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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 20, 1988

IT 067

ND 018
REG 006-1200
Pls prep
A short for my
reply signature!

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: BOB LINNARD/DON MAHLEY

SUBJECT: NATO and INF Modernization Issues

PY 11

At Tab I is a letter from Robin Beard and an Executive Summary of the study (at Tab II) of German attitudes and programs on INF Modernization. The study itself is of some interest, in that it demonstrates a willingness, even a desire, on the part of the German Ministry of Defense to proceed with a Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL). It also demonstrates the German "requirement" for a Follow-on-to-Lance which is in the 450-495 kilometer range band, as opposed to the 250 kilometer range band that the U.S. Army is currently contemplating.

Net Sec Advis
has seen

This study has been, we understand from other sources, the subject of some private discussion in Europe already. It may be part of the reason for the message you got from Horst Teltschik recently indicating that the FRG was prepared to take the FOTL decision in 1989.

There is one error in the Executive Summary enclosed in this package, where on page 2, the second bullet at the top of the page says, "FOTL should be conventional--not dual capable." Independent information indicates that the Germans in reality want to pursue for their own program a conventional ballistic missile in the 450-495 kilometer range band. The German "Technex" program is designed to provide a specific improved conventional munition warhead for anti-airfield use by the Germans in this range. Therefore, the Germans are prepared to pursue this kind of a missile even if it does not have the U.S.-associated nuclear capabilities. However, the Germans also privately tell us that if there is to be a modernized nuclear-capable FOTL, it would of course, be most convenient if that were interchangeable with the German conventional missile of a similar range, so that the Germans would be able to replace their nuclear-capable Lance with a nuclear capability in the FOTL without the requirement to procure a separate system. We understand that a correction to the Executive Summary is being prepared.

Rfj

BH

ML

A

Bill Cockell, Bill Heiser, Nelson Ledsky, and Don Spider concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Letter from Robin Beard
- Tab II Executive Summary
- Tab III The Study

NSC # 8803744

**National Security Council
The White House**

88 MAY 23 P 6: 11

System # I
 Package # 3744
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Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>RMP</u>	<u>I</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	<u>JAN</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Paul Stevens			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	50 PS/24 N	FFA
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>R.P. 3/24 N</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch ✓ N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other POS

COMMENTS

NSCIS -
 Please send
 comeback copy to
 REL w/CLP's
 comment.
 DP
 5/24

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ROBIN L. BEARD

1815 NORTH LYNN STREET * SUITE 800
ARLINGTON, VA 22209
TELEPHONE: (703) 524-6166

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daL+81

MAY 16 1988

Dear Colin,

I thought you should see the enclosed report resulting from my recent visit with Manfred Wimmer and other senior German & NATO officials.

Please take note of the attached German MOD issue paper - I was given an unofficial copy and I know it is "sensitive" but I thought it would be useful for you to see.

I'll be happy to discuss it in more detail if you so desire.

Keep on jogging,

Rob

88 MAY 16 P 4: 36

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II

3748

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Telephone: (703) 524-2828

Robin L. Beard
Senior Fellow

May 5, 1988

Lt.Gen. Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Subject: NATO Issues Related to Post-INF Modernization

Dear ^{*Colin*} ~~General Powell~~:

Related to some ongoing DoD work I have been doing I thought the enclosed report on NATO post-INF modernization issues would be of interest to you -- especially since so many of the views of West German and NATO officials parallel your own.

In general, I believe that, from a policy-political perspective, we understand what we need to do to have a successful program. This includes the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, working through NATO, to define the new "military conceptual framework." It means doing several things such as establishing military operational requirements and improving deep strike and offensive counterair conventional capabilities. By improving our conventional capabilities, we will have an alternative to the first and early use of nuclear weapons. Through force modernization efforts, we can establish the framework for a military balance that can lead to further arms control initiatives which will strengthen, not undermine, the defensive and deterrence posture of the Alliance.

While this general framework has been well understood, only recently have we begun to appreciate the deeply rooted concerns and fears of the West Germans about the "singularization" of the Federal Republic of Germany. I believe that the success of NATO's needed force modernization initiatives will hinge on a better understanding of the "singularization" problem and our ability to deal with it.

Telex: 4998312 CROTON * Facsimile: (703)524-8214

Several key elements that we need to address are discussed in the attached report. These include:

- o A Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) missile system with a range of approximately 500 kilometers.
- o FOTL should be conventional -- not dual-capable.
- o A conventional, deep strike, offensive counterair system.

The shorter range, 250 kilometer, FOTL system currently envisioned will not satisfy our theater military-operational requirements. Furthermore, staying on the present course would be adverse to our long term political interests. Making the FOTL dual capable will cause domestic political turmoil in the Federal Republic of Germany and could pose verification and other arms control problems for us in the future. Finally, we are now capable of deploying conventional offensive counterair missile system -- the Federal Republic of Germany has one in development known as Technex -- that will meet the need of raising the nuclear threshold.

What this means is that we need strong policy leadership and guidance. Our Services are geared to support their roles and missions through the R&D and Acquisition process. As a result, there is no institutional Service advocacy for the "Theater Level Systems" so critically needed to satisfy the operational and political requirements we face. In fact, the opposite is true.

In the above context, our numerous initiatives such as, "Nunn," "Quayle," "CTI," "BTI," "Competitive Strategies," etc., run the risk of being counter-productive if the Europeans continue to believe that these efforts are a ploy to "sell" or "buy" America. We need to show commitment to ideas, concepts, technologies, and systems that the Federal Republic of Germany and other allied countries have. Note the attached paper on this subject prepared by the Federal Ministry of Defense. Specific reference is made to their offensive counterair concept and the Technex system mentioned earlier. This is one particular systems concept that lacks United States Service support due to the roles and missions of our Army and Air Force.


At a policy level we need to understand what the Federal Republic of Germany is doing. We should also consider the

merits of the Technex program in the NATO military-operational context. FMOD officials have also suggested possible modular application of the Technex system as an additional candidate for the FOTL.

A combination of conventional and nuclear force modernization could alleviate many of the problems associated with nuclear artillery systems in the Federal Republic of Germany. By allowing these systems to be "restructured," the short range nuclear systems category could be qualitatively modernized but perhaps quantitatively reduced.

I think the above essentially captures the content of the various meetings I have had. We can discuss these and other points after your review of the enclosed.

Sincerely,



Robin L. Beard
Senior Fellow

Enclosure

PLEASE CONSIDER THE ATTACHED SENSITIVE

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DISCUSS AT YOUR CONVENIENCE

UNOFFICIAL DRAFT TRANSLATION

(FMOD INTERNAL ISSUE PAPER)

April 18, 1988

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

on

US Army LANCE follow-on activities and
a conventional missile system for
the German Air Force

- Reference:
1. TECHNEX in the Roland/Patriot framework.
 2. Conventional missile-concept definition studies (FKS I, II [Flugkörperstudie]) relative to extended air defense.
 3. US-Army RFI preparations for LANCE follow-on system.

