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**WHORM Subject File Code:** CO002  
(Afghanistan)  
**Case File Number(s):** 606000-629999

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 2/8/2010

**File Folder** CO002 (606000-629999)

**FOIA**

S10-306

**Box Number** 38

SYSTEMATIC

183

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84301	LETTER	KING FAHD TO REAGAN RE: AFGHANISTAN, ENGLISH TRANSLATION <b>R 4/23/2019 WH GUIDELINES</b>	2	9/27/1988	B1
84302	LETTER	PHOTOCOPY OF LETTER KING FAHD TO REAGAN, IN ARABIC <b>R 4/23/2019 WH GUIDELINES</b>	2	9/27/1988	B1
84303	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #84301, ORIGINAL <b>R 4/23/2019 WH GUIDELINES</b>	2	9/27/1988	B1
84304	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #84302, PHOTOCOPY <b>R 4/23/2019 WH GUIDELINES</b>	2	9/27/1988	B1
84305	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #84302, ORIGINAL <b>R 4/23/2019 WH GUIDELINES</b>	2	9/27/1988	B1
84306	MEMO	COLIN POWELL TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MEETING WITH BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	2	11/8/1988	B1
84307	TALKING POINTS	CARD FORMAT FOR MEETING WITH RABBANI	1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SYSTEMATIC

183

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84308	PAPER	POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH RESISTANCE ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	1	ND	B1
84309	PAPER	BIO, WITH NOTES ON THE BACK	2	9/20/1988	B1 B3

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

C.F.

7431

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY dm NADA, DATE 2/6/10

TRANSMITTAL FORM

606576  
3100

0002

S/S 8830173 CD134

FGD11

Date October 26, 1988

FG006-12

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan

From: King Fahd

Date: October 24, 1988

Subject: A Letter to President Reagan from King Fahd  
discussing the cause of the people of Afghanistan

WH Referral Dated: \_\_\_\_\_  
NSC ID# (If any): \_\_\_\_\_

The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.
- Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: No response is necessary because the King's letter is  
in reply to one we sent him from President Reagan..

NSC 8807431

*Kate Smith*  
Director  
Secretariat Staff

~~SECRET~~



## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 15, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens  
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential  
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Reagan from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on October 15, 1988. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "S. McElhenny".

Director, S/S-1  
Information Management Section  
Executive Secretariat  
647-3836



UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Honourable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Sec.34(b) E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House, Dec 11, 2008  
BY NARA *AK* DATE 4/23/2019

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your kind and friendly letter in which you have discussed the cause of the people of Afghanistan; the occupation they have suffered since 1980 and their struggle from that date on until achieving victory with the start of the Soviet forces withdrawal from their land.

While I warmly appreciate your comments about the position taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its support of this cause, I would like to pay tribute to Your Excellency's personal role and the moral and material support which has been continuously provided by your country to the Muslim Afghanistani people during the hard and severe circumstances they passed through and are still suffering, but with a firm confidence and conviction derived from their adherence to their faith.

The struggle of the Afghanistani people will remain, throughout the epoch of history, the living symbol of mankind clinging to their freedom and its defense regardless of the limited resources they may have and the severity of the circumstances which they face. Your Excellency's pledge on behalf of your friendly country to pursue the aim of realizing full withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan will continue to be the subject of lasting appreciation and esteem.

Undoubtedly, the withdrawal of these forces, the establishment of peace in the Gulf region and the granting of the Arab Palestinian people their legitimate rights in their homeland are vital grounds for stabilizing and bulwarking security and peace not only in the Middle East, but also in the whole world.



The Honourable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
Page Two

Let us hope, together, to see the banner of right and justice  
always raised high and victorious and security and peace  
prevailing in all parts of the world.

Concluding, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity  
to convey to Your Excellency my best wishes for continued  
good health and happiness and for a permanent prosperity  
for the friendly American people.

With my best regards and greetings,

Your friend,

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud

Jeddah, 16 Safar, 1409 H  
Corresponding to 27 September, 1988



صاحب الفخامة الصديق الرئيس رونالد ريغان

رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

عزيزي الرئيس:

لقد تسلمت رسالتكم الودية التي تناولتم فيها قضية الشعب الافغاني وتعرضه للاحتلال منذ عام ١٩٨٠ وجهاده منذ ذلك التاريخ حتى تحقق له النصر ببدء انسحاب القوات السوفيتيه من ارضه.

ومع تقديري الحار لما أعبتكم عنه تجاه موقف المملكة العربية السعودية ومناصرتها لهذه القضية أنهو بالدور الشخصي لفخامتكم وبالدعم المادي والمعنوي الذي قدمه ولايزال يقدمه بلكم الصديق للشعب الافغاني المسلم خلال الظروف القاسية التي اجتازها، ولايزال يجتازها بايمان راسخ ينبع من تمسكه بعقيدته.

