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FO006-13 (583655) (9 OF 12)

FOIA

F16-011

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FO006-48

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No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
Pages		

244877 PAPER

BACKGROUND PAPER TERRORISM

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

BACKGROUND PAPER EASTERN EUROPE

Your Objectives

- Increase U.S. influence by developing official and unofficial ties with individual East European countries. Also encourage Allies to expand contacts to foster moderation and change.
- -- Together with Allies, continue to press for fulfillment of Helsinki Final Act obligations in Eastern Europe, particularly on human rights.
- -- Expand economic and non-strategic trade ties with Eastern Europe; use this lever to encourage meaningful economic reform and popular political participation.

Key Background Points

- -- Eastern Europe is on the verge of change. Opportunities may exist to promote Western interests and values.
- -- Although the Warsaw Pact countries are diverse, they now face similar problems, namely:
 - o aging leaderships (except Poland) nearing transition;
 - o continued lack of political legitimacy leading to internal pressures for change;
 - o dismal economic performance, the result of the failure of the communist economic system.
- -- Most of the regimes in Eastern Europe recognize some change is required but are cautious in taking difficult, meaningful steps. Constraints include opposition within each regime and persistent concern about internal stability during the reform process.
- -- The basic impetus for change in Eastern Europe comes from within these countries, but Gorbachev's influence may affect timing and extent of change.
- -- While Soviet determination to retain ultimate economic and political hegemony in Eastern Europe is unchanged, the Soviet definition of what this means may be evolving. Gorbachev wants his clients to be efficient.

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-- Spontaneous strikes in Poland reflect exhaustion with economic austerity in the absence of popular participation. GOP must attain genuine reconciliation and dialogue with population for reform measures to succeed.

(Points to be made follow at next page.)

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POINTS TO BE MADE EASTERN EUROPE

- -- EASTERN EUROPE MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF CHANGE.
- -- PRESSURE FOR CHANGE IS INDIGENOUS, BUT GORBACHEV'S REFORM EFFORTS MAY REINFORCE THESE OPPORTUNITIES.
- -- HUNGARY (ESPECIALLY) MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION IN ECONOMIC

 AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. BULGARIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

 SEEK ECONOMIC REFORM, BUT NO POLITICAL RELAXATION. ROMANIA

 NOT INTERESTED IN EITHER.
- -- OUR MEANS OF ENCOURAGING MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ARE
 LIMITED. BUT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO INCREASE OUR
 CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE TO ENCOURAGE
 MODERATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE.
- -- THE U.S. IS EXPANDING ITS DIALOGUE WITH EACH EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRY. IN DOING SO, HUMAN RIGHTS HAS REMAINED HIGH ON OUR LIST OF POLICY PRIORITIES. WE SPEAK OUT FORCEFULLY AGAINST ABUSES AND PRESS FOR GREATER OPENNESS AND FREEDOM.
- -- EASTERN EUROPE WANTS OUR ECONOMIC SUPPORT, BUT OUR MESSAGE
 SHOULD BE CONSISTENT: WESTERN ECONOMIC SUPPORT REQUIRES
 MEANINGFUL REFORM AND SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE, WITHOUT WHICH
 IT WOULD BE SQUANDERED.
- THAT IS THE MESSAGE WE HAVE GIVEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT

 DURING AND AFTER THE RECENT STRIKES. WE STILL WANT TO BE

 HELPFUL, BUT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM

 IF IT DOES NOT INCLUDE POPULAR PARTICIPATION.
- -- TOGETHER, WE NEED TO HARMONIZE OUR APPROACHES TO THE PROSPECTS AND REALITY OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

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WSC/State Waiver

-- I REISSUE MY BERLIN INITIATIVE, CHALLENGING GORBACHEV NOT
ONLY TO TEAR DOWN THE WALL AND OTHER KINDS OF BARRIERS
WITHIN BERLIN, BUT ALSO TO SHOW TRUE "OPENNESS" BY RELAXING
THE SOVIET GRIP OVER EASTERN EUROPE.