1. General Political Background

The CDU's April 14, 1988 Foreign Policy Congress presented, taking a clear position from Chancellor Kohl and the propositions of Ambassadors Kwizinski and Burt, the following basic tenets:

- o No de-nuclearization of Europe.
- o No new alliance strategies.
- o A solid integration of the Federal Republic in the western alliance is viewed by both superpowers as preserving peace.
- o Even a partial de-nuclearization would dissolve the strategic unity of the NATO territories and place the credibility of its deterrent in question.
- o Point of orientation is Montabello; that is, emphasis should be placed upon longer-range systems.

- o Bonn will participate intensively in the decision-making processes for the follow-on system and will share fully in implementing the results.

2. Goal

To fulfill the security interests of the Alliance through the maintenance of an unrestricted defensive capability.

3. Measures

The aforementioned goal is in essence attainable through three measures which fall under the heading of the American "Competitive Strategies" concept.

- o Nuclear capability modernization.
- o Disarmament steps aiming for a qualitative and quantitative balance.
- o Qualitative improvements in the ability to react conventionally, since no alteration of Warsaw Pact offensive strategy (Burt) vis-a-vis Western Europe is expected in the mid-term.

4. Concrete Steps

In the area of Extended Air Defense (EAD), using the US-GE Roland/Patriot Agreement, new technologies have been developed and successfully tested which will allow within the required time frame (until 1993/95) the development and incorporation of a missile system having effective reaction and strike capabilities. The system will fulfill the following requirements:

- 4.1 Fixed high-priority targets such as airstrips, command centers, supply bases, strategic air defense batteries are to be eliminated at the very beginning of the ground conflict. Through this, the initiative will be regained through conventional means.
- 4.2 The 500 km range limit set by the INF Treaty should be fully exploited. The system must be sufficiently accurate and survivable, as to require only a limited number of missiles, which then can be effectively deployed and operated by the two missile squadrons of the German Air Force.

4.3 The system should have flexibility enough to be able to be outfitted with warheads in an extended battlefield (FOFA) scenario, avoiding the need for several different weapons systems, and thus contributes to the goal of interoperability.

4.4 The system should be modular, in order to ensure a higher level of commonality with other future NATO Central European systems (LANCE follow-on).

5. Agreement

The goal of these measures, which must be addressed immediately and cooperatively, must be the introduction not of "dual capable systems", but rather of distinct verifiable systems with conventional and nuclear tasks. These systems should however be up to 70% industrially modular on the component level, in order to allow for a more cost-effective procurement and a significantly improved logistical and manpower requirement.

This solution is the only alternative which is currently economical. Operationally it is of high value, since various deployment time frames are required.

The range, accuracy, and air- and ground-survivability of the conventional system is applicable to the nuclear follow-on system, allowing the fulfillment of the strategic goals established by NATO's General Galvin and by the Montebello conference.

In addition, it will be possible with a thus equipped nuclear missile of maximum range (up to 500km) to minimize collateral weaknesses, and through this, to hold the escalation potential of the system to a minimum.

The German government would welcome, even in the early stages of reflection -- for example, in conjunction with the US Army RFI (mid-May 1988) on the LANCE Follow-on -- the establishment of a joint cooperative approach. In this sense, attention should largely be paid to the technical and operational principles of the German/American conventional missile system. This approach is clearly considered in the joint US/GE system studies FKS I and FKS II, and will be demonstrated in the TECHNEX program as an element of the Roland-Patriot Agreement necessary for the qualitative expansion of the Alliance's defense.

HINTERGRUNDINFORMATION

Betr.:

LANCE Nachfolge-Aktivitäten der US-Army und
konventionelles Flugkörpersystem für die Deutsche
Luftwaffe

- Bezug:
1. TECHNEX im Rahmen Roland/Patriot
 2. Systemstudien (FKS I, II) im Rahmen der erweiterten Luftverteidigung zur Definition des konventionellen Flugkörperkonzepts
 3. US-Army RFI Vorbereitungen zum LANCE Follow-on System
-

1. Politisches Grundlagenmaterial

Der außenpolitische Kongreß der CDU vom 14.04.1988 hat mit klarer Stellungnahme von Herrn Bundeskanzler Kohl und den Thesen der Herren Botschafter Kwizinski und Burt folgende Grundsätze zur Thematik aufgestellt:

- keine Entnuklearisierung Europas;
- keine neuen Bündnisstrategien;
- eine feste Einbindung der BR Deutschland in das westliche Bündnis sichert den Frieden aus Sicht beider Mächte;
- auch nur teilweise Denuklearisierung löst die strategische Einheit des Bündnisgebietes der NATO auf und stellt die Glaubwürdigkeit der Abschreckung in Frage;
- Orientierungspunkt ist Montebello - wonach das Schwergewicht auf Systeme größerer Reichweite gelegt werden soll;
- Bonn wird sich intensiv am Entscheidungsprozeß zum Nachfolgesystem beteiligen und die Entscheidungen uneingeschränkt mittragen.

2. Ziel:

Das Sicherheitsinteresse der Allianz erfüllen durch Aufrechterhaltung der uneingeschränkten Verteidigungsfähigkeit.

3. Maßnahmen:

Das vorgenannte Ziel ist im Wesentlichen durch drei Maßnahmen unter Verankerung in die "Competitive Strategies" der USA zu erreichen:

- Modernisierung der nuklearen Fähigkeit;
- Abrüstungsschritte zur Erzielung eines ausgewogenen qualitativen und quantitativen Gleichgewichtes;
- Qualitative Verbesserung der konventionellen Reaktionsfähigkeit, da keine Änderung der Offensivstrategie des östlichen Paktes (Burt) mittelfristig gegenüber Westeuropa zu erwarten ist.

