WHORM Subject File Code: FO006-06
(Economic Summit, Williamsburg, Virginia,
05/29/1983-05/30/1983)
Case file Number(s): 115000-127999

115091

ID # ______________

FG006-06

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING

☐ H - INTERNAL

☑ I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 82/12/15

Name of Correspondent: Paul Trible

☐ **MI Mail Report** **User Codes:** (A) ______ (B) ______ (C) ______

Subject: writes on behalf of the Association for Retarded Citizens in Williamsburg, VA, regarding their Antique Show and sale on 20-22 May 1983. They have been asked to change their date due to the White House Economic Summit in Williamsburg on 28-30 May 1983. Requests assistance re same.

ROUTE TO: Office/Agency (Staff Name)	ACTION: Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION: Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LADuke	ORIGINATOR	82/12/16	KD	A	82/12/28
	Referral Note:				
Presidential Advance	R	82/12/30			/ /
	Referral Note: ATTN: William Henkel				
		/ /			/ /
	Referral Note:				
		/ /			/ /
	Referral Note:				
		/ /			/ /
	Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: ______________

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

December 28, 1982

Dear Paul:

Thank you for your letter of December 8 outlining the problems facing the Association for Retarded Citizens for the Greater Williamsburg Area with respect to their plans for holding an antiques show and sale in May. In your letter you indicated that the Association had been requested to alter their plans in order to accommodate the Economic Summit Meeting.

I appreciate your interest in contacting us in this matter. In order to ensure that these concerns are afforded prompt and careful consideration, I have taken the liberty of bringing your letter to the attention of the appropriate advisory staff members. You should be hearing further as additional information becomes available.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Paul Trible
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

KMD:CMP:KRJ:rs--

cc: w/copy of inc to Bill Henkel - for DIRECT response

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL

5

PAUL TRIBLE
1st District, Virginia

KD

Committees:
Armed Services
Budget

326 Cannon Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4261

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

District Offices:
Executive Tower
Box 59
2101 Executive Drive
Hampton, Virginia 23666
(804) 838-3287

P.O. Box 1183
Tappahannock, Virginia 22560
(804) 443-4740

P.O. Box 188
Tasley, Virginia 23441
(804) 787-7836

December 8, 1982

115091

Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Duberstein:

I am writing in behalf of the Association for Retarded Citizens for the Greater Williamsburg Area in Williamsburg, Virginia. This very worthwhile organization has one major fund raising project each year which provides approximately 70 per cent of its yearly budget. This fund raising event is the sponsorship of an antiques show and sale in William and Mary Hall on the campus of The College of William and Mary.

A problem has arisen with the next antiques show which is scheduled for May 20-22, 1983. This is one week prior to the White House planned Economic Summit meeting in Williamsburg, May 28-30, 1983. Although the Association for Retarded Citizens had reserved William and Mary Hall as early as May, 1982, they have been asked to move the date or location of their antiques show so that preparations can be made to use William and Mary Hall for press coverage of the Economic Summit Meeting.

While I realize that the Summit is of major international importance, it would appear that preparations could be made without placing an undue hardship on the Association for Retarded Citizens. This group has strong community backing and has worked hard for the past five years to make the antiques show grow into a profit-making project which allows them to serve the needs of the retarded citizens. To move the date would be most detrimental since that involves the schedules of over 75 antiques dealers from many of the east coast states who have already signed contracts to do this show. Moreover, there is no other adequate space in Williamsburg to house a show of this magnitude. The show has become so popular that visitors to Williamsburg have actually planned their vacations and made reservations to coincide with the event.

It would appear that holding an antiques show in one portion of one building one week prior to the Economic Summit Meeting would pose no security problems and not seriously hamper preparations for the meeting. I am sure you would agree that raising unnecessary community resentment over this situation is undesirable.

I would appreciate any assistance you can offer in satisfactorily resolving this problem for the Association for Retarded Citizens. Thank you very much for your help.

Sincerely,

Paul

Paul Trible

PST:dsj

Tower Box 59
2101 Executive Drive
Hampton, Virginia 23666

DOCUMENT NO. 118156 PD

F0006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Already sent

DATE: 3/14/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐		TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☐	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
DENEND	☐	☐		☐	☐
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐		☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐		☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐		☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☐		☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐		☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐		☐	☐
LI	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐		☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐		☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐		☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: ED HARPER EH/84

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit

- Logistics in good shape
- Substance has problems
- Sherpa meeting today at 3 p.m. and discussion with President on Monday

Historic Perception

Economic and Foreign Policy will be the back dogs as opposed to problems and promises at prior meetings.

