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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDUP

REF: BUENOS AIRES 4734

PART I -- NEW EVENTS AND INDICATORS

(THE FOLLOWING IS NOT A COMPLETE REPORT OF ALL NEW  
EVENTS SINCE OUR LAST REPORT OF JUNE 16, 1978. A FOLLOW-UP  
SEPIEL WILL BE SUBMITTED NEXT WEEK.)

DECISION REPORTED IMMINENT ON PERSONS HELD UNDER  
INSTITUTIONAL ACT.

SENIOR MILITARY CONTACTS CONTINUE TO REPORT THAT A  
GOVERNMENTAL DECISION SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED  
BEFORE AUGUST 1 REGARDING THE 35 PLUS PERSONS PRESENTLY  
BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL. THE JUNTA  
EVIDENTLY IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNEASY ABOUT  
THE ACTA WHICH INTER ALIA DETAINS INDEFINITELY A NUMBER  
OF SENIOR PERONIST LEADERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC CHARGES OR  
TRIAL. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, THE JUNTA HAS  
DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE THAT BEFORE AUGUST 1 ALL PERSONS  
BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA SHOULD RECEIVE SPECIFIC  
SENTENCES AS ACTS OF "REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE" OR BE TURNED  
OVER TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OR  
SET FREE. ONE NAVY CONTACT IN EARLY JULY ADMITTED THAT  
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN EACH CASE WAS PROVING TO  
BE VERY DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS OPTIMIST THE DETERMINATIONS  
WOULD BE MADE AND APPROVED BY THE JUNTA.

MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS REPORTED

A NUMBER OF THE EMBASSY'S HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACTS HAVE  
REPORTED THAT RECENTLY CATHOLIC PAROLED PEACE ACTIVIST  
ADOLFO MARIA PEREZ EDQUIVEL WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BY PRISON  
GUARDS IN LA PLATA PRISON SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO HIS  
RELEASE. A NUMBER OF HIS RIBS WERE BROKEN. SAME SOURCES  
REPORT THAT ANOTHER PERMANENT ASSEMBLY LEADER (SEPARATE  
HENCON) WAS SEVERELY TORTURED DURING HIS INITIAL INTER-  
ROGATION. (WARNING: XGDS-4. LEAKAGE OF THESE REPORTS  
IN WASHINGTON MAY PUT THESE MEN IN GRAVE DANGER.)

EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS IN THE LAST SEVERAL  
MONTHS THAT SOME PEN PRISONERS PRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE  
FROM LA PLATA PRISON HAVE BEEN BRUTALLY BEATEN BY  
PRISON GUARDS. RED CROSS AUTHORITIES (PROTECT) HAVE  
EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO EMBASSY REGARDING THE  
PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS IN LA PLATA PRISON.

MATERIAL WITNESSES REPORTED TORTUED

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY AND NUNCIATURA SOURCES (PROTECT)

\*PEN = prisoners held indefinitely on executive authority.

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HAVE REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IN MID-JUNE A FEMALE  
PSYCHOLOGIST WAS ABDUCTED BY SECURITY FORCES AND HELD FOR  
15 HOURS. DURING HER DETENTION, THE PSYCHOLOGIST, A  
POLIO VICTIM CONFINED TO A WHEEL CHAIR, WAS REPORTEDLY  
INTERROGATED WITH ELECTRIC PICANA REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS  
AND ACTIVITIES OF ONE OF HER PATIENTS.

LOCAL LAWYER WHO ACCEPTS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES REPORTED  
TO EMBASSY ON JULY 19 THAT THE MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS,  
DANIEL ALBERTO EGEA, WHO HAS BEEN UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION  
SINCE EARLY 1976, WAS ABDUCTED FOR FIVE DAYS IN EARLY JULY  
BY MEN CLAIMING TO BE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES. MRS. EGEA  
WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED DURING HER INTERROGATION WHICH  
FOCUSED ON HER SON'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND FORMER  
FRIENDS. DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS OF HER CAPTIVITY  
SHE SAID SHE WAS TREATED KINDLY AND RELEASED WITH APOLOGIES,  
BUT WITH AN ACCOMPANYING THREAT TO REMAIN QUIET. (WE ARE  
CHECKING FURTHER AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPORTED  
INTERROGATION OF ALLEGED "POLITICAL ACTIVITIES".)

NEW DRUG REPORTED INTRODUCED

A HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE CONTACT IN THE MEDICAL  
PROFESSION WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST  
INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN LATE JUNE THAT TERRORISTS AND  
SUBVERSIVES SELECTED FOR ELIMINATION WERE NOW BEING  
ADMINISTERED INJECTIONS OF "KETALAR", WHICH SOURCE  
DESCRIBED AS A POWERFUL ANESTHETIC, INSTEAD OF CURACE.  
ACCORDING TO SOURCE, KETALAR IS ADMINISTERED IN AN INTRA-  
MUSCULAR INJECTION TO THE PRISONER AS A PREVENTIVE HEALTH  
MEASURE, THE SUBJECT RAPIDLY LOSES CONSCIOUSNESS AND  
VITAL FUNCTIONS CEASE. SOURCE ALLEGES THAT SUBJECTS ARE  
THEN DISPOSED OF IN RIVERS OR THE OCEAN.

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II - JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES PROBLEMS CONTINUE

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES' LEADER INFORMED EMBASSY ON JUNE 28 THAT GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS RESULTED IN THE VIRTUAL EXPULSION OF EVERY JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CHILD FROM THE ARGENTINE SCHOOL SYSTEM. THE WITNESSES BELIEVE THAT MORE THAN A THOUSAND CHILDREN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPELLED. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN, MANY SCHOOL SYSTEMS USED THE WITNESSES REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELABORATE JUNE 28 FLAG DAY EXERCISES AS THE PRETEXT FOR THE EXPULSIONS. TO THE WITNESSES PARTICIPATION IN FLAG DAY CEREMONIES IS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND IS FORBIDDEN.

THE ARGENTINE WITNESSES HAVE SUBMITTED A DETAILED ARTICLE ON THE REPRESSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH FOR PUBLICATION IN THE AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES MAGAZINE, AWAKE. THE ARTICLE IS EXPECTED TO BE PRINTED IN ALL THE WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN, THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF THE ARTICLE TO ALL SENIOR EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA, AS WELL AS TO EACH ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR ABROAD.

THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN COMMENTED THAT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORKSHIP HAS STILL NOT ISSUED THE FORMS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF RELIGIONS IN ARGENTINA UNDER LAW 21,745. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES REGISTRATION BEING APPROVED, GIVEN THE CURRENT DECREE BANNING THE WITNESSES FROM PUBLICLY PRACTICING THEIR FAITH. HE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS NOW REFERRING TO THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AS AN "ORGANIZATION WITH RELIGIOUS COLORATIONS" (TINTE RELIGIOSA).

ON JUNE 8, THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTED THAT THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO HAD ISSUED A DECREE PROHIBITING ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY BY THE WITNESSES. THE DECREE ORDERS THE SEIZURE OF ALL WITNESSES MATERIALS AND THE CLOSING OF ALL WITNESSES' FACILITIES WHERE "PUBLIC OR PRIVATE" MEETINGS ARE HELD.

RED CROSS ACTIVITIES: TORTURE REPORT

SIX RED CROSS SWISS NATIONAL DELEGATES AND TWO SWISS DOCTORS ARE CONTINUING TO VISIT ARGENTINE NON-CRIMINAL PRISONERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. THE RED CROSS PLANS TO VISIT ALL THE MAJOR PENAL FACILITIES IN ARGENTINA THREE TIMES DURING 1978 AND THE SMALLER INSTITUTIONS TWICE. ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) STATED THAT AT PRESENT SIERRA CHICA WHICH HOLDS 590 PEN PRISONERS AND TINY LA RIOJA PRISON APPEAR TO BE THE COUNTRY'S WORST. IN GENERAL, THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA PEN PRISONERS ARE UNDERFERD, HAVE LITTLE OR NO MEDICAL ATTENTION AND NO HEAT IN THE WINTER.

THE RED CROSS DELEGATE STATED THAT ICRC REPS HAD

INTERVIEWED ALMOST EVERY PEN PRISONER IN ARGENTINA. HE NOTED THAT ABOUT 90 PERCENT HAD BEEN TORTURED. SOME HAD MERELY BEEN BEATEN UP BUT THE LARGE MAJORITY HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCK OR THE SUBMARINE. THE ICRC REP WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE RED CROSS WOULD BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE ANY CHANGE IN THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE OF TORTURE IN ARGENTINA. THE REP STATED THAT NO GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD ADMITS THAT TORTURE TAKES PLACE AND A GOVERNMENT CANNOT CORRECT A PROBLEM WHICH IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE.

THE DELEGATE RECOGNIZED THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT OF PEN PRISONERS IS INFREQUENT AFTER THEY HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE INTERROGATION PHASE, I.E., AFTER THEY HAVE PASSED OFFICIALLY TO THE PEN. HOWEVER, VARIOUS FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE PERSIST IN THE PRISONS.

ESTIMATED PRISON POPULATION AS OF JULY 1, 1978:

PRISON	PEN#	DAH#
LA PLATA PRISON	850	20 TO 50 (MULTISOURCED)
DEVOTO PRISON	750	
SIERRA CHICA	590	UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF OVER 100
CORONDA	450	
RESISTENCIA	350	20 (ICRC)
RAWSON	250	9 (ICRC)
CORDOBA	150	50 PLUS/MINUS (ICRC)
CASEROS MUNICIPAL	40	
MENDOZA	22	

#ICRC ESTIMATES (PROTECT)

# UNRECOGNIZED PRISONERS HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES. (ACCORDING TO SECURITY FORCES THERE MAY BE UP TO 500 AROUND THE COUNTRY AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN TIME.)

VILLA DEVOTO FIRE UPDATE

ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBASSY RECENTLY THAT FOUR PRISONERS HELD UNDER PEN WERE INVOLVED IN THE MARCH 14, 1978 VILLA DEVOTO RIOT AND FIRE. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL FOUR WERE BEING HELD ON DRUG CHARGES BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDER PEN AS WELL, AS THEY HAD FALSE ARGENTINE PASSPORTS WHEN ARRESTED, WHICH PUT THEM UNDER SUSPICION OF BEING POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVES AS WELL. THREE OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS DIED IN THE FIRE. THE EARLY BURNED SURVIVOR TOLD THE ICRC THAT HE AND THE OTHER PEN PRISONERS HAD NO CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSION BUT WERE DRUG ADDICTS AND TRAFFICKERS WHO HAD OBTAINED FALSE PASSPORTS TO USE IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES.

