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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 5/6/2014

File Folder IT067 (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION -
NATO) (400000-424599)

FOIA

S697

Box Number 14

SYSTEMATIC

31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
164889	MEMO	PETER SOMMER TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: YOUR MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON: SEPTEMBER 29, 2:30 P.M. R 3/22/2023 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	2	9/26/1986	B1
164890	MEMO	PAGE 2 ONLY OF #164889 R 3/22/2023 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	1	ND	B1
164998	MEMO	DAVID BROWN TO RODNEY MCDANIEL, RE: SPEECH	1	4/9/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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BB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

C.F. 7004
164889
420167
IT067
FG006-12

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Waivers
BY dh NARA DATE 3/24/2023

September 26, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN M. POINDEXTER

**Natl Sec Advisor
has seen**

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Lord Carrington:
September 29, 2:30 p.m.

You are scheduled to meet with Lord Carrington at 2:30 p.m. on September 29. He had hoped to meet with the President in Washington, but we had to substitute the shorter meeting in New York. Carrington will be accompanied by his private secretaries Brian Fall and Bill McCahill; Ambassador Abshire will also be along.

Carrington will be making his usual consultation rounds at State and Defense, but apparently will not spend as much time as usual on Capitol Hill in deference to the November elections. He also is seeing the Vice President, as well as Casey and Bud. He will, as well, be seeing various media people; and he is making a speech in Chicago and will visit SAC.

I suspect Carrington's primary interest will be to hear your views on US-Soviet relations, especially prospects for arms control agreements. As he did with the President, he will surely put in a strong plug on the benefits of consultations.

Absent agreement to a Summit date, we have not been able to formulate a precise consultation plan. The President's session in New York clearly paid dividends and bought us some time. The next major opportunity is the opening of the CSCE Review Conference in Vienna at the beginning of November. While Shultz has not yet agreed to go, I am sure he will attend. Depending on the timing of a Summit, there are a range of other consultation formulae to include inviting Heads of government to Washington.

With regard to the arms control agenda, conventional arms control will be of special interest to Carrington. Pursuant to the Halifax initiative, NATO expects to complete a draft report by the end of October on how to take "bold new steps." Carrington may sound you out on the best forum for reinvigorating conventional arms control. It would be useful to know Carrington views. You will recall that Secretary Shultz came down strongly in New York against CDE II, while Genscher and Raimond seemed to like this forum. For our part -- and somewhat separate from the

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Declassify on: OADR

NSC #8607004

forum -- we cannot lose sight of US strategic interests served by the MBFR talks: maintaining US forces in Europe.

Carrington will likely cite the need to find an effective way to get across to opposition parties -- like Labor in the UK and the SPD in Germany -- our harsh view of the consequences of the policies they are advocating. You are familiar with our general thinking and Ambassador Price has laid out a detailed plan for the UK in a cable I understand you received. You will want to ask for Carrington's suggestions, particularly about a greater European role.

*I haven't seen.
Hope you have it.*

In a broader sense, the breakdown of the security consensus encompasses the wider question of strains in US-European relations. Abshire is pushing a theme that NATO as an organization is in excellent shape, but the "Alliance Writ" -- the relationship between US and Europe -- is fraying at the edges. Abshire believes a crisis is imminent and will surely mention this during the session. He advocates a massive communication program to include the utilization of top Administration offices, Members of Congress, Ambassadors, and US business, labor and civic leaders.

Finally, Carrington may express an interest in who is replacing Abshire.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the above in preparing for your meeting with Carrington.

Approve

Disapprove

Jack Matlock and Don Mahley concur.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

September 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Lord Carrington

State had originally recommended that President meet with Lord Carrington during his September 29-30 visit to Washington (Tab I). Now that the President will meet with Allied Foreign Ministers and Lord Carrington at the UNGA in New York on September 22, State is no longer advocating a Presidential meeting. State does, however, hope that, as in the past, you will again meet with Lord Carrington. The focus of the meeting would be on East-West and transatlantic relations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Lord Carrington on September 29:

Approve *J* Disapprove _____

*2:00 pm Mon, Sep 29
(note: President will be traveling this date - not yet decided who will accompany him) Done*

(on travel)
Jack Matlock and Don Mahley concur. *JM*

Attachment
Tab I State's original recommendation

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #6033

August 15, 1986

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with NATO SYG Carrington

NATO Secretary General Peter Carrington has asked to meet with the President during his September 29-30 visit to Washington. He believes that such a meeting would serve to symbolize the closeness of transatlantic relations during a period of heightened East-West diplomacy.