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POINTS TO BE MADE TERRORISM

- -- WE MUST MAKE A STRONG REFERENCE TO TERRORISM AT THIS SUMMIT:
 ANYTHING LESS WOULD BE READ AS LOSS OF POLITICAL WILL.
- -- WE DO HAVE PROGRESS TO REPORT SINCE VENICE:
 - O WHERE THERE IS GREATER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION,
 INCIDENTS ARE DOWN: SYRIA'S REDUCED SUPPORT FOR
 TERRORISM SHOWS TERRORISM CAN BE DEALT WITH IF THE WEST
 STANDS UP TO IT AND ACTS TOGETHER.
 - O WE'VE ALSO SIGNED TWO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS TOWARD
 OUR GOAL OF TRAVELER SECURITY AND URGED THE SENATE TO
 RATIFY THEM.
- -- BUT WE MUST NOT LET OUR GUARD DOWN: WORLDWIDE, TERRORIST INCIDENTS ARE UP. WE FACE A BROAD RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM BY STATES LIKE IRAN AND LIBYA, AND GROUPS LIKE THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND THE JAPANESE RED ARMY.
- -- NORTH KOREAN BOMBING OF A SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER, HIJACKING

 OF KUWAITI JET ARE UNACCEPTABLE. OUR PUBLICS DEMAND WE TAKE

 ACTION:
 - O HIJACKERS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH IT.

 SUMMIT SHOULD EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE FACT

 HIJACKERS WERE NOT BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, URGE ALL

 COUNTRIES SIGN THE HAGUE CONVENTION.
 - O WE SHOULD ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE THAT HIJACKED AIRCRAFT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OFF ONCE THEY HAVE LANDED.

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NSC/State Welvers.

- O AIRPORT SECURITY SHOULD BE IMPROVED. THE GOOD BRITISH PROPOSALS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) SHOULD BE SUPPORTED.
- O GET AT THE BASIC PROBLEM: SPONSORS. OUR EVIDENCE
 SUGGESTS KUWAIT HIJACKERS ARMED BY IRAN. SUMMIT SHOULD
 MAKE CLEAR STATEMENT WE WILL NOT DO BUSINESS AS USUAL
 WITH STATES SPONSORING TERRORISM.
- -- VITAL WE STAND TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE: OUGHT TO REAFFIRM
 OUR VENICE POLICY OF NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS.

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BACKGROUND PAPER AFGHANISTAN

Your Objectives

- Soviet withdrawal is underway. Congratulate Allies on strong, unified efforts over past eight years to reach this historic achievement. Soviet troop withdrawal has had a positive short-term impact on East-West relations. However, over longer term, the USSR must accept loss of PDPA (Najibullah) control, a primary political role for the Resistance, and a truly neutral Afghanistan.
- -- Focus now turns to Afghan relief. Needs for resettling refugees and for reconstruction will be great. Emphasize importance of broad multilateral aid effort and the need for generous contributions to help get the Afghan people back on their feet.

Key Background Points

- -- Soviet troop withdrawal is underway. Soviets have formally agreed that half (50,000) troops would be out by August 15. May be reconsidering due to rapid collapse of Najibullah army in areas vacated by Soviet army.
- -- Resistance forces have been quickly occupying garrisons vacated by the Soviets to NE, East and South of Kabul, a trend which may foreshadow the early demise of the Kabul regime and is badly embarrassing to USSR. The Resistance continues to show admirable unity and coordination on the battlefield, but less so politically.
- -- UN negotiator Cordovez has not yet taken any initiatives on interim government. Soviets have said and Cordovez agrees that it might be better to wait a few months for reality to sink in with the Afghans. However, Soviets may have second thoughts as Resistance military success shifts political future in their favor and against PDPA.
- -- Soviet military commander in Afghanistan stated that Moscow would leave about \$1 billion worth of military facilities and supplies behind for Kabul forces. Intelligence confirms that transfer of weapons is continuing as is major role for Soviet military advisors with Afghan army units.
- -- We are watching carefully what Moscow does on the military supply question. If the Soviets show restraint, we are prepared to act in a similar fashion. Soviet charges that U.S. and Pakistan are violating understandings reached at Geneva are baseless. They rejected mutual freeze in military assistance.

