WHORM Subject File Code:
CO001-09 (South American-Central and Latin America)
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161

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84148	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #84147; ROBERT PASTORINO TO COLIN POWELL, RE: COMMENTARY ON DRAFT SANFORD COMMISSION REORT	2	12/21/1988	B1
		R 4/17/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS			

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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December 21, 1988

619423
C0001-09
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FG006-12

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT P. PASTORINO

SUBJECT: Commentary on Draft Sanford Commission Report Entitled Central American Recovery and Development

The draft report is a workman-like effort at describing the disastrous political and economic situation in the region. It provides an extensive menu of programs and strategies to improve the situation, none of which are particularly new or noteworthy.

Because the report does not break significant new ground or suggest spectacular solutions or initiatives, it will only be as relevant as Senator Sanford can make it by making it the centerpiece of legislation. It really runs the risk of being put on the shelf with other reports of this type.

Because it may be relegated to the shelf, it probably won't be very contentious. The drafters were careful not to apportion blame for the region's instability, treating the US and USSR in some cases as equally guilty. It carefully does not distinguish between the Central American countries, basically stating they all have (except for Costa Rica in some instances) the same problem. Of course, the blandness could elicit serious criticism from the passionate people on both sides of the issue.

On the positive side, it does recognize the importance of democracy for regional stability and economic developments. It comes down strongly on the need to provide for basic human needs (current AID policy) and emphasizes the need for conditionality on economic assistance. It does not call for a Marshall Plan for Central America, recognizing that USG resources are scarce. (On the other hand, its estimate that only $500 million more annually is required for real progress is very wrong; far more than that is needed.)

There are some serious problems:

-- On some issues it is naive, unrealistic, or vague. For instance, it implicitly assumes the current Nicaraguan Government will go along with "market-oriented" solutions to economic problems. It has a wide range of

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estimates for the number of refugees, noting its information comes from interviews with refugees, who really have no idea of their numbers.

-- It follows the simplistic notion that peace, democracy and development can or will proceed simultaneously. In concrete terms, I strongly doubt there will be any investment until there is some stability. And it does not chart a path to political stability.

-- It makes assistance to refugees and displaced persons the centerpiece of the strategy. This seems to be an attempt at "relevance" at the expense of the real economic problem.

In sum, I doubt that it will meet Levitt's high expectations for it. As a policymaker, I see it as "just another report."

Steve Farrar, for Ty Cobb and Peter Rodman concur.

Attachment
Tab A - Sanford Commission Report
on Central American Recovery and Development

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001	FARRAR	Z	88121912	PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
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002		X	89010915	NOTED BY POWELL

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	1	RmP	A
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens	2	✓	
John Negroponte	3	JDN	
Colin Powell	4		
Paul Stevens			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	12/11	N
NSC Secretariat	6		N

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RECORD ID: 8808739
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TO: POWELL

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FROM: PASTORINO

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA ECONOMICS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT RPT OF INTL COMMIS FOR CENTRAL AMER RECOVERY & DEVELOPMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY POWELL DUE DATE: 22 DEC 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FARRAR / PASTORINO LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		PASTORINO
		POWELL

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Bob Perito			
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens			
John Negroponte		✓	
Colin Powell	1	✓	A
Paul Stevens			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	JP 1/9	N
NSC Secretariat	3		N

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The Center for Democracy

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4800
CD001-09
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FG258

Allen Weinstein
President

MEMORANDUM

November 11, 1988

TO: Bush Transition Team

FROM: Allen Weinstein Allen Weinstein

SUBJECT: An Advisory Task Force on Central America/Panama Policy

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I just returned from a two-week visit to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, my fifteenth trip to the region in the past three years. Meetings with a comprehensive range of our friends in leadership positions from conservative to social democratic--including Presidents Arias, Azcona, and Cerezo (Duarte was ill and unavailable), nine presidential candidates in the four countries (the probable four future presidents in 1989-90 elections among them), the leaders of the four congresses & major opposition leaders, and our four U.S. Ambassadors--persuade me that there exists in the weeks prior to Inauguration Day a unique opportunity to develop a strong new bipartisan consensus behind an effective single set of U.S. policies in the region.

It is critical for the Bush Administration to lead such a bipartisan policy on Central America and Panama from the very beginning if the United States is to strengthen the fragile strands of democratic development in every country except Costa Rica (which, if anything, is an overdeveloped democracy) while coping with threats in the region from the Sandinista and Noriega governments and from unregenerate military officers.

A bipartisan Task Force, reporting directly to the President-Elect and to Secretary-Designate Baker, could undertake a thorough time-urgent assessment--in consultation with leaders of Congress, regional experts, and friendly leaders in Central America--that could provide policy recommendations and options to the new Administration prior to January 20, 1989. The Task Force would work in the same discreet manner as the Kissinger Commission (which forged a bipartisan U.S. consensus on policy toward El Salvador).

The Center for Democracy, whose Board members include Chairmen--past and current--of the two parties, Senators Lugar and Kerry, and Congressmen Fascell and Lagomarsino, has extremely cordial relationships with virtually all democratic Central American leaders and is in a unique position to help organize and coordinate such a Task Force. We are prepared to assist in the process. With or without us, however, the value of an immediate effort to assure bipartisan support for Bush Administration initiatives in the region is evident.

The Center
for Democracy

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11/11/88

B

I enjoyed our conversation last evening and trust that the dancing girls which I ordered on my way out arrived on schedule. David has some first-rate friends.

I thought you might be interested in seeing the one-pager which I have sent out via Frank and some folks in the campaign group on the subject of Central American policy. I accept your suggestion that Panama be excluded, but this was sent before I arrived this morning, having been prepared yesterday. I would be most appreciative if you would share the enclosed memo with those who might be interested.

Best wishes,
Allen

Put
Weinstein
in my
Rolodex

Done