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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/5/2010

File Folder CO002 (498142-529799)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 37

SYSTEMATIC

172

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84213 MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO FRANK CARLUCCI, RE: BRZEZINSKI LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN AND NICARAGUA	3	8/10/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

ID # 504660
20002

**WHITE HOUSE
 CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8 7 10 61 20

Name of Correspondent: Mr. Mrs. Miss Ms. Alfred SLESINGER

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Concerns about Afghanistan
→ Afghanistan

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CcWals</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>87 10 61 22</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>87 10 7 10 8</u> AB
<u>DOS</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>87 10 6 24</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>87 10 6 1 30</u> AB
_____	_____	<u>1 1</u>	_____	<u>1 1</u>
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ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8718006

DATE July 7, 1987

FOR: MR. GRANT GREEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Mr. Alfred Slesinger

DATE: June 17, 1987 SUBJECT: Concerns about
Afghanistan

REFERRAL DATED: June 24, 1987 ID# 504660
(IF ANY)

 THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

 A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.

 A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.

 A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.

 x AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.

 WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
CITED BELOW.

 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSED TRAVEL.

 OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

REMARKS:

for Rodia Saletis
DIRECTOR
SECRETARIAT STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Alfred Slesinger
45 Sutton Place South
New York, NY 10022

June 30, 1987

Dear Mr. Slesinger:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your letter of June 17 concerning a recent speech by Dr. Armand Hammer on U.S.-Soviet relations.

As you may recall, in November 1985 when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva, they agreed to expand the dialogue between our two countries at all levels. As part of that process of dialogue, the President invited the General Secretary to visit the United States. While no summit meeting has been scheduled, the President's invitation remains open.

In the course of our bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union, we have taken every opportunity to express our strong opposition to the continuing presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We have repeatedly called for the prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and the right of full self-determination for the Afghan people.

I have enclosed some material on Afghanistan which you may find of interest, as well as the text of the President's recent speech in Berlin where he challenged the Soviet Union to remove the Berlin Wall.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bruce G. Burton".

Bruce G. Burton
Deputy Director for
Multilateral and Security Affairs,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs

8718006

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JUNE 24, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 504660

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 17, 1987

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. ALFRED SLESINGER
45 SUTTON PLACE SOUTH
NEW YORK NY 10022

SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

June 17-1987

no records

8718006

205

Skelly

Alfred Slesinger

504660

45 SUTTON PLACE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

Dear Mr. President Reagan,
I am a close friend of Armand Hammer.
This May 24th my wife and I, we
attended his 89 birthday party.
There he made a speech, and told us
that he believes before this year is over
M. Gorbachev will visit our
President Reagan, and after our
President will visit Moscow, and
for the first time will be able
to speak on Television to Russian
people. Now, perhaps you could
delay asking M. Gorbachev to
remove the Berlin wall.

I believe it is much more important
for Russians to get out from Afghanistan,
where for 7 years they do not stop
killing each other.

Please, oblige me with your reply

Sincerely

Alfred Slesinger

aj
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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FG006-12


April 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

TR

SUBJECT: Public Themes for Afghanistan

We have reviewed your March 28, 1987 listing of public diplomacy themes for Afghanistan, and we concur.


Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NSC # 8702310

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

April 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: ROBERT DEAN *RD*
SUBJECT: Public Themes for Afghanistan

Charlie Dunbar has sent for our concurrence the listing of public diplomacy themes for Afghanistan (Tab II). After review, we concur in the listing as submitted.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to ^{*Levitsky*} Dunbar giving NSC concurrence.

~~not concurred~~ ^{*FWE*} Fritz Ermarth and ^{*DR*} Dennis Ross concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *G* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Dunbar
Tab II Memo from State, March 23, 87, w/atch

Prepared by: Robert Bemis *↑*



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 2310

March 28, 1987


~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
als 2/5/10

TO: OVP - Mr. Donald Gregg
NSC - Mr. W. Robert Pearson
DOD - Colonel James F. Lemon
USIA- Mr. Larry R. Taylor
CIA - Mr. H. Lawrence Sandall
JCS - Captain Joseph C. Strasser
AID - Mr. Richard Meyer

Subject: Afghanistan: Public Themes

Please provide comments/concurrence in the attached public themes on Afghanistan to Charles Dunbar (NEA, Room 5515, Department of State, 647 2505). The themes, which are unclassified, are for use both by officials here in Washington and by posts overseas.