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-- Perez de Cuellar has appointed Sadruddin Aga Khan as aid coordinator. EC countries and Japan are preparing to contribute significantly to Afghan relief. Budget shortfalls are likely to prevent us from adding substantially to our current cross-border and refugee assistance levels.

(Points to be made follow at next page.)

POINTS TO BE MADE AFGHANISTAN

- -- SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN IS AN HISTORIC

 EVENT IN POST-WW II ERA; IT IS CULMINATION OF UNITED EFFORT

 BY THE WEST AND ISLAMIC NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AFGHAN

 RESISTANCE. SOLIDARITY IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM BY THE FRIENDS

 OF AFGHANISTAN IS TRULY PRAISEWORTHY.
- OUT BY AUGUST 15 AND WITHDRAWAL COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF 1988. AS THE SOVIETS HAVE EVACUATED ALMOST ENTIRE AREA NORTHEAST, EAST AND SOUTH OF KABUL, THE AFGHAN ARMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO HOLD ONLY A DOZEN OF THE LARGEST TOWNS AND CITIES.

 RESISTANCE MILITARY COOPERATION AND SUCCESS IS IMPRESSIVE, EMBARRASSING TO USSR, AND HAS SHIFTED THE POLITICAL BALANCE SHARPLY AWAY FROM THE SOVIET-BACKED PDPA, DESPITE CONTINUED SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT.
- -- WE ARE WATCHING CAREFULLY HOW THE SOVIETS DEAL WITH THE
 MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUE. IF THEY EXERCISE RESTRAINT, WE ARE
 PREPARED TO ACT IN A SIMILAR MANNER. IN THE MEANTIME,
 SUPPORT TO THE RESISTANCE WILL BE UNFLAGGING. PAKISTAN
 FULLY AGREES WITH PRINCIPLE OF SYMMETRY. STRONG SOVIET
 BACKING OF THE PDPA, REJECTION OF THE RESISTANCE, AND
 PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN -- RATHER THAN WORKING FOR TRULY
 MUTUAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN -- IS A MAJOR MISTAKE THAT
 THREATENS LONGER-TERM STABILITY OF THE REGION.
- -- WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT,
 BUT ARE GLAD THAT THE EC, JAPAN AND OTHERS WILL PROVIDE

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SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE. SADRUDDIN KHAN IS THE BEST POSSIBLE PERSON TO COORDINATE THIS EFFORT AND NEEDS OUR SUPPORT. THE SOVIETS MUST ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO UN EFFORT AND NOT ONLY TO KABUL AND PDPA. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AID FOLLOW THE REFUGEES FROM PAKISTAN TO THE AREAS WHERE THEY WILL RETURN, AND NOT THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME.

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BACKGROUND PAPER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Your Objectives

- -- U.S. initiative: stress that our initiative is unchanged and remains the only workable approach to peace now on the table; we remain committed to it; ready to work with USSR and other permanent representatives of Security Council in properly-structured international conference.
- -- Allied support for our efforts: reiterate the importance of public and diplomatic backing from our friends if the initiative is to make progress; thank those who have backed our efforts.
- -- Future plans: we will continue to assert a leadership role in advancing the peace process; making clear to regional parties that their interests demand movement not stagnation and offering help when and where it is wanted.