The Department strongly supports this request as one of the essential elements of our program of Allied consultations in preparation for a possible U.S.-Soviet Summit meeting later this year. Secretary Shultz will have bilaterals on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly with a number of Allied Foreign Ministers and there is a possibility of a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in connection with the CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting in early November. Aside from Chancellor Kohl's October visit to the U.S., however, there are few scheduled opportunities for visible Presidential involvement. Carrington's visit thus provides an occasion for the President to demonstrate his attentiveness to Allied interests and concerns as we pursue our East-West agenda shortly after the September 19-20 sessions with Shevardnadze. Such a meeting would also underscore the President's commitment to close consultations.

As you know, Lord Carrington has been very helpful in the past in ensuring strong Allied backing for our policy on East-West issues. His role in shaping Allied perceptions prior to the Geneva Summit was crucial. A meeting with the President would strengthen his ability to continue his helpful role.

Nicholas W. Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY *ds* NARA, DATE 5/6/14

164890 7004
reversed

forum -- we cannot lose sight of US strategic interests served by the MBFR talks: maintaining US forces in Europe.

Carrington will likely cite the need to find an effective way to get across to opposition parties -- like Labor in the UK and the SPD in Germany -- our harsh view of the consequences of the policies they are advocating. You are familiar with our general thinking and Ambassador Price has laid out a detailed plan for the UK in a cable I understand you received. You will want to ask for Carrington's suggestions, particularly about a greater European role.

In a broader sense, the breakdown of the security consensus encompasses the wider question of strains in US-European relations. Abshire is pushing a theme that NATO as an organization is in excellent shape, but the "Alliance Writ" -- the relationship between US and Europe -- is fraying at the edges. Abshire believes a crisis is imminent and will surely mention this during the session. He advocates a massive communication program to include the utilization of top Administration offices, Members of Congress, Ambassadors, and US business, labor and civic leaders.

Finally, Carrington may express an interest in who is replacing Abshire.

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the above in preparing for your meeting with Carrington.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSE/state Waivers
BY ch NARA DATE 3/22/2023

Jack Matlock and Don Mahley concur.

National Security Council
The White House

JM

System # _____
Package # 7004
DOCLOG JM A/O _____

86 SEP 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
Rodman/Cockell			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Florence Gantt	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8607004

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 26 SEP 86 17

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SOMMER

dh 5/6/84

DOCDATE 26 SEP 86

KEYWORDS: NATO

CARRINGTON, PETER

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER MTG W/ CARRINGTON 29 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8606033

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NSCIFID

(DR TC)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i>	<i>9/29 Poindexter Approved Recom</i>		<i>PRS, Chron</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)



U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

**Current Status Details
for CTRH RECID: 424546
MAIN SUBCODE: IT067-01**

Current Status	None
User Name	dbarrie
Status Date	2014-05-16
Case Number	
Notes	Transfer to IT067

Review Status History

<u>No.</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>User</u>	<u>Case Number</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	None	2014-05-16	dbarrie		Transfer to IT067

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S697

14

SYSTEMATIC

31

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY REVIEW OASD(PA)
COORDINATION RECORD

CASE NO.

86-1286

DATE

April 9, 1986

TO:

National Security
Council

DESCRIPTION SUBMITTED BY SAPA-FOI

Speech - General Jack N. Merritt for presentation at the
AUSA Women in Defense, Henry Jackson School of International
Studies, University of Washington, Los Angeles, CA and
Seattle WA on 15, 16, and 17 Apr 1986.

THE ATTACHED MATERIAL IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES ON THE REVERSE
OF THIS FORM. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS CASE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO LTC Blank, Ext. 71182

A REPLY IS REQUESTED BY

1200 HOURS

11 Apr 1986

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

TO: Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, OASD(PA)

REVIEW BY THIS OFFICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM, RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING
RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING CLEARANCE FOR PUBLICATION (check one):

- NO OBJECTION AS RECEIVED.
- NO OBJECTION SUBJECT TO AMENDMENTS MADE BY THIS OFFICE (in black pencil).
REASONS FOR AMENDMENTS (security or policy) ARE SPECIFIED BY PAGE NUMBERS LISTED BELOW.
- OBJECTION. AMENDMENTS TO PERMIT PUBLICATION ARE IMPRACTICABLE. REASONS ARE STATED BELOW.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary.)

TYPED NAME, TITLE AND ORGANIZATION

DATE

SIGNATURE

BACKGROUND

The policy of the Department of Defense is to authorize and encourage the public release of information concerning the Department of Defense consistent with security requirements, and other exemptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. To implement this policy the Directorate for Security Review is responsible for review and final action on all material submitted for OASD (PA) public release clearance. To assist this office in making clearance determinations, it is necessary in some cases to solicit recommendations from knowledgeable sources within the Department of Defense and other Government agencies.