If no comments are forthcoming by April 6, we will assume your agency concurs in the themes.


Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

PUBLIC THEMES ON AFGHANISTAN

U.S. Policy

-- Towards the Afghans: The United States seeks a just and speedy end to the war in Afghanistan through the withdrawal of Soviet forces and self-determination for the Afghan people. To this end, the U.S. supports the Afghan resistance and views the resistance Alliance as a genuine spokesman of the Afghan people in their struggle for freedom. The United States joins other friends of Afghanistan in providing all appropriate assistance to the Afghan people, including a comprehensive program of humanitarian assistance to all Afghans affected by the war.

-- Towards Pakistan: We stand squarely behind Pakistan and with a large number of other countries in Pakistan's strong support of the Afghan people and in its efforts to end the war. We thus view with mounting concern the recent escalation of Soviet-inspired cross-border air strikes on Pakistani villages and of subversion throughout the country. Such attacks have for years been a part of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, but recent bombardments, in which 200 civilians were killed or wounded in the space of a few days, are of an unprecedented scale and constitute a major escalation.

-- Towards the United Nations: Evidence of U.S. interest in a political settlement is the support the United States gives the UN-sponsored negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement in Afghanistan. The U.S. offer to guarantee an appropriate settlement reached through these negotiations remains on the table.

-- Towards the Soviet Union: The United States loses no opportunity to emphasize to its Soviet interlocutors that we seek no strategic advantage in Afghanistan and that a just settlement in Afghanistan would remove a major obstacle in U.S.-Soviet relations. In March, Under Secretary of State Armacost met with senior Soviet officials in Moscow for a frank exchange of views on Afghanistan. Although no breakthroughs were achieved, discussions between the two governments will continue. Should Moscow decide to withdraw its forces within a short time frame, thus permitting self-determination in Afghanistan, the United States would facilitate that decision.

The Path to a Solution

-- We welcome recent Soviet professions of increased interest in achieving a settlement. Moscow's language on the war, and that of the Kabul regime, contains some new elements. Our hope is that these words will be matched by the deeds needed to end the war. Recent Soviet proposals, while seeming to show flexibility, are one-sided and accompanied by increased military pressure on the Afghan people and on Pakistan. Thus, we remain skeptical and urge Moscow to negotiate in good faith.

-- A genuine settlement must contain two elements:

1. Soviet troop withdrawal: Prompt, irrevocable withdrawal of Soviet forces remains the key to a settlement. Despite some progress on this issue at Geneva, the Soviets have yet to propose a timetable which meets these conditions. The Pakistan Government insists that the timetable should be based on logistical consideration and thus measured in months. This logical position enjoys overwhelming support in the Islamic, non-aligned and Western worlds.

2. Afghan self-determination: While not explicitly an element of the UN-sponsored Geneva talks, self-determination is necessary to achieving lasting stability in Afghanistan. Moscow has made much of the Kabul regime's so-called national reconciliation proposals as the basis of a just political settlement. In fact, these proposals mask a continuing effort at securing Kabul regime domination of Afghanistan's government.

-- There are other issues which need to be addressed in putting a settlement into effect:

o National reconciliation: On January 17, the resistance Alliance called for the establishment of a popularly chosen interim administration which would preside over the withdrawal of Soviet forces and organize national elections. By contrast, Kabul's "national reconciliation" proposals simply repackaged earlier schemes for a cosmetic broadening of the Kabul regime. The Afghan people have rejected Kabul's schemes by refusing to join the regime's "national reconciliation" exercises or, in the case of the refugees, to return home.

o Amnesty: The resistance Alliance spokesman has offered amnesty to its opponents. This offer is magnanimous after more than seven years of bitter fighting.

o Cease-fire: Kabul's cease-fire call placed the cart before the horse. Absent Moscow's agreement to withdraw its forces, the resistance Alliance had no choice but to reject the proposals. The cease-fire call was also duplicitous in that Soviet and Kabul regime forces did not stop their offensive operations against resistance forces. The Alliance has stated that they would guarantee safety to departing Soviet troops.

