

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

WHORM Subject File Code: CO086
(Countries: Lebanon, Republic of)
Case File Number(s): 103301 (2 of 2)
Box: 119

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Q: Does the United States support President Navon's call for a State Commission of Inquiry in Israel concerning the massacres?

A: This is an issue for Israel to decide. We presume, however, that the issue will be investigated. There are reports that the Government of Lebanon is launching an investigation as well.

We, ourselves, are not in a position to conduct an authoritative investigation, though we will, of course, continue to collect information.

As to an international investigation, we would have to see the specifics of a proposal before commenting. We think the Israelis and Lebanese should perhaps be permitted to proceed with their own investigations before deciding on other steps.

9/24/82

LEBANON: IDF ARRESTS IN BEIRUT

Q: Can you confirm or deny reports that the IDF is arresting a number of civilians in Beirut and transporting them to unknown locations?

A: -- These reports concern us, and we are looking into them.

-- If confirmed, we would strongly oppose such actions on the part of the IDF.

LEBANON BANK RAIDS

Q: Can you comment on reports that IDF troops are raiding bank files in Lebanon? Are any U.S. banks involved in the raids? What is the U.S. position on this alleged IDF activity?

A: --We have no independent confirmation of any banks having been entered. We would be firmly opposed to any such action.

--The U.S. Embassy in Beirut did receive reports from Lebanese government sources that the IDF had entered a few banks in West Beirut. We approached Israeli government officials regarding this allegation and they denied that banks had been entered.

--The Lebanese government sources later charged that, to the contrary, the Israelis had indeed entered some banks, but had later left them.

--We have no information beyond these conflicting reports.

ISRAEL: EMBASSY INTERFERING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS?

Q: What do you have for us on reports and Israeli complaints of US Embassy interference in domestic political affairs?

A: I can state categorically that the American Embassy has never interfered in Israel's domestic political scene, and we are not pleased by any such baseless allegations.

September 24, 1982

Size of US Force

Q. How large will the US contingent be?

A. At this point, we would expect the US contribution to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,200 personnel. The precise size of the Multinational Force depends on a number of factors which are still being refined in Beirut by a committee composed of representatives from the MNF contributors and the GOL.

Q. Under what conditions would you enlarge the size of the force?

A. Again that is a hypothetical question and I cannot go beyond what I have already said.

September 24, 1982

Duration of MNF Deployment

Q. You said earlier that we will deploy Marines for a limited period. How long is a "limited period?"

A. The MNF is in Beirut for a limited period to meet urgent requirements posed by the current situation there. I can't give you a precise date for their withdrawal at this point. When deciding on length of deployment, we will consider the Government of Lebanon's (GOL) progress in restoring its sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, and will make a decision in consultation with the GOL and other MNF contributors.

Q. But as we all know, the War Powers Act sets a limit of sixty days. Will that be enough time?

A. I do not wish to be tied down about the time limit, but of course we will comply fully with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

September 23, 1982

MNF: Mission and Operational Details

Q. What is the mission of the MNF?

A. The mission of the MNF is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, and thereby further its efforts to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

Q. What is the geographic scope of their operation?

A. The MNF is being deployed at locations in the Beirut area which have been worked out in Beirut by representatives from the MNF contributors and the GOL.

Q. Will the MNF perform internal security functions?

A. As the President said when he announced his decision to send a US contingent as part of this MNF deployment to Beirut, it is not intended to act as a police force. We do not expect the MNF to become directly involved in any "law and order" functions.

September 23, 1982

How Will US Forces be Equipped

Q. How will they be armed?

A. These troops will be equipped with weapons which are consistent with their non-combat mission.

Q. Will they carry rifles, mortars, etc?

A. The details of how the US force will be equipped are being addressed by the local US military commander in consultation with the Liaison and Coordination Committee in Beirut.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Q: What is the applicability of the War Powers Resolution? Will a notification go to Congress?