WITH REFERENCE TO A MAY 4, 1978 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY IN WHICH COHA DIRECTOR LAURENCE R. BIRNS ARGUES AGAINST EXPORT LICENSES FOR THE SALE OF THREE TROOP-CARRYING BOEING CH-47 HELICOPTERS ALLEGING THAT "HELICOPTERS SIMILAR TO THE ONES BEING SUPPLIED" WERE USED IN PUTTING DOWN THE VILLA DEVOTO PRISON RIOT AND CRUSHING LABOR STRIKES, WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING BASED ON DISCREET INQUIRIES OF SECURITY SOURCES:

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(CONREPA) PRIVATELY INFORMED TIMERMAN'S LAWYER ON JUNE 26 THAT THE CONREPA INVESTIGATION HAD TURNED UP NOTHING NEGATIVE AGAINST TIMERMAN. ACCORDING TO THE FAMILY, THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CONFIDED THAT "THIS CASE IS SOMETHING POLITICAL." THE SAME SOURCE TOLD THE FAMILY THAT CONREPA HAS PROVIDED A CONFIDENTIAL RESUME OF THE TIMERMAN CASE TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL VIOLA IN LATE JUNE.

TIMERMAN AND HIS FAMILY ARE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT THE REPEATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ADMIRAL MASSERA THAT THE STATUS OF PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL WILL BE RESOLVED BY THIS GOVERNMENT BEFORE AUGUST FIRST WILL RESULT IN TIMERMAN'S BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FOR ISRAEL.

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WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE ASSERTION THAT US MILITARY TYPE HELICOPTERS WERE USED IN HANDLING THE RIOT SITUATION AT VILLA DEVOTO. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT IT WAS NOT A PRISON UPRISING AS SUCH. THERE WERE NO POLITICAL DETAINEES IN THE CELL BLOCK CONCERNED (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE SO-CALLED "SUBVERSIVE ANGLE" TO THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS MENTIONED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE,) AND ALMOST ALL--IF NOT ALL--OF THE DEATHS RESULTED FROM SMOKE AND HEAT CAUSED BY THE FIRE THE INMATES HAD STARTED. ADDITIONALLY, THE SECURITY FORCES STATED THEY DO NOT USE HELICOPTERS, TO RUSH STRIKES OR TAKE OVER STRIKE-BOUND FACTORIES BECAUSE IT IS JUST NOT OPERATIONALLY SOUND AND WOULD BE WASTEFUL OF RESOURCES. (WE BELIEVE THAT SMALLER HELICOPTERS WERE USED FOR SPOTTING POSSIBLE SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS ALONG THE RAILROAD LINES DURING THE RAIL STRIKE LAST NOVEMBER, HOWEVER. SEVERAL BOMBS WERE SET OFF ON THE TRACKS DURING THE STRIKE.)

REQUESTS BY TIMERMAN'S ATTORNEY THAT HE BE PERMITTED TO SEE HIS CLIENT AND THAT HIS CLIENT ALSO BE PERMITTED VISITS BY HIS DOCTOR AND DENTIST HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY REPLY FROM THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF OR THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. (TIMERMAN IS NOT AMONG THOSE HELD UNDER THE INSTITUCIONAL ACT WHOSE PROPERTY IS EXPROPRIATED IN A RECENT CONREPA DECISION, ACCORDING TO JULY 21 PRESS ACCOUNTS. WE ARE CHECKING FURTHER, BUT THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY REPORTED ABOVE. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS ACCOUNTS, CONREPA EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES BELONGING TO EX-CGJ HEAD CASILDO HERRERAS, EX-SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER JOSE LOPEZ REGA, EX-DEFENSE MINISTER ADOLFO MARIO SAVINO, JORGE ROTEMBERG (AN ASSOCIATE OF TIMERMAN AND DAVID GRAIVER IN THE LA OPINION ENTERPRISE) AND GRAVIER'S MOTHER)).  
CASTRO

THE FEDERAL JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE VILLA DEVOTO INQUIRY HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE INVESTIGATION FOR JURISDICTIONAL REASONS. THE CASE IS NOW BEING TURNED OVER TO CRIMINAL COURT JUDGE WHO WAS CHOSEN BY LOT FROM THE CRIMINAL BENCH.

DETENTION FACILITIES REPORTED CLOSED

A LA PLATA HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN EARLY JULY THAT THE ARANA DETENTION FACILITY OUTSIDE OF LA PLATA HAS BEEN ABANDONED AND ITS PRISONERS TRANSFERRED. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL SIMILAR REPORTS REGARDING THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL IN BUENOS AIRES. THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL'S DETENTION FACILITY WAS DESCRIBED IN GREAT DETAIL IN THE SO-CALLED "MAGGIO LETTER" WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES AND FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THE EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THE DEACTIVATION REPORTS OF EITHER OF THESE WELL-KNOWN DETENTION FACILITIES.

RELEASE OF DETAINED UNION LEADERS STILL PENDING

A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS (FOWG) INFORMED EMOFF IN EARLY JULY THAT THE RELEASE OF 14 UNION LEADERS ANNOUNCED JUNE 19 BY THE PERONIST-LEANING BISHOP OF LA PLATA WAS STILL UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE FOWG OFFICIAL SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO ANNOUNCE THE NAMES OF THE LABOR LEADERS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT NOTED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR RELEASE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE TIMERMAN CASE

ACCORDING TO TIMERMAN'S FAMILY, THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNCIL ON PATRIMONIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION

Security Assistance Authorization (P.L. 94-329, 6/30/76)

Sec. 502B. HUMAN RIGHTS--(1) The United States shall "promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms..."

(2)... "no security assistance may be provided to any country of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

(3) The United States shall "avoid identification" with governments denying their people internationally recognized human rights." Finally a human rights report shall be required from the U.S. Government covering certain set topics each year.

Economic Assistance Authorization (P.L. 95-88)

Sec. 116. HUMAN RIGHTS--(1) No assistance to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights...

(2) The Administrator shall submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly benefit the needy people...

(3) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress a human rights report annually.

International Development Assistance Act (P.L. 95-88)

Sec. 112. "No agreement may be entered into under this title to finance a sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations...unless such agreement would directly benefit the needy people in such country." The Congress may require the President to submit in writing information demonstrating that an agreement will directly benefit the needy. An annual report regarding the steps taken under this Act is required by law.

IFI Authorization (P.L. 95-118)

Sec. 701. HUMAN RIGHTS. (1) The United States Government, by voice and vote, shall advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than those whose governments engage in consistent patterns of gross violations, commit terrorism, etc. The Act also forbids all assistance to any of the three countries of Vietnam.

Export/Import Bank (P.L. 95-143)

Section 2 includes the following language: The Export/Import Bank "shall take into account in consultation with the Secretary of State the observance of and a respect for human rights in a country to receive the exports supported by a loan or financial guarantee and the effect such exports may have on human rights in such country."

Foreign Assistance Appropriations (P.L. 95-148)

Sec. 113. "Funds appropriated by this Act may not be obligated or expended to provide security assistance to any country for the purpose of aiding directly the efforts of the government of such country to repress the legitimate rights of the population of such country contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618)

Sec. 402. (Jackson/Vanik human rights amendment)... "The United States shall not conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country--

(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;

(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas of other documents...;

(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, etc. charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate..."

State, Justice, Commerce Department Authorization (P.L. 95-94)

The Act establishes the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, especially for carrying out the functions of the Secretary of State in connection with Section 502(b) of this Act.

H:DTKenney/ezm  
April 17, 1978

PENDING HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION

The International Development Cooperation Act of 1978--  
S.2420 (The Humphrey Bill)

Sec. 102. ...."The Congress declares that the principal purpose of the United States bilateral development assistance is to help the poor majority of people in developing countries...."

Sec. 767. PROHIBITIONS.--(a) HUMAN RIGHTS.--(1) "No assistance authorized under this Act may be provided to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights...."

(2) Congress "may require the Administrator to submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly benefit the needy people..."

(3) In determining whether a government is a gross violator, the Administrator in connection with HA shall determine

(A) "the extent of cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of human rights"

(B) specific U.S. actions which may be taken by the President relating to human rights.

Sec. 781. Annual reports are required to include

(1) an assessment of the impact of aid policies and programs on the poor majority

(2) the status of internationally recognized human rights

(3) any steps which have been taken to alter foreign assistance provided by the United States because of human rights considerations.

H.R. 11908 (Young Bill)

The bill proposes that the United States seek adoption of an amendment to the Articles of Agreement for each international financial institution requiring the establishment of a human rights standard to be considered in connection with each application for assistance. The bill also

requires the President to report, not later than three months after the date of enactment of the bill, on all actions taken by the Congress in connection with the Act.

H.R. 9179 (OPIC Authorization) The Harkin Amendment

Section 8. "The Corporation shall take into account in the conduct of its programs in a country, in consultation with the Secretary of State, all available information about the observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in such country and the effect of the operation of such programs will have on the human rights and fundamental freedoms in such country. The provisions of Section 116 of this Act shall apply: any insurance, reinsurance, guaranty, or loan issued by the Corporation for projects in a country except that in addition to the exception (with respect to benefiting needy people) set forth in subsection (a) of such section the Corporation may support a project if the national security interests are required."

H.R. 9124 (The International Monetary Fund Authorization)  
The Harkin Amendment

Sec. 29. The U.S. Executive Director to the Fund is required to initiate wide consultations with other managing directors "to encourage the IMF staff to formulate stabilization programs which, to the maximum feasible extent, foster a broader base of productive investment and employment, especially in those productive activities which are designed to meet basic human needs."

The U.S. Director is required to take all possible steps to see that Fund activities do not "contribute to the deprivation of basic human needs, nor to the violation of basic human rights."

The U.S. Governor of the Fund is also required to prepare and submit, not later than 180 days after the close of each calendar year, a report to the Congress on the effect of Fund policies to provide

- "(1) an adequate supply of food etc.
- (2) shelter and clothing;
- (3) public services, etc.
- (4) public employment, etc."



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## BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS: ARGENTINA

Political violence has wracked Argentina since the late Sixties. The violence was partially responsible for the economic and political breakdown precipitating the March 1976 coup, and has subsequently been used by the junta as a rationale for a no-holds-barred approach to counter-terrorism. This has resulted in egregious violations of human rights, despite public recognition by the government that the terrorists have been largely defeated, although businessmen and military officers continue to be murdered.

Security personnel and prison officials use torture although it is prohibited by law and publicly condemned by government officials. The victims are usually suspected terrorists, but leftists, priests and foreign political exiles have been maltreated as well. The government is aware of such activities but generally has not acted effectively to limit them.

The Argentine armed forces have committed themselves to the elimination of terrorist "combatants." This policy has led to the summary execution of prisoners who reportedly had "blood on their hands." These executions are sometimes disguised as shootouts with the security forces or prison escapes. It should be noted that leftist terrorists rarely allow themselves to be taken alive, in order to avoid interrogation.

State of siege arrests are authorized by the Argentine Constitution during periods of internal disorder. The President of Argentina may detain and relocate people under the state of siege provisions but, according to law, he may not convict or apply punishment upon his own authority. The state of siege powers, which were invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a wide variety of persons, many of whom have been held for long periods without formal charges. Many arrests and abductions under the state of siege have taken place in the middle of the night, sometimes in the form of mysterious abductions. Some people are freed after short periods of interrogation. Others are held incommunicado without charges or formal acknowledgement of their detention. They join a group known as the "disappeared" whose number is estimated to range between 2,000 and 20,000.

