN MONTHS AGO BUT IS STILL AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. MORE NOTICEABLE, THOUGH, IS THE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC'S PREVIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ATTITUDE THAT THE EXCESSES OF THE PAST WERE DEFINITELY OVER. EXTREMISTS, HOWEVER, STILL LACK SOCIETAL SUPPORT AND ARE MOVING CAUTIOUSLY, FOCUSING ON INFILTRATING TARGET GROUPS AND REFINING THEIR OWN INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INCIDENTS THAT DO OCCUR ARE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE SURVIVABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION. DESPITE OCCASIONAL FLARE-UPS, THE

CURRENT LOW LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY WILL LIKELY CONTINUE OVER THE NEAR TERM. RECOGNIZING THE PUBLIC'S REVULSION WITH THE BLOODY YEARS OF THE 1970S, TERRORISTS HAVE GENERALLY DESIGNED THEIR CURRENT ACTIONS TO AVOID LOSS OF LIFE. SHOULD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WORSEN, AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRIFE INCREASE, EXTREMIST GROUPS MAY RAISE THEIR PROFILE AND REVISE TACTICS, WHICH HAVE THUS FAR HELD LOSS OF LIFE IN CHECK. ORTIZ
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PAGE 01 OF 02
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DIST: 2 NOVEMBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: APPRAISAL OF SITUATION: THE CURRENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL
SITUATION, ITS ANTECEDENTS, AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE

DOI: 2 NOVEMBER 1985



SUMMARY. AN INSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT BY THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA) DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, ALTHOUGH AN UNSTABLE SITUATION HAS EXISTED IN THE FFAA, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMY, SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1985. ACTS OF VIOLENCE--ESPECIALLY BOMBINGS--AND INTIMIDATION CREATED A SENSE OF INSECURITY AND A DEGREE OF TENSION IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST SIX WEEKS. THE GOA DID NOT PUT AN END TO THIS VIOLENCE, AND IT RESORTED TO ATTEMPTING TO DETAIN PEOPLE--WITHOUT OFFERING EVIDENCE--

ON ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THE ADMINISTRATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) WERE CONDUCTING A CAMPAIGN FOR THE 3 NOVEMBER OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS, USING QUESTIONED MEANS IN SOME CASES. WITH THEIR ACTIONS AND FAILURES SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE UCR WORSENE THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMED FORCES--RAISING THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE FFAA, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMY. ANTI-GOVERNMENT TALK INCREASED IN THE ARMED FORCES, AS DID COMMENTARY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A COUP D'ETAT. FOLLOWING THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN MAY TAKE STEPS TO ATTEMPT TO RESTORE WHATEVER PUBLIC CONFIDENCE THE THE ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE LOST OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND TO

REDUCE ADMINISTRATION-FFAA TENSIONS. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WILL REMAIN IN POWER AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF HIS POPULARITY, THE LACK OF A HIGHLY-DEVELOPED MOVEMENT IN THE MILITARY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH

SERIOUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AS WELL AS WITH GROUPS IN THE ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO SOME OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES. SOME MAY SEE THE VICE-PRESIDENT AS A MORE CONSERVATIVE AND MALLEABLE SUCCESSOR TO ALFONSIN.

1. AS OF EARLY NOVEMBER 1985, AN INSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) SEEMS UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. THE REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR A COUP D'ETAT DO NOT APPEAR TO EXIST. ALTHOUGH TENSIONS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMED FORCES AND TENSIONS IN THE FFAA ARE HIGH, THERE IS NO OSTENSIBLE AND JUSTIFIABLE REASON FOR A MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT PUBLIC OPINION HAS TURNED AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OR THE ADMINISTRATION, OR THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAVE REGAINED AMONG THE ARGENTINE POPULACE ANY OF THE PRESTIGE WHICH IT LOST THROUGH

THE CONDUCT OF THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S, THE MISHMANAGEMENT OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY FROM 1976 TO 1983, AND THE FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY FAILURE OF THE 1982 FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFLICT. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT BUSINESSMEN--ALTHOUGH STUNG BY THE RECESSION AND SUCH GOVERNMENT POLICIES AS THE FORCED SAVINGS LAW--ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. ORGANIZED LABOR, PERHAPS THE LARGEST AND MOST RESPECTED OF THE OPPOSITION FORCES, DOES NOT SEEM PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO GO BEYOND THE LEGAL FORMS OF PROTEST AND OPPOSITION AVAILABLE TO IT. FINALLY, DIVISIONS CONTINUE TO EXIST IN, AND BETWEEN, THE THREE ARMED SERVICES.

2. AN UNSTABLE SITUATION DOES EXIST IN THE FFAA, HOWEVER. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AN OFFICER OR A GROUP OF OFFICERS DRIVEN TO THE POINT OF IRRATIONALITY BY ANGER, FRUSTRATION, AND CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURES OF THE ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION AND OF THEMSELVES COULD ATTEMPT A PRECIPITATE MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE LIKELIHOOD FOR SUCCESS OF SUCH A MOVE IS SLIM. THERE IS NO INFORMATION AT THIS TIME INDICATING THAT THE BULK OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD SUPPORT REBELIOUS ACTIONS

OF A COMPARATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF OFFICERS--UNLESS, PERHAPS, SUCH ACTIONS SHOWED STRONG SIGNS OF SUCCEEDING. ANOTHER THREAT CONSISTS IN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE PRESIDENT, A POSSIBL WHICH CONCERNS MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR).

3. ALTHOUGH ARGENTINA APPEARS CALM ON THE SURFACE AND LIFE AND COMMERCE SEEM TO CONTINUE NORMALLY, A SENSE OF INSECURITY AND A DEGREE OF TENSION DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST SIX WEEKS. THIS SITUATION OCCURRED IN PART BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:

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PAGE 02 OF 02

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THE DETONATION OF BOMBS--ESPECIALLY IN GREATER BUENOS AIRES; A LARGE NUMBER OF ANONYMOUS BOMB THREATS MADE TO SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS; AND KIDNAPPINGS AND A HIGH INCIDENCE OF CRIME. ADDITIONALLY, SPOKESMEN FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA) RAISED THE SPECTRE OF RIGHT-WING GANGS OPERATING AGAINST DEMOCRACY. AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBINGS, A SENSE OF CONFUSION DEVELOPED BECAUSE THE PERPETRATORS--POSSIBLY FROM AT LEAST TWO GROUPS AT OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM--WERE NOT IDENTIFIED, A CONDITION PERHAPS CREATED IN PART BY THE TENDENCY OF ARGENTINE ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE TO MAKE AN ACTION APPEAR THE WORK OF ANOTHER

GROUP WITH COMPLETELY DIFFERENT POLITICS.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FOUND THEMSELVES UNABLE--UNWILLING, SOME OF THE GOA'S OPPONENTS SAID--TO STOP THE BOMBINGS AND TO MAKE ARRESTS. THE ADMINISTRATION ISSUED AN ILL-ADVISED, LEGALLY-FLAWED EXECUTIVE DECREE ORDERING THE DETENTION FOR SIXTY DAYS OF TWELVE ARGENTINE CITIZENS--CIVILIANS AND RETIRED AND ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICERS-- ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN AN EFFORT TO DE-STABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS ALLEGATION, AND THE COURTS FOUND THE DECREE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE GOA THEN DECREED A STATE OF SEIGE, WHICH PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR DECREEING DETENTIONS--WHICH IT DID AGAIN, SPARKING A ROUND OF COURT REVIEWS AND APPEALS WHICH SOON WILL REACH THE SUPREME COURT FOR RESOLUTION.

5. WHILE THE BOMBINGS WERE TAKING PLACE AND THE ADMINISTRATION APPEARED TO BE BUNGLING ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP BOMB ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE GOVERNING
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SUGGESTED THAT THE UCR USE SUCH ACTIONS AS BOMBINGS, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIONS OR PROPOSALS WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ANTI-SEMITIC WHICH HAVE OCCURRED RECENTLY IN ARGENTINA, AND MANIPULATION OF THE MEDIA FOR THE PARTY'S POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

6. THROUGH ITS ACTIONS AND FAILURES SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER, THE ADMINISTRATION DEEPEDED THE PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND ITSELF AND EXACERBATED TENSIONS IN THE FFAA, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMY. BY INNUENDO, IT INDICATED THAT FFAA PERSONNEL MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBINGS. WITH ITS EFFORTS TO DECREE THE DETENTIONS OF ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICERS, THE ADMINISTRATION RAISED THE CONCERN IN THE ARMY THAT ADDITIONAL

DETENTIONS OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS MIGHT FOLLOW AND INDIRECTLY, IT HEIGHTENED CONCERN THAT YOUNGER OFFICERS MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL ON CHARGES ARISING FROM THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. THROUGH ITS ACTIONS WHICH ADDED TO DISCONTENT ALREADY EXISTING IN THE FFAA OVER SUCH ISSUES AS PAY AND THE TRIAL OF FORMER MEMBERS OF PRECEDING MILITARY GOVERNMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION CREATED A SITUATION WHICH ARMY OFFICERS, IN PARTICULAR, PERCEIVED AS AN ATTACK ON THE ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION. IN TURN, THIS SITUATION RESULTED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT TALK IN THE FFAA AND REPORTS AND RUMORS OF PLOTTING. BY CONDUCTING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AS THEY DID, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE UCR ANGERED THE ARMED FORCES AND FOSTERED FEELINGS OF INSECURITY CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE FFAA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION.

7. IN ADDITION TO WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE ARMED FORCES, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS HURT ITSELF IN OTHER WAYS IN RECENT WEEKS. CONSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN MAY TAKE STEPS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS

TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN IT AND THE FFAA AND IN THE THREE SERVICES:

- A. REFORM THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY SIDE AND THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF POVER POLITICS, OR "DIRTY TRICKS," AND INCOMPETENCE.
- B. REPLACE INCOMPETENT GOA OFFICIALS AND IMPROVE PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT.
- C. IDENTIFY OR CONTROL THE SOURCES OF THE VIOLENCE OF THE PAST SIX WEEKS.
- D. REORGANIZE THE UCR.
- E. REPLACE THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE) WHO LOST THE SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE OF SUBORDINATES BECAUSE OF HIS PERCEIVED FAILURE TO PREVENT OR CONFRONT WHAT MANY OFFICERS CONSIDERED AN ADMINISTRATION ATTACK ON THE ARMY.
- F. RELEASE THOSE INDIVIDUALS NOW DETAINED WITHOUT PROOF THAT THEY WERE CONNECTED WITH ACTIVITIES INTENDED TO DESTABILIZE THE ADMINISTRATION.
- G. MAKE, OR HOLD TO, A DECISION THAT YOUNGER ARMED FORCES OFFICERS WILL NOT FACE TRIAL ON CHARGES ARISING FROM THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN.
- H. PROTECT HIMSELF, THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THE UCR FROM POSSIBLE CHARGES OF UNFAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES.
- 8. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WILL REMAIN IN POWER BECAUSE OF HIS

WHOSE CRITICISM COULD BE JUSTIFIED TO TO A DEGREE. DEVELOPED INFORMATION LINKING BOMB THREATS TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S CIVILIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) AND SOME EVENTS AND SOME PORTIONS OF THE UCR'S CAMPAIGN COULD APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN BASED ON A PURPORTED UCR HARD-LINE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY DESCRIBED IN A DOCUMENT WHICH BEGAN CIRCULATING IN THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER. THIS DOCUMENT

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56

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 [REDACTED]

DTG: 022041Z NOV 85 PSN: 070476

POPULARITY, THE LACK OF A HIGHLY DEVELOPED MOVEMENT IN THE MILITARY, AND THE PRESIDENT'S INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HOWEVER, HE WILL NOT FIND GOVERNING ARGENTINA EASY IN THE SHORT TERM,

EVEN IF HE RESTORES CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION. HE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES AS WAGES, PRICES, AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENTS, AND FACE OPPOSITION FROM THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. HE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE DEALING WITH

ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN DEBT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES HE MUST FACE A UCR PARTY CONGRESS IN MID-NOVEMBER, AND THE UCR IS NOT A MONOLITHIC ORGANIZATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN A SITUATION IN WHICH SOME ARGENTINES SEE VICE PRESIDENT VICTOR (MARTINEZ) AS A MORE CONSERVATIVE AND MALLEABLE SUCCESSOR. FINALLY, HE WILL BE DEALING WITH PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE UCR WHO HAVE TAKEN STRONG POSITIONS IN RECENT WEEKS FROM WHICH THEY MAY FEEL THEY CANNOT RETURN -- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EVENTS AND INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS TAKEN DURING THE PAST MONTH WILL BE THE SEEDS OF UNREST AND EVEN COUP PLOTTING IN 1986 OR BEYOND.

