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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**File Folder** FO006-06 (150193) (1 OF 5)

**FOIA**  
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
244104	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #104984; ALLEN WALLIS THRU WILLIAM CLARK, MICHAEL DEAVER TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT: GUIDANCE FOR THE MARCH 16-18 PREPARATORY MEETING	2	3/7/1983	B1
244105	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #104985; WILIAMSBUURG SUMMIT	11	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. F.

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FG006-07

June 14, 1983

Memo for the Record

notebook filed by office  
of Policy Development  
"Summit Prep. Book"  
Williamsburg Summit

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Enclosures filed in  
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June 17, 1983

Memo For the Record

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of Policy Development  
"Summit Prep. Book"  
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SUMMIT

PREP,

BOOK

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## INTEGRATED SUMMARY OUTLINE

I. Summary Statement of Themes - Reinforce fundamental interrelationships in world economy to ensure non-inflationary, lasting growth for both developed and developing countries. Nurture recovery without reigniting inflation; recognize role of open trade and financial markets in spreading recovery; reverse protectionism and provide adequate liquidity to sustain trade of developing countries; pursue long-term strategy of enhanced trade, aid and domestic development to manage debt problem and promote prosperity in developing world; and affirm relationship between economic strength, East-West economic relations and Western security.

### II. Objectives

- A. Achieve sustained non-inflationary growth of income and employment.
- B. Convey a realistic message of confidence in our economic capabilities and prospects.
- C. Inform the public and the wider international community of our policy priorities.
- D. Promote greater openness of trade and financial systems.
- E. Assure ability of financial system to manage current debt problems.
- F. Provide better coordination of trade and financial policies.
- G. Improve economic integration between developed and developing countries.
- H. Promote LDC development in the context of sound and sustainable growth; and
- I. Satisfy LDC needs for availability of financing and access to markets in a balanced manner.

### III. Assessment of Progress and Priorities

- A. Recovery now underway in many countries; need to promote and sustain this recovery in all countries without reigniting inflation, best chance to reduce unacceptably high unemployment on durable basis.

- B. Major successes in bringing down inflation; need for further progress, continued resolve to control inflation.
- C. Considerable reduction in interest rates; need for further lasting reductions.
- D. Fall in oil prices aids recovery, but calls for continued vigilance on energy front.
- E. Need for greater discipline over government expenditures, reduction of structural budget deficits.
- F. Need for increased private savings, investment, and technological efforts in medium-term to provide underpinnings for sustained growth.
- G. Improving productivity performance after long period of trend deterioration; need for continued efforts to enhance productivity and efficiency.
- H. Tendency toward greater exchange market stability in recent months, easing of tensions; need for continued efforts to promote greater exchange market stability.
- I. Risks posed by international debt problems and protectionist pressures; successful management of debt crises in recent months; confidence in close consultation to implement existing strategy, but major progress needed in restraining protectionism.

IV. Identification of Linkages

- A. Between open multilateral trading system and sustainable non-inflationary economic growth.
- B. Between convergence of domestic policies toward low inflation and exchange rate stability.
- C. Between openness of markets and solution of debt problems, including link between ability to export and ability to service debt.
- D. Between availability of financing and success of economic adjustment in LDCs, including ability to maintain essential imports; and

- E. Between growth in developed countries and growth in developing countries.
- F. Between economic strength and Western security.

V. Recommendations for Consideration at Summit

- A. Statement of confidence.
  - 1. Note substantial progress.
  - 2. Express resolve to reduce unemployment on a lasting basis.
  - 3. Describe sound reasons for optimism over prospects for emerging recovery.
  - 4. Economic environment, major structural adjustments and policy realignments over past few years have tested governments and citizens to a greater degree than at any other time in recent decades; recovery showing strength and resilience of market economies to meet severe challenges and overcome them.
- B. Endorse conclusions of OECD Council at Ministerial level (as warranted).
- C. Economic convergence and multilateral surveillance.
  - 1. Welcome steps taken in past year to implement agreement at Versailles Summit, in "multilateral surveillance" process with IMF Managing Director.
  - 2. Maintain emphasis on medium-term perspective to reassure markets and serve as guide for shorter-term policy actions.
  - 3. Reaffirm necessity of convergence toward sustainable non-inflationary growth as pre-condition for greater exchange market stability.
  - 4. Encourage Finance Ministers in countries concerned to develop further the multilateral surveillance process, to make it a more effective vehicle for economic consultation and cooperation to promote economic convergence and exchange market stability.