GUIDELINES

- a. **SECURITY** – Reviewing agencies should identify information known to be classified within the meaning of Executive Order 11652 (*DOD Regulation 5200.1R*) or information which in the judgement of the reviewing agency warrants classification. In the latter case, it is requested that reasons for this judgement be given and recommendations made for appropriate classification.

- b. **POLICY** – Material originated within the Department of Defense for public release should, in addition, be reviewed for conflict with established policies and programs of the Department of Defense or those of the national government. If change is necessary, reviewing agencies are requested to recommend acceptable substitute language where practicable, or to specify needed changes in sufficient detail to permit acceptable revision.

- c. **EDITORIAL** – Editorial review is not a responsibility of the Directorate for Security Review and reviewing agencies should not make editorial corrections. However obvious errors of fact should be indicated.

SPEECH TO THE _____

APRIL 1986

CALIFORNIA

BY

GENERAL JACK N. MERRITT

I AM DELIGHTED TO BE HERE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE HEALTH OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND MY APPRAISAL OF THE FUTURE OF NATO.

I'VE ONLY BEEN SERVING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS FOR SOME 6 MONTHS BUT I'VE COME TO REALIZE THAT NATO IS NOT ALWAYS WELL APPRECIATED NOR FOR THAT MATTER, WELL UNDERSTOOD. AND, I BELIEVE, THERE IS A PARTICULAR SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE UTILITY OF THE ALLIANCE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES.

ONE FORM OF SKEPTICISM QUESTIONS THE EXISTENCE OF A THREAT AND IT AFFECTS NOT ONLY THE ALLIANCE BUT ALL DEFENSE EFFORTS AS WELL -- AND THE MANIFESTATION IS NOT CONFINED TO THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC.

NOW DEBATES ABOUT THE THREAT HAVE GONE ON FOR DECADES. THERE ARE THOSE WHO SEE SIGNS OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT ALMOST EVERYWHERE

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AND THOSE ON THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM WHO SEE THE THREAT AS A FIGMENT OF THE IMAGINATION OF THE FAR "RIGHT". AND THERE ARE MANY IN THE MIDDLE WHO ARE RATHER CONFUSED.

AND THE CONFUSION IS NOT SURPRISING FOR IT HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE - SOVIET MILITARY MIGHT BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL IS AN UNDENIABLE FACT. BUT THE ISSUE IS ONE OF OPPOSING SCHOOLS OF LOGIC.

-- ON ONE SIDE THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THE THREAT IS ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY.

-- ON THE OTHER THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE YOU CAN DISCOUNT THREATS PURELY BASED UPON STATEMENTS OF GOOD INTENTION.

OF COURSE, NEITHER OF THESE APPROACHES RELATE TO THE COMPLEX REALITIES OF THE WORLD.

TAKE FOR EXAMPLE, ENGLAND AND FRANCE. THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THEIR HISTORY THESE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN AT WAR. BOTH HAVE SIZEABLE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND GREATER POWER THAN EVER TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON EACH OTHER. YET, NO ONE IS DEFENDING THE BEACHES. WHY? NOT BECAUSE OF TREATIES OR NON-AGGRESSION PACTS. NOR GOVERNMENTAL ASSURANCES. RATHER IT IS MORE COMPLEX AND MORE RELIABLE THAN THAT. THEY ARE TWO DEMOCRACIES WHEREIN A GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EACH HAVE THEIR OWN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION IN THE OTHER. AND, THESE PEOPLE INFLUENCE GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS

AND ANY MAJOR CHANGE IN POLICY WILL BE PRECEDED BY DISCERNABLE EVENTS AND OPEN CONTROVERSY.

ON THE OTHER HAND - WHILE THE WEST IS OPEN TO SOVIET INSPECTION - THERE IS NOTHING LIKE THE SAME WINDOW INTO THE SOVIET UNION AND - VERY IMPORTANT - THE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW THE COURSE OF POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

SO, FROM A THREAT VIEWPOINT IT MAKES SENSE FOR US AS A NATION AND AS AN ALLIANCE TO KEEP OUR INSURANCE PAID UP.

NOW, OF COURSE, ACCEPTANCE OF A THREAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT EVERYONE IS SATISFIED WITH THE ALLIANCE.

THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN QUESTIONS AND CRITICISMS SURROUNDING THE ALLIANCE, INDEED, AT LEAST TWO GENERATIONS OF AUTHORS AND RESEARCHERS HAVE REAPED AN ABUNDANT LIVING IN THIS PURSUIT. THESE CRITICISMS OF NATO ARE FAMILIAR.