Key Background Points

- -- We have been extremely active over the past several months in trying to further the peace process.
 - o Secretary Shultz just completed his fourth trip to the region of this year, consulting and urging the parties to move, and explaining publicly and privately the increasingly dangerous consequences of inertia.
 - O Also held several sessions with USSR to see if the Soviets are prepared to adopt practical, not merely symbolic, positions.
- -- Our objective is the opening of international conference that would directly and promptly lead to bilateral negotiations for a comprehensive peace. Bilateral negotiations are the only kind that can succeed, leading to an outcome that provides for the security of all states in the region and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.
- Our proposal is a carefully balanced and integrated package which includes:
 - o a properly structured international conference to launch direct, bilateral negotiations on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which applies to all territories;

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- o a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation to negotiate arrangements involving the powers of a transitional Palestinian authority on the West Bank and Gaza; PLO involvement will rule out any conference;
- o interlocked talks on interim arrangements and a date certain for talks on final status of the West Bank and Gaza indicating that transitional arrangements would not be substitute or means of delaying final status.
- -- Mubarak and Peres support the proposal; Saudi Arabia has been favorable; Hussein has not signed on because of pressure from PLO and Syria; Shamir has been cool to both procedural and substantive aspects; Assad negative; USSR states positive generalities but unwilling to be pinned down on specifics or to commit to specific positions unacceptable to Syria and PLO.

(Points to be made follow at next page.)

POINTS TO BE MADE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- -- WE REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AS EVIDENCED BY SECRETARY SHULTZ'S RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION.
- -- THE U.S. INITIATIVE REMAINS ON THE TABLE. IT IS A BALANCED AND INTEGRATED PACKAGE; THE ONLY PRACTICAL PLAN AVAILABLE; AND ADDRESSES THE KEY CONCERNS OF ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING PALESTINIANS AND SYRIA.
- -- INSISTENCE ON DIRECT PLO INVOLVEMENT IN A CONFERENCE WILL

 GUARANTEE THERE IS NO CONFERENCE. NO ISRAELIS WILL SIT WITH

 THE PLO BEFORE IT PROVES IN DEEDS, NOT SIMPLY WORDS, ITS

 COMMITMENT TO PEACE.
- -- WE RECOGNIZE THAT CREDIBLE PALESTINIANS MUST BE INVOLVED; WE SEE A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DELEGATION AS THE ANSWER.
- THE REGIONAL PARTIES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS,

 BUT WE CONTINUE TO FACE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS ON BOTH SUBSTANCE

 AND ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES, PRIMARILY WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO.

 THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE USSR WHICH IS UNWILLING TO BE PINNED

 DOWN OR TO TAKE A POSITION ON CRITICAL DETAILS OF

 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO.
- -- WE APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM OUR FRIENDS
 AND ALLIES. YOUR CONTINUED BACKING IS IMPORTANT TO KEEPING
 OUR EFFORTS AND THIS PROCESS ALIVE.
- -- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE HARD-LINE BY THE PLO AND SYRIA, ON THE ONE HAND, AND SHAMIR AND OTHER HARD-LINE ISRAELIS, ON THE

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AMERICAN NOCKHAŁ Walvers
BY AMNARADATE 3/14/2020

- OTHER, HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY EMOTIONS UNLEASHED BY THE PALESTINIAN UPRISINGS AND COMPLICATED BY THE PROSPECT OF ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS.
- -- NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO
 INITIATIVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN, INCLUDING
 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSUASION, TO MOVE THE PARTIES FORWARD
 AND AWAY FROM THE STATUS QUO THAT IS DANGEROUSLY
 UNACCEPTABLE.
- -- THIS IS NOT A PARTISAN ISSUE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THE NEXT

 ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN PRESSING

 FOR PEACE. WE MUST KEEP UP MOMENTUM AND NOT ALLOW DESPAIR

 AND RADICALISM TO TAKE OVER, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF NEW

 DANGERS FROM PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE AND CHEMICAL WARFARE.



BACKGROUND PAPER PERSIAN GULF

Your Objectives

- -- The fundamental goal is to end the Iran-Iraq war through diplomacy and contain Iranian aggression. The war and Khomeini's revolutionary Islam are major causes of instability in the region.
- The U.S. and our Allies have taken a series of military measures in the Persian Gulf to protect common interests, preserve freedom of navigation in international waters, and help prevent the spread of war or radical Islam to Arab Gulf states. We have also worked together for diplomatic action in UNSC.
- -- Essentially, there has been a successful multinational, effort in practice to contain Iranian aggressiveness while waiting for its revolutionary flame to die down and seeking means to end war.