- D. Consider endorsing following as elements of short-term strategy for international economic problems.
1. Noting that, with prospects for sustained, non-inflationary recovery improved, and in context of actions outlined above on economic policy cooperation, time is right to reverse recent trends toward restricting market access and to increase our openness to trade in order to ease adjustment in some countries and to reinforce momentum toward growth in all countries.
  2. Work in appropriate multilateral and bilateral ways to resolve current problems, including trade in agricultural products, a new safeguard system and conflicts of jurisdiction.
  3. Endorse IMF quota increase and urge speedy ratification by legislatures.
  4. Reject major reform or "master plan" for debt restructuring; confirm agreement on strategy. Proposed elements:
    - (a) Effective adjustment in borrowing countries; importance of avoiding new trade barriers;
    - (b) Availability of financing from official resources (IMF, multilateral lending, including IDA; structural adjustment; bilateral aid programs);
    - (c) Availability of short-term bridge financing from official creditors (governments and central banks);
    - (d) Important role of commercial bank lending, export credit programs; and
    - (e) Need for sustained, non-inflationary recovery in developed countries.
- E. Consider endorsing following as elements of long-term strategy, with work to begin now in preparing the way to implementation:

1. Examine ways to increase trade between developed and developing countries, especially by improving access in both markets to each others goods and services as one essential element of a long-term solution to the international debt problem and as an essential component of the development process.
  2. Give political-level impetus to GATT work program, including studies of trade in high technology products and trade in services.
  3. Examine measures to maintain an adequate flow of concessional assistance to developing countries, with particular emphasis on the resources of IDA and other development banks and the least developed countries.
- F. Recall that previous Summits, including Cancun, have stressed the importance in the development process of such measures as increasing food and energy production, etc. Reaffirm importance we attach to those conclusions.
- G. Welcome openness to dialogue expressed in New Delhi and Buenos Aires communique; reaffirm importance we attach to political stability and economic progress in developing countries and to above strategy as reinforcing interdependence between developed and developing countries and the promotion of genuine independence in developing world, with special focus on strengthening roles of LDC moderates.
- H. Signal hope for constructive UNCTAD VI Conference and for growing practical cooperation with LDCs in specialized institutions.
- I. Ask our governments, particularly our Trade and Finance Ministers, to meet on an ad hoc basis, also with other countries including LDCs, to examine proposals to deal with the relationships between growth, trade and financial policies, to improve the international trade and financial system, to encourage better working relationships among trade and financial institutions, and to convene more frequent GATT Ministerials.
- J. Drawing from principles governing our approach to East-West economic relations and the results of the work going forward in COCOM, IEA and OECD, discuss issues as appropriate and agree on appropriate tasks for the future.



Background on  
Economic Policies and Prospects  
of Other Summit Countries

Setting:

- Prospects for world economic recovery have strengthened in the last few months. Real growth in the industrial countries is likely to be around 2 1/2 percent in 1983 after zero in 1982. Several factors have contributed to a more favorable outlook.
  - o U.S. recovery is recognized as underway, and U.S. real growth is likely to be stronger than in the budget scenario.
  - o Oil price declines and the U.S. turnaround have bolstered consumer/investor confidence and growth prospects.
  - o Inflation expectations are easing in most countries and interest rates have fallen.
  
- By the time of the Summit in late May, differences in policies, performance and prospects among participants will be in sharp focus. Two distinct groups have emerged since 1981 Ottawa Summit in terms of policy and performance.
  - (1) The U.K., Germany and Japan -- with varying emphasis -- have generally stuck to policies of fighting inflation, deregulating economies, decreasing structural budget deficits, controlling monetary growth. All have achieved big declines in inflation, setting the stage for sustainable, non-inflationary recovery.
  - (2) France, Italy and -- until around the middle of last year -- Canada have, by and large, put emphasis on direct government programs to bolster employment, support social objectives, and resist economic adjustment to market realities. The result has been high inflation rates, large government roles in the economy and rising subsidies to inefficient sectors, contributing to growing budget deficits. The effort to maintain these policy approaches in the face of disinflationary trends in other countries has put their payments balances and exchange rates under pressure.