-- FIRST, THE KEY AND LONG STANDING CRITICISM. EUROPEANS ARE SEEKING SECURITY "ON THE CHEAP" BY RELYING ON ^{U.S.} NUCLEAR WEAPONS ^{guarantees} FOR SECURITY IN ORDER TO AVOID PAYING THE PRICE FOR A CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.

or "shields"

3/17

EVIDENCE FOR ALL THIS LIES IN THE STOCKS OF AMMUNITION THAT DO NOT EXIST; THE UNITS NOT ORGANIZED AND THE WEAPONS NOT MODERNIZED. AND, WHEN COUPLED WITH EUROPEAN QUESTIONING OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRANT--THERE IS A CERTAIN CYNICISM ABOUT EUROPEAN MOTIVES AS A WHOLE. A CYNICISM WHICH IS HARDLY ALLAYED BY DECADES OF DISPUTATION IN EUROPE OVER THE TRUE NATURE OF THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE.

-- ANOTHER MAJOR CRITICISM IS THE SHEER INEFFICIENCY OF THE WAY THE ALLIANCE DOES ITS BUSINESS OF DEFENDING THE WESTERN WORLD. FOR REASONS OF SOVEREIGNTY--OR PRIDE--OR PROTECTIONISM--OR WHATEVER--THERE IS WASTEFUL DUPLICATION IN ARMAMENTS PROCUREMENT. AND THE RESULT IS WHAT ONE ANALYSTS CALLS STRUCTURAL DISARMAMENT--BUYING FEWER AND LESS CAPABLE SYSTEMS AT INCREASING COST.

NOTE: E.9 11 FIRMS/7 COUNTRIES = ANTITANK WEAPONS;

18 FIRMS/7 COUNTRIES = DESIGN/PRODUCE GROUND TO AIR WEAPONS;

16 COMPANIES/7 COUNTRIES WORKING AIR TO GROUND.

o ONE EFFORT--"THE TWO WAY STREET"--WAS ADVANCED BY THE U.S. A FEW YEARS AGO, BUT EUROPEANS HAVE PERCEIVED IT TO BE A HOLLOW GESTURE WHICH HAS BEEN UNABLE TO OVERCOME PROTECTIONIST PROVISIONS IN US PROCUREMENT LAW AND THE NATURAL ADVANTAGES ACCRUING TO US INDUSTRY. AT LEAST SOME IN THE US HAVE CRITICIZED THE EUROPEANS AS INTERPRETING THE IDEA AS "BUY FROM ME" WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE CONTRIBUTION

TO BETTER DEFENSE.

O ANOTHER CRITICISM--OF THE US--HAS BEEN RELATED TO OUR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES WHICH, IT IS URGED, RESTRICT EUROPE FROM PLAYING FULLY IN THE PRODUCTION OF FIRST-LINE ARMAMENTS. BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS A REAL PROBLEM.

O AND ALL OF THIS PROCEEDS, IN PART, FROM THE LACK OF A UNIFIED VIEW OF THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY. WE TALK PAST EACH OTHER WHEN WE DISCUSS WHAT EACH NATION SHOULD BE DOING IF WE DO NOT HAVE A COMMON VIEW OF WHAT NEEDS DOING.

-- AND, OF COURSE, THERE IS THE STANDING CRITICISM WHICH ASSERTS THAT THAT ALLIANCE IS SIMPLY A THING OF THE PAST--SIXTEEN NATIONS IN SEARCH OF A CRISIS.

NOW THIS DOES NOT EXHAUST THE CATALOGUE OF CRITICISMS--FAR FROM IT. BUT, I THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO REMIND OURSELVES OF SOME OF THE PAST CRITICISMS THAT WILL INEVITABLY IMPACT, WHATEVER THE FUTURE OF NATO.

NOW MIND YOU I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT THESE OR OTHER CRITICISMS ARE FAIR OR EVEN ACCURATE--BUT, THEY EXIST AND GIVE FUEL TO SUCH EVENTS AS THE NUNN AMENDMENT OF 1984 WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE. AND THEY GIVE COMFORT TO

5/17

PARTIES AND POLITICIANS WHO GAMBLE THE SECURITY OF THEIR NATIONS AND PUT AT RISK THE SECURITY OF THEIR ALLIES.

IN FACT, EUROPE'S CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERRATED AND THE IDEA THAT THE US TROOPS ARE THERE TO DEFEND US INTERESTS ALONE--IS NOT WORTH MUCH OF OUR TIME. IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTS A GLOBAL THREAT TO AMERICA AND EUROPE AND REQUIRES GLOBAL RESPONSE.

FRANCOIS DE ROSE, LATE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO, HAS STATED IT MOST ELOQUENTLY -- "WESTERN SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, THUS, SHOULD BE DEFINED AS THE SECURITY OF THE WEST IN EUROPE."