9. TENSIONS WILL EXIST IN REGARD TO THE FFAA. ALTHOUGH THE LEVEL OF TENSION MAY SUBSIDE FROM THE PEAK OF LATE OCTOBER, TENSIONS WILL REMAIN HIGHER THAN THEY WERE JUST A FEW WEEKS AGO AND GROUPS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOW ENTRENCHED AS OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT OF INDICATIONS AT LEAST BY INNUENDO THAT ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBINGS WHICH BEGAN IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND WERE INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 03
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REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET
DIST: 13 MARCH 1984
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION EXISTING BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT; ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE ARMED FORCES; PROBLEMS FACING THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
DOI: EARLY MARCH 1984

SUMMARY: ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE IN EARLY MARCH 1984 THAT GOVERNMENT-ARMED FORCES (FAA) RELATIONS HAVE REACHED A LOW POINT AND THAT SOME TYPE OF CONFRONTATION IS LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE OFFICERS ARE MOST CONCERNED AT THIS TIME ABOUT THREE ISSUES. WHEN ARMY OFFICERS TALK ABOUT A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT, BUT THEY DO ADMIT THAT A LOCALIZED UPRISING COULD TAKE PLACE IN RESPONSE TO A GIVEN SITUATION OR ISSUE. THEY BELIEVE THAT CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT TAKEN STOCK OF THE FACT THAT THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY HAVE PUT INTO KEY POSITIONS COME FROM THE SAME BACKGROUND AS DO THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY RETIRED. ARMY OFFICERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF MUST SOON TELL THE CIVILIAN LEADERS THAT THERE EXISTS A POINT BEYOND WHICH THE ARMY WILL NO LONGER ACCEPT CIVILIAN TAMPERING WITH THE ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION. OFFICERS ARE CRITICAL OF ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

TEXT: 1. AS OF THE BEGINNING OF MARCH 1984, ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVED THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES (FAA) HAVE REACHED THE LOWEST POINT SO FAR DURING THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THEY EXPECT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 03

DTG: 131651Z MAR 84 PSN: 036723

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A. A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE, RAUL (BORRAS), AND HIS CONTROL OVER MANY DECISIONS TRADITIONALLY TAKEN BY THE SERVICE COMMANDERS.

[REDACTED]

B. CONTINUING ACCUSATIONS CONCERNING EXCESSES BY FFAA PERSONNEL DURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S AND THE PROSPECTS THAT ACCUSED PERSONNEL FACE TRIALS BOTH BY COURTS MARTIAL AND, MORE IRRITATINGLY, BY CIVILIAN COURTS.

[REDACTED]

C. MANY ARMY LIEUTENANT COLONELS AND COLONELS HAVE NO WORK TO DO, OR ARE NOT DOING ANY WORK.

2. WHEN ARMY OFFICERS TALK ABOUT A CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT. BUT, THEY DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME TYPE OF A SITUATION OR ISSUE COULD GET OUT OF HAND AND PROVOKE AN UPRISING IN A GIVEN UNIT OR ORGANIZATION.

3. ARMY OFFICERS NOTE THAT OFFICIALS OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE A MISTAKE IF THEY ASSUME THAT, BY RETIRING A NUMBER OF GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS, THEY COULD CONTROL THE FFAA THROUGH LEADERS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. THE OFFICERS SAY THE CIVILIAN OFFICIALS SEEM TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY RETIRED AND THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY MOVED INTO KEY POSITIONS HAVE HAD THE SAME BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EXPOSURES; CONSEQUENTLY, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY REAL CHANGE IN THE THINKING OF ARMED FORCES OFFICERS.

4. ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) JORGE (ARGUINDEGUI), THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF, MUST SOON TELL CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES -- INCLUDING PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSIN) -- THAT THERE EXISTS A NOT-YET-DEFINED POINT AT WHICH THE ARMY WILL NO LONGER ACCEPT CIVILIAN TAMPERING WITH THE ARMY AND WITH THE ARMED FORCES AS INSTITUTIONS. THE OFFICERS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WOULD REPRESENT A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR ARGUINDEGUI, BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT, WITH THE RATE AT WHICH THEY SEE ARMED FORCES-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS DETERIORATING, HE WILL HAVE TO TAKE A STAND IN FRONT OF THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES BEFORE TOO LONG.

5. IN REGARD TO ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, ARMED FORCES OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS FOOLISH IN TRYING TO ALIGN ITSELF WITH EUROPEAN SOCIALISM. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT A THIRD-WORLD POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IS ABSURD FOR ARGENTINA.

6. ARMY OFFICERS GENERALLY CREDIT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WITH HAVING AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITS TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CAN GO IN ATTACKING THE FFAA, BUT BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT IS BEING INFLUENCED BY THE MORE RADICAL OF HIS ADVISORS WHO ARE PRESSING FOR A HARD LINE AGAINST THE FFAA. ARMY OFFICERS HAVE BEGUN TO MOVE FROM THE POSITION THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAD TO RETURN TO THE BARRACKS TO THE POSITION THAT THE ARMY IS IN OPPOSITION TO THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY GERMAN ((LOPEZ)) MAY BE A KEY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES.

7. [REDACTED] A VERY SHORT-LIVED HONEY-MOON BETWEEN THE FFAA AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS COMING TO AN END. PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FFAA SEEM INCREASINGLY SERIOUS AND COULD LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION SOONER THAN ONCE ANTICIPATED.

[REDACTED]

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3. ARGENTINA: ARMY SHAKE-UP; ALFONSIN RAPS THE GENERALS

President Alfonsin recently accepted the resignation of the Army's top officer, Chief of Staff Arguindegui, and replaced three of the country's five corps commanders. The move followed press reports of a "destabilization campaign" within senior officer ranks and official unhappiness over Arguindegui's handling of the matter. Armed forces discontent over several issues appear to have convinced Alfonsin to assert civilian authority. Although there is no evidence of any coup plotting, problems remain.

* * *

Tensions between the civilian government and the armed forces came to a head on July 4 with the dismissals of Arguindegui and III Corps commander General Mansilla. Alfonsin's action came after several days of public speculation about a "destabilization" plot within the senior ranks of the armed forces. Several other senior officers were subsequently replaced.

Those who may have harbored fears about military plotting were reflecting memories of past military excursions into politics rather than hard appraisals of current armed forces' capabilities and intentions. There are matters causing considerable disquiet within military ranks--low pay, budget cuts, delayed promotions, persistent public attacks on the military for past sins, and continued vulnerability of individual soldiers to punishment for "dirty war" abuses. There is also skepticism over the government's ability to solve the country's economic problems. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of active coup plotting by the military that would present any imminent threat to the Alfonsin administration.

The armed forces continue in the state of disarray that has characterized them since Alfonsin's inauguration last December. This appears to be particularly so in the case of the army, which would have to be the locus of any serious conspiring. The army's general-officer ranks are currently manned at only about 30 percent of normal level because of post-inaugural resignations and the slowness of the Alfonsin government in completing the promotion-retirement-reassignment cycle that should have been completed at the end of 1983.

Alfonsin's quick reaction to rumors of military dissatisfaction is typical. Avoiding decisive action in other areas, he has swiftly cashiered military officers when they have publicly criticized civilian authorities. He remains deeply distrustful of military intentions and is willing to assert his constitutional mandate as commander-in-chief whenever he believes it potentially threatened. He will not tolerate the armed forces arrogating to themselves the public role of another political party or interest group.

ARGENTINA:

Argentina

Terrorist Spreading

Terrorist incidents in Argentina, while still few in number, are increasing as extremists on both the right and the left seem to be preparing to stage more attacks.

Offices of the ruling party and a progovernment military club were bombed recently, and last month police foiled a plot to kill President Alfonsin. Argentine officials link these acts to far rightist civilians and members of the armed forces.

Ultrarightists also were responsible for several bombings in Cordoba Province earlier this year.

says the terrorists and local military authorities have since agreed with Defense Minister Borrás to halt the violence as long as the government stalls trials of military personnel for human rights abuses and exempts specific officers from prosecution.

, the far-left Montoneros have established paramilitary training camps.

one faction claims it is about ready to renew terrorist activity.

Comment: Terrorism does not currently jeopardize the stability of Alfonsin's government. If the Defense Minister's reported bargain with the far right and military officers in Cordoba Province is confirmed, it would set a dangerous precedent. It could tempt elements of the armed forces and their civilian allies to use the threat or reality of terrorism again to force concessions from the government.

Although Montonero leaders oppose renewed terrorism for now, dissident members may stage violence soon in response to the coming trial of Firmenich. Such actions could provoke a rightist response, leading to a cycle of violence that would sap the government's authority. (C NF)

Top Secret

13 December 1984

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02
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Argentine Military

NAVY AND THEY POINT OUT THAT, SINCE ASTIZ COMMITTED NO CRIME AGAINST THE STATE, HE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS LEFTIST "MONTONERO" LEADER MARIO EDUARDO ((FIRMENICH)). NAVY OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE SAME AGE GROUP AS ASTRIZ, STRESS THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.)

2. NAVY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT, IF ASTIZ IS FOUND GUILTY IN A CIVILIAN COURT OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND IS SENT TO JAIL, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE SERIOUS. OFFICERS SAY THAT THE ARA'S FLAG OFFICERS HAVE DISCUSSED RESIGNING EN MASSE IN PROTEST IF THE CURRENT CASE INVOLVING ASTIZ IS NOT

TRANSFERRED TO A COURT MARTIAL. THEY ALSO SAY THE ADMIRALS AND OTHER SENIOR NAVY OFFICERS CONSIDER THE ASTIZ AFFAIR AS

PART OF A LEFTIST CAMPAIGN. THEY POINT OUT THAT THE SENIOR ARA OFFICERS HAVE ALLEGED THAT LUIS (ZAMORA), THE LAWYER REPRESENTING THE FAMILY OF THE DEAD SWEDISH CITIZEN, IS A MARXIST. THEY SAID THE SENIOR OFFICERS ARE UPSET BECAUSE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WORSHIP SUPPOSEDLY ASSISTED ZAMORA AND OTHER LAWYERS FOR THE FAMILY BY ALLOWING ONE ((BURGOS)) ((FNU)) AND ONE ((GERONDO)) ((FNU)), TWO WITNESSES WHOM THE SENIOR OFFICERS SAY ARE KNOWN "MONTONEROS," TO REENTER ARGENTINA.

3. NAVY OFFICERS HOPE THAT THE VILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL PRESSURE MIGUEL DEL ((CASTILLO)), THE FEDERAL JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE ASTIZ CASE, TO TRANSFER THE CASE TO THE COURT MARTIAL SYSTEM. THE OFFICERS ARE NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC IN THIS REGARD, BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL ((BORRAS)) FOR THE TRANSFER.

4. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE WORRIED AS A RESULT OF THE ASTIZ AFFAIR, ESPECIALLY BORRAS, WHO SEES THE CASE AS A TEST OF ADMINISTRATION-FFAA RELATIONS AND AS A TEST OF THE ABILITY OF THE TWO TO WORK TOGETHER. BORRAS SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF VICE ADMIRAL ((VADM)) RAMON ANTONIO ((AROSA)), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF ((EMGA)), TO OBTAIN THE TRANSFER OF THE ASTIZ CASE FROM THE CIVILIAN COURT SYSTEM AND TO COUNTER WHAT AROSA SEES AS A NARROW VIEW OF THE CASE ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

5. ON 10 DECEMBER, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN MET WITH BORRAS AND AROSA. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE ASTIZ AFFAIR, BUT HE MADE NO COMMITMENTS CONCERNING ANY STEPS WHICH HE MIGHT TAKE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 14 DECEMBER 1984

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: REACTION IN THE ARGENTINE NAVY TO THE DETENTION OF NAVY LIEUTENANT ALFREDO ASTIZ BY A CIVILIAN COURT; CONCERN OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS A RESULT OF THE ASTIZ MATTER

DOI: DECEMBER 1984

TEXT: 1. IN REGARD TO THE CASE OF ARGENTINE NAVY (ARA) LIEUTENANT (LT.) ALFREDO ((ASTIZ)), WHOM A CIVILIAN FEDERAL JUDGE

ORDERED DETAINED IN EARLY DECEMBER 1984 ON CHARGES RELATED TO THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF A SWEDISH CITIZEN DURING ARGENTINA'S COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN, NAVY OFFICERS FEEL THAT ASTIZ TYPIFIES THOSE ARMED FORCES ((FFAA)) OFFICERS WHO SIMPLY ACTED ON, OR CARRIED OUT, ORDERS DURING THE CAMPAIGN. NAVY OFFICERS SAY THAT ASTIZ AND HIS SITUATION HAVE BECOME AN INSTITUTIONAL MATTER IN THEIR VIEW, RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL COURT CASE. THEY ASSERT THAT ASTIZ HAS BECOME A SYMBOL FOR THE

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SUBJ>SUBJ: DIFFERING ATTITUDES IN THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES
CONCERNING THE TRIALS ISSUE

TEXT> [REDACTED]
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SECTION 1 OF 2

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 10 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: DIFFERING ATTITUDES IN THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES
CONCERNING THE TRIALS ISSUE
DOI: LATE MARCH 1987

TEXT: 1. IN SEVERAL MEETINGS IN LATE MARCH 1987, A GROUP OF OFFICERS REPRESENTING THE THREE ARGENTINE ARMED SERVICES DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IMPENDING TRIALS OF ARMED FORCES (FFAA) PERSONNEL WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS, THE OFFICERS HIGHLIGHTED THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TRIALS ISSUE WHICH EXIST IN THE NAVY AND THE ARMY ON THE ONE HAND AND IN THE AIR FORCE ON THE OTHER HAND.