ان جهاد الشعب الافغاني سيظل على مر التاريخ صورة حية تعبر عن تمسك الانسان بحريته والدفاع عنها رغم ماقد يكون لديه من امكانيات محدودة، وقسوة في الظروف التي تواجهه. وان ما اشار اليه فخامتكم عن تعهد بلكم الصديق بالعمل على تحقيق الانسحاب الكامل للقوات السوفيتيه في افغانستان سيظل محل التقدير والاعتبار الدائمين.

ولاشك ان انسحاب هذه القوات واحلال السلام في منطقة الخليج ومنح الشعب العربي الفلسطيني حقوقه المشروعة في وطنه



أسسهامة لاستقرار الامن والسلام ليسرفي منطقة الشرق الاوسط  
 وحدها بل في العالم كله.  
 واننا لنأمل معا ان تنتصر دائما راية الحق والعدل، ويسود  
 الامن والسلام في كل انحاء المعموره.  
 وفي الختام اغتنم هذه المناسبة لابعث لكم اطيب التمنيات  
 بدوام الصحة والسعادة وللشعب الامريكي الصديق بدوام الرخاء.  
 وتقبلو تحياتي،،،

صديق  
 فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

جده في ١٦ صفر ١٤٠٩ هـ  
 الموافق ٢٧ سبتمبر ١٩٨٨ م



United States Department of State 7431

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 15, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens  
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential  
Correspondence

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A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "S. McElhenny".

Director, S/S-I  
Information Management Section  
Executive Secretariat  
647-3836



October 13, 1988

The Honourable Richard W. Murphy  
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern  
and South Asian Affairs  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ambassador Murphy:

I have the honour of enclosing a letter from King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for President Reagan. May I ask your kind assistance in forwarding this correspondence to the President.

An unofficial translation in English is also enclosed.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz'.

Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz  
Ambassador

BbSbA/bg



UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Honourable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States

What is the...  
BY NARA

4/23/2019

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your kind and friendly letter in which you have discussed the cause of the people of Afghanistan; the occupation they have suffered since 1980 and their struggle from that date on until achieving victory with the start of the Soviet forces withdrawal from their land.

While I warmly appreciate your comments about the position taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its support of this cause, I would like to pay tribute to Your Excellency's personal role and the moral and material support which has been continuously provided by your country to the Muslim Afghanistani people during the hard and severe circumstances they passed through and are still suffering, but with a firm confidence and conviction derived from their adherence to their faith.

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Undoubtedly, the withdrawal of these forces, the establishment of peace in the Gulf region and the granting of the Arab Palestinian people their legitimate rights in their homeland are vital grounds for stabilizing and bulwarking security and peace not only in the Middle East, but also in the whole world.



The Honourable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
Page Two

Let us hope, together, to see the banner of right and justice  
always raised high and victorious and security and peace  
prevailing in all parts of the world.

Concluding, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity  
to convey to Your Excellency my best wishes for continued  
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Your friend,

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud

Jeddah, 16 Safar, 1409 H  
Corresponding to 27 September, 1988



صاحب الفخامة الصديق الرئيس رونالد ريغان

رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

عزيزي الرئيس:

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ولاشك ان انسحاب هذه القوات واحلال السلام في منطقة الخليج ومنح الشعب العربي الفلسطيني حقوقه المشروعة في وطنه

أسرهامة لاستقرار الامن والسلام ليسرفي منطقة الشرق الاوسط  
 وحدها بل في العالم كله.  
 واننا لنأمل معا ان تنتصر دائما راية الحق والعدل، ويسود  
 الامن والسلام في كل انحاء المعموره.  
 وفي الختام اغتنم هذه المناسبة لابعث لكم اطيب التمنيات  
 بدوام الصحة والسعادة وللشعب الامريكي الصديق بدوام الرخاء.  
 وتقبلو تحياتي،،

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

جده في ١٦ صفر ١٤٠٩ هـ  
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An unofficial translation in English is also enclosed.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be "Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above the printed name of the sender.

Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz  
Ambassador

BbSbA/bg





بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



DEI  
Sec. 34/10  
Wahab House  
Riyadh  
السعودية

٤١٢٣١٢٤٥٦

صاحب الفخامة الصديق الرئيس رونالد ريغان  
رئيس الولايات المتحدة الامريكية

عزيزي الرئيس:

لقد تسلمت رسالتكم الودية التي تناولتم فيها قضية الشعب  
الافغاني وتعرضه للاحتلال منذ عام ١٩٨٠ وجهاده منذ ذلك التاريخ  
حتى تحقق له النصر ببدء انسحاب القوات السوفيتيه من ارضه.  
ومع تقديرني الحار لما أعربتم عنه تجاه موقف المملكة  
العربية السعودية ومناصرتها لهذه القضية أنوه بالدور الشخصي  
لفخامتكم وبالدعم المادي والمعنوي الذي قدمه ولايزال يقدمه  
بلدكم الصديق للشعب الافغاني المسلم خلال الظروف القاسية التي  
اجتازها، ولايزال يجتازها بايمان راسخ ينبع من تمسكه بعقيدته.  
ان جهاد الشعب الافغاني سيظل على مر التاريخ صورة حية تعبر  
عن تمسك الانسان بحريته والدفاع عنها رغم ماقد يكون لديه من  
امكانيات محدودة، وقسوة في الظروف التي تواجهه. وان ما اشار  
اليه فخامتكم عن تعهد بلدكم الصديق بالعمل على تحقيق  
الانسحاب الكامل للقوات السوفيتيه في افغانستان سيظل محل  
التقدير والاعتبار الذائمين.