SO WHY AM I DREDGING UP THE SORDID PAST? AS SOMEONE ONCE WROTE, "THE PRESENT IS THE PAST ROLLED UP FOR ACTION--AND THE PAST IS THE PRESENT UNROLLED FOR UNDERSTANDING." AND, IF WE ARE TO GET TO THE FUTURE OF NATO WE HAVE TO START HERE.

NOW, IN SPITE OF THE CRITICISM, AND SPITE OF THE POLITICS AND IN SPITE OF FREQUENT OUTBREAKS OF PLAGUES OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY ONE HAS TO LOOK AT THE ALLIANCE--IN THE PRESENT--AND CONCLUDE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS COMPARATIVELY IN PRETTY GOOD HEALTH AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, THAT THERE IS A VITAL PROGRAM FOR FUTURE ACTION.

-- TWO YEARS AGO THE ALLIANCE CAME THROUGH ONE OF ITS SEVEREST TEST AS INF DEPLOYMENTS COMMENCED IN SPITE OF SOVIET PRESSURES

6/17

TO SPLIT THE WEST. NATO CAME THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE STRENGTHENED IN ITS PURPOSE, MORE CONFIDENT IN ITS POLITICAL BASIS AND MORE PRACTICED IN ITS CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES.

-- THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE ALSO MORE AWARE OF PUBLIC CONCERNS--ENGENDERED BY THE INF DEBATE--ABOUT EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- COUPLED WITH GEN ROGER'S WARNINGS ABOUT CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND BY SEN NUNN'S SEEMING DEFECTION TO THE ANTI-NATO RANKS - SPONSORING A BILL WHICH WOULD WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES IF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE WERE NOT STRENGTHENED - NATO LEADERS HAVE TAKEN SOME SIGNIFICANT STEPS REFLECTING A NEW REALISM IN NATO.

1. IN THE FACE OF CRITICISM BY NUNN AND OTHERS THAT WE WERE NOT PROVIDING RATIONALE SUPPORT FOR FORCES IN 1984, MINISTERS APPROVED AN INFRASTRUCTURE BUDGET OF \$7.8 BILLION.
2. FOR THE FIRST TIME NATO BEGAN TO TAKE REALISTIC ACCOUNT OF POSSIBLE OUT-OF-AREA DEPLOYMENTS OF US REINFORCEMENTS AND THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN PLANNING.
3. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAVE DEVELOPED A CONCEPTUAL MILITARY FRAMEWORK DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A UNIFIED APPROACH TO THE STRATEGY AND PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A MORE RATIONALE APPROACH TO ARMAMENTS COOPERATION AND EXPENDITURES OF ALL TYPES.

7/12

4. THERE IS NOW A MUCH MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT. NOT JUST "THE THREAT," BUT SERIOUS NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISONS COMPLEMENT THE CMF. ALONG WITH LONG RANGE PROJECTIONS (20 YRS) TO FOSTER LONG RANGE PLANNING THIS IS IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO SOME PRACTICES IN THE PAST WHICH REDUCED "THE THREAT" TO REDUCE THE NEED FOR COMPENSATING ACTIONS.
5. THE ALLIANCE HAS REALISTICALLY FACED-UP TO THE CRITICAL LIST OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE DEFICIENCIES AND HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THESE DEFICIENCIES IN OFFICIAL NATO DOCUMENTS.
6. NATO NATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED A PROCEDURE TO SYSTEMATICALLY EXPLOIT EMERGING TECHNOLOGY.
7. AND, THE MOVE TOWARDS THE ALL IMPORTANT ARMAMENTS COOPERATION HAS TAKEN ON NEW VITALITY.
 - o THE US HAS CREATED A SPECIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE-CHAired BY DEPSECDEF TAFT TO FOSTER COOPERATION. AND, EACH SERVICE HAS A FLAG RANK OFFICER CHARGED WITH BEING A COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE.
 - THE CNAD HAS TAKEN ON THE TASK OF FOSTERING ARMS COOPERATION.
 - THE IEPG HAS STARTED UNPRECEDENTED MINISTERIAL MEETINGS TO FOSTER EUROPEAN COOPERATION.

IN SHORT - I WOULD QUOTE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO DAVID ABSHIRE AND SAY "NATO IS ON THE MOVE". AND, ALL THIS HAS MOVED SEN NUNN, WITH SENATORS ROTH AND WARNER, TO OFFER AN AMENDMENT WHICH

WOULD PROVIDE \$200 MILLION FOR COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AMONG NATO ALLIES, AND THIS IN A TIME OF AN INCREASINGLY PROTECTIONIST CONGRESS.