2. IN THE FIRST OF THE MEETINGS, NAVY AND ARMY OFFICERS ARGUED THAT THE A-57 SHOULD PUBLISH A STATEMENT IN NATIONALLY-CIRCULATED NEWSPAPERS IN SUPPORT OF THOSE ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THEY NOTED THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD CRITICIZE THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) FOR ALLOWING THE PROSECUTION OF THE VERY PEOPLE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING A CLIMATE IN WHICH DEMOCRACY COULD FLOURISH. FOR THEIR PART, AIR FORCE OFFICERS TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE NAVY AND ARMY OFFICERS AND SAID THEY WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH MAJOR GENERAL ("BRIGADIER MAYOR") ERNESTO HORACIO ((CRESPO)), THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF (EMGFA).


3. CRESPO LATER MET WITH THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS FROM THE A-57 AND THANKED THEM FOR THEIR SHOW OF LOYALTY IN BRINGING THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT TO HIS ATTENTION. HE SAID THAT SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS

DO NOTHING TO HELP THOSE FACING TRIALS AND, THEREFORE, COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR THE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFFS OF THE THREE SERVICES WHO ARE TRYING TO SEEK POSITIVE SOLUTIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH REGARD TO THE TRIALS. IN THIS MEETING, CRESPO INDICATED TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS THAT HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HE DESCRIBED IN COLORFUL TERMS AS A "MESS." HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS PRIMARY INTEREST CENTERS ON PRESERVING THE AIR FORCE AS AN INSTITUTION. CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, CRESPO ASKED THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH THE TONE OF ANY PRONOUNCEMENT RELEASED BY THE A-57, IF THE ARMY AND NAVY MEMBERS INSISTED ON THE ASSOCIATION'S MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH CRESPO, THE AIR FORCE MEMBERS OF THE A-57 MET AGAIN WITH THE NAVY AND ARMY MEMBERS AND WERE ABLE TO CONVINCED THEM TO DEFER THE PUBLICATION OF ANY LETTER UNTIL THE ASSOCIATION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLETE A STUDY ON ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE FAA.



4. AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE A-57 MEMBERS, TWO ARMY COLONELS--RICARDO ((MATALONI)) AND JORGE ((KIEGER))--NOTED THAT THE SPEECH WHICH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN HAD GIVEN IN THE CORDOBA PROVINCE CITY OF LAS PERDICES ON 23 MARCH HAD BEEN POORLY RECEIVED BY THE ARMY. MATALONI WENT ON TO SAY THAT CONTRARY TO SOME ALLEGATIONS, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF INDISCIPLINE EXISTS AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE. HE NOTED THAT THE WAR COLLEGE'S SENIOR OFFICERS HAD ALLOWED ACTS OF SOLIDARITY BY OFFICERS STATIONED AT THE COLLEGE WITH MILITARY ACADEMY CLASSMATES ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

5. IN THE SAME MEETING, NAVY CAPTAIN JULIO ((SALAS)) POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION OF REAR ADMIRAL RAMON ANTONIO ((AROSA)), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF (EMGA) REMAINS "DELICATE" BECAUSE OF THE WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AMONG NAVAL OFFICERS WHO PERCEIVE THAT HE HAS FAILED TO INTERCEDE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF NAVY OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. SALAS ADDED THAT COMMENTS BY VICE ADMIRAL MAXIMO ((RIVERO)) KELLY, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE EMGA, IN WHICH RIVERO KELLY ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN DID NOT REPRESENT THE SENTIMENTS OF NAVY OFFICERS AND HAD CAUSED SURPRISE AND DISMAY AMONG THEM



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(SUBJ>SUBJ: OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AS A RESULT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE; COMMENTS ON GROUPS OF DISAFFECTED OFFICERS; REPORTED ASSURANCES OF THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING POST-TRIAL TREATMENT OF CONVICTED ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL

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SECTION 1 OF 2

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
(DIST: 09 APRIL 1987
(COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
(SUBJ: OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AS A RESULT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE; COMMENTS ON GROUPS OF DISAFFECTED OFFICERS; REPORTED ASSURANCES OF THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING POST-TRIAL TREATMENT OF CONVICTED ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL
(DT: LATE MARCH 1987

~BEGIN SUMMARY~
(SUMMARY: [REDACTED] DESCRIBED ARMY-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS EARLY IN THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1987 AS "DELICATE," ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE KNOWS OF NO PLOTTING FOR A COUP D'ETAT OR OF ACTS OF DEFIANCE BY ARMY OFFICERS FACING TRIALS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. [REDACTED] ABOUT THE APPEARANCE OF "SUPPORT GROUPS" FOR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND NOTED THAT THESE GROUPS COULD COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO HAVE ACCUSED OFFICERS MAKE COURT APPEARANCES. HE MENTIONED TWO GROUPS OF DISAFFECTED OFFICERS, BUT HE DISMISSED THE GROUPS AS HAVING LITTLE OR NO IMPORTANCE. HE ESTIMATED THAT TENSIONS WOULD RISE WHEN THE COURTS START HEARING CASES OF OFFICERS ONCE ASSIGNED TO THE FORMER I CORPS AND THAT NEW EFFORTS WOULD APPEAR IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO STOP THE TRIALS, EFFORTS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN.
(TEXT: 1. EARLY IN THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1987, [REDACTED]
~END SUMMARY~

[REDACTED] RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINED "DELICATE" AS A RESULT OF THE IMPENDING TRIALS OF ARMED FORCES (FFAA) PERSONNEL WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED HUMAN

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S.

[REDACTED] NO GROUP IN THE ARMY WAS THEN PLOTTING A COUP D'ETAT. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT TO DATE, SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS HAD MANAGED TO PERSUADE THEIR SUBORDINATES TO COMPLY WITH SUMMONSES FROM CIVILIAN COURTS DIRECTING THEIR APPEARANCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

2. [REDACTED] THE APPEARANCE OF "SUPPORT GROUPS" FOR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS REPRESENTED THE GREATEST PROBLEM WHICH THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND THEN FACED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THESE SUPPORT GROUPS CONSIST OF OFFICERS WHO GRADUATED FROM THE MILITARY ACADEMY IN THE CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES") TO WHICH ACCUSED OFFICERS BELONG. HE NOTED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPPORT GROUPS HAD CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH ARMY OFFICERS--WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND IN ALL OTHER AREAS--"ANSWER" TO THE SUPPORT GROUPS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THEIR PEERS IN CIVILIAN COURTS. HE ADDED THAT THE SUPPORT GROUPS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH CONSIST OF MAJORS OR LIEUTENANT COLONELS, WERE TRYING TO EXPAND THEIR RANGE OF CONTACT BY SEEKING SUPPORT FROM ARGENTINE NAVY (ARA) AND AIR FORCE (FAA) OFFICERS WHO GRADUATED FROM THEIR ACADEMIES IN THE SAME YEARS WHICH THE GROUPS REPRESENT. HE MADE THE POINT THAT THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND HAD BECOME CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OR MORE OFFICERS CALLED BY THE CIVILIAN COURTS WOULD REFUSE TO APPEAR BECAUSE--AS A RESULT OF THE FORMATION OF THE SUPPORT GROUPS--OFFICERS WOULD FEEL CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN ACT OF DEFIANCE WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PEERS. HE ADDED THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD PLACE THE HIGH COMMAND IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO ARREST THE DEFIANT OFFICERS ON BEHALF OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

4. [REDACTED] OTHER GROUPS OF DEFIANT OR DISAFFECTED OFFICERS EXIST IN THE ARMY, BUT HE DISMISSED THESE GROUPS AS HAVING LITTLE OR NO IMPORTANCE. [REDACTED] ONE SUCH GROUP, WHICH HE STRESSED IS QUITE SMALL, CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF RETIRED COLONELS AND GENERAL OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN CALLING ACTIVELY FOR A COUP D'ETAT. HE CHARACTERIZED THESE RETIRED OFFICERS AS INDULGING MORE IN "COFFEE HOUSE CHATTER" THAN IN SERIOUS PLANNING. [REDACTED] THIS GROUP HAS NO SUPPORT AMONG SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ANOTHER GROUP, MADE UP OF ACTIVE DUTY COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS, HAS BEEN CALLING FOR MORE ACTION BY ARMY CORPS COMMANDERS WHOM THE GROUP WOULD LIKE TO SEE INTIMIDATE THE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE THREAT OF DISRUPTING PUBLIC ORDER IN HOPES OF FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE WITH THE FFAA. [REDACTED] THIS SECOND GROUP BASES ITS PLANS ON A MODEL WHICH ITS MEMBERS SAY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE URUGUAYAN ARMY USED IN PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT INTO DECLARING AN AMNESTY FOR URUGUAYAN OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION WHICH ALLOWED AN AMNESTY IN URUGUAY DOES NOT EXIST IN ARGENTINA AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, THE GROUP HAS LITTLE APPEAL IN THE ARMY.

5. [REDACTED] TENSIONS WOULD RISE CONSIDERABLY WHEN THE CIVILIAN COURTS BEGIN HEARING CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY OFFICERS ONCE ASSIGNED TO THE FORMER I CORPS. [REDACTED] THESE CASES WOULD BRING ABOUT NEW EFFORTS IN CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE ARMY TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO HALT THE TRIALS HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL ARE THE CENTER OF A

~~SECRET~~

FINAL SECTION OF 2

5

[REDACTED]

PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN TO BRING SUCH PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION.
6. [REDACTED] ENDED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT MAJOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR LUIS ((RIOS)) ERENU HAD RECEIVED PRIVATE ASSURANCES FROM
PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PARDON, OR
COMMUTE THE SENTENCES OF, FFAA PERSONNEL WHO, ACCORDING TO A
DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HAD ACTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
ORDERS--THE PRINCIPLE OF DUE OBEDIENCE--AND WHO HAD NOT BEEN
CONVICTED OF MURDER OR TORTURE.

[REDACTED]

:DIST>PRT: SIT
:JT: EOB SORZANO VAX NSJHO

:PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEHBU<DTG> 161321Z APR 87
:ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
:TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7948

:SUBJ>SUBJECT: ALFONSIN PLANS TO HANDLE INSURRECTION ACTION

:TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 03794
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PGOV, MARR, AR

SUBJECT: ALFONSIN PLANS TO HANDLE INSURRECTION ACTION

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. AT REQUEST PRESIDENT, SOURROUILLE GAVE ME A SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HANDLE THE INSURRECTION SITUATION IN ONE UNIT IN CORDOBA WHERE ONE MAJOR WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO APPEAR IN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS CHARGES APRIL 15 HAS BEEN GIVEN PROTECTION BY THIS REGIMENT.

3. AS MORNING PRESS MAKES CLEAR, MAJOR BARREIRO WAS DISCHARGED DISHONORABLY FROM THE ARMY LAST NIGHT. ALFONSIN HAS CANCELLED HIS NEEDED EASTER VACATION AND IS COORDINATING OPERATIONS WITH HIS KEY ADVISORS.

4. HIS POLICY IS TO BE FIRM BUT TO HANDLE THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. THE GOA DOES NOT YET HAVE FORCES POSITIONED FOR A THREATENED OR ACTUAL CONFRONTATION.

5. A STATE OF SIEGE WILL BE DECLARED PROBABLY TODAY AND THE CONGRESS CALLED TO RATIFY IT. EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, BUSINESSMEN AND OTHER GROUPS TO MAKE CLEAR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY IS BEHIND THE PRESIDENT.

6. THE PRESIDENT WILL TRY TO DRAW THE LINE ON THIS FIRST CASE TO AVOID AN UNRAVELLING OF HIS AUTHORITY.

7. I PASSED THE MESSAGE TO ALFONSIN THAT WE ARE, AS IN THE PAST, PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE EXTENT WE CAN, INCLUDING A POTENTIAL STATEMENT HERE OR IN WASHINGTON BUT ONLY INCORPORATING ANY SUCH STATEMENT IN ALFONSIN'S OVERALL STRATEGY.