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وفي الختام اغتنم هذه المناسبة لابعث لكم اطيب التمنيات  
بدوام الصحة والسعادة وللشعب الامريكي الصديق بدوام الرخاء.

وتقبلو تحياتي..“



فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود

جده في ١٦ صفر ١٤٠٩ هـ  
الموافق ٢٧ سبتمبر ١٩٨٨ م

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8807431  
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 88 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: FAHD

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 88  
SOURCE REF: 8830173

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA  
HS

AFGHANISTAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM KING FAHD RE AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PENDING STATE RECOMS DUE DATE: 20 OCT 88 STATUS: **D**

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
CURTIN  
KELLY, B  
LEACH  
LEDSKY  
OAKLEY  
PERITO  
RODMAN  
ROSTOW  
STEVENS  
TAHIR-KHELI

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAPK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8807431

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STATE  
004

Z 88101710 PENDING STATE RECOMS  
X 88102617 NFAR PER STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8807431  
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 88 10

TO: STEVENS

FROM: LEVITSKY, M

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 88  
SOURCE REF: 8830173

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA  
HS

AFGHANISTAN

PERSONS: FAHD

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM KING FAHD RE AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: N FAR PER STATE DUE DATE: 20 OCT 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAPK CLOSED BY: NSREB DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

606580  
CO002

*Collection Name*

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
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84306	MEMO	2	11/8/1988	B1

COLIN POWELL TO THE PRESIDENT, RE:  
MEETING WITH BURHANUDDIN RABBANI

---

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
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84308	PAPER  POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH RESISTANCE ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	1	ND	B1

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PARTICIPANTS LIST

The United States

The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Kenneth Duberstein  
Colin Powell  
M. B. Oglesby  
Undersecretary Michael Armacost  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, NSC  
  
Zalmay Khalilzad, Interpreter

Afghanistan

Burhannudin Rabbani  
Eshan Jan Areef  
Din Mohammad  
Mr. Saljookie  
Mr. Waziri



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84309	PAPER  BIO, WITH NOTES ON THE BACK	2	9/20/1988	B1 B3

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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**SCHEDULING OFFICE**

606580  
C.0002

November 2, 1988

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, Director Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *PS*

REQUEST: Presidential Meeting in the Oval Office with Mr. Rabbani, Afghanistan Resistance Alliance Spokesman.

PURPOSE: To meet with the President to discuss the current military situation and diplomatic initiatives in Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: Mr. Rabbani and representatives of the resistance factions are at the UN this week. A variety of political and military developments suggest that we should use the occasion for Rabbani to meet with the President, to underscore U.S. support for the Resistance and Pakistan and our expectation that the Soviet withdrawal will proceed on the timetable called for in the Geneva Accord.

DATE & TIME: November 7, 1988; Duration: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President and Burhannudin Rabbani

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo Op - 5 minutes  
Meeting - 10 minutes

REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC will prepare talking points

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

PROPOSED "PHOTO": Yes

RECOMMENDED BY: State, NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

Prepared by: Sharin Tahir-Kheli

*File*  
*This was scheduled*  
*ACS*

cc Mari Maseng

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *ab*, DATE *2/5/10*

File

LEE SHAPIRO MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, INC.

3620 Lincoln Terrace, North Bergen, NJ 07047 (201) 865-0409

611085PD

August 31, 1988

Mr. Gary Bauer  
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

CO002  
FG -07

Dear Mr. Bauer,

Thank you for your letter of August 22, and for your continued support for the cause of Afghanistan and world freedom.


As Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, I feel that you are in the best position to judge how to proceed in the effort to see the three Americans who were killed in Afghanistan honored with the Medal of Freedom.

I want you to know that there are many ordinary citizens as well as office-holders and other prominent Americans who are willing to assist in the effort. In a way, the problem I face is that of deciding what actions would be most helpful at this point.

Please do not hesitate to let me know if there is anything more that I could do to support this initiative.

Thank you once again for your support and encouragement.

Sincerely,



Andrew Kessler  
Vice President



THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 10, 1989

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. MARK SULLIVAN

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES 2 COPIES OF REPORT REGARDING THE  
AFGHAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
COLIN POWELL		ORG	89/01/10		C 89/01/11
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL TO RALPH BELLAMY

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                        *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
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618236

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY  
PEACE AND WORLD ORDER STUDIES PROGRAM  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20064  
(202) 526-6287

January 9, 1988


The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

This report summarizes a number of proposals I have been asked to present to the government of the United States on behalf of representatives of various groups involved in the Afghan resistance movement.