SO, I HAVE TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF LATE. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL RECORD OF RECENT ACCOMPLISHMENT WHICH PROVIDES A MEANS TO REMEDY THE MAJOR FLAWS IN NATO--BUT, THE WAY AHEAD WILL NOT BE EASY.

BUT, I AM A GOLFER AND THERE ARE SOME RULES OF GOLF THAT APPLY TO LIFE AS WELL.

- (1) A GOOD SWING WITH SMOOTHNESS AND RHYTHM IS USEFUL--BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS HOW AND WHERE YOU HIT THE BALL.
- (2) YOU HAVE TO PLAY THE BALL WHERE IT LIES, WHETHER THE LAST SHOT WAS GOOD OR BAD IS NOW IRRELEVANT.
- (3) IT ISN'T OVER 'TIL ITS OVER'--OR UNTIL YOU "HOLE-OUT". YOU HAVE TO FINISH THE GAME.

WITH THAT IN MIND, I WOULD OBSERVE THAT WHILE WE HAVE GOT SOME GOOD PROCESSES STARTED WE ARE STILL PERFECTING OUR SWING. AND, THE BALL MAY NOT BE IN THE DEEP ROUGH AS IT APPEARED TO BE IN 1980 OR SO,, BUT CERTAINLY ISN'T IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FAIRWAY AND, THERE ARE A LOT OF SAND TRAPS BETWEEN HERE AND THE GREEN.

IF NATO IS TO FULFILL THE PROMISE OF THESE INITIATIVES, IF IT IS TO FIND A BETTER WAY TO USE RESOURCES, AND IF WE ARE TO DEAL WITH

OTHER PROBLEMS, IT WILL REQUIRE DEALING WITH SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS AND OF POLITICS.

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE IN MY VIEW, THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE ALLIANCE. TO UNDERSTAND THE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD, WE HAVE TO REMIND OURSELVES OF TWO IMPORTANT FACTS:

- (1) ECONOMICS DETERMINE THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR DEFENSE--IN BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT WAYS.
- (2) MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE ECONOMIC RIVALS.

IN EUROPE WE HAVE ECONOMICS NOT GENERATING THE AMPLE RESOURCES TO MAKE ALLOCATION AN EASY TASK. AND, THE LAGGING ECONOMY PRODUCES UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH IN THE SOCIALISTIC ENVIRONMENT IN MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CREATES AN ADDITIONAL DEMAND IN THE FORM OF INCREASED SOCIAL PROGRAMS.

IN THE US THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT--BUT NOT BETTER. WE WERE LOOKING AT 0-3-3 -- BUT NOT ONLY ARE DEFICIT CONCERNS/FISCAL CONSERVATIVES/PEACE MOVEMENTS/REFORMERS IN CONFLUENCE TO MAKE DEFENSE DOLLARS VERY DIFFICULT TO SECURE. GRAHAM-RUDMAN CASTS ITS SHADOW ON DEFENSE. WHILE THE IMPACT OF GRAHAM-RUDMAN LEGISLATION IS NOT YET TOTALLY CLEAR, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION THAT DEFENSE WILL BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. (50% OF BUDGET - 100% IMPACT) AND I WOULD SUSPECT THAT (BY THE WAY), IN TIME OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY,

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IT IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ARMAMENTS COOPERATION--
EVEN THOUGH IT PROMISES TO CONSERVE OR BETTER USE RESOURCES.

IN SUCH TIMES ECONOMIC RIVALRY, IT SEEMS, IS HEIGHTENED.
TRANSCENDING THIS RIVALRY IS MADE FURTHER DIFFICULT IN THAT
POLITICIANS RESPOND TO DOMESTIC, NOT ALLIANCE PRESSURES AND THERE
ARE FEW OR NO PRESSURES TO FORCE ARMAMENTS COOPERATION, AND
THERE ARE OTHER PROBLEMS AS WELL.

IN ADDITION TO IMPEDIMENTS TO ARMS COOPERATION THERE ARE
OTHER EXACERBATING PROBLEMS--RELATED TO THE ECONOMICS OF THE
ALLIANCE--WHICH HAVE UNIQUE AND WIDER RANGING SIGNIFICANCE.

FOR EXAMPLE - SDI

SDI-OF COURSE-IS CAUSING STRAINS - AND NOT JUST ECONOMIC STRAINS

THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS ARE:

1. FIRST--WORST MY VIEW--IS THE THEOLOGICAL OPPOSITION.
IT CENTERS IN THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT. THE ARGUMENTS IT SEEMS
TO ME ARE INCONSISTENT. THEY ARGUE THAT WE NEED LESS RELIANCE
ON (OFFENSIVE) NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT THEY REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE
INADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES. AND, AT THE SAME TIME REJECT
THE IDEA OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE TO SUPPLANT THE OFFENSE.
2. "THREATENS TO INCREASE TECHNOLOGY GAP WITH EUROPE". NOT
NECESSARILY IF EUROPE PARTICIPATES.
3. "BRAIN DRAIN." (DITTO)

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4. "DECOUPLING FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENT". NOT NECESSARILY AS WE EXTEND TO EUROPE.
5. "THREATENS UK/FR RETALIATORY FORCE". YES, BUT NOT U.S. SDI,
BUT SOVIET SDI!
6. COSTS MONEY! OF COURSE.