International responsibility

-- In the present situation, the international community should continue to press the Soviet Union to substitute actions for words in Afghanistan. The overwhelming majority of governments in the world express their support of the Afghan people with their annual votes in the General Assembly. This support should be complemented by greater acceptance, through dialogue and, as appropriate, through concrete support, of the Afghan resistance Alliance as a spokesman of the Afghan people.

March 1987

PUBLIC THEMES ON AFGHANISTAN

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

87 MAR 28 P 5: 39

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 2310

ACTION OFFICER:

~~TAHIR-KHELI~~

R. BEMIS

DUE: 2 APR

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo Green to Peterson / Murr |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo <u>GREEN</u> | to <u>DUNBAR</u> |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3950

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Batjer | <input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bemis | <input type="checkbox"/> Howard | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B. | <input type="checkbox"/> Rosenberg |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling | <input type="checkbox"/> Rostow |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Collins | <input type="checkbox"/> Lewis | <input type="checkbox"/> Smith |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dean, B. | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Sorzano |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> Mathews | <input type="checkbox"/> Stevens |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> McNamara | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ermarth | <input type="checkbox"/> Oakley | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Paal | <input type="checkbox"/> Tice |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flower | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Porter | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| INFORMATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Green | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cockell | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Carlucci (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Powell (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

National Security Council
The White House

HBL

87 APR 2 AIO: 15

System # _____

Package # 2310

DOCLOG HBL AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>JC4/3</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

RECEIVED 30 MAR 87 14

TO PEARSON

FROM LEVITSKY, M

DOCDATE 28 MAR 87

DEAN

01 APR 87

BEMIS

01 APR 87

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: PUBLIC THEMES RE AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO GREEN TO DUNBAR DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEMIS

ERMARTH

ROSS

GREEN

TAHIR-KHELI

RODMAN

PEARSON

COCKELL

COMMENTS

REF# 8708655

LOG

NSCIFID

(TC TC)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 4/3</i>	<i>Green Sgd Memo</i>		<i>Bemis, GSG</i>

DISPATCH

4/3 TC

~~W/ATTCH~~ FILE

FILE

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Ronald Reagan Library

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(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

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DLB 2/5/2010

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FOIA

S10-306

SYSTEMATIC

Box Number

37

172

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



5697

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

July 23, 1987

Dear Frank:

Let me pass on a suggestion regarding the President's speech to the United Nations this coming September: In my judgment, it provides him with a unique opportunity to spell out the U.S. approach to a peaceful solution of the Nicaraguan problem and of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Placing emphasis on the need to resolve two major outstanding regional issues would be a most appropriate focus for a UN speech, and it could also help to generate the needed movement for a somewhat wider American-Soviet accommodation.

By addressing the issue of Nicaragua, the President could also help to galvanize greater domestic support for the needed funding for the democratic resistance. In large part the opposition to that funding stems from confusion regarding long-range U.S. objectives and the absence of an appealing formula which indicates to the public that our goal is a constructive and peaceful resolution of the issue.

At the same time, by stressing the problem of Afghanistan the President would remind world public opinion of the centrality of that issue, he would make it more difficult for the Soviets to exploit any INF agreement with the United States as a means of burying the Afghan problem altogether. The Soviet strategy is clearly to fight-talk-fight, capitalizing politically on the widespread impression that the Soviets appear to want a political solution while waging the war aggressively.

Indeed, the problem in that respect could become quite grave if there is a summit meeting later this year for such a summit will inevitably become a great public relations triumph for Gorbachev, to the detriment of our geostrategic interests regarding Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Yet Gorbachev needs that summit more than Reagan, and he should be pressed on Afghanistan before he gets here and our mass media and Congress genuflect before him.

There is a further tactical reason for stressing at this time the need to resolve the Afghan problem peacefully: the resistance seems to be doing well and the Soviets must be considering right now whether to escalate their military efforts or whether to seek a

peaceful solution. Merely gloating through press briefings about the successes of the mujaheddin, with the recent delivery of the Stingers, might in fact help those in Moscow who argue for a tougher military posture. At the same time, by not stressing the Afghan issue publicly, we also help those in Moscow who argue that a war of attrition can be sustained because international attention is waning. It is only by publicly coming forth with the outlines of a peace proposal that the United States simultaneously increases the salience of the Afghan issue while perhaps also influencing constructively those in Moscow who might be leaning toward a political solution.