Key Background Points

- -- Combination of military, security assistance and diplomatic activities by U.S. and allies has resulted in much more favorable and less dangerous situation in Gulf than last year at Venice Summit. Iranian aggression has been contained and Gulf Ambassadors have regained internal equilibrium and confidence in West.
- -- The U.S. is continuing major diplomatic efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq war in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 598. Cooperation of all governments represented here has been very important.
- -- The U.S. still believes that passage of a second resolution imposing an arms embargo against the belligerent that refuses to accept 598, i.e., Iran, is long overdue as best means unblocking diplomatic movement.
- -- The Soviet Union is resisting in order to protect its relations with Iran, however, and other Council members are reluctant to act without U.S.-Soviet agreement. This makes passage of such a measure unlikely in the foreseeable future.
- -- We support the UN Secretary General's efforts to determine if there is a way to bridge the gap between Iran and Iraq regarding implementation of 598. This requires that both

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sides be flexible, but Iraq will not move until Iran categorically and clearly accepts 598 and Iran will not do so.

- -- Military balance is shifting in favor of Iraq and Iran is having serious internal problems. However, revolutionary principle in Iran still strong.
- -- Proliferation and greater use of missiles and use of CW are result of war's long duration. Example spreading to other countries.

(Points to be made follow at next page.)

POINTS TO BE MADE PERSIAN GULF

- THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS A MAJOR CAUSE OF TENSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF. BRINGING AN END TO DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT WILL HELP TO RESTORE SECURITY AND STABILITY TO REGION. COOPERATION OF ALL GOVERNMENTS HERE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER HAS HELPED STABILIZE GULF. IT IS A MORE FAVORABLE SITUATION THAN ONE YEAR AGO: COMMON EFFORT HAS CONTAINED IRANIAN DANGER AND REASSURED GULF ARABS.
- -- INDIVIDUAL YET COOPERATIVE MILITARY MEASURES THAT MANY OF US

 ARE TAKING IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO PROTECT COMMON INTERESTS,

 PRESERVE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AND

 PREVENT THE WAR FROM EXPANDING HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.
- THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO A COMPREHENSIVE,

 NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF

 UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 AND APPRECIATES

 COOPERATION BY ALL GOVERNMENTS HERE.
- -- IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT 598 IS A MANDATORY
 RESOLUTION. IRAN, HOWEVER, HAS FLAUNTED THE WILL OF THE
 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BY REFUSING A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE OF
 598.
- THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT ADOPTION OF FOLLOW-ON MEASURES

 IMPOSING AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN FOR ITS REFUSAL TO

 ACCEPT 598 IS LONG OVERDUE AS THE BEST MEANS OF GETTING IT

 TO ACCEPT 598. THE PURPOSE OF AN ARMS EMBARGO RESOLUTION IS

 NOT TO PUNISH IRAN, BUT TO LIMIT ACCESS TO THE MATERIEL IT

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BY dr NIZABITE 3/14/2020

- NEEDS TO CONTINUE THE WAR. THIS MAY THEN LEAD TO A REASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN POLICY.
- -- UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO STALL. CHANCES
 FOR EARLY PASSAGE OF AN ARMS EMBARGO RESOLUTION ARE SLIM IN
 VIEW OF SOVIET OPPOSITION, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE
 OUICK UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.
- -- IN THE MEANTIME, WE SUPPORT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S

 ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ON 598

 THROUGH MEDIATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH BELLIGERENTS

 EXHIBIT FLEXIBILITY. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THIS POINT TO THE