8. COMMENT: CORDOBA HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE HOTBED OF MILITARY UNREST, BUT EVENTS THERE HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN LOCALIZED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE MAJOR SUPPORT ELSEWHERE. WE BELIEVE ALFONSIN WILL MOUNT VIGOROUS NEGOTIATION EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION OF THIS OFFICER WHILE RALLYING THE COUNTRY BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE OF LAW INCLUDING THE APPEARANCE IN COURT OF THOSE ACTIVE MILITARY OFFICERS CALLED. THE COUNTRY WILL GIVE THIS SUPPORT.

9. UNTIL WE GET A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR A STATEMENT FROM ALFONSIN, I URGE THE DEPARTMENT NOT COMMENT.

A U.S. STATEMENT MIGHT DELAY SUPPORT FROM SOME DOMESTIC GROUPS, AND ANY EVENTUAL STATEMENT SHOULD FIT PRECISELY WITHIN THE OVERALL STRATEGY WHICH ALFONSIN, JAUNARENA, NOSIGLIA, AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR OVER A MONTH FOR JUST THE CURRENT SCENARIO. BARREIRO'S ACTION WAS NOT A SURPRISE.

10. NOTE: THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CONTADORA AND

SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES ARE STILL IN AGREEMENT THIS
MORNING AND THE GOA CAN ARRANGE THEIR SUPPORT IF SUCH
FITS THEIR STRATEGY. GILDRED

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 3794<TOR> 870417023858 MSG000166934338

SIT: EQB VAX NSJHO

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIA6<DTG> 170209Z APR 87
<ORIG> [REDACTED]
<TO>TO [REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER CONCERNING
THE REBELLION OF THE 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
(AIRBORNE) AND RELATED TOPICS

<TEXT>
*** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***

<TEXT>
~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
SECTION 1 OF 2

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 16 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER CONCERNING
THE REBELLION OF THE 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
(AIRBORNE) AND RELATED TOPICS
DOI: 16 APRIL 1987

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 ~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE CENTER CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN
CORDOBA IN WHICH A NOW-FORMER ACTIVE DUTY MAJOR SOUGHT AND OBTAINED
SUPPORT AND PROTECTION FROM AN ARMY UNIT. HE PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE SITUATION AS NOTED THE ARMY'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT. HE ALSO
PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS FOR DEALING WITH
THE SITUATION CAUSED BY THE REBELLIOUS OFFICER AND UNIT. HE
DESCRIBED AN INCIDENT WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE ON 15 APRIL AT THE ARMY'S
"CAMPO DE MAYO" BASE, AND HE NOTED THAT THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF SEES
21 APRIL AS A KEY DAY IN MILITARY-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

[REDACTED]

AGE 4

~~SECRET~~

INFORMED MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR ((RIOS)) RENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE), THAT RIOS HAS HIS SUPPORT BUT THAT FICHERA DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH MEN TO SEIZE THE 14TH INFANTRY'S COMPOUND BY FORCE. FICHERA ALSO TOLD RIOS THAT TWO OTHER PRINCIPAL REGIMENTS IN THE CORDOBA AREA - THE SECOND INFANTRY (AIRBORNE) AND THE 5TH ARTILLERY, AS WELL AS AIRBORNE ENGINEER AND COMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES, HAD SAID TO HIM THAT ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 14TH REGIMENT, THEY WOULD NOT INTERVENE BY FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ARREST BARREIRO. POLO IS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND A FOLLOWER OF RIGHTWING, NATIONALIST ARMY COLONEL MOHAMED ALI (SEINFELDIN))

2. ON 16 APRIL THAT BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS APPARENTLY HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT WHILE NOT ADVOCATING A COUP D'ETAT. HE NOTED THAT THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT BARREIRO AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED UNJUSTLY AND THAT THEY PROBABLY WANT TO CALL ATTENTION TO THEIR SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THE OFFICERS SUPPORTING AND SHELTERING

PAGE 5 ~~SECRET~~
BARREIRO HAVE NO SPECIFIC PLANS OTHER THAN PROTECTING HIM AND OTHERS WHO WISH TO TAKE REFUGE IN ARMY UNITS. HE ALSO SAID BARREIRO CLAIMS TO HAVE SUPPORT IN 30 ARMY UNITS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, BUT HE ADDED THAT THIS IS ONLY A BOAST. WENT ON TO SAY THE CENTER BELIEVES THAT BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS DO NOT HAVE ANY SUPPORT FROM ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL OFFICERS OR COLONELS, BUT RATHER THAT HIS SUPPORT COMES FROM LIEUTENANT COLONELS, MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS.

3. WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CURRENTLY IS PLANNING TO LET THE ARMY DEAL WITH THE BARREIRO-14TH INFANTRY AFFAIR. HE POINTED OUT THAT SENIOR EMGE OFFICERS HAD CALLED POLO THROUGHOUT THE DAY IN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE HIM TO SURRENDER BARREIRO TO THE AUTHORITIES. HE NOTED THAT AS OF THE AFTERNOON OF 16 APRIL, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PLANNING TO GIVE THE ARMY MORE TIME IN WHICH TO SETTLE THE AFFAIR PEACEFULLY. HE ALSO SAID THE ARMY HAD PLANNED TO SEND MAJOR GENERAL MARIO JAIME ((SANCHEZ)), THE VICE CHIEF OF THE EMGE TO CORDOBA WITH THE MISSION OF TRYING TO CONVINCE POLO TO SURRENDER THE MAJOR. HE ADDED THAT THE CRIM HAD NO INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO

PAGE 6 ~~SECRET~~
HAVE THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA) OR THE PARAMILITARY NATIONAL GENDARMERIE (GN) ATTEMPT TO SEIZE BARREIRO BY FORCE.

4. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA) IS PLANNING A LARGE PUBLICITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL INVOLVE ARGENTINES FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE AND FOREIGN POLITICAL DIGNITARIES IN CALLING PUBLICLY FOR SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. ON 16 APRIL, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY CONVENED GROUPS OF ARGENTINES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT POLITICAL SECTORS AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE (THE "CASA ROSADA") TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. LEOPOLDO ((MOREAU)) IS ONE LEADING FIGURE OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) WHO FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT'S TAKING IMMEDIATE AND STRONG ACTION AGAINST BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE 14TH INFANTRY.

A POLITICIAN ATTENDING A MEETING AT THE "CASA ROSADA" RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ASK ARMY PERSONNEL TO LEAVE THEIR BARRACKS AND DEMONSTRATE IN THE STREETS IN FAVOR OF

<DIST>SIT: EUB VAX

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 090158Z APR 87

<ORIG>
<TO>
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: COMMENTS BY ARMY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THEIR SERVICES AS A RESULT
OF THE TRIALS ISSUE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 08 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: COMMENTS BY ARMY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THEIR SERVICES AS A RESULT
OF THE TRIALS ISSUE
NOT: EARLY APRIL 1987

TEXT: 1.

IN EARLY APRIL 1987
THAT THE COMMANDERS OF THREE ARMY REGIMENTS, WHICH HE DID NOT
IDENTIFY, HAD TOLD MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR LUIS ((RIOS)) ERENU, THE
CHIEF OF THE EMGE, IN EARLY APRIL THAT THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THEIR
REGIMENTS WERE PREPARED TO HARBOR, AND TO DEFEND WITH THEIR WEAPONS
IF NECESSARY, ANY MEMBERS OF THEIR UNITS WHO DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR
BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS TO ANSWER CHARGES ARISING FROM THE
COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S.
HE ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO AN OFFICER WHO HAD SPOKEN WITH RIOS ERENU,
THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HAD ADVISED MINISTER OF DEFENSE
JOSE HORACIO ((JAUNARENA)) OF THIS INFORMATION AND THAT JAUNARENA IN
TURN HAD SPOKEN WITH PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)). HE NOTED THAT
REPORTEDLY, ALFONSIN HAD TOLD THE DEFENSE MINISTER THAT HE WOULD
DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER FOLLOWING THE APRIL VISIT OF POPE ((JOHN
PAUL II)) TO ARGENTINA.

2. WENT ON TO SAY THAT ANOTHER
OFFICER, WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT HE WAS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATING CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES")
9 TO 107, HAD SPOKEN TO RIOS ERENU IN WEEK OF 22 MARCH ABOUT THE
CASE OF ARMY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE ((MONES)) RUIZ, WHO IS EXPECTED TO FACE
DETENTION AND TRIAL IN THE COMING MONTHS. HE NOTED THAT THE OFFICER
HAD TOLD RIOS ERENU THAT MEMBERS OF THE CLASSES HAD NO IDEA ABOUT THE
MANNER IN WHICH THEY SHOULD DEAL WITH THE CASE OF MONES, IF INDEED
THAT SHOULD DO ANYTHING AT ALL. HE ADDED THAT THE OFFICER HAD ALSO
SAID THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING CLASSES FELT LEADERLESS,

12

NOTING THAT THEY HAD LOOKED TO ARMY COLONEL MOHAMED ALI
(SEINELDIN), WHO WAS
RECENTLY REASSIGNED TO PANAMA, FOR GUIDANCE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICER FINALLY
INDICATED TO RIOS ERENU THAT THE CLASSES WOULD NOT PLAN ANY ACTION ON
THEIR OWN IN DEFENSE OF MONES.

3. ALSO IN EARLY APRIL, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT OFFICERS AT THE MAIN
ARGENTINE NAVY (ARA) BASE AT PUERTO BELGRANO AND ARA OFFICERS
ASSIGNED TO THE BUENOS AIRES AREA HAD NOT RECEIVED WELL A LETTER
WHICH VICE ADMIRAL MAXIMO ((RIVERO)) KELLY HAD SENT TO A BUENOS AIRES
NEWSPAPER. [REDACTED] WITH THE LETTER-- WHICH
REPRESENTED RIVERO KELLY'S ONLY STATEMENT ON THE TRIALS ISSUE, THE
ADMIRAL WAS MAKING HIS OWN DEFENSE AND WAS NOT DEFENDING HIS ARA
COLLEAGUES. HE ASSERTED THAT [REDACTED] WHOM HE DID
NOT IDENTIFY, THERE EXIST NO FIRM PLANS OR EVEN INTENTIONS IN THE
NAVY FOR TAKING ACTION AGAINST, OR IN DEFIANCE OF, CIVILIAN COURT
ACTIONS.

4. FINALLY, [REDACTED] THE SITUATION OF NAVY
LIEUTENANT ALFREDO ((ASTIZ)), WHO FACES TRIAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED AS THE NAVAL MECHANICS SCHOOL (ESMA).
HE NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH SUPPOSEDLY UNDER DETENTION AT THE PUERTO
BELGRANO BASE, ASTIZ HAS BEEN SEEN ON THE STREETS OF BUENOS AIRES ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT VICE ADMIRAL RAMON ANTONIO
(AROSA), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF, AND THE COMMANDER OF
THE PUERTO BELGRANO BASE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF ASTIZ' DETENTION
AND HAD REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT DO
ANYTHING ABOUT THE LIEUTENANT'S LEAVING THE BASE.

15

IT: EOB VAX

PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 160659Z APR 87

ORIG> [REDACTED]
TO>TO RUEAIJU/NPIC

[REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//INR/DSTAD
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE//FOR ID
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA

SUBJ>SUBJECT: REBELLION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY
REGIMENT (AIRBORNE); INITIAL DECISION OF PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN TO FORCE THE ARREST OF OFFICERS INVOLVED

TEXT>
~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
SECTION 1 OF 2

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 16 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJECT: REBELLION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY
REGIMENT (AIRBORNE); INITIAL DECISION OF PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN TO FORCE THE ARREST OF OFFICERS INVOLVED
DOI: 15 APRIL 1987

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ENRIQUE DEL ((PINO)), THE OFFICER IN-
CHARGE OF AN ARGENTINE ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER
(CRIM) OFFICE INVOLVED IN COORDINATION AND LIAISON MATTERS, COMMENTED
ON 15 APRIL 1987 THAT EARLIER IN THE DAY, OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF
THE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE) HAD DECLARED LOCAL
CONTROL OF THE REGIMENT IN ORDER TO PROTECT MAJOR ERNESTO G.
((BARREIRO)), AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER WHO HAD FLED TO THE
REGIMENT RATHER THAN REPORT TO A CIVILIAN COURT IN CORDOBA WITH
REGARD TO CHARGES OF COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE
COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. DEL PINO IDENTIFIED THE
THREE KEY OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AT THE 14TH INFANTRY
REGIMENT AS BERREIRO AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS ((SCHIERANO)) (FNU) AND
((GONZALEZ)) NAYA (FNU). HE ADDED THAT A TOTAL OF SEVENTEEN OFFICERS
ARE INVOLVED, INCLUDING OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO OTHER UNITS OF III
CORPS, TO WHICH THE 14TH INFANTRY IS SUBORDINATE. HE ALSO SAID THAT
THESE SEVENTEEN OFFICERS CAN CALL ON THE SUPPORT OF OTHER OFFICERS
WHO FOUGHT IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN AND WHO ARE ASSIGNED
THROUGHOUT THE ARMY. HE ASSERTED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL ANTONINO
((FICHERA)), THE III CORPS COMMANDER, AND HIS MOST SENIOR OFFICERS
WERE ALLOWING THE INCIDENT IN THE 14TH INFANTRY TO DEVELOP AND WERE
NOT TAKING ANY STEPS TO BLOCK IT, BUT HE DID NOT EXPLAIN OR EXPAND

14TH INFANTRY. THE UNIT IS A PARATROOP REGIMENT AND IT CONSISTS OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS WHO ARE WILLING TO FIGHT AND TO TAKE CASUALTIES SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATION ORDER AN ATTEMPT TO RETAKE CONTROL OF THE UNIT.)