In my view, in his speech to the UN the President should stress that these two issues need to be resolved in a manner that is acceptable to the major powers and is in keeping with international principles. Moreover, it would be desirable, and it would be viewed as a bold step, for the President to acknowledge the proposition that the same principles should apply to the solution of the Nicaraguan problem and to the Afghan problem; and that the United States does not insist on a solution for Afghanistan that it is not prepared to accept for itself in regard to Nicaragua.

The formula for both ought to be "external neutralization and internal self-determination." The former assures the concerned major power that the country concerned will not be hostile and used against its interests; the latter is in keeping with the UN Charter and internationally accepted principles.

Having outlined these generalized propositions, the President could go on to say that in regard to Afghanistan the United States would be prepared to entertain an arrangement with the Soviet Union which entails the following elements:

1. A neutrality treaty for Afghanistan, modeled to some degree on the Austrian Peace Treaty, and signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and perhaps (if it is willing) Iran. In other words, all of Afghanistan's neighbors would guarantee its neutrality status, and that neutrality would be spelled out in detail so as to guarantee the Soviet Union that under no circumstances could Afghanistan be used in a manner hostile to Soviet interests.
2. Immediate (3-6 months) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, to be replaced on a transitional basis by peace-keeping forces designated by the UN, and perhaps deliberately drawn from those Moslem countries whose foreign policies are not unfriendly to the Soviet Union. Peace-keeping contingents from Algeria or Syria in the major cities could provide some transitional security for those who will be endangered by the departure of the Soviet troops.


3. Transitional political arrangements for Afghanistan, based on an inter-tribal council, and designed to insure that the Afghan people are governed by rulers of their choice. Without being too specific, some form of internationally supervised electoral process could also be envisaged.

I do not believe that at this stage the President needs to go beyond such generalized principles, and he could indicate that with proper refinements and changes similar arrangements for Nicaragua would be acceptable to the United States. The objective of a neutralized but democratically self-governing Nicaragua would, in my judgment, help the President to generate more bipartisan support for the more specific objective of sustaining the resistance. The President could indicate that American aid to both the Nicaraguan resistance and the Afghan mujaheddin would be terminated upon the implementation by the Nicaraguan government of the concept of internationally supervised and genuinely free elections and by the Soviet Union of a prompt deadline for the withdrawal of their forces.

I am convinced that such a speech would have a very major international impact and would be helpful to the United States insofar as our strategic objectives in both Central America and West Asia are concerned. In contrast, our present policies are likely to prompt greater national division over Nicaragua while giving the Soviets an increasingly free hand in Afghanistan to pursue a war of attrition, and perhaps actually of escalation, even while seemingly reviving detente with the United States.

Finally, I have reason to believe that the French are getting ready to surface a peace plan for Afghanistan, to be put forth by the Danish Presidency of the European Community in September. It would be better for the President to scoop them.

Best regards,



Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Honorable Frank Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

27

National Security Council
The White House

System # 8
Package # 5697
DOCLOG 27 AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WKC</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2/5</u>	<u>6</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>W</u>	
Frank Carlucci	<u>4</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green			
Lou Michael			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED 31 JUL 87 13

TO CARLUCCI

FROM BRZEZINSKI, ABIGNIEW DOCDATE 23 JUL 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO CARLUCCI FM BRZEZINSKI RE SOVIET & AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CARLUCCI DUE: 10 AUG 87 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ERMARTH

TAHIR-KHELI

ROSS

LEDSKY

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF#

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(RB DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Carlucci	X 8/11	For Decision	8/12	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
	C 8/13	Carlucci Approved		FWE, ISS, DBR, SPT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE WH (C) DR

EP

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE FILE

513359

~~EXECUTIVE~~

C0002

DATE

LETTER, MEMO, ETC.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

~~CORRESPONDENCE FILED CENTRAL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FILE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 002

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 30, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. SIDDIEG NOORZOY