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Recently the Government of Argentina has reinsti-  
tuted a limited "right of option" for political prisoners  
who are being held under executive detention--i.e., not  
charged and remanded to civil or military courts--to  
request exile. Only a few detainees to date have been  
granted exile.

Action Taken on Human Rights

-- On October 27 the U.S. voted no on a gas pipeline  
loan in the IDB. The Argentines have been informed that  
if they allow three other loans to come forward we will  
have to vote against them as well on human rights grounds.  
We supported an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds  
that it meets basic human needs, on November 3.

-- President Carter discussed human rights problems  
with President Videla when the latter was in Washington  
for the Panama Canal signing ceremony. Ambassador Todman  
and Assistant Secretary Derian have also discussed these  
problems directly with Videla.

-- Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY '78 after  
the Administration reduced the proposed budget request  
for human rights grounds. The Administration declined to  
sign the FY '77 FMS Agreement and did not request FMS  
credits for Argentina for FY '79. All arms transfers (FMS  
sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list)  
are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with only very  
few selected new items with no apparent relationship to  
human rights approved. In addition, explosive items such  
as shells, cartridges, etc. are being denied. Policy  
guidance is being sought on whether spare parts will be  
sold or not.

-- We have submitted over 3,000 names of individuals  
who are either detained or have disappeared to the  
Argentine government and have requested that they furnish  
information on these individuals.

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ARGENTINA

PENDING ASSISTANCE REQUESTS

- After learning of the intended level for the FY 1978 Foreign Military Sales Credit proposal, the Argentines rejected any FMS for FY 1978.
- There is no aid program in Argentina.
- Arms transfers to Argentina are on a case-by-case basis.

U. S. INTERESTS

- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and presumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity. (The USG is actively seeking Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other measures that would steer Argentina away from a nuclear warfare capability.)
- Petroleum: The U. S. Geological Service has estimated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may contain more than double existing proved reserves in the Western Hemisphere.
- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the production of grains and meat.
- Economic: U. S. private investment stands at \$1.4 billion; our banks are owed \$3 billion; and we have a \$250 million trade surplus. (Prospects for greater trade and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals and agricultural fields.)
- Scientific: Argentina is important to our Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar resources. Her cooperation, as well as her location are important to maintaining our full presence in Antarctica.

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- 2 -

- International Influence: Argentina is an almost wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial and cultural leader in Hispanic America, and one of the most active Latin American governments in global economic forums.

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LOAN PAPER

20

Argentina  
Science and Technology  
\$60.0 million (OC)  
IDB

The objective of the project is to transfer and adapt applied technology from abroad and from Argentina's more advanced industrial and agricultural organizations to firms and other organizations, mainly in development poles outside of the province of Buenos Aires. Examples of sub-projects being discussed are more efficient use of water in industrial processes, exploitation of advanced processes in petrochemical industry and general industrial development for the Santa Fe area. The technology transfer would be expedited by use of existing technical institutes in the country and IDB loan proceeds would be used for importation and/or procurement of equipment and materials to expand the institutes and their services. The loan proposal is now expected to come before the Board of Executive Directors in early 1978. Ordinary capital loans are not subject to U.S. veto. FSO loans (local currency in this case) are subject to U.S. veto.

At the time the working group considered this project, there was not enough information available to determine whether it met basic human needs.

The date of this loan's consideration by the IDB Board is uncertain, but it probably will not surface before the end of the year.

November 7, 1977

LOAN PAPER

22

Argentina  
Electrical Transmission and  
Substations  
\$61.3 M. (OC)  
IDB

The objective of the project is to further complete the national interconnection grid with the construction of high tension transmission lines and sub-stations. The project entails construction of 254 kilometers of 500 KV line between General Rodriguez in Buenos Aires Province and Rosario Oeste in the Province of Santa Fe, two sub-stations in Santa Fe Province, and a third substation in Cordoba Province. Ordinary capital is not subject to U.S. veto. The Argentine Government is reconsidering the priority of this project and it may be deferred until next year or eliminated from the lending program.

The working group did not have enough information to determine whether this loan met basic human needs.

This loan probably will not surface in the IDB before the end of the year.

November 7, 1977

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6082

F.O. 12065 XDS-1 7-26-09, (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M  
TAGS AR, SHUM  
SUBJECT HUMAN RIGHTS: AMBASSADOR'S SESSION WITH GENERAL CAMPS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THROUGH DAO, I WAS INVITED TO LUNCH BY BRIG. GENERAL RAMON JUAN ALBERTO CAMPS, COMMANDER OF THE REMOUNT AND VETERINARY SERVICE, ON WEDNESDAY (JULY 25) AT HIS NEARBY HDQTRS. I HAD NEVER MET GENERAL CAMPS, BUT HIS REPUTATION OF BEING ONE OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON'S EXECUTIONERS HAD PRECEDED HIM. HE HAD HIS TROOPS LINED UP IN FRONT OF HIS BUILDING FOR ME TO REVIEW, WHICH I DID WITH THE TRADITIONAL "BUENOS DIAS, TROPA DE LA REMONTA" AND THEY REPLIED IN UNISON "BUENOS DIAS SENOR EMBAJADOR." LT COL. DES REIS, ASST. ARMY ATTACHE, ACCOMPANIED ME TO THE LUNCH. WE WERE ESCORTED TO CAMP'S OFFICE, WHERE HE STOOD IN MILITARY FASHION--GARBED IN WHAT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS A TAKE-OFF ON A GENERAL PATTON ENSEMBLE. THE "REMONTA" HAS NO RELATIONSHIP TO ANY TANK UNIT BUT IT IS THE LAST VESTIGE OF WHAT WAS ONCE KNOWN AS CAVALRY. JUDGING FROM PHOTOS OF HIMSELF ON HIS DESK, IT CAN BE SAID CAMPS HAS SEEN MUCH BETTER DAYS. IT IS APPARENT HE HAS LOST A GREAT DEAL OF WEIGHT, IS TENSE AND HAS A PIERCING LOOK.

3. CAMPS' EXCUSE FOR WANTING TO MEET ME WAS THE SHARING OF A COMMON INTEREST--HORSES. HE BROUGHT OUT SEVERAL CHARTS OF HIS HORSE OPERATIONS LINE, IN AND CROSS BREEDING. HE TOOK GREAT PRIDE IN TELLING ME HE WAS THE LARGEST HORSE BREEDER IN THE COUNTRY. WE THEN UNDERTOOK ANOTHER KEY PRIORITY--LUNCH. HE WAS SERVED A SPECIAL PLATE--FOR HEALTH REASONS. HE WOULDN'T TOUCH THE WINE--WHICH FOR AN ARGENTINE IS SACRILEGIOUS, BUT HE DID PARTAKE IN HIS SHARE OF PILLS. HE DIDN'T WASTE ANY TIME IN GETTING TO THE SUBJECT OF SUBVERSION, TERRORISM ETC.

4. SUBVERSION BY IDEOLOGY: CAMPS GOT GREAT RELIEF IN TELLING

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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32A

US HOW HE WOULD LECTURE TO PARENTS OF RECRUITS FROM TIME TO TIME. CAMPS' EXPLANATION TO THE PARENTS AND SONS WAS THAT THE DUTY OF THESE RECRUITS WAS NOT TO DIE FOR THE SALVATION OF THEIR COUNTRY BUT TO KILL FOR THEIR COUNTRY. HE EMPHASIZED STRONGLY TO RECRUITS THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO LEARN TO KILL. AS HE MADE THESE STATEMENTS, HE WOULD TENSE UP AND BECOME IMPERVIOUS TO THE WORLD AROUND HIM. HE GESTURED WITH HIS HANDS WHILE HIS PIERCING EYES GAVE THE SEMBLANCE OF HIS TRYING TO LINE UP THE CROSS-HAIRS IN A TELESCOPIC RIFLE SIGHT ON HIS TARGET. HE THEN WENT INTO A DISSERTATION OF HOW PARENTS, NEWS MEDIA AND DISSIDENTS WERE CORRUPTING THE MINDS OF YOUNG, IMPRESSIONABLE PEOPLE. HE WENT INTO WEIRD METAPHORS AND SAID HOW NO ONE SHOULD EVER QUESTION THE VIRTUE OF HIS COUNTRY. HE THEN DESCRIBED HOW MILITARY FORCES HAD DEFEATED TERRORISTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT NOW THERE WAS A NEW WAR ON THOSE OF FOREIGN IDEOLOGY, SUCH AS MARXISM AND THE DIFFERENT SHADES OF COMMUNISM. CAMPS MADE THE ANALOGY OF THESE PEOPLE WITH FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES BEING THE SAME AS HAVING A ROTTEN APPLE IN THE BARREL--THE ROTTEN APPLE HAD TO BE ELIMINATED. HE ALSO USED THE ANALOGY OF A STRONG TRUNK ON A TREE WITH SICK LIMBS ETC.

5. JACOBO TIMERMAN: INASMUCH AS CAMPS WAS ALL INVOLVED IN THE THREAT OF NEWS MEDIA ETC., I THOUGHT IT WAS TIME TO DISCUSS JACOBO TIMERMAN. I TOLD CAMPS THE GOOD LORD HAD GIVEN HIS COUNTRY MANY PLUSSES BUT YET THE MINUSES WERE EATING THE PLUSSES. I TOLD HIM ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD WAS A BLACK AND NEGATIVE ONE--A COUNTRY CATEGORIZED AS ONE OF THE WORST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS ON EARTH. BUT THIS TIME, CAMPS WAS TENSING UP LIKE A FIGHTING ROOSTER READY FOR BATTLE, BUT I HAD THE FLOOR AND WASN'T ABOUT TO RELINQUISH IT. I EXPLAINED ARGENTINA'S IMAGE COULD IMPROVE SUBSTANTIALLY BY THE RELEASE OF TIMERMAN. HE BEAT ME TO THE DRAW, AS HE BELLOWED "TIMERMAN WILL NEVER BE RELEASED." CAMPS PROCEEDED TO BERATE TIMERMAN AND USED EVERY ADJECTIVE AND EXPLETIVE TO PAINT HIM AS AN IMMORAL, AMORAL AND SUBVERSIVE TYPE. I ASKED CAMPS THAT IF TIMERMAN WAS SUCH A SCOUNDREL WHY DID THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND THE SUPREME COURT ABSOLVE HIM OF ALL WRONG DOING. HE DID NOT MEET THE ISSUE BUT INSTEAD REPLIED TIMERMAN WAS A DANGEROUS SUBVERSIVE AS HE HAD POISONED THE MINDS OF YOUNG PEOPLE BY HIS MARXISTS WRITINGS IN LA OPINION. HE THEN CONTINUED THAT SO LONG AS THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE DIED DUE TO TIMERMAN'S ENCOURAGEMENTS BY HIS TEACHINGS TO FIGHT AN ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT, TIMERMAN CAN'T AND SHOULD NEVER BE RELEASED.