Your careful consideration of these proposals would be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully yours,



Dr. Mark Sullivan

8

NSC → STK

AFGHAN REPORT

by

Dr. Mark Sullivan

Peace and World Order Studies Program

The Catholic University of America

Washington, D.C.

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## INTRODUCTION

A number of people representing various groups currently involved in the Afghan resistance movement have asked me to help them establish a dialogue with Zaher Shah, the king of Afghanistan, and the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. These people include mujahideen commanders, tribal leaders, traditional religious leaders, and several individuals who claim to be members of an extensive underground resistance network operating in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. I have been told that this network includes numerous individuals from the various groups mentioned above, as well as senior officials of the Pesawar-based opposition parties and at least two dozen people now holding high level positions in the current Kabul regime.

I have been asked to inform Zaher Shah and the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union that an effort is currently being undertaken to unite these groups in a new coalition. The objectives of this coalition include the establishment of an early ceasefire to facilitate a peaceful withdrawal of Soviet troops and the formation of a broad-based interim government to oversee that ceasefire and begin the processes needed to establish a permanent, legitimate, and viable government in Afghanistan.

Members of the groups listed above have also asked me to convey to Zaher Shah and the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union a number of specific proposals for developing the type of process needed for achieving each of these objectives at the earliest possible date. Believing that the formation of this new coalition may have important implications for U.S. foreign policy, I would like to review these proposals with appropriate officials in our government as soon as possible.

Before concluding this introduction, let me emphasize that a great deal of secrecy surrounds current efforts to form a new coalition among groups involved in the resistance movement because there is widespread fear within these groups that their activities will be sabotaged, and lives endangered, if they are discovered by the current opposition leaders in Pesawar. Indeed, the primary motivation for the formation of the new coalition seems to be fear and distrust of the Pesawar-based opposition leaders and a general feeling that these leaders are not acting in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan. Consequently, on behalf of those involved in the formation of this coalition, I ask that the information in this report be handled with the utmost discretion.

DUE TO THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE MATERIAL  
PRESENTED IN THE REMAINING SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT,  
I AM REQUESTING THAT THEIR CONTENTS NOT BE REVIEWED  
BY ANYONE WITHOUT APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCES.

## PRELIMINARY STEPS

In late November representatives of the coalition described in the introduction to this report, asked me to help them initiate a negotiation process which they believe could lead to the establishment of a complete ceasefire and the formation of a new government in Afghanistan. Major details of the plan outlined to me by the coalition to initiate this process are reviewed below. As already indicated, the coalition has asked me to convey to Zaher Shah and the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union several important requests and proposals to acquire the cooperation and support needed to implement this plan. This and subsequent sections of this report will review these requests and proposals as part of this effort to summarize the major features of the new coalition's proposed program for ending the war in Afghanistan.

Before describing this program, however, let me emphasize again that current efforts to form a new coalition among the resistance groups are being carried out without the consent or approval of the Pesawar-based opposition leaders. As I have already noted, the primary motivation for the formation of the new coalition seems to be fear and distrust of the opposition leaders in Pesawar and a general feeling that these leaders are not acting in the best interests of the Afghan people.

Relations between the opposition leaders and members of the various groups listed above have been strained for years. The opposition leaders are widely disliked because there has been a great deal of favoritism and corruption in the distribution of military and humanitarian aid channeled through their organizations in Pesawar and because they and their closest associates have lived in comfort and luxury while other Afghans have suffered severe deprivations throughout the war years. More important, however, is that they are also disliked -- despised is probably a more appropriate term -- because, through coercion, assassination, and other intimidation tactics, they have frequently attempted to increase their own power or influence at the expense of others active in the resistance movement, while also exhibiting a callous disregard for the lives of others involved in the actual conduct of the war. Such incidents have left most of the mujahideen commanders, even those currently receiving the lion's share of the resources channeled through Pesawar, feeling as if the opposition leaders were no better than feudal warlords, each trying to maximize his own power at the expense of others within the Afghan community.

One does not have to look far for signs of this antagonism toward the Pesawar-based opposition leaders. It is prevalent, and often expressed, within the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan and within each of the groups currently working to form a new

coalition to end the war. Nowhere is this antagonism more visible, however, than among the mujahideen commanders themselves. Indeed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the man who frequently claims to be the most powerful of the opposition leaders, was recently run out of Khandihar by the mujahideen commanders in this strategically important province because he was pressuring them to escalate the military conflict around the provincial capital despite their protests that such an escalation would result in an unacceptably high number of casualties within the civilian population.

Over the years the Pesawar-based opposition leaders have come to be recognized as the de facto representatives of the Afghan resistance movement. Claiming to represent the people in Afghanistan, they have acquired an extraordinary amount of power. Their power, however, has not been derived from any legitimate political process within the Afghan community. Instead, it is solely the product of their control over resources flowing into that community from outside sources.