- Recent German and French elections point to divergences. Chancellor Kohl returned to power. Vote of strong confidence in conservative economic program. Likely to continue budget restraint; resist pressures for reflation. On other hand, President Mitterrand lost support in recent election; dissatisfaction with socialist/nationalization program. Pressure on franc intensified. Mitterrand devalued and reorganized cabinet; new policies to be announced shortly (hopefully to restrain inflation).

quick  
 as recs  
 to hold  
 next gov  
 borrow  
 next yr  
 below 8%  
 level of  
 ~40b

Prospects:

- For those countries which have succeeded in reducing inflation, the outlook is for solid recovery in 1983, strengthening during the year; continued low inflation; and small reductions in unemployment rates this year, with larger reductions coming in 1984.
  - o UK: Mrs. Thatcher's policies are bearing fruit. 1983 will be the second year of positive real GNP growth (perhaps 2 to 2 1/2 percent year over year), despite oil price declines. But lost revenues have reduced trade and current account surpluses. Could be rough balance in 1983. Reduction of the budget deficit as a percent of GNP continues. Inflation remains low. Unemployment at 12.9 percent -- 3 years of increases. Likely peak in 1983.
  - o Japan: Continued expansion is in prospect. Growth should pick up during 1983 (to 4 percent year over year) remaining the highest in Summit group. Japan will be among the largest gainers from the oil price declines. Trade and current accounts in sizeable surplus; still growing. Unemployment rate (2.7 percent) is at postwar record, but should ease this year.
  - o Germany: Recovery should finally begin around mid-year, with growth about 1/2 percent year over year versus a 1 percent decline in 1982. Investor/consumer confidence is now building; inflation continues to ease; and the external balance is getting stronger. Historically high 9 percent unemployment rate; should peak in late 1983. Trade and current account surplus rising.
- For those which have been relatively unsuccessful in reducing inflation, the outlook is less optimistic:

only  
 42%  
 in  
 82



- o Canada: May be moving out of this group. Inflation has recently improved to single digits. The growth outlook, assuming strong U.S. recovery, is good following very severe recession in 1982. Unemployment at record 12.5 percent. No reduction expected in 1983. Trade and current accounts reflecting deep recession were in record surplus in 1982. Some weakening expected. Investment-discouraging policies are being put on the back burner. Prime Minister Trudeau admits that past policies were inflationary, but there is a risk that inflation may revive, and anti-market policies resume, as the 1984 election nears.
  
- o Italy: Inflation remains in double digits (15 percent) though down from earlier peaks. Budget expenditures are virtually out of control, and monetary policy is being forced to accommodate huge budget deficits. The Government has been unable to put together a coherent program. Unemployment at 9.2 percent and rising. Trade and current account deficits narrowed in 1982; should be smaller again in 1983.
  
- o France: After the first year of wildly inflationary policies, making effort with marginal success to cut back. Nationalistic/socialistic policies run strongly counter to market forces, leading to pressures for subsidies, protectionist policies. Serious exchange rate problems continue (the French have spent enormous amounts to try to support the franc in the face of strong exchange market pressures). This week's EMS realignment -- franc devaluation -- should temporarily ease pressures. Major policy shifts are anticipated. If these fail to stick, as in the past, further weakening of the franc is inevitable.

Potential Differences at Summit:

The differences in performance and prospects outlined above point to potential differences at the Summit in areas of macroeconomic policy, exchange rates, both focusing on French.

Growth policies - President Mitterrand has failed to generate sustainable growth and has little political room in his traditional constituency to impose further austerity and lower inflation. He blames French problems on others -- especially U.S.-- and would like to see additional expansion undertaken by U.S., Germany and Japan through stimulatory policies so as to ease severe unemployment problems by increasing French exports. The French claim U.S. interest rates are too high (monetary policy too tight) and a root cause of French problems.

Exchange rates - The French are leading calls for greater governmental intervention in exchange markets. The Government is under attack. Exchange market pressure on the franc is a vote of "no confidence" by international community and hurts Mitterrand's domestic image. He may argue for U.S. intervention in market to hold the dollar down (i.e., help hold the franc up).