Theme

- Informal business like working summit.
- Thus no spectacles ... low profile.
- Holistic approach.
- Jobs and Growth.
- East - West relations.

Sherpa Meetings 16th - 18th of March in San Diego

- January 28th, letter from the President to other participants urging focus on 1) Economic Policy, 2) Economic Institutions, and 3) East - West relations.
- A. Wallis has lead.
- No pre-negotiated communique.
- Heads alone one third to one half of time.

Action Possibilities

- Finance and Trade Ministers meet regularly as multilateral task initiative - wise man's group may lead.

- Department strategy: support IMF, encourage reform by debtors, economic expansion.

Prenegotiated Papers and Activities

- Papers prepared by Ministers for their principals.

- If principals agree to reconsideration in the papers, then these can be put out as Summit products.

Logistics

- Plan: No note takers or interpreters in the Principals - only sessions. Use TV/audio book-ups.

The type of issues which the President needs to be briefed on:

- International Debt

- GATT: International Banking System Forbes articles

* one half hour every Friday to brief the President

Press

- 6,000 press people are expected to cover the Summit.

Bilaterals

- Trudeau in April early.

- Kohl in late April.

- Other proposals expected for late May.

- Thatcher: last week before Williamsburg.

DOCUMENT NO. 118175 PD

F0006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT FG

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/14/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

	ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	X
BARR	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☐
BOGGS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐
DENEND	☐	☐
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐
LI	☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐

	ACTION	FYI
DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
TURNER	☐	☐
D. LEONARD	☐	☐
OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
HOPKINS	☐	☐
PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
OTHER		
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REMARKS:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

Domestic Issues

Interest Rates
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy

International Policies

Debt
Export Subsidies
Protectionism
East-West Trade
North-South Relationships
Exchange Rate Coordination

RO

DOCUMENT NO. 118175 PD

F0006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/14/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	X	TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☐	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
DENEND	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
LI	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐	______	☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐	______	☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
(x6515)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: Various Summit Topics

Domestic Issues

Interest Rates
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy

International Policies

Debt
Export Subsidies
Protectionism
East-West Trade
North-South Relationships
Exchange Rate Coordination

DOCUMENT NO. 118389 PD

F0006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

FG
PU
IT012
CM008

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Weinfast

DATE: 3/16/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: OPEN

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Issue Papers

2 articles attached "a carrousel from Gatt" from Financial Times and article "How to Raise Steel Costs"

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☒	☐	TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☐	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
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FAIRBANKS	☐	☐		☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐		☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐		☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☒		☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☒		☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐		☐	☐
LI	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐		☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐		☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐		☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development

FINANCIAL TIMES
BRACKEN HOUSE, CANNON STREET, LONDON EC4P 4BY
Telegrams: Finantimo, London PS4. Telex: 8954871
Telephone: 01-248 8000

Friday March 11 1983

A corrective from Gatt

THE GATT secretariat's first retrospective glance at 1982, a year in which world trade volume declined by an estimated 2 per cent, could hardly have been expected to be cheerful. But its gloomy prognosis for the impending economic recovery is quite another matter.

The secretariat has genuine doubts about how far the monetary stimulus that began last summer will be translated into output rather than prices. It also makes an implicit assertion that the building blocks for sustained non-inflationary recovery in output and employment are far from being in place.

Seen from Geneva, the signs of an upturn in the construction and consumer sectors look real enough. The Gatt economists also draw some comfort from the recent change in the relationship between real wages and real interest rates: the disappearance of negative rates should help whittle down the existing bias in favour of labour-saving investment.

Their worry is rather that the focus of policy is both too short-term, and too heavily weighted towards macro-economic stimulus, to make the best of the opportunity which this cyclical upturn presents.

Backlog

In a thinly veiled critique of recent American and British policy the secretariat argues that both demand management and monetarist policies have been a soft option for politicians; they appear to remove the obligation to confront the special interest groups that put a brake on micro-economic change. The outcome is that relative prices have become less flexible, market signals are weak or unintelligible and investment, both in plant and machinery and in labour skills, fails to respond adequately to changes in demand.

The result of these distortions is that a backlog of structural adjustment has built up. Attempts to escape from recession via expansionary policies have thus increased inflation as recovery has run into supply [illegible] and excessive policies, without accompanying micro-economic reform to loosen the price structure, have curbed inflation at a high cost in unemployment and lost output.