4. Konkrete Schritte

Im Rahmen der Erweiterten Luftverteidigung unter Nutzung des US/GE Roland/Patriot-Abkommens wurden Technologien untersucht und bereits erfolgreich demonstriert, die es gestatten im erforderlichen Zeitrahmen - bis 1993/95 - ein reaktionsfähiges und durchsetzungsfähiges Flugkörpersystem zu entwickeln und einzuführen, das folgenden wesentlichen Anforderungen gerecht wird:

- 4.1 Feste hochpriorisierte Ziele wie z.B. Flugplätze, Führungseinrichtungen, Versorgungsstützpunkte, strategische Luftverteidigungsstellungen sind kurz nach Beginn des Konfliktes am Boden auszuschalten. Damit wird die Initiative durch konventionelle Maßnahmen zurückgewonnen.
- 4.2 Die nach den Mittelstreckenraketen-Abkommen gestattete Reichweite von bis zu 500 km ist voll zu nutzen. Das System muß so treffsicher und überlebensfähig sein, daß nur eine geringe Anzahl konventioneller Flugkörper beschafft werden muß, die dann von den beiden Flugkörpergeschwadern der Deutschen Luftwaffe effektiv operativ eingesetzt werden können.
- 4.3 Das System soll soviel Flexibilität besitzen können, daß es auch im erweiterten Gefechtsfeld - FOFA - mit angepaßten Gefechtsköpfen eingesetzt werden kann, die Einführung mehrerer unterschiedlicher Waffensysteme im Bündnis vermeidet und somit die Fähigkeit zur Interoperativität ideal anbietet.
- 4.4 Das System soll modular aufgebaut sein, sodaß zukünftig ein hoher Grad von Kommunalität mit anderen im Bündnis in Zentraleuropa zu stationierenden Flugkörpersystemen erreicht werden kann (LANCE follow-on).

5. Vereinbarungen

Ziel dieser Maßnahmen, die kooperativ jetzt angestrebt werden sollten, muß sein, keine "dual capable systems" sondern eindeutig verifizierbare Systeme mit konventionellem und nuklearem Auftrag einzuführen. Diese Systeme sollen aber im Komponentenbereich bis zu 70 % industriell modular sein und damit kosteneffektiver beschaffbar und wesentlich besser logistisch und personell versorgt werden können.

Diese Lösung ist derzeit die einzig wirtschaftliche. Sie ist operationell von hohem Wert, da unterschiedliche Einsatzzeiträume gefordert sind.

Die mit dem konventionellen System erreichbare Reichweite, Genauigkeit und Überlebensfähigkeit am Boden und in der Luft, übertragen auf das nukleare Nachfolgesystem, erlauben es, die von General Galvin in der NATO und auch die in Montebello skizzierten strategischen Zielsetzungen zu erreichen.

Im übrigen wird es mit den so ausgerüsteten nuklearen Flugkörpern maximaler Reichweite (bis zu 500 km) möglich, Kollateralschwächen zu minimieren und damit die Eskalationsfähigkeit des System auf das Geringste zu beschränken.

Die Deutsche Regierung würde es begrüßen, wenn schon in frühen Phasen des Nachdenkens - z.B. im Rahmen des RFI der US-Army Mitte Mai 1988 zur LANCE Nachfolge - ein gemeinsames kooperatives Vorgehen erreicht werden kann. Hier sollten weitgehend die Techniken und operationellen Prinzipien der Deutsch/Amerikanischen Vorgehensweise beim konventionellen Flugkörpersystem berücksichtigt werden. Diese Vorgehensweise wird deutlich in den gemeinsamen US/GE Systemstudien FKS I und FKSII behandelt und wird im TECHNEX Programm als Element des Roland/Patriot-Abkommens zur notwendigen qualitativen Ergänzung der Verteidigung des Bündnisses als im Zeitrahmen realisierbar demonstriert.

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III

White Paper
NATO Military Modernization Requirements
in the Post-INF Environment

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WHITE PAPER
NATO MILITARY MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS
IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT

Croton Institute, Ltd.
1815 N. Lynn Street
Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22209

May 4, 1988

WHITE PAPER

NATO MILITARY MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS
IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT

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NATO MILITARY MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT

Preface

With the signing of the INF Treaty there arises both an increased need to modernize conventional and nuclear forces and the prospect of increased resistance to such measures within the NATO Alliance in general and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in particular. The following discussion will summarize the evolution of the INF deployments and their elimination under the INF Treaty. It also will present the rationale for further nuclear and conventional modernizations and the German perspective on the relevant issues from inside and outside of Bonn based on recent visits to West Germany between February (Wehrkunde Conference) and April.

Summary & Conclusions

The INF Treaty could undermine the credibility of NATO's strategy of Flexible Response by removing those systems that have provided the so-called "in-theater nuclear overwatch" capability. The Treaty, however, will pose no threat to allied security provided the alliance follows through on the modernization of NATO's nuclear systems as agreed upon in the 1983 Montebello Force Goals. In the post-INF environment, NATO must seek a balanced approach to conventional and nuclear modernization that is affordable, politically acceptable, and militarily meaningful, yet remains within the confines of the Treaty.

In order to address the imperative of nuclear modernization, it is essential that the alliance obtain the support of the Federal Republic of Germany. The geopolitical position of Germany and the range and nature of the weapons in question ensure that without their agreement there can be no meaningful NATO position on the issue. But their support is contingent upon the ability of NATO to address the following German concerns.

First, NATO must develop a conceptual military framework defining its military objectives and the minimum nuclear and conventional forces needed to maintain deterrence. As espoused by West German officials, this concept must raise the nuclear threshold by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. This objective can be accomplished by improving conventional forces with missiles of sufficient range (up to 500 km) and capabilities to "hold at risk" Warsaw Pact airfields and other high value fixed targets

heretofore covered by nuclear forces, and by fielding other conventional FOFA and extended FOFA systems.¹

Second, within the redefined military framework, the allies must provide a framework for parallel arms control activities. While there is agreement within the Federal Republic of Germany on the need for continued arms control efforts, there is currently a great deal of dispute over which forces should be reduced or eliminated. (e.g., "triple" zero, strategic, conventional, or biological-chemical.)

Third, any nuclear modernization program must not "singularize" the territory of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany is unequivocal in its opposition to bearing an unfair or "singularized" risk stemming from the types, ranges and numbers of weapons deployed on its territory. Of paramount concern to the West Germans is the fact that most of NATO's short range nuclear systems can strike only German soil. Since this is unique to their country, they find it particularly disturbing. Any nuclear modernization effort should be designed to go to the limits of the INF Treaty, up to 500 kilometers. Shorter range systems, such as the proposed Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) with a range of 250 kilometers, threaten only German territory.

Fourth, in parallel with this modernization effort, various FRG officials have called for qualitative, rather than quantitative improvement of NATO's short range and artillery nuclear systems. The thesis underlying this rationale is that deep-strike conventional systems (e.g., the FRG's offensive counter air (OCA) Technex Program) combined with advanced Follow-on-Forces-Attack (FOFA) interdiction systems (such as ATACMS), a deep-strike nuclear system (such as FOTL) with a range between 450-500 km), and an extended range TASM would be militarily palatable and allow for modernization initiative(s) that could be "sold" by arguing that short range nuclear systems (capable of impacting only on German soil) could be reduced or possibly eliminated.²

Finally, there is a recognized need for qualitative, rather than quantitative, improvement of NATO's nuclear artillery and other

¹ The ongoing FRG Technex program is one example of a relevant system.