" A MAJOR HUGO JOSE ((SCHIERANO)) WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY AT THAT TIME, AS WERE LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUILLERMO ENRIQUE ((GONZALEZ)) NAYA AND MAJOR ARTURO FELIX ((GONZALEZ)) NAYA. THE TWO OFFICERS WHO WERE MAJORS IN 1982 MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH THE TWO LIEUTENANT COLONELS OF WHOM DEL PINO SPOKE.)

2. DEL PINO WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT 1900 HOURS (LOCAL) ON 15 APRIL, PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) HAD ORDERED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (MOD), THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE (GN), AND THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA) TO RETAKE THE 14TH INFANTRY AND TO ARREST SARREIRO. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL RECEIVING CONFLICTING ADVICE WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH HE SHOULD HANDLE THE SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT ENRIQUE "COTI" (NOSIGLIA) OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATING BOARD (JCN OR "COORDINADORA"), OTHER MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE FACTION, AND HE WERE COUNSELING THE PRESIDENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OFFICERS WHO HAD TAKEN OVER THE 14TH INFANTRY, WHILE MORE LEFTIST ADVISORS, INCLUDING A MEMBER OF THE ((STORANI)) FAMILY, WERE TELLING HIM THAT HE SHOULD ACT QUICKLY TO RETAKE THE REGIMENT. DEL PINO ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ATTEMPTING TO PLACE A NEWS BLACKOUT ON THE TAKEOVER OF THE 14TH INFANTRY AND IS CENSORING ALL ITEMS PERTAINING TO THE INCIDENT.

3.

4.

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 080052Z APR 87
<ORIG> [REDACTED]
<TO> [REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: COMMENTS BY AN OFFICER ASSIGNED TO NAVY HEADQUARTERS
CONCERNING ATTITUDES IN THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS AND
CONCERNING DISCONTENT IN THE NAVY

<TEXT>
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 07 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: [REDACTED]
CONCERNING ATTITUDES IN THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS AND
CONCERNING DISCONTENT IN THE NAVY
DOI: MARCH 1987

TEXT: 1. IN THE LATTER PART OF MARCH 1987.

[REDACTED] THE
COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS, WHICH REPRESENTS THE SERVICE'S FLAG OFFICERS,
HAS [REDACTED] A FIRM COMMITMENT FOR CAPPING THE LARGE AMOUNT
OF DISSENT AMONG LINE OFFICERS IN THE RANKS OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
AND COMMANDER WITH REGARD TO THE IMPENDING CIVILIAN COURT TRIALS OF
ARA PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. WITHOUT EXPLAINING THE COMMITMENT OF WHICH
[REDACTED] A PERCEIVED LACK OF
SUPPORT BY THE ARA'S SENIOR OFFICERS FOR ANTI-ADMINISTRATION
ACTIVITIES HAS PREVENTED JUNIOR OFFICERS FROM DECLARING THEIR
UNWILLINGNESS TO ANSWER SUMMONSES FROM CIVILIAN COURTS. [REDACTED]
THAT FOR ITS PART, THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS HOPES TO SACRIFICE THE
ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED ARA PERSONNEL ALREADY ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES AS THE ONLY GROUP OF NAVAL PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH
ABUSES. [REDACTED] THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION IN HOPE
THAT THE ARA COULD EMERGE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION UNCHANGED AS AN
INSTITUTION--AND WITH THE COUNCIL'S MEMBERS STILL IN CHARGE.

2. [REDACTED] TO POINT OUT THAT RESISTANCE, AS
[REDACTED] IN THE NAVY TOWARD THE IMPENDING TRIALS OF ARA
PERSONNEL HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO
MAGNIFY THE UNDERCURRENT OF DISCONTENT IN THE SERVICE IN AN EFFORT TO
PLACE PRESSURE ON THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES BY CREATING THE
IMPRESSION THAT CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IS THREATENED. [REDACTED]
AMONG ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS, THIS RESISTANCE IS DIRECTED BY LEADING
FIGURES OF SEVERAL NAVAL ACADEMY GRADUATING CLASSES, OFFICERS AND

IDENTIFY. [REDACTED] THE EFFORTS OF THESE GROUPS IS COMPLEMENTED BY A GROUP OF RETIRED ARA PERSONNEL WHO CALL FOR MORE HARD-LINE MEASURES AND WHO, AS HE TERMED IT, ARE PRONE TO THINK IN TERMS OF A COUP D'ETAT. [REDACTED] HOWEVER, THAT ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS REMAIN MORE CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT CALLS FOR ACTION SINCE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORT FROM ABOVE, THEY STAND TO LOSE THEIR CAREERS.

3. [REDACTED] THE ARA'S TOP COMMAND IS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT REACTIONS OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE TIME AT WHICH THE CIVILIAN COURTS HAND DOWN SENTENCES IN THE CASE OF THE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS NOW FACING TRIAL, WHICH THE HIGH COMMAND EXPECTS TO OCCUR BEFORE THE END OF 1987. [REDACTED] THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS BELIEVES THAT THE REMOVAL OF VICE ADMIRAL RAMON ((AROSA)) AS THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF (EMGA) WOULD REPRESENT ONE WAY OF LESSENING TENSION IN THE SERVICE. [REDACTED] MANY ARA OFFICERS SEE AROSA AS BUCKLING UNDER TO THE ADMINISTRATION BY FAILING TO DEFEND THE ACTIONS OF HIS SUBORDINATES WHO NOW FACE TRIAL BY SAYING THAT THEY HAD DONE NOTHING MORE THAN FOLLOW THE ORDERS OF SENIOR OFFICERS. [REDACTED]

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE ARA'S PRINCIPAL OPERATING BASE AT PUERTO BELGRANO HAD REGISTERED THE STRONGEST RESISTANCE THUS FAR TOWARD AROSA.

4. [REDACTED]

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 152148Z APR 87

<ORIG>

<TO>

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR

RUEKJCS/DIA

RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA

RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: VIEWS OF PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ON THE ISSUE OF PARDONS
FOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS; THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT
OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 15 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: VIEWS OF PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ON THE ISSUE OF PARDONS
FOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS; THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT
OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES


DOI: MARCH 1987

TEXT: 1. IN THE WEEK OF 15 MARCH 1987, ARGENTINE PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) TOLD THE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFFS OF THE THREE ARMED SERVICES AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS THAT WITH A VIEW TOWARD EVENTUALLY GRANTING PARDONS, HE WAS THEN INTENDING TO REVIEW THE TRIALS AND CONVICTIONS OF ANY ARMED FORCES (FFAA) OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN NOTED THAT A KEY DETERMINATION WITH REGARD TO A DECISION TO GRANT A PARDON WOULD CONSIST IN A CHIEF OF A SERVICE GENERAL STAFF STIPULATING THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION WAS FOLLOWING THE ORDERS OF A SUPERIOR OFFICER. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT ONCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DETERMINES THAT SUCH A STIPULATION IS CORRECT, A PARDON WOULD BE GRANTED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED-- WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "DUE OBEDIENCE." ALFONSIN MADE THAT POINT THAT PARDONS WOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO INDIVIDUALS FOUND GUILTY OF PREMEDITATED MURDER, MURDER FOR GAIN, OR TORTURE.

2. ALSO IN THE WEEK OF 15 MARCH, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TOLD ADVISERS THAT HE FEELS THE CRISIS WHICH EXISTS IN THE ARMED FORCES AS THE RESULT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE WOULD COME TO A HAPPY ENDING IN 1988, AS HE PHRASED IT. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY HE BELIEVES THAT SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS HAD EXAGGERATED TO HIM THE DISCONTENT IN THEIR SERVICES IN HOPES OF PRESSURING THE ADMINISTRATION INTO DECLARING AN AMNESTY--SOMETHING WHICH ALFONSIN STRESSED HIS ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT DO.

3.

PRODUCED IN THE ARMED FORCES AND BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION. SPECULATION--SOME OF IT APPARENTLY WELL-FOUNDED--
RANGES FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS' GRANTING AN
AMNESTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERMITTING THE CIVILIAN COURTS TO
CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS UNDER ARGENTINE LAW. SEVERAL REPORTS HAVE
NOTED THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS FOR FFAA PERSONNEL
CONVICTED OF CRIMES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN. THE
GRANTING OF PARDONS, HOWEVER, WOULD DRAW OUT THE TRIALS ISSUE WELL
INTO 1988 AT LEAST AND WOULD NOT QUICKLY DIFFUSE THE SITUATION IN THE
ARMED FORCES BECAUSE MILITARY PERSONNEL FIRST WOULD HAVE TO BE
CONVICTED--WHICH MANY MILITARY OFFICERS MIGHT FIND UNPALATABLE--AND
THEN EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF APPEAL.)



24

<UNCLAS>: S11
SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEHBU<DTG> 162239Z APR 87
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7989
INFO RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
RUEOSBA/USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DOI/LAI//

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: GOA SEEKS BROAD-BASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
- DEMOCRACY IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR'S DEFIANCE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 03868
CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, MARR, AR

SUBJECT: GOA SEEKS BROAD-BASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
- DEMOCRACY IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR'S DEFIANCE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3816

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: A KEY ELEMENT IN GOA'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO MAJOR BARREIRO'S DEFIANCE OF CORDOBA FEDERAL COURT IS EFFORT TO BRING FORTH AN OUTPOURING OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND RULE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION AND RULE OF LAW WITH A VIEW TO DEMONSTRATING TO DISSIDENT ARMY ELEMENTS THAT THEY HAVE NO POPULAR SUPPORT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE IS A POSSIBLE PARALLEL STEP TO HIGHTEN PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION. THE GOA HAS THUS FAR NOT MOVED TO HAVE BARREIRO CAPTURED FORCIBLY, ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL ORDER OF CAPTURE HAS BEEN PASSED BY MOD TO THE ARMY. BARREIRO AND HIS MID-LEVEL ARMY SUPPORTERS REMAIN TOTALLY CONVINCED THEY ARE RIGHT. THEY SAY THEIR INTENTION IS NOT TO PROVOKE A COUP, BUT RATHER TO SEEK VINDICATION. THE DANGER IS THAT RESISTANCE COULD SPREAD TO OTHER REGIMENTS, OR THAT LARGER UNITS, SUCH AS ARMY III CORPS, COULD TAKE UP BARREIRO'S CAUSE. SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED RAPIDLY. NOR ARE THERE MANY REALISTIC APPROACHES. AS WE HAVE SPECULATED ALL ALONG, SHARPLY HEIGHTENED PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT STABILITY OF SYSTEM COULD CREATE BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, POSSIBLY IN FORM OF AMNESTY LEGISLATION. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

3. THE GOA IS MOVING TO STIMULATE MASSIVE OUTPOURINGS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO BUILD PRESSURE ON BARREIRO AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO GIVE UP THEIR DEFIANCE.

-- NUMEROUS RADICAL AND PERONIST LEADERS WENT TO THE CASA ROSADA THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN.

-- GOA CALLED A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION WITH THE THEME "DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP" TO TAKE PLACE AT 1700 LOCAL TIME IN PLAZA DEL CONGRESO IN BUENOS AIRES.

25

ATTENDANCE AT DEMONSTRATION, CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS, IS REPORTEDLY MASSIVE. SOME DESCRIBE TURNOUT AS GREATER THAN FOR POPE. LOCAL RADIO IS ASKING ALL RESIDENTS TO GO TO NEAREST SQUARE OR PLAZA TO EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY. -- SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES. -- PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WILL ADDRESS THE NATION ON THE SITUATION AT 2100 TONIGHT. -- DEPUTY MARCELO STUBRIN, WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PALACE DECISION SINCE PRE-DAWN HINTED TO US THAT FONMIN CAPUTO WOULD SHORTLY INITIATE AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. RADIO HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT ALFONSIN RECEIVED MESSAGES OF SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL AND PERU, PROBABLY STIMULATED THROUGH FONMINS HERE FOR CONTADORA MEETING.

4. WE CONTINUE TO HEAR REPORTS THAT A DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE IS IMMINENT, AND THAT IT WILL INCLUDE A CURFEW. STATE OF SIEGE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY OSTENSIBLE EFFECT ON SITUATION IN CORDOBA, BUT WOULD SERVE TO ALERT COUNTRY CLEARLY TO DANGER IMPLICIT IN SITUATION AND STIMULATE PRESSURE FOR RESOLUTION.