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING SOVIET AGGRESSION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND URGES PRESSURE ON GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV DURING UPCOMING MEETINGS
TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS	ORG	87/11/30		C 87/12/1
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>NSC/Spowe</i>	A	87/12/01		C 87/12/04 TR
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>STATB</i>	R	87/12/01		C 87/12/04 TR
REFERRAL NOTE:				A 87/12/17 TR
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | * | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | | * | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | | * | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOb) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S # 8735489

DATE: December 18, 1987

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Dr. Siddieg Noorzoy
DATE: November 12, 1987 SUBJECT: Writes concerning Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan
WH REFERRAL DATED: December 9, 1987 NSC ID# 529758
(if any)

_____ THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
_____ A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.
_____ A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.
X AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
_____ WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON
CITED BELOW.
_____ THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSED TRAVEL.
_____ OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

REMARKS:

Kathleen Murphy
DIRECTOR
SECRETARIAT STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 17, 1987

Dr. Siddieg Noorzoy
Professor of Economics
Member, Board of Directors
Afghanistan Assistance Council
Post Office Box 162
Orinda, California 94563

Dear Dr. Noorzoy:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of the President to your letter of November 12, concerning the war in Afghanistan.

As you are probably aware, the President has deep personal feelings about the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He conveyed these clearly and directly to the Soviet leader during General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Washington this December. The United States wants the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops promptly and completely from Afghanistan and return the fate of that country to the Afghan people, where it rightfully belongs. We will continue to emphasize to the Soviets that the continuation of this war remains a major impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with us on this question.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Mark R. Parris", written over a light-colored background.

Mark R. Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

8735489

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

DECEMBER 9, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 529758

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 12, 1987

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. SIDDIQ NOORZOY
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS
MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE COUNCIL
POST OFFICE BOX 162
ORINDA CA 94563

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING SOVIET AGGRESSION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND URGES PRESSURE ON GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV DURING UPCOMING MEETINGS
TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

529758

AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE COUNCIL

8735489

L. Kopelov

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

November 12, 1987.

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing with the deepest concern about continued Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. While the Soviets tell the world they want to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, they have intensified their military aggression and continue to build up fortifications.

Mr. President, the upcoming December 7, 1987 meetings between yourself and Michael Gorbachev may be the last major opportunity to pressure the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

World public opinion expressed through the U.N. General Assembly vote of 123 countries demanding soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is not practically observed by Moscow. New initiatives are needed. We are writing to suggest initiatives in two areas:

First, the Soviets should be pressured to publicly accept the costs of reconstruction in post-war Afghanistan. This reconstruction should be carried out by an international consortium under the auspices of the United Nations.

Second, undoubtedly the Soviets want increased trade, investment, and other exchange relations with the United States. Some people suggest that these issues be tied to the treatment of civil rights issues within the Soviet Union. We would like to suggest that these issues should first be linked to the serious humanitarian problem of Soviet aggression and atrocities in Afghanistan; the only country in the world where the Red Army is fighting a war of genocide.

Mr. President, now that the doors of various forms of exchanges are opened to the Soviets in the United States and no trace of the initial U.S. reactions to the invasion of Afghanistan remain in force, now that major disarmament treaties are being signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, such new initiatives seem the only way to bring about a genuine Soviet withdrawal.

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
There is also, of course, the possibility of raising the cost of Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan through more than incremental steps as in the past to which the Red Army seems to have adjusted its tactics.

The Soviet insistence on constructing a collage of permanent communist dominated government in Kabul and on considering it as a condition for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is unacceptable to the Afghan people.

Mr. President, how long should the Afghan people bear the burden of personal sacrifices against a common enemy? Our estimates show that 339 Afghans lose their lives on daily basis because of Soviet bombardments, because of fighting, and because of war related diseases.

Can this be stopped? A holocaust is taking place in Afghanistan. Why are the Soviets getting away with it in 1987?

Respectfully yours,



Members of the Board of Directors:

Siddieq Noorzoy, PhD, Professor of Economics
Ravan Farhadi, PhD, Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Painda M. Koshani, Former Diplomat
Yar M. Mujaddedi, Former Government Official
Qayum Kochai, PhD, Former Diplomat
A. Hai Hamid, MD.

Copies to:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Senator Gordon J. Humphrey