Attitudes of Others:

By the time of the Summit, the Germans and Japanese should feel much more confident about the economic outlook. Neither is willing to risk a shift to expansionary policies. On the whole, the improving economic climate is likely to promote greater consistency of views among Germany, Japan, the U.K. and U.S. on the major economic policy issues.



## Background on Multilateral Surveillance

### "The Search for Discipline"

#### Historical Perspective

° The post-World War II fixed exchange rate system established under the Bretton Woods Agreement was preceded intermittently in the late 1800's and early 1900's by the classical gold standard. The gold standard system exerted strong discipline over national economic policies, because a country's money supply was directly linked to changes in the gold stock brought about by trade or current account imbalances. If a country's balance of payments was in deficit, an outflow of gold occurred, the money supply then declined; growth and inflation slowed until balance in external accounts was restored. It broke down because it ultimately required either deflation or inflation on a scale that national authorities would not tolerate.

° The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (par values) was not as binding; it assumed basic stability in world economic conditions; looked to countries to adjust domestic policies as needed to maintain exchange rate stability; and provided for exchange rate changes only in instances of "fundamental disequilibrium."

° Par values were defined in terms of gold. The U.S. undertook buy and sell gold freely at the par value for the dollar, and other currencies maintained their par values by buying and selling U.S. dollars. In this way, the whole system was linked to gold.

° The system worked well in the early postwar decades, which were characterized by dominance of the U.S. economy and by general price stability in the United States and most other major countries. Exchange rate changes were frequent, but tended to be isolated to one country at a time.

° The system began to come under increasing strain in the latter 1960s.

- The rigidity of exchange rates tended to delay or prevent changes needed to reflect evolution of countries' relative economic positions.
- The resurgence of inflationary pressures, particularly in the United States, undermined the U.S. competitive position and led to increasing divergences of economic performance among the major nations.
- These factors led to increasing world payments imbalances, pressures on the dollar, and ultimately to collapse of the fixed rate system.

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- The U.S. ended convertibility into gold in August 1971, and initiated negotiations on major realignments of exchange rates. After two major realignments in 1971, and early 1973, the new structure of exchange rates came under attack and could not be sustained. The period of generalized floating began in March 1973.
- Discussions were continued during this period on the reforms of the international monetary system, focusing on reestablishment of some kind of fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate system.
- Following the oil shock of late 1973/early 1974, which abruptly caused massive balance of payments deficits for oil importing countries, it was agreed to abandon efforts to reestablish a fixed rate system. This was motivated in part by recognition that efforts to maintain fixed rates in the face of the huge oil deficits would likely lead to an increasing spiral of protectionist steps and harsh domestic economic measures, as each country tried to improve its trade and balance of payments position -- and thus "protect" its exchange rate -- at the expense of others.
- Subsequent discussions of the international monetary system focused on the operation of a flexible rate system, and culminated at the first Economic Summit in Rambouillet, France in 1975.

° The Rambouillet Summit understandings, later incorporated in amended IMF Articles of Agreement, reaffirmed the desirability of exchange rate stability, but recognized explicitly that the achievement of exchange rate stability depends on development of orderly underlying economic and financial conditions in the major nations.

° In essence:

- The Bretton Woods system had attempted to exert discipline over national economic policy through the mechanism of fixed exchange rates, but had failed -- both to foster orderly economic conditions and to provide needed scope for change in response to evolution of world economic conditions.
- The Rambouillet Summit and subsequent amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement retained the strong emphasis on discipline, but placed responsibility directly on national economic policy-makers and gave the IMF new authority -- called "surveillance" -- to oversee the operations of the international monetary system and the compliance of its member countries with their undertakings to achieve orderly growth with reasonable price stability and to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions.

The Versailles Summit

° The IMF's surveillance provisions have developed only gradually. In the period leading up to the Versailles Summit, some countries, notably France, advocated increased governmental intervention in exchange markets as a route to greater exchange rate stability. The United States, convinced that large-scale governmental intervention in markets is neither desirable nor an effective substitute for proper economic policy:

- proposed a study of the impact of past exchange market intervention; and
- proposed a major strengthening of "surveillance," with the objective of fostering better convergence of economic performance among the major countries and thus providing the underlying basis for greater exchange market stability.