The new coalition currently being formed among groups involved in the resistance movement includes people who have a legitimate claim to power in Afghan society (tribal leaders and traditional religious leaders) as well as those who actually control the situation on the ground in Afghanistan (the mujahideen commanders). Rather disorganized in the past, these people have come to recognize that it is only through unity that they can effectively influence future developments in their country. Working to bring about that unity is the group I have previously referred to as the underground. People representing the underground have told me their association includes numerous individuals from the groups mentioned above, as well as senior officials of the Pesawar-based opposition parties who have become disillusioned with the leadership of these parties and at least two dozen people now holding high level positions within the current Kabul regime.

I spoke with a number of people involved in the formation of the new coalition during a recent five month trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan. These people have described to me at length their plans for extending the coalition and their proposed program for ending the war in Afghanistan. I will now review some of the highlights of that program relating to the establishment of a negotiation process.

Representatives of the coalition recognize that they are an unknown commodity at this point. To rectify that situation, they are ready to initiate an immediate, unilateral three day ceasefire in the province of Khandihar as a sign of their power and their willingness to begin negotiations as soon as possible. (They have also told me that they are capable of initiating a more extensive ceasefire if such a ceasefire is necessary to establish their credibility and that they are ready to halt the missile attacks on



Kabul if such an action is needed to facilitate the establishment of a negotiation process.) Prior to the initiation of this unilateral ceasefire, however, they have asked me to perform several tasks.

First, they have asked me to visit Zaher Shah in Italy to describe the new coalition and, on their behalf, invite him to serve as the chairman of the negotiating team they wish to establish if a dialogue can be opened with the U.S.S.R. and representatives of the current Kabul regime. I have been asked to explain to Zaher Shah the objectives of the new coalition and the proposed program it has developed to achieve these objectives. Again, the objectives of the new coalition include establishing an early ceasefire to facilitate a peaceful withdrawal of Soviet troops and the formation of a broad-based interim government to oversee that ceasefire and begin the processes needed to establish a permanent, legitimate, and viable government in Afghanistan.

I have been instructed to inform Zaher Shah that the coalition will proceed with its peace initiatives without him should he reject the invitation. The coalition recognizes that the king would be a valuable asset but, given the current situation, they are not willing to wait for him.

If the king does accept the invitation I am to request that he grant an exclusive interview to the BBC in which he repeats an already prepared statement which I currently have in my possession. Broadcasts of the interview will insure that this message is received by those waiting to hear it.

Representatives of the coalition have also asked me to contact the U.S. government prior to their initiation of the ceasefire. They are determined that no publicity whatsoever be generated by their initiatives at this point. This is why they have proposed a ceasefire of such limited duration and scale. They believe they can masquerade their intentions from the Pesawar-based opposition leaders by making it appear as if the ceasefire is circumstantial, the unintended result of a commanders' meeting they will hold outside the city of Khandihar during the cessation of hostilities.

Members of the coalition recognize, however, that the Pesawar leaders may discover their ruse and take retaliatory action against those participating in the ceasefire. Hopeful that the U.S. will support them in their endeavors, they have asked that our government use whatever influence it can to prevent such actions. What they are especially concerned about is the possibility that the opposition leaders will withhold food and other essential humanitarian aid from groups whose members are suspected of being involved in this peace initiative. They want to make sure that no one starves as a result of their attempts to end the war.

As this point I should note that it is my belief that the coalition will continue with its efforts to initiate a peace initiative with or without the support of the United States. Over and over I have been told that the mujahideen no longer need military assistance from the United States or any other country. Over and over they stress their need for humanitarian aid for their people. They believe that should they strike a deal with the Soviets such aid will be forthcoming.

I should also note that I have received numerous unsolicited messages from people involved in the resistance movement expressing their gratitude to the United States for our continued assistance throughout the war years. I believe these people are quite sincere in their attempts to enlist our cooperation and support for their current peace initiative. They have developed a great deal of respect for the United States and are very hopeful we will continue to help them in their efforts to end this long and difficult war.

Representatives of the new coalition have also asked me to inform the Soviet Union of their willingness to initiate a unilateral ceasefire as the first step of a negotiation process and requested that I encourage them to exhibit a similar reciprocal gesture if they are interested in participating in such a process. If the Soviets are willing to exhibit such a gesture, representatives of the new coalition will be ready to begin negotiations as soon as possible.

The proceeding paragraphs summarize the new coalition's thoughts about preliminary steps necessary before a dialogue can be opened leading to a peace process in Afghanistan. The next section of this report reviews essential features of their proposed negotiation process and the process they envision for establishing a permanent, legitimate, and viable government in their country.

## A NEGOTIATION PROCESS

I have already described the new coalition currently being formed by various groups involved in the Afghan resistance movement and some of their ideas regarding preliminary steps necessary to initiate a negotiation process. I will now review some of the important features of the program they envision for ending the war and their proposed process for establishing a permanent, legitimate, and viable government in Afghanistan.