5. THE GOA HAS THUS FAR NOT MOVED TO HAVE BARREIRO CAPTURED FORCIBLY, ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL ORDER FOR CAPTURE HAS BEEN PASSED BY MOD TO ARMY. AT THIS POINT, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT ARMY III CORPS WILL AGREE TO USE FORCE AGAINST ITS 14TH REGIMENT. CALLING IN GENDARMERIA IS POSSIBLE FUTURE OPTION, BUT LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE WEIGHTY. BY POSTPONING USE OF FORCE, GOA IS ATTEMPTING TO HOLD DOOR OPEN TO SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATED OR POLITICAL SOLUTION.

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 03868
CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

PAGS: PGOV, MARR, AR

SUBJECT: GOA SEEKS BROAD-BASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
5. BARREIRO AND HIS MID-LEVEL ARMY SUPPORTERS REMAIN TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE ON THE SIDE OF JUSTICE AND RIGHT. THEY CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS PROCESS UNFAIR, DISCRIMINATORY AND RANDOM IN NATURE. THEY SEE THEMSELVES AS HEROES WHO WON A WAR AGAINST A SUBVERSIVE MENACE. THERE APPEARS TO BE AN ELEMENT OF PANATICISM IN THEIR POSITION WHICH MAY MAKE ANY SOLUTION NOT INVOLVING VINDICATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ACCEPT.

A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS COMPLICATION IS THAT SIMILAR SITUATION MAY ARISE IN OTHER REGIMENTS. IF THE GOA CANNOT OR WILL NOT END THE CORDOBA INCIDENT, OTHER ARMY UNITS, SENSING GOVERNMENT WEAKNESS, COULD ADD THEIR SUPPORT TO THE DEFIANCE. IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT BARREIRO HAS CONSIDERABLE LATERAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMY. [REDACTED] SOME OTHER REGIMENTS HAD SUPPORTED BARREIRO'S STANCE. IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] A III CORPS CAPTAIN [REDACTED] SAYING THE III CORP "DOES NOT SUPPORT THE AUTHORITY

26

OF THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF" AND "MANY GARRISONS" HAVE THE SAME ATTITUDE AS THE 14TH. WHAT IS NOT CERTAIN YET IS THE EXTENT OF UPWARD SUPPORT. ADDITIONAL DEFIANCE COULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF SPECIFIC CASES, (TWO CAPTAINS ARE SCHEDULED TO TESTIFY NEXT WEEK AND AT LEAST ONE IS REPORTEDLY PREPARED TO RESPOND LIKE BARREIRO) OR AS A GENERALIZED EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT, NOT TRIGGERED BY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT.

8. THIS SITUATION COULD BREAK IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE, BARREIRO AND SUPPORTERS COULD CAPITULATE TO PUBLIC AND GOA PRESSURE. THERE COULD BE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. DEPUTY ARMY COS GENERAL SANCHEZ HAS GONE TO CORDOBA, PRESUMABLY IN THAT CONNECTION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS BLOODSHED. THE GOA COULD ORDER OTHER ARMY UNITS, THE GENDARMERIA OR EVEN PROVINCIAL POLICE TO ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE ARREST. IT IS, OF COURSE, ALSO POSSIBLE THAT VASTLY HEIGHTENED PERCEPTION OF DANGER TO POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED BY A STATE OF SIEGE, WILL ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A MOVE TO SOLVE THE OVERALL MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THROUGH AMNESTY LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, WHIPPING UP PUBLIC SENTIMENTS TO BUTTRESS RULE OF LAW MAY HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT OF DIMINISHING CHANCES FOR A QUICK-FIX AMNESTY LAW SOLUTION.

GILDRED

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 3868<TOR> 870416200819 MSG000166910899
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 3868<TOR> 870416200942 MSG000166910981

29

<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 131538Z APR 87

<ORIG> [REDACTED]
<TO> [REDACTED]

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
[REDACTED]

<SUBJ>SUBJ: INTENTION OF AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER TO FORCE THE
ADMINISTRATION'S HAND ON THE TRIALS ISSUE; POSSIBILITY
THAT SEVERAL ARMY OFFICERS WILL NOT ANSWER COURT

<TEXT>
~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 2

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 13 APRIL 1987

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: INTENTION OF [REDACTED] TO FORCE THE
ADMINISTRATION'S HAND ON THE TRIALS ISSUE; POSSIBILITY
THAT SEVERAL ARMY OFFICERS WILL NOT ANSWER COURT
SUMMONSES AND THAT ARMY PERSONNEL WILL HARBOR AND DEFEND
THEM
DOI: APRIL 1987

[REDACTED]

2. ON 9 APRIL 1987, AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER WHO HIMSELF
FACES TRIAL ON CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE
COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S TOLD A COLLEAGUE THAT MAJOR
ERNESTO ((BARREIRO)), AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER, PLANS TO FORCE THE
GOVERNMENT'S HAND ON THE TRIALS ISSUE BY CREATING A SITUATION IN
WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO ACT AGAINST HIM OR WOULD HAVE
TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARMY ON THE ISSUE. THE OFFICER NOTED THAT
BARREIRO HAS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF FORCING AN END TO THE TRIALS OF
ARMY PERSONNEL. HE NOTED THAT BARREIRO PLANS TO FORCE THE
GOVERNMENT'S HAND BY STAYING FIRM IN HIS INTENTION NOT TO APPEAR IN A
CIVILIAN COURT IN MENDOZA AS SCHEDULED ON 15 APRIL, EVEN THOUGH THE
MAJOR HAS DELIBERATELY GIVEN MISLEADING
PUBLIC INDICATIONS THAT HE WOULD ANSWER HIS SUMMONS. HE POINTED OUT
THAT BARREIRO SAYS HE WILL REPORT TO AN ARMY UNIT IN CORDOBA AS
SCHEDULED ON 13 APRIL FOR PRE-TRIAL BRIEFINGS, BUT WILL SEEK REFUGE
IN A UNIT PRIOR TO THE TIME SET FOR HIS COURT APPEARANCE THE OFFICER

ADDED THAT BARREIRO BELIEVES THAT BY GOING TO A UNIT FOR REFUGE, HE CAN FORCE THE GOVERNMENT'S HAND AND RECEIVE PROTECTION FROM ARREST. HE WENT ON TO SAY THE MAJOR HAS POINTED OUT THAT "PEOPLE" WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT REFUGE, INDIVIDUALS WHOM HE HAS NOT IDENTIFIED, HAD DISCUSSED WHAT THEY WOULD DO IF A CIVILIAN GROUP CAME TO DEMONSTRATE AND HAD SAID THEY WOULD USE DEADLY FORCE AGAINST EVEN CIVILIANS IF NECESSARY. HE NOTED BARREIRO HAD REMARKED THAT IF THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDED TO USE THE PARAMILITARY NATIONAL GENDARMERIE TO ARREST HIM, THE ENSUING PROBLEM WOULD BE THE ARMY'S. HE ADDED THAT DESPITE HIS INTENTIONS AND REMARKS, BARREIRO CLAIMS HE IS NOT TRYING IN ANY WAY TO INSTIGATE A COUP D'ETAT. ([REDACTED] DRAWING ON ARGENTINE WIRE SERVICE DISPATCHES, THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE BUENOS AIRES "HERALD" REPORTED ON 10 APRIL THAT BARREIRO HAS PUBLICLY VOICED HIS OPPOSITION TO BEING TRIED IN A FEDERAL COURT.)

3. [REDACTED] WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AS "A STATE OF FLUX." HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL GROUPS OF MID-LEVEL ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS--PARTICULARLY MAJORS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS--AND OF RETIRED OFFICERS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND TO TAKE NON-VIOLENT ACTIONS IN OPPOSITION TO THE IMPENDING TRIALS, BUT LACK AN INITIAL IMPETUS FOR DOING SO. HE ADDED THAT MEMBERS OF MANY OF THESE GROUPS BELIEVE THAT BARREIRO'S PLAN TO TAKE REFUGE IN AN ARMY UNIT RATHER THAN APPEAR IN A CIVILIAN COURT COULD PROVIDE THEM WITH THE IMPETUS OR PROXIMATE CAUSE WHICH THEY NEED. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 8 APRIL THAT THERE EXISTS A VERY GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT IN MID- TO LATE APRIL, SEVERAL ARMY OFFICERS WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY WOULD NOT ANSWER SUMMONSES TO TESTIFY BEFORE CIVILIAN JUDGES. HE ADDED THAT SOME ARMY UNITS, WHICH AGAIN HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, ARE PREPARED TO HARBOR AND TO DEFEND THESE OFFICERS HE ADDED THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE OFFICERS AND THE UNITS SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) TO BARGAIN ON THE TRIALS ISSUE AND SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT A COUP D'ETAT. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

FINAL SECTION OF 2

WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO WHSITRM: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR,
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.
TO STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR.
TO DIA EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA.

32

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 140308Z APR 87
<ORIG> [REDACTED]
<TO> [REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUEAIJU/NPIC

[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: COMMENTS OF AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CONCERNING A
HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN THE ARMY AND NAVY WITH
REGARD TO THE TRIALS ISSUE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DIST: 13 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: COMMENTS [REDACTED] CONCERNING A
HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN THE ARMY AND NAVY WITH
REGARD TO THE TRIALS ISSUE

DOI: EARLY APRIL 1987

TEXT: 1. IN EARLY APRIL 1987, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN THE
ARMY AND THE NAVY (ARA), ATTITUDES ARE HARDENING, AS HE PHRASED IT,
WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF CIVILIAN COURT TRIALS OF ARMED FORCES
(FFAA) PERSONNEL ACCUSED OF COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE
COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. [REDACTED]
ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS ARE PRESSURING THE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL
STAFFS OF THEIR SERVICES TO TAKE A FIRMER POSITION WITH THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE TRIALS ISSUE, A POSITION WHICH
WOULD ADVOCATE NOT TRYING OFFICERS WHO FOLLOWED THE ORDERS OF
SUPERIORS IN THE CAMPAIGN. [REDACTED] MADE
THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN THE ARMY, THE STRONGEST RESISTANCE TO THE
ADMINISTRATION ON THE TRIALS ISSUE CURRENTLY CENTERS AROUND THE
FIGURES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) ANTONIO ((FICHERA)), THE COMMANDER
OF III CORPS IN CORDOBA, AND BG ARTURO ((ALAIS)), THE COMMANDER OF II
CORPS IN ROSARIO. THE TWO GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN A POSITION
OPPOSED TO THAT OF MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR LUIS ((RIOS)) ERENU, THE
CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE), IN THAT THEY HAVE CALLED FOR
MAKING GREATER EFFORTS IN THE DEFENSE OF ARMY PERSONNEL CALLED BEFORE
CIVILIAN COURTS.

-- GROUPS OF OFFICERS FROM THE MILITARY ACADEMY
GRADUATING CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES") WHO CURRENTLY HOLD THE RANKS OF
MAJOR AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARE CALLING FOR OFFICERS WHO ARE SERVING
IN SIX DIFFERENT REGIMENTS IN THE INTERIOR OF ARGENTINA AND WHO FACE

SEQUESTER THEMSELVES IN THE INSTALLATIONS TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED. THE COMMANDERS OF THE SIX REGIMENTS SUPPORT THE CALL OF THE GROUPS OF OFFICERS.

-- WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN THE NAVY, REAR ADMIRAL (RADM) JOSE MARIA ((ARRIOLA)), THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (J-3) FOR THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (EMC), AND RADM EMILIO J.G. ((OSSES)), THE COMMANDER OF THE FLEET, HAVE BEEN LOBBYING THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS TO PRESSURE VICE ADMIRAL (VADM) RAMON ANTONIO ((AROSA)), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF (EMGA), TO UNDERTAKE STEPS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE PROSECUTION OF ARA PERSONNEL FACING CIVILIAN COURT TRIALS ON CHARGES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. ARRIOLA AND OSSES BASE THEIR LOBBYING ON THE CONCEPT OF DUE OBEDIENCE OF ORDERS ISSUED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. RETURNING TO THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY, [REDACTED] AN ORGANIZATION CALLED THE ARGENTINE ARMY IN RESISTANCE ("EJERCITO ARGENTINO EN LA RESISTENCIA") WAS THEN SUBJECTING THE ARMY TO AN INTENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN WHICH CALLS FOR IT TO DISOBEY RIOS ERENU. HE OFFERED HIS OPINION THAT THIS AND SIMILAR PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGNS PROBABLY WOULD WANE DURING THE 6 TO 12 APRIL VISIT OF POPE ((JOHN PAUL II)) TO ARGENTINA BUT WOULD GATHER MOMENTUM IN THE SECOND HALF OF APRIL HE ENDED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT THE OPENING OF CASES AGAINST OFFICERS ONCE ASSIGNED TO THE FORMER I CORPS COULD PROVIDE THE CATALYST FOR GREATER RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF FFAA PERSONNEL.