SDI INEVITABLE--THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE A PROGRAM.
COOPERATION IS ANSWER. NOT NECESSARILY A WEAKENING OF
COMMITTMENT. MAYBE EDI MAKES SENSE.

AND OTHER ALLIANCE PROBLEMS: RELATING TO ECOLOGY, GENERATIONAL,
CULTURAL, SOCIAL DIFFERENCES, ETC. BUT WON'T DWELL.

POLITICAL - IF ECONOMICS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM THEN
POLITICS PROVIDE THE MEANS OF SOLUTION.

EINSTEIN WAS ASKED ONCE, "WHY THE BRILLIANCE WHICH PRODUCED
THE ATOMIC BOMB COULD NOT PRODUCE THE SOLUTION FOR PEACE." HIS
SIMPLE REPLY WAS "POLITICS IS HARDER THAN PHYSICS." AND FOR THE
MOST PART WHAT I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING IS PHYSICS. OVERLAPPING
AND INTERWOVEN WITH ALL THIS ARE THE POLITICAL REALITIES. NO
PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THE ALLIANCE ON SUCH THINGS AS ARMAMENTS
COOPERATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR POLITICAL CONSENSUS. HOWEVER,
THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

-- WHILE THE INF DECISION WAS AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN THE
ALLIANCE--AND THE ALLIANCE IS CLEARLY STRONGER FOR IT.

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- I WOULD SAY THAT NO OTHER DECISION WAS POSSIBLE AND STILL HAVE AN ALLIANCE, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO HARD. I WOULD ALSO SAY THAT WE ARE NOT THROUGH IT ALL YET AND THE DROPPING OF NUCLEAR TASKS BY THE DUTCH INTRODUCES NEW AND VEXING PROBLEMS.
- AND, WHEN ONE LISTENS TO EUROPEAN RHETORIC, INF HAS A SORT OF A TENTATIVE QUALITY. SOMEHOW THE WHOLE THING GETS VIEWED AS AN AMERICAN IDEA WHICH PERTURBS THE ALLIANCE--NOTWITHSTANDING THE IMPORTANT COUPLING WITH THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT.
 - AND ALL THAT IS PART OF A MAJOR AVERSION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH FURTHER ERODES THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR STRATEGY LEAVING US IN A SITUATION WHERE:
 - o WE HAVE INADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, LEADING TO
 - o RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
 - o AT A TIME OF NUCLEAR PARITY WHICH MAKES THREAT OF THEIR USE AND THESE DETERRENT VALUE LESS CREDIBLE.
 - o AND THERE IS A GROWING ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT WHICH UNDERMINES WHATEVER CREDIBILITY REMAINS.

THIS GROUP AND OTHERS ARE EQUALLY OPPOSED TO CONVENTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ALL THIS CALLS INTO QUESTION POLITICAL RESOLVE AND INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT SO-CALLED "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS. AND CASTING THE US IN THE ROLE OF "THE VILLIAN" HAS NOT MADE IT EASIER FOR ALLIANCE SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S.

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HENRY KISSINGER SUGGESTED IN AN ARTICLE OF A YEAR OR SO AGO THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION DERIVES FROM:

- OVERWHELMING U.S. DOMINANCE--IN THE ALLIANCE WHICH WAS A NECESSARY FACT IN ITS FORMATION--WHICH PRODUCES EUROPEAN FRUSTRATION AND COMPULSIVE DISPLAYS OF INDEPENDENCE, ALONG WITH;
- A GENERATION OF LEADERS---ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC-- WHO DO NOT HAVE THE SAME PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AS ITS FOUNDERS. THUS;
 - o IN EUROPE THERE IS AN INSTINCT TO POSITION SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AND TO USE POSTURING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS A TOOL TO DEAL WITH THEIR INTERNAL POLITICS--AS WELL AS A TOOL IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.
 - o IN THE US WHILE POLITICAL ELITES SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE, IT IS NOT A MAJOR EMOTIONAL NECESSITY--RATHER IT IS MORE A PRACTICAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENT. AND WE TOO "TROT OUT NATO" TO DEFEND BUDGETS AND FOR VARIOUS OTHER REASONS. AND OUR RECORD OF CONSISTENCY HAS NOT BEEN COMFORTING TO EUROPE:
 - ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON.
 - OFF AGAIN/ON AGAIN INF.
 - SALT II, ETC.