The coalition -- composed of mujahideen commanders, tribal leaders, traditional religious leaders, and people involved in what has been described to me as an extensive underground network operating in both Pakistan and Afghanistan -- has proposed that they initiate a limited ceasefire to establish their credibility and to illustrate their willingness to begin negotiations as soon as possible. The negotiation process they envision has two distinct phases.

The first involves a series of behind the scenes, completely unpublicized meetings to establish an agenda and a schedule for further negotiations. The coalition hopes during this phase to establish specific agreements on crucial issues involving a complete ceasefire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a process for the formation of a new government in Afghanistan.

During the second phase of the proposed negotiation process these agreements would be introduced in a broader forum for further consideration and ratification. The notion underlying the scheme is that it should be possible to arrive at a series of agreements during the first stage of the negotiation process which will satisfy virtually all participants in later stages of the process. To understand the logic of the coalition on this point, it is necessary to review its thinking on who should participate in the first phase of the negotiations.

The coalition believes there should be two teams participating in the first phase of the negotiation process. One team should represent all of the groups involved in the resistance movement. The other should represent the current Kabul regime and those people inside Afghanistan who have supported this regime over the years. The coalition members have suggested that each team include fifteen to twenty-five prominent people representing each of the groups referred to above.

Members of the coalition would like to have Zaher Shah as the head of their negotiation team, but my conversations with them suggest they would also be glad to have him act as the chairman or chief moderator of the negotiation process itself. They would also like to have a number of mujahideen commanders, tribal leaders, and traditional religious leaders on their negotiation team.

My previous communications have attempted to describe the relationship between the new coalition and the current Pesawar-based opposition leaders. I have noted that individuals involved in the formation of the coalition do not trust these leaders to negotiate on their own an agreement which is in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan. The new coalition is not averse, however, to having several of the opposition leaders participate in the negotiation process. Indeed, they would like to have both Gailani and Rabbani play prominent roles in this process. What the coalition members are opposed to is a negotiation process in which the seven opposition leaders in Pesawar are allowed to determine, without their participation, future developments in their country.

Members of the coalition make no demands about the composition of the negotiation team put forward by the current Kabul regime but they have suggested that it would be wise if the team did not include hard core ideologues or individuals with reputations for ruthlessness during the war years.

In this regard it is important to emphasize that the new coalition seems to be an association of moderates within the resistance movement. They believe Afghanistan should be an Islamic nation but they are not fundamentalists. They condemn communism as an ideology but they are willing to have people associated with the current communist regime participate in the next government. Indeed, they are convinced the skills these people have acquired can help them make meaningful contributions to Afghan society. Representatives of the new coalition have expressed to me their determination to carry on with the war until the Russians leave, but they have also expressed their desire to form a friendly cooperative relationship with the people of the Soviet Union.

In short, the new coalition does not appear to be an organization composed of radicals. Instead, it is a coalition of individuals who are tired of the war, people who would like to bring a measure of peace and prosperity to their country. They are convinced that without their participation the nation is headed for a period of conflict like that occurring in Lebanon today. As the following remarks illustrate, they believe they have a program for avoiding this type of conflict in Afghanistan.

The coalition proposes that the two negotiating teams meet in secret as soon as possible to begin their negotiations. They assume that the Kabul team will be accompanied by Soviet advisors and have expressed to me their desire to have the U.S. perform a similar role for them in the negotiation process. It is their intention to establish specific agreements on a number of points during the first phase of the negotiation process. As indicated previously, these agreements will then be announced and legitimated during the second, less secretive stage of the process.

The coalition believes it is essential to reach agreements regarding the timing and speed of a Soviet withdrawal during the first stage, the behind the scenes phase, of the negotiation process. The coalition also believes it is essential that a detailed plan for the formation of a new government in Afghanistan be developed and agreed upon during the first stage of this process.

Their proposed scheme for establishing such a government relies on the traditional method for resolving conflicts in Afghan society i.e., the jirga system. Conversations with coalition members suggest they envision the jirga they are proposing as something roughly equivalent to what we might call a constitutional assembly. In this jirga, carefully selected working committees would introduce specific proposals regarding the structure and procedures of the next government of Afghanistan. Developed during earlier behind the scenes negotiations, these proposals would then be ratified by all those participating in the jirga. Acting as an interim government, the jirga would also announce and ratify those agreements already made in earlier negotiations concerning the ceasefire and the Soviet withdrawal.

The traditional jirga is an assembly of tribal and religious leaders called to resolve a particular problem. The jirga proposed by the new coalition would also include important mujahideen commanders, the Pesawar-based opposition leaders, and individuals representing the current Kabul regime or other groups affiliated with that regime over the years. The jirga would also have seats reserved for prominent Afghans not affiliated with particular groups or parties. This would provide members of the underground and people representing refugee groups outside the country a chance to participate in the formation of the new government.

