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**WHORM Subject File Code: SP1150**  
**Casefile Number(s): 502626-542885**

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** WHORM: Subject File

**Archivist:** ggc

**File Folder:** SP 1150 (502626-542885)

**Date:** 1/17/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (514891)  letter case (514912)	re President Reagan's Berlin speech (5pp.)	5/28/87	<del>P5</del>  MJD 11/6/01
2. memo	to Colin Powell from Peter Rodman re meeting with Griscom (2pp.)	6/2/87	<del>P5</del>
3. memo 3a. letter	re NSC comments on Berlin speech (1pp.)	5/22/87	<del>P5</del>
4. memo	Green to Dawson- Brandenburg address re NSC comments on revised Brandenburg Gate address (1pp.)	5/27/87 n.d.	<del>P5</del> <del>P5</del>
5. memo	to Tom Griscom from Colin Powell re Brandenburg Gate speech (1pp.)	5/28/87	<del>P5</del>
6. speech draft	Brandenburg Gate, 6/12/87, 6:00pm, p. 7 (1p, partial)	6/1/87	<del>P5</del>
7. speech draft	item #6, p. 10, (1p, partial)	6/1/87	<del>P5</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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9

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 7, 1987

512998

3105

SP1150

**SIGNED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: President Reagan's Bonn Arrival and Departure  
Statements

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory Tab I memo forwarding Tony Dolan the subject draft statements:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*M*  
Marybel *M* Barjer, Nelson Ledsy and Sally *S* Grooms concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Dolan  
Tab A Draft Statements

cc: Fritz Ermarth  
Ty Cobb  
Bob Linhard  
Steve Danzansky  
Alix Platt



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3105

May 11, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY R. DOLAN

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN *BSG*  
SUBJECT: President Reagan's Bonn Arrival and Departure  
Statements

Attached are the initial drafts, prepared by State, for the President's arrival and departure statements in Bonn, West Germany on June 12, 1987.

As we get closer to delivery time, we will provide you more up-to-date information on other appropriate points to be included in the President's arrival and departure remarks. The attached drafts are designed to kick off the drafting process.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Arrival and Departure Statements

cc: Tom Griscom

## ARRIVAL STATEMENT

I am delighted to be back in Bonn at the end of a long and highly successful European trip. I come to you from Berlin, that great and dynamic city that symbolizes the enduring commitment of the German people and their Allies to freedom and democracy. Thus it's all the more appropriate that my final stop is the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany -- one of our very closest allies and firmest friends. I'm particularly delighted to meet once again with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who has been a close personal friend for many years.

Chancellor Kohl and I, together with other allies and partners, have already had the opportunity in Venice to address many of the major issues confronting the world today. I think we took important steps, working together, to ensure continued economic progress and freedom for our nations. Here in Bonn, we will be talking in particular about progress in arms control and East-West relations. Chancellor Kohl and the government he heads have been staunch supporters of U.S. initiatives designed to maintain the military balance at significantly lower levels of armaments. While there is still a long way to go, we have taken significant strides in this direction in recent months. We will continue to consult actively with our German friends as we pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union.

I look forward to the meeting with Chancellor Kohl that is about to begin. I only regret that my time in Bonn will be so brief.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

My talks with Chancellor Kohl and his colleagues have fulfilled all my expectations. They confirm that relations between the U.S. and the Federal Republic are those of close allies and friends.

Chancellor Kohl and I agreed fully on the necessity of continuing our close consultations, as we pursue our common goal of reducing the threat to Europe posed by Warsaw Pact military superiority. We share deep satisfaction that the NATO double-track decision, so controversial when the Alliance first agreed upon it, has brought us close to success in our goal of eliminating a class of nuclear weapons which poses a particular threat to our European allies.

As we proceed in our quest for a more stable world, I look forward to continuing close cooperation and consultation with Chancellor Kohl and his government.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3105

May 11, 1987

512998

SP1150

TR180-02

FG006-12

TR

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cc: Tom Griscom

NSC# 8703105





8711510

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 3105

April 24, 1987

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President Reagan's Bonn Arrival and Departure  
Statements

Attached are draft arrival and departure statements for  
President Reagan's visit to Bonn on June 12, 1987.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Melvyn Levitsky".

Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Bonn Arrival Statement
2. Bonn Departure Statement

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 7, 1987

**SIGNED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN

FROM:

PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT:

President Reagan's Bonn Arrival and Departure  
Statements

RECOMMENDATION

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*B.B.* Marybel Batjer, *NL* Nelson Ledsky and *SL* Sally Grooms concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Dolan

Tab A Draft Statements

cc: Fritz Ermarth  
Ty Cobb  
Bob Linhard  
Steve Danzansky  
Alix Platt



**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

87 APR 24 P 5: 28

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3105

ACTION OFFICER: SOMMER DUE: 27 APR.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President         | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo Green to Peterson / Murr |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____                 | to _____   |

**CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\***

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 5732

- | FYI   | FYI                                 | FYI                                  |
|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Batjer             | <input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bemis              | <input type="checkbox"/> Howard     | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks             | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B.  | <input type="checkbox"/> Rosenberg   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns              | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J.  | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress          | <input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling | <input type="checkbox"/> Rostow      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb               | <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell    | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cohen              | <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer    | <input type="checkbox"/> Scharfen    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Collins            | <input type="checkbox"/> Lewis      | <input type="checkbox"/> Smith       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky          | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard    | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dean, B.           | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley     | <input type="checkbox"/> Sorzano     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky         | <input type="checkbox"/> Major      | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley             | <input type="checkbox"/> Mathews    | <input type="checkbox"/> Stevens     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass           | <input type="checkbox"/> McNamara   | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ermarth | <input type="checkbox"/> Oakley     | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar             | <input type="checkbox"/> Paal       | <input type="checkbox"/> Tice        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flower             | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt      | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier            | <input type="checkbox"/> Porter     | <input type="checkbox"/> _____       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes             | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> _____       |

- |             |   |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|---|
| INFORMATION | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Green   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
|             | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman             | <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell            | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |
|             | <input type="checkbox"/> Carlucci (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Powell (advance)   | <input type="checkbox"/> _____                  |

**COMMENTS**

**Return to Secretariat**

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # 3105

DOCLOG TC A/O \_\_\_\_\_

87 MAY 8

P 6: 25

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>2</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	<u>1</u>	<u>M.B.</u>	
Grant Green			
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>D.W. Sullivan</u>	<u>J</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



RECEIVED 25 APR 87.10.

TO CARLUCCI

FROM LEVITSKY, M

DOCDATE 24 APR 87

SOMMER

07 MAY 87

GREEN

11 MAY 87

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SUBJECT: PRES BONN ARRIVAL & DEPARTURE STATEMENTS 12 JUN

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

ERMARTH

GREEN

PEARSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8711510

LOG

NSCIFID

( CF TC )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C 5/11*

*Pearson Sgd*

*PRS, GSG*


DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION



CIRCLE ONE BELOW  
IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

MODE  
SECURE FAX # 34  
ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_  
RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 1  
DTG 201830Z AUG 7  
RELEASER MR

FROM/LOCATION

1. CB / Santa Barbara

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

*M*

1. West Wing Desk TOR: 201831Z  
2. Bill Courtney

RECEPTION ROOM  
P 2: 37

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

8/20

Please- Stuff to ~~DDO~~ FWE. Appropriate Action.  
Pres does not know sender. Grant will handcarry  
tape + photo back to D.C. on Sunday 8/23.

CB

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION



514792

SP11504883

FG006-12

405 East Nelson Ave.  
Alexandria, VA 22301  
19 August 1987

aj

CJ

President Ronald Reagan  
Rancho del Cielo  
Santa Barbara, California  
93117

Dear President Reagan:

During your Berlin Wall Address on 12 June 1987 you quoted me when you said "The wall will fall. Beliefs become reality." Upon my words you built your conclusion by saying "Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith. It cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom." We were right the wall will fall, but only if we take the initiative to make it happen.

The reason that I am writing you is that I am very concerned that the challenge you made to Mr. Gorbachev to "tear down the Berlin Wall" has become lost amongst the multitude of foreign affairs issues which must be dealt with by your administration. I believe that the reunification of Berlin should become one of the major issues on your foreign policy agenda. I envision Berlin eventually becoming a test site to show that it will be possible, in the future, to merge the systems of the East and West.

The time is right to revitalize your challenge to Mr. Gorbachev when you speak about East-West relations during your address to the Town Hall of California on 26 August 1987. It seems like an opportune time because your speech will be transmitted live to the East-West conference and possibly to Moscow. I think that if steps are taken towards resolving this issue it will eventually lead toward a peaceful union between the East and the West. So why hesitate? Let's make it happen now.

Beliefs do become reality. It happened to me when you quoted my words from the Berlin Wall. I was so sure it would happen that I told my colleagues about it during the week prior to your speech. I also stayed home from work that morning to watch it live on television. The video tape that I have enclosed contains a television news interview about my statement on the Berlin Wall.

All my best to you and Mrs. Reagan during your holidays.

NSC # 8704883

Sincerely,  
William M. Ozkaptan  
William M. Ozkaptan  
X

Enclosures



4883

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 1

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 34

DTG 201830Z AUG 7

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RELEASER MR

ROUTINE

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION

1. CB / Santa Barbara

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. West Wing Desk TOR: 201831Z

2. Bill Courtney

RECEPTION ROOM  
P2: 37

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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Pres does not know sender. Grant will handcarry  
tape + photo back to D.C. on Sunday 8/23.

CB

UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION

REFERRAL

DATE: 24 AUG 87

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOLAN, TONY

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: OZKAPTAN, WILLIAM M

DATE: 20 AUG 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

BERLIN

MP

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES RE EAST - WEST RELATIONS & BERLIN WALL

---

REQUIRED ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION PER ERMARTH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:



FOR Grant S. Green Jr.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # \_\_\_\_\_  
 Package # 4883  
 DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	_____	_____	_____
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Lou Michael	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>Stapled to FWE</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc:    VP                    Baker                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)



RECEIVED 20 AUG 87 18

TO PRESIDENT

FROM OZKAPTAN, WILLIAM M

DOCDATE 20 AUG 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

BERLIN

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES RE EAST - WEST RELATIONS & BERLIN WALL

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ERMARTH

LEDKY

SOMMER

DANZANSKY

KELLY, B

STEINER

RODMAN

COBB

STEVENS

*No action Required.  
Send package to Tony Dolan.*

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( AK )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*C*

*8/24*

*NFAR per ErmARTH*

*8/24*

*Sent to Dolan, A per ErmARTH.*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO: GENERAL COLIN POWELL

FROM: **WILLIAM HENKEL** *WH*  
Assistant to the President

The attached was sent to me by Andrew Littlefair, our Advanceman in Berlin, and John Kornblum.

According to <sup>Tommy GRISCOM</sup> Tony, he thinks many of these points were discussed at your meeting this afternoon. However, I wanted you to see this.

5/28

03 700 1 65: 03



4

462  
514891

SP1150

FG006-12

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BERLIN SPEECH  
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND  
COMMENTS ON DRAFT -- 5/27 1:30 p.m.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

-- The President will speak in Berlin at a time of change and uncertainty in Germany and Europe. Gorbachev's new look has intrigued many in Germany. There is hope that he is a Soviet leader with whom one finally can deal. He utilizes the rhetoric of peace and compromise.

-- The desire for stability is so strong in Germany that many are overlooking the continued totalitarianism of the Soviet state. Germans are impatient for movement. They hope Gorbachev can make it possible.

-- This does not mean a weakening of the ties to the United States or that there is less dedication to democracy.

-- What it does mean is that the Germans want from America a sign that we understand their desire for movement while at the same time maintaining the firm basis of defense necessary for the continued freedom of their country.

The result is a contradictory approach which is often hard to predict. For example:

--A considerable segment of Kohl's Christian Democratic Party opposes the zero-zero option.

-- At the same time, the Secretary General of this party calls on Germans to "take Gorbachev at his word," and to make detente the main goal of German foreign policy.

German officials expect the President's Berlin speech to be a major policy statement on East-West relations. It will come two weeks after Gorbachev's appearance at the East Berlin party summit. To be successful, this speech should do the following:

-- Make a firm statement of American principles, our dedication to freedom in Europe and of the strength of open societies.

-- Give proof of our understanding of the special German needs in Europe and the world.

-- Present a concrete strategy for dealing with the Gorbachev phenomenon.

NSC# 8704162

2

In other words, we strongly need an American vision for the future of Germany and Europe which is more compelling than the hopes now being raised by Gorbachev.

--To provide this vision, the President should deliver a serious, policy oriented speech.

--The speech should reflect personal commitment and emotion. It should be delivered in very human terms.

-- At the same time, it must include a serious discussion of the hopes and fears of Germans. It should present a careful discussion of issues and proposals for the future.

-- In a word, it should be a major effort to provide Ronald Reagan's vision for Europe and America in the 21st century.

The draft submitted by US Mission Berlin tried to provide such a vision.

-- It focused on the controversies of the past five years and drew directly on the President's 1982 visit to Bonn and Berlin.

-- It contrasted the situation then with the progress achieved today.

-- It referred specifically to the President's last speech in Berlin, his "Berlin Initiative for Peace." It recalled the challenges issued to Mr. Breshnev and drew a balance sheet.

-- The result was -- "freedom works."

Included in this draft were references to specific German and European concerns. It also provided evidence that the President sympathized with the specific plight of Germany. This latter point will be especially important now, when many Germans are worried that we might sacrifice their interests for an arms control agreement with the USSR.

The US Mission draft did not hesitate to criticize the Soviets or to proclaim the superiority of freedom over communism. It did, however, follow the strong request of Mayor Diepgen and Chancellor Kohl that there be no harsh polemics against the Soviet Union.

This latter point is perhaps the most important to keep in mind when drafting the speech. The Germans do not object to criticism of the East. However, a large number of Germans believe that progress will be possible only if we hold back on direct condemnation during this period of change. The balance is a delicate one, but it can be struck.



3

**WHITE HOUSE DRAFT**

The White House draft only partially meets these needs. It includes several inspirational passages which will give Berliners a feeling of solidarity. It also touches on several of the political points mentioned above. However, it fails to meet some of the above criteria in the following ways:

-- Tone: The tone is that of a speech which could have been written twenty years ago. It concentrates on the failures of the other side rather than our own hopes for the future. As such it presents a negative message which could touch on the apprehensions rather than the hopes of Berliners.

It also recites the heroic accomplishments of the past rather than providing a vision for the future. Today's Berliner will say: "We know all that, what is he saying about the future?"

The US Mission draft sought to stress the positives from the Western standpoint rather than the negatives about the East, i.e. the draft underlined the strength of the West in providing future peace and prosperity for a united Europe. This future orientation would be understood and welcomed by the Berliners.

However, in their current mood, many Berliners will see the tone of the current White House draft as being confrontational and detrimental to the progress they so deeply desire.

-- Substance: As now presented, the White House draft is somewhat too anecdotal. As noted above, this should be a personal statement of Ronald Reagan. It should not be a standard policy speech.

At the same time, to be accepted by the Germans, it should be presented in a style more in tune with public discussion in Europe. The current White House draft is more suited to a speech in the United States. Germans lean more on substantive discussion than on anecdotal examples.

4

As currently drafted, the speech does not pay enough attention to these points. In particular, the policy initiatives seem to be added as subsidiary points to the overall discussion rather than as major political proposals.

The speech should be structured more around the major policy initiatives which are now under discussion.

#### SPECIFIC COMMENTS

In addition to the above general considerations, the following specific comments might be helpful:

-- Page 1, para. 1: Harry Truman visited Berlin only once -- in 1945 during his attendance at the Potsdam conference. He did not address the Berliners and he did not offer them hope. He came as a victorious leader, nothing more. The first President to make a truly inspirational visit to Berlin was John F. Kennedy.

-- Page 1, para. 3: The song about the suitcase in Berlin was written by Paul Lincke and has been sung by dozens of artists. Marlene Dietrich did not make it famous and is not really identified with it. If this reference is to be used, it would probably be better to mention the composer, who is a famous name in Germany.

-- Page 2, para. 2: The wall between the two parts of Germany does not end at the Harz Mountains. It runs the length of the Federal Republic to the southern part of Bavaria. The fortified border then runs along the Austrian-Czech and Austrian-Hungarian border as well. In Germany it is in fact a wall or a heavily fortified fence for its entire distance.

-- Page 6, para. 3: here would be the best place to refer to the President's 1982 visit to Berlin and to the "Berlin Initiative for Peace" which he launched at that time. He issued several similar challenges to the Soviets in 1982 -- several have now at least begun to be answered. Referring to the 1982 speech demonstrates the continuity of our strategy and the success of our efforts to lower tensions between East and West.

5

-- Page 7, para 4: The CSCE is a body of 35 nations which acts on the basis of consensus. The US cannot propose something to the Soviets alone and the US and Soviets cannot agree by themselves. More accurate would be to propose that the 35 nations of the CSCE agree at their current meeting in Vienna to hold a follow-up meeting in the two parts of Berlin.

-- Page 8, para. 1: The Berlin Senat and the FRG have repeatedly sought UN meetings for Berlin. None has come because of a Soviet veto. Thus, here the president should again call on the Soviets to agree to such meetings.

-- Page 8, para. 2: The reference to the air initiative is incorrect and vague. Exact wording should be determined after consultations with the allies. As noted above, this section should also be given more prominence in the text.

Page 10, para. 2: Not good to ask why Berliners don't travel to the West. In our view, Berlin is the West. Suggest recasting to focus on the courage of Berliners and their success in attracting new residents, not asking the negative question -- why do they stay there?



NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8704162

RECEIVED 01 JUN 87 16

TO POWELL

FROM HENKEL, W

DOCDATE 28 MAY 87

LITTLEFAIR, A

27 MAY 87

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: LITTLEFAIR COMMENTS RE PRES BERLIN SPEECH

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 03 MAY 87 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LEDSKY

SOMMER

HOWARD

RODMAN

ERMARTH

KELLY, B

STEINER

COMMENTS

*No action required. Points have been  
made to speechwriters -*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( IB )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*LEDSKY*

*C 4/2*

*NFAR*

*NONE*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

*HL*



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
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FG006-12 4216

June 2, 1987

FG006-01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Today's Meeting with Griscom: Berlin Speech

TR Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

The positive outcome of today's meeting with Griscom is that in the future we will work through him so that he is always aware of NSC concerns. The price we paid for not doing this at every stage of the Berlin speech is that he continues to have a very wrong idea of the sequence of events:

- On May 7 we had a preliminary meeting with Tony to discuss what themes we wanted in the Berlin speech. We had given them the Kornblum draft (and Kornblum's cover memo on themes) and we strongly endorsed them. This was ignored; they did their own first draft (dated May 21) from scratch.
- At a meeting with Tony on May 26, we discussed with him our one-page set of recommended changes on their first draft (Tab A). This laid out the themes we wanted restored from the Kornblum draft; the sections of their draft that we wanted out; a proposed restructuring; and other guidance. This too was ignored.
- We responded to their second draft (May 27) with a memo from Grant to Rhett Dawson trying to head off their sending it to the President. The memo made clear we had "serious differences" over both tone and substance. (Tab B)
- I had a long phone conversation with Tony on the afternoon of May 27, in fact a heated argument, in which I stressed that we felt strongly about our concerns.
- On May 28, you sent a memo to Griscom forwarding our more detailed rewrite. (Tab C)
- That afternoon we had a meeting in Griscom's office in which we again went over what we wanted out and what we wanted in. We conceded them some of their rhetoric.
- Last Friday, May 29, we had limited time and submitted specific changes and comments -- with a specific proviso that we reserved the right to make further suggestions this week. (Tab D)

NSC # 8704216

In addition, Tony had the benefit of two submissions from Kornblum (May 26 and May 28) and one from Roz (May 27).

Thus, we tried every tactic: We offered general guidance, and general suggestions in the margins; we offered detailed rewrites. Neither tactic worked. Maybe Tom is surprised to hear of some of our concerns; certainly the speechwriters had no reason to be unaware. Perhaps I was too polite with Tony at our meeting on May 26; however, it was at that meeting that we spelled out our concept of the speech and how it differed from theirs -- and all our basic complaints since then have consistently followed the one-page presentation we discussed with him at that meeting (Tab A).

Unfortunately we scattered our shots, communicating with Dawson, Dolan, and Griscom at different stages. In the future I am sure we will do better with Griscom as the single focus.

#### Attachments

- Tab A NSC recommended changes to first draft
- Tab B Grant Green memo to Rhett Dawson responding to second draft
- Tab C Memo from you to Tom Griscom forwarding a more detailed rewrite of second draft
- Tab D Memo from Grant Green to Tony Dolan recommending specific changes and reserving the right to make further recommendations

Submitted to  
Dolan  
5/22

(A)

NSC Comments on Berlin Speech  
(5/21/87 - 12:00 noon draft)

- pp. 1 - 4:            Okay.    Perhaps delete Dietrich quote on p. 1.  
-            Perhaps say "There is only one Berlin"  
              in German.  
-            Not "Ku'damm Strasse"
- pp. 4 (2d ½) - 5:    Cut way back.    Keep middle para of p. 5.  
              Contrast between East and West okay.
- pp. 6 - 10:            Introduce positive vision:    Theme from  
                                 Kornblum draft (p. 4):    "I understand the  
                                 fear of war and the pain of division that  
                                 afflict this continent.    We must find ways to  
                                 overcome these problems persistently and  
                                 effectively.    I pledge my country to that  
                                 goal."    Try this structure:
- Arms reduction:
    - o    Vindication re INF.
    - o    Dedicated efforts in    START, CDE,  
              CW, etc.
    - o    I challenge the Soviets:    Withdraw  
              troops from Eastern Europe that  
              aren't needed for the military  
              balance but for maintaining Soviet  
              domination.
    - o    This brings me to:
  - Freedom:
    - o    Democratic tide in the world (as on  
              p. 8, Kornblum pp. 11, 13).
    - o    Some of these ideas spreading in  
              the East?    Gorbachev reforms?  
              We'll see (as on pp. 5-6).
    - o    We're ready to cooperate with the  
              East to promote true openness, to  
              break down barriers that divide  
              people, to let Europe flourish  
              again.    No place better than Berlin  
              to make a start (Kornblum p. 4).
  - Berlin Initiative:
    - o    It's time for the Wall to come  
              down.
    - o    U.S. commitment to freedom of  
              Western sectors and Quadripartite  
              Accord (Kornblum p. 14).
    - o    Berlin initiative (Kornblum pp. 18  
              -20).
- p. 11:                Ending okay (but German quote may be too  
                                 difficult to read).



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~Redmitt~~

(B)

3933  
Add-on

May 27, 1987

MEMORANDUM TO RHETT DAWSON

FROM: GRANT GREEN

SUBJECT: Presidential Address: Brandenburg Gate

We understand that consideration is being given to forwarding the Brandenburg Address to the President this evening or first thing tomorrow. You may recall that we provided an initial draft to the Speechwriters on April 28 and have subsequently discussed our views with them several times.

In reviewing the revised draft it is clear that serious differences still remain. We have only had a short time to review the revised draft, and our comments are accordingly brief. As you will see from the thrust of our comments, we do not concur with the speech being forwarded to the President in its current form. We will provide more detailed comments later tomorrow.

Attachment  
Tab A Comments on Revised Draft

cc: Tom Griscom  
Tony Dolan

NSC Comments on Revised Brandenburg Gate Address

The 27 May draft is predictably strong on the themes of freedom and its defense, which are unarguably appropriate to the occasion and the conceptual foundation of the speech. But the speech needs more than that foundation. Throughout, tone and substance need to be introduced along the lines of our and Berlin/Bonn's earlier suggestions, which relate the fundamental themes to the practical requirements of protecting and expanding freedom in the real situation perceived by Berliners and Europeans. We should not forget this is an important policy speech aimed at an European audience. The wrong thrust could do us real harm. The speech needs some positive themes showing we are responsive to European anxieties.

Without this honing and toning, the speech, the President, and the US risk appearing irrelevant to the larger audience, appealing to whom is the very purpose of the President's trip. The specific initiatives ("Signals from Berlin") also need to be reworded to be sound politically and diplomatically, but that is an easier problem to fix than the overall tone and thrust.

We plan to provide specific suggestions and changes by COB Thursday, May 28.

May 28, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM GRISCOM

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *CP*

SUBJECT: Presidential Address: Brandenburg Gate

Attached, as marked on the draft, are the <sup>ADDITIONAL</sup> NSC's recommended changes in the Brandenburg Gate speech.

The section on arms control (pp. 5-6) has been rewritten because of many inaccuracies. The section outlining our specific Berlin initiative (pp.7-8) has been rewritten for the same reason and also to make a more effective presentation.

Other revisions are suggested in the way that the main points about security and freedom in Europe are presented, which we believe will be more effective with the German and European audience.

The philosophical sections of the draft (pp. 1-4, 10-11) are excellent, though for reasons of overall length they may need to be trimmed somewhat. We have made some minor suggestions but we leave this to the speechwriters.

Attachment

Tab A Brandenburg Gate Address  
w/NSC recommended changes

cc: Rhett Dawson

*cc Tony Dolan*



(Robinson/ARD)  
June 1, 1987  
6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: BRANDENBURG GATE  
~~WEST~~ BERLIN, GERMANY  
FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1987

*President von Weiszaeder*

Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the City Hall. Since then, two other Presidents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. Today I myself make my second visit to your city.

We come to Berlin, we American Presidents, because it is our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we are drawn here by other things as well: By the feeling of history in this city, more than 500 years older than our own Nation. By the sense of energy in your streets. By the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten. Most of all, by your courage and friendship.

Perhaps the composer Paul Lincke understood something about American Presidents. You see, like so many Presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do:

"Ich hab noch einen koffer in Berlin." ["I still have a suitcase in Berlin" -- words from a much-loved song.]

Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. [I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East -- that Berlin television can be seen as far to the southeast as Leipzig, as far to the northeast as Gdansk; that Berlin radio can be picked up as far due east as Moscow.]

*Not  
"West"  
Berlin  
Won't he be  
here?*

*750<sup>th</sup>  
Anniv.*

*Nostalgia*

*And  
E.  
Europe*



X  
X

To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, I extend my warmest greetings and the goodwill of the American people. To those listening in East Berlin, a special word. Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you as I join your

fellow countrymen in the West in ~~this firm~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~insistence~~ <sup>CONVICTION:</sup> ~~this unalterable~~

~~belief:~~ Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]

Behind me stands a wall that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic ~~south~~ <sup>SOUTH</sup> it cuts <sup>^</sup> across Germany in one continuous gash of concrete, barbed wire, guard towers, dog runs, and gun emplacements. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same -- still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state.

Yet it is here in Berlin where the ~~wall~~ <sup>^</sup> ~~emerges~~ most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the newsphoto and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of ~~the world~~ <sup>^</sup> ~~the world~~ <sup>MANKIND.</sup>. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, ~~any~~ <sup>EVERY</sup> man is a German, separated from his fellow men. ~~Any~~ <sup>EVERY</sup> man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar.

President von Weizsaecker has said: The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed. Today I say: As long as this gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind.

Not just our "belief"

Geography is wrong

Move TO closing.

this city. To the West there is another wall that divides

WORLD SEES THE WALL

X

X

?



Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope -- even, in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph.

→ In ~~this season~~ <sup>the</sup> of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air-raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. In announcing the Marshall Plan, Secretary of State George Marshall stated, precisely 40 years ago this week: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: "The Marshall Plan at work. For the building of a Free World."

"[T]he building of a Free World" -- in the West, that building took place. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy, France, Belgium -- virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth. The European Community was founded.

Cap. In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the "Wirtschaftswunder." Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty -- that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come



about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin more than doubled.

Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany; busy office blocks; fine homes and apartments; proud avenues and the spreading lawns of parkland. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters and museums. Where there was want, today there is abundance -- [food, clothing, automobiles; the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm. Even home computers.]

MATERIALISTIC, PATERNIZING.

From devastation -- from utter ruin -- you Berliners have in freedom rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on Earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But, my friends, there was one thing the Soviets didn't count on: Berliner herz [Berlin heart]. Berliner humor [Berlin humor]. Ja, und Berliner schnauze [a favorite slang term meaning courage mixed with toughness -- an applause line].

TALK OUT

In the 1960's, Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure. Technological backwardness. Declining standards of health. Even want of the most basic kind -- too little food. The Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. East Germany has made strides, but at

harvest time the news announcers still speak, to use the well-known phrase, of "the battle to bring in the crops."

No FOOD SHORTAGE PER SC

After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion. Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds between the nations with comity and peace.

Freiheit -- Freiheit ist der Sieger. [Freedom is the victor.]

More EFFECTIVE IN ENGLISH.

Now the Soviets themselves may in a limited way be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control.

Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West <sup>or</sup> (and) to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness. For we believe freedom and security go together -- that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace.

Two separate points

X

General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace -- if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe -- if you seek liberalization: Come here, to this gate.

Herr Gorbachev, machen Sie dieses Tor auf. [Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate.]

Drop

DOESN'T WORK.



Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall. [This line in English for the American audience.]

I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent -- and I pledge to you my country's efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace. So we must strive to reduce arms on both sides.

Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western Alliance with a grave new threat: hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western Alliance responded by committing itself to a counter-deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution -- namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the Alliance in turn prepared to go forward with its counter-deployment, there were difficult days -- days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city -- and the Soviets actually walked away from the table.

But through it all, the Alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then -- I invite those who protest today -- to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. Because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.



As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. At the talks in Geneva, we have proposed deep cuts in strategic forces. And the Western Allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war, and to place a total ban on chemical weapons.

While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the ~~capacity~~ <sup>ABILITY AND WILL</sup> to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our Allies, the United States is pursuing a Strategic Defense Initiative -- research that <sup>seeks to</sup> bases deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will protect lives not by targeting populations but by shielding them.

By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed. We are armed because we mistrust each other. And our <sup>basic</sup> differences are not about weapons but about liberty. [Perhaps when President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, it was freedom that was encircled, Berlin that was under siege. No longer.] Despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands <sup>as a shining</sup> secure in its liberty. example of freedom. And today freedom itself is transforming the globe.

In the Philippines; in South and Central America, democracy has been given a rebirth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets are working miracle after miracle of economic growth. In the

Not our policy: would alter basis of deterrence only if it proves feasible

This is still wrong.

Berlin is still, in a sense, encircled + under siege.

Non-FACTUAL. New inserts

X

X

X

industrialized nations, a technological revolution is taking place -- a revolution marked by rapid, dramatic advances in computers and telecommunications.

In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice. It must make fundamental changes. Or it will become obsolete.

LOWDANT  
SOV  
BERLIN  
NOT  
NEEDED  
HERE.

Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness -- to break down the barriers that separate people, to create a safer, freer world. And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meetingplace of East and West, to make a start.

Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four-Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to usher in a new era -- to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 Agreement.

And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that should come with life in one of the great cities of the world.

To open Berlin still further to all Europe, East and West, let us expand the vital air access to this city, finding ways of



making commercial air service to Berlin through the established corridors more convenient, more comfortable, and more economical. We look to the day when West Berlin can become one of the chief aviation hubs in all Central Europe.

With our French and British partners, the United States is prepared to sponsor international meetings in Berlin. It would be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site of United Nations meetings, or world conferences on human rights and arms control or other issues that call for international cooperation.

There is no better way to establish hope for the future than to enlighten young minds, and we would be honored to sponsor summer youth exchanges, cultural events, and other programs for young Berliners from the East. Our French and British friends, I am certain, will do the same. And it is my hope that an authority can be found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from young people of the Western sectors.

One final proposal -- one close to my heart. Sport represents a source of enjoyment and ennoblement, and you may have noted that the Republic of Korea -- South Korea -- has offered to permit certain events of the 1988 Olympics to take place in the North. International sports competitions of all kinds could take place in both parts of this city. And what better way to demonstrate to the world the openness of this city -- than to offer in some future year to hold the Olympic Games here in Berlin, East and West?

In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have rebuilt a great city. You have done so in spite of threats: The



Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark. The blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall.

What keeps you here? 

Certainly there is a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe that there is something deeper. Something that involves Berlin's whole look and feel and way of life. Not mere sentiment -- no one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead that sees the difficulties of life in Berlin but chooses to accept them. That stubbornly refuses to abandon this good and proud city to a surrounding presence that is merely brutish. Something that speaks with a powerful voice of affirmation -- that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love -- love both profound and abiding.

Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West. The totalitarian world does not produce low living standards and backwardness because of some technical shortcoming in its economic arrangements. It produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship.

The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love an affront. During the War, the sculpture atop the Brandenburg Gate was taken down for safekeeping and stored here, in the Western sectors of the city. In 19\_\_, the West turned the sculpture over

INSULTING  
TO EAST  
GERMANS  
AFTER  
OFFERED  
INITIATIVES

to the East in a gesture of goodwill, and soon the sculpture was once again looking out upon "Unter den Linden" [the main avenue in East Berlin]. But something was different. The cross -- the cross the figure had borne aloft for nearly 150 years -- that cross was gone. In its place was a Communist wreath.

\_\_ years later, authorities in the East erected what is now the tallest structure in the city, the television tower above Alexanderplatz. I understand that virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower's one major flaw, treating the glass dome at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the sun strikes that dome -- that dome that towers over all Berlin -- the light makes the sign of the cross.

As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag -- that embodiment of German unity -- I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall -- perhaps by a young Berliner -- words that answer the German question. "This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality."

Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith. It cannot withstand truth.

Die Mauer kann Freiheit nicht zuruckhalten. [The wall cannot withstand freedom.]

Thank you. God bless you all.

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # 4216

DOCLOG JM A/O \_\_\_\_\_

87 JUN 2 P 5: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>R</u>
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_ (Date/Time)

In CLP before 0900 6/3



RECEIVED 03 JUN 87 17

TO POWELL FROM RODMAN

DOCDATE 02 JUN 87

KEYWORDS: BERLIN SPEECHES DOLAN, T

SUBJECT: TODAYS MTG W/ GRISCOM BERLIN SPEECH

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
POWELL

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8703152 NSCIFID ( MC CF )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	6/3	Noted by Powell		PWR Chron

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)



531958

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SP1150

FG006-12

June 11, 1987

TO: Lt. Gen. Powell

FROM: Steve Steiner *Steve* **PT**SUBJECT: Proposed Language for Bonn  
Departure

Per your discussion with Lint this morning, attached is proposed language on the Reykjavik NAC for the President to use on departure from Bonn. We will stay in close touch with both Reykjavik and Bonn tomorrow to make sure things go according to plan.

We know you prefer a shorter insert, but we have given you a somewhat longer alternative as well. It has some language which would help the President to highlight better the accomplishment at hand.

NSC #8704470



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11 JUN 87  
1130 EDT

GRANT GREEN  
TOM GRISCOM

IN THE EVENT YOU  
WANT ANOTHER PEG FOR  
THE DEPARTURE STATEMENT  
TOMORROW WE OFFER  
THE ATTACHED. YOUR  
CALL.

CA

PROPOSED INSERT TO BONN DEPARTURE STATEMENT

(Lead-in language assumes statement will begin with readout of German visit.)

Longer version (if we can get this in)

And that isn't all that we accomplished in Europe this week. I am pleased to tell you we have just received word that, at their meeting which ended earlier today in Reykjavik, NATO Foreign Ministers reached a consensus on how to deal with shorter-range missiles in the US/Soviet negotiations on INF. I plan to study the Reykjavik outcome carefully as soon as I get home. Based on this solid foundation of Alliance support, I expect to make a decision very soon on our next steps in the INF negotiations.

Just let me add: It is the unity and firmness which NATO has shown all along on the INF issue, ever since the new threat to our common security caused by those Soviet SS-20 deployments beginning in the late 1970s, that has given us this historic opportunity to get the Kremlin to go along with real and equitable cuts in US and Soviet nuclear arms.

Shorter version

And that isn't all that we accomplished in Europe this week. We just got word that, at their meeting in Reykjavik which ended earlier today, NATO Foreign Ministers reached a consensus on how to deal with shorter-range missiles in the US/Soviet negotiations on INF. I will study the Reykjavik outcome carefully when I get home, and make a decision soon on our next steps in the INF negotiations. And just let me add: It is the unity and firmness which NATO has shown all along on INF that has given us this historic opportunity to achieve real and equitable cuts in US and Soviet nuclear arms.

4470

Unclass

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

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MODE

PAGES

3

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX #

191

DTG

111547Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX #

RELEASER

DSJ

ROUTINE

RECORD #

FROM/LOCATION

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

GRANT GREEN FOR FRANK CARLUCCI/CIPRIANI/TOR: 111554Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

ROOM

11:57

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Unclass

CLASSIFICATION



National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # 4470

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green			
Colin Powell			
Paul Thompson			
Frank Carlucci			
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
_____			
_____			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

*Show LOX ID to JSG*

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8704470

RECEIVED 11 JUN 87 14

TO POWELL

FROM STEINER

DOCDATE 11 JUN 87

POWELL

11 JUN 87

KEYWORDS: GERMANY

NATO

INF

SUBJECT: INSERT TO BONN DEPARTURE STATEMENT RE NATO FOMIN MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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(C)