3. [REDACTED]

34

<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 141639Z APR 87

<ORIG> [REDACTED]
<TO> [REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: GOVERNMENT FEARS OF A REACTION FROM THE MILITARY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 2

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 14 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: GOVERNMENT FEARS OF A REACTION FROM THE MILITARY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS
DOI: APRIL 1987

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. SPEAKING IN EARLY APRIL 1987 TO A

[REDACTED]
EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT PRODUCE A SPECTACULAR ACT OF DEFIANCE ("UN CIMBRONAZO") AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A MAJOR BOMB, OR AN ATTACK ON A SENIOR FIGURE IN THE EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIARY.

2. [REDACTED] THERE WERE TWO KEY DATES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE FIRST WAS 6 APRIL WHEN CASE NUMBER 450, INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE FIRST ARMY REGION CAME BEFORE THE COURT. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT SOME 80 SERVING OFFICERS WOULD BE INDICTED. THE SECOND WAS 15 APRIL WHEN LT COLONEL (FNU) ((BARREIRO)) WAS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN THE CORDOBA FEDERAL COURT IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE LA PERLA DETENTION CENTRE. BARREIRO HAD ALREADY INTIMATED THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE HEARING.

[REDACTED] BARREIRO IS ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO G. ((BARREIRO)). IN THE 13 APRIL 1987 EDITION OF "AMBITO FINANCIERO," COLUMNIST CARLOS (TORTORA) REPORTED THAT THE CRITICAL SUMMONSES OF ARMY CAPTAINS JUSTAVO ADOLFO ((ALSINA)) AND ENRIQUE ((MONES)) RUIZ, AND OF ARMY MAJOR ERNEST BARREIRO HAVE BEEN POSTPONED AGAIN UNTIL THE END OF APRIL OR THE BEGINNING OF MAY. TORTORA ALSO NOTED THAT BARREIRO HAS MAINTAINED TO SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES THAT IN NO WAY WOULD HE PRESENT HIMSELF BEFORE THE CIVILIAN COURTS. THE ARTICLE DID NOT GIVE REASON FOR THE POSTPONEMENTS.)

3. WITHIN THE NEXT 20 TO 30 DAYS IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE

35

NAVY WOULD MAKE A FORMAL PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT DEMANDING THAT AN AMNESTY BE GRANTED TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS. IF THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, ALL THE SERVING ADMIRALS WOULD RESIGN. NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR-ADMIRAL RAMON ((AROSA)) HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE DETENTION OF ANOTHER SERVING NAVAL OFFICER.

4. WITHIN THE LAST MONTH THE GOVERNMENT HAD DETECTED EVIDENCE OF A CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN THE ARMY PARALLEL TO THAT OF THE GENERALS. EACH GRADUATION YEAR ("PROMOCION"), FOR INSTANCE, HAD DESIGNATED A REPRESENTATIVE TO LIAISE WITH PROVINCIAL GARRISONS. THIS WAS A NEBULOUS ARRANGEMENT WHICH MADE IT ALL THE HARDER TO DEAL WITH, AS THERE WAS NO ONE INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO WHOM THE GOVERNMENT COULD TALK. THE OFFICER CORP COULD AT PRESENT BE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS:

A. THE COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS. THESE WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED THAT, IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED SUFFICIENTLY TO MAKE ALL SERVING GENERALS RESIGN, THEY WOULD BE LEFT TO CARRY THE LOAD.

B. THE MAJORS AND CAPTAINS WHO WERE EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH THEIR COMRADES AND ATTEMPTING TO HAVE CASES RESOLVED PIECEMEAL.

C. THE LIEUTENANTS WHO HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN THE DIRTY WAR BUT WHO, PARADOXICALLY, WERE MORE RADICAL AND UNPREDICTABLE THAN THEIR SUPERIORS. THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY SAW NO FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES IN A SERVICE WHOSE MORAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES HAD SUNK TO SUCH A LOW EBB AND RESENTED THE WAY IN WHICH MILITARY INSTITUTIONS HAD COME UNDER ATTACK.

5. THERE WERE THREE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE GOVERNMENT:

A. TO GRANT AN AMNESTY. PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) HAD ALREADY GONE ON RECORD AS EXCLUDING THIS OPTION.

B. TO GRANT INDIVIDUAL PARDONS. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE ONCE SENTENCE HAD BEEN PASSED.

C. TO CARRY ON AS AT PRESENT NEGOTIATING WITH THE JUDICIARY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THIS WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S PREFERRED OPTION. SO FAR THE EXECUTIVE HAD HAD LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE JUDICIARY WHO CONTINUED TO TREAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS IN ISOLATION, WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WIDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOW ATTEMPTING TO WORK ON THE CONCEPT OF "DUE OBEDIENCE" ("OBEDENCIA DEBIDA") AS A WAY OF EXONERATING JUNIOR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF SPECIFIC CRIMES.

~~SECRET~~

FINAL SECTION OF 2

<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 232214Z APR 87

<ORIG> [REDACTED]

<TO>TO RUEAIJU/NPIC

[REDACTED]

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//INR/DSTAD
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE//FOR ID
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Argentine
sub file*

[REDACTED]
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA

<SUBJ>SUBJ: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
KNEW THAT A NOW FORMER ARMY MAJOR WOULD DECLARE
HIMSELF IN REBELLION; EVENTUAL DECISION BY PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN TO MAKE A POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE
SITUATION

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

DIST: 23 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
KNEW THAT A NOW FORMER ARMY MAJOR WOULD DECLARE
HIMSELF IN REBELLION; EVENTUAL DECISION BY PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN TO MAKE A POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE
SITUATION

DOI: APRIL 1987

TEXT: 1. LATE IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL 1987, [REDACTED] PRESIDENT
RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) ACKNOWLEDGED [REDACTED] THAT AS OF 13 APRIL,
THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE THAT NOW FORMER
ARGENTINE ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO G ((BARREIRO)) PLANNED TO DECLARE
HIMSELF IN REBELLION, AN ACT WHICH BARREIRO CARRIED OUT ON 15 APRIL
WHEN HE SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)
IN CORDOBA RATHER THAN ANSWER A CORDOBA CIVILIAN COURT SUMMONS
ARISING FROM ALLEGATIONS THAT HE COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALFONSIN ORIGINALLY HAD PLACED HIS CONFIDENCE
IN THE ASSURANCES OF NOW RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (MG) HECTOR ((RIOS))
ERENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE) AT THE TIME, THAT
THE SITUATION CREATED BY BARREIRO COULD BE CONTROLLED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT NEITHER RIOS NOR THE THEN
COMMANDER OF THE ARMY'S III CORPS IN CORDOBA HAD ANY CONTROL OVER THE
SITUATION, ALFONSIN ELECTED TO MAKE A POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE
SITUATION BY MEANS OF A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY,
THE DEMONSTRATION OR RALLY WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 17 APRIL. HE
COMMENTED THAT BY GOOD FORTUNE -- AS HE SAID IT, EVERYTHING HAD BEEN
PREPARED FOR A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND

38

FOR A CALL ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ALFONSIN
ADMINISTRATION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT PLANNED TO
USE HIS STRENGTHENED POSITION TO PUT TOGETHER A SOCIAL PACT AND TO
CALL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. [REDACTED] THAT PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN'S NEW STANDING WOULD FAVOR THE PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW ALFONSIN TO BECOME THE HEAD OF -- AS HE
SAID IT -- A RADICAL CIVIC UNION-PERONIST COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT
HE DID NOT EXPAND ON OR EXPLAIN THIS REMARK.

2. ALSO LATE IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOSE
HORACIO ((JAUNARENA)) WAS AWARE OF BARREIRO'S INTENTIONS ON 13 APRIL.
[REDACTED] TO SUBSTANTIATE [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) JUAN MANUEL ((POLO)), THE COMMANDER OF THE
4TH INFANTRY AT THAT TIME, HAD TOLD RIOS ABOUT BARREIRO'S INTENTION
NOT TO APPEAR IN COURT IN CORDOBA. [REDACTED] POLO HAD ALSO
TOLD RIOS THAT BARREIRO HAD THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE REGIMENT'S
OFFICERS AND HAD ASKED THAT RIOS RELIEVE HIM OF HIS COMMAND BECAUSE
HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] JAUNARENA HAD BEEN INFORMED OF
THE INFORMATION OF WHICH HE SPOKE ON 13 APRIL. [REDACTED]

3. IN ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ADVANCE
INFORMATION THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT IN THE ARMY, THE CIVILIAN STATE
INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) PUBLISHED A REPORT ON 13 APRIL
STATING THAT THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) HAD REPORTED TO
CGT SECRETARY GENERAL SAUL ((UBALDINI)) AND HIS ADVISORS THAT THE
SITUATION IN THE MILITARY WOULD BECOME MORE TENSE AND THAT A CRISIS
WOULD OCCUR, VERY PROBABLY IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL. SIDE ALSO SAID
THE CGT REPORT HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE CATALYST FOR THE CRISIS WOULD
COME FROM MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICERS WHO WOULD REFUSE TO PRESENT
THEMSELVES BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS AND WHO WOULD FIND SUPPORT FOR
THEIR ACTIONS FROM THE MILITARY PEERS.

~~SECRET~~

58



- Military-civilian relations in Argentina are presently uneasy. The most disruptive issue continues to be the trials of members of the Armed Forces for human rights abuses committed during the so-called "dirty war" against leftist insurgent groups (1976-83). Those on trial are accused of the kidnaping, torture, rape, and murder of some 9,000 people who disappeared during the years of the "war." On 16 April 1987, a few members of the 14th Airborne Infantry Regiment and about 100 members of the Infantry School ignited a short-lived military uprising--the Easter Rebellion--to protect an officer who refused to appear in a civilian court. According to many officers, the excesses committed during the "dirty war" were necessary due to the growing magnitude of terrorist activity.

- Ultimately, the Easter Rebellion ended peacefully on 19 April 1987, when the government made certain concessions, including the resignation of the Army Chief Hector Rios Erenu, to the rebels. The President also agreed to support the Due Obedience Doctrine--a virtual amnesty for junior officers who were deemed to be merely following orders. On 9 June, President Alfonsin signed into law the Due Obedience Bill that was amended by the Senate, due to pressure from the new Army Chief, General Jose Caridi, to include senior officers. In late June, the Supreme Court upheld the Due Obedience Law as constitutional.

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

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59

b. ~~(S/NF)~~ Military Situation.

- The April 1987 rebellion resulted in the reshuffle of Army leaders; 15 of 29 serving generals were put into retirement, and General Jose Dante Caridi was made the new Army Chief of Staff. The crisis revealed a lack of control by the senior leadership. It seems a dangerous gap has developed between junior--lieutenant colonel and below--and senior officers. There is widespread feeling in the middle and lower ranks that the Armed Forces are being unjustly persecuted over the human rights issue and the Falklands defeat. Senior officers, while also sympathetic, have advocated respect of the constitutional order and cooperation.


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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

41

- There is a minimal threat from insurgent leaders who fled into exile during the Armed Forces' counterinsurgency campaign "dirty war." While the Montoneros insurgent group still has the capability of conducting isolated acts of terrorism, the organized insurgency has been eliminated. The Argentine Army is concerned about the growing number of Chilean exiles and their connections with leftist groups in Argentina.



COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY:



APPROVED BY



1 Enclosure
Armed Forces Equipment
Inventory - Argentina
(S/NF) 1 Cy


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15

Sunday, April 17


1. No significant developments.



Wednesday, April 20

1. SAIC Mastrovito, USSS, travelled to Buenos Aires.

2.


and states: (a) Balmaceda is definitely involved in plot regardless of what he said during interview; (b) a key figure in plot is a Chilean, 22 - 24 years of age, whose birthday is 27 August. Chilean is allegedly a "personal attendant of President Carter's, possibly a valet." Chilean will hire a Puerto Rican friend as the assassin; (c) order to assassinate President will come from Switzerland within next seven months. Swiss banker "Kossler" involved as well as a "Klein"; (NOTE: Allegations contradict earlier reports.) (d) motives for plot are Carter's policies re: nuclear energy, weapons sales, and coffee exports. (NOTE: Motives appear unusually broad).




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~~SECRET~~

Page 2

Wednesday, April 20
(continued)



7. Investigation of Klein's banking activity draws David Graiver, Chilean and NYC banker, into picture. Graiver associated with financing of Montoneros terrorist activities. Graiver allegedly died in plane crash, Mexico, August, 1976.

Thursday, April 21

1. Former Chilean President Eduardo Frei's name surfaces in investigation due to bank dealings with Klein. Frei also suspected of dealings with international terrorists.
2. Investigation begins to uncover numerous discrepancies. Theory of counterintelligence or misinformation operation by Chile and Argentina emerges.