² Recent discussions in the Federal Republic of Germany indicate that the FOTL should not be dual-capable. Conventional deep strike systems, such as the FRG's Technex program, must be separate and distinct from FOTL, although officials in the Federal Ministry of Defense believe that perhaps up to 70% of the components of Technex might be applicable to a FOTL system. This position is based on the political perception and probable reality of not being able to distinguish or count the nuclear launchers of a system that is dual-capable. Should a future triple-zero agreement be reached, the conventional variant might be eliminated along with its nuclear counterpart. A dual-capable FOTL would also create domestic political problems. These issues, and the requirement for longer range, are the major reasons why the MLRS launcher and a dual-capable ATACM are not the best approach to FOTL.)

short range nuclear systems. German leaders propose a mix of systems such as:

- o An conventional offensive counterair system based on the West German Technex concept.
- o An advanced Follow-on-Forces-Attack (FOFA) interdiction system, such as ATACMS.
- o A deep-strike nuclear system with a range of 450-500 kilometers as a FOTL.
- o An extended range TASM.

They believe that this combination of conventional and nuclear capabilities would be militarily credible and could be "sold" by the argument that the short range weapons that threaten German soil could be concurrently reduced or possibly eliminated.

German officials who are prepared to take the political "heat" believe that this debate can take place only once. Hence NATO must insure that the right initiatives are developed. In addition to the politico-military rationale presented, there is a strong desire that West German industry should have a developmental and production role in future systems.

There is evidence that momentum for a "tradeoff" between short range nuclear force (SNF) restructuring and force modernization is gathering in Bonn. CDU Deputy Parliamentary Leader Volker Ruehe has proposed the elimination of as many as half of NATO's post-INF 4000 nuclear weapons and "restructuring" the rest to make them as "credible" as possible. This arrangement, he claims, would mean favoring longer-range over shorter-range theater systems and eliminating many of the "less credible" artillery pieces, which would be used almost exclusively on West German territory.³

The United States Department of Defense's Competitive Strategies was of special interest to a recent Federal Ministry of Defense delegation as one of the keys to providing a strong, cost-effective defense. This initiative is aimed at identifying, developing, and prioritizing key defense efforts to direct military competition into safer and more stable areas. The aim of Competitive Strategies is to take advantage of core long-term alliance strengths and Soviet weaknesses. Developing NATO's offensive counterair (OCA) capabilities and countering Soviet penetration of NATO forward defenses are two examples of NATO, through Competitive Strategies initiatives, attempting to exploit areas of potential high leverage gain. Ideally, the result will be a new military capability reflecting a combination of operational concepts, systems, and technologies.⁴ West German

³ Elizabeth Pond, "Consensus is Forming on Nuclear Missiles," International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.15.

⁴ Frank C. Carlucci, "Competitive Strategies," Annual Report to Congress FY89, pp.115-118.

officials, however, believe that this effort will fail if it becomes a "buy" ("sell") American initiative and does not consider ongoing West German initiatives. Again, Technex was cited as the example.

NATO modernization options should enhance flexible response. They should have high deterrent value, contribute to crisis stability, and provide escalation control. Enhancing actual and perceived "war fighting" capabilities are the cornerstone of a credible deterrent, though use of such terms in a defensive alliance must be limited.

Background

NATO's military strategy of "Flexible Response" was adopted in 1968 as part of MC 14/3. The strategy is intended to preserve peace through deterrence by giving NATO the capability to:

- o Defeat aggression at the level it is initiated.
- o Maintain deliberate escalation control.
- o Reserve the right to the first use and escalated control of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets and the Warsaw Pact made qualitative and quantitative advances in their nuclear and conventional forces in the 1970s. Particularly destabilizing was the introduction of the SS-20. NATO leaders feared that without the deployment of an intermediate range nuclear force (the INF) the integrity of the doctrine of Flexible Response would be undermined. The INF modernization program that resulted in the introduction of the Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) was a particularly prudent and rational response to Soviet advances, because it provided, with a modest number of warheads, an in-theater nuclear overwatch capability. The INF underlined the United States linkage to Europe and ensured credible escalation control.

The challenge NATO faces now is to devise a balanced approach to conventional and nuclear force modernization that will restore the in-theater nuclear overwatch capability within the constraints of the INF Treaty.

The Modernization Imperative

There is disagreement about the need to improve all elements of NATO defense in the wake of the INF Treaty. The most controversy, particularly in Germany, concerns the modernization and deployment of the 0-500 kilometer range nuclear forces that remain. It has been the consistent position of the United States' Administration that NATO modernization efforts, as

outlined in the 1983 Montebello Force Goals, can, and in fact must, continue in the aftermath of the INF Treaty. Speaking to this imperative, the United States Department of Defense Report on NATO Strategy in the 1990s states:

The (Montebello) program calls for a range of measures to ensure that NATO's nuclear weapons are responsive, survivable, and effective, and on this basis the European nuclear stockpile was also reduced by over 1,400 warheads. NATO must continue with the modernization of its remaining nuclear forces. The NATO modernization programs which have high priority include: development of a dual-capable (nuclear-conventional) longer range follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile system; development of a tactical stand-off air-to-surface missile (TASM); modernization of nuclear artillery projectiles, dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear bombs; and continued improvement in nuclear security and survivability. None of these programs are constrained by the INF Treaty because the treaty in no way limits systems with ranges below 500 km or dual-capable aircraft.⁵

To date, the nuclear modernization efforts stemming from the Montebello commitment have ensured that delivery systems and warheads remain "responsive, survivable, and effective." NATO continues to upgrade the platforms, the munitions, and associated command, control and communications to fulfill that mandate. The concern generated by the INF Treaty today is not that the Treaty itself will jeopardize Allied security, but rather that the successful negotiation of a very limited agreement will impede the implementation of crucial, treaty-compliant modernization efforts.

As outlined in the above referenced report to Congress, foremost among the nuclear enhancement options under consideration are the Follow-on-to-Lance missile (FOTL), Tactical-Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM), and an Army-developed Advanced Tactical Missile (ATACM).

- o Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) is a nuclear missile system designed to replace the eighty-eight aging, short range Lance systems deployed in Germany and with other European NATO allies. While the current range of Lance is 125 kilometers, planners expect the FOTL to have a range of at least 250 kilometers. West German advocates of a post-INF modernization program argue on military-operational and political grounds that the range of the FOTL should be approximately 500 kilometers.
- o The Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile system (TASM) is a long range, standoff nuclear missile that could cover currently designated "at risk" targets. Such targets would, in part, be important assets in Soviet western districts that were previously covered by Pershing II and GLCM

5

US Department of Defense Report "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990s, 1988.

forces. The TASM is conceived to have up to 400 kilometers range after launch. This range could be extended by exploiting ramjet or integral rocket/ramjet propulsion technologies.