° In an annex to the Versailles Communique ("Statement on International Monetary Undertakings"), the Summit countries accepted joint responsibility to achieve stability in the international monetary system through better convergence of policies aimed at producing lower inflation, economic recovery and higher employment; and agreed to strengthen surveillance of economic policies.

- The IMF's existing surveillance of countries' policies, performance and prospects tended to look at each country in isolation from others. One aim of the Summit agreement was to broaden the procedure to review a group of important countries simultaneously (multilateral surveillance)
  - to compare and contrast their policies, performance and prospects; to identify which countries are moving in the "right" direction; and to determine which are "out of line" and hence likely to be subject to pressure in the exchange markets.
- The group agreed to cooperate with the IMF, with multilateral surveillance focused primarily on the five major countries (the G-5 -- the U.S., Germany, Japan, France and the U.K.) -- in the expectation that intensified international consultations on, and examination of, policies and performance would encourage better convergence of economic conditions and thereby greater international monetary stability.

° The first meeting of G-5 finance ministers and central bank governors for this purpose was held in September 1982. IMF Managing Director de Larosiere (in his private capacity) prepared a discussion paper and participated in the exchange, giving his assessment of major policy changes needed in various countries to improve convergence.

- Talks were frank. Pointed up policy and performance differences. Showed France as being "out of line" in medium-term policy stance and economic performance. Suggested exchange rate pressure would continue.

- Urged all but U.K. to reduce budget deficits, and all to stick to anti-inflation thrust in policies.
- ° A second meeting is scheduled for late April. We expect talks to focus on policy differences and their near-term implications; exchange rate pressures stemming from relatively poor performance in some countries; and need for "out of line" countries to move toward others in both policies and performance. Greater stability for their currencies is to be achieved.

Summit at Williamsburg

° We remain convinced that the lasting way to achieve greater stability in exchange rates is to move toward better convergence of economic conditions among the major economies. (This is an essential conclusion of the intervention study referred to above, though the Summit countries have varying views on the utility and desirability of shorter-term intervention. This will be the subject of a later briefing.)

° We want the Summit to reaffirm and strengthen multilateral surveillance. Specifically, we are working toward:

- reaffirmation of the objectives of the surveillance effort;
- elaboration of policy goals by the major countries;
- definition by each country of the policy approaches it intends to follow to achieve its goals; and
- establishment of agreed criteria for assessing progress.

° This approach confirms the need for discipline and underlying stability and exerts that discipline by forcing key policy-makers to specify goals and policies; to collectively consider their policy effects, including exchange rate effects; and to assess their results.

° Such an agreement at the Williamsburg Summit would represent a concrete and useful initiative in the economic policy area.

° A more upbeat economic setting at time of May Summit will also provide the opportunity to highlight the success of anti-inflation policies: a number of the Summit countries have reduced inflation substantially; recovery is already under way; conditions have been established for sustained, noninflationary growth.

- With inflation under better control in these countries, it is logical to shift emphasis to sustaining growth; reaping employment gains; expecting more stable international monetary conditions.

° Those that have succeeded in reducing inflation and building recovery can expect more stability for their currencies; exchange rate pressures will remain for those that don't get inflation under control.

Why Strengthen Surveillance?

1. In general, the countries with relatively poor performance, particularly France, have called for systematic intervention in foreign exchange markets to stabilize exchange rates. With policies and performance out of step with others, they face exchange market pressures on their currencies and want to try to force exchange rate stability through such government intervention.

2. The recent realignment of the European Monetary System -- preceded by massive speculation, official intervention, and market disruption -- is strong evidence of the futility of intervention and of the inability of the exchange rate system to impose discipline and order.

3. Attempts to broaden the EMS-type experience, to try to deal with basic problems through market intervention, must be resisted. The debate needs to be shifted to fundamental policy approaches and problems -- including exchange market problems -- resulting from differences in approach. (Our resistance to solving exchange market problems through intervention does not apply to our commitment to intervene if necessary to counter serious episodes of exchange market disorder in fulfillment of our IMF Article IV obligations.)

4. Strengthening "surveillance" provides a desirable alternative to expensive -- and ultimately fruitless -- exchange market intervention. The only way to obtain meaningful and lasting exchange market stability is through convergence of policies and performance, and that is where the focus of our efforts should be.