As for the debt crisis, the worry is that too much emphasis is being placed on increasing debt servicing capacity by reducing the level of demand—a policy that will be counter-productive for both debtor and creditor in the longer run. Few are prepared to face up to the need for more fundamental domestic policy reforms in the debtor countries, complemented by more liberal trade policy in the creditor countries.

Reforms

The Gatt analysis is perhaps too narrowly confined to those constraints on investment that stem from the baroque panoply of trade restrictions, subsidies and other politicised forms of pricing. Investment decisions can also be affected by prices that are the very opposite of inflexible, most notably in the foreign exchange markets where volatile currency movements can wreck the investor's assumptions about relative costs in no time. The uncertainty over oil, which bears crucially on so many investment decisions, also deserves greater emphasis.

Indeed, much of the appeal of protectionism today lies in its proponents' claim that it can help stabilise conditions in an otherwise dangerously uncertain world.

It follows that the key Gatt policy prescriptions for the world economy and the debt crisis—budgetary reform and trade policy reform directed towards rehabilitating the price system—are not, in themselves, enough. Moves towards currency stabilisation and continuing efforts to promote investment in non-Opec energy sources are a precondition of lasting recovery.

Together these proposals represent an ambitious prospectus for the Williamsburg summit in May. But a meeting of minds at Williamsburg is only the first step. The assault on the micro-economic distortions singled out by Gatt calls for the greatest effort of political will on the part of

How to raise steel costs

WHEN politicians override commercial decisions, the results are likely to be expensive. That is the message from the report published yesterday by the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee on the British Steel Corporation.

British Steel has five large integrated works, including three strip mills, one of which is at Ravenscraig in Scotland. When the committee asked Mr Ian MacGregor, chairman of BSC, how much excess capacity he had on the strip mill side of the business, he replied "about two strip mills." Yet last December Mr Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Industry, instructed Mr MacGregor to keep Ravenscraig open.

The committee took the view this this was a political rather than an economic decision. Members were not impressed by Mr Jenkin's attempts to justify the instruction on economic grounds. They regarded Mr MacGregor's assessment of likely trends in demand—not much change in annual steel requirements for the foreseeable future—as more realistic than those of the Secretary of State.

Penalty

BSC's installed capacity in 1982-83 is 21.2m tonnes of liquid steel per annum, while manned capacity is 15.2m tonnes and production is expected to be only 11.8m tonnes. In other words 44 per cent of installed capacity is standing idle. The only sensible course, given the outlook for demand, is to concentrate production on fewer sites. The committee estimates that the Ravenscraig decision will add more than £10 to the cost of each tonne of finished steel sold, before taking into account the effects of inflation in the future. Losses will be increased, or profits reduced, by about £100m a year.

Plants which might have been viable with the closure of one of the major sites will now suffer the penalty of having to bear costs per tonne of steel produced, as a result of lower plant-loading. Thus the Ravenscraig decision, whatever its short-term attractions from a narrow Scottish point of view, will have a direct impact on jobs in other plants. The higher costs will make it more difficult for BSC to win back home market share, let alone increase its exports.

It would be [illegible], as the committee suggests, for the Government to finance directly the increased operating costs arising from the Ravenscraig decision since they result from a non-commercial obligation imposed on the Corporation. Mr MacGregor, not surprisingly, regarded that suggestion as somewhat academic. After all he, or his successor, has to live with the practical consequences of the decision, as with other government interventions which increase the BSC's costs.

An interesting appendix to the committee's report contains a BSC estimate of the impact of government intervention on the major European steel industries. In 1981 BSC received grants and loans equivalent to a subsidy of £20 per tonne of crude steel, far higher than any other EEC steel industry; France was the nearest with grants and loans of £11 per tonne. BSC argues that this figure has to be taken together with the costs of state intervention, such as maintaining surplus plant for reasons of employment protection; this "negative subsidy" amounted to £7 per tonne for BSC in 1981. In addition, according to BSC, a further penalty of £5 per tonne arises from the fact that, through government policy, it pays higher prices for gas, electricity and fuel oil than its rivals on the Continent.

The detailed figures may be open to question, but they do illustrate how the Government can take away with one hand what it gives with the other—and in doing so damage the prospects of both the steel industry and its customers.