A: Consistent with the reporting requirements of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and as he did in connection with the earlier introduction of U.S. forces into Beirut, the President will submit a report to Congress when U.S. forces again enter Beirut as part of a Multinational Force. (Statute requires within 48 hours of their introduction.) When the report is sent to Congress, it will be made available publicly.

Q: Under which section of the War Powers Resolution will the report be made?

A: Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution provides for a report in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced, in the absence of a declaration of war, (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; or (2) into the territory of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat. The Resolution does not require that the Congress be provided certain information concerning the reason for the deployment and its expected duration. In the report filed on August 24, when the earlier MNF went to Beirut, the

President did not specify the basis on which the report was being made, but did give a full assessment of the situation, including his judgment as to the possibility of hostilities.

It is our firm intention that the U.S. force will not become involved in hostilities. We are doing everything in our power to ensure that this is the case. The President will, however, review the circumstances which exist at the time of deployment, and will make his judgment concerning the contents of the report in that light.

BAHRAIN: U.S. ARMS PACKAGE

Q: Why is the USG permitting the sale of new fighter aircraft in the Gulf region at this critical period in the Middle East?

A: The proposed sale of F-5 aircraft to Bahrain is not new. On April 19 of this year, Congress was notified of a proposal to sell four F-5E and two F-5F fighters to Bahrain. The most recent notification merely substitutes F-5G's for the the F-5E's which were specified in the April case. Bahrain is an important moderate Middle East state with legitimate defense needs. This sale of six aircraft will help to strengthen Bahrain's modest air arm without posing any threat to its neighbors or peace and stability in the area.

9/24/82

PROPOSED UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON BEIRUT MASSACRE
AND SECURITY COUNCIL INVESTIGATION

Q: Does the U.S support the proposal for an Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly to deal with the Beirut massacre and the proposal for a Security Council investigation into the massacre?

A: -- The Security Council in Resolution 521 has already condemned the massacre in Beirut. Any further action in the UN should be of a balanced and non-partisan nature.

-- We would oppose any effort in the UN to exploit this terrible tragedy for political purposes which would detract from the shock and outrage that all nations feel.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

SS

September 22, 1982

NEA

CC → DTS
NAV
CH
WC
JP
NEA/P
ARN
IAI
ARP
EGY
AFN
RA
guy → S.A.

TO: P - Mr. Eagleburger.
FROM: PA - John Hughes *lyg JHK*
SUBJECT: Official USG Comments on Issues Related to the President's Middle East Peace Plan

Following are official USG comments, made ON-THE-RECORD since the President's speech of September 1, on:

1. Palestinian Homeland or Autonomous Entity
2. West Bank Settlements
3. Dialogue or Contact with PLO
4. UNSC Res. 242
5. Status of Jerusalem
6. Israel's Right of Security

MCFARLANE, ABC's NIGHTLINE, 9/1/82

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

The President made his proposal tonight after very thoughtful consideration of Israel's legitimate security interests; his pledge, reaffirmation of personal commitment to those security interests, was firm, unshakable.

And the question reasonably posed -- how do you achieve the security of Israel? Do you do it by the retention of territory, and the continuity of a very large standing army? Or do you do it by agreeing to peace through a combination with Israel's neighbors? ... The President put forth these principles and said he intends to pursue them with considerable determination.

* * * * *

SECRETARY SHULTZ, ABC GOOD MORNING AMERICA, 9/2/82

WEST BANK SETTLEMENT

If the Israelis insist on settling the West Bank, they have, in effect, annexed it -- creeping annexation. That's the way the Arabs look at it.... There has to be some statement of intention to negotiate about what's going to happen in those territories.

DIALOGUE WITH PLO

From the standpoint of the USG, certain conditions have been set out of the President and by previous presidents and others on the conditions that a prerequisite to the U.S. having any discussions--

HUGHES, SDPB, 9/2/82

PALESTINIAN HOMELAND

Our point is that no significant number of Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank be excluded from the Camp David Process.

... the Palestinians ought to have a say in their process of government and autonomy and that those who do participate should have ... it is not for us to determine what that legitimacy is and how that is established.... that's for the Palestinians.