6. TIMERMAN THE "CAUSE CELEBRE:" I THEN TOLD CAMPS IT WAS BEYOND MY COMPREHENSION OF HOW AND INTELLIGENT AND SOPHISTICATED COUNTRY LIKE ARGENTINA COULD ASSUME AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE

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\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\* COPY

CIVILIZED WORLD WHEN KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE FOREVER  
TELLING ME NO CHARGES EXISTED AGAINST TIMERMAN BECAUSE GCA  
COULDN'T PROVE ANYTHING AGAINST HIM. CAMPS WOULD REBUT BY  
STATING PROOF EXISTED TIMERMAN HAD INFLUENCED ARGENTINES BY  
HIS SUBVERSIVE WRITINGS. I THEN SUGGESTED TO CAMPS--WITH  
TONGUE IN CHEEK--HE WAS A PATRIOTIC PERSON. I EXPLAINED  
IT WAS HIS DUTY TO CONSIDER THE WELFARE OF THE WHOLE NATION  
AND NOT ONLY MILITARY COLLEAGUES. I TOLD HIM IN MY EXPERIENCE  
IN TRAVELLING THROUGHOUT THE NATION OF ARGENTINA THE GENERAL  
POPULACE CARED LESS THAN ONE IOTA ABOUT TIMERMAN'S FATE. I  
TOLD HIM I FOUND ARGENTINES INDIFFERENT TO TIMERMAN. THEREFORE,  
HOW COULD IT BE POSSIBLE THAT ONE SCOUNDREL--AS HE CALLED  
TIMERMAN--COULD BE PERMITTED TO GIVE HIS COUNTRY SUCH A  
HORRIBLE IMAGE ABROAD. I TOLD HIM ONE PERSON WAS NOT WORTH  
SACRIFICING THE WELFARE OF 26 MILLION ARGENTINES. I TOLD HIM  
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DE RUESBA #6082/2 2072020  
O 261944Z JUL 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1677

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6082

THAT SO LONG AS TIMERMAN WAS IN CUSTODY EVERY DAY WOULD PROVE TO BE AN IRRITANT FOR HIS COUNTRY ON A GLOBAL BASIS. I STATED EVEN IF TIMERMAN - IF RELEASED - WOULD WRITE ADVERSELY ON ARGENTINA HIS EXPOSURES WOULD PROBABLY BE OF A NON-RECURRING NATURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SO LONG AS HE IS IN CUSTODY HIS STORY IS BEING REPEATED ON A DAILY BASIS ALL OVER THE WORLD. AT THIS POINT IT BECAME APPARENT WE WERE AT AN IMPASSE. IT WAS TIME TO GET TO THE OFFICE, SO I THANKED HIM FOR THE INVITATION. AS WE STARTED TO WALK AWAY, HE SAID "DON'T FORGET WE (GOA) HAVE AGREED TIMERMAN SHALL NOT BE FREED."

7. FUTURE MEETINGS WITH CAMPS: AS HE SAW US OFF, CAMPS TOLD ME HE WANTED ME TO RETURN TO HIS HQTRS. ON AUGUST 8 AS HE WAS HAVING A HORSE EXPOSITION ON THAT EVENING. HE ALSO STATED HE WANTED ME TO TRAVEL WITH HIM TO ENTRE RIOS TO SPEND THE DAY VISITING HIS HORSE FARM. HE THEN SMILED AND SAID "WE WON'T DISCUSS POLITICS." I REPLIED THAT IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND PROBLEMS BETTER A DIALOGUE ABOUT THEM WAS ESSENTIAL.

8. COMMENT: GENERAL CAMPS MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS ONE OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON'S GOOD FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS. HE ALSO DESCRIBED SOME OF HIS EXPERIENCES WHEN HE WAS IN CHARGE OF THE POLICE IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. WITH GREAT BRAVADO, HE TOLD ME HE WAS THE INVESTIGATOR OF THE TIMERMAN AND GRAVIER CASES. HE IMPLIED HE WAS THE TIMERMAN EXPERT. IN ALL MY SEVEN AND ONE HALF YEARS OF DEALING WITH "RIFF-RAFF" AND CRIMINAL ELEMENT AS A DISTRICT ATTORNEY, I HAVE NEVER SEEN ANYONE AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AS THIS PERSON. I LEFT HIM WITH A FEELING HE WAS MENTALLY SICK. I ALSO LEFT WITH THE FEELING HE IS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO TIMERMAN'S RELEASE. I HAVE HAD MANY SESSIONS WITH GENERAL SUAREZ MASON AND SHALL HAVE A FE MORE, BUT NEVER HAD I

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ENCOUNTERED AN EXPERIENCE AS THIS ONE. I SHALL CONTINUE  
TO TALK WITH SUAREZ MASON AND CAMPS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY  
WITH THE HOPE I MIGHT WEAR THEM DOWN BEFORE THEY UNDO ME.  
CASTRO  
BT

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[REDACTED]

Carlos Washington PASTOR  
(Phonetic: pahSTOR)

ARGENTINA

Minister of Foreign  
Affairs and Worship  
(since November 1978)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Minister



Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Carlos Pastor became Foreign Minister when his predecessor resigned in a dispute with President Jorge Videla. Pastor is in tune with Videla's foreign policy thinking and has been responsive to the President's wishes. The Buenos Aires *Herald* has reported that Pastor feels strongly about the "anti-Argentine campaign" from abroad on the human rights problem and that he favors improving Argentina's relations with South Africa. Pastor has been friendly toward the United States, and while on active duty with the Air Force he urged US-Argentine cooperation on scientific projects. US military officials in Argentina described Pastor in 1968 as astute, hard working and conscientious and as one of the best generals in the Air Force. More recently, a US Embassy official has said that he is an affable man who lacks sparkle and who does not give the impression of knowing what the Foreign Ministry is all about. [REDACTED]

Pastor received his Air Force commission in 1945, after having graduated from the National Military College and the Military Aviation School. He was a member of the Argentine Air Mission in the United States from 1956 to 1957. During the 1960s he served as secretary general of the Aeronautics Secretariat, vice chief of staff for plans, chief of plans, and director of Air Force personnel in the Air Operations Command. Because he was strongly anti-Peronist, when former President (1943-55) Juan Perón returned to power in 1973, Pastor was replaced without being given a new assignment and was thus forced to retire. He remained out of public life for the next five years. [REDACTED]

Pastor, who will be 55 on 4 July, is married to the sister of President Videla's wife. He has at least two children. He speaks Italian. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CR M 79-13549  
18 June 1979

30

██████████  
Orlando Ramón AGOSTI Echenique  
(Phonetic: ahGOSTee)

ARGENTINA

Member, Ruling Junta  
(since March 1976)

Addressed as:  
General Agosti



Commander in Chief of the Air Force since December 1975, Brig. Gen. Orlando Agosti became a member of the three-man military junta after the coup that overthrew President María de Perón's government on 24 March 1976. Agosti is a competent and professional military officer, but he does not seem comfortable in his role as a high-ranking government official--he would rather deal with strictly military matters than with affairs of state. The junior member of the junta, Agosti is also the least assertive.

Agosti has enjoyed a long personal relationship with President Jorge Videla. Reared in the same small town in Buenos Aires Province and friends since childhood, the two men were both assigned to Washington, D.C., in the early 1960s. Agosti, however, favors a more conservative approach to governing Argentina than does Videla, and for this reason he appears to be more closely allied with the third member of the junta, Adm. Emilio Massera.

Agosti is favorably disposed toward the United States. US officials find him approachable and willing to discuss US-Argentine military relations, but he avoids more controversial topics (such as the human rights issue). He is not easily swayed from his convictions and becomes defensive when he feels his country is being attacked unjustly.

Agosti behaves with an air of importance but not affectation. He responds best to honesty and candor. He is a golfing enthusiast. He speaks moderately good English. Agosti, 53, is married and has a son and a daughter.

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[REDACTED]

Emilio Eduardo MASSERA Padula  
(Phonetic: maSEHra)

ARGENTINA

Commander in Chief of the  
Navy; Member, Ruling Junta

Addressed as:  
Admiral Massera



Adm. Emilio Massera has been Commander in Chief of the Navy since 1973. As such, he is one of the triumvirate of armed forces commanders who compose the military junta that has governed Argentina since March 1976. As the most senior of the three service chiefs, Massera presides over the junta's meetings, although he is not its President.

The most politically ambitious of the junta's members, Massera has engaged in political maneuverings and support-building efforts--presumably with an eye to seeking the Presidency for himself as a civilian, should elections be called in the next few years. Such moves have generated problems for President Jorge Videla: Massera has aligned himself with the more conservative, hard-line elements within the armed forces who are dissatisfied with Videla's moderate approach to governing.

Massera is friendly toward the United States. He served in this country as an adviser to the Inter-American Defense Board during 1963-64, and he was later a student at the Inter-American Defense College. His latest visit to this country was in February 1975, when he met with the US Chief of Naval Operations and received the Legion of Merit medal.

Massera, 52, is an intelligent, competent and professional officer. He has a strong, forceful personality, an excellent sense of humor, and an easy and articulate conversational manner. He likes to read, and he enjoys yachting, skin diving and horseracing. Massera is married to the former Delia Esther Vieyra and has two sons. He speaks limited French and English.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CR M 77-15698  
8 November 1977



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ARGENTINA

José Alfredo MARTINEZ DE HOZ, Jr.

*Minister of Economy*

A prominent businessman and attorney, José Martínez de Hoz (pronounced marTEEness day OHS) became Minister of Economy in March 1976, after a military coup that overthrew the government of President María de Perón. He is a wealthy businessman who has not held public office since 1963, when he served briefly in the position he holds today. One of the two civilians in the nine-man Cabinet, Martínez de Hoz is also one of the most influential members of the government; he has the full support of President Jorge Videla. Martínez de Hoz is an intelligent, hardworking and conscientious professional. He is a good listener and seems willing to hear other viewpoints, although his own are colored by his background as a member of one of Argentina's leading families. The current military leaders consider him to be apolitical, but he considers himself to be a political conservative; during the 1972-73 presidential election he headed the small, conservative centrist Partido Federalista de Centro. In October 1975 it was said that Martínez de Hoz was a member of one of several civilian groups that were working to bring about some type of military intervention in the Peronist government, though he did not necessarily favor a direct takeover.



(1976)

**The Economy Under Martínez De Hoz**

Referred to in Argentine terms as an economic liberal, Martínez de Hoz favors a private-enterprise, market-oriented economy. He advocates "relaxed" government participation and supervision in all economic activities. Martínez de Hoz stresses agricultural development. His policies are growth-oriented; during 1976 he emphasized the expansion of meat and grain exports, with export diversification to come at a later date. His program encourages private domestic and foreign investment.

Faced with an economic crisis of monumental proportions at the time of his appointment, Martínez de Hoz has gradually been implementing a tough stabilization program. Restraints on wages and cuts in government spending achieved remarkable success in bringing inflation under control: The monthly inflation rate dropped from 38% in March 1976 to less than 3% in June, and although it has risen since then, it is still well below the March rate. Real wages have declined drastically, however, producing labor restlessness.



