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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 6/1/2010

File Folder CO086 (LEBANON) (190000-196499)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 120

SYSTEMATIC

741

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
92125	LETTER	PRESIDENT MITTERAND TO REAGAN, ROUGH ENGLISH TRANSLATION R 10/18/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	2	ND	B1
92126	LETTER	PRESIDENT MITTERAND TO REAGAN, IN FRENCH R 10/18/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	3	2/10/1984	B1
92127	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #92126 R 10/18/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	3	2/10/1984	B1
92128	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #92126 R 10/18/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	3	2/10/1984	B1
92129	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #92126 R 10/18/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	3	2/10/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED

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Embassy of Lebanon
Washington

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The Ambassador

4 November 1983

The Honorable
Robert McFarlane
National Security Advisor
The White House


Dear Bud,

I thought you might like to see a copy of President Gemayel's article which appeared in the Washington Post on Sunday, 30 October, and of my interview which appears in the current issue of the U. S. News and World Report.

These past two weeks have been difficult ones for both the Americans and the Lebanese. However, we remain faithful and persistent in our efforts to restore a free and democratic Lebanon.

I look forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely,



Abdallah Bouhabib
Ambassador of Lebanon

Enclosure

ASC 8308050

What Lebanon Wants of U.S.: "Eliminate the Syrian Factor"

Diplomacy alone cannot force out the Syrians, Lebanon's envoy says. America also must use air and naval power.

Q Mr. Ambassador, why should the United States and other Western countries keep peacekeeping troops in Lebanon?

A If the Marines stay, it's bad since they are sitting targets. But if they get out, it will also be bad for you—not because they are fighting Lebanon's war but because they have been transformed into an arm of United States policy in the Mideast. If they are removed, it would demonstrate a lack of American commitment, really an abandonment of U.S. goals.

The United States policy aim in Lebanon has become very clear: It is to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces and to help the government regain sovereignty over the country. As such, the Marines are a tool of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Q The continued presence of the Ma-

rines, as you see it, is less important for Lebanese interests than for U.S. interests?

A Not exactly, because if they withdraw, that would also be bad for the Lebanese government. But it is just as important for United States credibility in the Mideast. You are a superpower that we are depending on; not only we but the whole region are dependent on you Americans. The death of more than 200 Marines is a terrible tragedy, but there is more than this at stake.

Q And the withdrawal of the Marines would be seen as a sort of U.S. capitulation to Syria, Iran and the Soviet Union?

A That's right.

Q As a tool of U.S. policy, what mission are the Marines performing in Lebanon?

A Their mission is to support the Lebanese government without actually having to fight. The mere fact that they are there gives support to the government and the Lebanese Army. I tell you, if they were not there, the Lebanese Army would not have performed as well as it has.

Q Does the Lebanese government be-

lieve that the number of Marines should be increased?

A No, that is not necessary. We are not interested in Marines fighting for us, because if we don't have an army and the Marines come and liberate our country, we gain nothing. So we don't want the Marines to fight Lebanese. We think we can handle the situation internally if you eliminate the Syrian factor from Lebanon, as well as other foreign factors.

Interview With Abdallah Bouhabib, Lebanese Ambassador To the United States



WARREN K. LEFFLER—USNA/WR

Q How should the United States eliminate the Syrians from Lebanon?

A When the United States came and said, "We are committed to Lebanese independence, sovereignty and democracy, and committed to withdrawal of foreign forces," what did you mean by that—just words? Are you going to depend only on diplomacy to implement your policy?

America is a superpower not only because it has talented diplomats but also because it has a strong military and economic power as well. So if you're going to ignore this, you're not a superpower any more.

Q But you said you didn't want the Marines to fight in Lebanon—

A Yes. But we didn't say we don't want American naval power and air power.

Q To drive the Syrians out?

A To influence the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q You feel that the U.S. has a commitment to get the Syrians out by diplomatic or military means, one way or another?

A Yes. But remember: Diplomatic means if not supported by military and economic means are quite meaningless.

Q If military means are used to force the Syrians out, would that raise the risk of Soviet involvement?

A Both Lebanon and the United

States probably have made some miscalculations—we Lebanese in thinking that because we are in the hands of a superpower we are totally safe, and you Americans in thinking that you can solve the problem of Lebanon simply through diplomatic means.

The Soviets are already involved. There are over 7,000 Soviet experts in Syria, but nobody expects them to become directly involved in case of a war.

Q Could the United States perform its mission in Lebanon by pulling the Marines back to a carrier and maintaining a naval presence offshore?

A You have to consider not just the military implications of such action but even more the political consequences.

President Reagan during the past couple of weeks has denounced Iran, the Soviet Union and Syria for their responsibility for violence in Lebanon. On their part, Syria, Iran and the Soviet Union have called for an American withdrawal from Lebanon. The Soviet Union would love to see Western forces out of Lebanon.

Q In what circumstances would it be feasible for the Marines to leave without dangerous repercussions?

A The presence of the Marines in Lebanon could be thinned out in the immediate future. Only if Syria and other occupying foreign forces were to

withdraw from at least the mountain areas of central Lebanon would this give the Lebanese some kind of freedom. We could sit down together and work out freely the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q What do you expect from negotiations in Geneva on Lebanese reconciliation? Is there much hope of achieving some kind of political settlement?

A Everything is on the table. The government is ready to discuss everything. We are going ahead with it and trying to find a solution for our problems.

But we feel strongly that there quickly will be a quarrel over foreign occupation. Reconciliation may not work as long as the Syrian Army is in a dominant position in Lebanon—that's what we're afraid of—not because we don't want to compromise.

Q How do you answer Americans who question whether the loss of more than 200 Marine lives is too high a price to pay for a symbolic U.S. presence in Lebanon?

A The lives of those brave Americans should not be lost in vain.

A lot of American interests are at stake in the Middle East. You should reaffirm your commitment to the values of freedom and democracy. In this way, those American martyrs will have died for a noble cause.