 IRAQIS. HOWEVER, IRAQ WILL NOT AGREE UNLESS AND UNTIL IRAN

 CATEGORICALLY, AND CLEARLY, ACCEPTS AND AGREES TO IMPLEMENT

 598 WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THIS POSITION IS UNDERSCORED AS THE

 MILITARY BALANCE TILTS TOWARD IRAQ. IRAN, HOWEVER,

 CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO DO SO.
- THIS TWO-TRACK DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY STRATEGY CAN
 EVENTUALLY BRING A SETTLEMENT THAT PROMOTES COMMON
 INTERESTS, BUT STAYING POWER IS REQUIRED. IN THE INTERIM,
 WE MUST TALK TO BOTH SIDES -- AND WE TALK TO IRAN THROUGH
 SWISS AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS -- BUT SUSTAIN PRESSURE ON IRAN
 WHILE COUNSELING MODERATION BY IRAQ. NATIONAL MEASURES TO
 BLOCK ARMS FOR IRAN REMAIN VERY IMPORTANT, AS DOES PRESSURE
 ON OIL SALES.

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BACKGROUND PAPER CENTRAL AMERICA

Your Objectives

- -- Convince our Allies to support democratic forces in Central America, including the opposition in Nicaragua and the region's troubled democratic governments.
- -- Convince our Allies that since the USG no longer provides military aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance, the work of the last seven years is unraveling. We should work together to advance our common goal of peace and democracy in Central America.
- -- Convince our Allies of the need for them to bring pressure to bear on the Sandinistas to comply with the commitments to democracy in the Esquipulas and Sapoa agreements.
- -- Persuade our Allies to take a strong stand against further Soviet military support for the Sandinistas.

Key Background Points

- -- August 7 Guatemala Accord (Esquipulas II) established process to resolve conflict in Central America through national reconciliation and democratization.
- -- Presidents pledged simultaneous implementation of: democratization; amnesty; cease-fire; non-use of territory for attacks; and cessation of aid to irregular forces.
- In January, the presidents met to review progress. The democratic presidents criticized Nicaragua's lack of action; communique called for immediate compliance on democratization.
- -- Democratic presidents forced dismissal of pro-Sandinista verification commission (CIVS), placed verification under Executive Commission (EXCOM) of the 5 foreign ministers, with Canada, FRG, and Spain to help verify security points.
- -- Canada, FRG, and Spain are willing to help but intend to move with caution; they do not want to get out in front; verification process appears stalled.
- -- Sandinistas and Resistance began negotiating cease-fire in December 1987, concluded preliminary agreement March 23.

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Sapoa agreement sets a 60-day truce beginning April 1 to negotiate definitive cease-fire; provides for creation of cease-fire zones, delivery of humanitarian aid, freedom of expression, phased-in amnesty, and compliance with Esquipulas Accord's democratization provisions.

- -- Cardinal Obando y Bravo and OAS SYG Baena Soares named co-chairmen of verification commission.
- -- High-level political talks between Resistance and Sandinistas held April 15-18, April 28-30 and May 25-28 in Managua. No agreement reached on modus operandi of cease-fire, and Sandinista non-compliance on democratization.
- -- Sandinistas stonewalling: their negotiating position contravenes Sapoa agreement; their strategy is to stall to prevent delivery of supplies to Resistance forces inside Nicaragua, thus starving them out.
- -- In February, Congress voted down an aid package for the Resistance; a Democratic alternative defeated in March.
- -- In late March, Congress passed a \$48 million package.
 Resistance to receive \$17.7 million in humanitarian aid;
 balance for children victimized by conflict, verification
 commission, and AID administrative expenses.
- -- Humanitarian aid to Resistance in Honduras through AID program, monitored by Honduran church, began April 19 due to pressing need for food and essentials.
- -- In Panama, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), defied a February 25 order of dismissal by President Eric Arturo Delvalle prompted by Noriega's indictment on narcotics charges in U.S. courts February 4.
- -- The PDF-controlled National Assembly then voted to dismiss Delvalle from office. Delvalle rejected this removal as unconstitutional, went into hiding, and brought suits freezing Panama's funds in the U.S. The U.S. has instituted a panoply of sanctions against the Noriega regime.