- o ATACMS is being developed to give NATO the ability to attack Warsaw Pact follow-on forces at ranges up to 150 kilometers with conventional weapons. ATACMS is intended to make forward defense feasible and to enhance conventional deterrence. Some in the United States Army advocate making ATACMS a dual-capable system that would satisfy the requirement for FOTL. To date, Congress has prohibited moves to make ATACMS dual-capable. This prohibition is clearly consistent with thinking in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The significance of the range enhancements contained in the options detailed above is two-fold. Studies show that a 250-kilometer missile gives only 15 percent improvement in coverage, whereas a 500-kilometer missile increases coverage by 74 percent. Further, as shown previously, an FOTL with a range of only 250 kilometers would create political problems in the Federal Republic of Germany. The longer range systems are politically attractive because they allow NATO to strike Warsaw Pact targets rather than, as at present, strike only German territory. Secondly, they are more effective militarily in that they provide wide lateral coverage and help to deter massing of Warsaw Pact forces at the front.

Conventional and Chemical Forces

With respect to conventional forces, the need for substantial improvements was well established long before the Soviets returned to the INF negotiating table in 1983. What has been lost in the post-INF Treaty environment is the fact that the removal of the intermediate range nuclear systems increases rather than decreases the imperative to proceed with improvements. In addition, given the massive Soviet chemical arsenal, modernization of United States retaliatory chemical weapons is also crucial to NATO's ability to deter at any level of conflict.

NATO's current Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), the Nunn Initiative, the Quayle Initiative, and other similar initiatives are all efforts designed to remedy or ameliorate the most critical deficiencies in the Alliance's conventional force posture relating to reinforcement, the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) mission, and the counter-air mission in all its dimensions. However, the United States runs the risk of confusing the Allies with so many "initiatives." They are skeptical about the seriousness of these initiatives and suspect that the initiatives are efforts to package and sell United

States' systems to the Allies. More consideration must be given to European thought and ideas. For example, the United States should seriously consider Technex for the conventional theater, deep-strike, and offensive counterair missions. Developed on a modular component basis, Technex has possible application to FOTL.

The View From Bonn

The Federal Republic of Germany is at NATO's center geographically, strategically, and politically. This position has made Bonn the critical player in post-INF planning. Removal of INF systems drives home the reality that the only nuclear weapons remaining in Europe will detonate on German soil in the event of conflict. This German fear of being "singularized" cuts across all party lines and is at the heart of the current debate. Speaking before the 1988 Wehrkundetagung, Chancellor Helmut Kohl succinctly summarized this concern:

...it is essential that we refuse to allow any areas within the territory of the Alliance to be exposed to a geographically restricted nuclear risk. Thus a strategy aimed at limiting the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons to European, or worse, German soil, is not acceptable to us.⁶

Bonn's opposition is concerned about the inequity of risk in NATO strategy. They are less hesitant to articulate the feeling that the other Alliance partners, the United States in particular, are "using" the Federal Republic. SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel has made clear that, "we [the SPD] are unable to accept the singularization of heightened German risk." Others, such as Egon Bahr, an SPD defense expert, have gone further:

The question is: how is the nuclear risk divided up in the Western Alliance? A qualitative difference indeed exists between those who take the risk and those who bear the risk...Nations without nuclear capacity are even today not invited to participate in negotiations which deal with nuclear weapons on their soil. Out of this arises a goal: no atomic weapons on the soil of those states without the power to control those weapons.⁷

Based on these concerns, the Bonn government and its opposition have been clear in their insistence that future nuclear deployments and modernizations in the Federal Republic be:

- o Set in the context of a redefined military-conceptual framework that clearly defines NATO's military requirements and begins with conventional modernizations that can contribute to raising the nuclear threshold.

⁶ Chancellor Helmut Kohl, speech before the XXVth International Wehrkundetagung in Munich on February 6, 1988.

⁷ Der Spiegel, 29 February 1988 (Nr. 9/1988), p.30.

- o Linked to a framework that will allow for further arms control initiatives, possibly including the pursuit of "triple-zero," conventional, biological/ chemical, and strategic nuclear weapons agreements.
- o Linked to longer-range nuclear modernization concentrating on qualitative, not quantitative, advances for short-range artillery and a range for FOTL up to 500 kilometers.⁸

A Redefined Military-Conceptual Framework

Perhaps the only shared conviction among the Bonn leadership and its opposition regarding future defense efforts involving the Federal Republic of Germany is that such changes should be part of what Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher has called a larger "global security concept." Such a concept, according to Genscher, "must address not only the disarmament problems ... but also what is necessary for defense whether or not our disarmament concept is successful."

German views on this issue make it clear that, before any deployments or modernizations take place in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Alliance must first define the future structure of its nuclear potential (including systems with ranges under 500 kilometers) and develop a comprehensive concept for security and disarmament in Europe. This overarching security framework must provide for a verifiable reduction of short-range nuclear weapons in conjunction with the creation of an improved conventional balance of forces in Europe and a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. With such a plan in place, Genscher notes, "isolated decisions (such as the deployment and removal of INF) would be completely out of place."⁹

Volker Ruehe, CDU Deputy Parliamentary Leader, has expanded on what shape such a military-conceptual framework might take by advocating a general Western concept for security, arms control, and disarmament that takes into consideration the especially exposed situation of the Germans. Such a model would answer questions about the future structure and number of nuclear weapons in and for Europe, giving priority to defining the "absolute minimum" of Western nuclear equipment needed. Says Ruehe, "The formula is that we want to maintain our strategy of preventing war with fewer nuclear weapons, but with a convincing structure, to make it acceptable and effective." Ruehe termed it

⁸ In this context, a dual-capable FOTL would inevitably provoke strong opposition in the FRG and could derail the successful implementation of such an initiative.

⁹ "FRG's Genscher Views Disarmament," Interview on Mainz ZDF Television Network in German, 21 February 1988, FBIS, 22 February 1988, p.1.

one of the "most urgent tasks" to clarify "how the absolute minimum is to be defined in figures and in quality of weapons, and what steps can be taken considering the conventional balance of forces between East and West."¹⁰

Ruehe, chairman of the commission of the CDU/CSU group formulating a draft concept of this plan, suggests coordinating further reductions with a restructuring of the remaining nuclear weapons arsenal. He is especially concerned about the "singularity" of the Federal Republic of Germany, and he wants to eliminate shorter-range systems that are "politically the least credible." He notes that neither the United States, France, or Great Britain have nuclear weapons planned for use on their own territory, and asserts that German interests require "a shift toward longer-range systems."¹¹

If the successor to the 100-kilometer Lance has a reach of 450 kilometers, it would not only cover two-thirds of the main Warsaw Pact bases for offensive air operations in Central Europe, but would also provide wide lateral coverage to deter any massing of Soviet forces for an attack. Then, much of the 20-kilometer range artillery could be forfeited.¹²

Linked to Arms Control/Reductions

It is imperative that all deployments and modernizations in the Federal Republic of Germany be viewed in the current climate of arms control. Planners must realize that as a result of the INF Treaty and the promise of reductions in strategic and conventional forces, arms control efforts will greatly circumscribe politically viable deployment and modernization options.