Even with the most favourable government policies British Steel faces a difficult future. As Mr MacGregor pointed out to the committee, some of the newer steel-producing countries have much lower costs than those faced by the older industrial countries. It is conceivable, he suggested, that in the long run production of crude steel will shift towards areas where the raw material is cheap and energy is available, while finishing and processing activities will remain close to the major markets. But this is no more than a long-term possibility. In the meantime British Steel has some advantages, not least the fact that its biggest crude steel works have good deepwater locations and thus can receive raw materials at competitive costs. If Mr MacGregor's drive for higher productivity is maintained, a viable industry can emerge. But the Government should be careful not to make the task harder than it need be.

ID # 118889 CU

FG006-06

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O · OUTGOING

☐ H · INTERNAL

☐ I · INCOMING
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) / /

Name of Correspondent: Michael A. McManus, Jr.

☐ **MI Mail Report** **User Codes:** (A) ______ (B) ______ (C) Williamsburg

Subject: Possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo

ROUTE TO:	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
CW Holland	ORIGINATOR	83/03/29		C	83/04/06
Referral Note:					
CWAT18	D	83/03/29		C	83/04/06
Referral Note:					
CWFIEL	S	83/04/06	FF	A	83/04/06
Referral Note:					
		/ /			/ /
Referral Note:					
		/ /			/ /
Referral Note:					

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FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

5/81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL A. McMANUS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING Orig. signed by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

You have asked for our thoughts on the possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo in order to prevent its commercialization. Under 17 U.S.C. § 105, "[c]opyright protection . . . is not available for any work of the United States Government . . . ." This precludes copyrighting the Summit logo.

If it is really necessary to protect the Summit logo, it may be possible to establish the logo as the official seal of the Economic Summit office. As a seal the logo would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506. This provision imposes criminal penalties on anyone who falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits an agency seal, or uses or possesses such a falsely made seal. Unfortunately, there is no established "agency" known as the "Economic Summit".

Designating the logo as an official seal would be highly unusual for a temporary, ad hoc office such as the Summit office. In light of these facts you should consider how serious the threat of commercialization of the logo actually is. There are, of course, criminal and civil penalties for any person or organization that attempts to promote any article if it fraudulently misleads the public to believe it is connected with, or sanctioned by, the Federal government. But you can imagine the problems of proof in that!

In short, our best bet for control is to strongly discourage inquiries, and to be quite free in our statements that no one is "authorized". Given the article in the NYT we discussed, the press may help in that effort.

Sorry . . .
FFF:JGR:FFF:dgh 4/6/83

cc: FFielding
JGRoberts
Subj
Chron

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1983

RUSH — do here

John T
Pls see me ASAP —
4/4

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS JGR

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

Michael McManus has asked for your thoughts regarding the possibility of copyrighting the logo of the Williamsburg Summit, to prevent its commercialization. Copyright protection is not available for any work of the United States government, 17 U.S.C. § 105, nor would trademark protection appear available, since the logo is not to be used in commerce, see 15 U.S.C. § 1051.

If it is necessary to protect the logo, the best approach would seem to be to establish the logo as an official seal. The logo would then be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506, which provides:

> Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters the seal of any department or agency of the United States; or
>
> Whoever knowingly uses, affixes, or impresses any such fraudulently made, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered seal to or upon any certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper, of any description; or
>
> Whoever, with fraudulent intent, possesses any such seal, knowing the same to have been so falsely made, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered --
>
> Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

The term "agency" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 506 is defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 6 to include "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States," which would seem to embrace the Economic Summit office.

The logo could be established as a seal by executive order. Seals have been so established, to cite a few examples, for the Office of Administration of the Executive Office of the

President, E.O. 12112; OMB, E.O. 11600; and NASA, E.O. 10849.

Those agencies, and most agencies with a seal, are "permanent" entities, unlike the ephemeral Economic Summit, which will be of only historic interest after Memorial Day. I can, however, think of no way to protect the logo other than establishing it as a seal. As an initial matter, I would question whether such protection is really necessary. It is hard for me to imagine commercialization of the logo. The Summit is not a tourist event, and I think any concern about Economic Summit T-shirts, pennants, and caps is probably exaggerated.