(Points to be made follow at next page.)

POINTS TO BE MADE CENTRAL AMERICA

- -- WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ESQUIPULAS ACCORD AND THE SAPOA AGREEMENT, BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF THE SANDINISTAS' INTENTIONS.
- -- WE SUSPECT THE SANDINISTAS SEEK TO USE THE PEACE PROCESS TO
 NEUTRALIZE THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE AND GAIN INTERNATIONAL
 ACCEPTANCE WITHOUT TAKING MEANINGFUL STEPS TO DEMOCRATIZE.
- -- THE SANDINISTAS HAVE STALLED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SEEKING TO STARVE OUT THE RESISTANCE: WE CANNOT LET THIS HAPPEN.
- -- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SANDINISTAS THAT THEY MUST COMPLY FULLY WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE OAS AND UNDER THE ESQUIPULAS AND SAPOA ACCORDS.
- -- WHILE WE ARE ADJUSTING OUR STRATEGY TO THE CHANGING

 SITUATION, OUR OBJECTIVES -- PEACE AND DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT

 CENTRAL AMERICA -- REMAIN UNCHANGED. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT

 RESISTANCE EFFORTS TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO NICARAGUA.
- -- WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING NICARAGUA AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. WE WILL DO NOTHING THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE RESISTANCE.
- -- WE HAVE CALLED ON SOVIETS TO STOP SENDING ARMS TO NICARAGUA,
 AS WE HAVE DONE TO THE RESISTANCE. (THEY HAVE GIVEN
 NICARAGUA OVER \$200 MILLION IN ARMS SINCE ESQUIPULAS ACCORD
 WAS SIGNED IN AUGUST.) PRESIDENT ARIAS ALSO DID SO AND WAS
 REBUFFED.

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Authority WSC/State Walver
By de NURADATE 3/16/2020

PANAMA

- -- (IF RAISED) WE SUPPORT THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLES' DESIRES TO
 BRING ABOUT A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. GENERAL NORIEGA
 REMAINS THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO THIS, AND WE SUPPORT HIS
 DEPARTURE FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE. MY ADMINISTRATION WOULD
 THEN WORK WITH CONGRESS TO HELP REBUILD PANAMA'S ECONOMY.
- -- IN ANY CASE, WE ARE COMMITTED TO HONORING, AND UPHOLDING,
 OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY.

EL SALVADOR

- -- (IF RAISED) WE ARE COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAS INCLUDING EL SALVADOR WHERE PRESIDENT DUARTE HAS COURAGEOUSLY DEFENDED HIS COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION WHILE CULTIVATING THE SEEDS OF FREEDOM AND PLURALISM.
- -- WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT HIS EFFORTS IN BRINGING DEMOCRATIC
 RULE TO EL SALVADOR WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED FOR
 GENERATIONS TO COME, AND WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST THE
 SALVADORIAN PEOPLE.

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BACKGROUND PAPER SOUTH AFRICA

Your Objectives

- -- Reassure Allies of our continued opposition to punitive economic sanctions and explain the current emphasis in our South Africa policy on economic and other positive measures to prepare blacks for and hasten the end of apartheid.
- -- Seek to enlist greater Allied cooperation and participation in such positive measures and include a reference to this in the Summit communique.

Key Background Points

- -- Growing repression in South Africa is generating mounting pressure for stronger economic sanctions and further isolation of South Africa. No evidence existing sanctions have done any good. To the contrary, they have created sharp backlash.
- -- We believe only growing black economic power will hasten erosion of apartheid and that notwithstanding rhetoric, sanctions will hurt black, economic interests, erode South African government's receptivity to Western pressure, and facilitate government repression.
- -- To show that there is a positive alternative to sanctions, we are promoting economic assistance to disadvantaged South Africans, trying to focus international pressure against the continuing erosion of democratic norms, and stepping up information activity to counteract censorship in South Africa.
- -- In parallel, we are emphasizing assistance to the Front Line States.
- -- We are urging Allies to join us in coordinating aid and human rights efforts and to increase broadcasting to South Africa. This responds in part to the congressional mandate to multilateralize our efforts.