The official position on arms control in Bonn, as outlined by Chancellor Kohl, is that the central problem of Alliance security is the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority in the absence of the INF missiles. Kohl shares the view adopted by the Alliance foreign ministers at Reykjavik in June, 1987. Given the conventional disparity in Europe, the further deployment/modernization or removal of short range nuclear forces (SNF) must be seen in conjunction with negotiations that provide for NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional parity.

Kohl has stated that while the negotiation of NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional parity is of the highest priority, ultimately SNF modernization is an imperative to countering the Warsaw Pact superiority in Europe. In a February meeting in Washington,

¹⁰ "Ruehe Urges Comprehensive Western Arms Stand," Die Welt, 15 March, p.1, FBIS, 16 March, 1988, p.4.

¹¹ Ibid., p.4.

¹² International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.15.

Chancellor Kohl assured Secretary of State George Shultz that Bonn would accept the modernization of short range missiles based in Germany.¹³ Kohl has further declared that a balance of conventional and nuclear forces will continue to be part of maintaining defense capabilities, and that Bonn does not intend to support a further zero option, nor does it approve of nuclear-free zones, and "certainly not a denuclearization of Europe."¹⁴

Kohl's Free Democratic coalition partners and the opposition Social Democrats place great faith on the potential of negotiated conventional arms equity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to remove a priori the need for SNF modernization or deployment. The most vocal opposition to the modernization of SNF comes from SPD Chairman Vogel. Vogel points to the vast superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in SNF (which he notes is 15:1) and suggests that it would be "very foolish to oppose a reduction of this ratio, up to and including the complete elimination of these weapons."¹⁵

Linked to Longer-range Advances (Follow-On-To Lance)

While NATO agreed in principle in 1983 to deploy an updated version of the Lance, Bonn has been publicly resisting pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom to publicly commit itself to the plan. Private discussions aside, Chancellor Kohl, in his efforts to postpone a domestic political decision on the issue, has walked a difficult line.¹⁶ On one hand, he has repeatedly emphasized that a third-zero option for nuclear short-range weapons is out of the question. On the other hand, he has refused to set a date for the agreed modernizations to begin. Clearly NATO, through the High Level Group, Nuclear Planning Group, and other vehicles, is required to take the initiative in this arena. The United States could begin development of modernization options that would give Alliance members the opportunity to offer their own participation consistent with their domestic political schedules.

Faced with domestic elections and a volatile coalition, Kohl's public remarks on the possibility of eliminating SNF have been very cautious, usually attaching conditions to leave his government room to maneuver. In a statement before the Bundestag

¹³ International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.9.

¹⁴ The Week in Germany, March 11, 1988, p.1

¹⁵ Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, "Security as a Joint Task," speech before the XXVth International Wehrkundetagung in Munich on February 6, 1988.

¹⁶ For an extended discussion on Kohl's privately stated position, see International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.9.

on 25 February 1988, Kohl tied the possibility of SNF elimination to what must be viewed as highly unlikely circumstances:

In connection with the big powers' nuclear missile systems with a range below 500 kilometers, the position of our alliance has been confirmed. In connection with the establishment of conventional stability in Europe and the worldwide abolition of chemical weapons, those systems are also to be reduced, with the goal of similar ceilings.¹⁷

While it is no surprise that the Social Democrats (SPD) oppose the Kohl position, a number of conflicting pronouncements by coalition members suggest that the coalition government itself has not come to an internal consensus on the issue.

Speaking over Radio Free Berlin, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group Leader Alfred Dregger noted that if the Soviet Union's conventional superiority is dismantled, nuclear deterrence could "perhaps disappear completely." Speaking to the question of the deployment/modernization of SNF such as the Lance, Dregger notes:

It is out of the question to replace those nuclear weapons that were eliminated with the double-zero solution by additional missiles with a range of less than 500 km. On the contrary, disarmament must also occur under a 500 km range. There exists identity of interests between the two German states - they always reach just from Germany to Germany. Naturally we also feel responsible for our compatriots in Berlin and the GDR."¹⁸

While other statements from coalition members do not mirror Kohl's position, it is Kohl's SPD government opposition, as previously suggested, that is clearly against the planned modernization, now, or in the future. Speaking before the 1988 Wehrkundetagung, SPD leader Vogel spoke of the need, not only to postpone modernization, but also to work for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic.

The negotiations on these nuclear weapons cannot be postponed until a conventional equilibrium has been achieved, nor would it be acceptable to have a break in nuclear disarmament and meanwhile engage in nuclear force modernization.¹⁹

Opposition leaders assert Bonn is stalling on a decision for political reasons. SPD officials claim domestic political considerations lie behind Bonn's apparent uncertainty over SNF modernization. With crucial state elections (in Baden-Wurttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein) approaching, many Union

17 "Kohl's Government Statement," Foreign Policy Discussion in the Bundestag, 25 February 1988, FBIS, 26 February 1988, p.9.

18 "Officials Differ on NATO Modernization Issue," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 March 1988, FBIS, 8 March 1988, pp.2-3.

19 Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, "Security as a Joint Task," speech before the XXVth International Wehrkundetagung in Munich on February 6, 1988.

politicians are hesitant to appear to the German electorate as favoring nuclear rearmament.²⁰

Kohl's opposition demands he make a decision against modernization. In a parliamentary debate on the NATO summit, Bundestag Deputy Alfred Mechttersheimer (representing the Green Party) charged that a debate on new deployment had already begun at the NATO meeting and was merely postponed. Emphasizing that such weapons would only impact on German soil, Mechttersheimer accused the Allies of shifting the risk of war to the West Germany and called for the Federal Republic of Germany to withdraw from the Alliance.²¹

SPD defense expert Egon Bahr feels that Bonn's unwillingness to take a stand on the issue of modernizing SNF has only achieved a delay. While he would not like to see the forces modernized, he agrees with British Prime Minister Thatcher that it is imperative to make a decision in the very near future.²² If new systems are to be introduced in 1995, he contends, the United States Congress must make the necessary funding available next year at the latest.²³

An editorial in the German daily, Die Welt, following the March NATO Conference asserted:

With his diplomatic maneuvers the Chancellor has merely gained time. He will have to use it to clarify the cruel but inevitable logic of weapons systems for a skeptical German public. As long as they are necessary they will have to be modernized.²⁴

Informed observers in the Federal Republic of Germany concur that Kohl will soon be forced to set a date for the pledged SNF modernization. Most likely, this modernization effort will be part of what Defense Minister Manfred Woerner and others have referred to as a "restructuring" of Germany's nuclear arsenal. The goal of such restructuring is to have "fewer, but better nuclear weapons." While insisting on retaining the right to modernize nuclear weapons, Woerner notes that there is no need

20 Manfred Wörner in Der Spiegel, 29 February 1988 (Nr. 9/1988), p.31.

21 The Week in Germany, March 11, 1988, p.1.

22 Bahr agrees with the conclusion of Margaret Thatcher that decisions on new nuclear weapons must be made 7 years before their introduction.