Lebanon: After the Bombing

Amin Gemayel

Yes, the Marines Have a Mission

Slightly over a year ago, in the aftermath of the 1982 war, three Western countries—France, Italy and the United States—agreed to Lebanon's request that they assist us by providing a multinational force. Great Britain later joined the force. Why did we request this assistance? What are the objectives of the multinational force? What is it doing?

These questions, which I have noticed frequently in American media, are legitimate concerns that have been raised with particular poignancy in the aftermath of the barbaric attacks on the U.S. Marine compound and French troops. It is of course not my place as a Lebanese to address American objectives or activities, and in any case President Reagan has discussed both at length. But I would like to explain the critical importance we in Lebanon attach to the multinational force, and to the U.S. Marine contingent in that force.

One important mission of the MNF was to

"The American Marines did not come to Lebanon to fight our war, but to help us establish peace and restore democracy. Your young men are not in Lebanon to engage in combat."

help create conditions in which security could be restored to all sectors of the population, stability thereby re-established in the country, and Lebanese democracy renewed. The MNF, in fact, quickly brought security to many parts of the Greater Beirut area, allowing the Lebanese Army to restore stability in other areas. The government could not have functioned without this aid, and the army has benefited immensely from MNF support and assistance in a variety of ways.

The U.S. Marine contingent was assigned one of the most important facilities in Lebanon—our international airport south of Beirut, the keystone of our contact with the rest of the world. The Marines have ably protected this sensitive and critical installation, and their presence there has been a major deterrent against some who would like to isolate us.

The multinational force was also sent to Lebanon to help the government extend its authority to areas evacuated by foreign forces. When the MNF arrived, the Lebanese Army was very small and had little equipment suitable to the task of re-establishing law and order.

Moreover, the security situation was chaotic, the country was emerging from the trauma of not only the war and the tripartite occupation, but also the horrible assassination of its president-elect. I had just assumed office, and I can tell you that I did not find a single Lebanese, including those who have since complained about the MNF, who was not glad and thankful at the arrival of your Marines. Since then, the MNF has played a crucial and successful role in facilitating the extension of the Lebanese government authority over areas evacuated by the external forces.

Our government's base has been destroyed by nearly a decade of violence. We are eager to rebuild this base to ensure that all elements of the population are equitably represented. At this juncture, when we need to rebuild our institutions and our country, when we need to reconstruct our economy and restore stability to families—at this time particularly, it is imperative that the government enjoy the broadest possible consensus.

Consequently, for over six months we have been seeking to pursue a reconciliation process among all major elements of the populace. We believed that Lebanese-Israeli accord would be

the first step toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and, thus, toward ensuring a free climate for national dialogue. Ideally, reconciliation should have followed the liberation of both the land and the people of Lebanon.

Later, events proved that the external forces had other plans for our country. As we continued to press for national entente, a major military offensive directed by external forces was launched against Lebanese institutions to prevent the realization of our national objectives. The presence of the MNF, and particularly of the U.S. forces, provided the necessary deterrent to arrest this attack, and achieve a cease-fire leading to national dialogue. It is certain that the Conference on National Reconciliation, due to begin Monday, and other informal discussions in this direction, can only be pursued in the environment of stability created by this deterrent.

The American Marines did not come to Lebanon to fight our war, but to help us establish peace and restore democracy. Your young men are not in Lebanon to engage in combat, for Lebanon must and should bear the national task of its own liberation.

I have indicated several functions—separation of forces, support of the Lebanese Army, establishment of human security, protection of vital installations, coordinating the extension of government authority to areas evacuated by foreign occupying armies, creating and maintaining conditions in which to build a broader national consensus—that the Marines have performed. Each one of these has been vital. But, frankly, a list of these successes demeans the value of the Marine presence, which is much more far-reaching than all of these activities combined. The Marines and other MNF contingents serve a number of broader purposes, and these too should be considered.

First, Lebanon has been used as a battlefield and chessboard by the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Until Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces withdraw from all our territory, they will continue to use Lebanon to sabotage progress toward a regional settlement. Such a settlement is critical not only to the Middle East, but also to the West, whose oil supply has twice been interrupted as a result of Arab-Israeli wars. Resolution of the problem in Lebanon is a prerequisite for an overall settlement in the region.

Second, the MNF expressed the West's commitment to peace and stability to Lebanon and the region. Lebanon welcomed this initiative because we belong to the family of the free world. The MNF must also be seen in this light—a symbol of Western awareness of Lebanon's unique role as a link between the West and the Orient and an earnest of Western interest in Lebanon and the region.

True, Lebanon is a small country. However, we cannot overlook the position and importance of Lebanon in the context of the overall strategic picture. The threat to Western interests in a region with vital resources is an additional element in the importance of the Marine presence.

TOPIC A



By Brooks for the Richmond Times-Dispatch

"For many years the Lebanese believed that if we threatened no one, no one would threaten us. 'Weakness is our strength,' we thought. We were wrong."

Lebanon has been the principal victim of extremism—radicals, revolutionaries and terrorists—because it was the easiest target. By no means are we alone, however. The moderate Arab countries, traditional friends of the United States, are all threatened. These moderates, including those on whose oil the West and Japan depend, are watching to see whether the West in general and the United States in particular will remain firm. For there is no doubt what will happen should Lebanon fall to the extremists: it will again become a center of international terrorism, but on a much greater scale, since all the country's resources will be subject to extremist control. The American commitment to Lebanon and the strength of U.S. resolve, symbolized by the physical presence of the Marines, have been a balm of reassurance to all the moderates.

So, American Marines are indeed performing a major and critical role in Lebanon. We wish American help were not required, but the reason it is required is itself instructive. For many years the Lebanese believed that if we threatened no one, no one would threaten us. "Weakness is our strength," we thought. But we were wrong. We have learned—but at what a price—that strength is necessary to defend freedom in a region where freedom is not appreciated. Lebanese only dream about liberty now, for theirs is lost temporarily to foreign occupation. Freedom is dear—but, believe me, no one knows how dear more than those who have lost it.