I have prepared a memorandum to McManus advising him that no copyright protection is available. The draft memorandum notes the possibility of establishing the logo as a protected seal, but questions the need to do so.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL A. McMANUS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Protection of Williamsburg Summit Logo

You have asked for our thoughts on the possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo in order to prevent its commercialization. Under 17 U.S.C. § 105, "[c]opyright protection . . . is not available for any work of the United States Government . . . ." This precludes copyrighting the Summit logo.

established

If it is really necessary to protect the Summit logo, it may be possible to establish the logo as the official seal of the Economic Summit office. As a seal the logo would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 506. This provision imposes criminal penalties on anyone who falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits an agency seal, or uses or possesses such a falsely made seal. Unfortunately, there is no "agency" known as the "Economic Summit"

Designating the logo as an official seal would, therefore, ~~however~~, ~~require a formal executive order, and it would~~ be highly unusual for a temporary, ad hoc office such as the Summit office. ~~to have an official seal~~. In light of these facts you should consider how serious the threat of commercialization of the logo actually is. There are, of course, criminal and civil penalties for any person or organization that attempts to promote any article if it fraudulently ~~purports~~ misleads the public to believe it is connected with, or sanctioned by, the Federal Govmt. But you can imagine the problems of proof in that!

In short, our best bet for control is to strongly discourage inquiries, and to be quite free in our statements that no one is "authorized"! Given the article in the NYT we discussed, the Press may help in this effort.

Sorry . . .

MAR 28 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Roberts
(No USG copyright —
does this apply?)

March 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING

FROM: MICHAEL, A. McMANUS, JR. MDC for

I would appreciate your thoughts regarding the possibility of copyrighting the 1983 Summit of Industrialized Nations logo in order to prevent the commercialization of it. If this is feasible, please let me know what steps need to be taken to accomplish obtaining the copyright.

Thank you.

1241465S

The President has seen ___

FO006-06

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARTIN FELDSTEIN MF

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN CONCERNS AT WILLIAMSBURG

Last week, while I was in Europe for an OECD meeting, I spoke with key government officials in London, Paris and Rome. In these conversations I repeatedly heard six comments that I think you are likely to hear at Williamsburg. Here is a summary of these comments and of the points that I made in reply:

1. "The United States should expand more rapidly."

- We expect the U.S. economy to grow at more than 4.5 percent this year, faster than any of the major European countries.
- Using more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy would be a mistake because it would cause inflation to rise.
- Higher inflation could lead to a subsequent slowdown which could cause an early end to the recovery.

2. "We need a coordinated policy of expansion among the major industrial countries."

- That's just a disguised way of saying that the U.S., Germany and Japan should expand faster.
- While we'd be pleased to see a strong recovery in Europe and Japan, that would not change U.S. policy. Coordination is therefore irrelevant for us.
- We don't want to tell other countries how to manage their affairs, but we hope that countries will converge toward a policy of price stability.

3. "The United States should lower its interest rates."

- Our interest rates have come down substantially since Versailles, reflecting the fall in expected inflation in the United States. Further declines in expected inflation will reduce interest rates further.

- The real long-term interest rate -- the difference between the interest rate on bonds and the expected rate of inflation -- will come down when the prospective budget deficit in the out-years is reduced. The Administration has proposed spending cuts and tax increases that would eliminate two-thirds of the budget deficit by 1987-88.

4. "The United States should intervene more actively in foreign exchange markets to stabilize the dollar."

- Exchange rate intervention cannot offset the substantial exchange rate shifts that are caused by such fundamental factors as changes in inflation, budget deficits, and the price of oil.

- To reduce these swings, countries should converge to stable prices at home.

- Businesses can protect themselves from much of the exchange risk involved in trade by using forward markets and overseas financing. Countries that limit such transactions (France and Italy) are hurting their own businesses.

5. "The United States should reduce the value of the dollar relative to other currencies."

- We do not favor an artifically strong dollar which hurts U.S. exporters and U.S. firms that compete with imports from abroad.

- When Congress agrees to the Administration's request to reduce out-year budget deicits, the long-term interest rate in the U.S. will decline. This will make it less attractive for foreigners to invest in dollars and the dollar will decline.

- Exchange rate intervention cannot reduce the dollar's value as long as the real interest rate remains high.

6. "<u>The strong dollar keeps our import costs high and prevents us from getting our inflation down</u>." (Italy and France made this point.)

- A drop in the dollar would give only a relatively small one-time decline in import costs.

- The only way to get inflation down is by controlling domestic monetary policy and domestic demand.

- Several European countries have reduced inflation to six percent or less despite the strong dollar (e.g., Germany, U.K., Holland).