23 "Officials Differ on NATO Modernization Issue," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 March 1988, FBIS, 8 March 1988, pp.2-3.

24 "Officials Differ on NATO Modernization Issue," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 March 1988, FBIS, 8 March 1988, pp.2-3.

for a decision at the present.²⁵ The delay in making a public decision stems from Bonn's unwillingness to dampen the present arms control atmosphere and the hope that reductions in SNF can be negotiated with the Soviet Union while still leaving open the possibility of "restructuring," i.e., modernizing a qualitatively improved but quantitatively diminished nuclear force structure. Such modernization must be done in parallel with conventional modernization options that through their deep strike/offensive counter air capability (e.g., the United States' ATACMS and the Federal Republic of Germany's Technex program) raise the nuclear threshold by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and provide NATO with improved escalation control through the deployment of conventional systems with deep strike force multiplier capabilities.

²⁵ "Officials Differ on NATO Modernization Issue," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 March 1988, FBIS, 8 March 1988, pp.2-3.

Attachments

"Consensus is Forming On Nuclear Missiles," International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.15.

"February 20: Kohl, Reagan Meet," International Herald Tribune, 20 April 1988, p.9.

Wehrkunde Speeches

"USA: In 1989 a NATO Disarmament Concept," S+ddeutsche Zeitung, 16-17 April 1988.

"Arms Control: FRG's Special Concerns," Defense News, 4 April 1988, p.20.

"Bonn Decision Hinders NATO," An interview with Margaret Thatcher, Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1988.

"Lowest Common Denominator," Der Spiegel, 29 February 1988, pp.25-32.

"Serves them Right," Der Spiegel, 7 March, pp.23-24.

"Sixty Million are More Important," Der Spiegel, 29 February 1988, p.30.

"All Must Share the Nuclear Risk," Der Spiegel, 22 February 1988, p.20.

"SPD Delegates Accuse Woerner of a New Rearmament," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15 April 1988, p.1.

"We are not Soft on Rearmament," Der Spiegel, 22 February 1988, p.18.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803744
RECEIVED: 18 MAY 88 10

TO: POWELL

FROM: LINHARD

DOC DATE: 20 MAY 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INF NATO
MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE NATO & INF MODERNIZATION ISSUES

ACTION: NOTED BY POWELL DUE DATE: 21 MAY 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MAHLEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
LINHARD
MAHLEY

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: NSRCB DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8803744

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 MAHLEY
002

Z 88051811 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 88052508 NOTED BY POWELL

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803744
RECEIVED: 18 MAY 88 10

TO: POWELL

FROM: BEARD, ROBIN L

DOC DATE: 05 MAY 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INF NATO
MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE NATO & INF MODERNIZATION ISSUES

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 21 MAY 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MAHLEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
MAHLEY

FOR CONCURRENCE
COCKELL
HEISER
LEDSKY
SNIDER

FOR INFO
COBB
MISKEL
PERINA
ROSTOW
STEINER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1987


573697
4900
IT067
FG006-12

Dear Dave:

Thank you for your recent letters. Your suggestions about how to develop a better defense investment strategy for the NATO Alliance are close to our own thinking about political and arms control planning within NATO for 1988 and beyond.

I will be in touch with you soon.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell
Acting Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

X
Dr. David M. Abshire
Chancellor
X Center for Strategic and
International Studies
X Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20006

NSA # 8708822



December 8, 1987

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FW*
NELSON C. LEDSKY *NCL*

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. David M. Abshire

Former Ambassador and currently Chancellor of Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, David Abshire, has written you a detailed letter about how we should go about making improvements in NATO defense next year as part of a NATO Summit strategy. His ideas are well worth considering.

Accordingly, we would suggest that you send Ambassador Abshire a brief reply, offering to meet with him later this month to explore his ideas at a greater length and to see how they might fit in at that time with our own developing plans for a NATO Summit.

PK
Peter Rodman and Don *Manley* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Dr. Abshire.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Powell to Abshire Letter
- Tab II Incoming from Abshire

AS

Retype shown.

done 12/14

[Signature]



8822

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

November 23, 1987

DSS,
STAFF TO
FWE. CC TO
PWL.
CP
J. Lawrence

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Colin:

I'm worried that the Administration is facing the prospect of its huge INF success being perceived as a failure, especially in Europe, where I just spent a month with leaders in and out of government. Now that I am out of government, they talk to me in a way they did not when I was in government. Many of them see no forward strategy emanating from Washington and feel they are going to be forced to trust in Gorbachev's good will alone. This is certainly not the legacy that the Administration of Ronald Reagan wants to leave.

The climate in Europe cries out for comprehensive leadership. An approach is needed that not only puts an INF treaty in its proper perspective, but also forces us to look at how nuclear modernization and arms control relate to the conventional improvements and negotiations. It is essential that the December NAC and DPC launch a program taking NATO beyond the zero/zero option. The objective should be to develop a defense investment strategy of thinking smarter, not richer, that also give us leverage for conventional negotiations.

That is what I argued in conversations with Thatcher, Woerner, Giraud, Carrington, the NATO Ambassadors and Military Committee, and SACEUR and his staff. Thatcher, Woerner, and General Galvin were the most positive.

This follow on to the Conventional Defense Initiative would not be a call for more American money, but a call for a better use of Alliance-wide investment. (I append as a model the paragraph from the 1984 NATO Defense Ministers' Communique that established the first conventional defense improvements initiative.) We need a new mandate in the same form to re-energize and galvanize further NATO machinery, at a time when nations are starting to lag on the 1984 initiative.

ED

87 DEC 1 AM 11:31

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
November 23, 1987
Page 2

Based on my trip, and the several dozen recommendations from our CSIS NATO Resources study, there are six action steps which I think are urgently needed -- in addition to pressing forward on what is already in motion.