Sadly, tragically, Lebanese are not the only ones who have paid dearly in the effort to restore democracy to Lebanon. You can have no idea how shocked and horrified the Lebanese were at the inhuman attack on the Marines and French troops last Sunday. We who have lost so many thousands of our loved ones to terrorism over these past years—and I have lost several members of my family—know that our sorrow and aches over this despicable act are little consolation to the families of those who have perished.

But still I want you to know that these young men were "our boys" too, or so we feel. They came thousands of miles across the ocean, committing their lives to the cause of freedom, our freedom, and they have been our great hope. These men are not just American and French, but are Lebanese martyrs as well. The terrible

"I want you to know that these young men are 'our boys' too, or so we feel. . . . We mourn each and every life lost."

tragedy of last Sunday burns at the heart and soul of us all. We mourn each and every life lost.

The monumental tragedy shows us all the qualities of those who oppose liberty here and elsewhere. To make a political point, they do not consider the cost in men's lives, nor the awesome effect on the thousands to whom these lives were so precious. To hold freedom in contempt is to hold man in contempt. This is the barbarism we face together. Lebanon may be a small country, but we Lebanese, who have been blessed with a tradition of pluralism and freedom like yours, recognize as other democratic peoples must, that liberty threatened is never a small or unimportant cause.

The writer is president of the Republic of Lebanon.



By Wright for the Miami News

What Lebanon Wants of U.S.: "Eliminate the Syrian Factor"

Diplomacy alone cannot force out the Syrians, Lebanon's envoy says. America also must use air and naval power.

Q Mr. Ambassador, why should the United States and other Western countries keep peacekeeping troops in Lebanon?

A If the Marines stay, it's bad since they are sitting targets. But if they get out, it will also be bad for you—not because they are fighting Lebanon's war but because they have been transformed into an arm of United States policy in the Mideast. If they are removed, it would demonstrate a lack of American commitment, really an abandonment of U.S. goals.

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*Interview With
Abdallah Bouhabib,
Lebanese Ambassador
To the United States*



WARREN K. LEFFLER—USMWR

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RECEIVED 04 NOV 83 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ITANI, KHALIL

DOCDATE 04 NOV 83

KEYWORDS LEBANON

MEDIA

GEMAYEL, AMIN

SUBJECT FWDS CY OF PRES GEMAYEL ARTICLES IN THE POST & US NEWS & WORLD RPT

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE 08 NOV 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON *WWS*

11/22/83 *00086*
FG006-12

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY *Admin*

Time reserved for visit of President Gemayel of Lebanon:

MEETING: 11:00 am - 30 min - Briefing for Visit - Oval Office
11:30 am - 45 min - Meeting - Oval Office/Cabinet Room
12:15 pm - 75 min - Luncheon - Residence
1:30 pm - 10 min - Departure Statements - Diplomatic Entrance

DATE: December 1, 1983

TIME: As shown

DURATION: As shown

LOCATION: As shown

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|------------|
| cc: R. Darman | C. McCain | R. Kimmitt |
| R. Deprospero | J. Rosebush | |
| K. Duberstein | R. Scouten | |
| B. Elliott | B. Shaddix | |
| D. Fischer | W. Sittmann | |
| C. Fuller | L. Speakes | |
| W. Henkel | WHCA Audio/Visual | |
| E. Hickey | WHCA Operations | |
| G. Hodges | A. Wrobleski | |
| | Nell Yates | |

NSC # 8308280

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3401, E.O. 12958, as amended
White House
BY NARA
11/20/14

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1983

8280
RECEIVED
NOV 21 1983
SCHEDULING
OFFICE

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
OF APPOINTMENTS & SCHEDULING

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bck*

REQUEST: Working Visit meeting with the President for
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel.

PURPOSE: To explore new initiatives towards obtaining
the withdrawal of foreign forces from
Lebanon.

BACKGROUND: Gemayel has been tasked by the Lebanese
reconciliation committee to seek further
movement on the withdrawal issue and to
explore flexibility regarding the May 17
Lebanon-Israel agreement prior to the re-
convening of the conference. The shaky
cease-fire in Lebanon is closely tied to pro-
gress in the reconciliation talks, therefore,
we believe it incumbent upon us to receive
Gemayel as soon as possible following the
visit of Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and
Defense Minister Arens.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: July 22, 1983.

DATE: Between December 1 and December 5. (*Fred:*

LOCATION: The Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary of State Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld
Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary, State
Geoffrey Kemp

*Shultz leaves town
Dec. 6-14, so pre-
Dec. 5 is needed.)*

Lebanese
President Amin Gemayel
Elie Salem, Deputy Prime Minister
Abdallah Bouhabib, Ambassador to the U.S.

SECRET
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR
Date. *12/1/83*
Time. *11:00 / 11:30 / 12:15 / 1:30*
Length. *30 / 45 / 75 / 110*
Date. *11/22/83* FJR

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President and Gemayel will meet in the Oval Office for a Working Visit meeting.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points to be provided.

MEDIA REQUIRED: Photo opportunity.

RECOMMENDED BY: State Department and NSC.

OPPOSED BY: None.

PROJECT OFFICER: Geoffrey Kemp

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

911

ID# 195190

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 25, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MISS MARY ASMAR

SUBJECT EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS	ORG	84/01/25	LK	A84/03/01
99 NS	D	84/01/26	LD	C84/02/27
REFERRAL NOTE:				
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COMMENTS	NSC ID 8400911			

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
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|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION CODES: | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | * CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT READY W/COPY * | | * | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | * | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | * | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1984

Dear Ms. Asmar:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 23 to President Reagan. We deeply appreciate your support and that of the American Lebanese League for the President's policy on Lebanon. Such support is particularly welcome at a time when there is so much misunderstanding of the important role the United States is playing in Lebanon and the entire Middle East.