[REDACTED]

Martínez de Hoz has also had dramatic success in reducing the budget deficit and has staved off default on Argentina's foreign debt. In 1976 he negotiated nearly US \$1 billion in commercial loans from financial institutions in the United States, Canada and Western Europe and obtained \$300 million from the International Monetary Fund.

Committed to attracting foreign investment, Martínez de Hoz has supervised the drafting of a new and liberal foreign investment law. He has settled some long-standing disputes arising from nationalization of some foreign enterprises by previous governments.

### Attitude Toward the United States

Martínez de Hoz is a friend and admirer of the United States. He is well and favorably known to US officials in Buenos Aires and Washington. In June 1976 he visited this country on a financial mission and met with then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and with then Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, whom he had met previously at the meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank in Cancún, Mexico, in May.

### An Early Achiever

José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, Jr., was born into a wealthy ranching family in Buenos Aires on 13 August 1925. An excellent scholar, he graduated in 1949 from the School of Law and Social Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires with the best grades in the department. In 1952 he attended a course in English Common Law for foreign attorneys at Cambridge University.

Entering public life in 1956, Martínez de Hoz was appointed minister of economy, finance and public works in Salta Province. During 1957-58 he was president of the influential National Grain Board. During the early 1960's Martínez de Hoz served as an adviser to the Minister of Economy; in 1962 he became Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock; and in 1963 he served briefly as Minister of Economy. He has also taught from time to time at the University of La Plata.

Since 1964 Martínez de Hoz has been involved primarily in business activities. He has held such positions as: president of the Petrosur fertilizer company; board chairman of Industria Argentina de Aceros, S.A., a steel manufacturing complex; board member of Compañía Italo Argentina de Electricidad, S.A.; and member of the Latin American Advisory Board of Westinghouse Electric Company. During 1964-67 he also served as president of the Argentine sector of the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production.





**Personal Data**

Energetic and at times intense, the Minister is honest and straightforward. He has an attractive and unassuming manner and is an excellent public speaker. He speaks fluent English in addition to his native Spanish.

Martinez de Hoz is married to the former Elvira Bullrich and has three children.

CIA/DDI/OCR



3 February 1977



38

[REDACTED]

José Alfredo MARTINEZ DE HOZ  
(Phonetic: marTEEnehs day ohs)

ARGENTINA

Minister of Economy  
(since March 1976)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Minister



A prominent businessman and attorney, José Martínez de Hoz is the architect of the military government's economic austerity program. One of the most influential members of the government, he exercises complete control over the economy and has the full support of President Jorge Videla. Martínez de Hoz is a strong advocate of a private enterprise, market-oriented economy. Intelligent and hard working, he is a conscientious professional. He is a good listener and is willing to hear other viewpoints--his own opinions are often colored by his background as a member of one of Argentina's leading families.

Faced with an economic crisis of monumental proportions at the time of his appointment, Martínez de Hoz has gradually been implementing a tough stabilization program. Restraints on wages and cuts in government spending have achieved remarkable success in reducing inflation. While given high marks as a "pure economist," the Minister has been criticized for lacking sensitivity to political realities and failing to adequately consider the social cost of the austerity measures. He is a strong proponent of foreign investment and is knowledgeable about and stresses agricultural development. Martínez de Hoz is a friend and admirer of the United States. He is well and favorably known to US officials and businessmen in Buenos Aires and Washington.

Energetic and at times intense, Martínez de Hoz, 51, is honest and straightforward. He has an attractive and unassuming manner and is an excellent public speaker. He speaks fluent English. He is married and has three children.

CR M 77-12220  
5 May 1977

[REDACTED]



1



# Visiting Hemisphere Leaders



RP 77-10231  
September 2, 1977

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## Visiting Hemisphere Leaders



*Central Intelligence Agency  
Directorate of Intelligence*

*September 2, 1977*

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Argentina. . . . . 3

Non Responsive




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## INTRODUCTION

Most of the Latin American chiefs of state will seize the opportunity of next week's bilateral discussions to speak forcefully and candidly on a number of issues. The southern cone leaders--Argentina and Chile, especially--will be quick to point out that they do not believe they are being given credit in Washington for the progress they have made on the human rights front during the past year. These leaders will be somewhat strident in proclaiming that they have been engaged in a virtual civil war with leftist extremists and will plead for the US to be "understanding" and "realistic" in pursuing its human rights policies.

Non Responsive



**ARGENTINA**



President Jorge Rafael VIDELA  
(phonetic: veeDEHla)

[REDACTED]

ARGENTINA

President Jorge Rafael VIDELA (pronounced veeDEHla), a political moderate, has successfully held off elements within the Argentine military who have urged a more vigorous attack against subversives. Videla--sophisticated, urbane, but overly methodical--is acutely aware that human rights violations have occurred since the March 1976 coup that deposed the government of President Peron. In recent months, excesses against the terrorists have diminished, but illegal activities not sanctioned by the government continue to occur. The regime is now trying to bring these actions under control.

President Videla appears to be sincere in his efforts to remove the human rights problem as an issue of contention with the US. He does, however, have to contend with a belief among the military as a whole that Argentine society was on the brink of destruction at the hands of leftist insurgents. Often referred to as a moralist, Videla is a man of great integrity.

[REDACTED]

He has correctness, honesty and puritanism elevated to extreme limits." He loathes corruption and is a deeply religious man.

The son of an infantry colonel, Videla rose through the ranks to become commanding general of the army in August 1975. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Videla is very polite and, though he sometimes appears timid, seems always to have a big smile and a ready handshake. Videla does not like to hear off-color stories and does not like to discuss his job, the infantry, or his children. He speaks English poorly.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] His physical appearance has earned him the nickname of "El Hueso" (the bone).



Although Videla is chief of state, the supreme governing authority belongs to a three-man military junta representing the three services. Videla, as the army's representative, is the most powerful member of the triumvirate; the two other service chiefs are Navy Commander Admiral Emilio Massera and Air Force Chief Brigadier General Orlando Agosti.

Videla has not proved to be a strong and dynamic President. His style is to proceed cautiously and avoid confrontations if possible. The President has been criticized both for his lack of assertiveness and for his administrative failure to centralize authority. There are no indications of an immediate threat to his government, but conservative elements within the armed forces are not pleased with his moderate, go-slow approach.

Partly because of differences of opinion, but primarily because Videla has not given an appearance of being firmly in command, since late 1976, there has been considerable inter-service rivalry and resulting tension within the junta and the government. Admiral Massera, the most politically ambitious and astute of the triumvirate, was quick to challenge Videla's authority and has been a disruptive influence within the executive branch.

Since the March 1976 coup, Videla's government has had considerable success in controlling leftist terrorism and reviving the ailing economy. Grave problems remain, however, in both of these priority areas.

With Videla's strong backing, Minister of Economy Jose Martinez de Hoz has had significant success in reviving the economy. The inflation rate, which was nearly 400 percent during the first half of 1976, was down to little more than 100 percent in the second half, without a sharp rise in unemployment. Because of the Videla government's high degree of political credibility at the time of the coup, \$1 billion was available in foreign loans to alleviate a severe balance-of-payments crisis. The exchange

[REDACTED]

rate was adjusted to maintain export competitiveness, foreign exchange reserves were replenished, and a significant trade surplus replaced the large deficit of 1975.

Argentina still has a fiscal deficit, and Videla has been personally criticized for failing to decrease the swollen public payroll. A more immediate concern, however, is the growing restiveness of labor, which is paying through a decline in real wages for the government's stabilization program.

In bilateral discussions, Videla will stress that the human rights situation in Argentina is beginning to improve. He probably will state that Argentina's democratic institutions were in jeopardy and that a heavy hand was necessary to correct this situation. Videla probably will recall the recent visits of Human Rights Coordinator Derien and Assistant Secretary Todman and the fact that they were able to talk to a wide spectrum of Argentines. He will also note that the Argentine military has no pretensions of remaining in power indefinitely.

Another issue that he may bring up is Argentina's problem with US foreign military sales assistance. The government's decision on 31 August to cancel participation in the UNITAS XVIII fleet exercise no doubt reflects in large part dismay over US policies, particularly the provisions of the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment denying all military cooperation after 30 September 1978. Government officials are also upset over interruptions in the flow of spare parts for equipment already purchased, the closing of the US military group in Argentina while one remains in Brazil, and the conditions imposed on the prospective Argentine purchase of helicopters.

Domestic politics also enter into the UNITAS decision. Videla has been under severe criticism from military hard-liners for being too accommodating to recent US official visitors. The hard-liners' arguments questioned Videla's

prestige and linked the UNITAS-US arms policies issue with Argentine nationalism and pride. Timing of the announcement probably is deliberately related to the President's US trip. Cancellation after the visit would have been viewed as an admission that the trip was a failure and inaction seen as another example of accommodation.

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Significant Intelligence:

Argentina: Ambassador Castro reported on a meeting with Foreign Ministry officials after his return from consultations in which they continued to take a pessimistic view of US relations. He comments that it is still apparent that President Videla and General Viola are not letting the Foreign Office know of their contacts with the Embassy. ~~(C)~~

Non Responsive



Non Responsive



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Jorge Antonio AJA ESPIL  
(Phonetic: AHha ehsPEEL)

ARGENTINA

Ambassador to the United  
States (since January 1977)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Ambassador



An attorney and diplomat, Jorge Antonio Aja Espil is a friend and relative by marriage of President Jorge Videla. He enjoys the President's support but probably does not have much influence in the relatively closed, military-dominated government. The Ambassador has been described as tough, efficient and sometimes inflexible and has impressed US officials as sharp, intelligent and well informed. Little known before his current appointment, he expressed enthusiasm for the new assignment.

Aja Espil is the second Ambassador named to Washington by the military junta. Like his predecessor, who resigned after only 3 months, he has to deal with considerable criticism as a result of his government's poor human rights record. He recognizes the deterioration in US-Argentine relations over the human rights issue and is undoubtedly concerned about it, but he has not taken a strong stand on the matter. Much of his time as Ambassador is taken up by the unenviable task of explaining human rights problems, and he tries to defend his government as best he can. Aja Espil served for a number of years with the Advisory Committee on Human Rights of the National Commission for UNESCO, and he has a dispassionate and legalistic approach to problems--an attribute that probably is advantageous to him as Ambassador.

The 56-year-old Aja Espil has served both military and civilian governments. His last Foreign Ministry post was that of Ambassador to Colombia (1971-73). Aja Espil speaks some English. Married, he has two grown children.

CR M 77-13958  
12 August 1977

[REDACTED]

9 May 1977

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*File  
Terrorism*

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone


The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly carry out operations against subversives on each other's soil. This effort, dubbed "Operation Condor", is not publicly known. One aspect of the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to foreign security services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of cooperation in Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange of intelligence information by governments facing a common problem is a routine practice throughout the world.

The military-controlled governments of the Southern Cone all consider themselves targets of international Marxism. Having endured real and perceived threats from leftist terrorists, these governments believe that the very foundations of their societies are threatened. In most cases, government leaders seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of suspected subversives, but control over security forces generally is not tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated. Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long way toward explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law, for instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In addition, most Latin American constitutions have provisions for states of seige or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments' powers of arrest, detention, and censorship.