First, the DPC, or better yet, the Council should mandate a net appraisal of the balance of forces. I have at CSIS a study group that has taken a cut at this on an unclassified basis, and we gave it to the entire NATO Council and Military Committee. The classified NATO appraisal, must show strengths, weaknesses and trends on both sides and emphasize their meaning for conventional improvements and arms control. The Secretary General and NATO commanders should take it to the Cabinets of Europe and North America. Cost: Zero.

Second, a review of NATO's crisis management capability is critical. The threat of a Warsaw Pact reduced-warning armored attack in Central Europe imposes enormous new pressures on NATO's less than streamlined crisis management machinery. Cost: Zero.

Third, a special study should be mandated on how NATO should face up to the precarious situation in the NORTHAG sector. Both SACEUR and the DPC need to identify how the acute danger of Soviet armored breakout in the north, which can invalidate all countries' investment in NATO, can be met more collectively. Rectifying this weakness is critical if we are to have leverage in the Atlantic to the Urals negotiations. Study cost: Zero.

Fourth, we should engage Senator Nunn and others in finding trade-offs with the Allies such as providing them with less-preferred ammunition under a war-reserve stock for SACEUR. In addition, terrain preparations could be advanced following up some of Fred Ikle's ideas.

Fifth, the NAC/DPC should mandate a second effort on armaments cooperation. A cooperative effort under the Balanced Technology Initiative in addition to ongoing Nunn programs would emphasize to Europeans our determination to use our total technology investment to rectify conventional imbalances. The perception of this going forward could have an incredible effect on the Soviet Union, as they so fear our creative use of technology.

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
November 23, 1987
Page 3

Sixth, we need a mandate for longer-range discussions involving both government and industry for better use of defense resources. This could include emphasis on more off-the-shelf purchases as well as a search for more trade-offs like the Roland/Patriot deal with Germany.

This strategy for comprehensive leadership needs to include Congressional involvement to give bipartisan continuity throughout an election year and to enhance the INF treaty ratification process.


As we address simultaneously conventional enhancements, the problems of negotiations, additional nuclear allocations, and resistance to a third zero option, it would be important to further drive this work program to the top political level.

The way to do this is not one, but two, heads of government meetings. The first would be fairly soon. The second would be scheduled in advance for later in 1988 or early in the new Administration. If Gorbachev is smart enough to build his framework around two summits, NATO must be smart enough to do the same.

The most recent meeting of the Alliance Defense Ministers in Monterey was an important step forward. But, my just completed travels and talks across Europe reveal deep unease. Too many important people in very high places say "things are bad." I think that during the ratification debate critics will make the treaty look bad in part because we do not appear to have a broad comprehensive approach to NATO security, and plenty of European voices will be cited to this effect, to wit, the Washington Post, advertisement signed by distinguished Europeans. Concern about U.S. financial leadership only underscores the need to move NATO to a comprehensive strategy at a summit early next year.

I look forward to your reactions to this approach.

Sincerely,



David M. Abshire
Chancellor

Attachment

4-5 December 1984

Defence Planning Committee
Brussels

rent and future conventional capabilities. In this context we noted the progress made within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) towards the coordination of research, development and procurement in Europe and, consistent with the need to protect militarily relevant technology, look forward to greatly improved cooperation in this area between the European and North American members of the Alliance.

— We stressed that obtaining better conventional forces also requires a greater emphasis on long term planning. We welcome the continuing development of long term planning guidelines as well as the work of the NATO Military Authorities in formulating a conceptual military framework. This should help us better to identify overall priorities and should assist the more effective implementation of NATO's existing strategy.

8. We agreed that redressing the steadily growing conventional imbalance favouring the Warsaw Pact is necessary to strengthen deterrence and reduce dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we invited the Secretary General and the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session to come forward with proposals for a coherent effort to improve NATO conventional defences. This should, inter alia, include an early conclusion to ongoing work on a conceptual military framework, establishment of priorities for conventional defence improvements, harmonisation of ongoing national efforts to improve conventional defence capabilities, the encouragement of current international efforts to co-ordinate defence procurement, Alliance-wide efforts to make the necessary resources available, optimisation of use of available resources, and integration of the results into the planning process of the Alliance. The approach and initial results of this work should be reported to us at our next meeting.

9. The 1984 Defence Review has shown again that despite commendable efforts by some Allies, more aid, and by more nations, is essential to help Greece, Portugal and Turkey to improve their forces and to carry out their missions more effectively to the advantage of all.

10. Recalling the Bonn Summit documents, we reaffirm the position adopted in previous communiqués concerning developments outside the NATO Treaty area that might threaten the vital interests of members of the Alliance. Against the background of United States planning for its rapidly deployable forces, we reviewed continuing work on measures necessary to maintain deterrence and defence within the NATO area, noting in particular that a number of force goals on compensation have been added to the 1985-1990 force goal package. We will ensure that NATO defence planning continues to take account of the need for such measures.

11. Determined that defence planning will remain responsive to the defence needs of the Alliance, we remain equally determined

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DAVE
Dear ~~Dr. Abshire~~:

~~I wanted to send you a short note, to~~ Thank you for your *recs*
~~letter of November 23, 1987, and to suggest that we get~~
~~together sometime after the U.S.-Soviet Summit is over to~~
~~discuss your ideas about NATO in greater detail.~~ Your
suggestions about how to develop a better defense
investment strategy for the ^{NATO} Alliance ~~needs to be meshed~~ *AND CLOSE*
~~together with our own thinking about political and arms~~ *TO*
~~control planning within NATO for 1988 and beyond.~~ ~~The~~
~~issues involved are indeed complex and the number of~~
~~players concerned—each like the British, French and~~
 ~~Germans with its own ideas—makes realistic planning~~
~~a challenge.~~

I would, therefore, especially welcome the chance to draw
on your experience and insights as we begin to plan in
earnest a NATO schedule, including a possible NATO Summit,
for 1988. I hope we can get together before the end of
the year for a good, long chat.

Sincerely ~~yours,~~

*I will be in touch with you
AS SOON.*

Dr. David M. Abshire
Chancellor
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20006

National Security Council
The White House

RF

System # I
Package # 8822
DOCLOG RR AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WHC</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>A</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	<u>JBN</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>4/5</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u>A</u>
Lou Michael			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Revision *final* + Tab I.
12/9

*I wonder how long a
chat " you want.
JBN*

RECEIVED 01 DEC 87 15

TO POWELL

FROM ABSHIRE, DAVID

DOCDATE 23 NOV 87



KEYWORDS: USSR

INF

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: LTR TO POWELL RE SUCCESS OF INF BEING PRECEIVED AS FAILURE

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 05 DEC 87 STATUS S

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ERMARTH

RODMAN

STEVENS

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COMMENTS

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