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

As the President pointed out last night, an immediate settlement freeze would facilitate our and Israel's efforts to broaden the peace process.

The President is not addressing himself to whether they [the settlements] are legal. He's looking at whether they are constructive.

I think the President's point was that there should be a freeze on the installment of new settlements, and I think he also made plain that he did not see any extension of land to existing settlements; but that is where he's going to rest.

UNSC RESOLUTION 242

A basis for peace between Israel and Syria is Security Council Resolution 242 which includes a provision on withdrawal from occupied territories; this obviously includes the Golan.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM

The President's statement that Jerusalem should remain undivided and that its final status should be negotiated is completely consistent with Camp David, and the position the U.S. has advanced for more than 30 years ... The U.S. position on Jerusalem, together with those of Golan and Israel, was included in an exchange of letters which accompanied the Camp David framework.

* * * * *

HUGHES, SDPB, 9/3/82

DIALOGUE OR CONTACTS WITH THE PLO

Our position on talking to the PLO has been made very clear -- it remains unchanged.

Our position on relations or non-relations with the PLO and a question of any discussions or negotiations with them remains unchanged. They have been constant and it has remained the same.

We did not [ask the PLO for a reaction to the President's initiative].

We have made it plain that we are unable to talk with the PLO until they recognize the U.N. Resolution and recognize the existence of Israel. That's unchanged.

UNSC RES 242

We have made it plain that we are unable to talk with the PLO until they recognized the U.N. Resolution and recognized the existence of Israel. That's unchanged.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

Implicit in that statement [by a "senior adviser official" about the West Bank during a briefing] was that the security interests of various parties would obviously have to be taken into account in any discussion of the situation of the West Bank.

* * * * *

SECRETARY SHULTZ - CBS FACE THE NATION, 9/5/82

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

You are going to have to look at the borders -- defensible borders are what people are talking about -- and appropriate security arrangements that must include the notion of a totally demilitarized area throughout the West Bank in terms of any possible offensive capabilities.

By that phrase [the President's request for freeze], he meant that the territory encompassed by the settlements be not expanded at all.

DIALOGUE WITH PLO

As far as the U.S. is concerned, the President has made very clear on numerous occasions, most recently in his last press conference, the conditions under which he would be willing to talk to the PLO. And until these conditions are met, we are not willing to talk to them.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

And it was a result of discussions with the President and his advisers about the importance in this whole picture of an absolutely determined statement and recognition of the importance of the security of Israel ... when you are in a country that small, surrounded by hostility, you are bound to have security right in the front of your mind.

There needs to be attention to security as borders are drawn. And, of course, it is very important that the whole of what we refer to as the West Bank, under whatever arrangements, would be demilitarized.

* * * * *

HUGHES, SDPB, 9/7/82

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

The President has said that the situation [of Israeli settlements on the West Bank] is not constructive.

I don't think the President has addressed himself to the question of legality [of the settlements]. I think he has said they're not constructive, they're not helpful.

DIALOGUE WITH PLO

We have made it plain that we are unable to talk with the PLO until they recognize the U.N. Resolution and recognize the existence of Israel. That's unchanged.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

We have made it plain that we are unable to talk with the PLO until they recognized the U.N. Resolution and recognized the existence of Israel that's unchanged.

We have consistently, I think, been concerned about Israel's security needs and continue to be concerned that Israel's security should not be jeopardized by any assistance from Southern Lebanon.

There will be negotiations about the kinds of security guarantees that would be in place [in Southern Lebanon].

There's room for discussion on how Israel's security concerns might be met.

There are three separate things: ... and the possibility of assessing Israel's concerns in some form unspecified be discussed and perhaps negotiated regarding threats from Southern Lebanon towards Israel.

* * * * *

HUGHES, SDPB, 9/8/82

DIALOGUE WITH PLO

Our point is unchanged on discussions and talks with the PLO or its leadership. We do not talk with members of the PLO until and if they accept the appropriate U.N. resolutions and the independence and legitimacy of Jerusalem.