There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security officers on government business from one country to the other.

Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay,

  
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Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. The JCR [REDACTED] coordinates activities and provides propaganda and logistical support for its members. The Junta has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involved in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last May and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974. The attache had been involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros, a member group of JCR.

Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was intensified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more detailed, long-range plans. Decisions included:

- The development of a basic computerized data bank in Santiago. All members will contribute information on known or suspected terrorists.
- Brazil agreed to provide gear for "Condortel" -- the group's communications network.

[REDACTED]

The basic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was "to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non-terrorists also were reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of Amnesty International were mentioned as targets. Ferreira may have been removed from the list, however, because he is considered to have good contacts among US congressmen. A training course was held in Buenos Aires for the team heading overseas. More recently Condor leaders were considering the dispatch of a team to London -- disguised as businessmen -- to monitor "suspicious activity" in Europe. Another proposal under study included the collection of material on the membership, location, and political activities of human rights groups in order to identify and expose their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to be collected on church and third-world groups.

Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last May, for example, armed men ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic Commission on Immigration and stole records containing information on thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not investigate the crime -- a signal that Latin refugees, principally from Chile and Uruguay were no longer welcome. A month later, 24 Chilean and Uruguayan refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted



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their interrogators were security officers from Chile and Uruguay. A number of Uruguayans were held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military officers offered to spare them their lives if they would agree to allow themselves to be "captured" by authorities -- as if they were an armed group attempting to invade the country. Moreover, two prominent political exiles in Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances.

Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign. These programs heavily use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists. By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs aim to secure the support of the citizenry in the hope they will report anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to another -- without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source. For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that allegedly support leftist movements. Bolivia will collect information on the groups and then send it to Argentina for publication.

The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype. Member countries communicate via radio and each is required to maintain an open channel.

Condor suffers from some organizational inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectiveness. Condor has tightened security measures

Security has been strengthened at Condor's operations center in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been increased. In addition, once a Condor member has declined to participate in an operation, he is excluded from all further details of that particular plan. Hence, less active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia may not be aware of many operations.

Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation between other security organizations in the region also is strong. For example, intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countries primarily to identify subversives in exile.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
National Foreign Assessment Center  
6 November 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SOUTHERN CONE PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICIES

Summary

The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view of US policies toward Latin America. Their perspective is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccupation since the mid 1960s with other parts of the world has left the US out of touch with Latin American realities. They view US policy toward their region as inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive. There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the US has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing its ability to lead the West.

*This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. It was requested by the NSC Staffer for Latin America.*

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Many of the differences between the US and the Southern Cone nations have historical origins. At the present time, however, each country in the area has specific grievances against the US, with the most common problem being human rights. The military leaders of the region believe that security against leftist terrorism and international Communism takes precedence over personal well-being and individual freedom. Most of these leaders are convinced that intervention by the military prevented a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic development and a slow, incremental approach toward democratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated national weaknesses. For the countries that have experienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for national survival has been very real. All of the Southern Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion, and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights policies.

The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their poor image in the world press and in international forums, where their military leaders are commonly described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilian official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers that the Israelis were praised for staging a raid into Uganda against terrorists, while counterterrorist activities in Brazil were denounced by the US press.

Leaders in the Southern Cone believe that investigations by unofficial and official organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human Rights are overzealous and misguided, and that US policymakers accept these findings uncritically. They deplore the United States' selective attention to Latin America while it ignores human rights violations in Communist countries.

This does not mean that US human rights policy has had a completely negative impact on the area. On the

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contrary, police and military officials in these countries are now sensitized to human rights considerations. Every chief of state in the area claims to have made clear to his subordinates that torture and arbitrary arrest will no longer be tolerated. All of these countries have shown general improvement during the past year in their treatment of prisoners.

From their perspective, however, these improvements go unacknowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent of criticism, adversary treatment, and antagonistic US legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the US is playing a game with them—using human rights as a way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed, return to "democratic government" is the real issue, their answer is that competitive politics is not possible in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable until the various military regimes are convinced that they have established economic progress and ensured the permanence of political changes they have brought about. Continued US pressure to speed up the process will probably only increase the bitterness and recrimination.

#### Public Views of US Policies

It is much more difficult to get an accurate reading of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most citizens seem to support the military governments; the rest are either unconcerned with politics or belong to a declared opposition. The Chilean Government probably enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the plebiscite vote held there earlier this year, even though rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this support.

Judging from newspaper commentary and personal conversations, US human rights policy has had little impact on the general populace. Some political groups that have long opposed the various governments and other groups representing civil and human rights causes have used the policy to air their own specific grievances.

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Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar to their own programs.

### Argentina

The human rights issue is the major point of contention between Argentina and the US. Senior Argentine officials view human rights abuses as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship. Current US policy is perceived by the Argentines as a sign that the US considers good bilateral relations to be expendable. They believe that this policy is selective and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for "punishment" regardless of their internal problems. Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it would also understand the government's tough measures.

Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating, the government is attempting to wind down its massive security operations and exert tighter controls over police and military units. It has ordered the release of many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal procedures, and the government has strengthened requirements for proper police identification. In an effort to appease its critics, the government has published several lists of those arrested or under detention and is making a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter-American Human Rights Committee has been invited to visit the country, possibly between March and May 1979.

The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of

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foreign military sales, the reduction in the size of the US military mission, the nonappropriation of training funds, and the lack of authorization for Argentina to pay for military training in the US. Buenos Aires has been concerned about the recently implemented Humphrey-Kennedy amendment that prohibits foreign military purchases, export licenses, and training. The State Department's recent decision to authorize a small military training contract for noncombatants alleviated some of the tension, but Senator Kennedy's letter to President Carter protesting the decision is sure to rankle Buenos Aires.

Another problem is the Argentine plan for an "experimental" plutonium reprocessing plant, [REDACTED]. The decision runs counter to President Carter's desire to curb the spread of proliferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, contending that it discriminates against countries without nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and the US will have to relent in its current policy. Meanwhile, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can independently decide whether or not to reprocess.

The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet expansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more active role in the nonaligned movement to counter Cuban activities. The hardline attitude is taken by Army General Agosti, who commented earlier this year that Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead without anybody's help or advice" and that something should be done about Africa.

There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos Aires against the US over the Export-Import Bank decision not to finance equipment exports for the Yacreta Dam project. The Export-Import Bank's change of mind on this issue has lessened the hue and cry, but many military men

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think that the financing turnaround is somehow linked to the visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Linking the Export-Import Bank financing with other problems with the US, many Argentine leaders seem determined to begin redirecting their country's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Montes, for example, played up Argentina's potential as a nuclear supplier during his recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers, meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abrogating the Rio defense pact and expelling the US military group.

### Brazil

Brazil's foreign policy reflects its very real great power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is working to achieve and demonstrate independence of the US in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but resentment of US human rights and nuclear proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance last year of military ties with Washington.

Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted intrusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic demands for basic changes. While President Geisel and President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberalization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring habeas corpus in many political and national security cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime sweeping dictatorial powers.

Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that the country's economic well-being is still fragile and

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vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend to view certain US trade positions--such as countervailing duties--as harmful to their development drive, fueled as it is by ever-expanding exports. This is especially true this year because poor agricultural performance has forced the government to concentrate on alleviating the balance of payments problem by promoting more exports of manufactured goods to developed nations. One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to basic Brazilian interests.

The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation concerns in a similar context, often saying that US opposition to the Brazil-West German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth. They point out the critical importance to them of non-fossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high cost of imported oil. Argentina's decision to develop reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt Brazil to follow suit.

Added to these specific problems with the US is the growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and the aftermath of its experience in Vietnam. The situation in Africa is perceived as the best current example of this development.

The US is viewed from an environment in which there is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses. At present the government is controlled and supported by a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the international Communist movement.

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The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist activity in the country and the growing civil rights movement among the black population. The Brazilian church has also been a factor through its long championing of the human rights cause and its protests against government policies. Nevertheless, like other Latin American countries, Brazilians in general adhere to authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service rhetorically questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil--the US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil's problems and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward democratic government rather than engage in constant and unproductive criticism.

### Chile

Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by this because it believes that it has made substantial progress in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to hear any favorable comment from Washington. President Pinochet is disappointed by the lack of US recognition of the improving situation in Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the same intensity as before he tried to make improvements. The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN Human Rights Committee's attempt to provide funds to "victims" of Chilean human rights violations.

Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for political prisoners and official consent for most exiles to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the

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intelligence service, which had been responsible for much of the abuse of human rights; civilian appointments to the cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the intelligence service; accelerated completion of a new constitution and advancement in the timetable for an elected government; preparation of a new labor code with plans to reinstitute collective bargaining next year; and the visit of the UN Human Rights Committee delegation.

The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional ally of the US and believes that Washington "encouraged" the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown, however, the military believes that the US was forced by domestic political concerns to become strongly critical of the new government and to deny any part in the coup.

The Chileans are now convinced that US-Chilean relations will never be the same. They believe that there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist Allende regime. They also think that the US is being overzealous in its prosecution of the Letelier case; the Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the "truth" in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nationalism is easily aroused. For example, a Washington Post editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be replaced by a Christian Democratic government was denounced in a series of man-in-the-street interviews and was described by nearly everyone as an unwarranted intrusion in Chilean affairs.

The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US human rights policy as made to order for their own campaign against the government. The Christian Democrats, in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier case will bring down Pinochet.

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While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly treated by Washington, there is still a strong pro-US feeling in the country. Military officers and civilian officials alike admire the US and would like their country eventually to evolve along US lines. Despite a current perception distrust of the US, the Chileans' great concern is that the poor relations between the two countries will deteriorate even further. The Chileans appear determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement against the US and continue to hope for better treatment. For example, Foreign Minister Cubillos recently devoted most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth the Chilean position in the Beagle Channel negotiations with Argentina. Despite the poor relations with the US, Cubillos clearly hoped that Washington would use its influence to soften Argentina's position in the dispute.

Cubillos went on to explain the evolutionary process of the return to democratic government in Chile. He acknowledged the Chilean belief that civilian government is impossible now, but pointed out that political institutionalization is under way. Cubillos' remarks and the general atmosphere in Santiago suggest that even though there are strong feelings in Chile favoring an accommodation with the US, there is little chance of a quick return to civilian rule. Not only has the government been successful in solving the country's chronic economic problems, there are strong memories of the political and economic chaos of the Allende years--in sum there is little desire to return the country to the politicians.

#### Paraguay

President Stroessner has been in power since 1954, and there appears to be little chance for any change in the policies that, in his view and in the view of many Paraguayans, have brought the country internal peace, stability, and economic progress. The Stroessner regime has a poor human rights record, but there is some evidence that improvements are being made and indications

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that combined Western diplomatic pressure is beginning to have an effect, however slight.

One recent example is the case of arrested human rights activist, Domingo Laino, in which the combined efforts of the US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France resulted in Laino's release from prison. Indeed, largely as a result of US pressure, Paraguay has released almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem because of the subservience of the judiciary to presidential authority and the lack of control over police interrogation methods.