Let me assure you that President Reagan remains committed to the unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. To that end, we will continue to exert every possible effort to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Sincerely,



Linas Kojelis
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison

Ms. Mary Asmar
National Secretary
American Lebanese League, Inc.
New York Chapter
P. O. Box 382
Ft. Hamilton Station
Brooklyn, NY 11209

~~P/Koje~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0911

February 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT ^{Boh}

SUBJECT: Letter to the President From the American Lebanese League Inc. Re Admin Policy Re Lebanon

We concur in the attached draft reply to Mary Asmar, National Secretary, American Lebanese League, Inc., concerning the Administration's policy re Lebanon.

Attachment:
As stated w/incoming
correspondence

PROPOSED REPLY

Dear Ms. Asmar:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 23, 1984 to President Reagan. We deeply appreciate your support and that of the American Lebanese League for the President's policy on Lebanon. Such support is particularly welcome at a time when there is so much misunderstanding of the important role the United States is playing in Lebanon and the entire Middle East.


Let me assure you that President Reagan remains committed to the unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. To that end, we will continue to exert every effort to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Sincerely,

LK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
0911

February 23, 1984

FOR: BOB KIMMITT  SIGNED
FROM: GEOFF KEMP
SUBJECT: Letter to American
Lebanese League, Inc.

A Kimmitt to Kelley memo is
attached for your signature.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

1420
S/S F840323011 24

Date 2/17/84

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Mary Asmar
Date: 1/23/84 Subject: Adm. Policy re Lebanon

WH Referral Dated: 1/31/84 NSC ID# 195190
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

Will: A. B. J.A.
for

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

PROPOSED REPLY

Dear Ms. Asmar:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 23, 1984 to President Reagan. We deeply appreciate your support and that of the American Lebanese League for the President's policy on Lebanon. Such support is particularly welcome at a time when there is so much misunderstanding of the important role the United States is playing in Lebanon and the entire Middle East.

Let me assure you that President Reagan remains committed to the unity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. To that end, we will continue to exert every effort to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Sincerely,

8403230

ID 8400911

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PAGE E01

REFERRAL

DATE: 31 JAN 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION.

TO. PRESIDENT

SOURCE: ASMAR, MARY

DATE: 23 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MP

SUBJ. LTR TO PRES FM AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE INC RE ADMIN POLICY RE

REQUIRED ACTION. DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 84

COMMENTS.

Letta Grayton
45860

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



American Lebanese League, Inc.

NEW YORK CHAPTER

#195190

January 23, 1984

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan,

In the name of the American Lebanese League of New York, I would like to thank you for your continued support of the Lebanese Government. We are grateful for the strong stand you have taken during the most difficult times. To quote your own words, which are so true, "The international thugs and criminals who oppose peace and security in the Middle East cannot be left free to undermine efforts for peace that are now underway."

Mr. President, here in New York our members have been working hard, exerting most of their efforts to rally support for your policy in the Middle East. On January 20th I met with Democratic Congressman Charles Schumer in his Brooklyn office. The purpose of our meeting was to urge his backing of your policy for a continued American military presence in Lebanon. I am also scheduling meetings with Congressman Stephan Solarz and Congressman Guy Molinari.

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter which I sent to the entire Congressional Delegation of the New York Metropolitan area. This past week members of the American Lebanese League sent out similar messages on a national scale.

Mr. President, thank you again for your determination to liberate Lebanon from its state of captivity. If our chapter here in New York can be of any further assistance please let us know.

Sincerely yours,



Mary Asmar
National Secretary

lml

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RECEIVED
National Security Council
The White House

84 FEB 27 11:25

System # I

Package # 0911

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0911

February 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Boh*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President From the American Lebanese League Inc. Re Admin Policy Re Lebanon

We concur in the attached draft reply to Mary Asmar, National Secretary, American Lebanese League, Inc., concerning the Administration's policy re Lebanon.

Attachment:

As stated w/incoming
correspondence

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8400911

RECEIVED 31 JAN 84 15

TO PRESIDENT

FROM ASMAR, MARY

DOCDATE 23 JAN 84

KEYWORDS . LEBANON

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE INC RE ADMIN POLICY RE LEBANON

ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE: 09 FEB 84 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO KEMP

COMMENTS

REF# 195190

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>JK</i>	<i>2/21</i>	<i>Lead S/S Draft</i>		
<i>S</i>	<i>2/21</i>	<i>Mem format to Kelly Kelley</i>	<i>2/25</i>	
<i>Kimmit</i>	<i>2/27</i>	<i>For Signature</i>		
<i>ed</i>	<i>2/27</i>	<i>Kimmit</i>		<i>Kemp</i>

DISPATCH *ed* *MJR* *2/27* W/ATTCH FILE *WH* (C)MR

FEB 27 1984

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United States Department of State

XR-8405128

Washington, D.C. 20520



DECLASSIFIED

12/21/97

9/28/10

Depl. BY *lb*

February 21, 1984

C.F.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3100

CO086

CO051

FG011

FG006-12

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

W/S

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from President Mitterrand
Regarding Lebanon

President Mitterrand's letter of February 10 (Tab A) restates French policy toward Lebanon in response to President Reagan's statement of February 6. It does not call for a reply -- beyond the generalized statement that "I attach the greatest importance to exchanges of views with your government"

Consultations with France about Lebanon are ongoing. On February 10, the President sent a personal message to President Mitterrand outlining our ideas on timing for the Marine redeployment, and the Vice President met with Mitterrand as recently as February 15. Therefore, the Department does not believe a separate additional response to President Mitterrand's letter is necessary.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A - President Mitterrand's Letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

NSD #8401374

92125

ROUGH TRANSLATION: Letter from French President Mitterrand to President Reagan

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Waivers.
BY ds NARA DATE 10/18/2022

Mr. President

I read with much attention your message of February 6 concerning the situation in Lebanon and I noted the decisions which you have taken.

