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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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FG006-12

June 21, 1984

Dear Zbig:

I have your letter of May 25, 1984, enclosing the report from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Peshawar about the situation in Afghanistan's Panjsher Valley. I found it a very moving commentary on Masood's situation there, almost on the eve of battle. Certainly most of the predictions have come to pass.

As you know, the major Soviet spring offensive in the Panjsher Valley began on April 21. Using unprecedented high altitude saturation bombing from bases in the Soviet Union, and the largest combat force -- up to 20,000 men -- ever assembled in Afghanistan, the Soviets have slowly moved up the 70-mile valley, searching for mujahidin and for Masood, and destroying villages, crops, and livestock. We believe this escalation of military activity clearly reveals Soviet frustration at not being able to defeat the resistance. The Panjsher Valley and Masood have obviously become symbols to the Soviets for their lack of success, and they were hoping for a noteworthy victory. They didn't achieve it.

Because he had expected the offensive well before it began, Masood had developed a strategy which prevented the Soviets from achieving their objectives, as he had done during the previous six unsuccessful Soviet campaigns in the Panjsher. He had decided to surprise the Soviets by withdrawing his forces from the Valley and deploying them elsewhere. He also evacuated most civilians. Masood stocked the Valley with supplies of weapons and ammunition, as though preparing to resist the invasion. Initially mujahidin casualties were negligible because there were no engagements on the Valley floor, and during the period of the Soviet advance the mujahidin attacked elsewhere outside the Valley. The Soviets, and mujahidin, sustained more casualties as the Soviets tried to sweep the heavily mined side valleys. With the Soviets entrenching themselves in the lower areas of the Valley, there is very little fighting now taking place in the Panjsher area. The mujahidin do not consider Soviet control of the Panjsher Valley floor as a defeat for Masood and morale remains high. It is worth noting that fighting continues elsewhere throughout Afghanistan -- at Kandahar, and in the east and north, and especially at Herat which had been virtually out of regime control but where the Soviets recently have attacked with a large number of tanks. The resistance continues to attack supply columns on the main road from the Soviet border to Kabul, disrupting the Soviet military supply network, especially for fuel. We think we will see a long and casualty-filled summer of

NSC # 8404391

the same kind of intermittent, intense fighting that will not basically change the stalemate.

In the midst of all this we remain very concerned about the food and medical situation of the resistance and the civilian population as well. This is why the Vice President's May 17 visit to a refugee camp near Peshawar, during his visit to India and Pakistan, was used as a tangible manifestation of U.S. concern for the Afghan resistance and refugees. Not only did he present a check for \$14 million as part of the U.S. contribution to the UNHCR, but he brought with him a U.S. Air Force C-141 transport full of medicine assembled by State's refugee program and Americares, on whose board I know you serve. This was turned over to the Government of Pakistan and to various private voluntary agencies working with the refugees, including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. We have heard that they were very pleased with what was delivered to them, and that they will put it to good use.

I am sure that you have also heard of the recent study on "The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan", done by Dr. Frances D'Souza for the British Afghan Aid Committee. This is certainly calling to the world's attention the plight of the Afghan people under the increasingly brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Coupled with predictions of a sparse water supply over the summer, you may be sure that we will be watching this situation with care. As we all have said, Soviet aggression must not be allowed to succeed.

I have shared the letters you sent with appropriate colleagues. I am glad to know of your continuing interest in Afghanistan and will look forward to keeping in touch with you about the situation and what the United States can do to ease the burden of the courageous Afghans.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C.

Handwritten notes:
This is a great letter to depth
you wish to be glad to do
would be glad to do
for some by
base fund.
We are looking for another program
which I hope will not
be too long

June 15, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*
SUBJECT: Letter from Zbigniew Brzezinski

Brzezinski wrote to you on May 25, 1984, concerning the situation in Afghanistan. You sent a brief note on June 5, 1984 acknowledging the letter and promising a more substantive reply. Copies of the letter were sent to State, DoD, and CIA. State was tasked to draft the substantive reply for you to send to Brzezinski.

Attached at Tab I is the letter for you to send to Brzezinski. It was cleared by DoD and CIA. In the letter you give your assessment of the current Soviet offensive in Afghanistan. The letter also reviews the efforts of the rebels to resist this offensive. You then go on to state our concern over the plight of the Afghans and the assistance that we have recently provided to them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Brzezinski at Tab I.

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE _____

Jack Matlock *JM* and Stephen *SRS* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter to Brzezinski
A - Incoming correspondence



8416419
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 12, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski on the situation in
Afghanistan

Attached is a draft letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski on the
situation in Afghanistan. This is in response to your
memorandum of June 5, requesting a substantive reply to his
letter of May 25. It has been coordinated with Defense and CIA.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

Draft Letter

Dear Zbig:

I have your letter of May 25, 1984, enclosing the report from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Peshawar about the situation in Afghanistan's Panjsher Valley. I found it a very moving commentary on Masood's situation there, almost on the eve of battle. Certainly most of the predictions have come to pass.

As you know, the major Soviet spring offensive in the Panjsher Valley began on April 21. Using unprecedented high altitude saturation bombing from bases in the Soviet Union, and the largest combat force -- up to 20,000 men -- ever assembled in Afghanistan, the Soviets have slowly moved up the 70-mile valley, searching for mujahidin and for Masood, and destroying villages, crops, and livestock. We believe this escalation of military activity clearly reveals Soviet frustration at not being able to defeat the resistance. The Panjsher Valley and Masood have obviously become symbols to the Soviets for their lack of success, and they were hoping for a noteworthy victory. They didn't achieve it.

Because he had expected the offensive well before it began, Masood had developed a strategy which prevented the Soviets from achieving their objectives, as he had done during the previous six unsuccessful Soviet campaigns in the Panjsher. He had decided to surprise the Soviets by withdrawing his forces

from the Valley and deploying them elsewhere. He also evacuated most civilians. Masood stocked the valley with supplies of weapons and ammunition, as though preparing to resist the invasion. Initially mujahidin casualties were negligible because there were no engagements on the valley floor, and during the period of the Soviet advance the mujahidin attacked elsewhere outside the valley. The Soviets, and mujahidin, sustained more casualties as the Soviets tried to sweep the heavily mined side valleys. With the Soviets ~~digging in~~ ^{entrenching themselves} in the lower areas of the valley, there is very little fighting now taking place in the Panjsher area. The mujahidin do not consider Soviet control of the Panjsher Valley floor as a defeat for Masood and morale remains high. It is worth noting that fighting continues elsewhere throughout Afghanistan -- at Kandahar, and in the east and north, and especially at Herat which had been virtually out of regime control but where the Soviets recently have attacked with a large number of tanks. The resistance continues to attack supply columns on the main road from the Soviet border to Kabul, disrupting the Soviet military supply network, especially for fuel. We think we will see a long and casualty-filled summer of the same kind of intermittent, intense fighting that will not basically change the stalemate.

In the midst of all this we remain very concerned about the food and medical situation of the resistance and the civilian population as well. This is why the Vice President's May 17 visit to a refugee camp near Peshawar, during his visit to India and Pakistan, was used as a tangible manifestation of U.S. concern for the Afghan resistance and refugees. Not only did he present a check for \$14 million as part of the U.S. contribution to the UNHCR, but he brought with him a U.S. Air Force C-141 transport full of medicine assembled by State's refugee program and Americares, on whose board I know you serve. This was turned over to the Government of Pakistan and to various private voluntary agencies working with the refugees, including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. We have heard that they were very pleased with what was delivered to them, and that they will put it to good use.

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- 4 -

I have shared the letters you sent with appropriate colleagues. I am glad to know of your continuing interest in Afghanistan and will look forward to keeping in touch with you about the situation and what the United States can do to ease the burden of the courageous Afghans.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable

Zbigniew Brzezinski,

1800 K Street, N.W.,

Suite 400,

Washington, D.C.

8416419

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4391

June 5, 1984

NEA (ACTION)

DIST. TO:

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NEA

PM

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TMB

RF (JNA)


MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Deteriorating Situation in Afghanistan

Attached at Tab A is a letter on Afghanistan, that I received from Zbig Brzezinski, concerning an appeal he had received from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Peshawar. I'd like to send him a substantive reply without going into too much detail. If State could prepare a draft reply and coordinate with Defense and CIA, I would be much obliged.



Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment

Tab A - Brzezinski letter

*Received in S/S-T
6/6 at 10:40 AM (CJ)*

June 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Letter from Zbig Brzezinski

Brzezinski wrote you on May 25, 1984, concerning the situation in Afghanistan. Attached at Tab I is a letter from you to Brzezinski acknowledging his concern and saying we would get back to him. At Tab II is a memo to Shultz, Weinberger and Casey passing a copy of Brzezinski's letter and the Swedish Committee's report. The memo asks State to prepare a substantive letter for you to send to Brzezinski.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the letter to Brzezinski at Tab I.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

2. That you sign the memo to Shultz, Weinberger, and Casey at Tab II.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

unavailable
Matlock and Sestanovich concur.

Attachments:

Tab I - Letter to Brzezinski

Tab II - Memo to Shultz, Weinberger, and Casey

A - Letter from Brzezinski


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Zbig:

Many thanks for your letter of May 25th concerning the latest developments in Afghanistan. I share your concerns and have passed your letter and the attached appeal from Peshawar to George Shultz, Cap Weinberger, and Bill Casey. I'll get back to you later with a more substantive reply, but meanwhile, I want you to know we are following this latest Soviet offensive very carefully and have no intention of slacking our pressure on the Soviet Union ~~to seek a peaceful and fair settlement.~~

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bud".

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

84 MAY 31

A 9: 42

(202) 833-2408

*Send for
urgent
MAY 21 9 1984
Shaw
to Kamp*

May 25, 1984

Dear Bud:

As you know, I have been rather involved in the Afghanistani affair. I negotiated some of the initial arrangements with the Paks, and since then I have been acting as honorary chairman for a group that provides medicines to the mujaheddin.

m

In connection with the latter, I have received the enclosed very urgent appeal from Peshawar. It deals with the deteriorating situation in the Panjshir Valley and also represents an urgent appeal for external assistance. I know the Swedish doctors involved quite well, and I consider them very reliable. I think it is important that the U.S. provide some more overt expression of concern for what is now transpiring in Afghanistan, both on the level of condemnation and of more tangible support.

I hope you can share this letter with your appropriate colleagues, including Bill Casey,

Best regards,

His.

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Anders Fänge
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
15A Gul Mohar Lane
Peshawar GPO Box 689
tel: 521-412 47

Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street N.W. Suite 400
Washington D.C.

Peshawar, April 23, 1984

Dear Dr Brzezinski,

First of all let me express my appreciation for the talk we had a few months ago at your office in Washington. For me it is always a pleasure to meet people like you, who has such a great sympathy for the Afghan people and their cause.

In this context I would also like to bring you the regards of Johan Fägerskiöld whom you met briefly at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Islamabad during your recent visit here. We thank you for mentioning our problem with the doctors to President Zia. As a result of that we had a most interesting talk with Ashraf Jehangir Qasi, the director of the Afghanistan desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Then to the point. I'm writing this letter to you with the intention to inform you about the alarming development in Afghanistan during the last months.

Since the last weeks of March the mudjaheddin coming out from the area around Kabul have been talking about a big Russian air-lift into the country, that they are bringing in strong reinforcements of troops and supplies. The mudjaheddin are saying, that it is like "the sixth of Jadi", i.e. Christmas 1979, when the Russian invasion came. In the end of March this information was confirmed at a journalist-briefing at the American and British Embassies in New Delhi, and I suppose that they in their turn got it from the diplomats in Kabul. Still there is not yet any final confirmation, but there are other signs pointing towards a Russian build-up.

President Zia was quoted in the Muslim just a few weeks ago and according to him it is obvious that the Russians are preparing

for a major offensive against the Afghan resistance.

The Politbureau of the Afghan Peoples Democratic Party recently confirmed in their own way, when they issued a statement that the war will be finished in three months. And that certainly fits into the picture. I mean, the Quislings are talking and their masters are acting.

According to a Pentagon-report, which you certainly know about, the Russians have moved 80 new bombers of the types "Fencer" and "TU-16 Badger" to airfields just north of the Afghan border.

And furthermore, there are a lot of confirmed reports that the Russians are concentrating big forces around the Panjshir Valley and that they are doing their utmost to disturb the supply-routes to the same valley. I'll give you more details about this a little further on, but first I would like to draw a background and to give you my opinion about what the Russians aims are.

Between 1980 and the end of 1982 the Russians made altogether six offensives against the mudjaheddin in the Panjshir Valley. The reasons for their efforts at that time was obviously that they, like Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, understood the strategic importance of the valley. It is the key, the natural ^{way} between Central Afghanistan and the northeastern provinces, it is close to Pakistan, even closer to the Salang-pass, the only way for the Russian traffic over the Hindu Kush, and it is not too far from the biggest Russian airbase, Bagram, and with a bus it takes only two hours down to Kabul. It is a long, narrow valley surrounded by mountains of 20.000 feet or more and a labyrinth of side valleys. In short, a gigantic fortress, a natural base for the Afghan resistance.

The Russian aims were of course to destroy the mudjaheddin and occupy the valley, but quite contrary every offensive with the following humiliating retreat got the consequence that the reputation of Ahmed Shah Massoud as the most capable commander in the resistance was growing.

In the last offensive during the winter 1982/83 the Russians used an estimated number of 15.000 troops, half Russians and half Afghan Government soldiers. But they didn't succeed this time either, and in December 82 or Januari 83 (different statements) the Russians offered Massoud a cease-fire. After negotiations (which in fact meant that the Russians for the first time recognized the mudjaheddin as their opponent) where the Russians agreed to withdraw from the valley except from the valley of Anowa, where they kept a garrison, Massoud

accepted the cease-fire.

Evidently the Russians hoped that the agreement should discredit Massoud among the other mudjaheddin. By now they had realized that Massoud had made himself a name among the people and freedom-fighters in Afghanistan. "The Lion from Panjshir" had become well-known and famous all over the country mainly through his successful resistance, but also through his ability to train and organize the mudjaheddin, his concern for the civilians and last but not least his efforts for unity.

The Russians made their best to destroy his reputation. Through KHAD-agents and other channels they spread rumours that he had sold himself out, that he had made a separate peace with the enemy, and so on. Of course Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i-Islami and other extreme fundamentalists joined the choir.

But instead it was Massoud who took the advantage of the cease-fire and used the temporary peace to reorganize the civilian and military administration of the valley, to train his mudjaheddin and to send them on missions against the Russians and the Government-troops outside the valley. He also used the time to make a four months journey to the northern provinces, where he to a great extent succeeded to organize and unify the mudjaheddin under his command. In one of his reports he wrote: "What I hoped to accomplish in two years, I have now done in four months."

In August last year the cease-fire formally ended but nothing happened in the valley. It was a wait-and-see situation and both sides just watched each other. In January this year the Russians suggested a new agreement, and their offer was to withdraw also from the garrison in Anowa and leave the entire valley to Massoud. But Massoud - well aware of the fact that the Afghan comprehension of warfare can't take to much of tactical subtilities - refused the Russian offer and told them, that he would accept a new cease-fire only if they retreated from all the northeastern provinces. Of course the Russians in their turn refused his "offer", the negotiations collapsed and then things started to happen.

In February the Russians attacked Iskamesh in the province of Tachar, one of the bases Massoud had established during his visit in the north. In the beginning of March they attacked in Kohestan, just south of Panjshir, and in the following weeks they followed up with heavy bombardments and strong groundforces along the whole supply-route from Teri Mangal at the Pakistan boarder up to Panjshir. Now the road has been closed for almost two months, no supplies have

reached the valley and a team of four French and one Afghan Doctors were forced to turn back together with a big convoy. They are now trying to reach the valley via another hopefully more secure but longer route. We have not yet any information whether they have done it or not.

The Russians are also building up forces on other spots around Panjshir, and about fourteen days ago we got the report that they are trying to force their way through the Fakhar Valley, where they - if they are succesful - will have only one pass to cross into the upper part of Panjshir.

Other reports, not yet confirmed, say that the Russians will try to cut the northern supplie-route from Pakistan to Panjshir; a way which is possible to use only during the summerseason, but which nevertheless is very important since the southern route very often is closed or at least disturbed.

According to the reports from Massoud, which are reaching Peshawar with courier in two to three days, the Russians are preparing the so fare biggest offensive against the valley. He is mainly relying on informationsources among the military and civilian administration in Kabul, and they have been proved to be right many times during the former offensives. He writes that the Russian reconnaissance aeroplanes are seen daily on the Panjshiri sky, and that he has taken all possible preparations for a succesful defence; so fare about 70 percent of the civilians are evacuated, and the mudjaheddin have digged themselves down in strongholds on the mountains overlooking the valleyfloor. He is also sending groups of mudjaheddin outside the valley to divert and disturb the Russian build-up. Just a week ago there was for instance an attack in the Salang where the mudjaheddin of Panjshir blowed up three bridges.