The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last May that the Paraguayans were improving their human rights performance. He called the move by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits and the military training program for Paraguay from the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence.

The Paraguayan Government's public response to the US human rights policy has been negative. President Stroessner often cites his staunch anti-Communism as well as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan political elite are plainly worried by what they see as the US failure to meet the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa. They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They regard US criticism of their country as naive and an invasion of their domestic affairs.

Because of the extent of media censorship in the country, it is difficult to determine what the populace thinks of the Stroessner regime. The President appears to be personally popular, however, and his travels about the country are enthusiastically received by the citizens.

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A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely.

### Uruguay

Uruguay has taken some steps during the past year to improve human rights conditions, although the overall situation remains poor. The government retains extensive statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give up. On the average, fewer political arrests have been made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners. Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive controls and is far from independent, military courts are reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases and are ordering the release of increasing numbers of detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more freely--if cautiously--an expeditious return to civilian government.

Among the positive measures taken by the government are: permission for an American Bar Association visit in April; plans to publish a list of prisoners released since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the International Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground rules for a visit; and curtailment of prisoner detentions under emergency powers. Most indications are that the regime would like to improve its image abroad and will move steadily to change its human rights practices.

Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay may now be the region's most highly controlled society. To explain this, Uruguayan leaders point out that Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan military sees this battle as a defense of its national moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and has attempted to discredit the US through a well-managed media campaign.

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Many rightist military officers oppose the US and want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the other hand, General Gregorio Alvarez, the commander in chief of the Army who wants to be President some day, supports a new evaluation of the human rights situation and is moving cautiously to compel military officers to accept his reform measures. The strength of the rightist officers, however, should not be underestimated, however. Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive.

Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of ending its control of the government until 1986. Meanwhile, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together with US legislative and policy restrictions on economic and military assistance, are impediments to better relations. Uruguayans hope that a new, more positive attitude toward human rights will result in better relations with the US, but they insist that Washington should have no illusions about the prospects for an early return to civilian government.

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Jorge Rafael VIDELA  
(Phonetic; veeDEHla)

ARGENTINA

President; Member, Ruling  
Junta; Commander in Chief  
of the Army

Addressed as:  
Mr. President



On 24 March 1976  
Army Commander in Chief  
Lt. Gen. Jorge Videla led  
a long-awaited, bloodless  
coup against the govern-  
ment of President María  
de Perón. Five days later  
he was installed as Argen-  
tina's 39th President. As  
such he performs all the ceremonial duties of  
Chief of State, but the supreme governing authority  
belongs to a three-man military junta, representing  
the three services. Videla, as the representative  
of the army, is the most powerful member of the  
triumvirate.

Videla has not proved to be a strong and  
dynamic President, although most observers have  
described him as well intentioned. His style is  
to proceed cautiously and avoid confrontations if  
possible. The President has been criticized both  
for his lack of assertiveness and for his adminis-  
trative failure to centralize authority. There  
are no indications of an immediate threat to his  
government, but conservative elements within the  
armed forces are not pleased with his moderate,  
go-slow approach.

#### Actions as President

Videla inherited a situation close to chaos,  
with uncontrolled inflation and rampant terrorist  
activity. In the 17 months since then, both prob-  
lems have been significantly reduced, although not  
eliminated. The President travels extensively in  
Argentina and has met privately with representatives  
of the religious, scientific, business and rural  
communities, as well as with members of the press.  
He has also made several trips to other South  
American countries to strengthen relations.

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Attitude Toward  
the United States

The President is favorably disposed toward the United States. He has been to this country several times, most recently in late 1972 on an Argentine-sponsored observation tour. He has tried to improve Argentina's ties to this country and has acted quickly to solve many of the outstanding US investment problems there. Embassy officials have repeatedly told Videla of the US Government's concern regarding Argentine abuses of human rights, and he is attempting to improve his country's tarnished image.

Personal Data

Often referred to as a moralist, Videla has been described as a man of great integrity. He loathes corruption and will not tolerate any degree of it within the government. Videla is a deeply religious man and serves as a lay reader in his hometown Catholic parish.

Videla, 52, is very polite and, though he sometimes appears timid, seems always to have a big smile and a ready handshake. He does not like to hear off-color stories and does not like to discuss his job, the infantry, or his children. The President is tall, lean and sinewy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is married to the former Alicia Raquel Hartridge and is the father of seven children. He speaks English poorly.

Career Highlights

1971-72	Director, Argentine Military Academy
Jun-Dec 1973	Deputy commander, I Corps
Dec 1973-May 1975	Chief of Staff, Army General Staff
Aug 1975-date	Commander in Chief of the Army
Mar 1976-date	President; Member, Ruling Junta

31 August 1977



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Jorge Rafael VIDELA  
(Phonetic: veeDEHla)

ARGENTINA

President; Member, Ruling  
Military Junta (since  
March 1976)

Addressed as:  
Mr. President



On 24 March 1976, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Jorge Videla led a long-awaited, bloodless coup against the government of President María de Perón. Five days later he was installed as Argentina's 39th President. As such, he performs all the ceremonial duties of the Chief of State, but he shares supreme governing authority with the other members of the three-man military junta, which represents the three services. Videla inherited a country in near chaos, with uncontrolled inflation and rampant terrorist activity. Under his government, both problems have been significantly reduced, although not eliminated. Videla does not believe that his campaign against the terrorists has resulted in violations of human rights, although he admits that some "excesses" may have been committed.

Videla has made several trips to other South American countries to improve relations. In September 1977 he visited the United States for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty. He was pleased with his reception here and felt that he received a fair hearing for his country's position on bilateral issues.

Often referred to as a moralist, Videla is a man of great integrity.

Videla loathes corruption and will not tolerate any degree of it in his government. A deeply religious man, he serves as a lay reader in his hometown Catholic parish. The President, 52, is married and has seven children. He speaks poor English.

CR M 77-15713  
9 November 1977

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~  
Evening Report

July 24, 1978

147

Significant Intelligence: (Pastor)

Bolivia: In the wake of the coup that put Pereda in power a variety of reports pose decisions. Ambassador Boeker has recommended that we hold up all assistance for FY 78 pending clarification of the Pereda government's intentions. Perez of Venezuela has written to Carter proposing that the OAS be asked to urge that new elections be held. The Embassy summarized events: "No one could plan a debacle so complete. Bolivia backed into it by a day-to-day succession of disjointed decisions." (C)

Chile: [REDACTED] Army generals backed Pinochet's move to oust Air Force Junta member Gustavo Leigh. Embassy reports that Leigh had hoped to hang on until Letelier indictments were issued, trusting that they would shift balance of opinion in his favor and that Pinochet knowing this appears to now be making his move. (C)

Ecuador: Embassy and DIA reporting indicate that military is determined to allow Roldes to participate in run-off election. Embassy reports that Poveda and the Navy are determined to have a clean election. A DIA summary sees some possibility of tinkering the outcome for the second slot in the run-off since Huerta would have a better chance of defeating Roldes than the current apparent second place candidate Duran. (C)

Argentina: Ambassador Castro indicates that Videla and Viola are moving to respond to the IAHR letter concerning the potential visit. General Bignone, Army Secretary General, indicated such a visit would be positive and that Videla and others would do battle with the recalcitrant Foreign Office as necessary. (C)

Argentina: On other subjects the Embassy reports that the Supreme Court ruled that Timerman, former editor of La Opinion, could not be detained under one of the charges against him. The other is still pending. Also, the fallout from Ex-Im rejection of a credit for Argentina continues. The latest repercussion was the refusal of a leading Argentine economist who is a prime candidate to replace Martinez de Hoz to accept an IV grant from the US. (C)

Dominican Republic: Antonio Guzman called a US Embassy official to report his (Guzman's) intention to challenge the Dominican military immediately after his election. Balaguer has been assigning particularly supportive military men to high positions, two of whom are obnoxious to Guzman. He intends to fire them and wants to be assured of our support should this provoke the military. (S-Exdis)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT VIDELA OF ARGENTINA

Rome, Italy, September 4, 1978

CHECKLIST

Addressed as Mr. President -- Videla (pronounced Vee-DAY-lah)

- Mr. President, President Carter and I welcomed our meeting one year ago at the time of the Panama Canal treaty signing. We are concerned that the relationship between the United States and Argentina has become strained in recent months. I am pleased to have this opportunity to review our relationship with you.
- (Probable opening for Videla to make his opening statement.)
- Let me reaffirm that we seriously wish to improve relations, and to take steps that will lead to such improvement.
- As a token of our interest we have taken steps to release export licenses for ambulance aircraft, army helicopters, airport radar equipment and other items.
- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of individuals in Argentina.
- While we want better relations, we are constrained by human rights standards.
- We are not trying to pick your government or to interfere in your internal affairs, we are not trying to run you -- you must help us on this human rights issue.
- I would note our deep concern over the plight of individuals such as Jacob Timerman. I would note the importance that we believe must be attached to satisfactory arrangements for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arrangements satisfactory to the Commission.

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- We are prepared to examine all aspects of our relationship to find areas for improvement, and vital to this is progress by Argentina on the human rights front, e.g., announcement of a visit by the Human Rights Commission, announcement of release of prisoners.
- I would note, for example, in terms of our bilateral interests that we must take a decision on the Allis-Chalmers bid by September 15; we must take decisions on bilateral military training by October 1.
- If there can be a public announcement of progress by your government on the human rights front prior to these dates, it would be extremely helpful for us - we would, of course, not publicly link your announcement to actions we might take to improve our relations.
- Further, we believe that we should have a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.
- The place and format for such consultations would be for you, Mr. President, to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires.
- Mr. President, I will take your message back personally to President Carter and Secretary Vance.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~HUMAN RIGHTS

The 1978 human rights record of the military junta led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better, than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. Serious violations still occur, however, raising questions about the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures that Argentine officials insist be recognized as "fundamental improvements."

There is no evidence available to us that would indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the treatment of political-security cases is in sight. ↗

On the positive side:

- An apparent, although unverifiable, decline in the rate of disappearances has occurred since mid-1977. Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights activists believe that the rate has declined. If true, this is the most important development listed here.
- Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook serial publication (nine lists to date) of the names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) prisoners acknowledged as detained.
- The "right of option" program has been implemented, enabling executive detainees to petition for exile in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 prisoners have so far departed under this procedure, however.
- Responsive action has been taken on cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest, e.g., Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and the Deutchs.
- Attempts reportedly have been made by some security authorities to regularize detention procedures, return counterterrorist troops to normal military activities, and demilitarize the police.

Despite positive development, there is general agreement that the human rights situation in Argentina is one of the very worst in the Western Hemisphere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS


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Jorge Rafael VIDELA  
(Phonetic: veeDEHla)

ARGENTINA

President (since  
March 1976)

Addressed as:  
Mr. President



On 31 July 1978 Lt. Gen. Jorge Videla retired from his post as Commander in Chief of the Army and member of the ruling junta to become the civilian President of Argentina. Before his retirement he had served as military President and junta member since the March 1976 coup that overthrew President Maria de Peron. As such, he performed the ceremonial duties of chief of state, but he shared governing authority with the other members of the three-man junta, which represents the three services. Videla's new relationship with the junta is as yet unclear.