You know well, I think, the attachment France has for Lebanon. The force of this sentiment motivates our profound preoccupation with that country's tragic fate and explains our engagement, as soon as events worsened, in efforts undertaken to aid the preservation of Lebanon's unity and sovereignty.

You know also our judgment on the origins of the lacerations which have affected that country, increasingly becoming so strong so as to put in peril its existence. They result, first of all, from contradictory pressures exercised by internal forces -- religious and social -- rivaling among themselves for the definition of a new equilibrium at a time of rapid change and in an external environment profoundly disturbed. They were aggravated by the action of external forces that we know well. They were made more acute following the military actions undertaken in June, 1982 by Israel.

In these conditions, what France wishes for most earnestly, and what she has tried to contribute to, is a Lebanon re-established in its unity by a general reconciliation, excluding the hegemony of any religious or political component, and allowing, for the benefit of the most disinherited members of the Lebanese community, adaptations rendered inevitable by the march of time. This presupposes that the Lebanese, whatever their tendencies, would permit the collective interest to triumph over their factional preoccupations.

A Lebanon thus reconstructed in its unity ought to be able to define its external status. I don't doubt that it would do so, taking account at that time of the manifest desire of its population to be sheltered from the conflict which has already caused so much suffering, and the evident necessity for Lebanon to live on good terms with all its neighbors and with the Arab world to which it belongs, in particular, Syria.

Those are the objectives that we have intended to serve and in this spirit, it has always been clear to us that the French contingent in the MNF -- in the absence of a UN force -- could only be at the service of a policy of understanding and reconciliation.

The events which took place recently, as you pointed out, represent a particularly grave turn. It is the result of external pressures that you denounce, and also of the apparent impossibility of making progress in the reconciliation and laying the foundation of an acceptable definition for all the Lebanese of that country's relations with its neighbors, and notably the manner in which it could assure the retreat, wished for by all, of Israeli forces, as well as other foreign forces.

Things have come to a point where it is more and more difficult for the MNF to carry out its functions conforming to the objectives and to the principles to which we adhere and which I have just recalled.

When we agreed, at the request of the Lebanese Government, to send our soldiers to Beirut, I wrote you that, in our view, the force ought to be placed under the aegis of the UN. Our position has never varied on this point. It seems to us at this moment that circumstances force us to turn toward the world organization to ask it to take under its responsibility the ~~job~~ task of working toward the cessation of hostilities, contributing to the protection of the civilian population and aiding the concerned parties to restore the unity and stability of Lebanon, ~~this~~ by the presence of international contingents in Beirut and the surroundings.

In Lebanon, we are and wish to be friends to all. Current events do not modify this perspective. We will thus continue to aid Lebanon in all useful ways.

This effort ought to be made, evidently, in conjunction with other friends of Lebanon. In this regard, I attach the greatest importance to exchanges of views with your government, even if the rapidity with which events unfold sometimes limits the scope of the exchange. It is important that we know and understand our respective positions and that each of our two countries, in the spirit of friendship, takes into account in its decisions the views and the interests of the other.

Complimentary close,

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

L'Ambassadeur

Washington, February 10, 1984.

Dear Mr. Mc Farlane:

Please find herein the text of a message addressed to the President of the United States by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the French Republic.

I would be most grateful to you for remitting this message to its high addressee.

With my warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,



Bernard Vernier-Palliez

The Honorable
Robert C. Mc Farlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

92/26 3a

Le 10 février 1984.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/State Wawers
BY dr NARA DATE 10/18/2022

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'attention de votre message du 6 février concernant la situation au Liban et j'ai noté les décisions que vous avez prises.

Vous connaissez bien, je pense, l'attachement de la France pour ce pays. La force de ce sentiment motive la profonde préoccupation que nous inspire son sort tragique et explique notre engagement, dès que les événements se sont aggravés, dans les efforts entrepris pour aider à la préservation de son unité et de sa souveraineté.

Vous connaissez aussi le jugement que nous portons sur l'origine des déchirements qui ont affecté ce pays de plus en plus fortement jusqu'à mettre en péril son existence même. Ils résultent d'abord des pressions contradictoires exercées par les forces internes-religieuses, sociales-rivalisant entre elles pour la définition d'un nouvel équilibre à une époque de changements rapides et dans un environnement extérieur profondément perturbé. Ils ont été aggravés par l'action de forces extérieures que nous connaissons bien. Ils ont été rendus plus vifs encore à la suite des actions militaires entreprises en juin 1982 par Israël.

Dans ces conditions, ce que la France a appelé de ses vœux, ce à quoi elle a essayé de contribuer, c'est un Liban rétabli dans son unité par une réconciliation générale, excluant l'hégémonie d'aucune composante religieuse ou politique, et comportant, au bénéfice des membres les plus déshérités de la communauté libanaise, les adaptations rendues inévitables par la marche des temps. Ceci suppose que les Libanais, quelles que soient leurs tendances, fassent passer l'intérêt collectif avant leurs préoccupations factionnelles.

./...

Le Liban ainsi reconstitué dans son unité devrait définir son statut externe. Je ne doute pas qu'il le ferait en tenant compte à la fois du désir manifeste de sa population de se placer à l'abri d'un conflit qui l'a déjà fait tant souffrir, et de la nécessité évidente pour le Liban de vivre en bonne intelligence avec tous ses voisins et avec le monde arabe auquel il se rattache ; ceci vise en particulier la Syrie.

Tels sont, en ce qui concerne, les objectifs que nous avons entendu servir, et dans cet esprit, il a toujours été clair à nos yeux que le contingent affecté par nous à la Force Multinationale -faute de force des Nations Unies- ne pouvait être au service que d'une politique d'entente et de réconciliation.