It looks undeniably as if all the signs are pointing in one direction. The Russians are building up for a major offensive against the Afghan resistance, the biggest since the invasion itself, and the spearhead will be directed against Panjshir and Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Of course it is impossible to say with a hundred percent certainness, that the offensive against Panjshir will come, but it would certainly be very strange if it didn't. When the Russians failed in destroying the good name and reputation of Massoud, they have only one choice left and that is to try to destroy him physically, to inflict such a defeat on him, that he never again will be able to stand up and challenge them. They want to destroy Panjshir, not only as a

stronghold among others, but merely for the symbol it has become. A symbol for the unification among the mudjaheddin, the base for the most advanced part of the Afghan resistance, the symbol for a future, liberated Afghanistan and thus the greatest threat against the Russian invaders.

There is a lot at stake and if the Russians succeed in smashing Massoud, then I'm afraid that will be the beginning of the end for the Afghan resistance. Certainly it will still take them quite a few years to completely defeat this brave people, but they've done it before; they have a long tradition of fighting against muslim guerilla in Central Asia. And it is a fact that today there is nobody who can fill the place of Massoud. Nobody who has his strategic views in military and political matters, his ability to organize and persuade people, nobody who can drive the Russians out of the country.

On the other hand, if he can force the Russians to once more withdraw from Panjshir, then it will mean a very humiliating defeat for them and then the Afghan mudjaheddin will be closer to unity than ever before. Because then no one, either in Peshawar or elsewhere who says that he is working for Afghanistan, can challenge the authority of Massoud. Then both the extreme fundamentalists and the leftists, who are those opposing him now, will be forced to accept him.

In his messages Massoud is asking for moral and political support in order to put external pressure on the Soviet Union. He is also asking for financial support, since the only party in Peshawar, which is prepared to help him, Jamiat-i-Islami, doesn't seem to have any money. Normally, even during the former offensives, he has always been very polite in his letters to Professor Rabani asking for support. Now, for the first time, rude letters are reaching Peshawar.

He needs the money not so much for weapons and ammunition, since the Panjshiris are much better armed now. The last Russian offensive supplied them with a lot. He needs the money merely to support the refugees inside and outside the valley and for the mudjaheddin, for food, clothes, boots and other necessities.

Through the Swedish and Dutch Committees we have sent a telex asking for help to Panjshir to about fifty other Committees in Europe, Canada, USA and Australia, but they are poor and so far it is only the Swedish Committee, which has given 38.000 dollars.

I don't know how things work in matters like this in your country.

I only know that the United States is a country where the word "freedom" is loved and held high, and I also know that your government often has expressed its firm support for the people of Afghanistan and their struggle.

I am, like most other foreigners working for the "inside" of Afghanistan here in Peshawar, in a somewhat desperate mood. We are not very many, but we are daily meeting and interviewing mudjaheddin coming from the other side of the mountains, we are listening to their stories, we realize their needs, but very often we have to turn them down because of lacks of funds. At the same time we see the inefficiency and in some cases corruption among the Afghan parties based in Peshawar and among the Pakistanis, we listen to the mudjaheddin when they are expressing their bitterness and complaints over the situation in Peshawar and the lack of interest for their cause in the rest of the world. And I can tell you, Dr Brzezinski, that it is a very frustrating situation.

And now we see that the Russian invaders are preparing for their so far biggest assault on the Afghan people and their freedomfighters, and we are standing here with almost empty hands. We pray to God to give us strength to continue our work, but we can't pray for a wonder. In our times there are no wonders. We have to do the work ourselves, and that's why, frankly speaking, I'm turning to you for help.

You are the only person I know, who has a possible influence in circles - if there are any circles like that - where fund for purposes like this can be found. Perhaps I am too blunt, and then you will have to excuse me, because there is no time for considerations. The offensive may start any day, the main battle will be between the valley and the superpower and if the valley loses, I am afraid that it will remain as dark shadow in our minds for the rest of our lives. And not only that, it will certainly be remembered as a dark moment in mankind's struggle for freedom. The analysis will be made and the questions will be asked - did we, we who were on the outside and observed the genocide, did we do enough. I am not putting this question to you, Dr Brzezinski, because I know that if it is in your power you will try to help. The question is, whether it is in your power.

One more thing in this context ought to be said. If it is possible for you to help, then I don't think it would be very wise to use the Pakistani channels or even the parties in Peshawar. To put

it simply, there are too many holes, too many persons who will create problems. Then it is better if you contact the Swedish Committee in Peshawar directly. We have direct channels to Massoud in Panjshir, we have transferred funds to him before and also received reports of their use in return. We have also - with good results - transferred money through Massoud to other areas north of Panjshir.

Personally I will not stay in Peshawar much longer. I am longing for the mountains and I will try to reach the valley in order to work as a journalist there, but Johan Fägerskiöld and Ingmar Andersson, my replacement in the Committee, will be here and they can answer any eventual questions.

I ask you to bring my best regards to Bob McCauley, Bert Schwarz and the others in Americare, and finally, I hope that you have been indulgent with my errors in the English language and that I in spite of those have been able to make myself clear.

Anders Fänge
Chief Coordinator
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

PS. Tonight (the 25th of ~~may~~ april) we hear that Radio Kabul is announcing that Panjshir has been taken. If it is not completely false it certainly means that the offensive is started.

National Security Council
The White House

1211 *RF*

System # I
Package # 4391

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull	<u>24</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hail	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Good letter. You might add a PS and offer for Don Fortin and Geoff Kemp to give him a classified briefing. [Signature]

RCM:

You put in today's outbox a signed note to Brzezinski -- as it was being logged out, the more substantive response prepared by Geoff Kemp was being logged in. If his prepared response meets your approval, you may wish to simply sign the latter version to Brzezinski.

Wilma

National Security Council
The White House

1195 *u*

System # I

Package # 4391

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt		<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u> - has copy ✓		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			

Don

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

* *Done*
Go ahead and send out Tab II and include info copy in package. Return to Bud for action on Tab I.
[initials]

RECEIVED 31 MAY 84 15

TO - MCFARLANE FROM BRZEZINSKI, Z DOCDATE 25 MAY 84
 KEMP 01 JUN 84
 POINDEXTER 05 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN MP FANGE, ANDERS

SUBJECT. DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

 ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 14 JUN 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
KEMP	MATLOCK	DUR
	SESTANOVICH	LENCZOWSKI
		DE GRAFFENREID

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (EF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
-	6/13	Rec'd state draft reply		SAA, SES, PT
Kemp	3	Prepare reply for MCFarlane	6/14	
Mcfarlane	X	signature		
	C	Mcfarlane Sgd ltr		GK, DF

DISPATCH

22. 6/22

W/ATTCH FILE WTT (C)

2A.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



FEB 28 1984

February 24, 1984

252102
0002

Dear Bud:

AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR, USIA's latest television documentary on the Soviet invasion, has achieved remarkable success among international TV broadcasters.

- Produced in cooperation with 11 international television networks including CBS, ITV, NHK and ABC (Australia).
- Seen by over 100 million people in 77 countries.

For your information, I am attaching a report compiled by our Television Service detailing the effectiveness of this one hour program through the comments of our worldwide audience and broadcast clients. The report on the tape represents a milestone in USIA's efforts to keep world attention focussed on the Soviet invasion and occupation.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Department of State

Enclosures filed in
Oversize Attachments #

9820

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8401654

RECEIVED 28 FEB 84 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 24 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USIA

AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: TAPE & REPORT ON THE HIDDEN WAR AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 05 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

LENCZOWSKI

KEMP

MATLOCK

STEINER

DUR

COMMENTS

Tape + Material w/ Raymond

Close out

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COPIES TO

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Close out per Raymond

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

w/ (C)

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FEB 28

February 24, 1984

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FG006-12

Dear Bud:


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Department of State

NSC # 8401654

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

IL 1654

RECEIVED 28 FEB

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 24 FEB 84

~~SUSPENSE~~ S

KEYWORDS USIA

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SUBJECT: TAPE & REPORT ON THE HIDDEN WAR AFGHANISTAN

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

LENCZOWSKI

KEMP

MATLOCK

STEINER

DUR

COMMENTS *Tape + Material w/ Raymond*

REF# LOG NSCIFID (V)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 7/30</i>	<i>ONR</i>		

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FROM:
Collection Wtorm Subject File
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File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # 252102

Box Number _____

Description of Material:

1 1/2 VHS Video Tapes
"Afghanistan: The Hidden War"

TO:
Collection: AV Storage
Series: _____
File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # _____

Box Number: _____

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NEED ONE COPY IN ORIGINAL LOCATION
SECOND COPY WITH ITEM PARALLEL FILED OR TRANSFERRED
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An outline map of Afghanistan, showing its irregular borders. The map is centered on the page and serves as a background for the title text.