With so many different individuals and groups represented in the jirga, members of the coalition recognize that it is essential that well thought out proposals be presented to the delegates attending this assembly to minimize dissension and to expedite the ratification process. They believe representatives of the current Kabul regime will work with them in behind the scenes negotiations to form a new government because they assume both sides in this conflict recognize by now that there can be no stability in Afghanistan without such a government. They assume representatives of all the groups participating in the second stage of the negotiation process will accept well thought out proposals in the public forum of a jirga because to do so is in their best interests, or in the best interests of their constituencies. They hope the Russians will be willing to work with them in the negotiation process because they have no intention of persecuting people associated with the Kabul regime and because they are offering the Soviet Union a peaceful

withdrawal and a stable, friendly government on their southern border.

Representatives of the coalition have spoken with me at length regarding the type of government they would like to see established in Afghanistan. Their discussions reveal that the type of government they envision would be very much like ours in both form and function. What they will propose in negotiations is that the new government include three major independent branches -- a legislative, an executive, and a judicial -- with the same sort of balance of power as we have built into our political system. They have expressed a willingness to have the king, Zaher Shah, serve as the symbolic figurehead of the government but are definitely opposed to having him assume the type of role he enjoyed in Afghan society before being overthrown by his nephew in 1973.

Members of the coalition have also described to me the types of policies they believe their government should adopt in coming years. At this point I will only note that they believe their government should adopt a nonaligned stance in international relations. They are hopeful, however, that such a stance will not prevent them from developing and maintaining friendly relations with both the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

The previous section of this report noted that the coalition was ready to initiate a limited unilateral ceasefire as a sign of its power and its willingness to participate in a negotiation process. Members of the coalition are proposing that the details for a complete ceasefire and withdrawal of Soviet troops be worked out during the first, behind the scenes stage of this process.

By way of review, representatives of the coalition have proposed a number of preliminary steps they are willing to undertake to demonstrate their power and their willingness to participate in a negotiation process. They have suggested that such a process, once initiated, be carried out in two stages. The first stage of their proposed negotiation process would involve two teams and their advisors, working in secret, to establish a series of agreements regarding a complete ceasefire and withdrawal of Soviet troops and a process for forming a new government in Afghanistan. They have suggested that a jirga be called during the second phase of the negotiation process. Carefully prepared agreements reached during the first stage of the process would be introduced in this jirga for discussion and ratification.

Representatives of the coalition believe their proposed program can lead to a complete ceasefire and the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan within a very short time if they can acquire the cooperation and support of Zaher Shah and the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. They have asked me to contact the above mentioned parties to review their

proposed plan in an effort to acquire that cooperation and support.

The final section of this report will discuss the implications of the coalition's proposed peace plan and present a number of recommendations regarding a U.S. response to this initiative. A favorable response to their proposals would greatly enhance the possibility that a peaceful resolution to this long and bitter conflict will be forthcoming in the very near future.

## IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Earlier sections of this report attempted to describe the major features of a proposed peace plan put forward by the new coalition now being formed by various groups involved in the Afghan resistance movement. They note that members of this coalition have asked me to contact Zaher Shah and the governments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in an effort to secure their support and cooperation in effecting this plan at the earliest possible date.

The formation of this coalition and its invitation to the above mentioned parties to participate in the development of a new peace program for Afghanistan has important implications for U.S. foreign policy. I would like to review these implications before concluding with some recommendations regarding a U.S. response to this initiative.

At this point, the new coalition is a nonentity. Although it is working to expand its membership, it is not yet involved in any political process likely to influence future developments in Afghanistan. Although the Soviets are currently meeting with the Pesawar-based opposition leaders, they recently indicated they wanted future negotiations to include a broad based coalition of mujahideen commanders, tribal leaders, and traditional religious leaders. Although the Pesawar leaders claim to represent such a coalition, the current initiative suggests otherwise. The new coalition described in this report is being formed by people in the resistance movement who feel alienated from the Pesawar leaders. They are not opposed to having these leaders participate in a negotiation process, but they feel that they, too, have earned the right to participate in this process.

I have noted that the new coalition is being formed because many in the resistance movement do not trust the Pesawar leaders to negotiate an agreement which is in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan. A great deal of antagonism towards these leaders is expressed within the movement itself and within the refugee community at large. They are disliked for their bloody feuds and their disregard for the lives of others directly involved in the war, and because there has been so much favoritism and corruption in the distribution of essential military and humanitarian assistance channeled through their organizations.

The new coalition has no history. It is a natural alliance of those who have been most directly involved in the conduct of this war over the years. It includes people who have traditionally held power in Afghan society -- tribal and religious leaders -- and those who actually control the situation on the ground inside Afghanistan -- mujahideen commanders. The opposition leaders do not have the allegiance or the support of those they claim to represent. I believe most people in the resistance movement will



accept a ceasefire and a withdrawal of Soviet troops if the opposition leaders can arrange one, but they do not believe these leaders are capable of establishing a stable government inside Afghanistan if left on their own to do so. The coalition believes that, with the help of the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, it has that capability.