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WARNDATE 3/16/2002

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POINTS TO BE MADE SOUTH AFRICA

- THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

 REFORM IS MORIBUND AND REPRESSION -- SUCH AS THE BANNING OF NON-VIOLENT OPPOSITION GROUPS, ESCALATING CENSORSHIP,

 INTERFERENCE WITH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO BLACK ADVANCEMENT -- IS GROWING.
- -- IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE SANCTIONS HAS NOT ARRESTED THIS TREND
 AND MAY HAVE ACCELERATED IT. YET PRESSURE IS MOUNTING IN
 THE U.S. FOR MORE SANCTIONS.
- -- WE WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE NEW SANCTIONS, BUT ARE STEPPING

 UP POSITIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO HELP BLACKS ATTAIN THE

 ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL POWER THEY NEED TO ERODE APARTHEID

 AND LIBERATE THEMSELVES.
- -- THESE MEASURES INCLUDE LARGE NUMBERS OF SCHOLARSHIPS,

 ASSISTANCE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMOTING BLACK
 PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, AND SO ON.
- -- MORE WESTERN ATTENTION MUST BE FOCUSED ON THE EROSION OF
 DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND ON EFFORTS TO CRAFT DEMOCRATIC
 CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN DILEMMA.
- -- GROWING CENSORSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL OSTRACISM IS CUTTING
 SOUTH AFRICA OFF FROM THE WEST AND HASTENING EROSION OF
 DEMOCRATIC VALUES. TO REDUCE SUCH ISOLATION, WE ARE
 INTENSIFYING VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTING TO SOUTH AFRICA
 AND URGE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE.
- -- WE ARE ALSO MAINTAINING A HIGH LEVEL OF AID TO THE FRONT LINE STATES.

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- THE ALLIES SEEM TO AGREE IN GENERAL ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
 POSITIVE MEASURES. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO CONSULT
 REGULARLY AND TO ALIGN OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.
- -- THIS SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION.

BACKGROUND PAPER ASIA

CAMBODIA

- -- Diplomatic activity increasing. Soviets have expressed renewed interest and drawn parallels to Afghanistan. Vietnam stressing plans for withdrawals, but continues to seek legitimacy for the weak Ummer government Vietnam supports.
- Sihanouk best hopes for leadership of independent Cambodia. Vietnam refuses to meet with him. His non-communist faction has showed improved strength.
- -- ASEAN Active: regional meeting, including Vietnamese, likely for late July in Jakarta. Thailand/Singapore seek to exploit Soviet interest, push Vietnam/Sihanouk meeting.

KOREA

- -- Seoul hosts 1988 Summer Olympics beginning September 17.
 One hundred sixty one nations will participate. Symbolize coming of age for Korea.
- -- Domestic political atmosphere contentious but stable.
- -- Prospects for North Korean Olympic participation are dim. Prompting by North Korea of trouble during Olympics unlikely, but concern for pre-Olympic terrorism or incidents.

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POINTS TO BE MADE

CAMBODIA

-- (IF RAISED) WE SHARE YOUR CONCERNS FOR THE CONTINUED

SUFFERING OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. THAT WAR HAS GONE ON FOR

FAR TOO LONG; THE KEY TO RESOLUTION LIES IN COMPLETE

VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL. A VIETNAMESE MEETING WITH

PRINCE SIHANOUK COULD BE AN OPENING TOWARD A POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT.

KOREA

-- (IF RAISED) KOREA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT HAS
BEEN REMARKABLE. THE OLYMPICS THIS SEPTEMBER WILL CELEBRATE
THIS PROGRESS. YET WE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE THREAT OF
DISRUPTION FROM NORTH KOREA OR OF TERRORISM. PREPARATIONS
BY KOREA HAVE BEEN THOROUGH, AND MANY OF US HAVE COOPERATED
CLOSELY. WE HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPICS.

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