**"Afghanistan:
The Hidden War"**

A Report to the Director

Program Concept



PROGRAM CONCEPT

"AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" IS A ONE HOUR USIA-TV DOCUMENTARY SPECIAL THAT WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED TO 77 COUNTRIES. IT HAS BEEN SEEN TO DATE BY AN ESTIMATED AUDIENCE OF OVER 100,000,000 PEOPLE.

AS A SPIN-OFF OF OUR HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL TV CO-PRODUCTION FORMULA, WE DEVELOPED THIS NEW TECHNIQUE IN TV NEWS PACKAGING. USIA-TV PRODUCED THE PROGRAM FROM MATERIAL CONTRIBUTED BY TWELVE DIFFERENT BROADCAST ORGANIZATIONS FROM AROUND THE WORLD.

"AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" IS DESIGNED TO INFORM FOREIGN TELEVISION AUDIENCES ABOUT THE PLIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. OUR GOAL IS TO MOBILIZE WORLD OPINION AGAINST ACTS OF TERROR AND DESTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN. STRESS IS PLACED ON THE HUMAN ASPECT OF THE SOVIET WAR AGAINST THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS.

THROUGH THE WORDS AND PICTURES OF RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL REPORTERS, IT PRESENTS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IS HARD TO REFUTE.

AFGHANISTAN:
THE HIDDEN WAR

An International
Retrospective of
Television Reporting

Produced by
USIA-TV

With the cooperation of:

ABC
Australian Broadcasting
Commission
Melbourne, Australia

ITV
Central Television
Thames Television
London, England

NHK
Japan Broadcasting
Corporation
Tokyo, Japan

PTV
Pakistan Television
Islamabad, Pakistan

TCN
Channel Nine Network, Ltd.
Sydney, Australia

USIA-TV
United States
Information Agency
Washington, D.C.

CBS
Columbia Broadcasting
System
New York, New York

KCRA-TV
Sacramento, California

ORF
Austrian Television
Vienna, Austria

RAI TG-1
Italian Television
Rome, Italy

TF-1
French Television
Paris, France

ZDF
German Television
Wiesbaden, FRG

RUNNING TIME: 58:00
Recorded
8/17/83



Highlights from the free world....

AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR

1. USIS BANGKOK Excerpts from program telecast on evening of August 31st to estimated audience of 13 million.
2. USIS BOGOTA VCR telecast Friday evening, September 2nd, to an estimated 2.5 million on one of National Colombian TV's most popular programs.
3. USIS MANILA In addition to placement in Manila and elsewhere, this program as well as other Afghan VCRs were telecast by all four Cebu TV stations as newsclips or documentaries. The Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation has telecast the program twice. Though the Post found it to be excellent, they noted that a 30 minute program would be much easier to place.
4. USIS RIO DE JANEIRO Three minutes of excerpts used on TV Globo late-night news program to estimated audience of more than 10 million.
5. USIS ISLAMABAD December 26th the USIS documentary was telecast to a large audience of influential Pakistanis and drew many favorable comments from viewers.
6. USIS RIYADH September 13 Saudi TV aired a 45-minute panel discussion on Afghanistan which utilized 20 minutes of Agency VCR. Riyadh-based evening newspaper Al-Masaiya featured an unattributed news story with photos on the VCR.
7. USIS SEOUL Korean version was prepared for KBS-TV telecast Sept. 5th and use in Post programming beginning Sept. 6th.
8. USIS MOGADISHU "The Hidden War" was the first USIA production placed on the new Somali TV station on the 4th anniversary of the invasion, Dec. 27th at 9pm.
9. USIS MELBOURNE Held a successful program utilizing the VCR and a lecture by the Chairman on the Australian Relief Committee for Afghanistan.

10. USIS BONN Post has distributed copies of the program to television stations, the Federal Press Office, a member of the German Bundestag, and to the Mayor's office in Bremen which is sponsoring an exhibit on the subject.
11. USIS CANBERRA Program given to all local TV stations in Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne. Program has been well received by TV channels in Sydney and Melbourne and will be programmed.
12. USIS JAKARTA Post appreciative of Indonesian language version and is programming this "excellent" VCR on Afghanistan.
13. USIS BOGOTA Telecast again December 27 on national networks, the estimated audience for "El Dia Historico" is 1.5 million.
14. USIS BUJUMBURA VCR shown to general public, radio and press, government employees and students. Some participants commented on plurality of views expressed by reporters from different countries.
15. USIS KAMPALA Programmed the VCR with DRS audience including Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Eastern European Affairs and the new Director of Television News for Uganda TV.
16. USIS KHARTOUM Arabic version used with broadcast journalists preparing future Sudanese TV special on Afghanistan.
17. USIS ANKARA Post produced Turkish language version and foresees multiple programs on Afghanistan with the VCR as centerpiece.
18. USIS MUSCAT Oman TV utilized visual and reporting materials from USIA's "Afghanistan Digest No. 2" and "Afghanistan: the Hidden War" to mark the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.



The Russians reacted immediately....

First evidence of the program's impact came from Moscow:

USIS MOSCOW

30 AUG 83

BOTH IZVESTIA AND PRAVDA OF AUGUST 28 RAN TASS ITEMS ATTACKING USIA FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" THE IZVESTIA STORY, BY FAR THE LONGER OF THE TWO, IS TITLED "MASTERS OF FALSIFICATION." IN IT THE AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM IS DESCRIBED AS A POTPOURRI OF "MALICIOUS INVENTIONS...INTERVIEWS WITH THE VENAL LEADERS OF ARMED BANDS WHO SURVIVE ON CIA MONEY AND WORK OFF THEIR DEBT WITH CRIMINAL RAIDS INTO AFGHAN TERRITORY...PHOTOGRAPHS DOCTORED BY WESTERN SPECIAL SERVICES AND 'COMMENTARY BY PROFESSIONAL ANTI-SOVIETS.'"

ACCORDING TO ISVESTIA, "THIS IS FAR FROM THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF IDEOLOGICAL SABOTAGE UNDERTAKEN BY THE AMERICAN PROPAGANDA AGENCY FOR THE POISONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND THE INCITEMENT OF ANTI-SOVIET HYSTERIA." THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO CITE DIRECTOR WICK'S INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, IN WHICH "...HE OPENLY DECLARED THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF HIS AGENCY WAS THE SHARP ACTIVIZATION OF ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA 'ON ALL SIDES WITH ALL THE MEANS AVAILABLE IN THE ARSENALS OF USIA AND OTHER U.S. AGENCIES.' IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT WICK WAS ONE OF THE INITIATORS OF SUCH BANKRUPT PROPAGANDISTIC FRAUDS AS THE FILM 'LET POLAND BE POLAND' AND THE BROCHURE 'THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT' (SIC), WHICH ALSO PROVOKED AN OPENLY SKEPTICAL REACTION EVEN AMONG SEASONED 'BRAIN WASHERS' BOTH IN THE U.S. AND IN EUROPE."

"THE TRUE GOALS OF USIA'S DISINFORMATION SPECIALISTS," CONCLUDES ISVESTIA, "ARE NO SECRET. WASHINGTON, WITH THE HELP OF NAKED LIES AND SLANDERS, STRIVES TO DENIGRATE THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHANI FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, AND BY ANY--EVEN ADMITTEDLY WORTHLESS--MEANS TO POISON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, SLANDER THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND JUSTIFY THE INTERFERENCE OF AMERICA'S SPECIAL SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE."

THE TWO PARAGRAPH PRAVDA ARTICLE NOTES THAT THE FILM, PRODUCED IN SEVEN LANGUAGES, WILL NOT BE SHOWN IN THE UNITED STATES: "THE REASON IS CLEAR. THE MASTERS OF PROPAGANDA FROM USIA DO NOT DARE PUT SUCH CRUDELY KNIT FALSIFICATION ON THE DOMESTIC MARKET."



Cable excerpts.....