They have asked me to contact the U.S. government first, however, because they realize that the Soviets will be advising any negotiating team put forward by the Kabul regime and they would like the United States to perform a similar role for them in the negotiation process. This raises an important question regarding the advantages or disadvantages which may result from our continued support of the Pesawar-based opposition leaders in the months ahead.

In this light it is important to emphasize again that the opposition leaders derive their power from their control over resources flowing into the Afghan community from outside sources. Because our country is a major supplier of these resources, the opposition leaders, despite their frequent public criticism of the U.S., are believed by many in the resistance movement to be the choice of the United States. Hence, if these leaders are allowed to negotiate an agreement which is not in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan -- an agreement which does not result in the formation of a stable government in Afghanistan -- it is the U.S. which will be held accountable. Like it or not, as anyone with any experience in the area will affirm, this is the way people think in this part of the world.

The coalition recognizes that our government may fail to respond to its initiative. I am quite convinced it will approach the Russians without our support, however, should we fail to provide it. The coalition members believe they can offer the Russians what they want, a peaceful withdrawal and a friendly government on their southern border, and they are hopeful the Soviets will consider that offer carefully, once it is made. They believe, with rather compelling logic, that their plan is the only method available for achieving a satisfactory resolution of this conflict. The coalition is asking the U.S. to assist them in their efforts to initiate and carry out a negotiation process because they would very much like to have us backing them up in the process. They are convinced that with or without our assistance, the Soviet Union will respond favorably to their initiative.

A number of benefits might accrue to the U.S. should it decide to support this initiative. There can be no doubt the Soviet Union would take the new coalition's proposals seriously if Moscow believed these proposals had the backing of the U.S. With the United States and the Soviet Union cooperating in the negotiation process, it is almost certain that this process could yield results within a short period of time. The United States would

end up playing a very positive role in determining future developments in Afghanistan, thereby insuring the continued respect and gratitude of the Afghan people, while also enhancing U.S.-Soviet relations as a result of our helping the Russians out of a very difficult spot. There can be little doubt that Mr. Gorbachev would appreciate our efforts in this regard. And a successful negotiation process would certainly enhance Mr. Bush's image in the first months of his presidency. It can also be assumed that Benazir Bhutto and the people of Pakistan would be grateful to the United States if we were to stand behind a peace initiative which ended the war and resulted in the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan.

Should the U.S. support this initiative, it would not be likely we will ever be accused of attempting to dictate a solution to this conflict. The initiative has been put forward by groups involved in the resistance movement. They have asked us to assist them in their efforts to negotiate an end to the war. They believe their initiative can result in the formation of a new government in Afghanistan. They are asking us to assist them in their efforts to establish such a government. Their invitation and their request for assistance are unambiguous. The U.S. can respond favorably to their proposals without fear that it will be accused at some point of having undue influence over future developments in Afghanistan. With this in mind I would like to put forward a number of recommendations regarding a U.S. response to this initiative.

First, I would like to recommend that the U.S. government put together a team of people qualified to review the proposals of the new coalition as soon as possible. I would be pleased to meet with members of this team to elaborate on any of the information contained in this report or to clarify any points which I have failed to elucidate in this attempt to summarize and contextualize a rather complex set of proposals.

Should the United States decide to respond to the invitation of the new coalition, it should, I believe, do so as expeditiously as possible. On December 28, 1988, I received a cable from Pakistan indicating that the new coalition is still waiting for a response to its invitation from the U.S., but I do not believe they will wait much longer before attempting to contact Moscow on their own through other channels. If they do so, and the Soviet Union responds favorably, there would arise the very distinct possibility that the U.S. could be left out of the negotiation process entirely.

The people who have asked me to represent them in this matter can offer the Soviet Union what Moscow is apparently looking for--a ceasefire and a peaceful withdrawal as well as a process for the formation of a new government in Afghanistan. If the Russians respond to their proposals, they can negotiate a settlement which

everyone in the resistance movement will accept. The outcome may not be entirely satisfactory for some of the Pesawar-based opposition leaders, but it would certainly be well received by the people of Afghanistan, who are looking forward to an end to this war.

The invitation of the new coalition provides the U.S. an opportunity to play a very positive role in the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan. If we wish to exploit that opportunity, it is essential that we contact the Soviet Union and members of the new coalition as soon as possible to indicate our willingness to do so. The coalition is standing by. I would encourage the U.S. to formulate a response to its invitation at the earliest possible date.



Dr. Mark Sullivan

P.S. A number of people involved in the new coalition--mujahideen commanders, tribal leaders, and traditional religious leaders--have also asked me to forward to the United States government a request for emergency humanitarian aid for people living in refugee camps inside Afghanistan. A number of these camps were set up along the southern border of the country this fall to handle people displaced by the heavy fighting which occurred inside Afghanistan this year. I have visited several of these camps and can attest to the miserable conditions which exist within them. The people living in these camps are in desperate need of tents, blankets, stoves, kerosene, food, and medicines. A separate proposal to secure assistance for providing this type of emergency humanitarian aid will be delivered to the people on the distribution list for this report and the Agency for International Development by the end of this week.

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