UNSC RES. 242

Our point is unchanged on discussion and talks with the PLO or its leadership. We do not talk with members of the PLO until and if they accept the appropriate UN resolutions and the independence and legitimacy of Jerusalem.

If those conditions [Arafat acceptance was met], then you would have a new situation, and I think we would have to look at it at that time.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

There are three separate things: ... and the possibility of assessing Israel's concerns in some form unspecified be discussed and perhaps negotiated regarding threats from Southern Lebanon towards Israel.

Our point is unchanged on discussion and talks with the PLO or its leadership. We do not talk with members of the PLO until and if they accept the appropriate U.N. resolutions and the independence and legitimacy of Israel.

* * * * *

SECRETARY WEINBERGER, Interview on Arrival at Andrews; 9/9/82

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

I think there will be a greater realization [by Israelis] as time goes on that it's much better to try to preserve your borders and your security by guarantees, by recognition, by understandings, simply than by maintaining a very strong, very capable military force, which the Israelis clearly have.

* * * * *

SECRETARY SHULTZ, HFAC, 9/9/82 and SFRC, 9/10/82

PALESTINIAN HOMELAND

It is time to address, forcefully and directly, the underlying Palestinian issues and genuine success depends on broadening participation in the negotiations to include as envisaged in the Camp David Accords, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

The Camp David framework has the necessary room for negotiations to fulfill the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and to reach peace treaties between Israel and her neighbors.

This same renewed dynamism [for the Camp David negotiations] will provide appropriate regard to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

It is the President's belief that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza. Accordingly, we will not support such a solution.

The status of Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations. We will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts, but neither will we support efforts to deny Jews the opportunity to live in the West Bank and Gaza under the duly-constituted governmental authority there, as Arabs live in Israel.

UNSC RES. 242

The Camp David accords provide that these negotiated arrangements on final status must be "just, comprehensive, ... durable," and "based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts."

STATUS OF JERUSALEM

We will fully support the position that Jerusalem must be undivided and that its status must be determined through negotiations. We do not recognize unilateral acts with respect to the final status issues.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

In taking this initiative, the President established two conditions -- we will remain firmly committed both to the principles of the Camp David Accords and to the security of Israel.

This Administration and the President personally are committed to Israel's security.

In our view, the objective of the transitional period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants, while ensuring that all necessary measures are taken to assure Israeli security.

* * * * *

SECRETARY WEINBERGER, CNN Interview, 9/10/82

UNSC RES. 242

The UN resolutions 242 and others that we have talked about speak about changes in borders and boundary lines that to make adjustments that can account for and take into consideration the wishes of the residents in many respects.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

The President believes, and I certainly agree, that the best way of peace and security for Israel and for all of those countries in the Mideast is to get a peace based on recognition and on guarantees of security that don't require those very large, very expensive forces that generate so much inflation and leave everyone in such a state of tension.

The more people who understand the general benefits that can come from the President's plan for them and for their future, for their children, so that there doesn't seem always to have to be this state of tension and worry about artillery ranges in fear of war or shellings, then I think the more it's appreciated how much the President's plan can eliminate that kind of fear and can bring a genuine and permanent peace and security, the more support it will have.

* * * * *

SECRETARY SHULTZ, Address to the United Jewish Appeal, 9/12/82

PALESTINIAN HOMELAND

Camp David calls for a "just, comprehensive and durable" Middle East peace based on Resolution 242, but builds on it as well by calling for a solution that recognizes "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements" and a "resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."

And third, there is the President's speech of September 1. This historical address builds on the earlier documents by stating categorically that our approach to peace will continue to be based on Res. 242, with its concept of an exchange of territory for peace, and of Camp David Accords, which provide for Palestinian self-government with full guarantees for Israel's security.

Our preference is for self-government by the Palestinians in association with Jordan, with the extent of withdrawal determined by the quality of peace offered in return.