[UNCLASSIFIED FIELD REACTION]

AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR

ANKARA

30 SEP 83

POST HAS COMPLETED DUBBING OF SUBJECT VTR INTO TURKISH. TWO HUNDRED MORE COPIES OF AGENCY PAMPHLET "AFGHANISTAN: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES" HAVE BEEN ORDERED FROM RSC MANILA IN SUPPORT OF VTR SCREENINGS, WHICH WILL BEGIN NEXT WEEK. IN ADDITION, POL/MIL OFFICER DOUG ARCHARD, FORMER AMERICAN CONSUL IN PESHAWAR FOR FOUR YEARS, WILL BE ON HAND AT MOST SCREENINGS IN ANKARA TO HELP WITH QUESTIONS. POST FORESEES MULTIPLE PROGRAMS ON AFGHANISTAN WITH SUBJECT VTR AS CENTERPIECE.

ANKARA

19 OCT 83

ONE IMMEDIATE BENEFIT OF USIS ANKARA'S SCREENING OF THE VIDEOTAPE "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" FOR 16 JOURNALISTS ON OCTOBER 7 WAS A COLUMN IN THE NATIONAL DAILY BULVAR (CIRCULATION 233,553) ON OCTOBER 10 BY ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS, GUNGOR YERDES. THE COLUMN NOT ONLY CALLED ATTENTION TO THE BRUTALITY OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION AND THE NEED FOR TURKISH VIGILANCE BUT ALSO URGED TURKISH TELEVISION TO BROADCAST THE TAPE IN ITS ENTIRETY.

BANGKOK

16 SEP 83

PROGRAMMING ON AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY FOCUS OF MEDIA ATTENTION AND PUBLIC INTEREST ON FIRST THE AQUINO ASSASSINATION AND THEN THE KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE GOOD USE OF AGENCY PRODUCTS TO REMIND THAIS OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN.

TO COMMEMORATE JESHYN WE PLACED THE VTR "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" ON TV CHANNEL 7, A MAJOR STATION IN BANGKOK WITH SUB-STATIONS AROUND THE COUNTRY. EXCERPTS OF THE PROGRAM WERE BROADCAST ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 31 DURING PRIME TIME TO AN ESTIMATED AUDIENCE OF THIRTEEN MILLION. IN ADDITION, THE SAME VIDEOTAPE WAS SEEN IN SEPARATE SCREENINGS BY STUDENTS AND FACULTY AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COLLEGE, ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE WAR COLLEGE, THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY AND PRASARNMITR UNIVERSITY. WE ALSO ARRANGED A SPECIAL SCREENING FOR GENERAL SAIYUD KEROPOL, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE THAI ARMED FORCES, AND THIRTY HIGH-RANKING MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF.

BOGOTA

3 SEP 83

AGENCY-PRODUCED RETROSPECTIVE "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WAS BROADCAST ON NATIONAL COLOMBIAN TELEVISION FRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 2 ON "ENVIADO ESPECIAL" PRODUCED AND NARRATED BY GERMAN CASTRO CAICEDO.

THE PROGRAM, WHICH WAS AIRED PRIME TIME, WAS EDITED INTO EIGHT-MINUTE SEGMENTS ALLOWING CASTRO TO INCORPORATE HIS OWN EDITORIAL COMMENTS. NOTING THAT THE AFGHANS HAVE SUFFERED MORE THAN SEVEN CENTURIES OF INVASIONS BY FOREIGN POWERS, CASTRO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENGAGED IN "INDISCRIMINATE SLAUGHTER" SINCE ITS 1981 INVASION. HE EXPLAINED THAT MEMBERS OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHICH INCLUDES CHILDREN AS YOUNG AS SEVEN YEARS, OFTEN FIGHT WITH THEIR BARE HANDS AND WITHOUT WEAPONS. THE BRAVERY OF AFGHANS IN THE FACE OF "MURDEROUS ACTIONS" BY THE SOVIETS PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE TO ALL PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WHO SEEK TO RESIST COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND INFILTRATION, HE DECLARED.

"ENVIADO ESPECIAL," WHICH IS BROADCAST WEEKLY AND FOCUSES ON IMPORTANT CURRENT EVENTS TOPICS, IS ONE OF COLOMBIA'S MOST POPULAR TELEVISION PROGRAMS. IT ENJOYS A NATIONWIDE AUDIENCE OF OVER 2.5 MILLION.

COMMENT: THE COINCIDENTAL AIRING OF "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" IN THE WAKE OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT, SHOULD SERVE TO HEIGHTEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF SOVIET DISRESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS REPEATED ATROCITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

BOGOTA

28 DEC 83

THE USIA-PRODUCED VCR "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WAS BROADCAST ON NATIONAL COLOMBIAN TELEVISION AT 5:30 P.M. DECEMBER 27, ON THE PROGRAM "EL DIA HISTORICO". THE FILM, WHICH WAS ALSO AIRED ON COLOMBIAN TV SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, SERVED AS ANOTHER REMINDER TO COLOMBIAN VIEWERS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL IN AFGHANISTAN FOUR YEARS AFTER THE INVASION. THE ESTIMATED AUDIENCE FOR "EL DIA HISTORICIA" IS 1.5 MILLION.

BONN

30 AUG 83

WE RECEIVED AND ARE DISTRIBUTING THE AGENCY'S PRODUCTION "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" TO TELEVISION. WE HAVE SENT COPIES TO THE FEDERAL PRESS OFFICE, TO THE MAYOR'S OFFICE IN BREMEN WHICH IS SPONSORING AN EXHIBIT BY AFGHAN REFUGEES IN GERMANY, TO A MEMBER OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG WHO WAS HIMSELF IN AFGHANISTAN WITH THE MUJAHEDIN, AND TO ALL OUR BRANCH POSTS.

BUJUMBURA

28 SEP 83

AFGHANISTAN VTR SHOWN TWICE, SEPTEMBER 16 TO GENERAL PUBLIC AND STUDENTS (50 PERSONS) AND SEPTEMBER 21 TO ABOUT 45 INVITED GUESTS FROM RADIO AND PRESS, GRB EMPLOYEES AND STUDENTS. SOME PARTICIPANTS COMMENTED ON EXCELLENT PRESENTATION AND PLURALITY OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY REPORTERS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES COVERING AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENTS.

CANBERRA

14 SEP 83

JESHYN PERIOD COINCIDED WITH RETURN OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT AND THE TABLING OF THE BUDGET. THAT AND THE KOREAN AIRLINE DISASTER DOMINATED AUGUST 23 - SEPTEMBER 10. HOWEVER, AGENCY PRODUCTION "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" HAS BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY TV CHANNELS IN SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE AND WILL BE PROGRAMMED.

USIS SYDNEY REPORTS THAT BOTH CHANNEL 9 AND CHANNEL 28 (ETHNIC TV) ARE REVIEWING "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR". AUSTRALIAN TV SETS PROGRAMMING MONTHS IN ADVANCE AND SELDOM WILL INSERT ON SHORT NOTICE.

USIS MELBOURNE HAS HAD SEVERAL AFGHAN PROGRAMS AND WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO AGENCY ON THESE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 16.

CANBERRA

15 SEP 83

CANBERRA, SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE PROVIDED FILM TO ALL LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS. ALL NOTED THAT INSUFFICIENT LEAD TIME WAS PROVIDED TO PROGRAM IT AUGUST 27-31. AT LEAST ONE MONTH'S ADVANCE NOTICE IS REQUIRED. AT THE MOMENT CHANNEL 9 AND 28 IN SYDNEY ARE REVIEWING THE FILM FOR POSSIBLE USE. CHANNEL 10 IN MELBOURNE MAY BE USING EXCERPTS THIS WEEK IN CONNECTION WITH INTERVIEW WITH LEADER OF AUSTRALIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN. BPAO WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO YOU ON THIS AND OTHER EXPECTED AFGHANISTAN PROGRAMMING THIS WEEK BY COB AUGUST 16.

NETWORKS HERE ARE WELL SUPPLIED WITH SATELLITE NEWS COVERAGE ON 24-HOUR BASIS, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN COVERAGE, ALTHOUGH PERTH CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE NETWORKS FOR INTERNATIONAL NEWS FEATURES.

ISLAMABAD

29 DEC 83

GOP-CONTROLLED TELEVISION, IN PRIME TIME FOLLOWING THE EVENING NEWS PROGRAM, FEATURED AFGHANISTAN-RELATED PROGRAMS DECEMBER 25, 26 AND 27. ON DECEMBER 25, THE 30-MINUTE BBC DOCUMENTARY ENTITLED "AFGHANISTAN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM" WAS TELECAST NATIONWIDE, ALONG WITH ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR THE TRANSMISSION DECEMBER 26 OF "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR". THIS USIA-PRODUCED DOCUMENTARY INCORPORATING SEGMENTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, DREW MANY FAVORABLE COMMENTS FROM VIEWERS. RESPONSE AND TALK ABOUT PRE-BROADCAST PUBLICITY INDICATE THAT THE PROGRAM REACHED A RELATIVELY LARGE AUDIENCE AMONG INFLUENTIAL PAKISTANIS.