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
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Page 3

Thursday, April 21
(continued)



4. FBI provides background information on banking operations of Klein, Graiver, and Frei.



9. FBI-Buenos Aires provides following surmise of case:

" . . . agrees that the Klein reportedly involved in the plot may be Jose Klein Konigstein, who is associated with the Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank in Geneva.

Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank has possibly changed its name to the Continental Trade Bank and that one Arturo Klein "of Chile" is the director of that bank.

the Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank is one of the banks mentioned in the Buenos Aires press

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Page 4

Thursday, April 21
(continued)

coverage of the David Graiver case. Graiver, a wealthy Jewish businessman, was killed in a plane crash in Mexico in 1976. The Argentine Government is attempting to prove that Graiver was heavily involved in providing financial support to the Montonero Terrorist organization. Graiver was allegedly one of the owners of the Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Argentine and Chilean Governments could conceivably be manipulating the report of a plot against President Carter, thereby tarnishing Graiver (for the Argentines) and Eduardo Frei (for the Chileans). Jose Klein is reportedly a close friend of former Chilean President Frei.

Friday, April 22

1.

[REDACTED]

2. USSS in Buenos Aires, in concert with CIA and BND, decide that Balmaceda should be reinterviewed. (BND Staff Officer specifically said he saw no problem in the interview.)

3.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 23

1.

[REDACTED]

- 2. CIA-HQS teletype to Germany and Buenos Aires: "If BND agrees to direct CIA contact to its field Case Officer, we confident this will satisfy USSS requirements and no further access to the [REDACTED] chain of information will be required. (Reference AD Burke's conversation [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in which Secret Service expressed desire that door to Secret Service access to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(TOP SECRET, (SECRET OR CONFIDENTIAL) CLASSIFIED BY another government agency EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (§ 5B (1), (2), (3), or (4)) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SENSITIVE~~

PAGE 1 - 313

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 05/26/82//146

SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE X

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA108
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEAIIA #0388 1351752
ZNY SSSSS
D 151754Z MAY 82

[REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEBWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUEADWW/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

[REDACTED]
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PA
RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
BT

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DIST: 15 MAY 1982

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJECT: CASUAL INVESTIGATION OF THE TEMPORARY KIDNAPPING OF
FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN ARGENTINA (DOI: ABOUT 14 MAY
1982)

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED ON ABOUT 14 MAY 1982
BY A MEMBER (-----) THE TEMPORARY KIDNAPPING
OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN BUENOS AIRES DURING THE WEEK OF 9 MAY:

PAGE 3

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

PAGE 1 - 314

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 05/26/82//146

SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE X

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A. PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO ((GALTIERRI)) IS PERSONNALLY INTERESTED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KIDNAPPINGS THAT ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION OF THE SIE. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY BELIEVES THE ACTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT BY MEMBERS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMPENENT OF THE 601ST INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, THE OPERATIONAL ARM OF THE SIE. THE SIE IS HOPEFUL IT WILL BE ABLE TO ARREST TWO OF THE KIDNAPPERS DURING THE WEEKEND OF 15-16 MAY, AND THE SIE WILL TRY TO GET THEM TO IDENTIFY THE OTHER PERSONS INVOLVED.

B. THERE IS ONLY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING. IF SUSPECTS ARE ARRESTED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN CONFESSIONS FROM THEM BECAUSE THEIR FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES WOULD BE THE PERSONS INTERROGATING THEM, AND THE LATTER CAN BE ASSUMED TO BE LESS THAN ZEALOUS IN THEIR PURSUIT OF THE FACTS.

[REDACTED] MANY PEOPLE IN THE 601ST BATTALION KNOW THE NAMES OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPINGS, BUT THE "CODE OF HONOR" OF THE 601ST BATTALION WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO INFORM ON THEIR FRIENDS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS DIVIDED OPINION WITHIN THE INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION OF THE SIE THAT IS DOING THE INVESTIGATING. SOME PERSONNEL ARE NOT SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATING AT ALL, AND THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO DO THE INVESTIGATION ARE CONSIDERED OUTSIDERS AND ARE GETTING NO
PAGE 4 [REDACTED]
COOPERATION FROM THIER COLLEAGUES.)

C. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON THE MOTIVATION FOR THE KIDNAPPINGS; WITHIN THE SIE, THERE IS SPECULATION THAT THE PERSONS INVOLVED DID IT BECAUSE OF THEIR PERSONAL ANTI-BRITISH AND ANTI-U.S. RESPONSE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM. THERE IS ALSO NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WHETHER SENIOR LEVELS OF THE 601ST BATTALION AUTHORIZED THE KIDNAPPINGS; IF THERE WERE SUCH AUTHORIZATION, IT IS SPECULATED, IT COULD HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO DESTABILIZE GALTIERI BECAUSE OF HIS ASSUMED CONCESSIONS TO THE BRITISH OR TO FORCE A BREAKDOWN IN THE TALKS WITH THE BRITISH AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

D. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE IS PROGRESS IN DETERMINING THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO MAKE A STATEMENT THAT IT HAS DETERMINED THEIR IDENTITIES; THIS STATEMENT COULD BE MADE AS EARLY AS THE WEEKEND OF 15-16 MAY. IN MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, GALTIERI OBVIOUSLY HAS THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM: TO ADMIT THAT PERSONNEL OR EVEN OFFICIALS OF THE SIE WERE INVOLVED AND WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL; TO CLAIM THAT IT WAS THE WORK OF A RENEGADE GROUP THAT HAD BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE SECURITY SERVICES DURING THE "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST TERRORISTS; OR TO CLAIM THAT IT WAS
PAGE 5 [REDACTED]
DONE BY TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRYING TO EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT.

2.

[REDACTED] KIDNAPPINGS, THE JOURNALISTS WHO WERE SEIZED WERE SIMPLY TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY; THERE WERE NO ADVANCE PLANS TO SEIZE THOSE PARTICULAR JOURNALISTS.

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

PAGE 1 - 407

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 05/27/82//147

SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA603
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEAIIA #1233 1402313
ZNY SSSSS
D 202315Z MAY 82

[REDACTED]
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEBWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUEADWW/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
RUEDFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PA
RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
BT

~~SECRET~~

REPORT CLASS-~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED [REDACTED] PLOTTING AGAINST
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT; ROLE OF TWO JOURNALISTS
EMPLOYED BY THE NAVY IN SPREADING REPORTS OF [REDACTED]
INVOLVEMENT (DUI: EARLY, MID-MAY1982)

[REDACTED]
1, DURING THE SECOND WEEK IN MAY 1982, THE ARGENTINE
STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) AND THE ARMY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIE) WERE VERY CONCERNED OVER REPORTS
PAGE 3 [REDACTED]

~~SENSITIVE~~

36

~~SENSITIVE~~

PAGE 1 - 408

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 05/27/82//147

SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

[REDACTED] WAS PLOTTING THE OVERTHROW OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. BY ABOUT 15 MAY, THE REPORTS WERE STILL BEING STUDIED, BUT CONSIDERABLE DOUBT HAD ARISEN AS TO THEIR VERACITY. NEVERTHELESS, THE SIE HAD NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE REPORTS WERE TRUE.

2. THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED PLOTTING

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE HAD SOLD HIS BELONGINGS AND WAS MOVING OUT OF HIS APARTMENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD SPENT 18 MONTHS IN ARGENTINA AND HIS TOUR WAS FINISHED. HE WAS OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH SEVERAL ARGENTINE LEFTISTS; THIS LED TO

PAGE 4 [REDACTED]

4. WHILE THE INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY, THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIM) REPORTED IT HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION [REDACTED] PLOT AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

5. THE INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED PLOTTING IS BEING HELD VERY CLOSELY WITHIN THE ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; APPROPRIATE INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SIE AND SIE.

6. DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION, SIE LEARNED THAT TWO ARGENTINE JOURNALISTS HAD WRITTEN AND COVERTLY DISTRIBUTED TO THE PRESS SEVERAL ARTICLES ATTACKING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR FOR ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION POLITICAL

PAGE 5 [REDACTED]

THE JOURNALISTS, RAUL ((PORTALES)) AND MARTIN ((ALLICA)), WERE FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAVY-INFLUENCED MAGAZINE "CONVICCION" AND THE MASSERA-OWNED MAGAZINE "CAMBIO." THE TWO MEN WERE OPERATING FROM A SIM COVER OFFICE CALLED "APIS" IN THE PLAZA HOTEL. THEY WERE EACH PAID EIGHT MILLION PESOS (ABOUT US\$560) PER MONTH FROM THE "PER DIEM" FUND OF THE NAVY, RATHER THAN FROM THE NORMAL OPERATIONAL FUND OF THE SIM; DISCOVERY OF THAT FUNDING CHANNEL HAS LED TO SPECULATION IN THE SIE THAT THE TWO JOURNALISTS MAY BE OPERATING WITHOUT THE

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

31

PAGE 1 - 409

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 05/27/82//147

SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF THE NAVY LEADERSHIP.

7. [REDACTED]

A. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALLICA IS A JOURNALIST WHO DESCRIBED HIMSELF IN MID-1980 AS AN UNDERCOVER JOURNALIST FOR SIDE WHO WAS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE OTHER JOURNALISTS TO WORK UNDERCOVER FOR SIDE. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON PORTALES.

PAGE 6 [REDACTED]

B. THIS RATHER COMPLICATED STORY SHOWS THAT THERE WAS AT ONE TIME CONCERN WITHIN THE ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT REPORTS OF [REDACTED] PLOTTING COULD BE TRUE, AT THE SAME TIME THAT SOME OF THESE STORIES WERE BEING DISTRIBUTED BY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. RELATED TO THESE CLAIMS OF ALLEGED PLOTTING, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN MID-MAY, SIE INSTRUCTED ITS OPERATIONAL ARM TO KEEP ALIVE THE CURRENT MEDIA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, THE U.S. EMBASSY, AND THE U.S. AMBASSADOR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT WOULD APPEAR EITHER THAT SIE OFFICIALS HAD CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT THE STORIES WERE NOT TRUE OR THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE STORIES WERE WORTH CIRCULATING FARTHER, REGARDLESS OF THE FACTS OF THE MATTER.)

8. [REDACTED]

SENSITIVE

~~Secret~~

12

Argentina: The Politics of Counterterrorism

The amnesty and antiterrorism laws just issued by Argentina's military government are viewed by many civilian leaders as self-serving and are, in our judgment, likely to be the focus of debate within the civilian congress when it convenes in 1984.

The new amnesty law (officially, the Law for National Pacification) is designed to protect the armed forces from punitive action by the civilian government following the upcoming October elections. It covers the period from the beginning of the last constitutional government in May 1973 to the installation of President Bignone in June 1982. The law specifically exempts from prosecution police and military personnel who participated in the violent campaign against leftists during the 1970s. Moreover, the decree is sweeping: it orders that all ongoing investigations into the hundreds of deaths and more than 6,000 political disappearances be immediately dropped if they involve members of the police or armed forces.

In contrast, the law is much more exclusive in its treatment of subversives and benefits only those who have not yet been legally charged with antigovernmental activity. In addition, it leaves the door open for future legal action against some of the more notorious terrorist leaders by excluding from its amnesty provisions those subversives living abroad. The decree also exempts from amnesty those suspects who have shown their "intention to continue" their association with guerrilla or terrorist organizations and those already convicted of terrorism.

Interservice disputes among the armed forces—over who should be covered, the date of issuance, and the period of time that should be covered by the amnesty—delayed the amnesty decree for months. Many officers opposed the amnesty on the grounds that it implicitly acknowledged that the military had committed crimes. Some junior officers also opposed the

law because actions taken during the "dirty war" were in response to orders from superior officers, and they had believed this would be a justifiable defense of their actions.

Promulgation of the amnesty was quickly followed by presidential signature of another law assigning special antiterrorist powers to the military. The government intends the antiterrorist law (officially, the Law for the Judgment of Subversive Acts) to streamline the judicial system and provide a legal apparatus for "preventing and punishing subversion and terrorism." It grants police broad powers to tap telephones, open mail, search houses, and make arrests without a warrant. The law also allows police to detain terrorist suspects incommunicado for up to 48 hours, if a judge is notified of the detention, and for up to 15 days with a judge's permission. Terrorist and subversive acts committed by civilians will no longer be subject to military law, but are to be decided by the Federal Court of Appeals, whose decisions cannot be appealed.

Public reaction to the amnesty and antiterrorism laws has been swift and harsh: leading civilian politicians, lawyers, and churchmen have denounced the laws as unconstitutional and reactionary and predict their repeal once a civilian congress convenes. Several trial judges have termed the amnesty law invalid, stating that, because the current government seized power in a coup, it does not have the constitutional authority to decree political laws such as the amnesty. Two judges have already refused to forward political disappearance cases to the Federal Appeals Court for possible dismissal as is required by the terms of the amnesty.

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