WELL WHERE DOES THIS BRING US? IT IS HARD TO SUM UP SUCH KALEIDOSCOPIC PRESENTATION--BUT THE SITUATION SEEMS AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE ALLIANCE IS AT THE MOMENT ON A POSITIVE VECTOR AFTER SOME VERY TRAUMATIC YEARS LARGELY OBSESSED WITH INF.

2. THAT SOME VERY SUBSTANTIAL STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TOWARD DEALING WITH MAJOR PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE FUNCTION OF THE ALLIANCE EG, CMF, CDI, ARMAMENTS, ETC.

3. THAT ECONOMIC ISSUES ARE CENTRAL TO ALL THE PROBLEMS AND THAT ARMAMENTS COOPERATION MAY BE THE CENTRAL UNDERTAKING--BOTH TO CONSERVE RESOURCES AND ENGENDER AND RENEW SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE.

4. THAT THERE ARE MAJOR ISSUES WHICH HAMPER THE SOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE ALLIANCE. SUCH AS:

o MATTERS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

o INTERNAL POLITICS OF NATIONS.

o UNEMPLOYMENT AND GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ETC.

5. THAT ALL THE FOREGOING IS THE "PHYSICS OF THE PROBLEM." IT DEALS WITH SYMPTOMS--NOT POLITICAL CAUSES. SO THE QUESTION, CAN THE NATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ALLIANCE FIND A COMMON POLITICAL PURPOSE AND RECONSTRUCT A GRAND STRATEGY? AND, IN PROCESS, CAN WE DEFUSE MOVEMENTS OF PACIFISM AND NEUTRALISM AND ISOLATIONISM BY PROVIDING A BETTER VISION?

ENCL.

AND "VISION" IS, OF COURSE, THE KEY WORD. "POLITICAL WILL" AND "POLITICAL PURPOSE" ARE, AFTER, ALL -- IN OUR FREE WESTERN SOCIETIES -- TOTALLY DEPENDENT UPON THE "PUBLIC" - OR "PUBLICS" - TO BE SERVED. TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL DEFENSE WE MUST HAVE A SOCIETY WHICH PEOPLE BELIEVE IS VALUABLE TO DEFEND AND, SO, THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN ECONOMIC TENSION IN THE ALLIANCE AND INSIDE THE NATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE.

BUT WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE DESIGNED TO SERVING THE ENDS OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE. THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE EXISTS -- NOT FOR STRENGTH ITSELF -- BUT AS ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, A US NAVAL STRATEGIST ONCE DESCRIBED IT, "THE PROPER PURPOSE OF POWER IS TO ALLOW MORAL IDEAS TO TAKE ROOTS," AND I SEE THIS BROAD VISION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE ALLIANCE -- AS LONG AS THERE IS A THREAT TO FREEDOM -- ...THIS BROAD VISION AS THE CONTINUING SOURCE OF VITALITY -- WHATEVER THE TRANSIENT DIFFICULTIES AND DISAGREEMENTS.

AND I WOULD SAY TO YOU THAT IT IS NOT THE NEXT NEW FIGHTER NOR THE NEXT NEW SHIP WHICH ARE KEY TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. RATHER, THE CENTRAL CORE OF OUR SECURITY IS THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST EVERY DAY CONTEMPLATE NOT ONE - BUT 16 NATIONS IN RESPONSE TO ANY CONTEMPLATED AGGRESSION.

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SO I AM "BULLISH" ON NATO -- WE MUST CONTINUE TO SOLVE TODAY'S PROBLEMS AND CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE A REALISTIC APPROACH -- AS WE HOLD THE VISION OF A PEACEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE FUTURE AND THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE PAST 40 YEARS OF PEACE.

OUR MEASURE OF SUCCESS WILL NOT BE COUNTED IN CONQUESTS BUT WILL BE AS IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN IN THE WORDS OF D.D. EISENHOWER, "EVERY DAY OF PEACE IS A DAY OF VICTORY".

17/17

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *210 8/11/14*

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TO MCDANIEL

FROM BROWN, D

DOCDATE 09 APR 86

KEYWORDS: SDI

MERRITT, J

SUBJECT: CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR MERRITT SPEECH

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 10 APR 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STEINER

MAY

MAHLEY

WRIGHT

LEHMAN

LINHARD

RODMAN

Cleared w/ changes marked
Tobey

COMMENTS *Cleared with change 4/11/86 by Will Libey*

REF# X38889

LOG

NSCIFID NSDD0172 (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 4/14 *WFVH per Steiner*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *RS* (C)