THE AMERICAN CENTER IN PESHAWAR FEATURED SPECIAL PROGRAMMING DECEMBER 26 THROUGH JANUARY 1, WITH DAILY SHOWINGS OF AGENCY-SUPPLIED VCRS (AFGHAN EXODUS, THANKSGIVING IN PESHAWAR, AND THE HIDDEN WAR).

JAKARTA

9 SEP 83

POST HAS RECEIVED AND IS PROGRAMMING THIS EXCELLENT AFGHANISTAN VTR. POST ESPECIALLY APPRECIATES INDONESIAN LANGUAGE VERSIONING WHICH IS MOST PROFESSIONALLY DONE. HOWEVER, PAL VERSION WE ORDERED DOES NOT SATISFY ALL OUR PROGRAM NEEDS. POST ALSO ORDERS ONE NTSC UMACIC CASSETTE SUBJECT VTR WITH BOTH ENGLISH AND INDONESIAN SOUND TRACKS.

KAMPALA

15 SEP 83

POST SUCCESSFULLY PROGRAMMED VTR "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WITH 25 PERSONS MOSTLY DRS AT USIS CENTER SEPTEMBER 13. MOST ATTENDEES WERE FROM MEDIA INCLUDING UGANDA TELEVISION, RADIO UGANDA AND FIVE NEWSPAPERS. THERE WERE NO REPRESENTATIVES FROM GOVERNMENT-OWNED "UGANDA TIMES" PRESENT, MOST PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY AFTERNOON RAINS AND USUAL LACK OF TRANSPORT.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WAS MOST IMPORTANT PARTICIPANT. AT CONCLUSION OF PROGRAM HE SAID THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH OCCASIONS LIKE THIS TO SEE THE OTHER SIDE OF THINGS. WE PLAN TO PRESENT HIM MANY SUCH OCCASIONS IN FUTURE.

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT ATTENDEE IS NEW DIRECTOR OF TELEVISION NEWS. HE APOLOGIZED FOR NOT COMING TO USIS FOR MONTHS AND EXPLAINED HE HAS BEEN TOTALLY INVOLVED WITH ESTABLISHING HIS NEWS ROOM AS DISTINCT ENTITY FROM RADIO UGANDA. HE TOO WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH PROGRAM AND SAID THAT VTR PRESENTS MUCH DIFFERENT PICTURE OF PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND CONDUCT OF WAR THAN HE HAS BEEN LED TO BELIEVE FROM OTHER SOURCES.

HE PROMISED TO BEGIN COMING TO WEEKLY CBS NEWS PROGRAMS AGAIN. HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE ARRANGE SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR HIM AND HIS STAFF THAT WILL PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT EVENTS AS WELL AS PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR WRITING AND PRODUCING TV NEWS.

MOST OTHER COMMENTS ALSO CENTERED ON FACT THAT PROGRAM REVEALED WHAT IS NOT REPEAT NOT APPEARING IN UGANDA MEDIA AND COUNTERS SOVIET PROPAGANDA BEING DISTRIBUTED IN UGANDA.

ONE INTRIGUING REQUEST CAME FROM SUB-EDITOR OF VERNACULAR NEWSPAPER "NGABO" WHICH IS SUPPORTIVE OF SOVIET BLOC. HE ASKED FOR PHOTOS OF "HEALTHY REFUGEES." THE STAFF MEMBER WHO TRIED TO HELP HIM INDICATED THAT THE TERM SEEMED A CONTRADICTION. WE, OF COURSE, HAVE NO SUCH PHOTOS. WE ASSUME HE PLANNED TO SHOW THAT REFUGEES ARE NOT AS BADLY OFF AS SOME SAY. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE EDITOR'S MOTIVES AT FOLLOW-UP PROGRAMS.

INFORMATION ASSISTANT RICHARD OTEE THROUGH HIS PERSISTENCE AND A GREAT DEAL OF LEGWORK IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROGRAM'S SUCCESS. BUT SUCH EFFORTS IN PAST HAVE NOT GUARANTEED AN AUDIENCE OF THIS SIZE AND CALIBRE.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN BUT AUDIENCE REACTION TO THE AFGHAN PROGRAM CONSIDERED WITH COMMENTS FROM OTHER SOURCES INDICATES THERE MAY BE A GROWING NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO ARE LOOKING FOR INFORMATION ABOUT "THE OTHER SIDE" OF MANY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. WE FIND IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO PRESENT THE U.S. POSITION ON IMPORTANT ISSUES TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH UGANDA MEDIA. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING PLACEMENT BUT PERHAPS NOT AS SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING CREDIBILITY. INTELLIGENT THINKING PERSONS ARE AWARE THAT THEY ARE NOT GETTING THE WHOLE STORY. PERHAPS WE ARE EXPERIENCING THE FIRST MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS AWARENESS.

KHARTOUM

15 SEP 83

POST HAS SUCCESSFULLY USED TV PRODUCTION "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" IN ARABIC WITH SELECTED BROADCAST JOURNALISTS IN PREPARATION OF FUTURE SUDAN TELEVISION SPECIAL ON AFGHANISTAN.

KINSHASA

USIS KINSHASA USED THE OCCASION OF HUMAN RIGHT'S DAY TO ORGANIZE A SHOWING AT THE CULTURAL CENTER OF "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" TO AN INVITED AUDIENCE OF FIFTY SENIOR ZAIRIAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

TO A NUMBER OF THE EDITORS PRESENT, THE ATROCITIES OF AFGHANISTAN CAME AS A REVELATION, AND MOST EXPRESSED SHOCK AND OUTRAGE.

SEVERAL SAW THE NUMBER AND VARIETY OF TV TEAMS WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE FILM'S PRODUCTION AS EVIDENCE OF ITS CREDIBILITY.

THE KINSHASA DAILY ELIMA CARRIED A LENGTHLY COMMENTARY OF THE SHOWING TWO DAYS LATER. TV ZAIRE HAS PROMISED TO TELECAST.

LIMA

13 JAN 84

CHANNEL 2 CARRIED A DIFFERENT SEGMENT FROM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" EACH NIGHT DURING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 26.

MANILA

30 AUG 83

CHANNEL 13 (INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORP., MANILA) HAS TWICE BROADCAST HOUR-LONG PROGRAM. IT WAS AIRED 4:30 - 5:30 P.M., SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, AND 11 P.M. - 12 MIDNIGHT, SUNDAY AUGUST 28. OF MANILA'S FIVE STATIONS, CHANNEL 13 IS THE ONE MOST NOTED FOR ITS "MASS AUDIENCE" APPEAL.

ALTHOUGH A HALF-HOUR PRODUCT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH EASIER TO PLACE, POST HAS FOUND THE PRODUCTION EXCELLENT AND BELIEVES IT WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING THIS "FORGOTTEN WAR" TO PUBLIC ATTENTION.

MANILA

2 SEP 83

MBS-CHANNEL 4, THE GOVERNMENT STATION IN MANILA BROADCAST SUBJECT PROGRAM AT 9:30 P.M., SEPTEMBER 1.

CATV-CHANNEL 5 (SINING MAKULAY, MANILA) USED SUBJECT PROGRAM TWICE -- AT 6 P.M. ON AUGUST 31 AND AT NOON ON SEPTEMBER 1.

IBC-CHANNEL 13 (DAVAO) AIRED SUBJECT PROGRAM AT 5 P.M. ON AUGUST 30. ALSO, SBN-CHANNEL 8 (DAVAO) AIRED A POST-EDITED THREE-AND-ONE-HALF MINUTE SEGMENT (BASED ON KCRA FEATURE IN SUBJECT PROGRAM) ON ITS 7 P.M. NEWSCASTS ON AUGUST 29.

FROM SEPT. 1-8, THE THOMAS JEFFERSON CULTURAL CENTER IS SPONSORING AN AFGHAN RETROSPECTIVE PROGRAM FEATURING AGENCY'S 17 PANEL POSTER DISPLAY AND SCREENINGS OF SEVEN AGENCY-PRODUCED OR ACQUIRED AFGHANISTAN-RELATED VCRS, INCLUDING SUBJECT PROGRAM (SCHEDULED FOR SEPT. 3 AND 8 SHOWINGS).