Les événements ont pris récemment, comme vous le soulignez, une tournure particulièrement grave. C'est le résultat des pressions extérieures que vous dénoncez, et aussi de l'impossibilité qui est apparue jusqu'à maintenant de faire progresser la réconciliation et de la fonder sur une définition acceptable pour tous les Libanais des relations du pays avec ses voisins, et notamment de la manière dont il pourrait assurer le retrait, souhaité par tous, des forces israéliennes, ainsi que des autres forces étrangères.

Les choses en sont venues à un point où il est de plus en plus difficile que la Force Multinationale remplisse ses fonctions conformément aux buts et aux principes auxquels nous adhérons et que je viens de rappeler.

Lorsque nous avons accepté, à la demande du Gouvernement libanais d'envoyer nos soldats à Beyrouth, je vous ai écrit que, selon nous, la force devrait être placée sous l'égide des Nations Unies. Notre position n'a jamais varié sur ce point. Il nous semble qu'au moment présent, les circonstances imposent que nous nous tournions vers l'organisation mondiale pour lui demander de prendre sous sa responsabilité la tâche consistant à veiller à la cessation des hostilités, à contribuer à la protection de la population civile et à aider les parties concernées à restaurer l'unité et la stabilité du Liban, ceci par une présence de contingents internationaux à Beyrouth et aux alentours.

.../.
Au Liban, nous sommes et voulons être les amis de tous. Les événements actuels ne modifient pas cette perspective. Nous continuerons donc à aider le Liban sous toutes les formes utiles.

Cet effort doit, évidemment, être conjugué avec celui des autres amis de ce pays. A cet égard, j'attache le plus grand prix aux échanges de vues avec votre Gouvernement, même si la rapidité des événements en atténue quelquefois la portée. Il est important que nous connaissions et comprenions nos positions respectives et que chacun de nos deux pays, dans l'esprit d'amitié qui préside à nos rapports, tienne compte dans ses décisions des vues et des intérêts de l'autre.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

A vous.

François Mitterrand

8405128

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8401374

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 FEB 84

MEMORANDUM FOR. STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE. MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DATE: 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

LEBANON

HS

SUBJ: PRES MITTERRAND LTR IN FRENCH RE LEBANON

REQUIRED ACTION. TRANSLATION / RECOMMENDATIONS /

DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 28 FEB 84

COMMENTS.

Melanie Rhodes
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Received in 5/5-1
2/18/84 - 4:00 p.m.
ngp*

8405128

92127 5

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 10 février 1984

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/State Weivers
BY dm NARA DATE 10/28/2022

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'attention de votre message du 6 février concernant la situation au Liban et j'ai noté les décisions que vous avez prises.

Vous connaissez bien, je pense, l'attachement de la France pour ce pays. La force de ce sentiment motive la profonde préoccupation que nous inspire son sort tragique et explique notre engagement, dès que les événements se sont aggravés, dans les efforts entrepris pour aider à la préservation de son unité et de sa souveraineté.

Vous connaissez aussi le jugement que nous portons sur l'origine des déchirements qui ont affecté ce pays de plus en plus fortement jusqu'à mettre en péril son existence même. Ils résultent d'abord des pressions contradictoires exercées par les forces internes religieuses, sociales - rivalisant entre elles pour la définition d'un nouvel équilibre à une époque de changements rapides et dans un environnement extérieur profondément perturbé. Ils ont été aggravés par l'action de forces extérieures que nous connaissons bien. Ils ont été rendus plus vifs encore à la suite des actions militaires entreprises en juin 1982 par Israël.

Dans ces conditions, ce que la France a appelé de ses vœux ce à quoi elle a essayé de contribuer, c'est un Liban rétabli dans son unité par une réconciliation générale, excluant l'hégémonie

.../...

Son Excellence
Monsieur Ronald REAGAN
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
WASHINGTON

6

d'aucune composante religieuse ou politique, et comportant, au bénéfice des membres les plus déshérités de la communauté libanaise, les adaptations rendues inévitables par la marche des temps. Ceci suppose que les Libanais, quelles que soient leurs tendances, fassent passer l'intérêt collectif avant leurs préoccupations factionnelles.

Le Liban ainsi reconstitué dans son unité devrait définir son statut externe. Je ne doute pas qu'il le ferait en tenant compte à la fois du désir manifesté de sa population de se placer à l'abri d'un conflit qui l'a déjà fait tant souffrir, et de la nécessité évidente pour le Liban de vivre en bonne intelligence avec tous ses voisins et avec le monde arabe auquel il se rattache; ceci vise en particulier la Syrie.

Tels sont, en ce qui nous concerne, les objectifs que nous avons entendu servir, et dans cet esprit, il a toujours été clair à nos yeux que le contingent affecté par nous à la force multinationale - faute de force des Nations Unies - ne pouvait être au service que d'une politique d'entente et de réconciliation.

Les événements ont pris récemment, comme vous le soulignez, une tournure particulièrement grave. C'est le résultat des pressions extérieures que vous dénoncez, et aussi de l'impossibilité qui est apparue jusqu'à maintenant de faire progresser la réconciliation et de la fonder sur une définition acceptable pour tous les Libanais des relations du pays avec ses voisins, et notamment de la manière dont il pourrait assurer le retrait, souhaité par tous, des forces israéliennes, ainsi que des autres forces étrangères.

Les choses en sont venues à un point où il est de plus en plus difficile que la force multinationale remplisse ses fonctions conformément aux buts et aux principes auxquels nous adhérons et que je viens de rappeler.

Lorsque nous avons accepté, à la demande du gouvernement libanais, d'envoyer nos soldats à Beyrouth, je vous ai écrit que, selon nous, la force devrait être placée sous l'égide des Nations Unies. Notre position n'a jamais varié sur ce point. Il nous semble qu'au moment présent, les circonstances imposent que nous nous tournions vers l'organisation mondiale pour lui demander de prendre sous sa

.../...

7

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Au Liban, nous sommes et voulons être les amis de tous. Les événements actuels ne modifient pas cette perspective. Nous continuerons donc à aider le Liban sous toutes les formes utiles.