BBn

Document No. 125146SS

1110

F0006-06

WS

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

C0001-05

DATE: 5/5/83 ACTION/CONCERNENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI FG006-03

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN CONCERNS AT WILLIAMSBURG -- CEA MEMO OF 5/4

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	GERGEN	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☐	HARPER	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☐	JENKINS	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	ROLLINS	☐	☐
CLARK	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☑SS	WILLIAMSON	☐	☐
DUBERSTEIN	☐	☐	VON DAMM	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	BRADY/SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	ROGERS	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	MCMANUS	☐	☑

Remarks:

The original has been forwarded to the President.

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x2702)

Response:

File Closed

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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DOCUMENT NO. 125474 PD

FO006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

FG006-03
FG011
FG012

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/27/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit Briefings with the President

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
✓HARPER	☐	☒	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	☐	TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☐	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☐	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
DENEND	☐	☐	✓Martin Feldstein	☐	☒
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐		☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐		☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐		☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☐		☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐		☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐		☐	☐
LI	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐		☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐		☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐		☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Mar 22 83 memo to Ed Harper from Roger Porter

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
(x6515)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1983 MAR 22 P 3:49

March 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN L. HARPER

FROM: ROGER B. PORTER RBP

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Summit Briefings with the President

Since our conversation this morning I have spoken with Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State of Economic Affairs and our chief sherpah for the Williamsburg Summit, and with some people at Treasury.

Allen informs me that the session tentatively scheduled for this Friday, March 25, is the first in a series of briefings with the President scheduled over the next six weeks. The March 25 session will focus on the economic policies and prospects of the other summit countries.

The Departments of State and the Treasury are taking responsibility for the preparation of papers for the session. Wallis was grateful for our offer of assistance but said that you would be enough and that they had the paper preparation well in hand.

I also learned that the tentative schedule of subjects for the coming weeks includes:

1. Economic Policies and Prospects of Other Summit Countries
2. Economic Policy Coordination Initiative
3. Exchange Rate Policies
4. Trade
5. Debt and Finance
6. Economic Institutions
7. East-West Issues

DOCUMENT NO. 125579 PD

F0006-06

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

F0004-02
F0004
FI007
PR009
IT044

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4/5/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: fyi

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Preparation

Roumboullet Summit decisions included in IMF

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
HARPER	☐	☐	DRUG POLICY	☐	☐
PORTER	☐	☒	TURNER	☐	☐
BARR	☐	☒	D. LEONARD	☐	☐
BLEDSOE	☐	☒	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BOGGS	☐	☐	HOPKINS	☐	☐
BRADLEY	☐	☐	PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD	☐	☐
CARLESON	☐	☐	OTHER		
DENEND	☐	☐		☐	☐
FAIRBANKS	☐	☐		☐	☐
FERRARA	☐	☐		☐	☐
GALEBACH	☐	☐		☐	☐
GARFINKEL	☐	☐		☐	☐
GUNN	☐	☐		☐	☐
B. LEONARD	☐	☐		☐	☐
LI	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROCK	☐	☐		☐	☐
ROPER	☐	☐		☐	☐
SMITH	☐	☐		☐	☐
UHLMANN	☐	☐		☐	☐
ADMINISTRATION	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Attached are charts - Change in Short-term Interest Rates of Summit Countries

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
(x6515)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: Williamsburg Preparation

History

Roumboullet Summit decisions included in IMF.

Savings in Capital Movement Make $ Stronger Than Trade Justifies

- Strong $ or weak Yen.
- Inflation kept interest rates high and encouraged inflow of capital to the U.S. keeping $ high.

"Surveillance" (result of Roumboullet)

- Orderly growth & price stability responsibility of individual countries.
- Exchange rate system is a legitimate subject for discussion. But not the extensive intervention that Mitterand wants.

Attachments

CHANGE IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
OF SUMMIT COUNTRIES



NOTE: Change is difference between observation and rate of January 1981. Short-term interest rates used are monthly averages of three-month rates on Wednesdays, except latest observation which is March 28, 1983. Short-term interest rates shown are: U.S. - New York C.D.; U.K. - London Interbank; France - Paris Call Money; Germany - Frankfurt Interbank; Italy - Milan Money; Canada - Canada Finance Paper.

SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES OF SUMMIT COUNTRIES



NOTE: All short-term interest rates are monthly averages of three-month rates on Wednesdays, except latest observation which is March 28, 1983. Short-term interest rates shown are: U.S. - New York C.D.; U.K. - London Interbank; France - Paris Call Money; Germany - Frankfurt Interbank; Japan - Yen Call Money; Italy - Milan Money; Canada - Canada Finance Paper.