MANILA

9 SEP 83

THIS IS THE POST'S THIRD VTR USAGE REPORT ON "JESHYN" INITIATIVES. IT FOCUSES ON ACTIVITIES IN CEBU.

SUBJECT PROGRAM, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER AFGHAN VTRS, WERE BROADCAST BY ALL FOUR CEBU TELEVISION STATIONS AS EITHER NEWSCLIPS OR DOCUMENTARIES. PLACEMENT BREAKDOWN WAS AS FOLLOWS:

CHANNEL 3: AUG 3 - "THE HIDDEN WAR" NEWSCLIP USED IN 6:30 P.M. NEWS. FULL TAPE WAS BROADCAST EARLIER AS SPECIAL PROGRAM (4 TO 5 P.M.).

CHANNEL 3: SEPT 1 - "CAUGHT IN A STRUGGLE" 4 P.M.

CHANNEL 9: AUG 30 - "HIDDEN WAR" NEWSCLIP IN 9 P.M. AND 11:30 P.M. NEWSCAST. FULL TAPE AS SPECIAL PROGRAM 5 TO 6P.M.

CHANNEL 9: AUG 31 - "CAUGHT IN A STRUGGLE" 5:30 P.M. TO 6 P.M.

CHANNEL 7: AUG 30 - "HIDDEN WAR" NEWSCLIP IN "NEWS AT SEVEN." FULL TAPE WAS BROADCAST LATER IN THE EVENING.

CHANNEL 7: AUG 31 - "CAUGHT IN A STRUGGLE" IN AFTERNOON SLOT.

CHANNEL 13: AUG 31 - 3 MIN OF "CAUGHT IN A STRUGGLE" USED IN 6:30 P.M. NEWS SHOW.

CHANNEL 13: SEPT 1 - "WHEN NIGHT COMES TO KANDAHAR," "AFGHAN EXODUS" AND "AFGHAN DIGEST '83" BROADCAST IN TANDEM BEGINNING 4 P.M.

OTHER USAGE: "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" AND "AFGHANISTAN: CAUGHT IN A STRUGGLE" WERE SHOWN AT USIS AUDITORIUM IN THREE SESSIONS ON AUG. 30 AND AUG. 31 TO A TOTAL OF ABOUT 300 PERSONS, MOSTLY STUDENTS AND OFFICE WORKERS. POST ALSO ISSUED PRESS RELEASE TO MARK "JESHYN" OBSERVANCE.

MANILA

19 SEP 83

CHANNEL 5 (SINING MAKULAY, CABLE TELEVISION, MANILA) USED "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" ON AUGUST 24.

MANILA

23 NOV 83

OF THE SEVERAL AFGHANISTAN PROGRAMS THAT THE POST HAS SYNDICATED, "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" AND "AFGHANISTAN: CAUGHT IN THE STRUGGLE" WERE AIRED IN DAVAO CITY, WHERE CHANNEL 13 RAN THE FORMER AT 5 P.M., OCT. 3, AND THE LATTER AT 4:30 P.M, OCT. 11. THE FORMER PROGRAM ALSO AIRED IN 6 P.M. SLOT ON MANILA'S CABLE TV CHANNEL 5.

MELBOURNE

15 SEP 83

USIS MELBOURNE SEPT 13 HELD A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM FEATURING A LECTURE BY ABDUL KHALIQ FAZAL, CHAIRMAN OF THE AUSTRALIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN. FOLLOWING HIS REMARKS ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE, THE AGENCY'S DOCUMENTARY FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WAS SHOWN. FAZAL THEN CONDUCTED A BRIEF BUT LIVELY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD.

THE AUDIENCE OF 20 INCLUDED ACADEMICS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE AND FROM MONASH UNIVERSITY, THE EDITOR IN CHIEF OF THE "SUN" AND "HERALD" NEWSPAPERS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LABOR AND LIBERAL PARTIES AND THE NATIONAL CIVIC COUNCIL, TWO YOUNG UNION OFFICIALS, AND AN I.V. DESIGNATE, WHO IS AN AIDE TO A FEDERAL SENATOR.

AS RESULT AN INVITATION TO THE USIS PROGRAM, TV CHANNEL 10 ASKED TO INTERVIEW FAZAL AND PLANNED TO USE EXCERPTS FROM USIS FILMS AS WELL. DUE TO OTHER EVENTS, THIS WAS POSTPONED. ALSO LEADING "AGE" NEWSPAPER REQUESTED INTERVIEW. ARTICLE HAS NOT YET APPEARED.

ON HIS REQUEST, USIS HAS PRESENTED FAZAL WITH A COPY OF AGENCY'S DOCUMENTARY FILM. HE PLANS TO SHOW FILM DURING PROGRAMS BEING PLANNED AT UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE AND AT MONASH UNIVERSITY.

MELBOURNE

20 OCT 83

RAFFAELE FAVERO, YOUNG (ABOUT 37) ITALO-AUSTRALIAN FILM PRODUCER, WAS KILLED OCTOBER 10 IN ORGON, IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE FILMING AN ATTACK BY THE MUJAHIDIN ON A RUSSIAN GARRISON. USIS MELBOURNE OCTOBER 20 WAS INFORMED OF FAVERO'S DEATH BY HIS CLOSE FRIEND, ABDUL KHALIA FAZAL, OF THE AUSTRALIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA ALSO REPORTED HIS DEATH.

ACCORDING TO FAZAL, WHO RECEIVED A TELEPHONE REPORT FROM PAKISTAN, WITHIN A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE ATTACK BEGAN, A SOVIET MIG FLEW OVER AND DROPPED 500 KILOGRAM BOMBS. FAVERO WAS FATALLY WOUNDED AND DIED WHILE BEING RUSHED BY JEEP TO THE NEAREST MUJAHIDIN HOSPITAL. HE HAS BEEN BURIED IN THE MARTYRS CEMETERY, A BURIAL PLACE INSIDE AFGHANISTAN FOR ALL MUJAHIDIN WHO DIE IN BATTLE AGAINST THE SOVIETS.

PART OF AGENCY'S DOCUMENTARY FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WILL BE USED OCTOBER 20 IN TV CHANNEL 10'S NEWS COVERAGE OF FAVERO'S DEATH. THE DOCUMENTARY INCLUDES FOOTAGE FROM HIS FILM "THE AFSAT FILM".

MOGADISHU

28 DEC 83

USIS MOGADISHU RECORDED ITS FIRST PLACEMENT ON SOMALIA'S NEW TELEVISION STATION DECEMBER 27 WHEN THE USIA-PRODUCED VCR "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WAS BROADCAST IN ITS ENTIRETY TO COMMEMORATE THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE BROADCAST WAS PRIME TIME 9 P.M. AND WAS PROBABLY SEEN BY AT LEAST TWENTY THOUSAND SOMALIS IN THE MOGADISHU AREA. SINCE TELEVISION IS NEW AND THERE IS NO ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF SETS IN USE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO GIVE A PRECISE ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF VIEWERS.

THIS VCR PLACEMENT IS A SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMMING FIRST FOR THE POST. THE TV STATION, BEING ONLY TWO MONTHS OLD, IS STILL IN A SHAKEDOWN PHASE. WE EXPECT THAT AS TV OVERCOMES ITS INITIAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, USE OF USIA PROGRAMS WILL BECOME ROUTINE.

MOSCOW

30 AUG 83

BOTH IZVESTIA AND PRAVDA OF AUGUST 28 RAN TASS ITEM ATTACKING USIA FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR". THE IZVESTIA STORY, BY FAR THE LONGER OF THE TWO, IS TITLED "MASTERS OF FALSIFICATION". IN IT THE AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM IS DESCRIBED AS A POTPOURRI OF "MALICIOUS INVENTIONS...INTERVIEWS WITH THE VENAL LEADERS OF ARMED BANDS WHO SURVIVE ON CIA MONEY AND WORK OFF THEIR DEBT WITH CRIMINAL RAIDS INTO AFGHAN TERRITORY...PHOTOGRAPHS DOCTORED BY WESTERN SPECIAL SERVICES AND 'COMMENTARY' BY PROFESSIONAL ANTI-SOVIETS."