The United States also believes that peace cannot be achieved by the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. The President has stated clearly and unequivocally that we will not support an independent Palestinian state in the territories.

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

While we support the right of Jews to live in peace on the West Bank and Gaza under the duly-constituted governmental authority there -- just as Arabs live in Israel -- we regard a continuation of settlement activity prior to the conclusion of negotiations as detrimental to the peace process.

UNSC RESOLUTION 242

UN Security Council Resolution 242 ... established the basis for a negotiating process founded on the idea of an exchange of territory for real peace.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

There should be full safeguards for Israeli security, both internal and external, throughout the transitional period and beyond. The President has made this forcefully clear.

Our commitment grows out of a sense of moral obligation but also out of strategic interest. A strong, secure Israel is in our interests and in the interests of peace. There will be no peace without Israeli security, but Israel will never be secure without peace. Our vision of the future on the West Bank is one guided by a vision of a secure Israel living with defensible borders and by our abiding belief that it is not in Israel's long-term interests to try to rule over the more than one million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.

If Israel's adversaries want peace and justice, they must recognize, clearly and explicitly, the right of the state of Israel to exist, and they must enter, as President Reagan said, "direct, hard, and fair" negotiations with Israel. When they do, Israel then has the chance to translate military strength into peace, the only long-term security.

The crucial point is that when it comes to safeguarding the long-term security of Israel, the friendship and resolve of the United States are second in importance only to Israel's own resolution and strength.

ROMBERG, SDPB, 9/13/82

DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO

Our own point on talks with the PLO is clear and been often stated (i.e., we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO until that organization has accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognized Israel's right to existence.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY

Our own point on talks with the PLO is clear and been often stated (i.e., we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO until that organization has accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognized Israel's right to existence.

PK
PA/OAP:PKnecht/IPernick:sch
x.20472 9/22/82

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 6688

02 10 19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>HAS SEEN</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			<u>SEP 25 1982</u> <u>[Signature]</u>
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	<u>D-Dispatch</u> N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

8: 24 PM '12

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Press Themes and Qs and As for Administration
Spokesmen

Attached are themes and questions and answers on the situation in Lebanon for use by Administration spokesmen this week-end. The packet will be up-dated Saturday, September 25. Please pass the packet to Mort Allin.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As StatedUNCLASSIFIED

Subject: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON LEBANON

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Judge Clark | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Guhin | <input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Myer | <input type="checkbox"/> Capt. Sims |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McFarlane | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Helm | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. North | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 Mr. Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Poindexter | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kemp | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nau | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tyson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bailey | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kimmitt | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Pipes | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Weiss |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cmdr. Blair | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Reed | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Wettering |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Boverie | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> Col. Wheeler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Col. Lilac | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rentschler | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Yorke |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. De Graffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Ltc. Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Robinson | <input type="checkbox"/> NSC Secretariat |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Lord | <input type="checkbox"/> Col. Russell | <input type="checkbox"/> NSC MSG Center |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fontaine | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Martin | <input type="checkbox"/> Col. Rye | <input type="checkbox"/> Sit Room |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Gregg | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McGaffigan | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sapia-Bosch | <input type="checkbox"/> Admin. Office |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Morris | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Sigur | |

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# cys	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT (OEOB OFFICES)				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/room 7241	1	25 Sep 82	1550	Joseph F. Alexander
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	1	25 Sep 82	1526	Arthur L. Pridemore Jr
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept of State				
CHAIRMAN, US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State.....				
DIRECTOR CIA Langley, VA/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon	1	25 Sep 82	1526	Arthur L. Pridemore Jr
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851.				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
DIRECTOR AID Room 5942 New State				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg.				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333/State Dept.	1	25 Sep 82	1550	Joseph F. Alexander
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10TH/Const. NW, Room 5119.....				
DIRECTOR OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, INTL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ICA) 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW.....				
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Const Ave NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street, SW.....				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS) 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
DIRECTOR, JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1360 Wilson Blvd. # 1051, Arlington, VA				