When Videla first became President, he inherited a country in near chaos, with uncontrolled inflation and rampant terrorist activity. Both problems have been significantly reduced under his government, but not eliminated.

In the past two and a half years, Videla has traveled extensively in Argentina and has met privately with representatives of religious, scientific, business and rural communities, as well as with members of the press. He has also made trips to other South American countries to strengthen relations. Videla came to the United States several times before becoming civilian President: in September 1977 he visited this country for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.

#### Early Life and Career

Jorge Rafael Videla was born into an army family on 2 August 1925 in the city of Mercedes in Buenos Aires Province. At 16 he entered the National Military College, where he was commissioned in 1944 as an infantry officer. His

(cont.)

CR M 78-14435




of corruption and his religious devotion are legend-

first post was with the 14th Infantry Regiment in the central Province of Córdoba. In 1946 he was a lieutenant in the Vigilance Company in the Ministry of War; and for the next two years he served with the Motorized Army Regiment. Joining the Military College in 1948 as an instructor, he gained a reputation as an excellent teacher and a stern, self-denying taskmaster. Rising to the rank of captain, he attended the Higher School of War during 1951-54 and then returned to the Military College as a staff officer.

Videla was posted to the United States from 1956 to 1958 as adviser to the Office of the Military Attache in the Argentine Embassy; at the same time he served as an adviser to the Inter-American Defense Board. He was promoted to colonel in 1965. From 1962 to 1968 he was a staff officer in the Army General Command. He was appointed chief of the cadet corps in 1968 and, as a brigadier general, served as the commandant of the Military Academy from 1971 to 1973.

Videla served as chief of staff of the Army General Staff from December 1973 until May 1975 and then was unassigned for two months, undoubtedly because Mrs. Perón's advisers saw him as a potential coup organizer. In July they agreed to have him serve as chief of the Joint Staff, hoping to keep him in a relatively weak post. A few weeks later a confrontation between the military and the government over the appointment of the Minister of the Interior forced the Commander in Chief of the Army to resign, and in August 1975 Videla was chosen as a compromise candidate to succeed him.



Personal Data


Videla is a lifelong professional soldier of unquestioned integrity, a strict moralist of the old school, and a devout Roman Catholic. His hatred.

Oscar Antonio MONTES  
(Phonetic: MOHNtehs)

ARGENTINA

Minister of Foreign  
Affairs and Worship  
(since 1977)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Minister



Vice Adm. Oscar Montes served as chief of naval operations of the Navy General Staff from 1974 until he assumed his current post. Montes' routine naval career (primarily ship-board duty) gave him little experience in foreign affairs or government administration. Since his appointment as Foreign Minister, however, he has become a spokesman for Argentina's positions on such international issues as human rights and nuclear power. In an October 1977 speech at the UN General Assembly, Montes defended Argentina's human rights policies and accused terrorist groups of being the main violators of human rights. He also discussed the subject with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the latter's visit to Argentina in November 1977.

In May 1978 Montes attended the UN Conference on Disarmament in New York, where he discussed Argentina's nuclear plans and program.

In May 1977 Montes signed a trade and maritime transport agreement with China. Montes traveled to Romania in July 1978 to discuss trade and the exchange of science and technology. He has accepted an invitation to visit the USSR later this year for the same purpose. These overtures toward Communist countries are seen by many US officials as a reaction to the proposed US cutoff of military assistance and sales to Argentina in September 1978.

Montes, about 53, is married and has several children. He understands some English but speaks only Spanish.

CR M 78-14050  
15 August 1978



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6104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
January 22, 1980

MEMO FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: GARY SICK *GS*

SUBJECT: SCC Checklist

1. Sanctions. Did the President approve delay of announcement of Iran sanctions until after the Islamic Conference this weekend?
2. Olympics. Results of efforts to stop the AAU boxing team. Reaction of allies?
3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. How did Vance's briefing yesterday go? Reaction of SFRC to the Pakistan package.
4. Pakistan Consortium. Results of yesterday's meeting. What are our next steps in preparing for the Political Directors meeting Friday?
5. Argentina. Status of emissary.
6. Military Facilities. Is the political team going next week? Have the terms of reference been worked out?
7. B-52. What was the Soviet reaction? Should we do it again? Regularly?
8. Military Deployments. It would be useful to have a brief update on the status of our carrier deployments, location of Marines, reconnaissance flights over Yemen.
9. Intelligence. Did President approve the Carlucci instructions and related findings?

*Chavira?*  
*2800*

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

January 22, 1980

6104 13

Time and Place: 9:00 - 9:45 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran, Olympics, Pakistan, Argentina, Yugoslavia,  
Intelligence, Military Deployments and  
Bartholomew/Murray Mission

Participants:

State

Deputy Secretary Christopher  
David Newsom  
Harold Saunders

Vice President's Office

Denis Clift

White House

David Aaron  
Hedley Donovan  
Hamilton Jordan (briefly)  
Lloyd Cutler

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown  
Graham Claytor

CIA

Admiral Turner  
Frank Carlucci

NSC

William Odom  
Gary Sick  
Thomas Thornton

JCS

General David Jones  
Lt. General John Pustay

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Iran Sanctions. The President approved the SCC recommendation of yesterday that the announcement be delayed until after the Islamic Conference this weekend. The group agreed that if the date of the Islamic Conference should slip, we will take another look at the timing of an announcement. State will notify Saudi Arabia of the decision to delay. ~~(c)~~

2. Olympics. Mr. Cutler reported to the group. We are beginning to get some support from a number of foreign governments, although the Olympic Committees are unanimously opposed. Congressman Zablocki will introduce a resolution of support for the President. Cutler and Onek will attend the weekend meeting of the U. S. Olympic Committee. Canada appears to be the most promising alternative site. The Canadian problems are twofold: money, and the fact that the Olympic Village is now gone. The SCC thought that public fundraising should be a realistic source of the necessary money, which is estimated to be in the tens of millions. Accommodations appear to be manageable if the two large universities in Montreal are made available. Moreover, the U.S. Moscow team had intended to train in West Berlin and then fly into Moscow as required. The same thing could be done

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Review on January 22, 2000  
Classified and Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Reason: NSC 1.13(f) (b)

~~SECRET~~

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in Montreal using accommodations in New England. All of the basic facilities and TV support are in place. Prime Minister Clark has said he supports the President's position. This subject will be added to Phil Habib's agenda while he is in Canada. ~~(S)~~

3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Christopher reported briefly on the closed session meeting yesterday. Senators Pell, McGovern and Church are on the cautionary side on the Afghanistan package, with the Republicans on the other side. Senator Glenn is interested in retaining our non-proliferation policy to the extent possible but he understands the problem. The SFRC staff has raised some questions about the legislative history of the 1959 Executive Agreement. The problems are not entirely clear, but they evidently relate to explanatory letters sent to the SFRC at the time of the Agreement which denigrate the extent of the commitment. The State Department Legal Advisor is looking into this and we may wish to prepare an opinion within the next few days which would strengthen the commitment. ~~(S)~~

4. Pakistan Arms and Aid Consortia. State is putting together a proposed package which will define the total effort we seek. It now appears that the total economic package will amount to \$1-1.5 billion and the military package about \$1 billion or more, depending on inclusion of high performance aircraft. This will be reviewed tomorrow. ~~(S)~~

5. Pakistan Debt Relief. Henry Owen's group will report on this issue for the SCC tomorrow. ~~(S)~~

6. Military Political Teams to Pakistan. The ball is presently in Pakistan's court. We have told the Pakistanis that a military survey team will be prepared to go whenever they are ready. The military team can go together with Mr. Christopher following the Islamic Conference, or independently. The Clifford mission to India will be announced at noon today, and we will notify the Pakistanis in advance. ~~(S)~~

7. Argentina. General Goodpaster has agreed to go to Argentina tonight. He will have a heavy series of briefings at State and the White House today. Mr. Claytor said that a finding that Argentina had made substantial progress on human rights (in connection with the Kennedy Amendment) would be extremely helpful. Others noted that the Kennedy Amendment merely established a deadline (October 1, 1978) for Argentinian performance on human rights but indicated no relief for subsequent improvement. Mr. Newsom noted that this amendment would be much harder to lift than the Symington Amendment on Pakistan. The Argentinian record is still very bad, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report which is coming out soon will be extremely derogatory. Mr. Aaron said that General Goodpaster must have something to encourage the Argentines to be helpful. The instructions for his trip are being drafted and will be reviewed this afternoon. State will take a new look at the legislation. We are prepared to be helpful to Argentina with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission. ~~(S)~~

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8. Military Facilities Team. A Mini-SCC will be held Wednesday to review the instructions for the political-military team to visit Oman, Somalia and Kenya. ~~(S)~~

9. Prepositioning Military Equipment. Admiral Turner raised the possibility of positioning military equipment at Berenice in Egypt. Secretary Brown said that Defense would be prepared to move in the next several months on ships which could be used to preposition military equipment; he thought that would be faster and less expensive than development of Berenice. However, Defense will take a look at the concept of storing equipment in the desert with a minimum of development. Admiral Turner thought that an immediate announcement of some equipment storage in the Berenice area would send a useful signal in the context of the Yemen situation. Secretary Brown said that a Marine exercise would be an even more effective signal, but all agreed that we should first tie down agreement to access facilities in Oman and Somalia. ~~(S)~~

10. B-52. The SCC briefly reviewed the results of the Sunday mission. The two planes flew a total of 28 hours non-stop, and the mission was considered uneventful. Pictures of the Soviet ships will be available in the next several days. The coverage was good, getting the hull number off one Soviet destroyer. The SCC recommended to the JCS that for the near future this become a regular reconnaissance mission approximately every two weeks. JCS will prepare a proposal to that effect. ~~(S)~~

11. Military Deployments. There are presently three carriers in the Northern Arabian Sea, while Nimitz replaces Kitty Hawk. The Coral Sea will replace Midway at the end of the month. Kitty Hawk will return to the West Coast via the Pacific, leaving Coral Sea and Nimitz on station. The Pacific MAU is en route to Eniwetok for turnover. It will then go to Subic Bay for several days. The MAU will be available to go to the Indian Ocean about mid-February. It could be available for an exercise in Oman by the end of February and in the Red Sea by early March. If a Red Sea exercise is planned, the Pacific MAU could be joined by the MAU from the Mediterranean. A decision will be required in the next few weeks if it is our firm intention to send the Pacific MAU to the Indian Ocean. The SCC thought it would also be valuable to exercise with the French Navy in the Mediterranean during this period when our carrier presence has been reduced and the Yugoslav problem is building. Mr. Aaron said he would raise this with the French during his forthcoming trip. ~~(S)~~

12. Arms Sales to Yugoslavia. They have accepted our offer to sell 1000 Dragon anti-tank missiles but want to shave down the price. Defense will see if there is something symbolic we can offer on payment terms as training costs. ~~(S)~~

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-4-

[REDACTED]

14. Intelligence Items. The President approved the instructions and related intelligence findings [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~