ACCORDING TO ISVESTIA, "THIS IS FAR FROM THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF IDEOLOGICAL SABOTAGE UNDERTAKEN BY THE AMERICAN PROPAGANDA AGENCY FOR THE POISONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND THE INCITEMENT OF ANTI-SOVIET HYSTERIA." THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO CITE DIRECTOR WICK'S INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, IN WHICH "HE OPENLY DECLARED THAT THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF HIS AGENCY WAS THE SHARP ACTIVIZATION OF ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA 'ON ALL SIDES WITH ALL THE MEANS AVAILABLE IN THE ARSENALS OF USIA AND OTHER U.S. AGENCIES'. IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT WICK WAS ONE OF THE INITIATORS OF SUCH BANKRUPT PROPAGANDISTIC FRAUDS AS THE FILM 'LET POLAND BE POLAND' AND THE BROCHURE 'THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT' (SIC), WHICH PROVOKED AN OPENLY SKEPTICAL REACTION EVEN AMONG SEASONED 'BRAIN WASHERS' BOTH IN THE U.S. AND IN EUROPE."

"THE TRUE GOALS OF USIA'S DISINFORMATION SPECIALISTS," CONCLUDES ISVESTIA, "ARE NO SECRET. WASHINGTON, WITH THE HELP OF NAKED LIES AND SLANDERS, STRIVES TO DENIGRATE THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHANI FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, AND BY ANY--EVEN ADMITTEDLY WORTHLESS--MEANS TO POISON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, SLANDER THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND JUSTIFY THE INTERFERENCE OF AMERICA'S SPECIAL SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE."

THE TWO PARAGRAPH PRAVDA ARTICLE NOTES THAT THE FILM, PRODUCED IN SEVEN LANGUAGES FOR 60 COUNTRIES, WILL NOT BE SHOWN IN THE U.S. "THE REASON IS CLEAR. THE MASTERS OF PROPAGANDA FROM USIA DO NOT DARE PUT SUCH A CRUDELY KNIT FALSIFICATION ON THE DOMESTIC MARKET."

MUSCAT

5 JAN 84

THE OMANI NEWS MEDIA MADE GOOD USE OF USIA MATERIALS IN THEIR DECEMBER 1983 COVERAGE OF THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. OMAN TELEVISION MARKED THE OCCASION WITH A SPECIAL HALF-HOUR BROADCAST ON THE CONTINUING WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. THE LOCALLY PRODUCED PROGRAM BROADCAST AT THE END OF DECEMBER UTILIZED VISUAL AND REPORTING MATERIALS FROM USIA'S "AFGHAN DIGEST NO. 2" AND "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR".

RIO DE JANEIRO

15 SEP 83

BRAZIL'S DOMINANT TELEVISION NETWORK, TV GLOBO, USED SOME THREE MINUTES OF EXCERPTS FROM THE SUBJECT PROGRAM ON ITS LATE NIGHT (11:30 PM) NEWS PROGRAM "JORNAL DO GLOBO" ON SEPTEMBER 13. THE NEWS THAT NIGHT FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST EVER SHOWING ON BRAZILIAN TV OF THE CLASSIC FILM "GONE WITH THE WIND" AND WE EXPECT THE AUDIENCE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN THE USUAL 10 MILLION. POST STILL HAS HOPES OF PLACING SOME PART OF THE PROGRAM ON OTHER TV OUTLETS AND WILL ADVISE USAGE IF SUCH PLACEMENT OCCURS.

RIYADH

8 SEP 83

SEPTEMBER 3 EDITION OF THE RIYADH-BASED EVENING NEWSPAPER, AL-MASAIYA, PROMINENTLY FEATURES ON PAGE 11 UNATTRIBUTED NEWS STORY ON USIA-PRODUCED FILM, "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" COMPLETE WITH THREE PHOTOS SHOWING SCENES FROM THE AFGHAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE. HEADLINED "AMERICAN FILM DEPICTS THE EPIC OF AFGHANISTAN'S STRUGGLE," THE STORY CREDITS USIA WITH PRODUCING THE FILM AND SUMMARIZES ITS CONTENTS. THE NEWSPAPER NOTES THAT USIA "HAS BEGUN DISTRIBUTING THE FILM TO 62 COUNTRIES." ARTICLE ACCURATELY REFLECTS CONTENT AND TONE OF FILM.

WE HAD EARLIER DELIVERED A SPECIALLY ORDERED 2-INCH SECAM COPY OF THE FILM, WITH ARABIC AND ENGLISH SOUND TRACKS, TO SAUDI TV, URGING OFFICIALS THERE TO SHOW IT DURING THE HIGHLY IMPORTANT HAJJ SEASON. USING AL-MASAIYA STORY TO RE-EMPHASIZE FILM'S IMPORTANCE, WE AGAIN URGED TV OFFICIALS TO RUN IT. TO DATE, HOWEVER, SAUDI TV HAS NOT DONE SO, PERHAPS BECAUSE MOST KEY OFFICIALS ARE NOT IN RIYADH. WE WILL KEEP TRYING.

CONCERNED EDITOR OF AL-MASAIYA IS OUT OF COUNTRY. ANOTHER OFFICIAL AT PAPER GUESSED ARTICLE WAS PROVIDED BY AL-MASAIYA OFFICE (WHICH IS ALSO AL-JAZIRA OFFICE) IN WASHINGTON. WILL CONFIRM SOURCE WHEN EDITOR RETURNS PROBABLY LATE SEPTEMBER.

RIYADH

27 SEP 83

WE HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM SAUDI TV OFFICIALS, JUST RETURNED FROM THE HAJJ AND EID AL-ADHA HOLIDAYS WHICH ENDED SEPT 23, THAT ON SEPT 13 (THE SIXTH DAY OF THE HAJJ SEASON) SAUDI TV AIRED A 45-MINUTE PANEL DISCUSSION ENTITLED "THE STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN" DURING WHICH SCENES FROM THE AGENCY-PRODUCED FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WERE SHOWN TO ILLUSTRATE THE MUJAHIDEEN STRUGGLE. AN OFFICIAL TOLD US SAUDI TV AIRED OVER 20 MINUTES OF THE FILM'S FOOTAGE IN ARABIC DURING THE PANEL DISCUSSION, WHICH CAME IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRIME-TIME ARABIC NIGHTLY NEWS ON CHANNEL ONE AT 2130 HOURS LOCAL. AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE MASA'IYA DAILY'S ACCOUNT OF THE AGENCY FILM (REF RIYADH 2943), THE EDITOR OF AL-MASA'IYA, WHO IS JUST BACK FROM HAJJ-EID VACATION, TOLD US THE ACCOUNT IS A COMPOSITE STORY BASED ON SEVERAL MATERIALS AND PHOTOGRAPHS PROVIDED BY USIS RIYADH.

COMMENT: NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE ARE PLEASED WITH LOCAL SHOWING OF MAJOR PORTIONS OF AGENCY FILM DURING THE HIGHLY IMPORTANT HAJJ SEASON AND IN PRIME TIME SLOT. WE FEEL THAT USING SEGMENTS OF THE FILM IN A SAUDI PROGRAM ON ITS MAIN CHANNEL PROBABLY ENHANCED THE FILM'S IMPACT. WE HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN FAVORABLY TO AL-MASA'IYA EDITORS ON THE ARTICLE THE PAPER CARRIED ABOUT THE FILM. WITH THESE PLACEMENTS PERSONAL CONTACTS WERE A KEY ELEMENT.

RIYADH

17 JAN 84

SEGMENTS TOTALING AT LEAST 15 MINUTES FROM THE AGENCY'S FILM "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" WERE USED IN A SPECIAL HALF-HOUR PROGRAM AIRED BY SAUDI TV THE EVENING OF JANUARY 16. THE SPECIAL TV PROGRAM ON AFGHANISTAN'S STRUGGLE COINCIDED WITH THE OPENING OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT IN CASABLANCA.

SEOUL

8 SEP 83

POST RECEIVED VTR AUG. 24 AND PREPARED KOREAN VERSION FOR USE IN POST PROGRAMMING BEGINNING SEPT. 6. POST HAS ARRANGED FOR BROADCAST OF VTR ON KBS-TV FOR NATIONWIDE AUDIENCE EVENING OF SEPT. 5. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE PROGRAMMING PLANS WERE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF UNUSUAL AND EXTENSIVE COVERAGE ON KOREAN TELEVISION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS RELATED TO THE KAL AIRLINER ATTACK. WILL ADVISE AT LATER DATE WHEN BROADCAST SCHEDULES ARE FIRM.

STOCKHOLM

7 OCT 83

POST PROVIDED SWEDISH TV CHANNEL TWO COPIES OF AGENCY VCR "AFGHANISTAN: THE HIDDEN WAR" FOR VIEWING AND POSSIBLE USE IN MAGAZINE FORMAT PROGRAM. TO DATE, TV2 HAS NOT MADE ANY DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO USE VTR.