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
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
THE SENIOR WHITE HOUSE GROUP  
FOR THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT PREPARATIONS

SUBJECT: Senior White House Group Meeting for the  
Williamsburg Summit Preparations --  
March 11, 1983 -- 9:30 a.m.; Roosevelt Room

The Summit White House Group established by NSDD-60 will meet on Friday, March 11, 1983, in the Roosevelt Room at 9:30 A.M., to review the preparations for the Williamsburg Summit. The agenda and background papers for the meeting are attached.

  
William P. Clark  
Co-Chairman  
Senior White House Group

Michael K. Deaver  
Co-Chairman  
Senior White House Group

Attachments

Tab A - Agenda  
Tab B - Wallis Memo to the President w/Attachments  
Tab C - Summit Schedule

cc: George Shultz  
Donald Regan  
William Brock  
Edwin Meese  
James Baker  
Robert McFarlane  
Richard Darman  
Craig Fuller  
Allen Wallis  
Michael McManus  
Beryl Sprinkel  
✓ Henry Nau

## SUMMIT WHITE HOUSE GROUP

March 11, 1983

AGENDA

1. Preparations for San Diego Meeting  
March 16-18 Wallis
2. Memo to the President on Williamsburg  
Summit Strategy (Tab A)
  - A. Jobs and Growth Sprinkel
  - B. East-West Economic Issues Wallis
3. Final Joint Press Statement by Heads of  
Government or State, and Recommendations  
Developed by Ministers Wallis
4. Summit Schedule and Administration  
(Tab B) McManus
  - A. Heads Only Meetings (President's  
Summaries)
  - B. Participants in Other Meetings
  - C. Status of Advance Team Visits
5. Bilaterals Before the Summit Nau
6. Press McManus
7. Meeting with the President on March 14  
and Future Meetings McManus



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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS  
RELATED TO WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT

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(All meetings would be for approximately  
thirty minutes, except as noted)

March 14            President Meets with U.S. Sherpa Team

April 8 a.m.        President Meets with U.S. Sherpa Team

April 15            President Meets with Principal Foreign  
Personal Representatives

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During period

April 17-  
30                    Possible Visit of German Chancellor  
(Regular Official Visit)

Possible Visit of Australian PM

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May 13 a.m.        President Meets with U.S. Sherpa Team

May 19              Final Briefing Papers Due at the  
White House

May 23-  
24                    Briefings for the President (for  
such time as President wishes)

May 25-  
27                    Bilateral Meetings in Washington  
(Thatcher, maybe others)

May 28-  
30                    Williamsburg Summit

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT OF INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS  
MAY 28 - 31, 1983

Saturday, May 28, 1983

- 1:00-4:05 pm Heads of Delegations and Official Delegations arrive at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia
- 1:20-4:25 pm Heads of Delegations and Official Delegations arrive at Market Square, Williamsburg, Virginia. Heads of Delegations ride in carriage to Governor's Palace
- 1:25-4:30 pm Heads of Delegations arrival ceremony at Governor's Palace
- 7:00-10:00 pm Carter's Grove Reception and Dinner

Sunday, May 29, 1983

- 9:00-10:00 am Heads of Delegations, Foreign Ministers and Personal Representatives attend respective meetings at The Capitol
- 10:15-11:30 am Heads of Delegations and Finance Ministers attend joint meeting at Williamsburg Inn
- 12:00-1:00 pm Heads of Delegations, Ministers and Personal Representatives lunch at Colonial Williamsburg taverns
- 1:15-2:00 pm Heads of Delegations, Finance Ministers and Personal Representatives attend respective meetings at The Capitol
- 2:15-3:30 pm Heads of Delegations and Foreign Ministers attend joint meeting at Williamsburg Inn
- 7:30-10:00 pm Governor's Palace reception and dinner



Monday, May 30, 1983

9:00-12:00 pm Heads of Delegations and Visiting  
Delegates attend Plenary Session at  
Williamsburg Inn

Heads of Delegations luncheon

Heads of Delegations Joint Statement

7:00-10:30 pm State Dinner at Williamsburg Inn

Tuesday, May 31, 1983

9:00-12:00 pm Heads of Delegations and Official  
Delegations departure ceremony in  
Williamsburg Inn lobby

9:30-12:30 pm Heads of Delegations and Official  
Delegations departure ceremony at Langley  
Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia