

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

WHORM Subject File Code: CO001-09
South America-Central and Latin America
Case file Number(s): 600000-619399
Box:36

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

ij

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

601648
5961

9

0001-09

August 17, 1988

FG013

RS

FG006-12

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS ^{PS}_{AS}

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Report on H.R. 4854

The NSC staff has no objection to the Defense draft report on H.R. 4854, "to encourage economic development in Central America, and to increase the sugar import quota."

NSC# 8805961

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

August 15, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY *SI*

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Report on H.R. 4854

OMB has requested our views on the attached draft AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ASF Alison Fortier, *not available* William Grant and *CNO for* Bob Pastorino concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to Peterson at Tab I indicating that the NSC staff has no objection to the Defense draft report on H.R. 4854.

Approve *SI*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Peterson
II Incoming from OMB

Prepared by: Stephen P. Farrar



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL

August 10, 1988

5961

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

Department of the Treasury (Carro 566-8523)	28
Department of State (Bachrach 647-4463)	25
Agency for International Development (Lester 647-8404)	
Department of Agriculture (Shapiro 382-1272)	01
Export-Import Bank (Record 566-8967)	36
United States Trade Representative (Parker 3432)	23
✓ National Security Council	

SUBJECT: Defense draft report on H.R. 4854, "To encourage economic development in Central America, and to increase the sugar import quota."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, 1988.

Questions should be referred to Annette Rooney/Sue Thau (395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: J. Doherty E. Rea
 N. Conklin

SPECIAL

The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request of 20 June for the views of the Secretary of Defense on H.R. 4854, 100th Congress, a bill "To encourage economic development in Central America, and to increase the sugar import quota."

H.R. 4854 would reduce interest rates on debts owed to the US Government (USG) and provide a USG guarantee for bank loans refinanced by designated Central American countries. The bill would also set a floor for the United States' annual sugar quota, and provide additional sugar quota allocations for Central American countries. The Department of Defense shares the desire of the bill's sponsor to aid the economies of Central America. However, the Department opposes the bill based on the concerns outlined below.

While H.R. 4854 might seem to offer a low cost way to provide economic stimulus and fiscal relief to Central American countries, in the event of a default on USG-guaranteed debt (including Foreign Military Sales debt), the cost to the US taxpayer would be far greater than that of conventional aid. Additional USG debt guarantees will increase US budget authority requirements and add to the deficit in the event of a default. The proposed interest rate reductions would require additional appropriations or compensatory cutbacks in other areas of the foreign assistance budget, which has already suffered severe budget cuts. Moreover, the assistance provided by H.R. 4854 would lack most of the controls and policy inputs of the normal assistance process, and do little to encourage critical reforms and improve long-term economic competitiveness and productivity. Finally, the debt-related provisions of H.R. 4854 overlap provisions in the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution (PL 100-202) for refinancing Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) debt. Passage of new legislation such as H.R. 4854 could undermine Central American countries' ability to take advantage of the FMSCR refinancing program.

The Administration believes the sugar program has substantially harmed the economies of countries around the world that are of strategic importance to the US (including not only Central American countries, but the Philippines and others),

while costing US consumers billions of dollars and thousands of jobs. Unfortunately, the provisions of H.R. 4854 do not address the root problems of the sugar program, and in fact could worsen the situation. The bill is contrary to a US commitment to the GATT that it will not administer its sugar program in a manner which provides preferences for any country or region. It also appears that the sugar quota floor and the increases for Central American nations that the bill provides cannot be reconciled with the requirement that the sugar program be run at no cost to the US government. We support the Administration's amendments to S. 1948, which would fundamentally reform the program by gradually reducing the US sugar support price and increasing the sugar quota allowance for all sugar exporters.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

National Security Council
The White House

JP

System # _____
Package # 5961
DOCLOG JP A/O _____

88 AUG 17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>JP</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
John Negroponte	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>OM 8/17</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Duberstein Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 8/18
(Date/Time)

OMB referral

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8805961
RECEIVED: 12 AUG 88 15

TO: PETERSON, R

FROM: STEVENS

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA
ECONOMICS
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

INTL TRADE
IMPORT CONTROLS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DOD DRAFT RPT ON HR-4854 / TO ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
CENTRAL AMER & INCREASE SUGAR IMPORT QUOTA

ACTION: PERITO SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 16 AUG 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DANZANSKY LOGREF: 8800070 8803042

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DANZANSKY
FARRAR
FORTIER
GRANT
PASTORINO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY ed DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSCLG CLOSED BY: NSCLG DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8805961

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DANZANSKY
002 STEVENS
003

Z 88081215 PREPARE MEMO FOR STEVENS
Z 88081713 FOR SIGNATURE
X 88081717 PERITO SGD MEMO

UNCLASSIFIED

g.

SECRETARY
Walter H. Beckham, Jr.
800 City National Bank Building
25 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33130

*
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

6805
1. Clerk
2. Staff

ABA

750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 988-5000

September 1, 1988

SEP 20 1988

601660
4900

00001-09

FG006-12

Honorable Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

RE: Establishment of Peace in Central America

Dear General Powell:

At the meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association held on August 9-10, 1988, the attached resolution was adopted upon recommendation of the Section of International Law and Practice. Thus this resolution now states the official policy of the Association.

We are transmitting this policy for your information and whatever action you think appropriate. Please do not hesitate to let us know if you need any further information, have any questions or we can be of any assistance. Please direct any inquiries to my Chicago office.

Sincerely yours,

Walter H. Beckham, Jr.
Walter H. Beckham, Jr.

WHB:kci
Attachment
1757f/1679f/1711f

cc: Robert D. Evans
Vincent J. Apruzzese
Cynthia R. Price
Steven C. Nelson

NSC # 8806805

REPORT 105C

BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association:

- (1) Supports the efforts that the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have undertaken to establish a firm and lasting peace in Central America, as a major step "to advance the rule of law in the world," a purpose that the Association identifies as its own Goal VIII;
- (2) Urges the continued commitment of the five Central American presidents to the process of regional dialogue and democratization, including respect for human rights and national sovereignty, as elaborated in the "Procedure for the Establishment of a Strong and Lasting Peace in Central America," also known as the "Arias Plan," signed in Guatemala City on August 7, 1987;
- (3) Welcomes the commitment of the United States government to facilitate the process of regional dialogue; and
- (4) Strongly urges all interested parties to observe their commitments pursuant to the United Nations Charter and principles of international law to seek the pacific settlement of disputes and to refrain from the use of force in international affairs in the course of the implementation of the Arias Plan.
- (5) Endorses the Arias Plan and calls on all interested parties to accept it and work towards its implementation.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8806805
RECEIVED: 21 SEP 88 08

TO: POWELL

FROM: BECKMAN, WALTER H JR

DOC DATE: 20 SEP 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES

CENTRAL AMERICA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION ADOPTED UPON RECOM OF SECTION OF INTL LAW & PRACTICE
RE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN CENTRAL AMER

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE DATE: 24 SEP 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
ROSTOW

FOR CONCURRENCE
TILLMAN

FOR INFO
KELLY, B
PASTORINO

No action required

COMMENTS: *No action required. Please close.
3854 Kay*

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8806805

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ROSTOW
001

Z 88092109 ANY ACTION NECESSARY
X 88092315 NFAR PER ROSTOW

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8806805
RECEIVED: 21 SEP 88 08

TO: POWELL

FROM: BECKMAN, WALTER H JR

DOC DATE: 20 SEP 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES

CENTRAL AMERICA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION ADOPTED UPON RECOM OF SECTION OF INTL LAW & PRACTICE
RE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN CENTRAL AMER

ACTION: NFAR PER ROSTOW

DUE DATE: 24 SEP 88

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ROSTOW

FOR CONCURRENCE
TILLMAN

FOR INFO
KELLY, B
PASTORINO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSCTF DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0001-89

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 28, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DICK ARMEY

SUBJECT: REQUESTS LETTER ENDORSING THE HUMANITARIAN
WORK GLOBAL OUTREACH IS DOING IN CENTRAL
AMERICA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ALAN KRANOWITZ	ORG	88/10/28	OK	A 8811101 TR
XXXXXXXXNS <i>SLER</i>	R	8811103	TR	C 8811130 TR
<i>Das</i>	R	8811202	TR	TR
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240
MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

- *ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
- *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *CORRESPONDENCE: *
- *C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
- *D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * OF SIGNER *
- *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED * CODE = A *
- *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
- *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * OUTGOING *
- *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * *
- *X-INTERIM REPLY * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OE0B) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8835304

Date January 21, 1989

FOR: Brent Scowcroft
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:


To: President Reagan
From: Honorable Dick Arme
Date: October 13, 1988
Subject: Requests Letter Endorsing the Humanitarian
Work Global Outreach is Doing in Central America
WH Referral Dated: December 2, 1988
NSC ID# (if any): 603246

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 X An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:


Director
Secretariat Staff



Washington, D.C. 20520

18

Dear Mr. Armev:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of the President to your letter of October 13 regarding the efforts of private groups to assist Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica. I regret the delay in our response.

As you note in your letter, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans have fled--and continue to flee--their country. The brutal and repressive policies of the Sandinista government, its blatant abuses of authority and human rights, and the seriously floundering Sandinista economic programs exacerbate this flow of refugees.

Many of these Nicaraguan refugees have settled in neighboring Honduras or Costa Rica. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers refugee camps and villages, providing desperately needed assistance in these countries. Nevertheless, the UNHCR's resources are limited. Many Nicaraguans choose to live outside of UNHCR facilities and without UNHCR support. Private charities and organizations have played a vital role in assisting these refugees. These organizations provide medicine, building supplies and farm tools, food, clothing, etc. which help the refugees get back on their feet.

Although we cannot endorse the activities of a specific voluntary organization, the Department of State recognizes and appreciates the valuable assistance which these organizations provide to thousands of Nicaraguan refugees.

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned.

The Honorable
Dick Armev,
House of Representatives.

November 1, 1988

Dear Dick:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your recent letter concerning Global Outreach.

Your request regarding this organization's private relief efforts on behalf of Nicaraguan refugees is being reviewed appropriately. You will be receiving an additional response in the near future.

Thank you again for taking the time to write.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

Alan M. Kranowitz
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dick Arme
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

AMK:KRJ:

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/31

TO: ALAN

FROM: KATHY RATTÉ JAFFKE
Office of Legislative Affairs

Guidance please.

Routine interim
from me; NSC
for final

AMK



United States Department of State

C-5-5

Washington, D.C. 20520

JAN 18 1989

Dear Mr. Armev:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of the President to your letter of October 13 regarding the efforts of private groups to assist Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica. I regret the delay in our response.

As you note in your letter, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans have fled--and continue to flee--their country. The brutal and repressive policies of the Sandinista government, its blatant abuses of authority and human rights, and the seriously floundering Sandinista economic programs exacerbate this flow of refugees.

Many of these Nicaraguan refugees have settled in neighboring Honduras or Costa Rica. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers refugee camps and villages, providing desperately needed assistance in these countries. Nevertheless, the UNHCR's resources are limited. Many Nicaraguans choose to live outside of UNHCR facilities and without UNHCR support. Private charities and organizations have played a vital role in assisting these refugees. These organizations provide medicine, building supplies and farm tools, food, clothing, etc. which help the refugees get back on their feet.

Although we cannot endorse the activities of a specific voluntary organization, the Department of State recognizes and appreciates the valuable assistance which these organizations provide to thousands of Nicaraguan refugees.

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned.

The Honorable
Dick Armev,
House of Representatives.

8835304

'88 DEC-02 9:24 PM

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

DECEMBER 2, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 603246

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 13, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE DICK ARMEY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON DC 20515

SUBJECT: REQUESTS LETTER ENDORSING THE HUMANITARIAN
WORK GLOBAL OUTREACH IS DOING IN CENTRAL
AMERICA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE

(OR DRAFT) TO:

AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

8
CONGRESSMAN DICK ARMEY
20TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
EDUCATION AND LABOR



603246
CHAIRMAN
TRADE EXPANSION CAUCUS

TASK FORCE ON ENERGY

A.K.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

October 13, 1988

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

10/31
Copy to Ark
for guidance

Dear President Reagan,

As you know, Sandinista repression in Nicaragua has made life miserable for tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. Thousands are fleeing Nicaragua for Honduras and Costa Rica, and large civilian populations are being kept without adequate food and medical supplies in the Nicaraguan country-side.

Since Congress has agreed to send only \$27 million in humanitarian assistance -- and since accounts show the Sandinista's are misdirecting resources away from many groups -- private groups must fill in if humanitarian needs are to be met.

Thanks to groups like Global Outreach, private assistance is being focused and sent to help these desperate Nicaraguan refugees. Global Outreach reports they are gathering record quantities of supplies but are still far short of meeting current and anticipated needs.

That's why I'm writing to ask for a letter from you endorsing the humanitarian work Global Outreach is doing in Central America. I have enclosed a copy of a letter from Adolfo Calero which documents some of the assistance that Global Outreach has provided in the past. I also feel confident that officials at the Department of State, particularly those at the Agency for International Development, can document the help Global Outreach has provided in the past and the demand that must be met in the near future.

Thanking you in advance for your kind attention to this matter, I am

Respectfully yours,

DICK ARMEY
Member of Congress

Resistencia



Nicaragüense

February 11, 1988

Dear Friends:

I am most thankful for the kind support many Americans have so generously given to organizations such as Global Outreach. Tom Wright and his ministry have proven to be godsent. They have contributed much needed medical equipment and supplies.

Our struggle for democracy in Nicaragua has been a long and even if it were to end today, there would still exist tremendous humanitarian needs for multitudes of Nicaraguans who are currently living in refugee camps in Honduras and Costa Rica. Without ministries such as Global Outreach, most of these people would go without many necessities that are so basic to life. Thank you for your continued support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Adolfo Calero".

Adolfo Calero

AC/ca

H. Hon.

VICTOR H. KRULAK

3665 Carleton St.

San Diego Calif 92106

22 April 1988

604137

5300

C0001-09

PU

FG031

PR005-02

*President's handwriting
No Reply*

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It has been my feeling that the news media have been reluctant to place the responsibility for our Central American problems where they belong. The enclosed column tries to focus the weak and uncertain behavior of the Congress.

I pray for a triumphant outcome from your coming trip to Moscow.

Sincerely,

Brutz

VHK:jm
Enclosure

REPRODUCED FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL ARCHIVES

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 001-09

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 09, 1989

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM ENCLOSING A REPORT FINDING
PRESIDENT REAGAN THE MOST ADMIRER HEAD OF
STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
KENNETH DUBERSTEIN		ORG	89/01/10		
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



January 9, 1989

PRESIDENT REAGAN LEAVES OFFICE AS THE HEAD OF STATE MOST ADMIRERD IN THE CARIBBEAN

In all but one of the fourteen Caribbean communities that were polled in 1988,¹ President Reagan was named most often as the head of state who was admired the most. The exception was Bermuda, a British colony, where the public named British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher more often by a very slight margin (31% to 28%).

Coming just after a question about their general opinions of eight foreign countries,² the public in each survey was asked

"And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Dominican Republic Leads in Respect for President Reagan

A majority (55%) of the public in the Dominican Republic, the most populous and only Hispanic country included in the study, named President Reagan as the head of state they most admired. The second highest level of recognition for President Reagan was achieved in Grenada (49%), the site of a 1983 U.S. military intervention under President Reagan's direction.

In the other islands except Bermuda, the plurality, ranging from a low of 27 percent in the French-speaking islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique to a high of 45 percent in Trinidad, St. Vincent and St. Kitts/Nevis, named President Reagan as the head of state they admired most (Table 1).

¹ Polls of approximately 500 to 1000 persons were conducted from March through June, 1988 in 14 Caribbean islands by SBRA, International Survey and Market Measurement of London. An earlier USIA report (M-11/1/88), "U.S., Canada Widely Admired in Caribbean; Soviet Union and Cuba Regarded Poorly," provides other findings from these surveys.


² In the survey, respondents were first asked whether they had favorable or unfavorable opinions of France, the United Kingdom/Great Britain, United States, Soviet Union, Canada, Venezuela, Cuba and India. The U.S. ranked with Canada as the country Caribbeans respected most, see USIA Report M-1/11/88.

Thatcher Generally Follows Reagan in Respect; Castro Is Ignored Except in the Dominican Republic

Besides leading in Bermuda, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was named second most frequently after President Reagan in most of the other islands, including some which were not formerly British colonies or Commonwealth members. The major exceptions in Thatcher's popularity were Antigua, where she was surpassed by Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, St. Kitts/Nevis, where Prime Minister Bird of the nearby Antigua did a little better, and the Dominican Republic, where Fidel Castro came in second.

Castro's relative success (17%) in the Dominican Republic was not matched elsewhere. Thus Castro's thirty years of leadership in the Caribbean's largest country has not created much relative popularity for the Cuban dictator among his closest neighbors.

Figure 1. Reagan Stands Out Over Thatcher and Castro As Most Admired in the Caribbean



Question: "And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Figure 1
NAMING THE MOST ADMIRED HEAD OF STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Question: "And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Head of State	Antigua (507)	Bahamas (617)	Bar- bados (600)	Bermuda (475)	Cayman Island (447)	Curacao (507)	Dominican Republic (616)	Grenada (504)	Guade- loupe (506)	Martin- ique (518)	St.Kitts /Nevis (515)	St. Lucia (483)	St. Vincent (504)	Trinidad (1019)
Reagan (U.S.)	42%	38%	36%	28%	41%	38%	55%	49%	27%	27%	45%	41%	45%	43%
Thatcher (U.K.)	7	20	8	31	24	15	2	11	9	11	7	10	12	17
Castro (Cuba)	1	3	2	1	1	3	17	9	3	4	2	5	2	2
Charles (Dominica)	2	2	4	‡	‡	0	0	5	‡	1	3	5	9	1
Gorbachev (USSR)	2	2	‡	3	‡	1	‡	‡	‡	2	‡	‡	‡	1
Ghadafi (Libya)	‡	2	1	‡	‡	‡	‡	4	1	1	1	2	1	1
R. Ghandi (India)	‡	4	1	1	‡	1	1	1	3	1	0	‡	1	2
Others	39 ^a	12 ^b	4	20 ^c	6	20 ^d	4	4 ^b	1	4	18 ^e	11 ^b	13 ^b	12
None/don't know	2	17	44	16	28	22	22	18	56	49	25	25	17	21
TOTAL*	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%

‡ Indicates less than one half of one percent.

* May not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

^aCanadian Prime Minister Mulroney was named by 31 percent.

^bMainly leaders of Caribbean countries, such as Edward Seaga of Jamaica and A.N.R. Robinson of Trinidad and Tobago.

^cA substantial number named other U.S. leaders, including past presidents, such as John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter.

^dVenezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi was named by 17 percent.

^ePrime Minister Bird of the neighboring island of Antigua was mentioned by 13 percent.

Map of the Caribbean Islands



Report prepared by USIA Office of Research:
Gene E. Bigler, Analyst (R/AR)

M-1/9/89

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research
(485-2965)

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

605842

Office of the Director



January 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Kenneth M. Duberstein
Chief of Staff
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Opinion of the Most Admired
Head of State in the Caribbean

I thought you would find of interest the attached report,
"President Reagan Leaves Office as the Head of State Most Admired
in the Caribbean."

This report, based on polls in 14 Caribbean communities in 1988,
shows that:

- o President Reagan was named the most admired head of state far more often than anyone else.
- o In Bermuda, Margaret Thatcher was named "most admired" slightly more often than the President.
- o The United States ranked with Canada as the country Caribbeans most respect.

Wright/Shultz Peace Agreement

4/17/87

610233

PY

0001-09

1. We want the Guatamala City agreement to succeed in bringing peace and freedom and democracy to Central America.

PC

LD

2. We believe that efforts toward that objective should be concentrated in Central America and continue to be guided primarily by Central Americans.

3. We strongly encourage Cardinal Obando y Bravo to undertake his mission of mediation and peace.

4. The United States has vital interests in this outcome, as was stated in the Reagan-Wright Plan.

5. As the Cardinal's efforts lead to serious negotiations, the United States will be ready to meet directly in a regional setting with representatives of the countries of the region.

6. Neither of us want to create unnecessary problems. We want to work together to bring about solutions.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1988

616609
4400
COPIES
HL1040
HL1013-20


Dear Mr. Dan:

Thank you for your recent letter and enclosures. We appreciate your support of our efforts to ensure democracy is not threatened in Central America.

In support of ASEAN efforts in Southeast Asia, we have worked hard to effect the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and allow the Cambodian people self-determination. We have informed Hanoi that diplomatic recognition, the lifting of the trade embargo or consideration of official aid is all contingent upon a peaceful political settlement in Cambodia.

In the interim, we will continue our negotiations with Hanoi on the humanitarian issues of POW/MIA, reeducation camp internees and Amerasian children. We have made some recent progress, but the pace is too slow for us all. It is clearly in their own national interest to resolve these issues and withdraw from Cambodia and we will continue our efforts to ensure this message is made clear to them.

Sincerely,


John D. Negroponte
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Phan Quang Dan
P. O. Box 16940
Tampa, Florida 33687

NSC 8802006

National Security Council
The White House

DP

System # _____
Package # 2006
DOCLOG DP AIO _____

15 PK: 20

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>Bob</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>DM</u>	<u>A</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	<u>JAN</u>	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>DP 3/7</u>	<u>A</u>

3/1

Lilly
 pls keep
 address & tel #
 then lets send to
 Dick Childers to do
 draft reply for my
 signature. marks.
 JAN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 14, 1988

ACTIONDeputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS *RC*
SUBJECT: Draft Reply to Phan Quang Dan

Per your note at Tab II, I have prepared a draft reply to Dan at Tab I. It is couched in such a way as to avoid any endorsement of the Vietnamese resistance with whom he is active, while reassuring him on any concerns he may have over our policy.

JK
J. Kelly concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the prepared reply at Tab I.

Approve OK Disapprove _____
3/17/88

Attachments

Tab I Negroponite/Phan Quang Dan Letter
Tab II Phan Quang Dan/Negroponite Letter dated 2/12/88

cc: J. Kelly

2006

FEB 16 1988

February 12, 1988

The Honorable John D. Negroponte
Deputy National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Excellency,

I was delighted to receive your letter of January 13.

I am most grateful to know how much you cared for Vietnam, my fatherland, in which America had invested so much, not just in finance and weapons, but more importantly, in human sacrifices, and where the Vietnamese and other America's allies have bravely fought and suffered so many casualties.

I also know how much effort you have made to turn the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance (on whom the media has coined the negative misnomer Contras) into an efficient fighting force.

I have never lost faith in the future of my country, and am strongly convinced that Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will regain their freedom, provided that America does not commit the mistake of extending food and economic assistance to the Vietnamese communists and thereby consolidating Vietnam's communist regime and promoting Soviet expansionism.

It is also obvious to me that all freedom movements are solidary, and the success of freedom fighters in one country is bound to have a happy impact on freedom movements everywhere else.

I am enclosing for your personal information: 1.- a paper that I presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 9, 1982 along with the list of attendees, 2.- an article I wrote for The Christian Science Monitor Wednesday June 28, 1978. I have been writing for newspapers and magazines in the U.S., Australia and Southeast Asia, especially The Christian Science Monitor, The Asian Affairs, The Washington Times, The Pacific Defence Reporter and The Bangkok Post. I used to send letters to the Editor of The New York Times and The Washington Post and they published them. But since the fall of Saigon, their attitude has changed. I have also issued a Newsletter of my own, The Free Vietnam Times, and a Vietnamese broadcast program Tiếng Nói Trường Sơn for The Voice of Khmer of Prince Sihanouk.

I am planning to carry out special projects for 1988, and hope I will have the privilege of discussing them with you and receiving your advice at my next visit to Washington, D.C.

With kindest regards and warmest thanks,

Yours sincerely,

Phan Quang Dan, P.O. Box 16940, Tampa, FL 33687. Tel: (813) 971-7513

Phan Quang Dan



The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street Northwest / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202 / 833-8595

Cable Address: CENSTRAT

LUNCHEON BRIEFING

SPEAKER: DR. PHAN QUANG DAN

SUBJECT: VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

PLACE: African Room, 3rd Floor, International Club Building,
1800 K Street, N.W.

TIME: March 9, 1982 - Reception, 12:15 pm; lunch, 12:45 pm

HOST: Ray Cline, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Senior Associate

ATTENDEES: Dora Alves - CSIS, Research Assistant, World Power Studies

Everett Bierman - Minority Staff Director, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker

Ann Campagna - CSIS, Assistant to Dr. Cline

Sevinc Carlson - CSIS, Director, Southeast Asian Studies

Col. Robert Carr - Department of Defense, International Security
Affairs

The Honorable William Colby - Counsel, Reid & Priest

Robert Downen - CSIS, Director, Pacific Basin Project

Professor Allan Goodman, Georgetown University, Associate Dean
and Director, Master of Science in Foreign Service Program,
and Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service

Mahlon Henderson - Department of Defense, International Security
Affairs

Ambassador Martin Herz, Georgetown University, Director of Studies,
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and Research Professor
of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service

LUNCHEON BRIEFING
March 9, 1982

Philip Merrill - Department of Defense, Counselor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Allan Ryskind - Human Events newspaper, Co-owner and
Capitol Hill Editor

William Stearman - National Security Council, Staff Member

Bernard Yoh - Accuracy in Media, Director of Communications

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFEATING SOVIET IMPERIALISM
IN THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND INDOCHINA

By Phan Quang Dan

President Reagan's statesmanship gives hope to freedom loving people in every nation. It is an inspiring leadership based on the American traditional virtues of honesty, hard work and freedom; determination to meet the Soviet threat of world domination; willingness to implement political and economic changes required to insure peace and stability, though not necessarily popular; and also wisdom not to reveal all American politico-military plans, thus safeguarding the American ability to select options and take initiatives.

The World Already at War.

In face of Soviet Russia's growing military strength, America has no choice but to build greater military strength while remaining economically prosperous. This, combined with strong alliance with Western Europe, Japan, and also China, will restrain Soviet adventurism and prevent world nuclear war. But this military might is designed mainly for a deterrent role, which is expressed by the Chinese character Wu (military) 武 composed of two characters 止 and 戈 meaning that real military strength is built in order not to be used.

But meanwhile, Soviet Russia has been pursuing a dual policy of duplicity and aggression. As the Pavlovian bell of peace and detente continues to ring at the Kremlin to deceive naive politicians, Soviet Russia is insidiously waging a special international war, mainly in the third world. The weapons are propaganda, subversion, terrorism and guerrilla war increasingly carried out with sophisticated military hardware. It is sometimes direct invasion, but mostly war by proxy through puppet regimes. The goal is to conquer the third world with its vast manpower and natural resources, and control the world's vital waterways at their choke points: the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca and the Panama Canal.

Counter guerrilla versus Guerrilla.

Guerrilla has proved a deadly strategy in the past, and is much more so with modern weapons. It is offensive, elusive, and highly efficient at little cost.

Communist guerrilla is absolutely ruthless and deceitful. While out of power, or in acute distress, it portrays itself as a democratic and moderate reform movement, fighting for freedom and social equity, independent from its main supporter Soviet Russia, and friendly to the West whose assistance would help them loosen their ties to Moscow. But once in power, communists guerrillas reveal themselves as the worst tyrants and Soviet Russia's most servile lackeys.

Communist guerrilla ignores international laws and boundaries, and has complete disregard for human lives. It is entirely irresponsible. It does not have to maintain law and order; protect highways, bridges and public buildings, fortresses, cities or villages; dispense education or medical care; or provide people with employment and food.

It concentrates instead on carrying out indiscriminate terrorism, assassinating influential nationalist leaders, shelling factories, airbases, harbors, cities and villages, destroying military outposts, cutting highways, blowing bridges, stirring social unrest, generating insecurity, spreading fear, wrecking the economy and making the country ungovernable. It is supplied by Soviet Russia, either directly or through satellite countries, and can go on indefinitely until the legal government is overthrown.

Neither direct American intervention, nor native counter guerrilla represent adequate antidotes to communist guerrilla. Even proper political and social reforms, democratic elections and land reform, which are excellent per se and are necessary to win the minds and hearts of the people, more often than not are unable to cope with communist guerrilla.

Counter guerrilla, and especially direct American intervention are financially costly, militarily inadequate and politically risky. In the best of circumstances, it is bound to drag on for a long time, and irresponsible politicians will not fail taking advantage of the government's difficulties, going as far as sympathizing with the enemy, to wage and win stormy elections.

The answer to communist guerrilla is anticommunist guerrilla carried to its very source. Anticommunist guerrilla will not be ruthless and inhumane as communist guerrilla. But it will be able to mobilize the patriotic feelings of the masses against communist totalitarianism and Soviet domination, and therefore can be more efficient.

Moscow and Hanoi, in spite of their experience in guerrilla warfare, and their overwhelming superiority in manpower and fire power, have not succeeded to suppress Afghan and Cambodian guerrilla resistance which could be far more vigorous if better supplied, better coordinated, and in the case of Cambodia less unpopular than Pol Pot.

Soviet Russia and its satellites are in fact extremely vulnerable to anticommunist guerrilla, now that they are militarily overextended, politically abhorred, diplomatically isolated, and economically bankrupt with a severe food shortage they are in no position to remedy for them all.

They are about at the end of their rope. No economic aid to them should be one of the basic principles to be adhered to. Neither should any new "Mariel boat lift" be organized. This would help the communists reduce their unemployment, alleviate their economic difficulties, and get rid at no cost of their anticommunist citizens along with some of their worst criminals.

Instead, severe political, diplomatic and economic sanctions should be applied against them to increase their internal tension and encourage anticommunist revolt.

Another basic principle is that anticommunist guerrilla should be led by native leaders whose patriotism and dedication have been well known and time tested, and guerrillas should all be natives. American assistance should be limited to supply of finance, arms and ammunition, food and drugs, along with some training in the handling of weapons. Only guerrilla leaders should be trained, and they in turn will train their fellow countrymen. And the training would better take place outside the USA and the embattled countries, in isolated and safe islands or third nations which are strongly anticommunist and friendly to the USA. The assistance needed by anticommunist guerrillas will represent but a tiny fraction of the huge American military budget, and formulas could be worked out to avoid political controversies and embarrassment.

The Case of Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

This is at the present time the most critical area. It is at the front yard of the USA, and made up of a complex aggregation of tiny nations economically fragile and politically unstable. And the Panama Canal, which runs through Central America, is for all practical purposes the USA's jugular.

The entire area is porous, with no well controlled frontiers from one country to another. Soviet Russia has already three firmly established bases, Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua where weapons can be stockpiled, anti-American propaganda organized, Marxist indoctrination imposed on the people, agitprops and guerrillas trained and armed to infiltrate neighboring countries and destabilize the whole area.

Communist guerrillas are waging open war in El Salvador, and becoming increasingly aggressive in Guatemala and other countries in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

The situation is further complicated by the unrealistic policy of countries like Mexico and France which are giving moral encouragement, economic and even military aid to Soviet's puppet regimes under the illusion of loosening the latters' ties to Soviet Russia.

The war in El Salvador is escalating and getting over-reported and sometimes misreported by the international press in favor of the communists for the main reason that politicians and correspondents have easy and safe access to government-controlled areas, but rarely dare venture into enemy-controlled areas where, if admitted, they can only see what the communists want them to see.

The presence of American military advisers, though without combat duties, is increasingly criticized. One single American casualty might trigger disproportionate waves of protest in the American press and Congress.

Irrelevant comparison is being drawn between El Salvador and Vietnam. The differences between the two situations are however immense and crystal clear. El Salvador is on the doorstep of the USA to which the nearby Panama Canal is of vital importance. The communists in El Salvador, instead of enjoying the vast sanctuaries which were offered to Hanoi by China and Soviet Russia, are surrounded by small nations, most of them strongly anticommunist.

However, the El Salvador war is bound to escalate and drag on for many years, even after democratic elections are fairly organized, and land reform properly implemented. It also threatens to spread to the rest of Central America.

While America has to continue supporting El Salvador's legal government and its political and social reforms, it is urgent to organize anticommunist guerrilla in Nicaragua, Grenada and Cuba. These should be covert operations with native leadership and native guerrilla fighters.

There are a great many anticommunist Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and neighboring countries with combat experience. It will be a matter of weeks to set up a Nicaraguan National Liberation Front and reinfiltrate them into Nicaragua gradually but steadily. They should avoid the Sandinista larger military units, and resort mainly to guerrilla tactics, waging hundreds of daily small battles, ambushes, acts of sabotage in widely scattered areas. No American soldiers should be involved. American assistance in finance and weapons should be channelled through third countries. The Marxist Sandinistas, who are in acute economic distress, could be overthrown in a year or less.

Carefully prepared guerrilla operations could bring about the collapse of the Bishop's government of Grenada in a matter of weeks, with American navy discreetly patrolling at a well calculated distance. And a democratic Grenadan government should be immediately proclaimed.

It will take more time and meticulously planned operations to defeat Castro. American massive invasion would generate highly adverse political repercussions. On the other hand, Castro's troops would take to the hills where it would be difficult to search and destroy them.

An open landing of anticommunist Cuban exiles would be another disastrous Bay of Pigs.

But anticommunist guerrilla carried out by Cuban nationalists will have serious chance of succeeding. Well trained and slightly armed Cuban anticommunist guerrillas should be infiltrated into mountainous areas, at first very slowly, by small groups, and in widely dispersed areas. After clandestine military bases are firmly established, the infiltration could be stepped up at a faster pace. Again, they should avoid encounters with Castro's larger military

units, and resort mainly to guerrilla tactics to wreck Cuba's already more than half-bankrupt economy and arouse the population against Castro's dictatorship and Soviet imperialism.

It took Castro less than two years after his clandestine return from exile in Mexico to defeat Batista in January 1959. He has been Cuba's absolute despot for over 20 years, and Cubans have been experiencing the most repressive regime, severe economic hardships and Russian ruthless domination. It might take anticommunist guerrillas no more than two years to overthrow Castro.

Replacing all pro-Soviet Marxist regimes in Central America and the Caribbean Basin with democratic and pro-American regimes is a must for the security of the USA and the Western Hemisphere.

The Case of Indochina.

Paradoxical as it might sound, America has never been in a stronger political position in East and Southeast Asia than at the present time. Its political position in that crucially important area is also much more favorable than in any other part of the world.

Japan to the North, and Australia and New Zealand to the South are among America's staunchest allies. China is dead-set against Soviet Russia and its Hanoi puppet regime. It contains Soviet Russia much more efficiently than any other power in today's world. The ASEAN nations, without any American prodding, are deeply committed to oppose Hanoi's aggression and Soviet expansionism. The overwhelming majority of the Indochinese peoples themselves, including the Vietnamese both North and South, are looking to America for salvation.

All nations in the Western Pacific, East and Southeast Asia, with the only exception of Hanoi, want a strong American presence in that part of the world.

Hanoi, on the other hand, in spite of its huge army, and may be because of its huge army, has never been in a more vulnerable condition.

Politically it is extremely unpopular in both North and South Vietnam. It is labeled by the Vietnamese people as Soviet Russia's puppet, and traitor to its fatherland and also to all of Asia. Belonging to the Soviet empire, and member of the faraway and impotent COMECON, it is the pariah of today's Asia.

The North Vietnamese had the opportunity of discovering that, contrary to Hanoi's propaganda, South Vietnam was far more prosperous, freer and happier. From North to South, the Vietnamese people have been disillusioned with both Hanoi and Soviet Russia. The general saying was that North Vietnam should have been liberated by South Vietnam. Seven years after Hanoi rolled Soviet tanks into Saigon, there is neither independence, nor freedom, nor peace.

Communist cadres are heartless, corrupt and incompetent. They rely almost exclusively on brutal force and Russian guns. Compared to French colonialists of yesteryears who, besides undeniable social injustices, did also much good for the Vietnamese people and were highly civilized, the Russians are the worst colonialists, greedy, stupid and arrogant; and the Vietnamese people have but scorn and hatred for them.

The Vietnamese people remember how good-hearted and well-behaved the American soldiers were. The writer of these lines was in charge of refugees for five years. There were million of war refugees. They never moved to the communist side. They always went to areas protected by the ARVN, and especially American troops. And since the fall of Saigon, million of boat people and other Indochinese refugees have been fleeing communist Indochina in hope of being admitted to the USA. This stands in sharp contrast to today's Afghanistan where million of Afghans are fleeing away from the Russian invaders.

This writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity to pay tribute to the US Vietnam veterans who fought thousands of battles bravely and well, and lost not a single one, and were also kind and compassionate. Besides fighting communism to defend Vietnam's freedom, they also served the Vietnamese people in many constructive ways. They toiled under the tropical sun to open new highways, build bridges, schools and clinics, dispense medical care to women and children, and distribute fertilizers and miracle rice seeds to peasants.

It is difficult not to fully endorse President Reagan's statement that "they came home without a victory, not because they had been defeated, but because they had been denied permission to win". On the other hand, it is sad to observe how unfairly treated they were on their return home, while the French soldiers who were truly defeated, were decently treated by their countrymen, and General De Castries who surrendered to the communists at Dienbienphu, was greeted as hero. It is time to render justice and pay tribute to the US Vietnam veterans who responded to the call of duty and served with honor their country and the cause of freedom. They truly won the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people. Thanks to them, the Vietnamese people's friendship for America and love of freedom are now stronger than ever before, and pave the way to the coming struggle against communist totalitarianism and Soviet colonialism. This is eloquently proved by the continual flow of Vietnamese refugees to American shores, unabated by the tragic loss of over half million boat people who had drowned in the Pacific ocean.

Diplomatically, Hanoi is completely isolated, and becomes an undesirable foreign body in the Asian environment. It no longer enjoys the support of China which is now its worst enemy in the shadow of which it is condemned to live without any possible escape.

The five ASEAN nations are strongly united against Hanoi which was time and again condemned by United Nations and urged to withdraw from Cambodia. They will keep increasing pressure on Hanoi, and are now willing to provide military assistance to Cambodia, and are encouraging the formation of a United Cambodian Front which will be free of Pol Pot's ignominy and able to rally the Khmer people against Hanoi's invaders.

Militarily Hanoi is overextended from the Chinese frontier to the Thai-Cambodian border, from the Pacific coast to the Mekong river in Laos. It is bogging down in the war in Cambodia while facing widespread passive resistance and social unrest with sporadic armed resistance in Laos and Vietnam.

Economically it is bankrupt with an acute food shortage that Soviet Russia and COMECON are unable to solve. It becomes an increasingly heavy economic burden to Soviet Russia which is neither generous nor prosperous, and is in the process of forcing Hanoi to export to Siberia 500,000 able-bodied adults to work in labor camps at very low wages to pay part of Hanoi's debts to its master.

But the ASEAN's determination to take economic sanctions against Hanoi, and their disapproval of French \$35 million economic aid to Hanoi should be fully endorsed.

In the first place, it is sheer delusion to think that such aid would loosen Hanoi's ties to Soviet Russia. Hanoi's Politburo was trained in Moscow in the early twenties, operated as Soviet agents for several decades, fought the Indochina wars with allout Soviet backing, signed an alliance treaty with Moscow, brought Vietnam into the COMECON, annexed Laos and invaded Cambodia to expand the Soviet empire, voted in support of Soviet Russia at United Nations on every international issue including Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and even turned against China which was the first nation to recognize them and had given them so much military, political and economic assistance.

On the other hand, aggression should be punished, not rewarded. Hanoi neither deserves nor needs economic aid. They have been "squandering their scarce resources in aggressive adventurism" as so well put by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. They could solve their economic difficulties by withdrawing their troops from Laos and Cambodia, reducing their huge army and police to 10 % of their present size, closing their "reeducation camps" and liberating the political prisoners still therein incarcerated, and restoring the basic human rights to the Vietnamese people, thus encouraging them to work and produce more. Anyway, the USA have no obligation whatsoever to help Soviet Russia and their puppet regimes solve their economic difficulties.

The operant conditioning should be applied against the Pavlovian conditioning, and severe political, diplomatic and economic sanctions should be used to punish and discourage aggression.

World public opinion is focussing on Cambodia while ignoring the fate of Laos and Vietnam. But Laos is entitled as much as

Cambodia to recover its national sovereignty and independence which has been flagrantly violated by Hanoi. On the other hand, the real and most serious threat to East and Southeast Asia is communist Vietnam serving as military base to Soviet Russia for encircling China to the South, and gradually expanding Soviet empire to the rest of Southeast Asia. The presence of Russian navy in Danang and Camranh also enables it to dominate the Western Pacific and more easily control the Indian Ocean.

But, as stated above, communist Vietnam is at the present time the most vulnerable part of Soviet empire. Pol Pot's forces, tiny and unpopular as they are, succeed to pin down 200,000 Hanoi's invasion troops. Sihanouk-Son Sann, if properly supported, will have much greater potential for rallying the Cambodian people against Hanoi's invaders. Sihanouk would lend his international prestige while Son Sann would probably be the real organizer of Cambodian non-communist resistance to Hanoi. American food and other humanitarian aid should be diverted from Phnom Penh's Heng Samrin puppet, and channelled to Son Sann forces which will directly distribute it to the Khmer people in the villages, without the risk of its falling into the hands of Hanoi's troops. This will also encourage the Khmer people to go back to the land and grow crops, and broaden at the same time the popular basis of non-communist Cambodia, thereby weakening Hanoi and its puppet Heng Samrin. Non-communist Cambodians should also receive, through ASEAN, military assistance to wage a more vigorous guerrilla war against Hanoi.

However, even without the ignominy of Pol Pot, with all Cambodians united against Hanoi, the severely decimated and undernourished Cambodian people would not be able to defeat their enemy.

Two other guerrilla fronts have to be organized in Laos and Vietnam. General Vang Pao is highly reliable, has great experience in guerrilla warfare, commands wide respect in Laos and has still many followers. With some modest assistance, he can restart guerrilla war in Laos against Hanoi almost at any time. Vang Pao's guerrilla war was one of the most successful and least costly operations of the Indochina war. Should this project receive support anew, three improvements will have to be implemented. The Laotian guerrillas should not be concentrated in one single area as they were in the Plain of Jars; they should be instead widely distributed from Northern to Lower Laos. Instead of being air-borne, they should be foot guerrillas. Finally, it should not be a purely military operation. The active participation of the Laotian people should be mobilized. This Laos guerrilla front would force Hanoi to divert part of its troops from Cambodia to Laos and spread thinner.

But the guerrilla front with the greatest potential for decisive victory over Hanoi will be the Vietnamese anticommunist guerrilla. Vietnamese anticommunist guerrillas can be recruited among three groups: the refugees still in Southeast Asian camps who do not qualify and are not accepted for permanent asylum in any third country;

Hanoi's occupation troops in Laos and Cambodia which could be appealed to defect to Free Vietnam's side, there will undoubtedly be massive desertion of South Vietnamese soldiers which might in turn generate also the defection of part of North Vietnamese soldiers; and most important of all, the Vietnamese people in Vietnam itself, especially the peasant masses who are deeply traditionalist and religious, and strongly attached to their land which the communists are threatening to collectivize.

The terrain in Laos and Vietnam lends itself admirably to guerrilla warfare. Vietnamese anticommunist guerrillas will concentrate on cutting Hanoi's supply lines, destroying highways, blowing bridges, shelling airports and naval bases, exploding ammunition depots, burning food stockpiles, delivering the final blow to Hanoi's agonizing economy, and arousing the people against totalitarian communism and Soviet colonialism.

Close cooperation between Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese nationalists in a well coordinated guerrilla war will bring about Hanoi's collapse within the span of a few years, thus putting an end to Soviet colonialism in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

All the above might sound like day dreaming because the myth of Hanoi's invincibility has been carefully and persistently nurtured by the international press. But it is no more than a myth.

This writer has significantly contributed to make many dreams come true in Vietnam in the past four decades. But after several regimes were successfully established, he also predicted their failure when they were diverted to serve the selfish interests of but a few.

To this long time observer of Indochina, Hanoi's self-destruction began the very day it rolled Soviet tanks into Saigon. Since then it has been pursuing its downhill course towards collapse blindly, stupidly and irreversibly.

It is now time to charter Indochina's future, not merely to the defeat of Hanoi's communist totalitarianism and Soviet colonialism in Indochina, but, more importantly, to the establishment of truly independent and free Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and the consolidation of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The Case of Other Pro-Soviet Marxist Regimes.

Whether it is the Caribbean Basin, Central America, Indochina, Afghanistan, Poland, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique or Angola, it is everywhere the same struggle for freedom against the same enemy, namely Soviet imperialism. It is the same one and indivisible struggle.

By striking at Soviet Russia and its satellites in all those areas at the same time, through the same tactics of anticommunist

guerrilla carried out by America's smaller allies, the chance of victory will be greatly enhanced.

If the African nationalists such as UNITA are given some modest assistance, they will be able to go after the Cuban troops and Russian advisers who will soon be swallowed up by the African jungle.

Afghan and Polish freedom fighters, better supplied, will keep Soviet Russia busy at its very doorstep.

There has been too much talk of American hawks and doves, forgetting altogether the American Eagle. Yet, this is the true America with olive branches in one hand, and weapons in the other. It has to use both, alternately or simultaneously, depending on circumstances. Now is the time to use both. Negotiations on disarmament and especially nuclear arms reduction are rightly kept going on regardless of problems in other areas, because this is the most crucial issue of our time, and also because this will help win the support of world public opinion, and make it easier to apply severe sanctions against Soviet Russia in case it continues to display the same discrepancy between its peace propaganda and aggressive behavior.

At the same time, the world-wide communist guerrilla waged by Soviet Russia and its puppets should be countered by a world-wide anticommunist guerrilla with America's smaller allies playing the major role, the USA reserving itself for bigger confrontation.

At the present time, America's smaller allies are doing all the fighting and dying against Soviet imperialism, with practically little else than sticks and stones. They are undergoing tremendous sufferings, sacrifices and humiliation. Their conditions cannot be worse. They fully realize there is no easy way to regain freedom after it is lost to Soviet Russia, and that Soviet domination means slavery and often genocide. They have nothing to lose, and much to gain by fighting.

There will be no American involvement in manpower. American assistance will be limited to provision of finance, food, drugs and weapons, with training in the handling of weapons. Guerrilla leaders will be trained, and they in turn will train their fellow countrymen. Such American assistance will represent but a tiny fraction of the American overall military budget.

As so well put by Ambassador William E. Colby, the ex-CIA Director, "Good covert operations can solve a problem at an early stage. The US needs an ability to conduct large, unattributed, unadmitted operations". Now is time to carry out such operations.

Communist guerrilla waged by Soviet Russia, on an international scale, if allowed to develop and spread unchecked, will lead to the strangulation of the free world, and eventually to its unconditional surrender or to global nuclear war.

It is high time to counter communist international guerrilla by international anticommunist guerrilla which will severely bleed Soviet Russia and its satellites economically and militarily, score resounding victories for the free world, force Soviet Russia to curtail its military buildup and restrain its adventurism, thus enhancing the chance of world peace and stability.

March 5, 1982

Phanquang Dan

Vietnam three years later

By Phan Quang Dan

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

Three years ago, when Hanoi's troops rolled into Saigon in Russian tanks, there were Vietnamese who sighed in relief. They thought that it was the end of the war, that although political freedoms would be abolished altogether, rudimentary human rights would be spared, and that they could retain their tiny rice paddies, be free to work and feed their families, worship God and Buddha, and educate their children according to Vietnamese cultural traditions.

But before long they realized that communism means more than mere suppression of political freedoms. It is absolute control — politically, socially, culturally, and economically.

Step by step, in crescendo, Hanoi's Communist regime unfurled its true nature. All foreign correspondents, technicians, and priests were expelled, and embassies, consulates, and international agencies in Saigon closed.

Non-Communist parties and trade unions were banned. The National Liberation Front itself was scrapped. Nhan Dan, Hanoi's official organ, became the only newspaper in circulation. The Lao Dong Labor Party label was cast off and Hanoi proudly unveiled the long-hidden title of Vietnamese Communist Party.

On April 25, 1976, the Communists organized carnivals to celebrate their prefabricated National Assembly for reunified Vietnam which was renamed Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Saigon Faculty of Law was closed, as were the tribunals.

Confessions required

More than 300,000 former civil servants and army officers were sent to re-education camps. The re-education process was gradually expanded to cover all the South Vietnamese people, with everyone forced to make confessions and enroll in Marxist-Leninist indoctrination courses.

Communist youth, women, children, and the elderly had to enlist, attend endless meetings, and spy on each other. Communist authorization was required to change the place of one's living, even within the same district, or to visit relatives and friends in the next village.

Private schools were nationalized. Catholic, Buddhist, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai educators were thrown out, and the teaching of religions prohibited. Communist books along Soviet lines were imposed. The most influential Catholic priests, Buddhist monks, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao leaders were jailed. The An Quang Pagoda and the Tay Ninh Cao Dai Temple were occupied by the Bo Doi or Communist troops.

No religious leaders, priests or monks, could be ordained without the explicit approval of the Communist authorities — which was never granted. Protests by religious communities, going as far as the self-im-

molation of 12 Buddhists in Can Tho at the beginning of 1976, were to no avail.

Economically, all private enterprises were nationalized. On Sept. 22, 1975, everyone was forced to change old piasters for the new bills, within 24 hours, up to the limit of 200 new piasters; the rest of their money was confiscated by the Communist government.

Hundreds of thousands of city people were forced to join the "new economic zones" to carve a living out of the jungle, practically with bare hands. Farmers and fishermen had to turn over to Communist authorities their crops and catches, keeping hardly enough to feed their families. They reacted by lowering production to a minimum subsistence level.

The oppressive economic policy of Hanoi has been the main cause of Vietnam's unprecedented food shortage in the past two years, causing more damage than the typhoons and floods which occur practically every year, especially in central Vietnam. Moreover, passive resistance in southern Vietnam was counteracted by comrade Pham Van Dong, who announced on Dec. 16, 1976, a mass migration plan to move the Mekong Delta peasants to labor camps in northern Vietnam and send Communist cadres from the north to occupy their lands.

As of last March 23, Communist troops also occupied more than 30,000 private shops in Saigon and other cities. Hanoi's Communist leaders now have concentrated in their hands all political, social, cul-

tural and economic powers. They control Vietnam's economic resources, the land, factories, shops, and the distribution and transportation networks.

Hanoi's basic policy is condensed in a nutshell: control the brain through the stomach (Lây bao tu giũ dô ộc). Comrades Le Duan and Pham Van Dong

are convinced that they will succeed in starving people into submission in southern Vietnam as they have done in northern Vietnam.

Has this policy of enslaving the people created a classless society with equality in poverty? The answer is "no."

Shortly after the conquest of Saigon a new privileged class sprang up: the Communist cadres, the secret agents, and North Vietnamese Army officers. The news rapidly spread to North Vietnam that contrary to Hanoi's propaganda, South Vietnam was prosperous and wealthy, economically and technologically far ahead of North Vietnam.



Sven Simon

Schoolchildren in Ho Chi Minh City marshaled for a military parade

This generated a rush to Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). The rank and file North Vietnamese soldiers tried to buy wrist watches, radio sets, bicycles, and cameras. The Communist cadres, secret agents, and officers confiscated refrigerators, cars, and villas in systematic looting. The technical and industrial equipment of South Vietnam was shipped North, where there were no technicians to operate them.

Mobilization decreed

Is Vietnam's enslaved people allowed to live in peace? The answer is again "no." Instead of concentrating on reconstruction, Hanoi has decreed general mobilization in both north and south Vietnam. People from 16 to 27 years of age, boys and girls alike, are being drafted into the armed forces.

At the 60th anniversary of the Russian revolution, comrade Le Duan solemnly proclaimed in Moscow that Communist Vietnam will carry out with determination its international responsibilities, and spread communism throughout Southeast Asia.

For the past three years, more than 30,000 of Hanoi's troops have been trying to exterminate the proud and independent-minded Meo hill tribes. And up to eight Vietnamese Communist divisions, supported by Russian tanks, guns, and MIGs have been invading Cambodia. There also are persistent reports of infiltration of Thailand, and it is increasingly clear that Hanoi, obedient to Soviet Russia, is endeavoring to encircle China to the south.

Do Hanoi's leaders offer the Vietnamese people some worthwhile ideal to serve, which could in some way justify their immense sufferings and sacrifices? The answer is again a flat "no."

'Empty slogans' everywhere

In Saigon there are countless posters proclaiming the value of independence and freedom, but these are empty slogans. Vietnam is neither independent nor its people free.

There is no Vietnamese Communist culture worth the name. Hanoi's so-called thinkers and writers have been repeating parrot-like Communist lies and propaganda and heaping servile flatteries on Lenin, Stalin, Brezhnev, Fidel Castro, and Ho Chi Minh. No Vietnamese with any sense of decency can read without blushing the poem "Mourning Stalin" by To Huu, North Vietnam's most vaunted poet, a member of Hanoi's Politburo: "O Stalin! O dearest Stalin! Alas! Thou passed away! How could Heavens and Earth Survive? I love my father, my mother, my husband. I love myself. But it is nothing compared to my love for Thee!"

Increasingly, the Vietnamese people are finding Hanoi's political regime as distasteful as To Huu's poems.

February 14, 1988

Dear President Reagan,

The three T.V. networks ABC, NBC, and CBS refused to broadcast your message to the American people on the necessity of continuing aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance to defend peace, freedom and security of Nicaragua, Central America and also the U.S. They censored you, and your message could not fully reach the American people!

Now Jim Wright and his leftist friends, after rejecting your request brought down from \$270 million to 36 million with a tiny 3.6 million for military assistance to Nicaraguan freedom fighters put under escrow to be released only after a consensus decision of the White House and the Congress, wanted to censor you again! Their request to avoid "confrontation" and to work together with you "at the outset in perfecting the (aid) program" is unacceptable.

You have been consulting with the Congress on a continual basis and made so many concessions. Yet they tried hard and succeeded to defeat your aid program with a very narrow margin by merely shouting oversimplified and misleading slogans such as "We are for peace, not for war" and "let's give peace a chance".

They should have a better solution and present it to the American people. The public debate should go on, not only in the Congress, but also in the Presidential electoral campaign. The American people have the right to ask for a serious and responsible debate on this extremely important topic of peace with freedom in Nicaragua and Central America on the very doorstep of the U.S. and so close to the Panama Canal, the jugular of the entire Western Hemisphere.

The Senate vote, though not abiding, also reversed the trend in favor of aid to freedom fighters. This time people will listen to the leftist congressmen and will press for a factual and sensible debate. They will have a new chance of hearing your message and will vigorously support you.

I am herein submitting to your kind consideration a paper entitled QUESTIONS ON NICARAGUAN PEACE.

With kindest regards.

Yours sincerely,



Phan Quang Dan, MD, DrPH
P.O. Box 16940
Tampa, FL 33687
Tel: (813) 971-7513

cc: Vice President George Bush
Senator Bob Dole
Deputy National Security Adviser John Negroponte

QUESTIONS ON NICARAGUAN PEACE

by Phan Quang Dan

If the goal is peace at any price in Nicaragua and Central America, with or without freedom, no debate is needed. However, serious questions have to be raised since the publicly stated goal of all sides concerned is peace with freedom.

Double standard. Judge Robert Bork was scrutinized for every word he had said in the past. Judge Douglas Ginsburg was discarded for having smoked marijuana in his college years. But this standard does not apply to the Sandinistas, marxist-leninists committed to communist totalitarianism and Soviet expansionism. They violated the 1979 OAS international settlement, developed huge armed forces and secret police with the support of Soviets and Cubans, imposed on the Nicaraguan people a ruthless police state, all this without the pretext of Contras' rebellion in-existent at that time, and while receiving generous American economic assistance. They have been dragging their feet on the Arias' peace plan whose implementation has been postponed again and again. Yet, 219 congressmen seemed to say: the past does not matter; here are trustworthy new Sandinistas.

Contras' achievements. The Contras or Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance have to be credited for remarkable achievements. About 12,000 Contras are fighting in 8 of Nicaragua's 16 provinces, with the active support of the peasant masses and the moral support of the internal opposition. Thanks to them the politico-military situation in El Salvador has been stabilized. Without the Contras, La Prensa and Radio Catolica would not have been reopened, the internal opposition would not have enjoyed whatever freedom they are enjoying, there would not be any Arias' peace plan, nor Nobel prize for President Arias, and the Sandinistas would not be brought to the negotiating table. The question is not whether Nicaraguan freedom fighters will bring peace with freedom to their country, but whether the U.S. will stay the course. It took a long time for marxist-leninist regimes to win power with the full backing of the Soviet Union, whether in Eastern Europe, Indochina or Cuba. If the U.S. only display 50% as much determination and perseverance in defending freedom as the Soviets in destroying freedom, peace and democracy will prevail in Nicaragua, Central America and the world over, especially now that communism is failing everywhere and the Soviet empire, the only empire in today's world, is bursting at its seams.

Military versus humanitarian assistance. Military academies have yet to prove that strong armed forces are no longer necessary for national defence, and that the Red Cross alone would suffice.

Anyway, while the huge Soviet assistance to marxist-leninist regimes continues to be mainly military, a new doctrine seems to emerge from the American Congress that a tiny humanitarian assistance in food and band-aids would be enough to allow freedom fighters to defend themselves against communist aggression.

Debate has to continue among congressmen and presidential candidates. The 219 votes against 211 in the House of Representatives to cut off military assistance to the Contras (a modest \$3.6 million under escrow to be released only after a consensus decision of the White House and the Congress that the Sandinistas are not complying with the Arias' peace plan) has not settled the Nicaraguan problem in a satisfactory way. Already a Senate vote (51 in favor, 48 against military assistance) reversed the trend. The debate should continue among congressmen and presidential candidates and serious questions remain to be answered, not by shouting oversimplified and misleading slogans, but in a factual and responsible way.

- 1.- Is there any pressure on the Soviets and Cubans to end military assistance to the Sandinistas?
- 2.- Unilaterally disarming the Contras is tantamount to offering them as sacrifices on the altar of the Sandinistas, Cubans and Soviets. How could it be interpreted otherwise?
- 3.- Are the sacrifices; fighting and dying of freedom fighters not worth some American financial and military assistance (without any involvement of American troops)?
- 4.- If the U.S. display so little concern to defend freedom in Central America, on the very American doorstep, and so close to the Panama Canal, the jugular vein of the Western Hemisphere, how could America's far-away allies such as Western European nations, Japan, Thailand, Australia believe that America is truly committed to defending their freedom when put to test?
- 5.- Can the U.S. afford to tolerate a second Cuba in Central America from which marxism-leninism and the Soviet empire are going to spread North and South through subversion?
- 6.- What would be the alternatives? Sending in American troops who do not speak the native language, do not know the land and the people, cannot be as motivated as the local freedom fighters, cannot mobilize the same popular support, and will cost far more to maintain?
- 7.- President Reagan, without ever being involved in Vietnam, has learned the lesson of the Vietnam experience. No regional conflict has been Americanized under his Administration. Native freedom-loving patriots have been supported. This new policy has proved highly efficient, and the Soviets are now on the defensive everywhere. Is there any valid reason to abandon such a wise policy which has the wide support of the world as proved by U.N. votes on Afghanistan and Cambodia?
- 8.- President Reagan's two-track policy, based on negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arm-race on the one hand, and on the other hand on supporting freedom fighters represents the best policy to make our planet a safer, freer and better place to live. What are the valid reasons for removing the second track and leading the world to communist totalitarianism, at the very time when Marxism-Leninism is agonizing everywhere?

Phan Quang Dan

Phan Quang Dan
Temple Terrace, FL.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8802006
RECEIVED: 14 MAR 88 17

TO: PHAN QUANG DAN

FROM: NEGROPONTE

DOC DATE: 17 MAR 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VIETNAM

PERSONS: PHAN QUANG DAN

SUBJECT: REPLY TO PHAN / AVOIDING ANY ENDORSEMENT OF VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE

ACTION: NEGROPONTE SGD LTR DUE DATE: 17 MAR 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHILDRESS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHILDRESS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSTAC

CLOSED BY: NSAPK

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8802006

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 NEGROPONTE
002

Z 88031510 FOR SIGNATURE
X 88031716 NEGROPONTE SGD LTR

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C 0001-09

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 09, 1989

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES REPORT SUMMARIZING THE FINDINGS
OF RESULTS FROM A PUBLIC OPINION POLL
CONDUCTED RECENTLY WITH THE PEOPLES OF THE
CARIBBEAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
RONALD GEISLER	ORG	89/01/09		C 89/01/10
REFERRAL NOTE: PD DRIVE	A	89/01/10		< 89/01/11
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: NOT FOR PRESIDENT'S INITIAL TO THE CONGRESS

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

- *ACTION CODES:
- *DISPOSITION
- *OUTGOING
- *CORRESPONDENCE:
- *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
- *A-ANSWERED
- *TYPE RESP=INITIALS
- *C-COMMENT/RECOM
- *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
- *OF SIGNER
- *D-DRAFT RESPONSE
- *C-COMPLETED
- *CODE = A
- *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
- *S-SUSPENDED
- *COMPLETED = DATE OF
- *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
- *OUTGOING
- *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
- *S-FOR-SIGNATURE *
- *X-INTERIM REPLY *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

8
**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

618215
Office of the Director



Ron Giveler

January 6, 1989

Dear Mr. President:

I am very pleased to report to you that because of your policies promoting democracy and development over the past eight years, you leave office as the Head of State most admired by the many peoples of the Caribbean.

This striking result comes from a public opinion poll conducted recently in the region that was analyzed by our Office of Research. I enclose a report summarizing the findings.

Your popularity among the Caribbean people is strong testimony to the value and success of your personal commitment to building peaceful democracies in the region.

With warm best wishes,

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The President
The White House

Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



January 9, 1989

PRESIDENT REAGAN LEAVES OFFICE AS THE HEAD OF STATE MOST ADMIRIED IN THE CARIBBEAN

In all but one of the fourteen Caribbean communities that were polled in 1988,¹ President Reagan was named most often as the head of state who was admired the most. The exception was Bermuda, a British colony, where the public named British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher more often by a very slight margin (31% to 28%).

Coming just after a question about their general opinions of eight foreign countries,² the public in each survey was asked

"And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Dominican Republic Leads in Respect for President Reagan

A majority (55%) of the public in the Dominican Republic, the most populous and only Hispanic country included in the study, named President Reagan as the head of state they most admired. The second highest level of recognition for President Reagan was achieved in Grenada (49%), the site of a 1983 U.S. military intervention under President Reagan's direction.

In the other islands except Bermuda, the plurality, ranging from a low of 27 percent in the French-speaking islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique to a high of 45 percent in Trinidad, St. Vincent and St. Kitts/Nevis, named President Reagan as the head of state they admired most (Table 1).

¹ Polls of approximately 500 to 1000 persons were conducted from March through June, 1988 in 14 Caribbean islands by SBRA, International Survey and Market Measurement of London. An earlier USIA report (M-11/1/88), "U.S., Canada Widely Admired in Caribbean; Soviet Union and Cuba Regarded Poorly," provides other findings from these surveys.


² In the survey, respondents were first asked whether they had favorable or unfavorable opinions of France, the United Kingdom/Great Britain, United States, Soviet Union, Canada, Venezuela, Cuba and India. The U.S. ranked with Canada as the country Caribbeans respected most, see USIA Report M-1/11/88.

Thatcher Generally Follows Reagan in Respect; Castro Is Ignored Except in the Dominican Republic

Besides leading in Bermuda, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was named second most frequently after President Reagan in most of the other islands, including some which were not formerly British colonies or Commonwealth members. The major exceptions in Thatcher's popularity were Antigua, where she was surpassed by Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, St. Kitts/Nevis, where Prime Minister Bird of the nearby Antigua did a little better, and the Dominican Republic, where Fidel Castro came in second.

Castro's relative success (17%) in the Dominican Republic was not matched elsewhere. Thus Castro's thirty years of leadership in the Caribbean's largest country has not created much relative popularity for the Cuban dictator among his closest neighbors.

Figure 1. Reagan Stands Out Over Thatcher and Castro As Most Admired in the Caribbean



Question: "And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Figure 1
NAMING THE MOST ADMIRED HEAD OF STATE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Question: "And which head of state/head of government, outside your own country, do you most admire?"

Head of State	Antigua (507)	Bahamas (617)	Bar- bados (600)	Bermuda (475)	Cayman Island (447)	Curacao (507)	Dominican Republic (616)	Grenada (504)	Guade- loupe (506)	Martin- ique (518)	St.Kitts /Nevis (515)	St. Lucia (483)	St. Vincent (504)	Trinidad (1019)
Reagan (U.S.)	42%	38%	36%	28%	41%	38%	55%	49%	27%	27%	45%	41%	45%	43%
Thatcher (U.K.)	7	20	8	31	24	15	2	11	9	11	7	10	12	17
Castro (Cuba)	1	3	2	1	1	3	17	9	3	4	2	5	2	2
Charles (Dominica)	2	2	4	#	#	0	0	5	#	1	3	5	9	1
Gorbachev (USSR)	2	2	#	3	#	1	#	#	#	2	#	#	#	1
Ghadafi (Libya)	#	2	1	#	#	#	#	4	1	1	1	2	1	1
R. Ghandi (India)	#	4	1	1	#	1	1	1	3	1	0	#	1	2
Others	39 ^a	12 ^b	4	20 ^c	6	20 ^d	4	4 ^b	1	4	18 ^e	11 ^b	13 ^b	12
None/don't know	2	17	44	16	28	22	22	18	56	49	25	25	17	21
TOTAL*	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%

Indicates less than one half of one percent.

* May not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

^aCanadian Prime Minister Mulroney was named by 31 percent.

^bMainly leaders of Caribbean countries, such as Edward Seaga of Jamaica and A.N.R. Robinson of Trinidad and Tobago.

^cA substantial number named other U.S. leaders, including past presidents, such as John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter.

^dVenezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi was named by 17 percent.

^ePrime Minister Bird of the neighboring island of Antigua was mentioned by 13 percent.

Map of the Caribbean Islands



Report prepared by USIA Office of Research:
Gene E. Bigler, Analyst (R/AR)

M-1/9/89

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research
(485-2965)