Cet effort doit, évidemment, être conjugué avec celui des autres amis de ce pays. A cet égard, j'attache le plus grand prix aux échanges de vues avec votre Gouvernement, même si la rapidité des événements en atténue quelquefois la portée. Il est important que nous connaissions et comprenions nos positions respectives et que chacun de nos deux pays, dans l'esprit d'amitié qui préside à nos rapports, tienne compte dans ses décisions des vues et des intérêts de l'autre.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.—

A us

François Mitterrand
François MITTERRAND

Ambassade de France
aux États-Unis

Washington, le February 16, 1984


Dear Mr. Mc FARLANE:

You will find herein a letter addressed by Mr. François MITTERRAND, the President of the French Republic, to President Ronald REAGAN, and which I was asked to forward to him.

I would be most grateful to you for remitting this document to its high addressee.

With many thanks and my best regards, I am

Sincerely,



Bernard BOYER
Minister

The Honorable
Robert C. Mc FARLANE
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

Paris, le 10 février 1984

NSI/State Waivers
BY dr 10/18/2012

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'attention de votre message du 6 février concernant la situation au Liban et j'ai noté les décisions que vous avez prises.

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Son Excellence
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WASHINGTON

Historical File .../...

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Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération—

A vous

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

Historical File

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 FEB 84

MEMORANDUM FOR. STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE. MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DATE: 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

LEBANON

HS

SUBJ: PRES MITTERRAND LTR IN FRENCH RE LEBANON

REQUIRED ACTION. TRANSLATION / RECOMMENDATIONS /

DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 28 FEB 84

COMMENTS.

Melanie Rhodes
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

92127 11

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 10 février 1984

DEC
Nsc/state waivers
10/18/2022

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'attention de votre message du 6 février concernant la situation au Liban et j'ai noté les décisions que vous avez prises.

Vous connaissez bien, je pense, l'attachement de la France pour ce pays. La force de ce sentiment motive la profonde préoccupation que nous inspire son sort tragique et explique notre engagement dès que les événements se sont aggravés, dans les efforts entrepris pour aider à la préservation de son unité et de sa souveraineté.

Vous connaissez aussi le jugement que nous portons sur l'origine des déchirements qui ont affecté ce pays de plus en plus fortement jusqu'à mettre en péril son existence même. Ils résultent d'abord des pressions contradictoires exercées par les forces internes religieuses, sociales - rivalisant entre elles pour la définition d'un nouvel équilibre à une époque de changements rapides et dans un environnement extérieur profondément perturbé. Ils ont été aggravés par l'action de forces extérieures que nous connaissons bien. Ils ont été rendus plus vifs encore à la suite des actions militaires entreprises en juin 1982 par Israël.

Dans ces conditions, ce que la France a appelé de ses vœux, ce à quoi elle a essayé de contribuer, c'est un Liban rétabli dans son unité par une réconciliation générale, excluant l'hégémonie

Son Excellence
Monsieur Ronald REAGAN
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

.../...

d'aucune composante religieuse ou politique, et comportant, au bénéfice des membres les plus déshérités de la communauté libanaise, les adaptations rendues inévitables par la marche des temps. Ceci suppose que les Libanais, quelles que soient leurs tendances, fassent passer l'intérêt collectif avant leurs préoccupations factionnelles.

Le Liban ainsi reconstitué dans son unité devrait définir son statut externe. Je ne doute pas qu'il le ferait en tenant compte à la fois du désir manifesté de sa population de se placer à l'abri d'un conflit qui l'a déjà fait tant souffrir, et de la nécessité évidente pour le Liban de vivre en bonne intelligence avec tous ses voisins et avec le monde arabe auquel il se rattache; ceci vise en particulier la Syrie.

Tels sont, en ce qui nous concerne, les objectifs que nous avons entendu servir, et dans cet esprit, il a toujours été clair à nos yeux que le contingent affecté par nous à la force multinationale - faute de force des Nations Unies - ne pouvait être au service que d'un politique d'entente et de réconciliation.

Les événements ont pris récemment, comme vous le soulignez, une tournure particulièrement grave. C'est le résultat des pressions extérieures que vous dénoncez, et aussi de l'impossibilité qui est apparue jusqu'à maintenant de faire progresser la réconciliation et de la fonder sur une définition acceptable pour tous les Libanais des relations du pays avec ses voisins, et notamment de la manière dont il pourrait assurer le retrait, souhaité par tous, des forces israéliennes, ainsi que des autres forces étrangères.

Les choses en sont venues à un point où il est de plus en plus difficile que la force multinationale remplisse ses fonctions conformément aux buts et aux principes auxquels nous adhérons et que je viens de rappeler.

Lorsque nous avons accepté, à la demande du gouvernement libanais, d'envoyer nos soldats à Beyrouth, je vous ai écrit que, selon nous, la force devrait être placée sous l'égide des Nations Unies. Notre position n'a jamais varié sur ce point. Il nous semble qu'au moment présent, les circonstances imposent que nous nous tournions vers l'organisation mondiale pour lui demander de prendre sous sa

responsabilité la tâche consistant à veiller à la cessation des hostilités, à contribuer à la protection de la population civile et à aider les parties concernées à restaurer l'unité et la stabilité du Liban, ceci par une présence de contingents internationaux à Beyrouth et aux alentours.

Au Liban, nous sommes et voulons être les amis de tous. Les événements actuels ne modifient pas cette perspective. Nous continuerons donc à aider le Liban sous toutes les formes utiles.

Cet effort doit, évidemment, être conjugué avec celui des autres amis de ce pays. A cet égard, j'attache le plus grand prix aux échanges de vues avec votre Gouvernement, même si la rapidité des événements en atténue quelquefois la portée. Il est important que nous connaissions et comprenions nos positions respectives et que chacun de nos deux pays, dans l'esprit d'amitié qui préside à nos rapports, tienne compte dans ses décisions des vues et des intérêts de l'autre.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.—

A vous

François Mitterrand
François MITTERRAND

RECEIVED 17 FEB 84 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DOCDATE 10 FEB 84

VERNIER PALLIEZ, B

16 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

LEBANON

HS

SUBJECT. PRES MITTERRAND LTR IN FRENCH RE LEBANON

ACTION. TRANSLATION / RECOMMENDATIONS DUE: 28 FEB 84 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

COBB

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KEMP

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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DISPATCH ed m JR 2/17 W/ATTCH FILE W/ATT (C)

ID# 196183

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 06, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DAN COATS

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES STATEMENT ISSUED UPON HIS RETURN
FROM A VISIT WITH THE MARINES IN BEIRUT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY	ORG	84/02/06	<i>mo</i>	<i>A 84/02/07</i> LD
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COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 _____
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       * CORRESPONDENCE  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

February 7, 1984

Dear Dan:

The President has shared with me your February 1 letter in which you reflected on your recent visit to Beirut. He has asked me to convey to you his sincere appreciation for your statement of confidence in his efforts to bring about an early solution to this difficult situation. He also welcomes your offer to comment further on your trip, and he asked me to send his warm regards.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dan Coats
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO/KRJ/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - FYI
cc: w/copy of inc to Dave Wright - FYI

#196193

S/MO

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515


February 1, 1984

Hon. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Recently I had the opportunity to visit with the Marines in Beirut and survey the situation in that troubled spot. In the interest of informing you of my observations and conclusions, I enclose a copy of the statement I issued upon my return last week.

Please feel free to contact me for any further thoughts or suggestions regarding my trip.

Sincerely,


Dan Coats
Member of Congress

DC:cs:kp

Enclosure



NEWS

Congressman

DAN COATS

4th District, Indiana

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COATS REPORTS ON BEIRUT VISIT

When the Marine gunner slapped live ammunition in the machine gun mounted in the open door of the helicopter and shouted in my ear "Hang on, we're going straight in," I realized that Beirut would no longer be merely a place I read about in the paper. Skimming just a few feet above the waves of the Mediterranean, we quickly approached the area where 1,600 U.S. Marines were dug-in against hostile forces in the closely surrounding hills. We landed directly in front of the rubble of what had once housed the 241 Marines killed in the tragic October terrorist attack. I will never be able to erase that scene from my thoughts.

Earlier that morning, Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia and I met with Vice Admiral Ed Martin, Commander of the 6th Fleet based in the Mediterranean. Admiral Martin met us in Haifa, Israel, aboard the U.S.S. Puget Sound. From there, we were supposed to fly to the U.S.S. Guam, an aircraft carrier stationed off the Lebanese coast. However, bad weather conditions made the landing risky and a decision was made to go directly to Beirut. As a result, we spent 3½ hours on the ground with the Marines instead of the planned 45 minutes.

-more-

General Jim Joy, Commander of the Marine Battalion, met us in Beirut and quickly escorted us to his "command post" -- an underground bunker 5 feet wide and 15 feet long, with a cot, a small table, two chairs, a portable electric heater and a large map on the wall. He briefed us on the steps he had initiated since assuming command following the bombing of the barracks, and gave us his current assessment of the safety of the Marines. I was pleased to hear that our Marines now had full authority to fire back if fired upon. I had been critical of our earlier policy that limited the Marines in this regard, feeling that such a policy would only lead to indiscriminate attacks by opposing forces. In fact, only hours before our arrival, the Marines had quickly silenced Arab positions that had fired at troops on routine perimeter patrol. General Joy and I agreed that we must demonstrate that any attack on our Marines must be met with a vigorous response. No more free shots on our troops. Such a policy has had an obvious positive effect on morale.

We then were given a comprehensive intelligence briefing by a number of intelligence personnel, followed by a "tour" of the encampment. It was obvious to me that the Marines had done all they could to prevent a repeat of the October tragedy. The troops were well dug-in, dispersed and at a constant state of readiness.

Water, mud, sandbags and below-ground bunkers, surrounded by partially bombed Arab settlements in the hills to the north, east and south, characterize the Marine facilities. General Joy informed me that 750,000 sandbags had been used to fortify the Marine positions. I couldn't help but recall the one million sandbags filled by the 30,000 volunteers to combat the Fort Wayne

flood. Those 1,600 Marines had done a lot of digging in.

The most significant part of the visit was the opportunity to have lunch with the troops. Baloney, cheese, pita bread and Pepsi didn't seem like enough to feed hungry Marines, and eating lunch in a flak jacket and steel helmet was a far cry from lunch in the House of Representatives dining room. Regardless of whether we agree or disagree with the policies that have placed our Marines in Beirut, we all have to respect and admire those troops who answer the call without complaint or protest.

Soon, almost too soon, it was time to leave. It didn't quite seem fair that I was allowed to fly in, take a quick look and then leave the Marines behind. It is one thing to debate policy on the House floor about a place far away and never seen. It will be for me totally different now that I have seen the situation first hand.

I have never been and still am not comfortable with the situation as it exists in Beirut. Despite the significant improvements in security and the authority to fight back if fired on, the Marines' geographically limited position and politically limited role places them in continued jeopardy and greatly limits their peacekeeping ability. It is imperative that we continue to work for an early solution to the Lebanon crisis.

I will not call for immediate withdrawal at this time, because to do so would surely destroy the negotiations currently underway for a political solution as well as send a signal to the Arab world that terrorism can dictate U.S. policy. However, it is now clear to me that the Lebanese government must quickly demonstrate its ability to either politically or militarily bring about a solution to the current hostilities so that the U.S. forces can be withdrawn from their present

position. Failing this, it is my opinion that the U.S. must either withdraw the Marines or relocate them to a more secure location.

The time to act is short and the need to act is great.

I am convinced that the President is doing all in his power to bring about the necessary conditions for an early withdrawal of our Marines and trust that an early solution to this difficult situation will be found.